TY - JOUR A1 - Grimm, Veronika A1 - Kleinert, Thomas A1 - Liers, Frauke A1 - Schmidt, Martin A1 - Zöttl, Gregor T1 - Optimal Price Zones of Electricity Markets: A Mixed-Integer Multilevel Model and Global Solution Approaches JF - Optimization Methods and Software N2 - Mathematical modeling of market design issues in liberalized electricity markets often leads to mixed-integer nonlinear multilevel optimization problems for which no general-purpose solvers exist and which are intractable in general. In this work, we consider the problem of splitting a market area into a given number of price zones such that the resulting market design yields welfare-optimal outcomes. This problem leads to a challenging multilevel model that contains a graph-partitioning problem with multi-commodity flow connectivity constraints and nonlinearities due to proper economic modeling. Furthermore, it has highly symmetric solutions. We develop different problem-tailored solution approaches. In particular, we present an extended KKT transformation approach as well as a generalized Benders approach that both yield globally optimal solutions. These methods, enhanced with techniques such as symmetry breaking and primal heuristics, are evaluated in detail on academic as well as on realistic instances. It turns out that our approaches lead to effective solution methods for the difficult optimization tasks presented here, where the problem-specific generalized Benders approach performs considerably better than the methods based on KKT transformation. KW - Multilevel Optimization KW - Mixed-Integer Nonlinear Optimization KW - Graph Partitioning KW - Generalized Benders Decomposition KW - Electricity Market Design} Y1 - 2017 IS - 34(2) SP - 406 EP - 436 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Grimm, Veronika A1 - Schewe, Lars A1 - Schmidt, Martin A1 - Zöttl, Gregor T1 - A Multilevel Model of the European Entry-Exit Gas Market JF - Mathematical Methods of Operations Research N2 - In entry-exit gas markets as they are currently implemented in Europe, network constraints do not affect market interaction beyond the technical capacities determined by the TSO that restrict the quantities individual firms can trade at the market. It is an up to now unanswered question to what extent existing network capacity remains unused in an entry-exit design and to what extent feasible adjustments of the market design could alleviate inefficiencies. In this paper, we offer a four-level modeling framework that is capable of analyzing these issues and provide some first results on the model structure. In order to decouple gas trading from network congestion management, the TSO is required to determine technical capacities and corresponding booking fees at every entry and exit node up front. Firms book those capacities, which gives them the right to charge or discharge an amount of gas at a certain node up to this capacity in every scenario. Beyond these technical capacities and the resulting bookings, gas trade is unaffected by network constraints. The technical capacities have to ensure that transportation of traded quantities is always feasible. We assume that the TSO is regulated and determines technical capacities, fees, and transportation costs under a welfare objective. As a first step we moreover assume perfect competition among gas traders and show that the booking and nomination decisions can be analyzed in a single level. We prove that this aggregated model has a unique solution. We also show that the TSO's decisions can be subsumed in one level as well. If so, the model boils down to a mixed-integer nonlinear bilevel problem with robust aspects. In addition, we provide a first-best benchmark that allows to assess welfare losses that occur in an entry-exit system. Our approach provides a generic framework to analyze various aspects in the context of semi-liberalized gas markets. Therefore, we finally discuss and provide guidance on how to include several important aspects into the approach, such as network and production capacity investment, uncertain data, market power, and intra-day trading. KW - Entry-Exit System KW - Gas Market KW - Multilevel Modeling Y1 - 2017 IS - 89(2) SP - 223 EP - 255 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Grimm, Veronika A1 - Grübel, Julia A1 - Schewe, Lars A1 - Schmidt, Martin A1 - Zöttl, Gregor T1 - Nonconvex Equilibrium Models for Gas Market Analysis: Failure of Standard Techniques and Alternative Modeling Approaches JF - European Journal on Operational Research N2 - This paper provides a first approach to assess gas market interaction on a network with nonconvex flow models. In the simplest possible setup that adequately reflects gas transport and market interaction, we elaborate on the relation of the solution of a simultaneous competitive gas market game, its corresponding mixed nonlinear complementarity problem (MNCP), and a first-best benchmark. We provide conditions under which the solution of the simultaneous game is also the solution of the corresponding MNCP. However, equilibria cannot be determined by the MNCP as the transmission system operator's (TSO’s) first-order conditions are insufficient, which goes back to nonconvexities of the gas flow model. This also implies that the welfare maximization problem may have multiple solutions that sometimes do not even coincide with any of the market equilibria. Our analysis shows that, even in the absence of strategic firms, market interaction fails to implement desirable outcomes from a welfare perspective due to the TSO’s incentive structure. We conclude that the technical environment calls for a market design that commits the TSO to a welfare objective through regulation and propose a design where the market solution corresponds to a welfare maximum and vice versa. KW - Natural Gas Markets KW - Nonconvex Equilibrium Models KW - Uniqueness KW - Multiplicity KW - Fundamental Welfare Theorems Y1 - 2017 IS - 273(3) SP - 1097 EP - 1108 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Grimm, Veronika A1 - Schewe, Lars A1 - Schmidt, Martin A1 - Zöttl, Gregor T1 - Uniqueness of Market Equilibrium on a Network: A Peak-Load Pricing Approach JF - European Journal of Operational Research N2 - In this paper we analyze peak-load pricing in the presence of network constraints. In our setup, firms facing fluctuating demand decide on the size and location of production facilities. They make production decisions constrained by the invested capacities, taking into account that market prices reflect scarce transmission capacities. We state general conditions for existence and uniqueness of the market equilibrium and provide a characterization of equilibrium investment and production. The presented analysis covers the cases of perfect competition and monopoly - the case of strategic firms is approximated by a conjectural variations approach. Our result is a prerequisite for analyzing regulatory policy options with computational multilevel equilibrium models, since uniqueness of the equilibrium at lower levels is of key importance when solving these models. Thus, our paper contributes to an evolving strand of literature that analyzes regulatory policy based on computational multilevel equilibrium models and aims at taking into account individual objectives of various agents, among them not only generators and customers but also, e.g., the regulator deciding on network expansion. KW - Pricing KW - Peak-Load Pricing KW - Networks KW - Uniqueness Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.03.036 VL - 261 IS - 3 SP - 971 EP - 983 ER -