TY - JOUR A1 - Grimm, Veronika A1 - Schewe, Lars A1 - Schmidt, Martin A1 - Zöttl, Gregor T1 - A Multilevel Model of the European Entry-Exit Gas Market JF - Mathematical Methods of Operations Research N2 - In entry-exit gas markets as they are currently implemented in Europe, network constraints do not affect market interaction beyond the technical capacities determined by the TSO that restrict the quantities individual firms can trade at the market. It is an up to now unanswered question to what extent existing network capacity remains unused in an entry-exit design and to what extent feasible adjustments of the market design could alleviate inefficiencies. In this paper, we offer a four-level modeling framework that is capable of analyzing these issues and provide some first results on the model structure. In order to decouple gas trading from network congestion management, the TSO is required to determine technical capacities and corresponding booking fees at every entry and exit node up front. Firms book those capacities, which gives them the right to charge or discharge an amount of gas at a certain node up to this capacity in every scenario. Beyond these technical capacities and the resulting bookings, gas trade is unaffected by network constraints. The technical capacities have to ensure that transportation of traded quantities is always feasible. We assume that the TSO is regulated and determines technical capacities, fees, and transportation costs under a welfare objective. As a first step we moreover assume perfect competition among gas traders and show that the booking and nomination decisions can be analyzed in a single level. We prove that this aggregated model has a unique solution. We also show that the TSO's decisions can be subsumed in one level as well. If so, the model boils down to a mixed-integer nonlinear bilevel problem with robust aspects. In addition, we provide a first-best benchmark that allows to assess welfare losses that occur in an entry-exit system. Our approach provides a generic framework to analyze various aspects in the context of semi-liberalized gas markets. Therefore, we finally discuss and provide guidance on how to include several important aspects into the approach, such as network and production capacity investment, uncertain data, market power, and intra-day trading. KW - Entry-Exit System KW - Gas Market KW - Multilevel Modeling Y1 - 2017 IS - 89(2) SP - 223 EP - 255 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ambrosius, Mirjam A1 - Grimm, Veronika A1 - Kleinert, Thomas A1 - Liers, Frauke A1 - Schmidt, Martin A1 - Zöttl, Gregor T1 - Endogenous Price Zones and Investment Incentives in Electricity Markets: An Application of Multilevel Optimization with Graph Partitioning JF - Energy Economics N2 - In the course of the energy transition, load and supply centers are growing apart in electricity markets worldwide, rendering regional price signals even more important to provide adequate locational investment incentives. This paper focuses on electricity markets that operate under a zonal pricing market design. For a fixed number of zones, we endogenously derive the optimal configuration of price zones and available transfer capacities on a network in order to optimally govern investment and production decisions in the long run. In a multilevel mixed-integer nonlinear model that contains a graph partitioning problem on the first level, we determine welfare-maximizing price zones and available transfer capacities for a given electricity market and analyze their impact on market outcomes. Using a generalized Benders decomposition approach developed in Grimm et al. (2019) and a problem-tailored scenario clustering for reducing the input data size, we are able to solve the model to global optimality even for large instances. We apply the approach to the German electricity market as an example to examine the impact of optimal zoning on key performance indicators such as welfare, generation mix and locations, or electricity prices. It turns out that even for a small number of price zones, an optimal configuration of zones induces a welfare level that almost approaches the first best. KW - Electricity Markets KW - Price Zones KW - Investment Incentives KW - Multilevel Optimization KW - Graph Partitioning Y1 - 2018 IS - 92 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Egerer, Jonas A1 - Grimm, Veronika A1 - Kleinert, Thomas A1 - Schmidt, Martin A1 - Zöttl, Gregor T1 - The Impact of Neighboring Markets on Renewable Locations, Transmission Expansion, and Generation Investment JF - European Journal of Operational Research N2 - Many long-term investment planning models for liberalized electricity markets either optimize for the entire electricity system or focus on confined jurisdictions, abstracting from adjacent markets. In this paper, we provide models for analyzing the impact of the interdependencies between a core electricity market and its neighboring markets on key long-run decisions. This we do both for zonal and nodal pricing schemes. The identification of welfare optimal investments in transmission lines and renewable capacity within a core electricity market requires a spatially restricted objective function, which also accounts for benefits from cross-border electricity trading. This leads to mixed-integer nonlinear multilevel optimization problems with bilinear nonconvexities for which we adapt a Benders-like decomposition approach from the literature. In a case study, we use a stylized six-node network to disentangle different effects of optimal regional (as compared to supra-regional) investment planning. Regional planning alters investment in transmission and renewable capacity in the core region, which affects private investment in generation capacity also in adjacent regions and increases welfare in the core region at the cost of system welfare. Depending on the congestion-pricing scheme, the regulator of the core region follows different strategies to increase welfare causing distributional effects among stakeholders. KW - Neighboring Markets KW - Renewables KW - Network Expansion KW - Multilevel Optimization KW - Benders Decomposition Y1 - 2019 ER - TY - INPR A1 - Bohlayer, Markus A1 - Fleschutz, Markus A1 - Braun, Marco A1 - Zöttl, Gregor T1 - Energy-intense production-inventory planning with participation in sequential energy markets N2 - To support the uprise of demand response, especially in the context of industrial processes, we propose a new approach to integrally determine the production-inventory plan and the cost-minimizing bids to participate in sequential reserve and energy-only markets. In particular, our approach considers time-coupling constraints which occur in the context of a production-inventory planning problem. We extend this problem with a comprehensive bidding formulation, which allows evaluating revenues and potential cost from the market participation, considering price uncertainties and uncertain activations of committed reserve capacity. This results in a multistage stochastic mixed-integer linear program, which explicitly considers the stage-wise revelation of information in our setup. To illustrate the capabilities of our approach, we apply our model to a real-world case study in which we investigate the participation of a cement plant in the German energy-only and reserve markets. The results of our case study indicate significant revenues for flexible industrial processes when participating in German spot and reserve markets. KW - Demand side flexibility Load management Multi market bidding Stochastic programming Production planning Demand response Y1 - 2019 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Grimm, Veronika A1 - Rückel, Bastian A1 - Sölch, Christian A1 - Zöttl, Gregor T1 - The impact of market design on transmission and generation investment in electricity markets JF - Energy Economics N2 - In this paper we propose an equilibrium model in order to analyze the impact of electricity market design on generation and transmission expansion in liberalized electricity markets. In a multi-level structure, our framework takes into account that generation investment and operation is decided by private investors, while network expansion and redispatch is decided by a regulated transmission system operator — as well as the different objectives of firms (profit maximization) and the regulator (welfare maximization). In order to illustrate the possibilities to quantify long term economic effects with our framework, we calibrate our model for the German electricity market. We consider various moderate adjustments of the market design: (i) the division of the market area into two price zones, (ii) the efficient curtailment of renewable production and (iii) a cost-benefit-driven balance between network expansion and network management measures. We then analyze the impact of these market designs on generation and transmission investment in case those design elements are anticipated upon network development planning. The resulting investment and production decisions are compared to a benchmark that reflects the current German electricity market design and to an overall optimal first-best benchmark. Our results reveal that price zones do have a significant impact on locational choice of generators and result in a reduced need for network expansion, but lead to only moderate annual welfare gains of approximately 0.9% of annual total system costs. Anticipation of optimal curtailment of renewables and a cost-benefit-driven use of redispatch operations upon network expansion planning, however, implies a welfare gain of over 4.9% of annual total system costs per year as compared to the existing market design, which equals 85% of the maximum possible welfare gain of the first-best benchmark. KW - Electricity Markets, Network Expansion, Generation Expansion, Investment Incentives, Market Design, Congestion Management, Computational Equilibrium Models Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2020.104934 IS - 93 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Grimm, Veronika A1 - Grübel, Julia A1 - Schewe, Lars A1 - Schmidt, Martin A1 - Zöttl, Gregor T1 - Nonconvex Equilibrium Models for Gas Market Analysis: Failure of Standard Techniques and Alternative Modeling Approaches JF - European Journal on Operational Research N2 - This paper provides a first approach to assess gas market interaction on a network with nonconvex flow models. In the simplest possible setup that adequately reflects gas transport and market interaction, we elaborate on the relation of the solution of a simultaneous competitive gas market game, its corresponding mixed nonlinear complementarity problem (MNCP), and a first-best benchmark. We provide conditions under which the solution of the simultaneous game is also the solution of the corresponding MNCP. However, equilibria cannot be determined by the MNCP as the transmission system operator's (TSO’s) first-order conditions are insufficient, which goes back to nonconvexities of the gas flow model. This also implies that the welfare maximization problem may have multiple solutions that sometimes do not even coincide with any of the market equilibria. Our analysis shows that, even in the absence of strategic firms, market interaction fails to implement desirable outcomes from a welfare perspective due to the TSO’s incentive structure. We conclude that the technical environment calls for a market design that commits the TSO to a welfare objective through regulation and propose a design where the market solution corresponds to a welfare maximum and vice versa. KW - Natural Gas Markets KW - Nonconvex Equilibrium Models KW - Uniqueness KW - Multiplicity KW - Fundamental Welfare Theorems Y1 - 2017 IS - 273(3) SP - 1097 EP - 1108 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Grimm, Veronika A1 - Orlinskaya, Galina A1 - Schewe, Lars A1 - Schmidt, Martin A1 - Zöttl, Gregor T1 - Optimal Design of Retailer-Prosumer Electricity Tariffs Using Bilevel Optimization JF - Computers & Operations Research N2 - We compare various flexible tariffs that have been proposed to cost-effectively govern a prosumer's electricity management - in particular time-of-use (TOU), critical-peak-pricing (CPP), and a real-time-pricing tariff (RTP). As the outside option, we consider a fixed-price tariff (FP) that restricts the specific characteristics of TOU, CPP, and RTP, so that the flexible tariffs are at least as profitable for the prosumer as the fixed-price tariff. We propose bilevel models to determine the optimal interplay between the retailer's tariff design and the prosumer's decisions on using the storage, on consumption, and on electricity purchases from as well as electricity sales to the grid. The single-level reformulations of the considered bilevel models are computationally highly challenging optimization problems since they, e.g., combine bilinearities and mixed-integer aspects for modeling certain tariff structures. Based on a computational study using real-world data, we find that RTP increases retailer profits, however, leads to the largest price volatility for the prosumer. TOU and CPP only yield mild additional retailer profits and, due to the multiplicity of optimal plans on the part of the prosumer, imply uncertain revenues for the retailer. KW - Electricity tariffs KW - Pricing KW - Bilevel optimization KW - Mixed-integer optimization KW - Tariff design Y1 - 2019 IS - 114 ER - TY - INPR A1 - Wiertz, Ann-Kathrin A1 - Walther, Andrea A1 - Zöttl, Gregor T1 - Strategic Retailers in the Energy Sector N2 - We propose a general framework which allows to analyze the strategic interaction of retail companies, where customers choose retail contracts over a longer period of time based on price and non-price characteristics of retail contracts. We allow for many, possibly asymmetric retailers which can offer fixed price tariffs or dynamic prices, as typically observed in energy markets. Our framework considers uncertainties and allows for price-responsive consumption choices of customers. We analytically characterize all resulting market equilibria for the general asymmetric setting. Based on those results we then propose a solution algorithm which is capable to determine all resulting equilibria. For the case of symmetric retailers we provide analytical comparisons of the different tariff structures. To show the applicability of our framework and our algorithm to real-world instances, we calibrate it to data of the German retail electricity market. Our results show, that firms profits remain unchanged but consumer surplus and welfare increase when switching from fixed price tariffs to real-time pricing. This effect is more pronounced under higher wholesale price fluctuations. Finally we also propose a surrogate, reduced order model, which is shown to be equivalently capable to quantify the welfare difference of the different tariffs. Y1 - ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Grimm, Veronika A1 - Martin, Alexander A1 - Schmidt, Martin A1 - Weibelzahl, Martin A1 - Zöttl, Gregor T1 - Transmission and generation investment in electricity markets: The effects of market splitting and network fee regimes JF - European Journal of Operational Research N2 - We propose an equilibrium model that allows to analyze the long-run impact of the electricity market design on transmission line expansion by the regulator and investment in generation capacity by private firms in liberalized electricity markets. The model incorporates investment decisions of the transmission system operator and private firms in expectation of an energy-only market and cost-based redispatch. In different specifications we consider the cases of one vs. multiple price zones (market splitting) and analyze different approaches to recover network cost—in particular lump sum, generation capacity based, and energy based fees. In order to compare the outcomes of our multilevel market model with a first best benchmark, we also solve the corresponding integrated planner problem. Using two test networks we illustrate that energy-only markets can lead to suboptimal locational decisions for generation capacity and thus imply excessive network expansion. Market splitting heals these problems only partially. These results are valid for all considered types of network tariffs, although investment slightly differs across those regimes. KW - Electricity market modeling KW - Mixed-integer nonlinear optimization KW - Multilevel programming KW - Network expansion KW - Transmission management Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2016.03.044 VL - 254 IS - 2 SP - 493 EP - 509 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Grimm, Veronika A1 - Schewe, Lars A1 - Schmidt, Martin A1 - Zöttl, Gregor T1 - Uniqueness of Market Equilibrium on a Network: A Peak-Load Pricing Approach JF - European Journal of Operational Research N2 - In this paper we analyze peak-load pricing in the presence of network constraints. In our setup, firms facing fluctuating demand decide on the size and location of production facilities. They make production decisions constrained by the invested capacities, taking into account that market prices reflect scarce transmission capacities. We state general conditions for existence and uniqueness of the market equilibrium and provide a characterization of equilibrium investment and production. The presented analysis covers the cases of perfect competition and monopoly - the case of strategic firms is approximated by a conjectural variations approach. Our result is a prerequisite for analyzing regulatory policy options with computational multilevel equilibrium models, since uniqueness of the equilibrium at lower levels is of key importance when solving these models. Thus, our paper contributes to an evolving strand of literature that analyzes regulatory policy based on computational multilevel equilibrium models and aims at taking into account individual objectives of various agents, among them not only generators and customers but also, e.g., the regulator deciding on network expansion. KW - Pricing KW - Peak-Load Pricing KW - Networks KW - Uniqueness Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.03.036 VL - 261 IS - 3 SP - 971 EP - 983 ER -