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  <doc>
    <id>417</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear/>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber>24</pageNumber>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>preprint</type>
    <publisherName/>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2021-08-25</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>2021-08-25</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Robust Market Equilibria under Uncertain Cost</title>
    <abstract language="eng">We consider equilibrium problems under uncertainty where firms&#13;
maximize their profits in a robust way when selling their output. Robust&#13;
optimization plays an increasingly important role when best guaranteed objective&#13;
values are to be determined, independently of the specific distributional&#13;
assumptions regarding uncertainty. In particular, solutions are to be determined&#13;
that are feasible regardless of how the uncertainty manifests itself within&#13;
some predefined uncertainty set. Our analysis adopts the robust optimization&#13;
perspective in the context of equilibrium problems. First, we consider a singlestage,&#13;
nonadjustable robust setting. We then go one step further and study the&#13;
more complex two-stage or adjustable case where a part of the variables can&#13;
adjust to the realization of the uncertainty. We compare equilibrium outcomes&#13;
with the corresponding centralized robust optimization problem where the&#13;
sum of all profits are maximized. As we find, the market equilibrium for&#13;
the perfectly competitive firms differs from the solution of the robust central&#13;
planner, which is in stark contrast to classical results regarding the efficiency of&#13;
market equilibria with perfectly competitive firms. For the different scenarios&#13;
considered, we furthermore are able to determine the resulting price of anarchy.&#13;
In the case of non-adjustable robustness, for fixed demand in every time step&#13;
the price of anarchy is bounded whereas it is unbounded if the buyers are&#13;
modeled by elastic demand functions. For the two-stage adjustable setting,&#13;
we show how to compute subsidies for the firms that lead to robust welfare&#13;
optimal equilibria.</abstract>
    <enrichment key="SubmissionStatus">under review</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">publish</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="review.accepted_by">2</enrichment>
    <licence>Creative Commons - CC BY - Namensnennung 4.0 International</licence>
    <author>Christian Biefel</author>
    <author>Frauke Liers</author>
    <author>Jan Rolfes</author>
    <author>Lars Schewe</author>
    <author>Gregor Zöttl</author>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Continuous Optimization</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Equilibrium Problems</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Robust Optimization</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Adjustable Robustness</value>
    </subject>
    <collection role="institutes" number="">Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg</collection>
    <collection role="subprojects" number="">B06</collection>
    <collection role="subprojects" number="">B07</collection>
    <collection role="institutes" number="">University of Edinburgh</collection>
    <collection role="subprojects" number="">B09</collection>
    <file>https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-trr154/files/417/Robust_Market_Equilibria_Preprint.pdf</file>
  </doc>
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