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  <doc>
    <id>527</id>
    <completedYear>2023</completedYear>
    <publishedYear/>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber>31</pageNumber>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>preprint</type>
    <publisherName/>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>1</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2023-11-13</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">On a Tractable Single-Level Reformulation of a Multilevel Model of the European Entry-Exit Gas Market with Market Power</title>
    <abstract language="eng">We propose a framework that allows to quantitatively analyze the interplay of the different agents involved in gas trade and transport in the context of the European entry-exit system. Previous contributions have focused on the case of perfectly competitive buyers and sellers of gas, which allows to replace the respective market equilibrium problem by a single welfare maximization problem. Our novel framework considers the mathematically more challenging case of a monopolistic and thus strategic gas seller. In this framework, the objective functions of the gas sellers and buyers cannot be aggregated into a common objective function, which is why a multilevel formulation is necessary to accurately capture the sequential nature of the decisions taken. For this setup, we derive sufficient conditions that allow for reformulating the challenging four-level model as a computationally tractable single-level reformulation. We prove the correctness of this reformulation and use it for solving several test instances to illustrate the applicability of our approach.</abstract>
    <enrichment key="SubmissionStatus">under review</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">publish</enrichment>
    <licence>Creative Commons - CC BY - Namensnennung 4.0 International</licence>
    <author>Veronika Grimm</author>
    <author>Julia Grübel</author>
    <author>Martin Schmidt</author>
    <author>Alexandra Schwartz</author>
    <author>Ann-Kathrin Wiertz</author>
    <author>Gregor Zöttl</author>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Multilevel optimization</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Reformulations</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Gas markets</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Market power</value>
    </subject>
    <collection role="institutes" number="">Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg</collection>
    <collection role="subprojects" number="">B08</collection>
    <collection role="institutes" number="">Universität Trier</collection>
    <collection role="subprojects" number="">B09</collection>
    <file>https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-trr154/files/527/document.pdf</file>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>455</id>
    <completedYear>2022</completedYear>
    <publishedYear/>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber>41</pageNumber>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>workingpaper</type>
    <publisherName/>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>1</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2023-03-22</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Dynamic Pricing and Strategic Retailers in the Energy Sector: A&#13;
Multi-Leader-Follower Approach</title>
    <abstract language="eng">We consider strategic retail pricing in markets, where retail companies buy commodities at fluctuating wholesale prices and resell them to final consumers by applying dynamic retail tariffs. This is of   especially large relevance in the context of energy markets where substantial wholesale price fluctuations are observed. Policy makers currently foster the introduction of such dynamic tariff schemes. From  a modelling point of view, we propose a multi-leader-follower problem to investigate the implications of strategic retail pricing and we compare the impacts of implementing dynamic tariffs on retailers and final consumers. Our analysis tackles different aspects: first, we formulate the model and provide theoretical results. Second, we develop algorithms, which solve the multi-leader-follower problem and allow us to characterize the resulting market equilibria. Third, we calibrate and solve our framework based on data of the German retail electricity market for the years 2020 and 2021. This allows us to quantitatively assess the impact of introducing real time prices on retailers’ profits and customers’ benefits. As our results show, dynamic real-time pricing on the one hand typically increases market efficiency, which confirms previous results obtained without the explicit consideration of strategic behavior. On the other hand, however, as a novel aspect, dynamic real-time pricing turns out to significantly reduce equilibrium profits in case of strategic firms. This effect is especially large in environments with strongly fluctuating wholesale prices.</abstract>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">publish</enrichment>
    <licence>Creative Commons - CC BY - Namensnennung 4.0 International</licence>
    <author>Giorgia Oggioni</author>
    <author>Alexandra Schwartz</author>
    <author>Gregor Zöttl</author>
    <author>Ann-Kathrin Wiertz</author>
    <collection role="subprojects" number="">B09</collection>
    <file>https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-trr154/files/455/OggioniSchwartzWiertzZoettl.pdf</file>
  </doc>
</export-example>
