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The European Leniency Program constitutes an important part of the anti-cartel enforcement and thus of the protection of sound competition. By offering incentives to cartel members, illegal detrimental agreements can be detected and penalized in order to stop infringement of the internal market. Companies willing to participate in the European Leniency Program however have to evaluate whether the offered incentives, i.e. full or partial immunity from fines, outweighs the possible risk resulting from private enforcement. With the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions, the harmonized, effective enforcement of antitrust damage claims shall be ensured. The possibility of private enforcement constitutes a major threat to leniency applicants. It is the European Commissions’ task and challenge to design an anti-cartel enforcement providing sufficient incentives for whistleblowers, while concurrently strengthening individuals suffering from cartels. The results show the dilemma and contradiction between the protection of the individual by strengthening the private enforcement and the need for an appealing leniency program.