ExxonMobil in Europe’s Shale Gas Fields:
Quitting Early or Fighting It Out?

Marc Naumann / Anne Philippi
Technical University of Applied Sciences, Wildau, Germany

Abstract. This article focuses on the oil and gas supermajor, ExxonMobil, and its business in the unconventional gas field in Europe. The purpose was to investigate whether and how ExxonMobil runs its natural gas operations differently among European countries and possible reasons for divergent strategies. After a brief introduction of the firm, ExxonMobil’s approach in Europe in general will be discussed. Two countries are in focus: Poland and Germany. The key finding is that the firm indeed has shown different approaches and strategies. In Poland, ExxonMobil faced a supportive, positive environment but quit quickly when its small investment resulted only in disappointing results. In contrast, its German unconventional gas operations are connected to broad conventional activities and are being defended by an extensive effort to win back public support.

Keywords: energy, energy policy, ExxonMobil, fracking, Germany, hydraulic fracturing, Poland, public acceptance, regulatory politics, shale gas, unconventional gas, USA

The Company

ExxonMobil Corporation, headquartered in Texas, is the largest publicly traded oil and gas producing company of the world; this “supermajor” in 2012 was ranked third in the Global Fortune 500 list (ExxonMobil, n.d.-a; Fortune, 2013). The company holds a great number of mining rights and resources around the world. The firm has its roots in the legendary Standard Oil Trust which was broken up by a U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1911. Among the many legacy companies coming out of this split were two which, after some name changes, became Exxon and Mobil. In their early years, they focused on oil production and refining but by the 1950s expanded into the chemical industry (Vassiliou, 2009, p. XXXI). A change in U.S. antitrust law allowed the companies to merge in 1999. Today, ExxonMobil is a globally active multinational with many joint ventures (ExxonMobil, n.d.-b).

ExxonMobil has a century-long history in Europe, too, with Esso and Mobil being well-known consumer brands. Across Europe, the firm runs a broad upstream (exploration, production), downstream (refining, marketing, service stations), and chemical manufacturing business. Growth in demand for oil and gas products, together with continuously rising prices, has helped the firm expand enormously.

ExxonMobil became one of the leaders of the private oil industry, together with Chevron (USA), Royal Dutch Shell (UK/Netherlands), BP (UK), ConocoPhillips (USA) and Total (France). In the past decades, these corporations have faced stiff competition from state-owned firms such as Saudi Aramco, China’s CNPC, Russian Rosneft, Iran’s NIOC, PDVSA from Venezuela, Brazil’s Petrobras and Malaysia’s Petronas. In order to keep its leading position, ExxonMobil invests in finding new ways to reach and exploit resources. Deep water exploration is one path, as is unconventional gas.
ExxonMobil is a classic oil “supermajor,” but it has long moved into the natural gas business. In fact, today the firm produces as much gas as it produces oil (O'Keefe, 2012). It was, however, not among the pioneers of the unconventional gas players in North America, which were all smaller, independent firms that experimented with new methods. They did what the large companies did not dare to do because it seemed too difficult, too labor-intensive, and financially too expensive. As is now well known, only when they showed spectacular success, the big oil companies began to pay attention. By the mid-2000s, they began to realize the potential of the shale gas market.

So, like other major oil companies, ExxonMobil arrived late to the scene. It was through the 2010 takeover of XTO Energy, a specialized unconventional firms and the largest gas producer (conventional and unconventional), that ExxonMobil firmly established itself as a natural gas major. The XTO buy was very controversial among ExxonMobil’s shareholders and actually pushed Exxon’s stock prices down, since fast profits were unsure; ExxonMobil’s top management tried to explain that it was a new long-term investment and that the company had the financial resilience to do so: “We can be patient” (O’Keefe, 2012). Nevertheless, other big oil companies also bought unconventional gas producers, thus changing the commercial landscape, and introducing different approaches to the science, technology, and management of unconventional gas production.

ExxonMobil’s acquisition of XTO Energy has been interpreted by some as a “drastic shift in strategy,” reshaping the firm; but others point to continuity in the firm’s strategy to look for new horizons and a new project mix in the face of shrinking opportunities to replace oil reserves; even before the XTO acquisition, ExxonMobil had considerable investment in gas and other unconventional resources, such as Canadian oil sands, as well as worldwide facilities to produce and export liquefied natural gas (LNG) (Aeberman, 2012). It may also be said that the firm is increasingly wary of business risks in the international arena and is undergoing a “transformation from an integrated oil company to a capital and service provider,” which means that it moves away from the traditional model of production and distribution towards services like building plants and processing, adding value by providing capital and efficiency for external customers (Aeberman, 2012).

Globally, ExxonMobil is one of the most well-known firms. It is also one of the most criticized for a number of reasons, but certainly as a symbol for undue influence and power of multinational corporations, and as a symbol for pollution and climate-threaten- ing business. The firm is a familiar enemy and target for the ecologically minded: “ExxonMobil is the environmental movement’s antichrist” (Mower, 2010). Going into unconventional gas has increased the company’s exposure to harsh criticism over the “fracking” technology, both in the U.S. and abroad, particularly in Europe. The firm, like others in the industry, has been reproached for dening environmental and health risks, and continuing to invest in fossil fuels rather than to contribute to a climate-friendly buildup of renewable energy and a low-carbon economy.

Thus, the firm makes a considerable effort to publicize its reputation from attacks, invest in Corporate Social Responsibility projects, and commits to broad public communication about its value to economies and societies in the countries where ExxonMobil is active.

The firm’s CEO, Rex Tillerson, offers a defensive and even somewhat laid-back attitude to public criticism over ExxonMobil’s pursuit of new energy resources and methods. “We go through this every time we go to a new area to develop,” he says, “it’s just part of how society deals with having their energy needs met.” He criticizes the attitude to avoid any risk because a constant governance by precautionary principle would undermine the economy: “If you want to live by the precautionary principle, then crawl up in a ball and live in a cave” (O’Keefe, 2012). He adds that in his view, his firm is actually more popular abroad than at home:

What I find interesting about the U.S. relative to other countries is in most every other country where we operate, people really like us. And they’re really glad we’re there. And governments really like us. And it’s not just ExxonMobil. They admire our industry because of what we can do. They almost are in awe of what we’re able to do. And in this country [USA], you can flip it around 180 degrees. I don’t understand why that is, but it just is (O’Keefe, 2012)

A mainstream view from Europe may not quite match Tillerson’s perception. There is no lack of hostility towards ExxonMobil, and its unconventional gas engagement has increased rather than decreased the difficulties business strategy has to deal with.

ExxonMobil in Europe

Energy markets and political contexts vary across Europe. The potential for unconventional gas exploration also varies because geology and technical conditions are different, and some European countries have no sizable deposits of shale gas or other unconventional resources. In general, ExxonMobil portrays itself as “one of Europe’s largest oil and gas producers” and is “active in almost every European country” (ExxonMobil Corporation, n.d.-b), sporting regional websites for nearly 20 European countries (Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom). But this does not mean that the company is doing business in unconventional gas everywhere.

The firm has pursued this special business in Poland, Germany, Ukraine, Hungary and Turkey. However, for several reasons and factors, ExxonMobil has already quit activities in some countries, or no concrete investment decision has been communicated. In Hungary, ExxonMobil formed a joint venture with the Hungarian energy company Falcon Oil & Gas in 2008/09. But after disappointing test results, Exxon left the partnership and stopped its tests (Brenner, 2009; NaturalGasEurope.com, 2012b). ExxonMobil was reported in 2012 and 2013 to hold talks with Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) for shale gas exploration in Turkey (Hürriyet Daily News, 2013). In Ukraine, ExxonMobil and the state-owned Naftogaz signed a deal in early 2011 to cooperate in development and exploration of shale gas reserves. Ukraine has the fourth-largest deposits of shale gas. Other big companies such as Shell, Chevron, Total, Eni and EdF have rushed to compete, which makes it difficult for Exxon to get the real pioneer role in this country. Nevertheless the company has the necessary resources and funds to hold a solid position in Ukraine (n.a., 2011b; Reuters, 2011; Tuohy & Bulakh, 2013). Even though ExxonMobil’s performance on the stock market had been rather poor compared to the Dow Jones Industrial Average, it generated gains above 10% in 2013 (Caplinger, 2013) and its revenues and profits are among the highest in the world (see Global Fortune 500 list).

ExxonMobil makes a Europe-wide effort to communicate on unconventional gas opportunities and industrial processes. Its Brussels office continuously participates in discussions and consultations by the EU institutions, collaborating with industry associations such as OGP, the International Oil and Gas Producers Association, representing upstream interests. Next to its corporate global and national websites, it has hired the Brussels-based public affairs agency Fleishman-Hillard to run, from 2011, a web platform in English, German, French and Polish (europeunconventionalgas.org, europaukonventionelleserdgas.de, gaznonkonventionnelleurope.org, europagazniekowncijonalpy.nl). Probably because of this, the firm has not joined the younger cross-industry “Shale Gas Europe” initiative and web platform (shalegas-europe.eu), started in 2012 by London- and Brussels-based FTI Consulting and supported by Chevron, Cuadrilla, Halliburton, Shell, Statoil and Total. Both web platforms are, however, quite similar.
in their positive promotion of unconventional gas and in their attempt to refute negative arguments.

Only in Germany, a country deeply skeptical of unconventional gas and “fracking” in particular, has ExxonMobil attempted to soften critical public opinion by a lengthy, elaborated and broadly publicized local stakeholder consultation process combined with extensive independent scientific work: the “Information and dialogue process of ExxonMobil about the safety and environmental impact of fracking technology for natural gas from unconventional sources” (Krüger, 2011; Schmitz, 2012).

**Poland: Testing and Quitting**

Poland is one of the few countries in Europe which has decided come out in favor of shale gas and tries to provide firms with a positive environment. The country wants to be a forerunner in the unconventional gas sector and is ready to activate stakeholders to deflect potential EU regulatory restrictions on the sector. The government became more sensitive towards its policymaking processes taken by the Polish government in order to keep as many investors as possible come too late for ExxonMobil. The government became more sensitive towards its policymaking process. It has emphasized that businesses should not fear the regulatory framework, and that it hopes to convince companies that have left to come back (NaturalGasEurope.com, 2012a). Poland is against a regulation about unconventional gas on the EU level. The government argues that every country should handle laws and regulations on its own (Shale Gas Europe, 2013b).

Actions taken by the Polish government in order to keep as many investors as possible come too late for ExxonMobil. The government became more sensitive towards its policymaking process. It has emphasized that businesses should not fear the regulatory framework, and that it hopes to convince companies that have left to come back (NaturalGasEurope.com, 2012a). Poland is against a regulation about unconventional gas on the EU level. The government argues that every country should handle laws and regulations on its own (Shale Gas Europe, 2013b).

**Germany: Holding on, Fighting**

Compared to Poland, the German energy market and system shows very different characteristics. Germany has a fairly diversified energy supply, but a major feature is a high degree of import...
dependency well above EU average (Ćwiek-Karpowicz, Gawlikowska-Fyk & Westphal, 2013). As the largest EU member state with a very advanced industry, Germany also needs the most energy. The country, which historically is a large-volume gas user for industry purposes, heating, and recently also electricity generation, has a well-developed gas pipeline infrastructure. Still bound by long-term contracts, Germany imports high volumes of gas and oil from Russia, Norway, and the Netherlands (Ćwiek-Karpowicz et al., 2013). But Germany, which also has a long history of producing its own gas (albeit not nearly enough to be self-sufficient), also counts among the countries in which sizeable unconventional deposits of natural gas have been identified. This has not led to enthusiasm at all, not even when the “Energiewende” debate made it clear that innovative replacements for outgoing nuclear plants have to be found, and that energy prices are expected to increase steeply – despite big investments in renewable energy production from photovoltaics to wind farms to biomass.

German energy policymakers are indeed very skeptical and undecided in regard to “fracking” and its related risks and benefits. There are many organized opponents. However, industrial leaders and other groups have shown some quite solid support for unconventional gas development, not the least to keep Germany’s high tech industries and manufacturing internationally competitive.

ExxonMobil recognized Germany as a great and important market, although it has to face strong obstacles for its unconventional gas business. In recent years, the company has stepped up its communication efforts to make elites and the public aware of the significance of domestic natural gas production – conventional and unconventional.

**ExxonMobil has a market position to defend**

This seems very plausible. While Germany imports most of its gas and generates only twelve percent on its own, of the German domestic production, ExxonMobil has a share of nearly 70 percent. As figure 1 shows, the firm is much bigger in output than domestic production, ExxonMobil has a share of nearly 70 percent. While Germany imports most of its gas and generates only twelve percent on its own, of the German domestic production, ExxonMobil has a share of nearly 70 percent. As figure 1 shows, the firm is much bigger in output than domestic production, ExxonMobil has a national market position to defend. Locally, the firm has had a solid and positive reputation as a responsible, community-anchored employer in economically challenged regions of the rural, less populated and less industrialized North-west. ExxonMobil was the quintessential corporate citizen, a generous charitable neighbor who helped small towns to finance a fire truck or a children’s therapy center when they needed it. The gas boom was a great time for the municipalities, also because they cashed in. The firm was a welcome taxpayer: In the state of Lower Saxony alone, it not only paid tax to federal and state authorities but to up to 80 local governments, who lived quite happily with the rigs that ExxonMobil put up to drill (Müller, 2013).

But then, the shale gas controversy hit Germany – with much credit going to German media picking up the dramatic messages of the U.S. film, *Gasland*. In many places public opinion capsized “with remarkable speed,” as the conservative national daily *Frankfurter Allgemeine* noted: Local politicians and dignitaries disassociated themselves from the firm. They suddenly refused gifts in the name of Corporate Social Responsibility, and, under pressure from new anti-fracking groups, began to draft resolutions against their former benefactor in local councils (Müller, 2013).

In the national arena, ExxonMobil has experienced an even more negative and politicized backlash in recent years as the most prominent target for environmental groups and new grassroots initiatives, such as the “Gegen-Gasbohren” network. Media reporting about failing and faulty drilling and accidents, connected to unconventional gas or not, in Germany or abroad, fed the smoldering fire (NDR, 2011; Krüger, 2011; Panorama, 2011).

---

**Figure 1: Supply of the German gas market 2012 (ExxonMobil Central Europe Holding GmbH, n.d.-b)**

German conventional gas reserves and production have continuously decreased, despite relatively intensive technical attempts to improve output. For producers, the challenge is to replace old sources by new ones – and here, unconventional gas comes in.
A new approach: campaign for acceptance

ExxonMobil’s managers recognized they had a problem on their hands. The company has responded with broad, numerous communication initiatives. Exxon is not afraid or shy to communicate its activities in the public and it also wants to solve arising problems openly. ExxonMobil representatives spend considerable time in local hearings and citizen forums, where they sometimes face aggressive questioning and reproachful comments (Klemp, 2010; Meier, 2010; n.a., 2011a).

It has initiated an advertising campaign, taking out full-page ads in leading daily and weekly newspapers and magazines, and has run a television campaign, with 30-second spots directly placed before Germany’s most popular nightly news, “Tagesschau.”

These spots – just like various other media – prominently feature Exxon employees (mostly engineers) as testimonials; they not only promoted the potential of Germany’s domestic gas supply but also, in a serious tone, address public concerns. They used words like future, environmental friendliness or safe and responsible. Needless to say, this advertising provoked a stir among critical bloggers and social media users, trying to counter the corporate messages with commentary and analysis that the firm offers “un-conventional half-truths” (n.a., 2011c).

Apart from a German-language version of its European website (europaunkonventionelleserdgas.de), the firm’s Hamburg-based Public and Government Affairs department, aided by a press spokesman in Hannover, also runs a website dedicated to “the search for natural gas in Germany” (erdgassuche-in-deutschland.de). With some extension to other electronic channels (YouTube, Twitter), Exxon supplies plenty of online materials, photos, graphic charts, fact sheets, data and brochures (“Domestic gas production: myth and reality”); it also invites users for interactive blogging in an opinion section. A continuous flow of news about even detailed works on gas sites comes out of the news section, and press “canards” with incorrect information are responded to regularly. While these media channels and messages might still be considered quite conventional, ExxonMobil also committed serious resources to an extensive and openly publicized participatory stakeholder consultation process, combined with “a neutral” risk assessment of hydraulic fracturing. As was reported, the company committed about one million euros to the innovative effort (Tenbrock, 2011).

There were no flashy ads and marketing-styled communications; instead, it took a decidedly down-to-earth, earnest path in three segments – “Wissen und Forschen,” knowledge and science, “Reden und Einfluss nehmen,” speaking and influencing, and “Fragen und Kommentieren,” questioning and commenting.

This setup had a lengthy formal title: “Informations- und Dialogprozess der ExxonMobil über die Sicherheit und Umweltverträglichkeit der Fracking-Technologie für die Erdgashgewinnung,” or in English: information and dialogue process by ExxonMobil about safety and environmental compatibility of the fracking technology for natural gas extraction.

This internationally unique tool started in April 2011 and was operative until April 2012, with subsequent communications continuing. ExxonMobil representatives continually observed the process but, for the most part, stood out of the way. Some company engineers and scientists answered firm-specific questions, and at the opening and end, ExxonMobil Europe CEO Gernot Kalkoffen spoke some friendly words, but overall the firm took a low profile, avoiding criticism it was steering the process.

The “info-dialogue’s” basic credibility-enhancing element was the concept of an independent and neutral panel of experts from different disciplines, formed to investigate potential risks for a final report. Obviously, the neutrality of the experts would be questioned. ExxonMobil only selected experts that had never before worked for the firm or the natural gas industry.

Their efforts would also be put under scientific peer review. Their work was public and was observed with a critical eye from a working group consisting of various social actors including community leaders, water utility representatives, farmers’ associations, citizen groups and even clerics and religious community representatives. They were to work with the experts, collecting and formulating questions which the scientists would try to answer and later debate with the other stakeholders.

The whole process was documented on a website, dialog-erdgasundfrac.de (see screenshot, figure 3), and facilitated by professional moderators from an Osnabrück consultancy specializing in citizen dialogues (Ewen, Borchardt, Richter & Hammerbacher, 2012).

In April 2012, the expert panel presented its comprehensive risk assessment in a large public conference. This completed the twelve-month “info-dialogue”. The experts did not see any objective reasons to totally ban exploration and production of unconventional gas using hydraulic fracturing.

Their final report, however, included elaborate recommendations and warnings: there are major and minor risks, including threats to water; the extraction of unconventional gas leads to more emissions than that of conventional gas; “frac” fluids should be used without certain dangerous chemicals; “fracking” should not be applied in at-risk territory; some laws should be changed to be more restrictive; more science must be generated; and in any case, all projects should undergo extensive stakeholder consultations and planning procedures. The scientists clearly said: proceed with high caution, not everywhere and not under all circumstances (ExxonMobil Central Europe Holding GmbH, n.d.-i).

Figure 2: Samples of German ExxonMobil media – brochure covers and TV spot with employee testimonial on a special-interest website, erdgassuche-in-deutschland.de

The company has coined clever slogans, used in various media and in press interviews, such as “Germany needs natural gas, and Germany has natural gas.” The message is simple but effective – and in press interviews, such as “Germany needs natural gas, and it also wants to solve arising problems openly”.
The firm documented the whole process and had its representa-
tives present at it various events. But it framed it, as could be ex-
pected, in all-positive terms. News media generally reported in a
friendly way, particularly local and regional newspapers and
broadcasting. But since all was public, many critical voices echoed
across media and the Internet. For example, since ExxonMobil
paid for the complex and costly procedure, questions came up how
independent the work of the panel of nearly 40 scientist really was
and whether Exxon influenced them, perhaps indirectly. Experts
and the company did not disclose how much the scientists and their
reviewers were paid. So this left room for speculation. Beyond
such details, some of course put a question mark behind the inten-
tions and purposes of the total exercise.

ExxonMobil also tried to win over skeptics with substantial
independent the work of the panel of nearly 40 scientist really was
and whether Exxon influenced them, perhaps indirectly. Experts
and the company did not disclose how much the scientists and their
reviewers were paid. So this left room for speculation. Beyond
such details, some of course put a question mark behind the inten-
tions and purposes of the total exercise.

In one harshly critical report, the left-leaning, green-minded
Berlin national daily newspaper taz debunked the “pseudo-dia-
logue” as “cosmetic” and “manipulative.” The process was meant
to give new legitimacy to ExxonMobil’s operations, now enjoying
the blessing of serious scientists. It created an “illusion” of equal-
ity when small-town mayors and simple farmers conversed with
eminent researchers or mighty corporate leaders. The taz pointed
out that discussion topics were systematically limited to “frac-
ing” – it was not an arena to debate energy policy, how fossil fuels
competed with renewables, or whether that gas was really needed,
or who makes a profit from continuing to produce and consume
gas. Fundamental questions about power in society were not on
the table: neither the pre-democratic principles behind Germany’s
mining laws which gives priority to resource extraction, not ecol-
ogy or citizen participation, nor the power of corporate lobbyists
setting the stage for the public agenda (Seyfert, 2012).

Nevertheless, the one-year process which saw ExxonMobil pay
scientists to publicly write up a long list of no-go areas and busi-
ness-restricting recommendations impressed even some of the
most vocal critics. As one astounded senior policy analyst from
the U.S. Natural Resource Defense Fund, a well-organized anti-
fracking green organization, said: “Can anyone imagine Exx-
onMobil funding a similar project in the U.S.?” (Mall, 2012).

ExxonMobil also tried to win over skeptics with substantial
commitments. Not only does the firm support full disclosure of
chemicals used in the hydraulic fracturing process, in one 2012
interview with business magazine WirtschaftsWoche, ExxonMo-
bil Europe CEO Gernot Kalkoffen announced that his firm would
reduce the percentage of potentially dangerous or toxic chemicals
in the fluids to zero by 2013 (Dürand & Matthes, 2012).

At the moment, exploration is on hold. As a de facto moratorium
had interrupted work, it is still unclear what the federal and state
governments will change in the legislative and regulatory frame-
work. ExxonMobil has committed to educational efforts and to be
open and communicative about public acceptance problems to
safeguard its investments, as the firm does not want to lose its
dominating position in the German upstream gas market.

So far, the outcome is uncertain, but ExxonMobil has set a new
standard for itself and the industry which diverges greatly from
what it has undertaken in Poland or in any other country.

Conclusion

ExxonMobil showed impressively different approaches in Po-
land and Germany. They offer quite different business environ-
ments. At first view, Poland’s seemed so much more promising
and supportive, and an easy context to pursue unconventional gas
opportunities. The firm’s exit from Poland was a shock for the
country and the government which had placed great hopes on for-

eign investors. Perhaps the new deal with Russia for tight oil in
Siberia was a good reason to reshuffle priorities in the face of dis-
appointing test runs in Poland.

Maybe the company, and also the Polish government handing
out concessions, was a little too naive to think that it would be
possible to quickly find commercialization of Polish reserves. This
case shows that even if a government strongly comes out in favor
and creates a good environment for companies like Exxon, this
cannot guarantee success when other technical and business deci-
sions are more important. Poland may have looked like a “fracking
heaven” (Economist, 2013) but to some extent the country was not
ready to deal with all the new challenges.

In Germany, ExxonMobil found a much more uncomfortable
environment. Yet there were also some unique advantages for the
firm as a dominant and well-established player in domestic con-
ventional gas production. ExxonMobil’s upstream gas business in
Germany has a 100-year-old history. The contrast could not be
greater: ExxonMobil was a newcomer to Poland’s rush for gas,
one competitor among many. It did not lose much when it quit the
quest for the prize. Germany is a difficult place, too, but the non-
technical risk may in the end prove manageable, as the company
has political leverage and the will to fight in familiar territory.

ExxonMobil might have had some reasons to quit Germany’s
unconventional gas base, as it had done in Poland. But one should
keep in mind that the firm saw Germany to be more likely to be-
come a shale gas producer than Poland (Bergin, 2012). When the
German public, at various levels, turned hostile, it pushed ExxonMobil to a new approach. Instead of giving up, the
company developed ideas to provide a higher level of transpar-
ency, to work with information and argumentation to educate the
public, and make concessions to the greater political demand for
responsible operations. ExxonMobil fell far from erasing all
doubts, of course, and this could hardly work within a short period,
or in the face of a strong green movement which is generally
against continuing and growing use of fossil fuels, domestic or
elsewhere. Governments in Germany have made no effort to make
it easier to operate unconventional gas facilities; quite the con-
trary. More regulation is on the way, but ExxonMobil has tried to
show that it is part of the solution rather than part of the problem.

Given that the German governments and political parties are
anxious to develop renewable energies as a high priority, Exx-
onMobil could never have expected a fossil fuel enthusiasm as has
been found in Poland. But that was always clear. On the other
hand, the “Energiewende” debate has opened up opportunities to
talk about domestic supply as a matter of high national and economic concern. That, at least, is something that Poland and Germany have in common.

References


European Commission DG Environment. (2013, June 7). Presentation of the results of the public consultation “Unconventional fossil fuels (e.g. shale gas) in Europe.” Brussels.


Naumann & Philipp: ExxonMobil in Europe’s Shale Gas Fields