<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<export-example>
  <doc>
    <id>593</id>
    <completedYear>2014</completedYear>
    <publishedYear>2014</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst>139</pageFirst>
    <pageLast>162</pageLast>
    <pageNumber/>
    <edition/>
    <issue>1</issue>
    <volume>38</volume>
    <type>article</type>
    <publisherName/>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>1</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2014-01-08</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Institutional Competition of Optional Codes in European Contract Law</title>
    <abstract language="eng">The Common European Sales Law (CESL) is the European Commission’s most recent policy initiative for European contract law. It aims to address the problem that differences between the national contract laws of the Member States may constitute an obstacle for the European Internal Market. This paper develops a model of the institutional competition in European contract law and uses it to addresses the question as to whether an optional European contract code and the CESL are economically desirable for European contract law. To do so I examine the transaction costs involved in the process of choosing an applicable law that European businesses face when they conduct cross-border transactions in the European Internal Market. I then describe how these transaction costs shape the competitive environment, i.e. what I refer to as the “European market for contract laws” in which the contracting parties choose a law to govern their cross-border contracts. Having identified this environment and the competitive forces operating within it, I propose a model, the “Cycle of European Contract Law”. I use this model to analyze the competitive processes that take place in the European market for contract laws. Based on my results I make recommendations for the optimal implementation of an optional European contract code and the CESL in European contract law.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">European Journal of Law and Economics</parentTitle>
    <note>Online: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263737791_Institutional_competition_of_optional_codes_in_European_contract_law</note>
    <enrichment key="PeerReviewed">Keine Angabe - No details</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="LinkProfileA">https://www.srh-berlin.de/hochschule/hochschulteam/wulf-alexander/</enrichment>
    <licence>Creative Commons - CC BY-NC-ND - Namensnennung - Nicht kommerziell - Keine Bearbeitungen 4.0 International</licence>
    <author>Alexander J. Wulf</author>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Institutional Competition</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>European Union</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>European Contract Law</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Common European Sales Law</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Choice of Law</value>
    </subject>
    <collection role="jel" number="K">Law and Economics</collection>
    <collection role="institutes" number="">Contractual Management Institute (CMI, SRH Berlin)</collection>
    <thesisPublisher>SRH Berlin University of Applied Sciences</thesisPublisher>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>459</id>
    <completedYear>2014</completedYear>
    <publishedYear>2014</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber>328</pageNumber>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>book</type>
    <publisherName>Springer Gabler</publisherName>
    <publisherPlace>Wiesbaden</publisherPlace>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>1</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2014-06-12</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Institutional Competition between Optional Codes in European Contract Law: a Theoretical and Empirical Analysis</title>
    <abstract language="eng">The Commission of the European Union has identified divergences between the national contract laws of the Member States as an obstacle to the completion of the European Internal Market and put this issue on its highest political agenda. Alexander J. Wulf analyses and predicts the effects. The study is situated in the context of the recent developments in the discussion on European contract law. The book begins with an introduction to the economic and legal theories that serve as the rationale for the development of the line of argument. These theories are then applied to the issues involved in the current controversy on European contract law. The author develops a model that he uses to analyze the institutional processes of European contract law. Empirical data are employed to test this model and discuss the results. From his analysis the author develops criteria that can serve as a starting point for thinking about the economic desirability of an optional European contract law.</abstract>
    <note>Volltext aus urheberrechtlichen Gründen nicht verfügbar.&#13;
Fulltext due to copyright not available.</note>
    <enrichment key="LinkProfileA">https://www.srh-berlin.de/hochschule/hochschulteam/wulf-alexander/</enrichment>
    <licence>Creative Commons - CC BY-NC-ND - Namensnennung - Nicht kommerziell - Keine Bearbeitungen 4.0 International</licence>
    <author>Alexander J. Wulf</author>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>European Contract Law</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Empirical Legal Research</value>
    </subject>
    <collection role="jel" number="K">Law and Economics</collection>
    <thesisPublisher>SRH Berlin University of Applied Sciences</thesisPublisher>
  </doc>
</export-example>
