@inproceedings{MoehrleBizikZelleretal.2017, author = {M{\"o}hrle, Felix and Bizik, Kai and Zeller, Marc and H{\"o}fig, Kai and Rothfelder, Martin and Liggesmeyer, Peter}, title = {A Formal Approach for Automating Compositional Safety Analysis Using Flow Type Annotations In Component Fault Trees}, series = {Proceedings of the 27th European Safety and Reliability Conference (ESREL): Safety and Reliability - Theory and Applications., Portorož, Slovenia: Taylor \& Francis (CRC Press).}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 27th European Safety and Reliability Conference (ESREL): Safety and Reliability - Theory and Applications., Portorož, Slovenia: Taylor \& Francis (CRC Press).}, year = {2017}, abstract = {Safety assurance is a major challenge in the design of modern embedded systems that has become increasingly difficult in recent years. Growing system sizes and the rise of Cyber-Physical systems confront safety engineers with large sets of configurations to be analyzed. Current approaches are usually carried out at design time and do not address the need for automated assessments in the field. With Component Fault Trees (CFTs) there exists a component-based methodology that enables an efficient modular composition of safety artifacts. The combined model is a system-level CFT that can be analyzed by means of popular Fault Tree Analysis techniques that are widely accepted in the industry. However, when composing models, their interfacing elements must be connected manually which impedes the automation of the procedure. In this work, we introduce the notion of flow types that represent a particular kind of component interaction and define a taxonomy of related failure behavior. By annotating CFTs with types, a machine-readable vocabulary is provided that allows for an automated interconnection of their interfaces. This way, the automatic composition of models according to system architecture is enabled, allowing for automated safety assessments on system-level. We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach using an example ethylene vaporization unit.}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{MoehrleZellerHoefigetal.2016, author = {M{\"o}hrle, Felix and Zeller, Marc and H{\"o}fig, Kai and Rothfelder, Martin and Liggesmeyer, Peter}, title = {Automating compositional safety analysis using a failure type taxonomy for component fault trees}, series = {Risk, Reliability and Safety: Innovating Theory and Practice: Proc. of ESREL}, booktitle = {Risk, Reliability and Safety: Innovating Theory and Practice: Proc. of ESREL}, pages = {1380 -- 1387}, year = {2016}, abstract = {Safety assurance is a major challenge in the design of today's complex embedded systems and future Cyber-physical systems. Changes in a system's architectural design invalidate former safety analyses and require a manual adaptation of related safety analysis models in order to restore consistency. In this work, we present an approach for automating the compositional assembly of Component Fault Trees by automatically generating mappings between their input and output failure modes. Therefore, we propose a taxonomy of failure types for annotating model elements and deriving a model of the failure propagation. This way, automatic and system-wide safety analyses can be executed and easily repeated after making modifications to the system's architecture. We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach using an example ethylene vaporization unit from an industrial domain.}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{MoehrleZellerHoefigetal.2015, author = {M{\"o}hrle, Felix and Zeller, Marc and H{\"o}fig, Kai and Rothfelder, Martin and Liggesmeyer, Peter}, title = {Automated compositional safety analysis using component fault trees}, series = {Proceedings of the IEEE International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering Workshops (ISSREW 2015), November 2015, Gaithersburg, MD.}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the IEEE International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering Workshops (ISSREW 2015), November 2015, Gaithersburg, MD.}, pages = {152 -- 159}, year = {2015}, abstract = {Safety assurance is a major challenge in the design of today's complex embedded systems and future Cyber-physical systems. Especially changes in a system's architectural design invalidate former safety analyses and require an adaptation of related safety analysis models in order to restore consistency. In this work, we present an approach for automatically generating mappings between failure ports in compositional safety analysis models. This way, automatic and system-wide safety analyses are enabled that can be easily repeated after making modifications to the system's architecture. We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach using a case study from the automotive domain.}, language = {en} }