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To broaden the operational scope of monetary policy, several authors suggest cash abolishment as an appropriate means of breaking through the zero lower bound. The key question in this respect is: What are the costs of such a proposal? We argue that the welfare costs of bypassing the zero lower bound can be dealt with analytically and empirically by assuming negative interest rates on cash holdings. Adopting a money-in-the-utility-function (MIU) model, we measure the welfare loss in terms of theamount needed to compensate consumers (compensated variation), and as excess burden (deadweight loss) imposed on the economy. Firstly, we gauge the welfare effects of abolishing cash, both, for the Euro area and for Germany, and we perform several robustness checks. Secondly, we broaden the analysis by taking into account the liquidity services of assets included in the monetary aggregates M1 and M3, and we contrast the results for the year 2015 with those for the pre-crisis period 2005. Our findings suggest that the welfare losses of negative interest rates incurred by consumers and society are large, notably if implemented in a low interest rate environment. Imposing a negative interest rate of 3 percent on cash holdings and reducing the interest on all assets included in M3 creates a deadweight loss of € 62bn for euro area and of €18bn for Germany. The annual compensation required by consumers in the euro area as well as in Germany is equivalent to 2.2 percent of GDP or about €700 per capita. Thus, stepping into deep negative interest rates turns out to be a very costly economic experiment, leaving aside the potential risks and negative side effects of protracted and intensified unconventional monetary policy.
Wir zeigen, dass die gängige These, Bargeld würde wegen des zunehmenden Einsatzes elektronischer Zahlungsmittel generell immer stärker an Bedeutung verlieren, sowohl im weltweiten Maßstab als auch in den Emissionsländern der international nachfragten Sorten(USD, EUR,CHF, GBPund JPY) als klar widerlegt angesehen werden kann.Besonderes Augenmerk legen wir dabeiauf die Entwicklung der Bargeldnachfrage in Krisenphasen. Hierunterscheiden wir zwischen drei verschiedenen Typen von Krisen (technologische Krisen, Finanzmarktkrisen, Naturkatastrophen) und untersuchen jeweils die krisenbedingte Nachfrage nach großen und kleinen Denominationen von Banknotenseit 1990. Dabei zeigt sich als generelles Krisen-Charakteristikum, dassin derartigenunsicheren Zeiten die Bargeldnachfrage unabhängig von der speziellen Art der Krise immer ansteigt. Dahinterstehen sowohl Transaktions - als auch Hortungsmotive. Die völlig elastische Befriedigung dieser Nachfrage durch die Zentralbanken hilft die jeweilige Situation zu beruhigen und die Unsicherheit zu reduzieren. Vor diesem Hintergrund sind Forderungen nach der Abschaffung von Bargeld äußerst kritisch zu sehen.
To broaden the operational scope of monetary policy, several authors suggest cash abolition as an appropriate means of breaking through the zero lower-bound. We argue that the welfare costs of bypassing the zero lower-bound by getting rid of cash entirely are analytically equivalent to negative interest rates on cash holdings. Using a money-in-the-utility-function model, we measure in two ways the welfare loss consumers as money holders would be forced to bear once the zero lower-bound is broken: in terms of the amount needed to compensate consumers (compensated variation), and as excess burden (deadweight loss) imposed on the economy as a whole. We calibrated the model for the euro area and for Germany. Our findings suggest that the welfare losses of negative interest rates incurred by consumers as holders of cash and transaction balances (M3) are large and enduring, notably if implemented in the current low-interest rate environment.
In this paper, we endeavour to determine the volume of euro banknotes issued by Germany that is in circulation outside Germany. In so doing, we draw a distinction between banknotes outstanding in non-euro-area countries and those that are in circulation in other euro-area countries. The analysis is based on approaches that estimate the volume of banknotes in circulation outside Germany indirectly. The observation period runs from 2002 to 2009. We discover that, at the end of 2009, a total of roughly two-thirds of Germany's cumulated net issuance of euro banknotes was in circulation outside Germany. The lion's share of roughly €160 billion was in non-euro-area countries, with the remaining €80 billion in other euro-area countries. Thus, the volume of German euro banknotes in circulation in Germany accounted for only roughly one-third of all banknotes issued by the Deutsche Bundesbank (€350 billion). This confirms the results of direct approaches.
In dem vorliegenden Papier versuchen wir den Bestand der Euro-Banknoten zu ermitteln, der sich von der deutschen Banknotenemission im Ausland befindet. Dabei unterscheiden wir nach Beständen, die außerhalb des Euro-Währungsraumes gehalten werden, und solchen, die in anderen Ländern der EWU zirkulieren. Die Analyse basiert auf Ansätzen, die den Auslandsumlauf auf indirektem Wege abschätzen. Der Untersuchungszeitraum reicht von 2002 bis 2009. Wir finden heraus, dass Ende 2009 insgesamt rund zwei Drittel der deutschen kumulierten Nettoemissionen im Ausland umliefen. Der größte Teil, etwa 160 Mrd. €, befand sich außerhalb des Euro-Raums, der Rest - 80 Mrd. € - lief in anderen EWU-Ländern um. Somit entsprach der Inlandsumlauf deutscher Euro-Banknoten nur rund einem Drittel aller von der Bundesbank in Höhe von 350 Mrd. € in Umlauf gegebenen Banknoten. Damit werden die Ergebnisse direkter Ansätze bestätigt.
The present paper provides an overview on current developments of cash usage and issue of central bank digital currency (CBDC) in the euro area and proposes a possible design of a digital euro that allows for instant offline payments. Cash usage at the point-of-sale decreased perceptibly in the past years mainly due to the ongoing trend towards digitalization. However, we show that there are also indications that consumers were somewhat pushed into cashless payments by government regulations and supply-side restrictions by commercial banks. Nonetheless, overall demand for euro cash remained strong and even increased relative to GDP since the financial crisis in 2008. In this process, however, we observe a supply-driven shift towards lower banknote denominations. Central banks all over the world are intensively thinking about the potential issue of CBDC as a substitute or complement to cash. Based on some of its preferred characteristics, we propose a double pre-paid scheme combining central elements of TARGET Instant Payment Settlement and electronic money features enabling offline and online instant payments. Since anonymity is categorically discarded by the ECB and as cash has some special advantages from a consumer perspective, the digital euro will rather co-circulate with cash than replace it in transactions.
This paper focuses on the role of specific types of crisis (technological crisis, financial market crisis, natural disaster) and their effects on the demand for cash in an international context. As evidence from the last 30 years shows, demand for cash increases during periods of crisis, regardless of the nature of the crisis. The nature of the crisis does, however, determine whether small or large banknote denominations are affected more. This study finds that times of payment uncertainties are associated with increased demand for small denominations, probably reflecting an elevated demand for transaction balances. By contrast, in times of financial crisis or general economic uncertainty, the increased demand for cash is largely the result of consumers taking precautionary actions and building up non-transaction balances; for this reason, there is greater demand for large banknote denominations. This study finds that cash continues to play an important role in crisis management. Whether this function can also be fulfilled by a future central bank digital currency, however, remains to be seen.
