<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<export-example>
  <doc>
    <id>2988</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2021</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber>20</pageNumber>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>conferenceobject</type>
    <publisherName/>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2021-05-01</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Automated Threat Evaluation of Automotive Diagnostic Protocols</title>
    <abstract language="eng">Diagnostic protocols in automotive systems can offer a huge attack surface with devastating impacts if vulnerabilities are present. This paper shows the application of active automata learning techniques for reverse engineering system state machines of automotive systems. The developed black-box testing strategy is based on diagnostic protocol communication. Through this approach, it is possible to automatically investigate a highly increased attack surface. Based on a new metric, introduced in this paper, we are able to rate the possible attack surface of an entire vehicle or a single Electronic Control Unit (ECU). A novel attack surface metric allows comparisons of different ECUs from different Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), even between different diagnostic protocols. Additionally, we demonstrate the analysis capabilities of our graph-based model to evaluate an ECUs possible attack surface over a lifetime.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">ESCAR USA, 2021, Virtual</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="urn">urn:nbn:de:bvb:898-opus4-29882</identifier>
    <enrichment key="Kostentraeger">IUK-1711-0018</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">publish</enrichment>
    <licence>Keine Lizenz - Es gilt das deutsche Urheberrecht: § 53 UrhG</licence>
    <author>Nils Weiss</author>
    <author>Sebastian Renner</author>
    <author>Jürgen Mottok</author>
    <author>Václav Matoušek</author>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Automotive Diagnostic Protocols</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Security Metrics</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Automated Network Scan</value>
    </subject>
    <collection role="institutes" number="FakEI">Fakultät Elektro- und Informationstechnik</collection>
    <collection role="othforschungsschwerpunkt" number="16311">Digitalisierung</collection>
    <collection role="institutes" number="">Laboratory for Safe and Secure Systems (LAS3)</collection>
    <thesisPublisher>Ostbayerische Technische Hochschule Regensburg</thesisPublisher>
    <file>https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-oth-regensburg/files/2988/ESCARPaper.pdf</file>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>1001</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2020</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst>1</pageFirst>
    <pageLast>8</pageLast>
    <pageNumber/>
    <edition/>
    <issue>7</issue>
    <volume/>
    <type>conferenceobject</type>
    <publisherName/>
    <publisherPlace>Feldkirchen</publisherPlace>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2021-02-03</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Transport Layer Scanning for Attack Surface Detection in Vehicular Networks</title>
    <abstract language="deu">In the beginning of every security analysis or penetration test of a system, information about the target has to be gathered. On IT-Systems a port scan is usually performed as a first step of an investigation. Since the communication protocols differ in automotive systems, generic port scanning tools can’t be used for a security analysis of CANs.&#13;
More complex protocols have a higher likelihood of implementation errors and bugs. On CAN networks, such payloads are transferred through International Standard Transport Protocol (ISO-TP) communication. We designed a new methodology to identify ISO-TP endpoints in automotive networks. Every of these endpoints can provide exploitable application layer protocols and therefor has to be considered during penetration testing and security analysis.&#13;
&#13;
We contribute a new scan approach for the automated evaluation of possible attack surfaces in automotive CAN networks which has a higher coverage and multiple advantages than state of the art approaches.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">CSCS '20: Computer Science in Cars Symposium</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="doi">10.1145/3385958.3430476</identifier>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">publish</enrichment>
    <author>Nils Weiss</author>
    <author>Sebastian Renner</author>
    <author>Jürgen Mottok</author>
    <author>Václav Matoušek</author>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>automotive networks</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>network scan</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>attack surface detection</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>automation</value>
    </subject>
    <collection role="ddc" number="005">Computerprogrammierung, Programme, Daten</collection>
    <collection role="institutes" number="FakEI">Fakultät Elektro- und Informationstechnik</collection>
    <collection role="othforschungsschwerpunkt" number="16311">Digitalisierung</collection>
    <collection role="institutes" number="">Laboratory for Safe and Secure Systems (LAS3)</collection>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>2514</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2018</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber/>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>conferenceobject</type>
    <publisherName/>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2022-01-22</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">A Survey on Media Access Solutions for CAN Penetration Testing</title>
    <abstract language="eng">Controller Area Network (CAN) is still the most used network technology in today's connected cars. Now and in the near future, penetration tests in the area of automotive security will still require tools for CAN media access. More and more open source automotive penetration tools and frameworks are presented by researchers on various conferences, all with different properties in terms of usability, features and supported use-cases. Choosing a proper tool for security investigations in automotive network poses a challenge, since lots of different solutions are available. This paper compares currently available CAN media access solutions and gives advice on competitive hard-and software tools for automotive penetration testing.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="deu">ACM Computer Science in Cars Symposium (CSCS), 2nd, 2018, Munich, Germany</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="url">https://cscs.mpi-inf.mpg.de/files/2018/09/05-A-Survey-on-Media-Access-Solutions-for-CAN-Penetration-Testing.pdf // 10.1145/3273946.3273949</identifier>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">publish</enrichment>
    <licence>Keine Lizenz - Es gilt das deutsche Urheberrecht: § 53 UrhG</licence>
    <author>Enrico Pozzobon</author>
    <author>Nils Weiss</author>
    <author>Sebastian Renner</author>
    <author>Rudolf Hackenberg</author>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>CAN</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Penetration Testing</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Benchmarks</value>
    </subject>
    <collection role="institutes" number="FakIM">Fakultät Informatik und Mathematik</collection>
    <collection role="othforschungsschwerpunkt" number="16311">Digitalisierung</collection>
    <collection role="institutes" number="">Labor Informationssicherheit und Complience (ISC)</collection>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>2530</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2017</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst>131</pageFirst>
    <pageLast>135</pageLast>
    <pageNumber/>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>conferenceobject</type>
    <publisherName>IARIA</publisherName>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2022-01-22</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Extending Vehicle Attack Surface Through Smart Devices</title>
    <abstract language="eng">Modern cars include more and more features that first emerged from the consumer electronics industry. Technologies like Bluetooth and Internet-connected services found their way into the vehicle industry. The secure implementation of these functions presents a great challenge for the manufacturers because products originating from the consumer industry can often not be easily transferred to the safety-sensitive traffic environment due to security concerns. However, common automotive interfaces like the diagnostics port are now also used to implement new services into the car. With dongles designed to read out certain vehicle data and transfer it to the Internet via the cellular network, the owner can access information about gas consumption or vehicle location through a mobile phone app, even when he is away from the car. This paper wants to emphasize new threats that appear due to the ongoing interconnection in modern cars by discussing the security of the diagnostics interface in combination with the use of an Internet-connected dongle. Potential attack vectors, as well as proof-of-concept exploits will be shown and the implications of security breaches on the safe state of the vehicle will be investigated.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">SECURWARE 2017 : The Eleventh International Conference on Emerging Security Information, Systems and Technologies, 11th, 2017, Rome, Italy</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="url">https://www.thinkmind.org/articles/securware_2017_8_10_38014.pdf</identifier>
    <identifier type="isbn">978-1-61208-582-1</identifier>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">publish</enrichment>
    <licence>Keine Lizenz - Es gilt das deutsche Urheberrecht: § 53 UrhG</licence>
    <author>Rudolf Hackenberg</author>
    <author>Nils Weiss</author>
    <author>Sebastian Renner</author>
    <author>Enrico Pozzobon</author>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>On-Board-Diagnostics</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Cellular Network</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Automotive Security</value>
    </subject>
    <collection role="ddc" number="621">Angewandte Physik</collection>
    <collection role="institutes" number="FakIM">Fakultät Informatik und Mathematik</collection>
    <collection role="othforschungsschwerpunkt" number="16315">Information und Kommunikation</collection>
    <collection role="institutes" number="">Labor Informationssicherheit und Complience (ISC)</collection>
  </doc>
</export-example>
