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  <doc>
    <id>2525</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2019</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber/>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>conferencepresentation</type>
    <publisherName/>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2022-01-22</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">SIM SIMulator</title>
    <abstract language="deu">Der Vortrag präsentierte ein Tool, das die Simulation einer SIM-Karte durch einen Standard-Mikrocontroller ermöglicht. Mit diesem Täuschungsmanöver kann die Authentifizierung des 3G-Mobilfunkstandards seitens der SIM-Karte umgangen werden. Tritt zusätzliche Hardware hinzu, die eine 3G-Basisstation vortäuscht, lässt sich eine Man-in-the-Middle-Attacke im 3G-Netz durchführen.&#13;
&#13;
In diesem Szenario ist es möglich, die sensiblen Kommunikationsdaten, also den gesamten Datenverkehr beispielsweise zwischen einem Pkw und den Backend-Servern des Herstellers, auszulesen und zu untersuchen. Zudem eignet sich das Tool zum Pentesten von Modems oder SIM- beziehungsweise Smartcard-Applikationen. Der komplette Aufbau des sogenannten SIMulators ist als Open-Source-Software frei verfügbar und auf GitHub abrufbar.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="deu">IT Security Conference Troopers19, 2019, Heidelberg, Germany</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="url">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC8UsCy4zVE</identifier>
    <identifier type="url">https://intra.fh-regensburg.de/en/our-university/aktuelles/detail/news/einbruchsicherheit-fuer-die-vernetzte-zukunft.html</identifier>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">publish</enrichment>
    <licence>Keine Lizenz - Es gilt das deutsche Urheberrecht: § 53 UrhG</licence>
    <author>Sebastian Renner</author>
    <author>Enrico Pozzobon</author>
    <collection role="institutes" number="FakIM">Fakultät Informatik und Mathematik</collection>
    <collection role="othforschungsschwerpunkt" number="16315">Information und Kommunikation</collection>
    <collection role="institutes" number="">Labor Informationssicherheit und Complience (ISC)</collection>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>1303</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2019</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber/>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>conferenceobject</type>
    <publisherName/>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2021-02-07</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Benchmarking Software Implementations of 1st Round Candidates of the NIST LWC Project on Microcontrollers</title>
    <abstract language="eng">This paper introduces a custom framework for benchmarking software implementations from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)  Lightweight  Cryptography  (LWC)  project  on  embedded  devices. We present the design and core functions of the framework and apply it to various NIST LWC authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) ciphers. Altogether, we evaluate the speed of 213 submitted algorithm vari-ants on four different microcontroller units (MCUs), including 32 bit ARM and 8 bit AVR architectures.  To allow a more meaningful comparison, we also conduct code size tests on all four boards and RAM utilization tests on one test platform.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">3rd Lightweight Cryptography Workshop at NIST, Gaithersburg, USA</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="url">https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Events/lightweight-cryptography-workshop-2019/documents/papers/benchmarking-software-implementations-lwc2019.pdf</identifier>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">publish</enrichment>
    <author>Sebastian Renner</author>
    <author>Enrico Pozzobon</author>
    <author>Jürgen Mottok</author>
    <author>Rudolf Hackenberg</author>
    <collection role="institutes" number="FakEI">Fakultät Elektro- und Informationstechnik</collection>
    <collection role="institutes" number="FakIM">Fakultät Informatik und Mathematik</collection>
    <collection role="othforschungsschwerpunkt" number="16311">Digitalisierung</collection>
    <collection role="institutes" number="">Labor Informationssicherheit und Complience (ISC)</collection>
    <collection role="institutes" number="">Laboratory for Safe and Secure Systems (LAS3)</collection>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>2514</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2018</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber/>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>conferenceobject</type>
    <publisherName/>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2022-01-22</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">A Survey on Media Access Solutions for CAN Penetration Testing</title>
    <abstract language="eng">Controller Area Network (CAN) is still the most used network technology in today's connected cars. Now and in the near future, penetration tests in the area of automotive security will still require tools for CAN media access. More and more open source automotive penetration tools and frameworks are presented by researchers on various conferences, all with different properties in terms of usability, features and supported use-cases. Choosing a proper tool for security investigations in automotive network poses a challenge, since lots of different solutions are available. This paper compares currently available CAN media access solutions and gives advice on competitive hard-and software tools for automotive penetration testing.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="deu">ACM Computer Science in Cars Symposium (CSCS), 2nd, 2018, Munich, Germany</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="url">https://cscs.mpi-inf.mpg.de/files/2018/09/05-A-Survey-on-Media-Access-Solutions-for-CAN-Penetration-Testing.pdf // 10.1145/3273946.3273949</identifier>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">publish</enrichment>
    <licence>Keine Lizenz - Es gilt das deutsche Urheberrecht: § 53 UrhG</licence>
    <author>Enrico Pozzobon</author>
    <author>Nils Weiss</author>
    <author>Sebastian Renner</author>
    <author>Rudolf Hackenberg</author>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>CAN</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Penetration Testing</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Benchmarks</value>
    </subject>
    <collection role="institutes" number="FakIM">Fakultät Informatik und Mathematik</collection>
    <collection role="othforschungsschwerpunkt" number="16311">Digitalisierung</collection>
    <collection role="institutes" number="">Labor Informationssicherheit und Complience (ISC)</collection>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>2530</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2017</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst>131</pageFirst>
    <pageLast>135</pageLast>
    <pageNumber/>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>conferenceobject</type>
    <publisherName>IARIA</publisherName>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2022-01-22</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Extending Vehicle Attack Surface Through Smart Devices</title>
    <abstract language="eng">Modern cars include more and more features that first emerged from the consumer electronics industry. Technologies like Bluetooth and Internet-connected services found their way into the vehicle industry. The secure implementation of these functions presents a great challenge for the manufacturers because products originating from the consumer industry can often not be easily transferred to the safety-sensitive traffic environment due to security concerns. However, common automotive interfaces like the diagnostics port are now also used to implement new services into the car. With dongles designed to read out certain vehicle data and transfer it to the Internet via the cellular network, the owner can access information about gas consumption or vehicle location through a mobile phone app, even when he is away from the car. This paper wants to emphasize new threats that appear due to the ongoing interconnection in modern cars by discussing the security of the diagnostics interface in combination with the use of an Internet-connected dongle. Potential attack vectors, as well as proof-of-concept exploits will be shown and the implications of security breaches on the safe state of the vehicle will be investigated.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">SECURWARE 2017 : The Eleventh International Conference on Emerging Security Information, Systems and Technologies, 11th, 2017, Rome, Italy</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="url">https://www.thinkmind.org/articles/securware_2017_8_10_38014.pdf</identifier>
    <identifier type="isbn">978-1-61208-582-1</identifier>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">publish</enrichment>
    <licence>Keine Lizenz - Es gilt das deutsche Urheberrecht: § 53 UrhG</licence>
    <author>Rudolf Hackenberg</author>
    <author>Nils Weiss</author>
    <author>Sebastian Renner</author>
    <author>Enrico Pozzobon</author>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>On-Board-Diagnostics</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Cellular Network</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Automotive Security</value>
    </subject>
    <collection role="ddc" number="621">Angewandte Physik</collection>
    <collection role="institutes" number="FakIM">Fakultät Informatik und Mathematik</collection>
    <collection role="othforschungsschwerpunkt" number="16315">Information und Kommunikation</collection>
    <collection role="institutes" number="">Labor Informationssicherheit und Complience (ISC)</collection>
  </doc>
</export-example>
