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  <doc>
    <id>5527</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2022</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber>4</pageNumber>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>conferenceobject</type>
    <publisherName>IEEE</publisherName>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>--</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">An optimized Bitsliced Masked Adder for ARM Thumb-2 Controllers</title>
    <abstract language="eng">The modular addition is used as a non-linear operation in ARX ciphers because it achieves the requirement of introducing non-linearity in a cryptographic primitive while only taking one clock cycle to execute on most modern architectures. This makes ARX ciphers especially fast in software implementations, but comes at the cost of making it harder to protect against side-channel information leakages using Boolean masking: the best known 2-shares masked adder for ARM Thumb micro-controllers takes 83 instructions to add two 32-bit numbers together. Our approach is to operate in bitsliced mode, performing 32 additions in parallel on a 32-bit microcontroller. We show that, even after taking into account the cost of bitslicing before and after the encryption, it is possible to achieve a higher throughput on the tested ciphers (CRAX and ChaCha20) when operating in bitsliced mode. Furthermore, we prove that no first-order information leakage is happening in either simulated power traces and power traces acquired from real hardware, after sufficient countermeasures are put into place to guard against pipeline leakages.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">27th International Conference on Applied Electronics (AE): Sep 6, 2022 - Sep 7, 2022, Pilsen, Czech Republic</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="doi">10.1109/AE54730.2022.9919884</identifier>
    <enrichment key="BegutachtungStatus">peer-reviewed</enrichment>
    <licence>Keine Lizenz - Es gilt das deutsche Urheberrecht: § 53 UrhG</licence>
    <author>Enrico Pozzobon</author>
    <author>Sebastian Renner</author>
    <author>Jürgen Mottok</author>
    <author>Václav Matoušek</author>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>ARM Thumb</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>bitsliced</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>side-channel</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Boolean masking</value>
    </subject>
    <collection role="institutes" number="FakEI">Fakultät Elektro- und Informationstechnik</collection>
    <collection role="othforschungsschwerpunkt" number="16311">Digitalisierung</collection>
    <collection role="institutes" number="">Laboratory for Safe and Secure Systems (LAS3)</collection>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>5579</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2022</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber/>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>conferencesummary</type>
    <publisherName>National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)</publisherName>
    <publisherPlace>Gaithersburg</publisherPlace>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2022-11-14</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">3rd Round Ciphers Evaluation on Microcontrollers</title>
    <parentTitle language="eng">Lightweight Cryptography Workshop (virtual): May 9-11 2022</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="url">https://www.nist.gov/video/day-1-part-2-lightweight-cryptography-workshop-2022</identifier>
    <enrichment key="BegutachtungStatus">begutachtet</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="Kostentraeger">2056071</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">publish</enrichment>
    <licence>Keine Lizenz - Es gilt das deutsche Urheberrecht: § 53 UrhG</licence>
    <author>Sebastian Renner</author>
    <author>Enrico Pozzobon</author>
    <author>Jürgen Mottok</author>
    <collection role="institutes" number="FakEI">Fakultät Elektro- und Informationstechnik</collection>
    <collection role="othforschungsschwerpunkt" number="16315">Information und Kommunikation</collection>
    <collection role="institutes" number="">Laboratory for Safe and Secure Systems (LAS3)</collection>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>5632</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2022</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst>1</pageFirst>
    <pageLast>20</pageLast>
    <pageNumber/>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>conferenceobject</type>
    <publisherName>Springer Nature</publisherName>
    <publisherPlace>Cham</publisherPlace>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>--</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">The Final Round: Benchmarking NIST LWC Ciphers on Microcontrollers</title>
    <abstract language="eng">In this work, we present our benchmarking results for the ten finalist ciphers of the Lightweight Cryptography (LWC) project initiated by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). We evaluate the speed and code size of various software implementations on five different platforms featuring four different architectures. Moreover, we benchmark the dynamic memory utilization of the remaining NIST LWC algorithms on one 32-bit ARM controller. We describe our test cases and methodology and provide some information regarding the design and properties of the finalists before showing and discussing our results. Altogether, we evaluated almost 300 implementations of the 3rd round candidates and pick the most appropriate and best (primary) implementation of each cipher for our comparisons. We include a variant of AES-GCM in our benchmarking in order to be able to compare the state-of-the-art to the novel LWC ciphers. Our research gives an overview over the performance of the latest software implementations of the NIST LWC finalists and shows under which circumstances which candidate is performing the best in our individual test cases. Additionally, we make all benchmarking results, the code for our test framework and every tested implementation available to the public to ensure a transparent testing process.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">Attacks and Defenses for the Internet-of-Things, 5th International Workshop, ADIoT 2022: Copenhagen, Denmark, September 30, 2022, Revised Selected Papers</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="isbn">978-3-031-21311-3</identifier>
    <identifier type="doi">10.1007/978-3-031-21311-3_1</identifier>
    <enrichment key="opus.import.date">2022-12-14T15:14:57+00:00</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">sword</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.import.user">importuser</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="OtherSeries">Lecture Notes in Computer Science ; 13745</enrichment>
    <licence>Keine Lizenz - Es gilt das deutsche Urheberrecht: § 53 UrhG</licence>
    <author>Sebastian Renner</author>
    <author>Enrico Pozzobon</author>
    <author>Jürgen Mottok</author>
    <collection role="institutes" number="FakEI">Fakultät Elektro- und Informationstechnik</collection>
    <collection role="othforschungsschwerpunkt" number="16311">Digitalisierung</collection>
    <collection role="institutes" number="">Laboratory for Safe and Secure Systems (LAS3)</collection>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>5634</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2022</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst>21</pageFirst>
    <pageLast>40</pageLast>
    <pageNumber/>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>conferenceobject</type>
    <publisherName>Springer Nature</publisherName>
    <publisherPlace>Cham</publisherPlace>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>--</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Evolving a Boolean Masked Adder Using Neuroevolution</title>
    <abstract language="eng">The modular addition is a popular building block when designing lightweight ciphers. While algorithms mainly based on the addition can reach very high performance, masking their implementations results in a huge penalty. Since efficient protection against side-channel attacks is a requirement in lots of use cases, we focus on optimizing the Boolean masking of the modular addition. Contrary to recent related work, we target evolving a masked full adder instead of parts of a parallel prefix adder. We study how techniques typically found in neural network evolution and genetic algorithms can be adapted in order to help in evolving an efficiently masked adder. We customize a well-known neuroevolution algorithm, develop an optimized masked adder with our new approach and implement the ChaCha20 cipher on an ARM Cortex-M3 controller. We compare the performance of the protected neuroevolved implementation to solutions found by traditional search methods. Moreover, the leakage of our new solution is validated by a t-test conducted with a leakage simulator. We present under which circumstances our masked implementation outperforms related work and prove the feasibility of successfully using neuroevolution when searching for complex Boolean networks.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">Attacks and Defenses for the Internet-of-Things, 5th International Workshop, ADIoT 2022: Copenhagen, Denmark, September 30, 2022, Revised Selected Papers</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="isbn">978-3-031-21310-6</identifier>
    <identifier type="doi">10.1007/978-3-031-21311-3_2</identifier>
    <enrichment key="opus.import.date">2022-12-14T15:14:57+00:00</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">sword</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.import.user">importuser</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="OtherSeries">Lecture Notes in Computer Science ; 13745</enrichment>
    <licence>Keine Lizenz - Es gilt das deutsche Urheberrecht: § 53 UrhG</licence>
    <author>Sebastian Renner</author>
    <author>Enrico Pozzobon</author>
    <author>Jürgen Mottok</author>
    <collection role="institutes" number="FakEI">Fakultät Elektro- und Informationstechnik</collection>
    <collection role="othforschungsschwerpunkt" number="16311">Digitalisierung</collection>
    <collection role="institutes" number="">Laboratory for Safe and Secure Systems (LAS3)</collection>
  </doc>
</export-example>
