@inproceedings{WeissRennerMottoketal., author = {Weiss, Nils and Renner, Sebastian and Mottok, J{\"u}rgen and Matoušek, V{\´a}clav}, title = {Automated Threat Evaluation of Automotive Diagnostic Protocols}, series = {ESCAR USA, 2021, Virtual}, booktitle = {ESCAR USA, 2021, Virtual}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:898-opus4-29882}, pages = {20}, abstract = {Diagnostic protocols in automotive systems can offer a huge attack surface with devastating impacts if vulnerabilities are present. This paper shows the application of active automata learning techniques for reverse engineering system state machines of automotive systems. The developed black-box testing strategy is based on diagnostic protocol communication. Through this approach, it is possible to automatically investigate a highly increased attack surface. Based on a new metric, introduced in this paper, we are able to rate the possible attack surface of an entire vehicle or a single Electronic Control Unit (ECU). A novel attack surface metric allows comparisons of different ECUs from different Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), even between different diagnostic protocols. Additionally, we demonstrate the analysis capabilities of our graph-based model to evaluate an ECUs possible attack surface over a lifetime.}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{WeissRennerMottoketal., author = {Weiss, Nils and Renner, Sebastian and Mottok, J{\"u}rgen and Matoušek, V{\´a}clav}, title = {Transport Layer Scanning for Attack Surface Detection in Vehicular Networks}, series = {CSCS '20: Computer Science in Cars Symposium}, booktitle = {CSCS '20: Computer Science in Cars Symposium}, number = {7}, address = {Feldkirchen}, doi = {10.1145/3385958.3430476}, pages = {1 -- 8}, abstract = {In the beginning of every security analysis or penetration test of a system, information about the target has to be gathered. On IT-Systems a port scan is usually performed as a first step of an investigation. Since the communication protocols differ in automotive systems, generic port scanning tools can't be used for a security analysis of CANs. More complex protocols have a higher likelihood of implementation errors and bugs. On CAN networks, such payloads are transferred through International Standard Transport Protocol (ISO-TP) communication. We designed a new methodology to identify ISO-TP endpoints in automotive networks. Every of these endpoints can provide exploitable application layer protocols and therefor has to be considered during penetration testing and security analysis. We contribute a new scan approach for the automated evaluation of possible attack surfaces in automotive CAN networks which has a higher coverage and multiple advantages than state of the art approaches.}, language = {en} } @article{WeissPozzobonMottoketal., author = {Weiss, Nils and Pozzobon, Enrico and Mottok, J{\"u}rgen and Matoušek, V{\´a}clav}, title = {Automated Reverse Engineering of CAN Protocols}, series = {Neural Network World}, volume = {31}, journal = {Neural Network World}, number = {4}, issn = {1210-0552}, doi = {10.14311/NNW.2021.31.015}, pages = {279 -- 295}, abstract = {Car manufacturers define proprietary protocols to be used inside their vehicular networks, which are kept an industrial secret, therefore impeding independent researchers from extracting information from these networks. This article describes a statistical and a neural network approach that allows reverse engineering proprietary controller area network (CAN)-protocols assuming they were designed using the data base CAN (DBC) file format. The proposed algorithms are tested with CAN traces taken from a real car. We show that our approaches can correctly reverse engineer CAN messages in an automated manner.}, language = {en} }