@misc{RennerPozzobonMottok, author = {Renner, Sebastian and Pozzobon, Enrico and Mottok, J{\"u}rgen}, title = {Current and Future Efforts in Benchmarking NIST LWC Ciphers}, series = {4th Lightweight Cryptography Workshop 2020 at NIST, Gaithersburg, USA}, journal = {4th Lightweight Cryptography Workshop 2020 at NIST, Gaithersburg, USA}, language = {en} } @misc{RennerPozzobon, author = {Renner, Sebastian and Pozzobon, Enrico}, title = {SIM SIMulator}, series = {IT Security Conference Troopers19, 2019, Heidelberg, Germany}, journal = {IT Security Conference Troopers19, 2019, Heidelberg, Germany}, abstract = {Der Vortrag pr{\"a}sentierte ein Tool, das die Simulation einer SIM-Karte durch einen Standard-Mikrocontroller erm{\"o}glicht. Mit diesem T{\"a}uschungsman{\"o}ver kann die Authentifizierung des 3G-Mobilfunkstandards seitens der SIM-Karte umgangen werden. Tritt zus{\"a}tzliche Hardware hinzu, die eine 3G-Basisstation vort{\"a}uscht, l{\"a}sst sich eine Man-in-the-Middle-Attacke im 3G-Netz durchf{\"u}hren. In diesem Szenario ist es m{\"o}glich, die sensiblen Kommunikationsdaten, also den gesamten Datenverkehr beispielsweise zwischen einem Pkw und den Backend-Servern des Herstellers, auszulesen und zu untersuchen. Zudem eignet sich das Tool zum Pentesten von Modems oder SIM- beziehungsweise Smartcard-Applikationen. Der komplette Aufbau des sogenannten SIMulators ist als Open-Source-Software frei verf{\"u}gbar und auf GitHub abrufbar.}, language = {en} } @misc{WeissPozzobon, author = {Weiss, Nils and Pozzobon, Enrico}, title = {IOT Backdoors in Cars}, series = {IT Security Conference Troopers19, 2019, Heidelberg, Germany}, journal = {IT Security Conference Troopers19, 2019, Heidelberg, Germany}, abstract = {Connecting cheap IoT devices to the safety-critical network of a car can be an extremely bad idea, but at least it allows us to hack together our own automotive gadget. This talk explains the complete procedure involved in transforming a cheap OBD GSM dongle designed for fleet management into a open source automotive hacking tool. First, the hardware reverse engineering is demonstrated, showing how each component is interconnected and working together. With this knowledge, it was possible to capture the communication of the GSM module and understand the OTA protocol used by this dongle, which can be used to extract the firmware. A quick reverse engineering of the software will show that no cryptographic authentication is used for the OTA updates, and therefore a pirate GSM BTS can be used to obtain remote code execution. After that, a new open source firmware is written for the device, which can easily be extended and controlled remotely with the LUA scripting language. Examples on how hacking this dongle remotely can affect the safety of the driver will be also given.}, language = {en} } @misc{WeissPozzobon, author = {Weiss, Nils and Pozzobon, Enrico}, title = {Automotive Penetration Testing with Scapy}, series = {IT Security Conference Troopers19, 2019, Heidelberg, Germany}, journal = {IT Security Conference Troopers19, 2019, Heidelberg, Germany}, abstract = {This talk will provide a general overview on how Scapy can be used for automotive penetration testing. All present features of Scapy for automotive penetration will be introduced and explained. Also an overview of higher level automotive protocols will be given. As automotive penetration testing becomes more important, the lack of free tools for automotive network penetration testing led us to integrate new features in Scapy. Scapy is a well established framework for packet manipulation. The flexibility of Scapy allowed us to implement automotive interfaces (CAN) and automotive protocols (ISOTP, GMLAN, UDS, DoIP, OBD-II). This talk explains the basics of these automotive protocols, the workflow with Scapy for automotive network penetration testing. A live demonstration with some embedded hardware will be given.}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{RennerPozzobonMottok, author = {Renner, Sebastian and Pozzobon, Enrico and Mottok, J{\"u}rgen}, title = {A Hardware in the Loop Benchmark Suite to Evaluate NIST LWC Ciphers on Microcontrollers}, series = {Information and Communications Security: 22nd International Conference, ICICS 2020, Copenhagen, Denmark, August 24-26, 2020, Proceedings}, booktitle = {Information and Communications Security: 22nd International Conference, ICICS 2020, Copenhagen, Denmark, August 24-26, 2020, Proceedings}, editor = {Meng, Weizhi}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Cham}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-61078-4_28}, pages = {495 -- 509}, abstract = {The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) started the standardization process for lightweight cryptography algorithms in 2018. By the end of the first round, 32 submissions have been selected as 2nd round candidates. NIST allowed designers of 2nd round submissions to provide small updates on both their specifications and implementation packages. In this work, we introduce a benchmarking framework for evaluating the performance of NIST Lightweight Cryptography (LWC) candidates on embedded platforms. We show the features and application of the framework and explain its design rationale. Moreover, we provide information on how we aim to present up-to-date performance figures throughout the NIST LWC competition. In this paper, we present an excerpt of our software benchmarking results regarding speed and memory requirements of selected ciphers. All up-to-date results, including benchmarking different test cases for multiple variants of each 2nd round algorithm on five different microcontrollers, are periodically published to a public website. While initially only the reference implementations were available, the ability of automatically testing the performance of the candidate algorithms on multiple platforms becomes especially relevant as more optimized implementations are developed. Finally, we show how the framework can be extended in different directions: support for more target platforms can be easily added, different kinds of algorithms can be tested, and other test metrics can be acquired. The focus of this paper should rather lay on the framework design and testing methodology than on the current results, especially for reference code.}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{RennerPozzobonMottoketal., author = {Renner, Sebastian and Pozzobon, Enrico and Mottok, J{\"u}rgen and Hackenberg, Rudolf}, title = {Benchmarking Software Implementations of 1st Round Candidates of the NIST LWC Project on Microcontrollers}, series = {3rd Lightweight Cryptography Workshop at NIST, Gaithersburg, USA}, booktitle = {3rd Lightweight Cryptography Workshop at NIST, Gaithersburg, USA}, abstract = {This paper introduces a custom framework for benchmarking software implementations from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Lightweight Cryptography (LWC) project on embedded devices. We present the design and core functions of the framework and apply it to various NIST LWC authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) ciphers. Altogether, we evaluate the speed of 213 submitted algorithm vari-ants on four different microcontroller units (MCUs), including 32 bit ARM and 8 bit AVR architectures. To allow a more meaningful comparison, we also conduct code size tests on all four boards and RAM utilization tests on one test platform.}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{PozzobonWeissRenneretal., author = {Pozzobon, Enrico and Weiss, Nils and Renner, Sebastian and Hackenberg, Rudolf}, title = {A Survey on Media Access Solutions for CAN Penetration Testing}, series = {ACM Computer Science in Cars Symposium (CSCS), 2nd, 2018, Munich, Germany}, booktitle = {ACM Computer Science in Cars Symposium (CSCS), 2nd, 2018, Munich, Germany}, abstract = {Controller Area Network (CAN) is still the most used network technology in today's connected cars. Now and in the near future, penetration tests in the area of automotive security will still require tools for CAN media access. More and more open source automotive penetration tools and frameworks are presented by researchers on various conferences, all with different properties in terms of usability, features and supported use-cases. Choosing a proper tool for security investigations in automotive network poses a challenge, since lots of different solutions are available. This paper compares currently available CAN media access solutions and gives advice on competitive hard-and software tools for automotive penetration testing.}, language = {en} } @article{WeissPozzobonMottoketal., author = {Weiss, Nils and Pozzobon, Enrico and Mottok, J{\"u}rgen and Matoušek, V{\´a}clav}, title = {Automated Reverse Engineering of CAN Protocols}, series = {Neural Network World}, volume = {31}, journal = {Neural Network World}, number = {4}, issn = {1210-0552}, doi = {10.14311/NNW.2021.31.015}, pages = {279 -- 295}, abstract = {Car manufacturers define proprietary protocols to be used inside their vehicular networks, which are kept an industrial secret, therefore impeding independent researchers from extracting information from these networks. This article describes a statistical and a neural network approach that allows reverse engineering proprietary controller area network (CAN)-protocols assuming they were designed using the data base CAN (DBC) file format. The proposed algorithms are tested with CAN traces taken from a real car. We show that our approaches can correctly reverse engineer CAN messages in an automated manner.}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{HackenbergWeissRenneretal., author = {Hackenberg, Rudolf and Weiss, Nils and Renner, Sebastian and Pozzobon, Enrico}, title = {Extending Vehicle Attack Surface Through Smart Devices}, series = {SECURWARE 2017 : The Eleventh International Conference on Emerging Security Information, Systems and Technologies, 11th, 2017, Rome, Italy}, booktitle = {SECURWARE 2017 : The Eleventh International Conference on Emerging Security Information, Systems and Technologies, 11th, 2017, Rome, Italy}, publisher = {IARIA}, isbn = {978-1-61208-582-1}, pages = {131 -- 135}, abstract = {Modern cars include more and more features that first emerged from the consumer electronics industry. Technologies like Bluetooth and Internet-connected services found their way into the vehicle industry. The secure implementation of these functions presents a great challenge for the manufacturers because products originating from the consumer industry can often not be easily transferred to the safety-sensitive traffic environment due to security concerns. However, common automotive interfaces like the diagnostics port are now also used to implement new services into the car. With dongles designed to read out certain vehicle data and transfer it to the Internet via the cellular network, the owner can access information about gas consumption or vehicle location through a mobile phone app, even when he is away from the car. This paper wants to emphasize new threats that appear due to the ongoing interconnection in modern cars by discussing the security of the diagnostics interface in combination with the use of an Internet-connected dongle. Potential attack vectors, as well as proof-of-concept exploits will be shown and the implications of security breaches on the safe state of the vehicle will be investigated.}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{PozzobonRennerMottoketal., author = {Pozzobon, Enrico and Renner, Sebastian and Mottok, J{\"u}rgen and Matoušek, V{\´a}clav}, title = {An optimized Bitsliced Masked Adder for ARM Thumb-2 Controllers}, series = {27th International Conference on Applied Electronics (AE): Sep 6, 2022 - Sep 7, 2022, Pilsen, Czech Republic}, booktitle = {27th International Conference on Applied Electronics (AE): Sep 6, 2022 - Sep 7, 2022, Pilsen, Czech Republic}, publisher = {IEEE}, doi = {10.1109/AE54730.2022.9919884}, pages = {4}, abstract = {The modular addition is used as a non-linear operation in ARX ciphers because it achieves the requirement of introducing non-linearity in a cryptographic primitive while only taking one clock cycle to execute on most modern architectures. This makes ARX ciphers especially fast in software implementations, but comes at the cost of making it harder to protect against side-channel information leakages using Boolean masking: the best known 2-shares masked adder for ARM Thumb micro-controllers takes 83 instructions to add two 32-bit numbers together. Our approach is to operate in bitsliced mode, performing 32 additions in parallel on a 32-bit microcontroller. We show that, even after taking into account the cost of bitslicing before and after the encryption, it is possible to achieve a higher throughput on the tested ciphers (CRAX and ChaCha20) when operating in bitsliced mode. Furthermore, we prove that no first-order information leakage is happening in either simulated power traces and power traces acquired from real hardware, after sufficient countermeasures are put into place to guard against pipeline leakages.}, language = {en} } @misc{RennerPozzobonMottok, author = {Renner, Sebastian and Pozzobon, Enrico and Mottok, J{\"u}rgen}, title = {3rd Round Ciphers Evaluation on Microcontrollers}, series = {Lightweight Cryptography Workshop (virtual): May 9-11 2022}, journal = {Lightweight Cryptography Workshop (virtual): May 9-11 2022}, publisher = {National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)}, address = {Gaithersburg}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{RennerPozzobonMottok, author = {Renner, Sebastian and Pozzobon, Enrico and Mottok, J{\"u}rgen}, title = {The Final Round: Benchmarking NIST LWC Ciphers on Microcontrollers}, series = {Attacks and Defenses for the Internet-of-Things, 5th International Workshop, ADIoT 2022: Copenhagen, Denmark, September 30, 2022, Revised Selected Papers}, booktitle = {Attacks and Defenses for the Internet-of-Things, 5th International Workshop, ADIoT 2022: Copenhagen, Denmark, September 30, 2022, Revised Selected Papers}, editor = {Li, Wenjuan and Furnell, Steven and Meng, Weizhi}, publisher = {Springer Nature}, address = {Cham}, isbn = {978-3-031-21311-3}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-21311-3_1}, pages = {1 -- 20}, abstract = {In this work, we present our benchmarking results for the ten finalist ciphers of the Lightweight Cryptography (LWC) project initiated by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). We evaluate the speed and code size of various software implementations on five different platforms featuring four different architectures. Moreover, we benchmark the dynamic memory utilization of the remaining NIST LWC algorithms on one 32-bit ARM controller. We describe our test cases and methodology and provide some information regarding the design and properties of the finalists before showing and discussing our results. Altogether, we evaluated almost 300 implementations of the 3rd round candidates and pick the most appropriate and best (primary) implementation of each cipher for our comparisons. We include a variant of AES-GCM in our benchmarking in order to be able to compare the state-of-the-art to the novel LWC ciphers. Our research gives an overview over the performance of the latest software implementations of the NIST LWC finalists and shows under which circumstances which candidate is performing the best in our individual test cases. Additionally, we make all benchmarking results, the code for our test framework and every tested implementation available to the public to ensure a transparent testing process.}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{RennerPozzobonMottok, author = {Renner, Sebastian and Pozzobon, Enrico and Mottok, J{\"u}rgen}, title = {Evolving a Boolean Masked Adder Using Neuroevolution}, series = {Attacks and Defenses for the Internet-of-Things, 5th International Workshop, ADIoT 2022: Copenhagen, Denmark, September 30, 2022, Revised Selected Papers}, booktitle = {Attacks and Defenses for the Internet-of-Things, 5th International Workshop, ADIoT 2022: Copenhagen, Denmark, September 30, 2022, Revised Selected Papers}, editor = {Li, Wenjuan and Furnell, Steven and Meng, Weizhi}, publisher = {Springer Nature}, address = {Cham}, isbn = {978-3-031-21310-6}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-21311-3_2}, pages = {21 -- 40}, abstract = {The modular addition is a popular building block when designing lightweight ciphers. While algorithms mainly based on the addition can reach very high performance, masking their implementations results in a huge penalty. Since efficient protection against side-channel attacks is a requirement in lots of use cases, we focus on optimizing the Boolean masking of the modular addition. Contrary to recent related work, we target evolving a masked full adder instead of parts of a parallel prefix adder. We study how techniques typically found in neural network evolution and genetic algorithms can be adapted in order to help in evolving an efficiently masked adder. We customize a well-known neuroevolution algorithm, develop an optimized masked adder with our new approach and implement the ChaCha20 cipher on an ARM Cortex-M3 controller. We compare the performance of the protected neuroevolved implementation to solutions found by traditional search methods. Moreover, the leakage of our new solution is validated by a t-test conducted with a leakage simulator. We present under which circumstances our masked implementation outperforms related work and prove the feasibility of successfully using neuroevolution when searching for complex Boolean networks.}, language = {en} } @article{PozzobonWeissMottoketal., author = {Pozzobon, Enrico and Weiß, Nils and Mottok, J{\"u}rgen and Matoušek, V{\´a}clav}, title = {An evolutionary fault injection settings search algorithm for attacks on safe and secure embedded systems}, series = {Neural Network World (NNW)}, volume = {33}, journal = {Neural Network World (NNW)}, number = {5}, publisher = {Czech Technical University in Prague}, doi = {10.14311/NNW.2023.33.020}, pages = {357 -- 374}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{PozzobonWeissMottoketal., author = {Pozzobon, Enrico and Weiß, Nils and Mottok, J{\"u}rgen and Matoušek, V{\´a}clav}, title = {Fuzzy fault injection attacks against secure automotive bootloaders}, series = {21th escar Europe : The World's Leading Automotive Cyber Security Conference (Hamburg, 15. - 16.11.2023)}, booktitle = {21th escar Europe : The World's Leading Automotive Cyber Security Conference (Hamburg, 15. - 16.11.2023)}, publisher = {Ruhr-Universit{\"a}t Bochum}, doi = {10.13154/294-10381}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:hbz:294-103817}, pages = {20}, abstract = {Secure embedded bootloaders are the trust anchors for modern vehicles' software. The secure software update process of ECUs is well-defined across the entire automotive industry. Every OEM has his own implementation, but follows the general software update process. This paper demonstrates code execution attacks by combining software and hardware weaknesses in secure automotive bootloaders. The attack can be performed entirely automated, no static code analysisis required. Random fault injection parameters were sufficient to obtain code execution in a reasonable time. All experiments were conducted with electromagnetic fault injection and without any hardware modifications of the targets. We successfully performed our attack on two entirely different gateway Electronic Control Units (ECUs) used in current vehicles (at the time of this research) from Volkswagen and BMW. As a result of this attack, consisting of a combination of a hardware and asoftware attack, the general secure software update process used in the automotive industry needs to be revised.}, language = {en} }