@unpublished{GaubeJussupowKokjeetal., author = {Gaube, Susanne and Jussupow, Ekaterina and Kokje, Eesha and Khan, Jowaria and Bondi-Kelly, Elizabeth and Schicho, Andreas and Kitamura, Felipe Campos and Koch, Timo Kevin and Ezer, Timur and Mottok, J{\"u}rgen and Lermer, Eva and Ghassemi, Marzyeh and Colak, Errol}, title = {Examining Reliance Patterns on AI Advice in Medical Imaging: a Mixed-Methods Randomized Crossover Experiment}, doi = {10.31219/osf.io/4wv8j_v3}, pages = {20}, abstract = {Background: Artificial intelligence (AI) holds significant potential to support diagnostic decision-making; however, evidence regarding its clinical utility remains mixed. Often, the collaboration between clinicians and AI systems does not surpass the individual performance of unaided humans or standalone AI. Yet, currently, the mechanisms that limit human-AI synergy are poorly understood. This study examined the impact of AI advice on diagnostic decision-making among experts and novices, focusing on reliance patterns. Methods: We used a mixed-methods crossover experimental design with a think-aloud and an eye-tracking study arm. Participants were 50 task experts (radiologists) and 75 novices (non-radiologist physicians and medical trainees) from 10 countries. They reviewed 50 head CT scans and every case was examined in three time-separate sessions in randomized order. In each session, participants were exposed to different experimental conditions: (a) control, no AI prediction; (b) basic advice, AI prediction without annotations; and (c) XAI advice, AI prediction with scan annotations. For each case, participants had to determine if the patients had an intracranial hemorrhage (ICH). The main outcomes were diagnostic performance, confidence in the diagnosis, case reading time, and AI advice usefulness ratings. Findings: Both overreliance on incorrect advice and underreliance on correct advice occurred. Underreliance was associated with high uncertainty and, in absolute terms, had a more detrimental impact on diagnostic performance than overreliance. Correct XAI advice reduced underreliance, improved performance (OR=1·84, p<0·0001), and confidence (b=0·15, p<0·0001), particularly when reviewing more difficult cases with ICH. Surprisingly, correct XAI did not reduce reading time (b=1·81, p=0·0713). XAI was perceived as more useful than basic AI advice (b=0·12, p=0·0029), especially among novices. Interpretation: The occurrence of both under- and overreliance highlights the need for efficient counterstrategies beyond classic XAI methods to foster appropriate reliance and synergy.}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{PozzobonWeissMottoketal., author = {Pozzobon, Enrico and Weiß, Nils and Mottok, J{\"u}rgen and Matoušek, V{\´a}clav}, title = {Fuzzy fault injection attacks against secure automotive bootloaders}, series = {21th escar Europe : The World's Leading Automotive Cyber Security Conference (Hamburg, 15. - 16.11.2023)}, booktitle = {21th escar Europe : The World's Leading Automotive Cyber Security Conference (Hamburg, 15. - 16.11.2023)}, publisher = {Ruhr-Universit{\"a}t Bochum}, doi = {10.13154/294-10381}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:hbz:294-103817}, pages = {20}, abstract = {Secure embedded bootloaders are the trust anchors for modern vehicles' software. The secure software update process of ECUs is well-defined across the entire automotive industry. Every OEM has his own implementation, but follows the general software update process. This paper demonstrates code execution attacks by combining software and hardware weaknesses in secure automotive bootloaders. The attack can be performed entirely automated, no static code analysisis required. Random fault injection parameters were sufficient to obtain code execution in a reasonable time. All experiments were conducted with electromagnetic fault injection and without any hardware modifications of the targets. We successfully performed our attack on two entirely different gateway Electronic Control Units (ECUs) used in current vehicles (at the time of this research) from Volkswagen and BMW. As a result of this attack, consisting of a combination of a hardware and asoftware attack, the general secure software update process used in the automotive industry needs to be revised.}, language = {en} }