Stationary Equilibria in Discounted Stochastic Games with Weakly Interacting Players
Please always quote using this URN:urn:nbn:de:0296-matheon-887
- We give sufficient conditions for a non-zero sum discounted stochastic game with compact and convex action spaces and with norm-continuous transition probabilities, but with possibly unbounded state space, to have a Nash equilibrium in homogeneous Markov strategies that depends in a Lipschitz continuous manner on the current state. If the underlying state space is compact this yields the existence of a stationary equilibrium. Stochastic games with weakly interacting players provide a probabilistic framework within which to study strategic behavior in models of non-market interactions.
Author: | Ulrich Horst |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:0296-matheon-887 |
Referee: | Hans Föllmer |
Document Type: | Preprint, Research Center Matheon |
Language: | English |
Date of first Publication: | 2004/02/13 |
Release Date: | 2004/02/13 |
Institute: | Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin |
Technische Universität Berlin | |
Preprint Number: | 80 |