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Stationary Equilibria in Discounted Stochastic Games with Weakly Interacting Players

Please always quote using this URN:urn:nbn:de:0296-matheon-887
  • We give sufficient conditions for a non-zero sum discounted stochastic game with compact and convex action spaces and with norm-continuous transition probabilities, but with possibly unbounded state space, to have a Nash equilibrium in homogeneous Markov strategies that depends in a Lipschitz continuous manner on the current state. If the underlying state space is compact this yields the existence of a stationary equilibrium. Stochastic games with weakly interacting players provide a probabilistic framework within which to study strategic behavior in models of non-market interactions.

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Metadaten
Author:Ulrich Horst
URN:urn:nbn:de:0296-matheon-887
Referee:Hans Föllmer
Document Type:Preprint, Research Center Matheon
Language:English
Date of first Publication:2004/02/13
Release Date:2004/02/13
Institute:Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Technische Universität Berlin
Preprint Number:80
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