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This thesis focuses on the current SOE reform ambitions of the Xi administration which envisaged the creation of state-owned capital management systems to reform China´s SOE sector. While SOEs, as suggested in the recent reform catalogues issued by the CCP are supposed to be divided into commercially and non-commercially driven, this thesis intends to analyse whether the envisaged state-owned capital management systems can improve the performance of Chinese SOEs which are classified as commercial. If the implementation of capital management systems will be successful largely depends on the corporate environment of SOEs. Principal-agent and free-rider problems as well as soft-budget constraints, which most of the SOEs are subject to can hamper a successful implementation. Thus, in order to neither become a redundant institution nor amplifying existing institutional problems the question is: how should state-owned capital management systems be organized and operated in order to curb institutional problems to the greatest extent possible? To answer this question, the thesis examines if the Singaporean Temasek Holdings, often rewarded for its outstanding corporate governance practices, can serve as a role model for the creation of state-owned capital management systems in China. Therefore, the environment under which Temasek Holdings operate as well as its organizational structure and the government-linked companies (GLC) it manages will be examined, to point out the reasons for the exceptional sound corporate governance practices of Singapore´s state-owned sector. This thesis asserts that the Singaporean Temasek approach can serve as a potential role model for the creation of state-owned capital management system in China, but only when several institutional preconditions are fulfilled that create an environment that allows capital management systems to unfold their power and reduce institutional problems to the minimum level possible while the state remains the ultimate power. These preconditions only can be fulfilled if the Chinese government is willed to gradually withdraw from the management of SOEs and is ready to concede more autonomy to the directors and managers of SOEs by introducing more independent directors and create an institutional framework that promotes sound corporate governance practices.