In einem Interview mit der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung überträgt Jordan Bardella seine innenpolitische Strategie auf die Europapolitik: meist sanft im Ton, dem ersten Eindruck nach unklar in der Sache. Was beruhigend wirken soll, beißt sich mit den Folgen, die das Programm des Rassemblement National (RN) hätte. Es offenbart ein strategisches Dilemma, das die Partei auch im Wahlkampf begleiten wird.
Navigating the 2027 French elections – Campaigns, electoral systems, and power constellations
(2026)
France is heading into a pivotal election year. With a far-right candidate leading the polls, all eyes are on the presidential elections in the EU’s second largest economy and founding member state. At the end of a campaign marked by high uncertainty, winning the presidency would only be a first step: a president without a majority in the National Assembly would have limited room to govern. The legislative elections that will most probably follow will be just as decisive. Should the far right prevail, if it is to implement its programme it would also need to win a referendum that would entail sweeping changes to the French constitution and a negation of the primacy of EU law. All these elements will lead to one of four possible power constellations in France, shaping its approach to the European Union.
Europe's green transition is expected to generate a substantial increase in demand for critical raw materials (the same holds true for the digital transformation that lies outside this inquiry). European firms heavily rely on imports for these minerals, with a significant amount coming from China. This geospatial concentration of supply chains exposes Europe's climate and green industrial policies to significant geopolitical risks. This complex of issues prompted the European Commission to introduce the Critical Raw Material Act in March 2023. Albeit a valuable addition to Europe’s strategic autonomy agenda, the Act does not rise to the scale of the challenge. Internally, it aims to develop a European value chain for critical raw materials by streamlining permitting processes without committing any new funds. Externally, it reframes existing trade instruments and partnership initiatives without providing a step-by-step schedule for tapping into new sources of supply. If the EU is intent on reducing its vulnerabilities it must recognize that resilience comes with a price tag. It needs to marshal meaningful European funding and administrative support provisions, set realistic diversification requirements for European companies via regulation, and back its external trade and partnership strategies with convincing resources.
The French Council Presidency in the first half of 2022 comes at an important time. While many European dossiers such as the Digital Markets Act or the climate package „Fitfor55“ are waiting for decisive impulses and successfully conducted negotiations, presidential and parliamentary elections will take place in France from April on. President Macron will therefore use the first three months of the Council Presidency intensively to set political accents, to advance the European project and to make his mark in the French election campaign. The elections will then be the beginning of a technocratic phase of the Council Presidency in which few results are to be expected.
La présidence française du Conseil de l’UE au premier semestre 2022 aura lieu
dans un contexte très particulier. Alors que de nombreux dossiers européens,
tels la législation sur les services numériques ou le paquet « Fitfor55 » pour
la protection du climat, doivent être finalisés, la France se verra face à des
élections présidentielles et législatives à partir d’avril. Emmanuel Macron devra
donc mettre à profit les trois premiers mois de cette présidence pour marquer
ses priorités politiques, faire avancer le projet européen et se démarquer lors
de la campagne électorale pour se faire réélire. Les élections présidentielles
marqueront la fin de cette première phase de la présidence du Conseil, qui sera
suivie par une phase technocratique, où peu de décisions d’envergure sont
attendues au niveau européen.
There can be no European security agenda without France and Germany.
To shape this agenda and get others on board, they need to converge on the challenges they wish to tackle and the means to do that. This policy brief reviews the degree of Franco-German convergence while focusing on three issues: geopolitical assessment, strategic cultures, and capability development. We find that strategic convergence often goes hand in hand with tactical divergence. To be able to shape Europe’s security agenda in the short- to medium-term, deeper Franco-German convergence and more inclusive co-leadership will be needed
At a time when the world is facing the unprecedented challenge of a pandemic and a variety of other pressing global issues, the EU needs to assert a new geopolitical identity and reshape its relations with international players, in particular Africa and China. On the basis of recommendations formulated by a group of distinguished European, African and Chinese experts, this policy paper proposes an EU strategic agenda for cooperation with Africa and China. The ambitious trilateral cooperation strategy is centred around three policy areas: health, economic development, good governance and security.