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Bureaucratic influence on public policies is both necessary and potentially problematic for democratic governance. However, surprisingly little is known about how ministerial bureaucracies exercise their policy autonomy (or influence potential) in executive policymaking. This dissertation investigates under what conditions policy bureaucracies have high policy autonomy in policy formulation. It focuses on the role of lead ministerial departments in policy formulation in parliamentary democracies. From an organizational perspective and in a case-oriented research design, it analyzes two dimensions of ministerial policy autonomy: 1. Under what conditions lead ministries successfully realize their policy preferences in policy proposals and 2. under what conditions these ministerial policy proposals prevail throughout executive coordination. Based on comparative case studies on the design of a technical, low-salience waste policy provision in the French and German environment ministries, this study finds that ministerial drafts do not always reflect the policy position of the lead ministry. Instead, the realization of ministerial policy positions in ministerial drafts depends on their ability to mobilize political support or expertise in favor of their policy proposal. They do so based on their organizational interests in anticipation of opposition from political executives and stakeholders. Second, based on a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of German policy proposals, this dissertation finds that technical and low-salience ministerial policy proposals tend to prevail throughout executive coordination. In contrast, coalition partners hold each other to account in executive coordination on politically salient cross-cutting reforms leading to major edits of ministerial drafts. Overall, the findings indicate a surprisingly moderate ministerial policy autonomy in consensual parliamentary systems of government. The relative policy autonomy of the policy bureaucracy and political executives over policy proposals depends on the type of policy, i.e. their complexity, political salience to the coalition government, and alignment with bureaucratic interests. This points to a functioning democratic control of ministerial bureaucracies in policy formulation. Further research is needed, however, to better understand the substantive policy preferences of policy bureaucracies, how they exercise their organizational role of balancing political preferences, stakeholder interests, and professional expertise and how the organizational structure, politicization and civil service systems of ministerial bureaucracies affect ministerial policy autonomy in practice.
Implementation of cohesion policy funds in the EU member states – who gets what, when and how?
(2025)
This cumulative dissertation investigates which driving forces shape the national distribution of EU cohesion policy funds. Despite the important role that distributive policies play in the EU’s governance framework, drivers beyond administrative and government capacity have been neglected in previous EU implementation research. Consequently, this dissertation aims to contribute to a more detailed understanding of the national implementation phase of EU funds. Adopting a political science perspective, three concepts are tested for EU distributive policies that have so far been primarily applied to domestic funds, namely vote-buying strategies, policy continuity, and non-demand. The three separate analyses explore on the distribution of cohesion policy funds across regions, budgetary priorities, and beneficiaries. Cohesion policy funds are chosen as a relevant and appropriate case due to their important financial volume, their long-standing implementation in all member states, and their interesting variance in implementation during the Covid-19 pandemic. The dissertation draws on qualitative and quantitative methods, spanning from interviews conducted in one region to statistical analyses including all EU member states.
The findings are threefold. First, the analysis shows that vote-buying strategies do not explain the allocation of cohesion policy funds across EU regions. Despite the extraordinary discretion of the national governments in the studied Covid-19 recovery programme REACT-EU, electorally opportune regions are not targeted with these cohesion policy funds. Second, policy continuity characterizes the budgetary choices of national governments during the implementation phase. Even though the national political and socioeconomic context changes, national governments largely adhere to past budgetary priorities. Third, a lack of applications from potential beneficiary organisations can be a challenge despite adequate administrative capacity. Non-demand mainly results from unawareness of the offers, a too high administrative burden, and a low need for additional funding.
In brief, the findings indicate that even with adequate government and administrative capacities, inherent processes and third parties have a larger impact on the distribution of EU funds than deliberate political actions and strategies. The results of the dissertation provide avenues for future EU implementation research but are also of interest for reforms of the cohesion policy funds and the development of new EU distributive policies.
In 1999, a group of member states of the European Union launched a common currency, the euro. The political weight and institutional set-up of this group have prompted fears that eurozone members might dominate non-members. This thesis studies political dynamics between members and non-members of the eurozone. Specifically, it explores to what extent eurozone membership explains negotiation performance in the Council of the European Union – the core arena for negotiations among member states. To this end, the thesis uses an original dataset of 303 negotiations conducted under the co-decision procedure between 1999 and 2016.
The thesis makes a two-fold theoretical argument. First, it is argued that eurozone members have an incentive to build “minimum winning coalitions” under exclusion of non-members, as this increases their gains in Council negotiations. Secondly, this process is enabled by the institutional setup of exclusive eurozone-only bodies, most importantly the Eurogroup. On this basis, it is hypothesized that eurozone members should have a higher probability of inclusion in a winning coalition in the Council (H1), especially in the Economic and Financial Affairs (ECOFIN) Council (H2), but perhaps also in other Council configurations (H3). It is furthermore hypothesized that inclusion of eurozone members in winning coalitions increased during the euro crisis (H4).
Contrary to theoretical expectations, the analysis yields four null findings. Eurozone members were not more likely to be included in winning coalitions, independently if a proposal was negotiated in the ECOFIN Council or other Council configurations, and regardless if negotiations took place during the euro crisis.
The thesis provides a possible explanation for this puzzling finding. An analysis of coalition patterns reveals that eurozone members were too divided to exercise their collective influence in the Council. Rather than acting as a cohesive bloc, eurozone states were split internally along traditional cleavages structuring conflict in the Council.