Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Article (20)
- Part of a Book (5)
- Doctoral Thesis (4)
- Working Paper (3)
- Book (1)
Language
- English (33)
Keywords
- Agenda-setting, European Commission, legislation, politicisation, depoliticisation, withdrawals (1)
- Bargaining success, codecision, early agreements, party groups, presidency, rapporteur (1)
- Bicameralism, codecision, legitimacy, political system (1)
- Cohesion, early agreements, European Parliament, ordinary legislative procedure, political groups (1)
- European Parliament, fast-track legislation, informal politics, functionalist institutionalism, distributive bargaining, socialization (1)
- European integration, institutional reform, legitimacy, multilevel polity, values (1)
- agenda-setting; European Commission; politicisation; priorities; responsiveness (1)
- deliberative democracy, deliberation, democratic innovation, democratization, deliberative systems, political theory (1)
How to Negotiate under Co-decision in the EU: Reforming Trilogues and First-Reading Agreements
(2012)
Enlargement and treaty reform have moved Europe's constitutional debate into the political spotlight. This important new text outlines the main themes of constitutional debate in the EU, analyzes formal and informal constitution-building since the early days of European integration, and introduces the actors and structures behind treaty change
This chapter examines the European Union’s institutional design and how its institutions interact with national institutions in five different policy modes. It first considers the evolving role and internal functioning of the European Commission, Council of the EU, European Council, European Parliament, and Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). It also discusses quasi-autonomous agencies, in particular the European Central Bank (ECB), institutionalized control and scrutiny, and non-state actors. It concludes with an analysis of five EU policy modes that capture the different patterns of interaction between EU and national institutions: the classical Community method, the regulatory mode, the distributional mode, the policy coordination mode, and intensive transgovernmentalism.
This contribution conceptualises bottom-up politicisation in Europe’s multi-level system. EU-level actors, we argue, respond strategically to the functional and political pressures ‘travelling up’ from the member states. Perceiving domestic dissensus as either constraining or enabling, actors display both self-restraint and assertiveness in their responses. Motivated by the survival of the EU as a system ‘under attack’, and by the preservation of their own substantive and procedural powers, actors choose to either politicise or depoliticise decision-making, behaviour and policy outcomes at the supranational level. As a collection, this Special Issue demonstrate that the choices actors make ‘under stress’ at the EU-level – ranging from ‘restrained depoliticisation’ to ‘assertive politicisation’ – are, indeed, conditional on how bottom-up pressures are perceived and processed.
The European Union (EU) has experienced a remarkable degree of change during its history: it legislates in an ever wider range of policy areas, and its institutions and decision-making processes have been reformed repeatedly. One of the most important institutional changes was the introduction of the codecision procedure in 1993, which empowered the European Parliament (EP) and transformed the EU system of governance. Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon the majority of legislation is now subject to codecision under the ordinary legislative procedure. Consequently, the operation of codecision has major implications for our understanding and analysis of the EU's legislative outputs and for studies of supranational policy-making and systemic evolution more generally. This collection takes stock of 20 years of practising and studying codecision and examines the procedure's long-term implications for the EU's institutions, politics and policies.
Calls to ratify the Lisbon Treaty by referendum have been countered with arguments about the Treaty's ‘non‐constitutional’ nature. Against this backdrop, this article asks how much ‘constitution’ is left in the new document. To answer this question, I assert that little is gained by classifying the Treaty in toto as a ‘European constitution’ or as the epitome of its failure. Instead, I develop an analytical framework that disaggregates the concept of constitution into its formal, material and symbolic functions, and systematically assess how far Lisbon would strengthen (or weaken) Europe's constitutional quality. The article suggests that, rather than transferring new competences to Brussels or making a constitutional saut qualitatif, Lisbon moderately bolsters the Treaties' formal functions; yet, in contrast to the Constitutional Treaty it adds little in material terms and is a decisive setback symbolically. Calls for ratification by referendum justified by the reform's extent are therefore ill‐founded.
The impact of informalisation: Early agreements and voting cohesion in the European Parliament
(2016)
European Union legislative decision-making is increasingly shifted into informal secluded arenas. Scholars have explained this trend and analysed its consequences for bargaining success and democratic legitimacy. Yet, we know little about how informalisation affects legislative behaviour in the European Parliament. This article contributes to closing the gap, by theorising and analysing the impact of ‘early agreements’ on cohesion. Given the reputational, political and transaction costs of failing an early agreement in plenary, we expect political groups to invest heavily in discipline and consensus, and legislators to comply in votes. Using a new dataset, combining Hix et al.’s (2007) roll-call data with original codecision data (1999–2011), we show that informalisation increases cohesion but only for centrist parties. Rapporteurships and votes on ‘costly’ legislative resolutions also matter, but do not mediate the effect of early agreement.