Centre for Digital Governance
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Digitalkultur in der Verwaltung: Begriffliche Grundlagen, Operationalisierung und Spannungsfelder
(2026)
• Das Working Paper klärt, was Organisationskultur und Digitalkultur im Verwaltungskontext bedeuten und wie Digitalkultur empirisch untersucht werden kann.
• Kultur wird als dynamisches Muster aus Praktiken, Werten, Normen und Grundannahmen verstanden – akteursgetragen, institutionell eingebettet und verwaltungsspezifisch geprägt.
• Digitalkultur ist keine eigene Kulturform und keine bloße Digitalkompetenz, sondern eine Perspektive auf Organisationskultur unter Bedingungen der Digitalisierung.
• Operationalisiert wird Digitalkultur über drei Ebenen: sichtbare Artefakte und Praktiken, organisationale Werte sowie tieferliegende Grundannahmen.
• Zentrale Spannungsfelder betreffen Effektivität und Verantwortung, nicht intendierte Folgen von Kulturwandel, Zurechenbarkeit und digitale Steuerung sowie die Frage, welche öffentlichen Werte digitale Innovation leiten.
• Digitalkultur in der Verwaltung ist eine Übersetzungsleistung: Digitale Werte und Praktiken müssen mit Rechtsbindung, Rechenschaft, Leistungsanforderungen und demokratisch-rechtsstaatlichen Leitplanken vermittelt werden.
This study compares governance structures, policy formulation and implementation of administrative digitalization at the local level in three countries with different administrative traditions: France, Germany and the United Kingdom. A new analytical framework is developed that allows for a systematic comparison of administrative digitalization in different national contexts. To this end, we draw on concepts from comparative public administration and public policy analysis and assess whether and how national political and institutional contexts and ‘initial conditions’ influence local administrative digitalization. Three distinct models of governance are identified that reflect specific administrative traditions: a centralized and coordinated approach in France, a fragmented and multilevel system in Germany, and a centralized and decoupled model in the United Kingdom. Despite these differences, all countries priorities a policy‐making model based on voluntary participation and incentive systems in the digitalization of municipal administration. In terms of the results of the reforms, there are notable differences between countries: high digital maturity in the United Kingdom, medium and low levels of maturity in Germany and France. The continuation of capacity differences is also emphasized, with growing digital divides between municipalities.
Research on the governance of digital platforms has concentrated on technology companies as intermediaries. This article analyzes the emergence of societal actors as new intermediaries in the governance of digital platforms in the European Union. What forms of intermediation evolve during the implementation of data access under the Digital Services Act? Based on semi-structured interviews, the article compares Germany and Ireland as key countries. It concludes that regulators in both countries rely on researchers as intermediaries in order to strengthen capacity for implementation. This research introduces new ways to capture and understand the role of the state and society in governance of digital platforms.
This study investigates how labeling AI-generated content (AIGC) influences users’ perceptions of authenticity in social media environments. Motivated by emerging global regulations mandating the disclosure of AI-generated media, we designed a pre registered survey experiment to test two main questions: (1) Do AI labels reduce the perceived authenticity of AI-generated images? (2) Does exposure to labeled content affect perceived authenticity in unlabeled images (a potential spillover effect)? The pre-analysis plan and materials are available on OSF (see link below). We conducted a survey experiment with a German sample (N = 877) in which participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups: a control group without labels, a process-based label group (“AI-generated”), or a harm-based label group (“Misleading”). Participants viewed twelve Instagram-style posts, six of which contained AI-generated or AI-altered content. Perceived authenticity was measured by asking whether the depicted events actually occurred. Our results show that both labeling strategies significantly reduced perceived authenticity of AI-generated images, with average reductions of about 0.27 standard deviations. We also find evidence of an implied authenticity effect: exposure to labeled content slightly increased perceived authenticity in unlabeled images (about one-fifth the size of the direct labeling effect). Exploratory analyses indicate that internet skills and age are associated with perceived authenticity differences. By embedding labels in Instagram-style posts, our study increases ecological validity compared to earlier work focused on headlines or generic stimuli. Situated in Germany, a frontrunner in digital platform regulation, the findings provide rare non-U.S. evidence on AI labeling and contribute directly to ongoing policy debates.
Deceptive online networks are coordinated efforts that use identity deception to pursue strategic political or financial goals. During the US 2020 elections, these networks reached at least 37 million Facebook and 3 million Instagram users, representing 15% and 2% of the platforms’ active US adult users, respectively. Only 3 networks out of 49—1 network with explicitly political aims and 2 that appeared to use politics as a lure for profit—were responsible for over 70% of users reached. Notably, accounts unaffiliated with the networks played an important role in facilitating this reach by resharing content the three networks produced. Deceptive networks, regardless of whether their goals were political or financial, reached users who were older, more conservative, more frequently exposed to content from untrustworthy sources, and spent more time on Facebook.
Evaluative social interactions are pervasive in labor markets. Inequality in these settings can arise not only from how individuals are treated or perform when evaluated, but from whether they enter evaluation at all. We study these margins in the context of social anxiety. In a controlled online experiment (N = 922), applicants decide whether to complete a live video interview that determines a monetary hiring bonus. We find that inequities associated with social anxiety are concentrated in participation rather than in performance or treatment. Socially anxious applicants are substantially less willing to interview, hold more pessimistic beliefs about being hired, and correctly anticipate a worse experience. Yet they perform no worse and are evaluated no differently. Interview experience does not attenuate the relative pessimism of socially anxious individuals, a pattern that is inconsistent with Bayesian updating under comparable signals. We use our rich audio-visual data and open-ended reflection texts to show that, instead, socially anxious applicants interpret similar interactions more negatively. We then provide evidence on organizational interventions aimed at closing social anxiety gaps. Finally, we show that social anxiety explains a meaningful share of inequalities commonly attributed to gender and social skill differences and is associated with significant earnings gaps in national data.
We conduct an experiment that engages U.S. Democrats and Republicans in video conversations about policy-relevant facts. We study self-selection into conversations and their effect on information aggregation and affective polarization. Participants prefer co-partisan conversations, believing cross-partisan conversations to be less informative and less pleasant. There is more to learn from counter-partisans, but participants find it harder to extract knowledge from them. Our rich audiovisual data reveal that coand cross-partisan conversations are strikingly similar in content and tone. Yet, knowledge extraction is impeded by participants’ persistent lack of trust in the knowledge of counter-partisans. In contrast, cross-partisan interactions prove more enjoyable than anticipated and significantly reduce affective polarization, an effect that persists in an obfuscated follow-up survey three months later. More emotionally engaged conversations produce larger reductions in affective polarization. Policies encouraging cross-partisan interactions may be more successful at reducing affective polarization than at promoting information aggregation.
The concept of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) has been key to understanding and identifying information control operations. We argue that this concept overlooks two central aspects: the attribution to state actors and, relatedly, understanding the role of non-state actors. This working paper therefore analyses how and to what extent Chinese actors facilitate information control practices inside the country, but with a larger focus outside of China, especially inside the European Union (EU). We show that information control takes place across four dimensions: information production, information dissemination, information salience and within the Chinese diaspora.
Over recent years knowledge production on China has declined, as researchers face mounting constraints both within China and in their countries of residence. Restricted access, pressure on collaborators, and the growing politicisation of research environments have all contributed to a reduction in the availability and quality of empirical data, particularly on sensitive topics. As a result, scholars, policymakers, and the wider public are left with a more limited and less reliable evidence base for understanding developments in China.
These pressures arise from a combination of state and non-state actors, as well as broader political dynamics shaping research environments globally. Addressing them will require stronger protections for academic freedom, increased support for independent research, and policies that safeguard open and critical inquiry. Ensuring robust knowledge production remains essential for evidence-based policymaking and informed public debate.
