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The legal order is the legitimate foundation of liberal democracy. Its incomplete enforcement of the law can therefore appear dysfunctional, reflecting weak institutions, state capture, and corrupt practices. This paper casts doubt on such categorical assessments by systematically examining the reasons for and intentions behind incomplete enforcement. It argues that law enforcement is part of the political process that is deeply affected by the constellation of actors concerned. Choices over law enforcement produce social order that is analytically distinct from the production of legal norms and their formal implementation. By analyzing different types of partial enforcement, its rationales, and intended effects, we propose an approach that studies law enforcement as an integral part of public policy analysis and of the study of socioeconomic orders.
When Ursula von der Leyen spoke about a “Geopolitical Commission” when she took office in 2019, the disruption brought about by the year 2020 could not quite be predicted.
Faced with the world’s upheavals, caught up in between Sino-American rivalry, it is essential to assess and question the Union’s position in the world and its perspectives for the future. At the heart of this endeavour is a debate on the meaning of European strategic autonomy.
As part of the Groupe d’études géopolitiques’ publications, following a major interview with the French President and a long analysis written by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, we have asked some twenty scholars, observers and experts from multiple horizons, nationalities and fields of expertise to position themselves on a scale from 0 (“the EU has become less strategically autonomous”) to 5 (“the EU has become more strategically autonomous”), explaining their mark with a short text
A Rejoinder by the Author
(2016)
Large companies are increasingly on trial. Over the last decade, many of the world’s biggest firms have been embroiled in legal disputes over corruption charges, financial fraud, environmental damage, taxation issues or sanction violations, ending in convictions or settlements of record-breaking fines, well above the billion-dollar mark. For critics of globalization, this turn towards corporate accountability is a welcome sea-change showing that multinational companies are no longer above the law. For legal experts, the trend is noteworthy because of the extraterritorial dimensions of law enforcement, as companies are increasingly held accountable for activities independent of their nationality or the place of the activities. Indeed, the global trend required understanding the evolution of corporate criminal law enforcement in the United States in particular, where authorities have skillfully expanded its effective jurisdiction beyond its territory. This paper traces the evolution of corporate prosecutions in the United States. Analyzing federal prosecution data, it then shows that foreign firms are more likely to pay a fine, which is on average 6,6 times larger.
Usages et travail politiques : une sociologie compréhensive des usages de l’intégration européenne
(2004)
Conclusion
(2004)
What role do firms play in the making of EU trade policy? This article surveys the policy domain and lays out the instruments firms can employ to influence decisions on trade. It underlines that European
trade policy is characterized by a high degree of institutional complexity, which firms have to manage in order to be successful. In particular, the European Commission works intensively to solicit business input in order to gain bargaining leverage vis-à-vis third countries and the EU member states. This reverse lobbying creates a two-channel logic of trade policy lobbying in the EU. Corporate actors have a very good chance of working closely with the European Commission if they can propose pan-European trade policy solutions. This can be either trade liberalization or EU-wide regulatory restrictions on trade. Demands for traditional protectionist measures, especially those that reveal national interest divergences, are difficult to defend at the supranational level. Protectionist lobbying therefore goes through the national route, with corporate actors working to block liberalization by affecting the consensus in the Council of Ministers. The chapter illustrates this two-channel logic by studying business-government interactions in agricultural trade, textiles and clothing, financial services, and telecommunication services.
The national association of French employers and industry, MEDEF, seems to be an example of strong and unifi ed interest organization, especially since its reform in 1998. Through a study of the collective action of fi rms in France, this article sheds doubt on such an impression. In fact, a central employers’ and industry association only constituted itself in France in response to state and trade union activism and struggled throughout history once these external threats lost importance. Like all encompassing business associations, MEDEF comprises a great variety of groups of business actors and constantly has to manage its internal interest heterogeneity. An analysis of the historical and institutional context of its latest reform demonstrates that the recent media campaign should not be understood as a display of actual strength and coherence; rather it is the last resort of collective action that MEDEF can claim legitimately as its responsibility.
Lobbying by economic actors constitutes a central element of a large part of the literature on trade policy-making. However, it is mainly considered as "input" into the political system, which then aggregates the demand of different societal interests. As such inputs, the preferences of economic actors are often simply deduced from economic theory. This paper raises doubts about the usefulness of this analytical parsimony and tries to distinguish more clearly between stable interests, preferences and strategic choices. In particular, it suggests a model that clarifies how abstract interests are translated into concrete policy choices. By examining the lobbying carried out by service providers in the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) in telecommunications and air transport, it then shows that the deduction of trade policy preferences from economic theory does not account well for the general support of multilateral trade liberalization by EU service providers. In particular, changes in identity, causal beliefs and strategic environments in the US and the EU create a variety of lobbying choices that goes beyond the material incentives of trade liberalization. By studying the learning process and the constraints on lobbying imposed by political institutions, the paper suggests that even the political preferences of strong economic actors are sometimes more appropriately dealt with as endogenous to the trade policy process.
Lectures Critiques
(2008)
The Demise of Statism? Associations and the Transformation of Interest Intermediation in France
(2009)
Regulation
(2007)
This book is the most comprehensive study of the European member states available. It covers the principal member states in separate chapters, as well as bringing together the smaller member states in comparative groupings, and also includes a chapter on the new member states. The country chapters look at the wider political issues associated with integration and not just policy machinery. In order to help readers understand the interaction of the member states, there are sections which cover analytical and empirical themes such as EU member relations and the European economy.
Régulation
(2004)
Over the past decade, many of the world’s biggest companies have found themselves embroiled in legal disputes over corruption, fraud, environmental damage, tax evasion, or sanction violations. Corporations including Volkswagen, BP, and Credit Suisse have paid record-breaking fines. Many critics of globalization and corporate impunity cheer this turn toward accountability. Others, however, question American dominance in legal battles that seem to impose domestic legal norms beyond national boundaries. In this book, Cornelia Woll examines the politics of American corporate criminal law’s extraterritorial reach. As governments abroad seek to respond to US law enforcement actions against their companies, they turn to flexible legal instruments that allow prosecutors to settle a case rather than bring it to court. With her analysis of the international and domestic politics of law enforcement targeting big business, Woll traces the rise of what she calls “negotiated corporate justice” in global markets.
Woll charts the path to this shift through case studies of geopolitical tensions and accusations of “economic lawfare,” pitting the United States against the European Union, China, and Japan. She then examines the reactions to the new legal landscape, describing institutional changes in the common law countries of the United Kingdom and Canada and the civil law countries of France, Brazil, and Germany. Through an insightful interdisciplinary analysis of how the prosecution of corporate crime has evolved in the twenty-first century, Woll demonstrates the profound transformation of the relationship between states and private actors in world markets, showing that law is part of economic statecraft in the connected global economy.
Green growth requires strategy and coordination. The green transition entails important costs and will fail politically if we do not address socio-economic inequalities. In this Policy Position, Cornelia Woll proposes three pathways to a net-zero economy by 2050 that ideally should be combined: (i) correcting market signals through taxonomies and taxation; (ii) developing a European industrial policy that supports green innovation but also rewards successful transition plans; (iii) facilitating the funding for companies and financial institutions lending to those invested in green technology.
The recent financial crisis has demonstrated that governments continuously seek to steer their economies rather than leaving them to free markets. Despite the ambitions of international economic cooperation, such interventionism is decidedly local. Some politicians even proudly evoke "economic patriotism" to justify their choices.
This volume links such populism to a specific set of tensions the paradox of neo-liberal democracy and argues that the phenomenon is ubiquitous. The mandate of politicians is to defend the economic interests of their constituents under conditions where large parts of economic governance are no longer exclusively within their control. Economic patriotism is one possible reaction to this tension. As old-style industrial policy and interventionism gained a bad reputation, governments had to become creative to assure traditional economic policy objectives with new means.
However, economic patriotism is more than just a fashionable word or a fig leaf for protectionism. This volume employs the term to signal two distinctions: the diversity of policy content and the multiplicity of territorial units it can refer to. Comparing economic interventionism across countries and sectors, it becomes clear that economic liberalism will always be accompanied by counter-movements that appeal to territorial images.
This book was published as a special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy.