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The legal order is the legitimate foundation of liberal democracy. Its incomplete enforcement of the law can therefore appear dysfunctional, reflecting weak institutions, state capture, and corrupt practices. This paper casts doubt on such categorical assessments by systematically examining the reasons for and intentions behind incomplete enforcement. It argues that law enforcement is part of the political process that is deeply affected by the constellation of actors concerned. Choices over law enforcement produce social order that is analytically distinct from the production of legal norms and their formal implementation. By analyzing different types of partial enforcement, its rationales, and intended effects, we propose an approach that studies law enforcement as an integral part of public policy analysis and of the study of socioeconomic orders.
When Ursula von der Leyen spoke about a “Geopolitical Commission” when she took office in 2019, the disruption brought about by the year 2020 could not quite be predicted.
Faced with the world’s upheavals, caught up in between Sino-American rivalry, it is essential to assess and question the Union’s position in the world and its perspectives for the future. At the heart of this endeavour is a debate on the meaning of European strategic autonomy.
As part of the Groupe d’études géopolitiques’ publications, following a major interview with the French President and a long analysis written by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, we have asked some twenty scholars, observers and experts from multiple horizons, nationalities and fields of expertise to position themselves on a scale from 0 (“the EU has become less strategically autonomous”) to 5 (“the EU has become more strategically autonomous”), explaining their mark with a short text
A Rejoinder by the Author
(2016)
Large companies are increasingly on trial. Over the last decade, many of the world’s biggest firms have been embroiled in legal disputes over corruption charges, financial fraud, environmental damage, taxation issues or sanction violations, ending in convictions or settlements of record-breaking fines, well above the billion-dollar mark. For critics of globalization, this turn towards corporate accountability is a welcome sea-change showing that multinational companies are no longer above the law. For legal experts, the trend is noteworthy because of the extraterritorial dimensions of law enforcement, as companies are increasingly held accountable for activities independent of their nationality or the place of the activities. Indeed, the global trend required understanding the evolution of corporate criminal law enforcement in the United States in particular, where authorities have skillfully expanded its effective jurisdiction beyond its territory. This paper traces the evolution of corporate prosecutions in the United States. Analyzing federal prosecution data, it then shows that foreign firms are more likely to pay a fine, which is on average 6,6 times larger.
Usages et travail politiques : une sociologie compréhensive des usages de l’intégration européenne
(2004)
Conclusion
(2004)
What role do firms play in the making of EU trade policy? This article surveys the policy domain and lays out the instruments firms can employ to influence decisions on trade. It underlines that European
trade policy is characterized by a high degree of institutional complexity, which firms have to manage in order to be successful. In particular, the European Commission works intensively to solicit business input in order to gain bargaining leverage vis-à-vis third countries and the EU member states. This reverse lobbying creates a two-channel logic of trade policy lobbying in the EU. Corporate actors have a very good chance of working closely with the European Commission if they can propose pan-European trade policy solutions. This can be either trade liberalization or EU-wide regulatory restrictions on trade. Demands for traditional protectionist measures, especially those that reveal national interest divergences, are difficult to defend at the supranational level. Protectionist lobbying therefore goes through the national route, with corporate actors working to block liberalization by affecting the consensus in the Council of Ministers. The chapter illustrates this two-channel logic by studying business-government interactions in agricultural trade, textiles and clothing, financial services, and telecommunication services.
The national association of French employers and industry, MEDEF, seems to be an example of strong and unifi ed interest organization, especially since its reform in 1998. Through a study of the collective action of fi rms in France, this article sheds doubt on such an impression. In fact, a central employers’ and industry association only constituted itself in France in response to state and trade union activism and struggled throughout history once these external threats lost importance. Like all encompassing business associations, MEDEF comprises a great variety of groups of business actors and constantly has to manage its internal interest heterogeneity. An analysis of the historical and institutional context of its latest reform demonstrates that the recent media campaign should not be understood as a display of actual strength and coherence; rather it is the last resort of collective action that MEDEF can claim legitimately as its responsibility.
Lobbying by economic actors constitutes a central element of a large part of the literature on trade policy-making. However, it is mainly considered as "input" into the political system, which then aggregates the demand of different societal interests. As such inputs, the preferences of economic actors are often simply deduced from economic theory. This paper raises doubts about the usefulness of this analytical parsimony and tries to distinguish more clearly between stable interests, preferences and strategic choices. In particular, it suggests a model that clarifies how abstract interests are translated into concrete policy choices. By examining the lobbying carried out by service providers in the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) in telecommunications and air transport, it then shows that the deduction of trade policy preferences from economic theory does not account well for the general support of multilateral trade liberalization by EU service providers. In particular, changes in identity, causal beliefs and strategic environments in the US and the EU create a variety of lobbying choices that goes beyond the material incentives of trade liberalization. By studying the learning process and the constraints on lobbying imposed by political institutions, the paper suggests that even the political preferences of strong economic actors are sometimes more appropriately dealt with as endogenous to the trade policy process.
Lectures Critiques
(2008)