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Levelized costs of electricity (LCOE) are a common metric for comparing power generating technologies. However, there is criticism particularly towards evaluating variable renewables like wind and solar PV power based on LCOE because it ignores variability and integration costs. We propose a new metric System LCOE that accounts for integration and generation costs. For this purpose we develop a new mathematical definition of integration costs that directly relates to economic theory. As a result System LCOE allow the economic comparison of generating technologies and deriving optimal quantities in particular for VRE. To demonstrate the new concept we quantify System LCOE from a simple power system model and literature values. We find that at high wind shares integration costs can be in the same range as generation costs of wind power and conventional plants in particular due to a cost component “profile costs” captured by the new definition. Integration costs increase with growing wind shares and might become an economic barrier to deploying VRE at high shares. System LCOE help understanding and resolving the challenge of integrating VRE and can guide research and policy makers in realizing a cost-efficient transformation towards an energy system with potentially high shares of variable renewables.
Decarbonizing the global energy system requires large-scale investment flows, with a central role for international climate finance to mobilize private funds. The willingness to provide international finance in accordance with common but differentiated responsibilities was acknowledged by the broad endorsement of the Paris Agreement, and the Green Climate Funds in particular. The international community aims to mobilize at least USD 100 billion per year for mitigation and adaption in developing countries. In this article, we argue that too little attention has been paid on the spending side of climate finance, both in the political as well as the academic debate. To this end, we review the challenges encountered in project-based approaches of allocating climate finance in the past. In contrast to project-based finance, we find many advantages to spending climate finance in support of price-based national policies. First, the support for international climate cooperation is improved when efforts of successively rising domestic carbon pricing levels are compensated. Second, carbon pricing sets incentives for least-cost mitigation. Third, investing domestic revenues from emission pricing schemes could advance a country's individual development goals and ensure the recipient's ‘ownership’ of climate policies. We conclude that by reconciling the global goal of cost-efficient mitigation with national policy priorities, climate finance for carbon pricing could become a central pillar of sustainable development and promote international cooperation to achieve the climate targets laid down in the Paris Agreement.
Dieses Papier beschreibt Empfehlungen zur Weiterentwicklung des nationalen Brennstoff-Emissionshandelsgesetzes (BEHG) – und wie ein reibungsfreier Übergang zur europäischen Ebene gestaltet werden kann.
Bei der Einführung und Ausgestaltung eines EU-Emissionshandelssystem für Gebäude und Straßenverkehr (EU ETS-II) bestehen derzeit noch diverse Unsicherheiten. Unabhängig von den Entscheidungen auf europäischer Ebene identifizieren wir jedoch vier No-Regret Maßnahmen zur Weiterentwicklung des BEHG, die in allen Fällen förderlich sind:
1. Zeitliches Vorziehen und Anhebung des Preiskorridors plus Versteigerung: Die Einführung eines Preiskorridors und die Versteigerung von Zertifikaten sollte auf das Jahr 2023 vorgezogen werden. Zudem sollte der Preiskorridor angehoben und verbreitert werden, um den neuen nationalen Klimazielen Rechnung zu tragen.
2. BEHG Emissionsmengen analog zu Sektorzielen: Die EU-Kommission hat im Fit-for-55 Paket eine Erhöhung des deutschen ESR-Ziels auf 50% vorgeschlagen, was auch ungefähr den nationalen Zielen im Rahmen des Klimaschutzgesetzes (KSG) von 2021 entspricht. Um zu einem früheren Zeitpunkt Verbindlichkeit zu schaffen, sollten daher die BEHG-Emissionsmengen aus den KSG Sektorzielen abgeleitet werden.
3. Direkte Pro-Kopf-Rückerstattung: Für den zu erwartenden Fall deutlich steigender CO2-Preise sollte die Bundesregierung schon vor 2023 die institutionellen Voraussetzungen für die Umsetzung des Klimagelds wie im Koalitionsvertrag beschrieben schaffen.
4. Nationaler CO2-Mindestpreis: Bis spätestens 2025 sollte ein Mindestpreis zur eventuellen Ergänzung eines EU ETS-II vorbereitet und ggf. implementiert werden. Dadurch kann im Fall anfänglich niedriger Preise im EU ETS-II garantiert werden, dass der CO2-Preis in Deutschland weiterhin kontinuierlich ansteigt.
Neben diesen Maßnahmen auf nationaler Ebene, sollte sich die Bundesregierung in den Fit-for-55 Verhandlungen einsetzen (1) für die Flexibilität zwischen EU ETS und ESR sowie (2) für ein graduelles Linking zwischen ETS-I und ETS-II. Mit beiden Maßnahmen können die sehr hohen Preisunterscheide reduziert und die Effizienz der Klimapolitik erhöht werden.
The Paris Agreement formulates the goal of GHG neutrality in the second half of this century. Given that Nationally Determined Contributions are as yet insufficient, the question is through which policies can this goal be realized? Identifying policy pathways to ratchet up stringency is instrumental, but little guidance is available. We propose a policy sequencing framework and substantiate it using the cases of Germany and California. Its core elements are policy options to overcome barriers to stringency over time. Such sequencing can advance policy design and hopefully reconcile the controversy between first-best and second-best approaches.
Global mitigation efforts remain insufficient to limit the global temperature increase to well below 2 °C. While a growing academic literature analyzes this problem, perceptions of which obstacles inhibit goal attainment and which responses might be most effective seem to differ widely. This makes prioritization and agreement on the way forward difficult. To inform prioritization in global climate policy and research agendas, we present quantitative data on how 917 experts from the IPCC and the UNFCCC perceive the importance of different obstacles and response options for achieving 2 °C. On average, respondents consider opposition from special interest groups the most important obstacle and technological R&D the most important response. Our survey also finds that the majority of experts perceives a wide range of issues as important, supporting an agenda that is inclusive in terms of coverage. Average importance ratings differ between experts from the Global North and South, suggesting that balanced representation in global fora and regionally differentiated agendas are important. In particular, opposition from special interest groups is a top priority among experts from North America, Europe and Oceania. Investigating the drivers of individual importance ratings, we find little difference between experts from the IPCC and the UNFCCC, while expert's perceptions correlate with their academic training and their national scientific, regulatory, and financial contexts.
Should economic growth continue in a world threatened by the prospect of catastrophic climate change? The scientific and public debate has brought forth a broad spectrum of views and narratives on this question, ranging from neoclassical economics to degrowth. We argue that different positions can be attributed to underlying differences in views on (a) factors that determine human well‐being, (b) the feasibility and desirability of economic growth, (c) appropriate intervention points, and (d) preferences about governance and policy options. For each of these dimensions, we propose points of agreement on which a consensus between conflicting positions might be achieved. From this basis, we distill a sustainability transition perspective that could act as a basis for a renewed debate on how to align human well‐being with environmental sustainability.
The integration of wind and solar generators into power systems causes “integration costs” – for grids, balancing services, more flexible operation of thermal plants, and reduced utilization of the capital stock embodied in infrastructure, among other things. This paper proposes a framework to analyze and quantify these costs. We propose a definition of integration costs based on the marginal economic value of electricity, or market value – as such a definition can be more easily used in economic cost-benefit assessment than previous approaches. We suggest decomposing integration costs intro three components, according to the principal characteristics of wind and solar power: temporal variability, uncertainty, and location-constraints. Quantitative estimates of these components are extracted from a review of 100 + published studies. At high penetration rates, say a wind market share of 30–40%, integration costs are found to be 25–35 €/MWh, i.e. up to 50% of generation costs. While these estimates are system-specific and subject to significant uncertainty, integration costs are certainly too large to be ignored in high-penetration assessments (but might be ignored at low penetration). The largest single factor is reduced utilization of capital embodied in thermal plants, a cost component that has not been accounted for in most previous integration studies.
Electricity is a paradoxical economic good: it is highly homogeneous and heterogeneous at the same time. Electricity prices vary dramatically between moments in time, between location, and according to lead-time between contract and delivery. This three-dimensional heterogeneity has implication for the economic assessment of power generation technologies: different technologies, such as coal-fired plants and wind turbines, produce electricity that has, on average, a different economic value. Several tools that are used to evaluate generators in practice ignore these value differences, including "levelized electricity costs", "grid parity", and simple macroeconomic models. This paper provides a rigorous and general discussion of heterogeneity and its implications for the economic assessment of electricity generating technologies. It shows that these tools are biased, specifically, they tend to favor wind and solar power over dispatchable generators where these renewable generators have a high market share. A literature review shows that, at a wind market share of 30-40%, the value of a megawatt-hour of electricity from a wind turbine can be 20-50% lower than the value of one megawatt-hour as demanded by consumers. We introduce "System LCOE" as one way of comparing generation technologies economically.
The performance of the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading System (ETS) and other cap-and-trade schemes has been under scrutiny because of their inability to create a stable price for greenhouse gas emissions. This article seeks to inform the often confusing debate about the economic performance of cap-and-trade systems over time, with a focus on the EU ETS. Based on a simple intertemporal framework of emissions trading and a review of the literature, we show that different frameworks and notions of efficiency result in both different assessments of performance and different recommended strategies for improving performance. More specifically, we argue that if cap-and-trade systems have temporal flexibility (i.e., they include banking and borrowing of emissions allowances), it can be highly misleading to base the economic assessment on short-term efficiency. We seek to draw attention to the concept of long-term economic performance, which takes into account the intertemporal nature of emissions trading systems. In particular, we identify market and government distortions (e.g., myopia, lack of policy credibility, excessive discounting) that may depress allowance prices and hamper intertemporal efficiency. We then examine whether the recently adopted Market Stability Reserve and the alternative price collar are likely to address these distortions.
This policy briefbuilds on theworkshop EU ETS Reform: Taking Stock and Examining Carbon Price Floor Options,held at the Centrefor European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels on July 3, 2018. The workshop was cosponsored by CEPS and the AHEAD and Mistra CarbonExit projects. While the brief draws on insights from workshop discussions, its views are solely those of the authors. The brief outlinesdifferent perspectives on thepast performanceof the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS)in terms of its allowance price (Section 1), analyzes how the recent reform respondedto related challenges(Section 2), and considers the case for introducinga carbon pricefloor in the EU ETS(Section 3). The main part of the brief (Section 4) identifies five myths in the debate of an EU ETSpricefloorand criticallyconfrontsthem. Section 5 concludes by discussing potential entry points for introducing a carbon price floor in the context of the upcoming EU climate policy process
Several years of very low allowance prices in the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS) have motivated calls to introduce a price floor to correct potential underlying distortions and design flaws, including (i) the political nature of allowance supply and related credibility issues, (ii) potential myopia of market participants and firms, and (iii) waterbed and rebound effects resulting from policy interactions. In the wake of the recent EU ETS reform, allowance prices have sharply increased. This raises the question of whether the case for introducing a price floor in the EU ETS remains valid. We argue that such a price floor, also adopted in several other greenhouse gas cap-and-trade systems worldwide, remains an important improvement in the design of the system, as long as the above-mentioned distortions and design flaws persist. An EU ETS price floor can safeguard against these issues and provides more explicit guidance on the minimum allowance price policymakers consider acceptable. Either as a complement or substitute to the current Market Stability Reserve (MSR), a price floor would thus make the EU ETS less prone to future revision in case of unexpectedly low prices. We identify and confront four prominent arguments against the introduction of an EU ETS price floor.
Key policy insights:
- An EU ETS price floor would be an important institutional innovation enhancing political and economic stability, and predictability of the EUA price
- The recent Market Stability Reserve (MSR) reform has not removed the need for a carbon price floor.
- Introducing an element of price responsiveness into the so far purely quantitative design of the EU ETS would help to preserve its integrity
- In contrast to conventional wisdom, legal analysis reveals that an EU ETS price floor can be legally feasible
- Political support for a carbon price floor is gaining traction across Europe
Model analysis within the ADAM project has shown that achieving low greenhouse gas concentration levels, e.g. at 400ppm CO 2 -eq, is technologically feasible at costs of a few percent of GDP. However, models simplify the dynamics involved in implementing climate policy and the results depend on critical model assumptions such as global participation in climate policy and full availability of current and newly evolving technologies. The design of a low stabilization policy regime in the real world depends on factors that can only be partly covered by models. In this context, the paper reflects on limits of the integrated assessment models used to explore climate policy and addresses the issues of (i) how global participation might be achieved, (ii) which kind of options are available to induce deep GHG reductions inside and outside the energy sector, and (iii) which risks and which co-benefits of mitigation options are not assessed by the models.
Im Dezember 2015 wurde in Paris Geschichte geschrieben: Die Weltklimakonferenz einigte sich auf das erste Klimaschutzabkommen, das alle Länder in die Pflicht nimmt. Damit bekennt sich die Weltgemeinschaft völkerrechtlich verbindlich zum Ziel, die Erderwärmung auf unter zwei Grad zu begrenzen. Doch was ist dieses Paris-Abkommen wert? Wo liegen seine Stärken, welche Herausforderungen kommen auf die Weltgemeinschaft zu? Welche Risiken birgt es? Was muss jetzt politisch folgen? Expertinnen und Experten aus Wissenschaft, Politik, Medien und NGOs analysieren in diesem Buch Hintergründe, Inhalte und Konsequenzen des neuen Weltklimavertrages.
Even without internationally concerted action on climate change mitigation, there are important incentives for countries to put a price on their domestic emissions, including public finance considerations, internalizing the climate impacts of their own emissions, and co-benefits, such as clean air or energy security. Whereas these arguments have been mostly discussed in separate strands of literature, this article carries out a synthesis that exemplifies how policies to put a price on emissions can be conceptualized in a multi-objective framework. Despite considerable uncertainty, empirical evidence suggests that different countries may face quite different incentives for emission pricing. For instance, avoided climate damages and co-benefits of reduced air pollution appear to be the main motivation for emission pricing in China, while for the US generating public revenue dominates and for the EU all three motivations are of intermediate importance. We finally argue that such unilateral incentives could form the basis for incremental progress in international climate negotiations toward a realistic climate treaty based on national interest and differentiated emission pricing and describe how such an agreement could be put into practice.
Auf mehreren Ebenen Agieren
(2013)
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has proven its value as an institution for large-scale scientific collaboration to synthesize and assess large volumes of climate research for use by policy-makers, as well as for establishing credibility of findings among diverse national governments. But the IPCC has received considerable criticism of both its substance and process. The new IPCC leadership to be elected in October could help guide the IPCC to a clear, shared understanding of future objectives and could shape procedural reforms. We identify key opportunities for reform by addressing two related questions: Is the IPCC doing the right things? Is the IPCC doing things right?
Climate Policies for road transport revisited (II): Closing the policy gap with cap-and-trade
(2011)
Agreeing on an EU ETS minimum price to foster solidarity, subsidiarity and efficiency in the EU
(2017)
Technical Summary
(2014)
Summary for Policymakers
(2014)
Carbon pricing is essential to achieve a reduction in global CO2 emissions. A carbon price can either be set directly via a carbon tax (price control) or be achieved through a cap-and-trade system (quantity control). While there has been much debate about the relative merits of each approach, cap-and-trade systems have been favoured in the political arena. In principle, they offer the most straightforward way to achieve a country’s emission reduction target by simply setting the cap at the remaining emission budget. Existing emissions trading schemes (ETSs) can be found in Europe, California and Québec, for example.
With the global expansion of renewable energy (RE) technologies, the provision of optimal RE policy packages becomes an important task. We review pivotal aspects regarding the economics of renewables that are relevant to the design of an optimal RE policy, many of which are to date unresolved. We do so from three interrelated perspectives that a meaningful public policy framework for inquiry must take into account. First, we explore different social objectives justifying the deployment of RE technologies, including potential co-benefits of RE deployment, and review modelbased estimates of the economic potential of RE technologies, i.e. their socially optimal deployment level. Second, we address pivotal market failures that arise in the course of implementing the economic potential of RE sources in decentralized markets. Third, we discuss multiple policy instruments curing these market failures. Our framework reveals the requirements for an assessment of the relevant options for real-world decision makers in the field of RE policies. This review makes it clear that there are remaining white areas on the knowledge map concerning consistent and socially optimal RE policies.
The EU ETS is in a crisis. There is a fundamental concern that persistently low allowance prices will fail to incentivize the investments in low-carbon capital stock and technology research and development (R&D) required to achieve long-term European decarbonization targets in the context of the Paris Agreement. Attainment of these targets is at risk. Introducing a carbon price floor can re-affirm the role of the EU ETS as the central pillar in the European effort towards decarbonization. Such a price floor should start at an economically significant level and rise over time. Many observers argue that it is misguided to focus on the EU ETS allowance (EUA) price, since the emissions cap determines environmental effectiveness and the allowance market works well in technical terms. Four interrelated considerations underpin our concern over the persistently low EUA price: First, the EU ETS cap is not cast in stone. It might be relaxed in the future if the costs of maintaining it become politically unacceptable. This could be the case if allowance prices escalate, which can be expected to result from a high-carbon capital stock building up in presence of persistently low allowance prices. Second, there is emerging scientific evidence that the EUA price is distorted as the carbon market does not operate cost-efficiently in a long-term perspective due to private sector short-sightedness and regulatory uncertainty. Third, the EU ETS has so far not allowed the effective expression of different climate policy preferences across EU member states. Without compensatory measures, voluntary unilateral emission reductions within member states (e.g. UK carbon price support, potential German coal power exit) dampen short-term allowance prices and shift emissions in space and time. Finally, all ambitious short-term climate policy measures required for embarking on long-term decarbonization pathways face significant political opposition. This opposition can be expected to come not only from reluctant EU member states, but also industry constituencies concerned about impacts on competitiveness, businessmodels and jobs. These distributional challenges need to be tackled more effectively by strategically allocating allowance value, providing limited compensation to adversely affected constituencies, promoting low carbon R&D to reduce future costs of decarbonization, and fostering public support for ambitious climate policy. The recent EU ETS reform effort offers an entry point to tackle these concerns, but does not sufficiently address the underlying problems. The magnitude and direction of its impact on the EUA price is highly uncertain. More fundamental change will be required to reaffirm the role of the EU ETS as the central pillar of European decarbonization efforts. In particular, a carbon price floor that rises over time can provide a clearer policy signal for guiding short-and mid-term capital stock and technology R&D investment decisions towards low-carbon options, and can thus enable cost-efficient achievement of long-term decarbonization targets. If designed accordingly, it allows member states with a higher preference for ambitious climate policy to effectively achieve additional emission reductions. In addition, targeted and transitory compensation models for particularly affected constituencies, and public investments into the development of new technologies and related business models will be required to ensure short-and long-term political support and reinforce policy credibility. Companion policies can play an important role in fostering low-carbon investment, but are
inadequate substitutes to effective long-term carbon pricing. Ideally, a carbon price floor will be implemented at the EU-level. An alternative is to start with a coalition of countries including Germany (also in view of attaining its 2020 climate targets), France and others, and to expand it over time