The defence angle of European strategic autonomy remains sensitive and contested. In this chapter of a report published by the Finnish Institute of International Relations (FIIA) Nicole Koenig reviews the EU's defence cooperation initiatives since 2016 and assesses progress along the political, institutional and material dimensions of strategic autonomy. She shows that divergent national strategic cultures and threat perceptions continue to stand in the way of political autonomy while progress on the institutional and material dimensions is gradual. The renewal of Atlanticism triggered by Biden’s election and the pandemic’s uncertain impact on defence spending and collaboration risk broadening the persisting gap between ambition and reality. The author calls upon the EU and its member states to strengthen all three dimensions of autonomy and provides guidance for the next steps.
The EU should appear more capable of acting, more capable of global politics and more sovereign. That is what the election manifestos of the leading German parties and future coalition partners say. But if you take a closer look, you often find vague formulations, old proposals or ones that will probably collect dust on the shelf. In this policy brief, Dr Nicole Koenig addresses the questions that the next federal government in Germany will have to face in the area of EU foreign and security policy to get a little closer to the promise of an EU capable of acting in foreign policy.
The Strategic Compass for Security and Defence should concretise the EU’s level of ambition as a security provider. In November 2021, a first draft was presented to the member states. It is now up to them to negotiate the final document until March 2022. The need for consensus and long-standing divides could tempt them to either dilute the draft or postpone the more controversial decisions to the implementation phase. With this paper, we seek to counteract these temptations. We identify eight key deliverables, point towards possible implementation challenges and propose ways to address them.
There can be no European security agenda without France and Germany.
To shape this agenda and get others on board, they need to converge on the challenges they wish to tackle and the means to do that. This policy brief reviews the degree of Franco-German convergence while focusing on three issues: geopolitical assessment, strategic cultures, and capability development. We find that strategic convergence often goes hand in hand with tactical divergence. To be able to shape Europe’s security agenda in the short- to medium-term, deeper Franco-German convergence and more inclusive co-leadership will be needed
The EU decided to develop a “strategic compass” for its security and defence policy until 2022. Building on a common threat analysis, it should concretise the EU’s level of ambition as a security provider. The strategic compass represents a real and timely opportunity, but there is also a risk of engaging in a lengthy and winding process that would simply produce another paper. This policy paper presents risks and opportunities and develops recommendations for both stages of the process.
After four days of intense negotiations, EU leaders have finally reached an agreement on the EU´s long-term EU budget and post-Covid recovery fund. The final compromise leaves mixed feelings. It truly constitutes a historically ambitious package which almost doubles EU spending for 2021-2024 with money raised on the financial markets. Internal solidarity and economic recovery are key pre-conditions for wielding power externally and being resilient to external influence. The contrast between the initial lack of intra-European solidarity and China’s so-called “mask diplomacy” underlined by targeted disinformation illustrates this point. At the same time, we saw a traditional pattern in the European Council’s budgetary negotiations: the compromise has been reached by largely preserving spending pre-allocated to Member States – e.g. agriculture and cohesion spending, the new facility providing support to national recovery and resilience plans - and by drastically cutting key EU programmes financing EU-level public goods and thus delivering added value for all – in areas such as research and innovation, mobility, development aid or internal and external security.
EU member states have been debating the notion of European strategic
autonomy in the field of defence for decades. The election of
US President Donald Trump in 2016 revived this debate and his administration’s negative attitude towards EU defence cooperation initiatives rendered it highly emotive. With Joe Biden’s victory, the debate is apparently ready to enter the next stage. In this policy brief, I argue that a Biden administration represents an opportunity to go beyond terminological debates onto two more substantial questions that represent two sides of the same coin: how can Europeans
shape a more balanced transatlantic security and defence agenda
and how can they defend their own security interests?
On 31 December 2020, Germany’s rotating EU Council presidency will come to an end after a particularly difficult term. Corona burst upon an already crowded policy agenda, including the negotiation of the EU’s next seven-year budget, rule of law conditionality and the
finalization of the Brexit negotiations. On top of a packed agenda, the German presidency faced considerable institutional and corona-related constraints. In this Policy Brief, Nicole Koenig and Thu Nguyen look back at the German presidency and develop five key takeaways for the upcoming corona presidencies, notably Portugal (first half of 2021) and Slovenia (second half). The German presidency has shown that they should prepare for more corona crisis
management,internal divisions and unexpected crises.
Twelve months ago, Ursula von der Leyen announced that her Commission would be a geopolitical one. This promise was a response to the
crisis of multilateralism, the growing competition between the US and China, the fallout of Brexit, and the broad range of brewing and frozen conflicts in the EU’s neighbourhood. One year later, a geopolitically assertive EU is needed more than ever. The pandemic has underlined the vulnerability of Europe’s supply chains
and intensified the political rift between the US and China. The further the two superpowers move towards economic decoupling, the clearer it becomes how exposed Europe is to this rivalry. Meanwhile, the crises in the eastern Mediterranean, Mali, and Belarus have reminded Europeans of their geopolitical responsibilities.
Putin’s war and the Strategic Compass: A quantum leap for the EU’s security and defence policy?
(2022)
One month into the Russian war against Ukraine, the EU approved the Strategic Compass. The strategy document promises a quantum leap in the EU’s security and defence policy. But how realistic is this? The war sharpened the focus of the Compass, it triggered a substantial increase in defence spending, and it enhanced the sense of urgency regarding implementation. It is less clear whether it will entail a greater capacity to act, more strategic autonomy and better spending. The member states will have to move on these issues if there is to be a real quantum leap.
The Conference on the Future of Europe has put the extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) at the top of the EU’s reform agenda. The EU’s response to the invasion of Ukraine has underlined the pitfalls associated with unanimity. And the old debate on the balance between deepening and widening has come back with the prospective EU membership for Ukraine and Moldova. While the extension of QMV to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is currently the most popular reform option for member states, there is no quick and easy path towards it. This policy brief discusses different paths and potential short-cuts. The member states should seize the current window of opportunity to explore different approaches and speeds for different sub-areas of CFSP and prepare a broader reform package for the medium to long term.
Angesichts der Corona-Pandemie sind die 27 Staats- und Regierungschefs aufgerufen, gemeinsam zu handeln. Der Europäische Rat vom 23. April kann es sich nicht leisten, erneut zu scheitern, indem er innere Spaltungen offenbart, die angesichts der Covid-19-Krise wieder aufgeflammt sind. Die Dramatik der Situation hat auch Jacques Delors aus einer längeren Phase des Schweigens gerissen: „Die Atmosphäre, die unter den Staats- und Regierungschefs zu herrschen scheint, und der Mangel an europäischer Solidarität versetzen die Europäische Union in Lebensgefahr“.
“The climate that seems to prevail among Heads of State or government and the lack of European solidarity are putting the European Union in mortal danger,” Jacques Delors warned in an exceptional public speech in the middle of Europe’s devastating coronavirus crisis. This lack of solidarity has already left its mark on public opinion, especially in Italy, as divisions unfolded during the March European Council.
The coronavirus pandemic accelerates some of the global trends that fueled the EU’s geopolitical ambition while raising the challenges that come with its enactment. This policy paper reviews the implications for the EU while focusing on three key relationships: China, the US and Africa. It argues that the pandemic represents an opportunity for EU global leadership and shows what that could look like.