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Diagnoses of a democratic recession or ‘hollowing out’ of democracy are numerous and varied but usually encompass the following symptoms: a decline in turnout and other forms of political participation; policy making that is increasingly detached from ordinary citizens and their preferences; and an erosion of trust in government and satisfaction with democracy among citizens – all of which ultimately challenge the legitimacy of democratic institutions. Direct democracy is one of the most prominent, far-reaching and popular remedies proposed in response to such diagnoses. It, by allowing citizens to directly vote on questions usually decided by representatives, seems intuitively appealing as an obvious extension and deepening of democracy. In this article I survey the potentials but also pitfalls of an increased institutionalization of direct democracy and use thereof in the countries of the EU focusing on the three key aspects identified above: representation, turnout and citizens’ political support.
Direct democracy, an addition to representative democracy allowing citizens to directly vote on substantive issues parliaments usually vote on, has an intuitive appeal in appearing to be the most obvious institutionalization of democracy itself. Increased institutionalization and usage of direct democracy has heightened interest in the topic in political science. In the three papers which make up this dissertation I explore different aspects of the political effects of direct democracy with an aim to provide insights how it affects citizens' representation as well as their behavior and attitudes.
In a first paper I test the claim that referendums are unrepresentative because turnout in referendums is usually lower than in parliamentary elections and tends to be skewed towards citizens of high socio-economic status. The analysis is made possible by a unique feature of Swiss post-referendum surveys which also asked non-voters about their opinion on the referendum's subject. Comparing opinion majorities in the surveys against actual referendum outcomes we show that representativeness increases slightly in turnout as well as over time. On balance we find more representative than unrepresentative outcomes implying that direct democracy, at least in Switzerland, seems to improve representation.
In a second paper I focus on citizens' attitudes towards and actual participation in referendums. Using data from the European Social Survey I find that voting, other forms of political activity and political interest are positively associated with support for direct democracy. Analyzing post-referendum surveys I find the same pattern to hold for actual participation in referendums. Hence, direct democracy, despite its widespread popularity, appears insuffcient to bring the politically disengaged back into democratic politics.
In a third and final paper, I investigate whether direct democracy increases citizens' satisfaction with democracy. After all, they give citizens participatory opportunities and promise to offer them more control over policy. Combining aggregate data on satisfaction with democracy from semi-annual Eurobarometer surveys from 1973 to 2013 with data on all national referendums in the same period, I find no evidence for an (average) effect of referendums on democratic satisfaction. While an analysis of individual time-series suggests that referendums may have an effect under certain circumstances, significant positive estimates obtain for two countries, my empirical investigation of possible mechanisms remains inconclusive.
When elections are distant, polls are poor predictors. Too few voters are paying attention and too much can change before election day. Structural models can establish baseline expectations but suffer from high uncertainty and underspecification imposed by small samples. We present an early forecast of the 2017 Bundestag election results for individual parties that leverages economic and political data as well as state parliament (Landtag) election results in the German states (Länder) to sidestep these shortcomings. A linear random effects model provides our estimates. Länder elections are dispersed over the calendar and offer the advantage of capturing both actual voter preferences and new political issues. We argue that this approach offers a promising method for early forecasts when polls are not informative.
Do voters judge their national economy relative to economic performance abroad? In 2013 we took advantage of the German Bundestag election to test this hypothesis predictively. Nearly two months prior to the election, we published an election forecast relying on a theory-driven empirical model of election outcomes that draws on previous election outcomes; characteristics of the government and of voters; and, most originally, the relative economic performance of Germany (‘benchmarked' growth) in comparison to the three other most important economies in Europe – France, the UK and Italy. Our forecast put the outgoing coalition government of CDU/CSU and FDP at 47.05 per cent of the popular vote deviating from the actual outcome of 46.3 by 0.75 points. This makes our forecast one of the most accurate in this election cycle. Despite one-and-a-half months of lead time, our forecast performed on par or slightly better than the last poll results issued only two days before the election.