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As part of the Digital Markets Act, the EU Commission has proposed a new competition tool to address market power in the digital economy that is dominated by large online platforms. While limiting the power of US-based tech companies, such as Google or Facebook, can be helpful, we argue that limiting competition is not enough. Business models based on invasion of privacy and behavior modification are at the root of the associated problems stemming from their use are at the root of challenges to democracy and sustainability — in order to protect democracy and support sustainable development, Europe needs to develop alternatives to the current behaviorally targeted advertising business model. This policy brief discusses current alternatives to business models based on invasion of privacy and behavior modification, arguing that current alternatives need further development before implementation. To further support the development of new business models we argue in favor of regulatory sandboxes, digital ad revenue tax, reducing accumulation of data to technical necessity only, and adapting procedures and ethics from human subjects research.
This paper proposes a novel instrument – the political position generator - for measuring individuals’ political ties, or personal, affective connections to state officials and other political actors. It adopts and adapts the more general position generator framework in social capital research to capture three key dimensions of political ties – upper reachability, network diversity, and tie strength. The measure is validated with data from a representative survey of the Chinese population and three scales representing the three political ties dimensions are created. In correlational and multivariate regression analyses, we find initial evidence of the instrument’s criterion-related (discriminant and concurrent) validity.
Tech companies and the public interest: the role of the state in governing social media platforms
(2023)
In the early days of the internet, it was hoped that digital technology would bring about democracy and positive outcomes for society. Recently, the debate has shifted towards tech lash with many critics pointing towards technology companies undermining democracy, stability, and sustainability. As a result, a new consensus seems to be emerging among policymakers, companies, and civil societal actors that self-regulation has to move towards co-regulation. This Special Issue of Information, Communication and Society draws together cutting-edge contributions on three core themes in scholarly and policy discourse on platform regulation: First, the papers in this special issue enhance empirical understandings of the role of the state in governing social media platforms developing in the United States, Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Second, they provide a holistic framework to understand policy problems that need to be addressed, which helps to develop and evaluate new policy initiatives. Finally, papers point towards three approaches in governing social media platforms and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of content moderation, process-based co-regulation, as well as competition regulation and alternative business models.
Social media companies rely on user agreements as one means to manage content produced by users. While much has been written on user agreements and community standards of U.S.-based social media, surprisingly little is known about Chinese user agreements and their implications. We compare terms of services as well as privacy policies of WeChat and Weibo between 2014 and 2019 using their U.S. counterparts WhatsApp and Twitter as a benchmark. We find that Chinese user agreements reveal a territorial-based understanding of content management differentiating between PRC and non-PRC users based on language, IP address and country of citizenship. Second, Chinese social media companies are surprisingly transparent about what content can be published, which has implications for self-censorship among users. Third, changes in PRC user agreements reflect Xi Jinping’s tightening control of the Internet. Finally, U.S.-based platforms have moved towards content management that differs by region, thus becoming more similar to the Chinese approach over time.
Concerns over online hatespeech have prompted governments to strengthen social media governance. However, claims by policy-makers and political activists regarding the effectiveness and likely consequences of legal regulations remain largely untested. We rely on qualitative interviews and two expert surveys to examine the behavior of public relations professionals in response to online hatespeech when having the option of using the new user-complaint mechanism under the German Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG). Our findings reveal that strategies depend on whether professionals work at public sector institutions, business, or civil society organizations and political parties. Public sector institutions are likely to report to the platform, but not under NetzDG. Civil society organizations are likely to choose content moderation, counterspeech, and other forms of intervention. Businesses deploy a wide range of strategies. In practice, Germany's procedural approach relying on user-complaint mechanisms to deal with online hatespeech is not used by experts as a means to combat online harassment.
The EU Digital Service Acts signals a move away from self-regulation towards co-regulation of social media platforms within the European Union. To address online harms and rising platform power the DSA clarifies responsibilities of platforms and outlines a new technology regulatory framework to increase oversight. One key oversight instrument constitutes Article 40 of the DSA, which lays out data access for vetted researchers, who add value to regulators and the broader public as creators of knowledge, educators, advisors, innovators, and watchdogs. Currently, the EU Commission and national governments make important decisions regarding Digital Service Coordinators (DSCs) that play a key role in implementation. Based on expertise on European public administration and political science we lay out key challenges and success factors of DSCs that will play a role in promoting successful cooperation between DSCs and researchers. We provide three recommendations: First, we recommend to strengthen transfer of scientific knowledge into policy-making by processing publicly accessible publications within public administrative bodies. To this end, capacities of DSCs need to be increased. In addition, we also point towards the database of vetted researchers collected by the Board of DSCs as important resource in order to strengthen knowledge transfer. Second, the DSC network requires agile institutions with fast response time in order to enable researchers to play a constructive role in implementation. This also includes institutional procedures between DSCs and the Intermediary Body and Data Protection Agencies. To avoid delay in implementation agile institution-building needs to start now. Finally, institutional safeguards will help to avoid strategic choice of companies of the DSC of establishment. At the same time, the Irish DSC's capacity should be strengthened compared to other national DSCs since most large intermediary services providers have their European headquarters in Ireland.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, even Xi Jinping, who is often depicted in the media and pundit world as having centralized control over nearly every dimension of Chinese governance, still must rely on powerful technology corporations to carry out his will in the increasingly important Internet sector. This suggests a model of political control significantly more nuanced than most observers realize. This chapter argues that Xi Jinping does not rule the Internet and more specifically social media via a tight command-and-control structure, which implies that he is the ultimate decision-maker and companies simply implement his policy decisions. Instead, the chapter demonstrates based on process-tracing that China’s governance of the Internet is best understood as a corporate management model, whereby the Chinese state engages in a partnership with technology companies. Xi Jinping assumes a leadership role enforced by state instruments of control and cooptation strategies. At the same time, the state remains dependent on companies due to their informational, organizational, and institutional resources.
Race to the Bottom: Media Marketization and Increasing Negativity Toward the United States in China
(2012)
This article examines how Chinese newspapers respond to opposing demands by audiences and Propaganda Department authorities about news regarding the United States when competition poses pressure on marketized media to make a profit. To examine the tone of news reporting about the U.S., I rely on a computer-aided text analysis of news stories published in the People's Daily and the Beijing Evening News, comparing the years 1999 and 2003 before and after the rise of commercialized newspapers in the Beijing newspaper market. Results show that the emergence of news competitors may exert pressure on less marketized papers to change news content, resulting in an increase of negative news about the United States. Evidence is provided to show that the rise of negative news is unlikely to result from an intended strategy by Propaganda authorities, actions undertaken by the American government, or journalists' own attitudes.