Refine
Document Type
- Article (2) (remove)
Language
- English (2)
Has Fulltext
- no (2)
Keywords
- Drugs (1)
- International institutions (1)
- Police (1)
- State transformation (1)
- Terrorism (1)
In recent years, a growing literature has argued that European Union (EU) member states have undergone a profound transformation caused by international institutions and by the EU, in particular. However, the state core – the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force, embodied by the police – seemed to remain intact. The literature has argued that in this area, international institutions are weak, and cooperation has remained informal and intergovernmental. We take issue with these claims and evaluate the strength of international institutions in two core areas of policing (terrorism and drugs) over time. We find that in terms of decision-making, precision, and adjudication, international institutions have become considerably stronger over time. Even when international institutions remain intergovernmental they strongly regulate how EU member states exercise their monopoly of force. Member states are even further constrained because adjudication is delegated to the European Court of Justice. Thus, even the state core is undergoing a significant transformation.
We argue that there is a commonality between federal states and the EU: both face a dilemma between sub-unit autonomy and collective problem-solving. We develop the structure of this dilemma, which is pervasive in multilevel systems with a strong element of shared policy-making and most pronounced in the EU. While a substantial part of the federalism literature considers this relationship as precarious and discusses ways to stabilize it, we propose an analytical perspective which focuses on actor dynamics, i.e., on the attempts of sub-units to change the balance between sub-unit autonomy and collective problem-solving by changing their position in two distinct dimensions: exit and voice. Exit measures the degree to which sub-units want to be subject to collective policies, voice measures the influence sub-units seek in collective decisions. We illustrate this framework with examples, mainly from the EU, and conclude that this perspective can shed new light on differentiated integration in the EU and open comparative inquiries.