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Neue deutsche Diplomatie?
(2015)
In der aktuellen Debatte stellt sich die Frage, ob mit einer „neuen“ deutschen Außenpolitik auch eine neue deutsche Diplomatie einhergeht oder einhergehen sollte. Berlin täte gut daran, sich auf die außenpolitischen Traditionen der Bonner Republik zu besinnen. Diese Prinzipien werden bisweilen vernachlässigt, sind aber aufgrund der allseits konstatierten gewachsenen Bedeutung Deutschlands heute aktueller denn je. Allerdings bedürfen die konkreten Instrumente der Diplomatie und ihr institutioneller Rahmen einer Überarbeitung, um den Herausforderungen gerecht zu werden, denen die Berliner Republik gegenübersteht.
The Munich Security Conference, founded as "Internationale Wehrkunde-Begegnung" in 1963, has evolved into the leading independent forum for security policy. Traditionally seen as a kind of transatlantic family meeting for debating NATO strategy during the Cold War, the conference has increasingly broadened its agenda and today attracts participants from across the globe. Each year, dozens of heads of state and government, ministers, and experts from different fields of security policy gather in Munich for an open exchange of ideas and policies on the most pressing international security issues - ranging from regional conflicts, international peace operations and nuclear disarmament to cyber security and environmental challenges. On the occasion of the conference's 50th anniversary in 2014, a number of prominent participants, including former and current foreign and defense ministers, reflect on the conference's history and significance, some of the major issues debated, and on key security challenges facing the international community.
For many German policymakers, a commitment to European integration in defence is a necessary means to further the end of European integration in general – in stark contrast to French leaders who see European integration as the means to reach the end of a stronger European defence. Although there is general support for European defence cooperation and even integration among the German public and state elites, other ideational factors, most notably wide-spread anti-militarist attitudes, military planners’ traditional embeddedness in NATO planning procedures, and a deep commitment to parliamentary control of the armed forces, present manifest hurdles for real capacity-building on the supranational level. As a result, German efforts to integrate defence policy within the EU have been largely symbolic, while real progress takes place in other (bilateral or minilateral and often German-led) frameworks. Berlin has thus contributed considerably to the increasing institutional fragmentation and territorial differentiation in European defence.
In Germany, the Russian war on Ukraine is widely perceived as a “Zeitenwende,” a watershed moment undermining key foreign policy beliefs. Despite mounting evidence contradicting them, German elites previously failed to adapt core beliefs regarding Russia and the use of force because these beliefs were not only deeply embedded in largely uncontested identity constructions but also shaped the definition of economic interests, which in turn made ideational adaptation more costly. Moreover, Germany’s extraordinarily beneficial geopolitical situation in the post-Cold War era meant that the country could afford not to learn. Although the “Zeitenwende” will trigger significant change, it is unclear which lessons exactly Germans will now be learning and how far that adaptation will go. Given Germany’s key position in Europe and its previous role in shaping the European and transatlantic policy toward Russia, the results of these learning processes will significantly shape the emerging European security order.
Social constructivism
(2023)
From a social constructivist perspective, NATO is not just another alliance or security institution, but the institutional embodiment of the transatlantic security community, which is based on a collective identity of liberal democracies. This collective identity serves as the main explanatory factor for social constructivist research dealing with NATO’s creation, its specific institutional design and its unique culture of consultation. It also helps understand NATO’s persistence after the end of the Cold War, its enlargement and its (liberal) out-of-area operations and missions in the post-Cold War period. Constructivism has become one of the key theoretical approaches in NATO research, offering a broader view of the Alliance and accounting for empirical anomalies that competitors fail to explain. Still, constructivist research has arguably not yet reached its full potential and could offer additional insights into NATO’s past, presence and future. These lacunae are addressed in the chapter.
From today's viewpoint, 2016 may well represent the end of the post‐Cold War era and the general assumptions that are associated with it. These include the beliefs that the United States remains a European power, guaranteeing the territorial integrity of its European NATO allies, that liberal democracy represents the political system widely seen as the only legitimate normative reference point, and that the future of the European Union will be defined by continued integration into an ‘ever closer Union’. These assumptions have been shaken to the core.