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Fast fünf Jahrzehnte nachdem das Vereinigte Königreich der Union beigetreten ist und dreieinhalb Jahre nachdem sich die Briten in einem Referendum mit knapper Mehrheit für den Brexit entschieden haben, beendet Großbritannien am 31. Januar um Mitternacht deutscher Zeit offiziell seine Mitgliedschaft. Die direkten Folgen des Austritts halten sich dennoch zunächst in Grenzen. Noch bis zum Jahresende läuft eine Übergangsfrist, während der sich Großbritannien weiterhin an alle EU-Standards halten muss, Teil des Binnenmarkts und der Zollunion bleibt und Beiträge in den EU-Haushalt zahlt. Erst am Ende dieser Frist wird Großbritannien nicht nur formal und institutionell, sondern auch faktisch aus der EU ausscheiden. Beiden Seiten bleiben damit elf Monate, um ihre künftigen Beziehungen zu regeln und ein umfassendes Freihandelsabkommen zu vereinbaren. Gelingt das nicht, drohen die Einführung von Zöllen, Importquoten und anderen Handelsbeschränkungen. Die wirtschaftlichen Folgen wären mit denen eines No-Deal Brexits durchaus vergleichbar. Das Ringen um den Brexit geht also in die nächste Runde. Drei Fragen werden dabei in den kommenden Monaten entscheidend sein. Erstens, ist ein Abkommen innerhalb der gesetzten Frist überhaupt zu erreichen? Zweitens, wie breit könnte so ein erstes Abkommen werden? Und drittens, wie geschlossen wird die EU in den kommenden Verhandlungen auftreten können?
While the ongoing pandemic affects all European economies, we show that it is likely to cause much more economic damage in some member states than in others. Early fiscal crisis responses by EU governments do not reflect these differences. If anything, countries which are likely to be especially vulnerable are currently committing fewer fiscal resources to fighting the economic fallout than others. A joint European policy response to share the fiscal burden of this crisis is, therefore, urgently needed.
Geduldig am Abgrund
(2020)
When it comes to industrial policy, the EU remains big in ambition but meager in substance. This is not surprising. With its renewed strategy, the EU Commission aims to follow the international trend towards more active industrial policy. However, it has to do so within a framework that was designed to discourage – indeed even prevent – the investment- centered policies at the heart of the current discussion. For the EU’s industrial strategy to really have teeth, it needs new financial instruments, a stronger macroeconomic focus on growth and employment and better governance.
The green and digital transformation of industry was one of the central issues in the German election campaign. However, many fundamental decisions on industrial policy can only be taken at the European level. The new German government must therefore turn its attention to Brussels as soon as possible and provide answers to specific questions: How can an investment-oriented industrial policy be organized in the single market? What European regulatory framework does the transformation of European industry to climate neutrality require? And finally, how much geopolitics can European industrial policy take?
Strengthening the EU’s capacity to act in economic policy making has become a fashionable talking point on the European policy agenda. At the same time, there is little debate about the institutional preconditions to be able to live up to these ambitions. In this policy brief, Nils Redeker and Thu Nguyen argue that the combination of grand policy ambition and institutional neglect constitutes a dangerous mix. Without new financial tools and decision-making procedures, the agenda is bound to disappoint. The authors argue that the debate on EU economic sovereignty needs to start talking about real reforms or else stop raising false expectations.
How to make the marriage work: Wedding the Recovery and Resilience Facility and European Semester
(2022)
A year into its existence, the Recovery and Resilience Facility finds itself closely wed to the European Semester. It is a difficult marriage, but it is a marriage made to last. Any debate on the future of the Semester will take place against the backdrop of the RRF experience. And any future fiscal capacity at the EU level will not come without a Semester-style reform leg. It is therefore crucial to make this marriage work.
In this policy brief, Nils Redeker and Thu Nguyen argue that this requires three things: 1) scaling back recommendations under the regular Semester, 2) balancing out the asymmetric powers that the Commission now has over different member states, and 3) striking the right balance between flexibility and enforcement of agreed plans.
The economic knock-on effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine are going to be felt throughout Europe. While the overall economic fallout is still difficult to predict, the impact will differ from country to country. This brief takes a very first look at divergences in exposure, focusing on direct trade links, potential costs of energy dependence on Russia and vulnerabilities towards rising energy prices more generally. It shows that the EU’s member states’ vulnerability to the economic consequences of the war is very unevenly distributed. To cushion the economic blow and ensure political unity, the EU will likely have to organise some sharing of the economic burden of this crisis.
The Solvency Support Instrument (SSI) is central to the European Commission’s proposal to mitigate economic damage of the pandemic. It would use part of the money raised under the Recovery Instrument to provide equity support to struggling firms. It could become a powerful tool for the recovery. However, in its current form, the instrument risks providing free lunch bailouts for owners and private investors without ensuring that public support secures jobs, avoids market concentration, and puts firms on a growth path more conducive with the EU’s broader industrial policy goals. To remedy these shortcomings, the instrument needs clear political criteria for equity support and better political control.
After four turbulent years in trade relations, Europe has high expectations of the Biden administration. However, the room for big trade reforms is small and new grand-scale liberalization is neither economically necessary nor politically realistic. Accordingly, we propose a pragmatic agenda that focuses on ending ongoing trade conflicts and making progress on some WTO reforms as well as trade-adjacent issues such as climate change and supply-chain security.