Refine
Document Type
- Working Paper (23)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (23)
Keywords
- CoFoE, Treaty Reform, Bundesregierung (1)
- European Parliament; transnational lists (1)
- European Semester; economic governance; recovery instrument (1)
- Fiscal Rules, Excessive Deficit, Stability and Growth Path (1)
- German 2021 elections; rule of law (1)
- Rule of Law, Suspension of Funds, Conditionality, Hungary, Poland (1)
How Much Money is a Lot of Money? The Recovery Fund and the Battle over Rule of Law in Poland
(2021)
On 7 September 2021, the European Commission announced that it will ask the European Court of Justice to impose financial penalties against Poland for not complying with the Court’s order for interim measures. More specifically, Commissioner Reynders said that the request was for a fine €1 million for each day that the Disciplinary Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court would continue to operate. And while at first glance, a penalty of 1€ million a day sounds like a lot, Thu Nguyen argues in this policy position that this sum only shows how little harm the EU penalties usually do to national budgets – especially if compared to the leverage the Commission can yield with a completely new instrument: the withholding of funds under the Recovery and Resilience Facility.
Der Rechtsstaat ist in vielen Mitgliedstaaten der EU unter Druck.
Insbesondere Polen und Ungarn stellen durch eine immer systematischere
Aushöhlung rechtsstaatlicher Prinzipien den Grundkonsens der EU als
Rechtsgemeinschaft zur Disposition. Mit dem Urteil des polnischen
Verfassungstribunals vom 7. Oktober 2021 erreichte diese Entwicklung
ihren bisherigen Höhepunkt. Dieser Policy Brief erklärt die Hintergründe
des Konflikts, zeigt Handlungsmöglichkeiten für die Europäische
Kommission auf und erläutert, welche Rolle die nächste Bundesregierung
bei der Wahrung der Rechtsstaatlichkeit in der EU spielen kann.
Strengthening the EU’s capacity to act in economic policy making has become a fashionable talking point on the European policy agenda. At the same time, there is little debate about the institutional preconditions to be able to live up to these ambitions. In this policy brief, Nils Redeker and Thu Nguyen argue that the combination of grand policy ambition and institutional neglect constitutes a dangerous mix. Without new financial tools and decision-making procedures, the agenda is bound to disappoint. The authors argue that the debate on EU economic sovereignty needs to start talking about real reforms or else stop raising false expectations.
How ‘political’ can and should the European Commission be? This question is a long-standing one. On the one hand, European integration demands more and more political and distributive choices to be taken at European level. On the other hand, there is the fear that a political Commission would undermine its own role as the neutral, objective guardian of the Treaties. In this policy brief, Thu Nguyen revisits the concept of a ‘political Commission’ and argues for a reinforcement of its political character in the run-up to the 2024 European elections.
On 9 June 2020, the European Commission announced that it is bringing an infringement procedure against Germany because of the PSPP judgment of its Federal Constitutional Court. On 5 May 2020 the German Court had declared a ruling by the European Court of Justice ultra vires and therefore not legally binding on Germany. In this policy position, Thu Nguyen argues that the Commission is right to initiate an infringement procedure against Germany: It is a matter of principle and a signal that the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, will not accept breaches of EU Treaty obligations, no matter the member state or authority in breach of EU law.
The next European Parliament elections in May 2024 are approaching faster than it might seem. In this Visions for Europe Policy Paper, Thu Nguyen takes a critical look at two ideas to reform the elections ahead of 2024 and assesses their potential to enhance EU democracy in light of the EU’s institutional set-up: Transnational lists and the Spitzenkandidaten procedure. It is argued both could enhance the European dimension of the elections, but they are no silver bullets. Any such reforms should therefore be accompanied by a third component: a stronger role for the European Parliament.
How to make the marriage work: Wedding the Recovery and Resilience Facility and European Semester
(2022)
A year into its existence, the Recovery and Resilience Facility finds itself closely wed to the European Semester. It is a difficult marriage, but it is a marriage made to last. Any debate on the future of the Semester will take place against the backdrop of the RRF experience. And any future fiscal capacity at the EU level will not come without a Semester-style reform leg. It is therefore crucial to make this marriage work.
In this policy brief, Nils Redeker and Thu Nguyen argue that this requires three things: 1) scaling back recommendations under the regular Semester, 2) balancing out the asymmetric powers that the Commission now has over different member states, and 3) striking the right balance between flexibility and enforcement of agreed plans.
How to spend it right - A more democratic governance for the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility
(2020)
The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) will be the core of the EU’s new Recovery Instrument to fight the economic fallout of the pandemic. Under the RRF, 310 billion euros in additional EU spending will be allocated by the European Commission to member states based on individual Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs). In this Policy Brief, we argue that the proposed governance to decide on the assessment of RRPs lacks democratic elements as parliaments are largely sidelined. This should be changed to ensure necessary political ownership at national and European level; to include a second pair of European eyes to prevent misspending; and to avoid a roll-back of EU democracy. Therefore, we propose that the European Parliament get a veto over the Commission decision assessing individual RRPs and allocating funds. National parliaments should also have a say in the adoption of the RRP of the respective member state.
On 1 July 2020 Germany will take over the presidency of the Council of the EU. Major European issues such as the Commission’s proposal for a Recovery Instrument, the EU multiannual financial framework, or the negotiations on the future UK-EU relationship will fall within its term. If expectations were high before corona that a member state with the political weight and capacities of Germany would be able to significantly advance the political agenda at EU level, such expectations are even more prevalent now. At the same time, the institution of Council presidency has lost much of its bite under the Treaty of Lisbon. Germany does not only find itself wedged between different institutional actors with a limited time frame to achieve political results. It is also faced with an overcrowded agenda and many practical limitations caused by the pandemic. This policy brief analyses and assesses the expectations as regards the German Council presidency, in particular by considering the institutional context in which it operates and the limitations imposed by the pandemic.
After Hungary and Poland almost derailed the EU budgetary negotiations over rule of law conditionality, the EU found itself in a weeks-long game of chicken before the drama finally culminated in the European Council conclusions of December 2020. The conclusions were widely criticised for postponing the enforcement of the rule of law mechanism and for upsetting the EU‘s institutional balance. In this Policy Brief, Thu Nguyen explains how the rule of law mechanism works and takes a more balanced approach: The rule of law mechanism was not weakened by the conclusions, nor did the European Council encroach upon the Commission’s prerogatives in a meaningful way.