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Despite significant renewable energy expansion in the past, Germany has encountered difficulties in meeting its national greenhouse gas emission targets. In response, Germany adopted the Federal Climate Change Act (CCA) in 2019. We analyze the state of climate governance in Germany before the CCA, the main design elements of the CCA, and assess the potential of the CCA to change German climate governance. Drawing on policy integration theory and 26 semi-structured interviews with senior policymakers and stakeholders, we find that German climate governance before the CCA was only moderately integrated. The sectoral emission targets legislated by the CCA make climate change mitigation a priority sector goal in non-energy sectors, and CCA provisions for monitoring, assessing and implementing policy reforms promise to enhance alignment of instruments with targets over time. Overall, the CCA advances a multi- rather than cross-sector climate governance, failing to advance coordination across sectors and ministries.
The Paris Agreement (PA) sets out to strengthen the global response to climate change, setting targets for mitigation, adaptation, and finance, and establishing mechanisms through which to achieve these targets. The effectiveness of the PA's mechanisms in achieving its targets, however, has been questioned. This review systematically maps the peer-reviewed literature on the PA, categorizing the available evidence on whether or not the 'Paris Regime' can be effective. We split our analysis into three methodologically distinct sections: first we categorize the literature according to the mechanisms being studied. We find a diverse body of literature, albeit with a clear focus on mitigation, and identify adaptation and capacity building to be clear gaps. Second, we carry out a content analysis, identifying common drivers of, barriers to, and recommendations for effectiveness. Here we find mixed evidence, with potential drivers often qualified by more concrete barriers. Thirdly, we use scientometrics to identify six research clusters. These cover loss and damage, finance, legal issues, international politics, experimental evidence, and studies on tracking progress on the PA's targets. We conclude with a narrative discussion of our findings, presenting three central themes. First, transparency is widely considered a precondition for the PA to be institutionally effective. However, a lack of clear reporting standards and comparable information renders the PA's transparency provisions ineffective. Second, environmental effectiveness relies on national ambition, of which there is currently too little. It remains unclear to which extent the Paris Regime structure itself can induce significant ratcheting-up of ambition. Finally, the PA facilitates the diffusion of norms, enables learning and the sharing of best practices. This production of shared norms provides the most promising avenue for overcoming the current lack of ambition. One of the primary successes of the PA is in providing a platform for the exchange of experiences and ideas.
In order to achieve the UNFCCC Paris Agreement goals, climate policies worldwide require considerable ratcheting-up. Policy sequencing provides a framework for analysing policy process dynamics that facilitate ratcheting-up. We apply a sequencing perspective to two key EU climate and energy policies, the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) and the Renewable Energy Directive (RED), to comparatively test the empirical relevance of sequencing for single policies – in addition to sequencing across policies, which has been the focus of sequencing theory so far – and to uncover specific mechanisms. Our results confirm that sequencing, based on triggering positive and controlling negative feedback, is relevant both within and across policies. Policy choices that may facilitate ratcheting-up include tools to control costs, the possibility to centralise and harmonise in a multi-level governance context, options for compensation of reluctant actors, and the encouragement of learning processes.
Devising policies that facilitate a transition to low-carbon energy systems requires a close understanding of the country-specific political economy of energy and climate policy. We develop a generalized AOC (‘Actors, Objectives, Context’) political economy framework to inform and enable comparison of country-specific case studies of how economic structure, political institutions, and the political environment shape policy outcomes. Our actor-centered perspective is built on the assumption that those policies are implemented that best meet the objectives of actors with the greatest influence on policy decisions. Applying the framework in practice includes four basic steps: i) identifying the societal and political actors most relevant for the formulation, implementation and enforcement of energy and climate policies; ii) spelling out these actors’ underlying objectives; iii) assessing the economic, institutional, discursive and environmental context which determines how certain objectives matter for certain societal actors; and iv) analyzing the dynamic interactions among these factors leading to aggregate policy outcomes. Context factors determine how societal actors influence political actors engaged in formal public policy formulation, implementation and enforcement, and how the dynamic interplay of different political actors’ interests results in energy and climate policy outcomes. The framework can accommodate a wide range of theoretical perspectives. We illustrate how the framework enables conducting comparable energy and climate policy country case studies, using the example of coal use in India, Indonesia and Vietnam. Finally, we discuss how the framework can contribute to the identification of entry points that could bring about policy change.
Despite Germany’s Paris Agreement pledge and coal exit legislation, the political debate around carbon-intensive coal remains heated. Coal power and mining have played an important, yet changing role in the history of German politics. In this paper, we analyze the entire parliamentary debate on coal in the German parliament (Bundestag) from its inception in 1949 to 2019. For this purpose we extract the more than 870,000 parliamentary speeches from all protocols in the history of the Bundestag. We identify the 9167 speeches mentioning coal and apply dynamic topic modeling – an unsupervised machine learning technique that reveals the changing thematic structure of large document collections over time – to analyze changes in parliamentary debates on coal over the past 70 years. The trends in topics and their varying internal structure reflect how energy policy was discussed and legitimized over time: Initially, coal was framed as a driver of economic prosperity and guarantee of energy security. In recent years, the debate evolved towards energy transition, coal phase-out and renewable energy expansion. Germany’s smaller and younger parties, the Greens and the Left Party, debate coal more often in the context of the energy transition and climate protection than other parties. Our results reflect trends in other countries and other fields of energy policy. Methodologically, our study illustrates the potential of and need for computational methods to analyze vast corpora of text and to complement traditional social science methods.
Should economic growth continue in a world threatened by the prospect of catastrophic climate change? The scientific and public debate has brought forth a broad spectrum of views and narratives on this question, ranging from neoclassical economics to degrowth. We argue that different positions can be attributed to underlying differences in views on (a) factors that determine human well‐being, (b) the feasibility and desirability of economic growth, (c) appropriate intervention points, and (d) preferences about governance and policy options. For each of these dimensions, we propose points of agreement on which a consensus between conflicting positions might be achieved. From this basis, we distill a sustainability transition perspective that could act as a basis for a renewed debate on how to align human well‐being with environmental sustainability.
Carbon pricing is widely considered a key policy instrument for achieving substantial climate change mitigation. However, implementation remains patchy and price levels vary significantly across countries and regions. In this article, we analyze the structural social, political, and economic conditions under which carbon prices have been implemented so far. We estimate a Tobit regression model to investigate variations in explicit carbon prices over 262 national and subnational jurisdictions. Our results highlight well-governed institutions and public attitudes as the most important conditions for carbon pricing and characterize fossil fuel consumption as a barrier to the implementation of carbon prices. The results suggest that governance and public attitude need to be integrated into political economy analysis. Policy makers should take regulatory capacities and public attitudes seriously when designing carbon pricing policies.
Global mitigation efforts remain insufficient to limit the global temperature increase to well below 2 °C. While a growing academic literature analyzes this problem, perceptions of which obstacles inhibit goal attainment and which responses might be most effective seem to differ widely. This makes prioritization and agreement on the way forward difficult. To inform prioritization in global climate policy and research agendas, we present quantitative data on how 917 experts from the IPCC and the UNFCCC perceive the importance of different obstacles and response options for achieving 2 °C. On average, respondents consider opposition from special interest groups the most important obstacle and technological R&D the most important response. Our survey also finds that the majority of experts perceives a wide range of issues as important, supporting an agenda that is inclusive in terms of coverage. Average importance ratings differ between experts from the Global North and South, suggesting that balanced representation in global fora and regionally differentiated agendas are important. In particular, opposition from special interest groups is a top priority among experts from North America, Europe and Oceania. Investigating the drivers of individual importance ratings, we find little difference between experts from the IPCC and the UNFCCC, while expert's perceptions correlate with their academic training and their national scientific, regulatory, and financial contexts.
Agreeing on an EU ETS minimum price to foster solidarity, subsidiarity and efficiency in the EU
(2017)
Several years of very low allowance prices in the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS) have motivated calls to introduce a price floor to correct potential underlying distortions and design flaws, including (i) the political nature of allowance supply and related credibility issues, (ii) potential myopia of market participants and firms, and (iii) waterbed and rebound effects resulting from policy interactions. In the wake of the recent EU ETS reform, allowance prices have sharply increased. This raises the question of whether the case for introducing a price floor in the EU ETS remains valid. We argue that such a price floor, also adopted in several other greenhouse gas cap-and-trade systems worldwide, remains an important improvement in the design of the system, as long as the above-mentioned distortions and design flaws persist. An EU ETS price floor can safeguard against these issues and provides more explicit guidance on the minimum allowance price policymakers consider acceptable. Either as a complement or substitute to the current Market Stability Reserve (MSR), a price floor would thus make the EU ETS less prone to future revision in case of unexpectedly low prices. We identify and confront four prominent arguments against the introduction of an EU ETS price floor.
Key policy insights:
- An EU ETS price floor would be an important institutional innovation enhancing political and economic stability, and predictability of the EUA price
- The recent Market Stability Reserve (MSR) reform has not removed the need for a carbon price floor.
- Introducing an element of price responsiveness into the so far purely quantitative design of the EU ETS would help to preserve its integrity
- In contrast to conventional wisdom, legal analysis reveals that an EU ETS price floor can be legally feasible
- Political support for a carbon price floor is gaining traction across Europe
Bewertung des Klimapakets und nächste Schritte. CO2-Preis, sozialer Ausgleich, Europa, Monitoring
(2019)
Das von der Bundesregierung vorgelegte Klimapaket wird aller Voraussicht nach unzureichend sein, um die Ziele für 2030 zu erreichen. Zwar wird eine sinnvolle Architektur für eine umfassende CO2-Bepreisung sichtbar: Einstieg mit einem Fixpreis, mittelfristig ein nationaler Emissionshandel für Wärme und Verkehr und langfristig Integration in den EU-Emissionshandel mit einem Mindestpreis. Aber der Preispfad ist zu niedrig und reicht nicht weit genug in die Zukunft, um eine ausreichende Lenkungswirkung zu entfalten und die notwendige Sicherheit für Investitionen zu vermitteln. So wie der Preispfad jetzt festgeschrieben worden ist, sind nach 2026 voraussichtlich erhebliche Preissteigerungen zur Zielerreichung nötig. Dadurch wird das Erreichen der 2030er-Ziele unnötig teuer. Weiterhin besteht das Risiko, dass der Preispfad mittelfristig (2022 bis 2025) womöglich schon zu einem Verletzen der EU-Lastenteilungsziele führt.
Auch die Frage des sozialen Ausgleichs in der deutschen Klimapolitik ist noch nicht befriedigend gelöst. Es zeigt sich, dass die Mittelschicht am stärksten belastet wird, während die Belastung für ärmere Haushalte zwar abgefedert wird, der Ausgleich aber noch unzureichend ist: Gerade hier treten besondere Härtefälle auf. Die soziale Schieflage verschärft sich dramatisch bei steigenden CO2-Preisen, die ab 2026 zu erwarten sind.
Es kommt nun darauf an, in den nächsten Schritten nachzusteuern: Der CO2-Preispfad sollte auf ein Ambitionsniveau angehoben werden, mit dem die Klimaziele zuverlässig erreicht werden können. Außerdem müssen die klimapolitischen Instrumente sozialverträglich ausgestaltet werden. Weiterhin ist eine aktivere Rolle Deutschlands in der europäischen Klimapolitik entscheidend. Denn parallel zum nationalen Einstieg sollte Deutschland die Einführung einer integrierten europaweiten CO2-Bepreisung vorantreiben, um eine dauerhafte Zersplitterung und entsprechend hohe Kosten der europäischen Klimapolitik zu verhindern. Die europäische Klimadebatte um eine Erhöhung des Klimaziels für das Jahr 2030, angestoßen durch die neue EU-Kommission, bietet dafür in der kommenden Zeit einen guten Einstiegspunkt.
Zentral ist zudem ein effektiver Monitoringprozess. Dabei sollte der einberufene Expertenrat nicht nur das Ex-post-Monitoring der Emissionen unterstützen, sondern auch ein Vorschlagsrecht für das Nach-steuern von Maßnahmen zur Zielerreichung haben (Ex-ante-Evaluierung alternativer Optionen). Auch eine Berichtspflicht gegenüber dem Bundestag wäre wichtig, um Transparenz über den Fortschritt bei der Zielerreichung herzustellen. Der jetzt aufgesetzte Expertenrat hat dagegen nur ein schwaches Mandat zur bloßen Überprüfung von Daten und Modellannahmen. Doch das Gremium sollte nicht bloß den Fortschritt hinsichtlich der Klimaziele notariell bestätigen, sondern der Schrittmacher für deren Umsetzung sein. Hier wurde es verpasst, eine starke Institution zu schaffen.
Sustaining and increasing climate policy ambition in the presence of heterogeneous interests and potential veto players is a key challenge for climate governance. We examine the conceptual and empirical significance of transfers to balance heterogeneous interests and build support for raising climate policy ambition in the development of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). We provide insights into how to strategically sequence ‘brown cushioning’ and ‘green push’ policy incentives within the EU ETS to deliberately incentivize transformative change among actor constituencies towards decarbonization endogenously. The analysis demonstrates the significance of preventive and compensatory buy-in, via allowance allocation and revenue spending design, for the introduction and each major reform of the scheme. Given the potential for a substantially increasing value distributed within the EU ETS, future policy options should aim to strengthen the scheme’s inherent incentives towards decarbonization and to prevent an increasing structural divide among EU member states.
Die deutsche Klimapolitik benötigt eine grundlegende Neuausrichtung. Deutschland muss im Rahmen der EU-Lastenteilungsverordnung bis 2030 seine Emissionen im Verkehrs-, Gebäude- und Landwirtschaftssektor sowie in Teilen des Industrie- und Energiesektors um 38 Prozent gegenüber 2005 vermindern, sonst drohen erhebliche Strafzahlungen. Das erfordert einen deutlich steileren CO2-Reduktionspfad als in den vergangenen Jahren. Die Regierung plant daher, bis zum Ende des Jahres ein Klimaschutzgesetz zu verabschieden. Mit der aktuellen Ausrichtung von Energiewende und Klimapolitik kann dieses Ziel allerdings nicht erreicht werden, weil die bestehenden ökonomischen Anreize unzureichend sind und für Investoren und Innovatoren erhebliche Unsicherheiten über die zukünftige Ausrichtung der Klimapolitik bestehen. Außerdem sind die bisherigen Maßnahmen sozial unausgewogen. Der klimapolitische Rahmen muss dringend auf das zentrale Ziel ausgerichtet werden, also das Vermeiden von CO2-Emissionen. Der CO2-Preis sollte zum Leitinstrument der Klimapolitik werden. Gleichzeitig wächst die Unzufriedenheit mit dem unzureichenden klimapolitischen Fortschritt in breiten Teilen der Gesellschaft: Die nationalen Klimaziele für 2020 werden verfehlt. Die Jugend, prominent vertreten durch die „Fridays for Future“-Bewegung, sieht die Lebensgrundlagen ihrer eigenen und künftiger Generationen in Gefahr. Klimaschutz ist zu einem zentralen Thema in der Mitte der Gesellschaft geworden. Daraus ist ein unmittelbarer klimapolitischer Handlungsdruck entstanden, der für eine umfassende Reform der Klimapolitik genutzt werden sollte. Die nötigen Reformen lassen sich nur durch einen Paradigmenwechsel erreichen, bei dem auch die
Umwelt- und Klimapolitik an den grundlegenden Prinzipien der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft ausgerichtet wird. Dabei gilt es den Wettbewerb um die günstigsten Vermeidungstechnologien zu fördern, Investitionssicherheit zu stärken, die Gesamtkosten für die Erreichung der Ziele möglichst gering zu halten und die Belastungen gerecht über Haushalte und Unternehmen zu verteilen. Ordnungsrecht und Förderprogramme sollten künftig nur eine ergänzende Rolle einnehmen. Im Zentrum der Neuausrichtung muss eine umfassende und koordinierte Bepreisung der CO2-Emissionen stehen. Die Ausgestaltung einer deutschen CO2-Preisreform sollte von Beginn an als Dreiklang gedacht werden: Erstens muss der Konvergenzpunkt eine europaweit harmonisierte CO2-Bepreisung sein. Zweitens sollte Deutschland als Zwischenschritt zügig eine nationale CO2-Preisreform umsetzen, um seine Ziele im Rahmen der EU-Lastenteilungsverordnung zu erreichen. Drittens sollte die europäische CO2-Preisreform Grundlage für erfolgreiche internationale Klimaverhandlungen werden. Mit dieser Reform haben Deutschland und Europa die Chance, nicht nur die europäische Klimapolitik voranzubringen, sondern auch ihre Position in den internationalen Verhandlungen zu verbessern.
This policy briefbuilds on theworkshop EU ETS Reform: Taking Stock and Examining Carbon Price Floor Options,held at the Centrefor European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels on July 3, 2018. The workshop was cosponsored by CEPS and the AHEAD and Mistra CarbonExit projects. While the brief draws on insights from workshop discussions, its views are solely those of the authors. The brief outlinesdifferent perspectives on thepast performanceof the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS)in terms of its allowance price (Section 1), analyzes how the recent reform respondedto related challenges(Section 2), and considers the case for introducinga carbon pricefloor in the EU ETS(Section 3). The main part of the brief (Section 4) identifies five myths in the debate of an EU ETSpricefloorand criticallyconfrontsthem. Section 5 concludes by discussing potential entry points for introducing a carbon price floor in the context of the upcoming EU climate policy process
Economic Growth, Human Development, and Welfare" of the 2018 Report of the International Panel on Social Progress (IPSP). Mission of the IPSP: The International Panel on Social Progress (IPSP) will harness the competence of hundreds of experts about social issues and will deliver a report addressed to all social actors, movements, organizations, politicians and decision-makers, in order to provide them with the best expertise on questions that bear on social change. The Panel will seek consensus whenever possible but will not hide controversies and will honestly present up-to-date arguments and analyses, and debates about them, in an accessible way. The Panel will have no partisan political agenda, but will aim at restoring hope in social progress and stimulating intellectual and public debates. Different political and philosophical views may conceive of social progress in different ways, emphasizing values such as freedom, dignity, or equality. The Panel will retain full independence from political parties, governments, and organizations with a partisan agenda. While the Panel will primarily work for the dissemination of knowledge to all relevant actors in society, it will also foster research on the topics it will study and help to revive interest for research in social long-term prospective analysis