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If infrastructure is a fundamental driver of economic growth and social development, why is it so difficult to get right? This volume makes the case for a governance perspective on infrastructure. This implies moving beyond rational economic analysis of what should be done towards an analysis of the political, institutional and societal mechanisms that shape decision-making about infrastructure investment, planning and implementation. The expert contributions dissect the logics of infrastructure governance in a novel way, providing timely analyses that will enrich debates about how to get infrastructure governance right.
In the existing literature there is general agreement that the effectiveness and efficiency of command and control instruments versus market-based instruments is highly context specific. A country's particular regulatory environment and state capacity, as well as the features of given environmental problems, play an important role in ascertaining what the “right” set of policy instruments for environmental management might be. This article examines how command and control instruments are used as an environmental enforcement mechanism in China's authoritarian state. Based on extensive fieldwork, this paper shows that the reliance on binding environmental targets as the main domestic policy instrument in China has generated numerous undesirable consequences. While China's target-based approach to implementation has incentivized local officials to strictly enforce environmental mandates, there are numerous shortcomings in the system. In particular, target rigidity, cyclical behaviour, poor data quality, and the absence of an independent monitoring agency have generated adverse effects and contribute to a yawning gap between regulatory goals and outcomes. The paper concludes that binding environmental targets as the main command–control instrument in China can be more accurately described as “command without control” as the target-setting central government does not exercise a high degree of control over implementation and monitoring processes. But command and control instruments can be suited for managing “first-generation” environmental problems and addressing environmental issues that have easily identifiable pollution sources and which are easy to verify.
Wind and Solar Power in Brazil and China: Interests, State-Business Relations, and Policy Outcomes
(2015)
This article examines developments in the renewable electricity sector in Brazil and China since 2000. The two countries share many interests with respect to solar and wind power, but institutional differences in state–business relations led to different outcomes. In China, in a context of corporatist state–business relations, state interventions were more far-reaching, with the state coordinating with state-owned banks, offering large financial and investment incentives to state-owned or state-connected enterprises. By contrast, in Brazil’s public–private partnerships, state support to promote renewable energies was shaped by a stronger preference for competitive auctions and stricter financing rules. The differences in state–business relations help explain the observed developmental trajectories in wind and solar power
The key findings of this report are that sesame is a suitable crop for poverty alleviation for smallholders in Benishangul Gumuz and that the smallholder model is competitive versus
the large-scale investor model in terms of productivity. Farmers can achieve high profits without significant up-front investments. With minimal expenditure for sesame seeds and
some simple equipment for ploughing, weeding and harvesting, farmers can cultivate sesame on a family labor basis. Potential income is higher in the smallholder model than
from either communal land management, or from the salaries from large-scale investors. However, this potential is mirrored by the highest risk for farmers to
receive the lowest income. Smallholders can mitigate this risk as well as increase their income further through membership of primary production co-operatives that offer higher sales prices and paid-out dividends.
Debates about how to respond to climate change have largely focused on the difficulties in agreeing on national targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. By assuming that the main obstacle to emissions reduction lies in the inability to reach agreement internationally, the current debate underplays the challenges of building the state capacity that will be needed to ensure mitigation takes place. Yet the implementation of mitigation strategies is far from straightforward. It requires careful balancing of competing priorities and deliberate strategies to bring different interest groups on board. We analyse the way this balancing act has been carried out in promoting energy efficiency measures in China and India. The balancing act has been done differently as each country has tailored its approach to the context of competing priorities and differing institutional capabilities. We encapsulate these differences by referring to China’s approach as ‘state-signalling’ and India’s approach as a ‘market-plus’ approach. China’s approach is more explicitly statist than India’s, but in both countries the state plays a central role in building the support base for its policies through processes that we describe as the bundling of policies and interests.
Private sector development in central China: patterns, causes, and the role of local governments
(2010)
This article examines the career backgrounds of municipal Chinese Communist Party secretaries between 1990 and 2011. Based on an analysis of 898 cadre biographies and 32 interviews with local government officials during 2011 and 2013, this article shows that the majority of municipal party secretaries had spent their careers working at the provincial and municipal levels, while only few advanced up from the county. Our analysis finds that obstacles hindering leading county cadres from rising to the upper ranks of the municipal apparatus include age and education restrictions; limited positions at the municipal level; the lack of networks linking to provincial leaders; and provincial leaders’ appointment preferences. Limited career advancement opportunities for county cadres have important implications for understanding the incentive foundations of China’s bureaucracy. With only slim prospects for leading county cadres to rise to top municipal positions, the political incentives outlined in the cadre evaluation system might not be as effective in steering cadre behavior as currently claimed in the literature.
China's national leaders see restructuring and diversification away from resource-based, energy intensive industries as central goals in the coming years. On the basis of extensive fieldwork in China between 2010 and 2012, we suggest that the high turnover of leading cadres at the local level may hinder state-led greening growth initiatives. Frequent cadre turnover is intended primarily to keep local Party secretaries and mayors on the move in order to promote the implementation of central directives. While rotation does seem to aid implementation by reducing coordination problems, there are also significant downsides to local leaders changing office every three to four years. Officials with short time horizons are likely to choose the path of least resistance in selecting quick, low-quality approaches to the implementation of environmental policies. We conclude that the perverse effects of local officials’ short time horizons give reason to doubt the more optimistic claims about the advantages of China's model of environmental authoritarianism.
Debates about how to respond to climate change have largely focused on the difficulties in agreeing on national targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. By assuming that the main obstacle to emissions reduction lies in the inability to reach agreement internationally, the current debate underplays the challenges of building the state capacity that will be needed to ensure mitigation takes place. The implementation of mitigation strategies is far from straightforward. It requires careful balancing of competing priorities and deliberate strategies to bring different interest groups on board. We analyze the way this balancing act has been carried out in promoting energy efficiency measures in China and India. The balancing act has been done differently as each country has tailored its approach to the specific context of competing priorities and differing state capacity. We encapsulate these differences by referring to China’s approach as “state-signaling” and India’s approach as a “market-plus” approach. China’s approach is more explicitly statist than India’s, but in both countries, the state plays a central role in building the support base for its policies through processes that we describe as the bundling of policies and interests. These bundling strategies are used to help build informal coalitions in favor of energy efficiency measures.