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For many German policymakers, a commitment to European integration in defence is a necessary means to further the end of European integration in general – in stark contrast to French leaders who see European integration as the means to reach the end of a stronger European defence. Although there is general support for European defence cooperation and even integration among the German public and state elites, other ideational factors, most notably wide-spread anti-militarist attitudes, military planners’ traditional embeddedness in NATO planning procedures, and a deep commitment to parliamentary control of the armed forces, present manifest hurdles for real capacity-building on the supranational level. As a result, German efforts to integrate defence policy within the EU have been largely symbolic, while real progress takes place in other (bilateral or minilateral and often German-led) frameworks. Berlin has thus contributed considerably to the increasing institutional fragmentation and territorial differentiation in European defence.
Objective: We analyse the employment patterns of childless first-generation migrants to Germany. In particular, we focus on the behaviour of female "marriage migrants". Marriage migrants are defined as individuals who married after their spouse had moved to Germany.
Background: Demographic studies have illustrated that marriage migrants have particularly high childbirth rates upon arrival. There is, however, little empirical evidence on how the childbearing behaviour of migrant women is related to their employment behaviour.
Method: We use event history techniques to study women's labour market entry after migration in relation to their childbearing behaviour. We draw on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). The analytical sample is restricted to immigrant women who moved while childless to Germany between 1990 and 2016 (n=981).
Results: Compared to other groups, marriage migrants have very low chances of entering the labour market. Only 32 per cent of the migrants in our sample had ever participated in the labour market in the five-year period after their arrival in Germany. A large share of the differences between these migrants and other migrants can be attributed to the socio-demographic composition of these women, and to their tendency to transition to parenthood soon after their arrival.
Conclusion: We argue that the low employment rates of female marriage migrants must also be viewed in the context of Germany’s migration policies, which do not provide many routes for female third-country nationals to move to Germany. One of the few available channels is that of marriage migration. We conclude by discussing the social policy implications of these findings at a time when Germany is gradually becoming a dual-earner society.
Abstract
Europeanization research found no general convergence towards centralized EU policy coordination, despite decentralized systems' comparatively slow and ineffective position‐taking. Does this finding hold against the threat, urgency, and uncertainty exerted by recent years' polycrisis? We posit that decentralized systems indeed persist, albeit in a three‐step reactive sequence in which situational centralization during crises dialectically reinforces decentralization in the long run. First, the prime minister's office harnesses a crisis to acquire hierarchical control of position‐taking. Second, to exploit the deep expertise of the bureaucracy and maximize its bargaining power on the EU‐level, it co‐opts a lead ministry. Third, due to the institutional underpinnings of the decentralized system, the lead ministry, rather than the prime minister's office, eventually retains the administrative capacities created in crisis. We illustrate this causal mechanism in a comparison of the German government's EU policy coordination during the Eurozone and Schengen crises.
We distinguish between social and liberal collective skill formation systems and demonstrate that the German VET system is a social system with a strong (parity) role for trade unions in its governance. In contrast, unions play a considerably weaker role in the more liberal Swiss system, which privileges employers’ interests. We show that the different position of unions in VET systems has the expected consequences on a range of indicators. We further examine why unions are less important in Switzerland and show how, after the First World War, differences in the institutional environment and power resources of the union movements set Germany and Switzerland on different paths, which are still visible today.
When elections are distant, polls are poor predictors. Too few voters are paying attention and too much can change before election day. Structural models can establish baseline expectations but suffer from high uncertainty and underspecification imposed by small samples. We present an early forecast of the 2017 Bundestag election results for individual parties that leverages economic and political data as well as state parliament (Landtag) election results in the German states (Länder) to sidestep these shortcomings. A linear random effects model provides our estimates. Länder elections are dispersed over the calendar and offer the advantage of capturing both actual voter preferences and new political issues. We argue that this approach offers a promising method for early forecasts when polls are not informative.
Instrumental or procedural democrats? The evolution of procedural preferences after democratization
(2019)
This paper addresses instrumentalist attitudes to democracy – attitudes according to which democracy is not valued for itself, but accepted only as a means to specific policy goals. Pippa Norris has argued that in the process of democratic consolidation, such instrumentalist conceptions of democracy are replaced with proceduralist ones, leading to an enlightened understanding of democracy. We use the unique case of German reunification to show that this process takes at least a generation to complete. Based on data from a novel battery of items fielded via the German GESIS panel, we show an East–West divide in democratic instrumentalism, which, however, is smaller among younger generations. While our findings do confirm Norris’ thesis that growing democratic experience leads to a shift from instrumental to procedural understandings of democracy, we also show that instrumental democrats still make up a sizeable portion of the citizenry that might withdraw support if dissatisfied.
The article presents the findings of a research project on the roles and positioning of foundations in Germany, with a focus on the fields of education, higher education, social services, and arts and culture. Results show that fields as well as differences in size and mode of operation are key to understanding the roles and positioning of foundations. Germany is a coordinated market economy with a conservative welfare regime and a corporatist nonprofit sector. However, especially the latter of the two characteristics is gradually changing, and foundations are moving away from a state orientation toward a greater civil society focus.
Wie Städte sich neu finden
(2013)
In Städten verdichten sich wie nirgendwo sonst ökonomische, soziale und kulturelle Facetten menschlichen Zusammenlebens. Hier entstehen wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Impulse. 84 Prozent der deutschen Bevölkerung lebt in Städten. Doch sind nicht alle Städte gleichermaßen Orte von Wachstum und Innovation. Mit dem Ende der Industrialisierung und dem Übergang in die Dienstleistungsgesellschaft (vgl. Bell 1999) sind einige Städte aus dem größeren Arbeits-kreislauf der Gesellschaft herausgefallen. Sie haben aufgehört, zentrale Orte des Wirtschaftens zu sein. Ihre Bevölkerungen schrumpfen, Gebäude bleiben ungenutzt und die öffentliche Hand verfügt nur über unzureichende und schwindende Mittel, dem entgegenzuwirken. Es sind strukturschwache Städte.
Kommunale Schrumpfungsprozesse sind aus dem 20. Jahrhundert kaum bekannt, obwohl zwei Kriege in Deutschland tobten und unvorstellbare Verwüstungen hinterlassen haben. (...)
BACKGROUND:
Health literacy is of increasing importance in public health research. It is a necessary pre-condition for the involvement in decisions about health and health care and related to health outcomes. Knowledge about limited health literacy in different age groups is crucial to better target public health interventions for subgroups of the population. However, little is known about health literacy in Germany. The study therefore assesses the prevalence of limited health literacy and associated factors among different age groups.
METHODS:
The Health Literacy Survey Germany is a cross-sectional study with 2,000 participants aged 15 years or older in private households. Perceived health literacy was assessed via computer-assisted personal interviews using the HLS-EU-Q-47 questionnaire. Descriptive analyses, chi-square tests and odds ratios were performed stratified for different age groups.
RESULTS:
The population affected by limited perceived health literacy increases by age. Of the respondents aged 15-29 years, 47.3 % had limited perceived health literacy and 47.2 % of those aged 30-45 years, whereas 55.2 % of the respondents aged 46-64 years and 66.4 % aged 65 years and older showed limited perceived health literacy. In all age groups, limited perceived health literacy was associated with limited functional health literacy, low social status, and a high frequency of doctor visits.
CONCLUSIONS:
The results suggest a need to further investigate perceived health literacy in all phases of the life-course. Particular attention should be devoted to persons with lower social status, limited functional health literacy and/or a high number of doctor visits in all age groups.