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The ‘asymmetry thesis’, articulated by Fritz Scharpf, holds that EU governance is characterised by an asymmetry between positive and negative integration. The EU has well-developed capacities for negative integration but only limited capacities for positive integration. The present paper challenges the orthodoxy that this thesis has become in EU law and political science scholarship. It argues that the asymmetry thesis no longer accurately depicts European integration, revisiting its key legal and institutional assumptions. Taking the internal market as the most likely case to test the thesis, we show that negative integration has become weaker, positive integration has gained in strength, and both developments have had an impact on the substance of EU law and policymaking, which is promoting non-economic concerns and market-correcting policies to a greater extent than it used to. These shifts, so we contend, could be even more pronounced in other areas of European integration.
This article examines the development of judicialization literature in the EU arguing that – in spite of the obvious advantages of interdisciplinary collaboration – scholarship on judicialization in law and political science is drafting apart in the 21st Century. While early political science research on the European Courts found theoretical inspiration in legal research, law and political science have increasingly diverging epistemological and methodological starting points. As the article argues, using prominent papers, this results in both disciplines producing partial accounts of judicial change with limited external validity. The article concludes by offering routes to improving the inter-disciplinary foundations of judicialization research.
What role does the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and EU law play in elaborating the rights and principles embodied by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)? Over the last 20 years, human (or ‘fundamental’) rights have become a constant part of the way the CJEU interprets and applies EU law. In a period where fundamental rights and values are increasingly under threat both globally and in Europe, judicial institutions remain an important last bastion of protection. Commenting on Judge Rosas’ (2007) observation that the CJEU is not in fact a human rights Court, three critical questions are derived: The first question is the most related to this special issue. What does the development of the CJEU—an institution with human rights responsibilities—mean for general international human rights law? The second takes up Judge Rosas’ observation that the CJEU, unlike the Strasbourg Court, has extensive judicial responsibilities beyond human rights. What does the development of EU human rights law mean for EU law more broadly? Finally, if Judge Rosas is right that the CJEU is not a human rights Court, what does that mean for its relationship to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the other organs of the Council of Europe? In answer to this last question, the article cautiously advances the argument that the very fact that the CJEU is not a human rights Court implies a more robust role than Judge Rosas suggests for external review of EU law by international human rights bodies.
The last decade has seen increasing demands for greater accountability in digital governance. What, however, does accountability require and what normative goods does it serve? This article develops a general framework for assessing digital accountability focused on four normative goods: openness, non-arbitrariness, effectiveness and publicness. As the article will evidence, claims for digital accountability often refer to deficits relating to one or more of these goods. While scholarly attention has deservedly focused on tying powerful digital actors to rule of law guarantees, the article argues that accountability offers an important normative yardstick to allow citizens to contest digital decisions beyond strict legality. The framework therefore provides a basis for both conceptually disaggregating and normatively forwarding accountability claims in the digital sphere.
Accountability in the EU's para-regulatory state: The case of the Economic and Monetary Union
(2021)
This article revisits Majone's famous argument about accountability in the regulatory state in reference to the European Union's (EU) Economic and Monetary Union. We show that the EU has entered the stage of a “para-regulatory state” marked by increasing EU regulation in areas linked to core state powers. Despite the redistributive and politicized nature of these policy areas, the EU's “para-regulatory state” has continued to rely on its regulatory model of accountability, focused on decisionmaking processes, and interest mediation. In line with Majone, we describe the model as procedural and contrast it to substantive accountability – which is necessary when regulation has clear redistributive implications. Using two case studies from fiscal policy and monetary affairs, we illustrate the predominance of procedural accountability as exercised by the European Parliament and EU Courts. We complement the empirical analysis with a normative discussion of how substantive accountability could potentially be rendered in both fields.
When looking for possible constraints on Differentiated Integration, the fundamental values of the European Union (EU) seem an obvious starting point. Both the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the values articulated in Art. 2 TEU are cross-cutting across EU states. However, while fundamental values have acted as centralising devices in other federal settings, in an EU context marked by extensive value disagreement, they may also act as pathways for differentiation. Insofar as national constitutional orders disagree on the scope of EU rights, attempts to ground EU law in fundamental values trigger inevitable interpretive conflicts across states. This paper will use the examples of asylum and the European Arrest Warrant to demonstrate this argument: while EU law may use fundamental values as a reason to harmonise EU law across states, such values may also be invoked to question the principle of mutual trust underlying the EU legal order, thereby causing rather than limiting differentiation.
his article introduces a new normative framework for analysing accountability in the European Union’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The framework is anchored in four normative ‘goods’ that accountability is supposed to ensure: openness, non-arbitrariness, effectiveness, and publicness. All of these can be achieved in a procedural or substantive way, depending on whether actors are held accountable for the quality of their decision-making processes or for the actual merit of their decisions. Transposed to EMU, this conceptualisation shows both the payoffs and trade-offs of prioritising procedural accountability. Using different examples across EMU governance, the article illustrates how current mechanisms of political, legal, and administrative accountability predominantly evaluate the procedures followed by EU institutions when performing their tasks. While such an approach can bring clarity, predictability, and autonomy for the actors involved, it distracts attention from the substantive assessment of EMU decisions. The article contributes to the EMU accountability literature by going beyond principal-agent expectations of democratic control rooted in the nation-state or legal debates about principles for accountable behaviour found in EU Treaties. The EMU, and the EU more broadly, need a different perspective on accountability focused on generally-applicable standards for holding power to account.
Making sense of the “incomprehensible”: The PSPP Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court
(2020)
This article investigates how the European Union’s political process affects the level of rights protection afforded by European Union (EU) law. It does so in two steps, firstly by analysing how institutional politics plays an important role in the evolution of the EU fundamental rights framework and secondly by demonstrating empirically how legislative interaction affects the level of protection provided by three important EU legislative acts. As the article will demonstrate, this interaction tends to result in the overall level of rights protection being increased. Analysing this finding, the article uses institutionalist theory to argue that the EU’s political process carries certain positive effects: the diversity of the legislative process (both within and between institutions) makes the explicit overlooking of rights-based concerns difficult. These findings carry implications for the increasing tendency to channel EU law and policy outside of the ‘ordinary’ legislative process.
The rise in Europe of populist movements has created severe anxiety about the stability of the EU legal order. This article argues that, while populist ideas challenge numerous elements of the EU’s constitutional settlement, there exists no fundamental incompatibility between populism and EU law. By comparing its response to populism with attempts by EU law to stabilise its legal order in the face of political contestation arising from other political cleavages, the article discusses three different ways to understand the interaction between EU law and populism. EU law may seek to ‘survive’ the growth of populism by (i) bracketing or insulating its institutions from populist contestation, (ii) accommodating populist ideas or (iii) confronting the constitutional strategies populists utilise domestically. In examining the constitutional foundations of populism and its relation to emerging doctrines of EU law, the article seeks to build a road map of how populist movements might utilise or resist EU law in their development.