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If infrastructure is a fundamental driver of economic growth and social development, why is it so difficult to get right? This volume makes the case for a governance perspective on infrastructure. This implies moving beyond rational economic analysis of what should be done towards an analysis of the political, institutional and societal mechanisms that shape decision-making about infrastructure investment, planning and implementation. The expert contributions dissect the logics of infrastructure governance in a novel way, providing timely analyses that will enrich debates about how to get infrastructure governance right.
In the existing literature there is general agreement that the effectiveness and efficiency of command and control instruments versus market-based instruments is highly context specific. A country's particular regulatory environment and state capacity, as well as the features of given environmental problems, play an important role in ascertaining what the “right” set of policy instruments for environmental management might be. This article examines how command and control instruments are used as an environmental enforcement mechanism in China's authoritarian state. Based on extensive fieldwork, this paper shows that the reliance on binding environmental targets as the main domestic policy instrument in China has generated numerous undesirable consequences. While China's target-based approach to implementation has incentivized local officials to strictly enforce environmental mandates, there are numerous shortcomings in the system. In particular, target rigidity, cyclical behaviour, poor data quality, and the absence of an independent monitoring agency have generated adverse effects and contribute to a yawning gap between regulatory goals and outcomes. The paper concludes that binding environmental targets as the main command–control instrument in China can be more accurately described as “command without control” as the target-setting central government does not exercise a high degree of control over implementation and monitoring processes. But command and control instruments can be suited for managing “first-generation” environmental problems and addressing environmental issues that have easily identifiable pollution sources and which are easy to verify.
Wind and Solar Power in Brazil and China: Interests, State-Business Relations, and Policy Outcomes
(2015)
This article examines developments in the renewable electricity sector in Brazil and China since 2000. The two countries share many interests with respect to solar and wind power, but institutional differences in state–business relations led to different outcomes. In China, in a context of corporatist state–business relations, state interventions were more far-reaching, with the state coordinating with state-owned banks, offering large financial and investment incentives to state-owned or state-connected enterprises. By contrast, in Brazil’s public–private partnerships, state support to promote renewable energies was shaped by a stronger preference for competitive auctions and stricter financing rules. The differences in state–business relations help explain the observed developmental trajectories in wind and solar power
The key findings of this report are that sesame is a suitable crop for poverty alleviation for smallholders in Benishangul Gumuz and that the smallholder model is competitive versus
the large-scale investor model in terms of productivity. Farmers can achieve high profits without significant up-front investments. With minimal expenditure for sesame seeds and
some simple equipment for ploughing, weeding and harvesting, farmers can cultivate sesame on a family labor basis. Potential income is higher in the smallholder model than
from either communal land management, or from the salaries from large-scale investors. However, this potential is mirrored by the highest risk for farmers to
receive the lowest income. Smallholders can mitigate this risk as well as increase their income further through membership of primary production co-operatives that offer higher sales prices and paid-out dividends.