Refine
Document Type
- Article (3)
Language
- English (3)
Has Fulltext
- no (3)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (3)
Does social recognition motivate prosocial individuals? We run large-scale experiments at Italy’s main blood donors association, evaluating social recognition through social media and peer groups against a simple ask to donate. Across several studies, we find that the simple ask is at least as effective as offering social recognition. In a survey experiment with blood donors we show that socially recognized donations signal not only altruism but also image-seeking. This can lead to social recognition being less effective, or even counterproductive, when offered to those who are already perceived as good citizens.
Positive feedback about the outcome of volunteers’ prosocial actions is often thought to help motivate continued volunteers’ engagement. In the context of blood donations, various collection systems have begun to provide blood donors feedback on successful utilization of their blood donation. An experiment conducted by the main NGO that supports the collection of blood in Italy studies how such feedback affects subsequent blood donations. From a sample of over 8’000 blood donors, we find that providing feedback of successful utilization decreases donations. Though surprising, these results are consistent with theoretical models in which individuals engage in prosocial behavior to sustain a positive self-image: feedback about the outcome of a recent donation can act as reminders that boost self-image and reduce the need for re-engaging soon in prosocial activities. Interestingly for policy, we also show that combining the feedback with an explicit request to sign up for a new donation can eliminate, but not overturn, the negative effect of the feedback.
We propose a novel experiment that prevents social learning, thus allowing us to disentangle the underlying mechanisms of social influence. Subjects observe their peer’s incentives, but not their behavior. We find evidence of conformity: when individuals believe that incentives make others contribute more, they also increase their contributions. Conformity is driven by individuals who feel socially close to their peer. However, when incentives are not expected to raise their peer’s contributions, participants reduce their own contributions. Our data is consistent with an erosion of norm-adherence when prosocial behavior of the social reference is driven by extrinsic motives, and cannot be explained by incentive inequality or altruistic crowding out. These findings show scope for social influence in settings with limited observability and offer insights into the mediators of conformity.