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While intrastate conflicts remain the dominant form of armed conflict and migration receives increasing attention, the international dimension of civil wars, particularly non-state sponsorship, has largely been overlooked. This dissertation examines the phenomenon of diasporas as external sponsors in intrastate conflicts. It investigates: (1) Why do diasporas support rebel organizations? (2) Under what conditions is diaspora support more or less likely? (3) How does diaspora sponsorship of rebel organizations impact civilian victimization and rebel governance? To understand the logic of diaspora support, I employ a principal-agent framework. Conflict, rebel group, diaspora, and homeland characteristics are determinants of diaspora sponsorship. I argue that diasporas aim for kin support and changes in the homeland and consequently prefer limited violence against civilians and co-ethnic civilians. Diasporas benefit from delegating the task of combat and limited civilian victimization but risk agency slack. Concurrently, the rebel organization gains additional resources but loses autonomy. I introduce an information-sharing mechanism between co-ethnics in the conflict zone and the diaspora, which enhances the monitoring capability of the diaspora. I employ a mixed-methods approach to answer the research questions. Interviews conducted in the Washington DC area with members of various diasporas and experts provide evidence for the information-sharing between the diaspora and co-ethnics. I produced a unique data set on diaspora support for African and Asian intrastate conflicts between 1989 and 2014. Findings from multiple large-N analyses, utilizing extreme bounds analysis, logistic regression, and negative binomial analyses, serve as the empirical base for examining the causes and consequences of diaspora sponsorship to rebel organizations. I demonstrate that conflict and rebel group characteristics are strong determinants of diaspora sponsorship, while homeland and diaspora characteristics yield mixed results. Diaspora support significantly reduces the number of civilian killings. The impacts on ethnic violence and rebel governance are heterogeneous. Overall, this dissertation enriches our understanding of diasporas’ roles as external actors in conflict dynamics and as non-state sponsors for rebel organizations. It opens further avenues for researching civilian-rebel relationships and host country-homeland dynamics. Policy discussions may follow around monitoring of sponsorship activities and the responsibilities of host countries.
At the beginning of the twenty‐first century, the large democracies of Western Europe experienced some of the most prosperous and peaceful decades in human history. Specifically, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Germany experienced high and stable quality of life, democratic accountability and state capacity between 2000 and 2019, according to the 2022 Berggruen Governance Index. While all four of these countries are among the top performers in the Index, substantial problems lurk beneath the surface. Notably, each failed to capitalise on the low interest rate environment in the decade following the global financial crisis of 2007–2009—albeit in different ways and for different reasons in each country. In particular, low investment in infrastructure and key technologies, the persistence of stubborn regional inequalities, and resulting sluggish GDP growth have prevented the ‘Big Four’ in Western Europe from improving further and future‐proofing their existing gains.
Much of Latin America has experienced a renewed ‘lost decade’, failing to substantially expand quality of life since the late 2000s. While the outcomes of governance performance across the largest countries – including Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia, and Argentina – have discrete causes, common themes like internal conflict, corruption, and overreliance on natural resources plague the entire region. Put more generally, the inability to turn democratic accountability into a state mechanism able to deliver economic growth and public goods in a sustainable manner is a liability affecting all five countries. To explore the difficulties that the large Latin American countries have faced in the twenty‐first century, this article examines results from the 2022 Berggruen Governance Index, and then presents three key issues facing the region: insufficient state capacity, flirtations with authoritarianism, and economic inequality and inflation. While the challenges remain substantial, increased regional integration may offer one way out of the predicament.
AbstractThe United States—often hailed as the ‘oldest democracy in the world’ and the ‘leader of the free world’—has fallen on hard times. In addition to recent headline‐grabbing political events that have highlighted its political dysfunction, data from the 2022 Berggruen Governance Index (BGI) reveal that overall state capacity and democratic accountability have been declining for years. Although public goods provision has remained on a steady course, the US still trails much of the developed world. We find this struggling performance is largely the result of neglecting three types of infrastructure: civic, physical and social. Specifically, we argue that the crisis became particularly pronounced due to an insufficient response to the 2008 global financial crisis. Although some recent political achievements could slow the decline, more drastic action will be required to reverse these troubling trends.
Implementing the EU Green Deal requires annual investments of about €620 billion, most of which will have to be shouldered by the private sector. However, businesses and households are not investing enough as of now. An important lever for greater green investment is reducing uncertainty around such investment. At the start of the next institutional cycle, the EU should hence improve regulatory certainty for green investments, which should be palatable to most parties likely to form a majority in the Parliament. In addition, the EU should adopt concrete tools that reduce cost uncertainty for companies and households in a pragmatic manner. To this end, this policy position recommends using green lead markets and proposes moves to explore two novel mechanisms that cost taxpayers little to nothing but should boost green investments.
We demonstrate how the incentives of firms that partially own their suppliers or customers to foreclose rivals depend on how the partial owner can extract profits from the target. Compared to a fully vertically integrated firm, a partial owner may obtain only a share of the target’s profit but influence the target’s strategy significantly. We show that the incentives for customer and input foreclosure can be higher, equal, or even lower with partial ownership than with a vertical merger, depending on how the protection of minority shareholders and transfer price regulations affect the scope for profit extraction.
Election campaigns are increasingly conducted online. Social media platforms in particular shape political discourse and facilitate new ways of delivering political messages. This was initially considered a boon for democracy, but opaque manipulation tactics quickly turned it into a threat to fair and transparent elections. National regulatory frameworks have often proved to be inadequate for online campaigns and the transnational nature of European elections. The EU has reacted to this with a regulation on political advertising. The initiative facilitates transnational campaigning online and aims to protect the integrity of European elections. The 2024 European elections will be the first time EU rules operate in this area, putting these to the test. This election cycle will indicate whether political actors are striking out for more cross-border campaigns and whether they suffice to protect European elections. Critical here is how online platforms implement the new rules and how transparent they are about campaign-related posts on their sites.
EU enlargement has historically fostered economic growth and political stability. In the Western Balkans, however, the process has stalled for many years due to the myriad crises afflicting the EU and failure to deliver reforms in the Western Balkans. This policy brief examines the evolution of the EU accession process, the challenges faced by candidate countries, and the need for a revitalized approach that builds reforms into the accession process rather than keep them a precondition for kickstarting it. It calls for the EU to remove bilateral disputes from the process and open accession talks with all candidate countries in all areas covered by the acquis, ensuring that all candidate countries have a fair chance based on their merits.