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At a time of slow growth in several advanced and emerging countries, calls for more structural reforms are multiplying. However, estimations of the short- and medium-term impact of these reforms on GDP growth remain methodologically problematic and still highly controversial. We contribute to this literature by making a novel use of the non-parametric Synthetic Control Method to estimate the impact of 23 wide-reaching structural reform packages (including both real and financial sector measures) rolled out in 22 countries between 1961 and 2000. Our results suggest that, on average, reforms started having a significant positive effect on GDP per capita only after five years. Ten years after the beginning of a reform wave, GDP per capita was roughly 6 percentage points higher than the synthetic counterfactual scenario. However, average point estimates mask a large heterogeneity of outcomes. Benefits tended to materialise earlier, but overall to be more limited, in advanced economies than in emerging markets. These results are confirmed when we use a parametric dynamic panel fixed effect model to control for the rich dynamics of GDP, and are robust to a variety of alternative specifications, placebo and falsification tests, and to different indicators of reform.
Setting a country’s structural growth rate on a higher path, i.e. sparking and sustaining a growth acceleration can have quantitatively huge implications for national income and, more broadly, for people’s wellbeing. We develop a novel statistical framework to identify systematically the set of binding constraints that were unlocked before the 135 growth acceleration episodes that took place between 1962 and 2002 worldwide. We employ this information to characterise the acceleration process, which tends to be preceded by a deep recession and major economic policy changes. Once we combined this information with a set of counterfactual analyses, we find however that successful acceleration strategies should not contain off-the-shelf approaches or necessarily all-encompassing “shock therapy” solutions. On the other hand, they call for a careful tailoring to local conditions. Richer countries tend to experience fewer accelerations, but once these have been ignited, they are better positioned to make the most out of them. Despite standard growth determinants doing a fairly good job at characterising successful accelerations, we note how take-offs remain extremely hard to engineer with a high degree of certainty.
Macroeconomic adjustment in the euro area periphery was more recessionary than pre-crisis imbalances would have warranted. To make this claim, this paper uses a Propensity Score Matching Model to produce counterfactuals for the Eurozone crisis countries (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus, Spain) based on over 200 past macroeconomic adjustment episodes between 1960-2010 worldwide. At its trough, between 2010 and 2015 per capita GDP had contracted on average 11 percentage points more in the Eurozone periphery than in the standard counterfactual scenario. These results are not dictated by any specific country experience, are robust to a battery of alternative counterfactual definitions, and stand confirmed when using a parametric dynamic panel regression model to account more thoroughly for the business cycle. Zooming in on the potential causes, the lack of an independent monetary policy, while having contributed to a deeper recession, does not fully explain the Eurozone’s specificity, which is instead to be traced back to a sharper-than-expected contraction in investment and fiscal austerity due to high funding costs.
This chapter aims at anchoring the experience of the Euro area south during the crisis to the vast literature on the political conditions that increase the likelihood of reforms being passed. In doing so, it qualitatively benchmarks 11 government experiences in five countries and explores 11 hypotheses originally formulated by Williamson (1994). While far from identifying clear silver bullets, the chapter can be seen as a handbook for future reform-minded politicians.
Macroeconomic adjustment in the euro area periphery was more recessionary than pre-crisis imbalances would have warranted. To make this claim, this paper uses a Propensity Score Matching Model to produce counterfactuals for the Eurozone crisis countries (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus, Spain) based on over 200 past macroeconomic adjustment episodes between 1960-2010 worldwide. At its trough, between 2010 and 2015 per capita GDP had contracted on average 11 percentage points more in the Eurozone periphery than in the standard counterfactual scenario. These results are not dictated by any specific country experience, are robust to a battery of alternative counterfactual definitions, and stand confirmed when using a parametric dynamic panel regression model to account more thoroughly for the business cycle. Zooming in on the potential causes, the lack of an independent monetary policy, while having contributed to a deeper recession, does not fully explain the Eurozone’s specificity, which is instead to be identified in a sharper-than-expected contraction in investment and fiscal austerity due to high funding costs. Reading through the overall findings, there are reasons to believe that an incomplete Eurozone institutional setup contributed to aggravate the crisis through higher uncertainty.
This dissertation is on general principles of growth, comprising of three chapters and a short introduction. Chapter 1 analyses the macroeconomic adjustment experienced in IMF/EU-programme countries during the Eurozone crisis by creating counterfactuals based on comparable historical or contemporaneous episodes worldwide. It therefore shows
how crisis management and the institutional framework in which it operates have important implications for the depth of the recession. In particular, an incomplete Eurozone institutional setup contributed to aggravate the crisis through higher uncertainty. The first general principle that can be drawn is that sustained growth rests not only in preventing booms but also in designing institutions that well-manage busts. When growth slows down, calls for deep structural reforms multiply. However, estimations of the short- and medium-term impact of these reforms on GDP growth remain methodologically problematic and still highly controversial. As such, Chapter 2 estimates the impact of 23 wide-reaching
structural reform packages (including both real and financial sector measures) rolled out in 22 countries between 1961 and 2000. It therefore illustrates how large reform packages tend to have on average a positive medium-term impact on growth, but these effects were highly heterogeneous across countries. The second general principle that can be drawn is
that deep economic reforms are no growth silver bullet per se, and rather require careful design, tailored to local conditions.
Finally, Chapter 3 explores factors behind the largest growth acceleration episodes that took place worldwide between 1962 and 2002 and identifies general principles that should underlie a successful growth strategy. In particular, it shows how accelerationstend to be preceded by a deep recession and major economic policy changes. Once this information
is combined with a set of counterfactual analyses, it finds that acceleration strategies should not contain off-the-shelf approaches or necessarily all-encompassing ‘shock therapy’solutions. Despite standard growth determinants doing a fairly
good job at characterising successful accelerations, the quest for take-offs remains elusive, as they seemextremely hard to engineer with a high degree of certainty.