Explaining changes in tax burdens in Latin America: Do politics trump economics?

  • This paper examines whether elections, which are generally held on fixed dates, and banking crises explain the timing of tax reforms and the allocation of the additional tax burden. Using an original fine-grained data set of tax reforms, the paper finds support for the role of these two sources of variation. In particular, the probability of reform is higher during banking crises. During electoral periods, increasing taxes becomes highly unlikely, even if the government is facing financing problems. Interestingly, politics seem to trump economics: banking crises do not affect the probability of having a reform during electoral times. Moreover, the presence of an IMF program affects the tax instruments chosen: countries with a program increase the value-added tax, while those without raise the personal income tax. Finally, the ideology of the president does not explain who bears the additional tax burden.

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Metadaten
Document Type:Article
Language:English
Author(s):Mark HallerbergORCiD, Carlos Scartascini
Parent Title (English):European Journal of Political Economy
ISSN:1873-5703
Publication year:2017
Publishing Institution:Hertie School
First Page:162
Last Page:179
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.07.004
Release Date:2018/10/01
Volume:48
Licence of document (German):Metadaten / metadata
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