Cooperation and norm enforcement - The individual-level perspective

  • We explore the relationship between individuals' disposition to cooperate and their inclination to engage in peer punishment as well as their relative importance for mitigating social dilemmas. Using a modified strategy-method approach we identify individual punishment patterns and link them with individual cooperation patterns. Classifying N = 628 subjects along these two dimensions documents that cooperation and punishment patterns are aligned for most individuals. However, the data also reveal a sizable share of free-riders that punish pro-socially and conditional cooperators that do not engage in punishment. Analyzing the interplay between types in an additional experiment, we show that pro-social punishers are important for achieving cooperation. Incorporating information on punishment types explains large amounts of the between- and within-group variation in cooperation.

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Document Type:Article
Language:English
Author(s):Felix Albrecht, Sebastian Kube, Christian Traxler
Parent Title (English):Journal of Public Economics
Publication year:2018
Embargo Date:2020/01/01
Publishing Institution:Hertie School
First Page:1
Last Page:16
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.06.010
Release Date:2018/10/01
Tag:Conditional cooperation; Public-good games; Punishment patterns; Strategy-method; Type classification
Volume:165
Notes:
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Journal of Public Economics. The final authenticated version is available online at: DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.06.010

Document includes Appendix.
Licence of document (German):Metadaten (öffentlich), post-print
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