Cooperation and norm enforcement - The individual-level perspective
- We explore the relationship between individuals' disposition to cooperate and their inclination to engage in peer punishment as well as their relative importance for mitigating social dilemmas. Using a modified strategy-method approach we identify individual punishment patterns and link them with individual cooperation patterns. Classifying N = 628 subjects along these two dimensions documents that cooperation and punishment patterns are aligned for most individuals. However, the data also reveal a sizable share of free-riders that punish pro-socially and conditional cooperators that do not engage in punishment. Analyzing the interplay between types in an additional experiment, we show that pro-social punishers are important for achieving cooperation. Incorporating information on punishment types explains large amounts of the between- and within-group variation in cooperation.
Document Type: | Article |
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Language: | English |
Author(s): | Felix Albrecht, Sebastian Kube, Christian Traxler |
Parent Title (English): | Journal of Public Economics |
Publication year: | 2018 |
Embargo Date: | 2020/01/01 |
Publishing Institution: | Hertie School |
First Page: | 1 |
Last Page: | 16 |
DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.06.010 |
Release Date: | 2018/10/01 |
Tag: | Conditional cooperation; Public-good games; Punishment patterns; Strategy-method; Type classification |
Volume: | 165 |
Notes: | This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Journal of Public Economics. The final authenticated version is available online at: DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.06.010 Document includes Appendix. |
Licence of document (German): | Metadaten (öffentlich), post-print |