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An Inconvenient Constraint: A Hungarian Council Presidency and the EU’s Rule of Law

  • On 1 July 2024, Hungary is set to take over the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. Given the ongoing rule of law violations in Hungary, concrete proposals have been put forward to prevent it from exercising the Presidency. In this Policy Position, Martijn van den Brink analyzes the legal feasibility of these proposals and argues that the proposed EU measures violate the EU’s very own rule of law.

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Metadaten
Document Type:Working Paper
Language:English
Author(s):Martijn van den BrinkORCiD
Publication year:2023
Publishing Institution:Hertie School
Number pages:4
Related URL:https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/an-inconvenient-constraint-a-hungarian-council-presidency-and-the-eus-rule-of-law
Release Date:2023/06/09
Hertie School Research:Jacques Delors Centre
Jacques Delors Centre / Policy Positions
Licence of document (German):Metadaten / metadata
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