• search hit 1 of 1
Back to Result List

Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia in EMU

  • We investigate the effect of fiscal institutions such as the strength of the finance minister in the budget process and deficits on interest rate spreads of Eurozone countries. Deficits significantly increase risk premia measured by relative swap spreads. The effect of deficits is significantly lower under EMU. This effect partly results from neglecting the role of fiscal institutions. After controlling for institutional changes, fiscal policy remains a significant determinant of risk premia in EMU. Better institutions are connected with lower risk premia. Furthermore deficits matter less for risk premia in countries with better institutions. Markets acknowledge that better institutions reduce fiscal difficulties rendering the monitoring of annual developments less important.

Export metadata

Additional Services

Share in Twitter Search Google Scholar
Metadaten
Document Type:Article
Language:English
Author(s):Mark HallerbergORCiD, Guntram B. Wolff
Parent Title (English):Public Choice
Publication year:2008
First Page:379
Last Page:396
Release Date:2014/05/31
Tag:Budget institutions; EMU; Fiscal policy; Fiscal rules; Sovereign risk premia
Volume:136
Issue:3-4
Hertie School Research:Political Economy | Cluster
Licence of document (German):Metadaten / metadata
Verstanden ✔
Diese Webseite verwendet technisch erforderliche Session-Cookies. Durch die weitere Nutzung der Webseite stimmen Sie diesem zu. Unsere Datenschutzerklärung finden Sie hier.