



External Diaspora Sponsorship to Rebel Organizations

Causes and Consequences

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Abstract

While intrastate conflicts remain the dominant form of armed conflict and migration receives increasing attention, the international dimension of civil wars, particularly non-state sponsorship, has largely been overlooked. This dissertation examines the phenomenon of diasporas as external sponsors in intrastate conflicts. It investigates: (1) Why do diasporas support rebel organizations? (2) Under what conditions is diaspora support more or less likely? (3) How does diaspora sponsorship of rebel organizations impact civilian victimization and rebel governance? To understand the logic of diaspora support, I employ a principal-agent framework. Conflict, rebel group, diaspora, and homeland characteristics are determinants of diaspora sponsorship. I argue that diasporas aim for kin support and changes in the homeland and consequently prefer limited violence against civilians and co-ethnic civilians. Diasporas benefit from delegating the task of combat and limited civilian victimization but risk agency slack. Concurrently, the rebel organization gains additional resources but loses autonomy. I introduce an information-sharing mechanism between co-ethnics in the conflict zone and the diaspora, which enhances the monitoring capability of the diaspora. I employ a mixed-methods approach to answer the research questions. Interviews conducted in the Washington DC area with members of various diasporas and experts provide evidence for the information-sharing between the diaspora and co-ethnics. I produced a unique data set on diaspora support for African and Asian intrastate conflicts between 1989 and 2014. Findings from multiple large-N analyses, utilizing extreme bounds analysis, logistic regression, and negative binomial analyses, serve as the empirical base for examining the causes and consequences of diaspora sponsorship to rebel organizations. I demonstrate that conflict and rebel group characteristics are strong determinants of diaspora sponsorship, while homeland and diaspora characteristics yield mixed results. Diaspora support significantly reduces the number of civilian killings. The impacts on ethnic violence and rebel governance are heterogeneous. Overall, this dissertation enriches our understanding of diasporas' roles as external actors in conflict dynamics and as non-state sponsors for rebel organizations. It opens further avenues for researching civilian-rebel relationships and host country-homeland dynamics. Policy discussions may follow around monitoring of sponsorship activities and the responsibilities of host countries.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Intrastate conflicts are the predominant form of state-based armed conflict since 1945 (Pettersson & Öberg, 2020, p. 600). Migration has existed for centuries (World Bank, 2023, p. 1). It both influences and is influenced by conflicts, through aspects of conflict-driven migration, forced displacement used as a strategy by conflict actors, or migration flows that may exacerbate ethnic grievances or affect conflict dynamics. The number of international migrants increases, with the number of international migrants tripling since 1970 (IOM, 2024). Factors like displacement, conflicts, environmental degradation and natural disasters (e.g. Bercovitch, 2007; Kivisto & Faist, 2010, pp. 83–84) are likely to further accelerate migration in the upcoming years. Migration presents a big challenge, while simultaneously serving as factor for growth and development. Numerous reports, academic articles and sub groups within UN agencies and organizations, such as the World Bank and the International Organization of Migration are dedicated to addressing the phenomena of intrastate conflict and migration.

While diasporas are often included in discussions around migration, the focus is on the role of diasporas as peacemakers, development actors, foreign policy influencers or victims of transnational repression (Bercovitch, 2007; Hear & Cohen, 2017; Marinova, 2017; Moss, 2016; Shain & Barth, 2003). Diaspora groups are experiencing growth worldwide (e.g. Bercovitch, 2007, pp. 17, 36) as a result of inter alia migration flows. The World Bank reported that in 2015 remittance inflows to development countries tripled the amount of official development aid (World Bank, 2016, p. 17). Globalization and particularly technological progress increase the opportunities to move. Information and communications technology (ICT) plays a crucial role in maintaining connections with people in countries of origin, staying informed about news, and facilitating platforms for exchange and intervention (Brinkerhoff, 2009, p. 176; Bercovitch, 2007, pp. 20, 29; Dufoix, 2008, p. 98; Mohamoud, 2005, p. 30; Piazza & LaFree, 2019, p. 4; Werbner, 2010, p. 75).

Despite the prominence of internationalized intrastate conflict, including detailed examinations of non-state actors behavior in civil wars, their interaction with the civilian population, and the establishment of alternative governance structure known as rebel governance in opposition to the incumbent government, the scholarly focus has predominantly been on states' external involvement in these conflicts. In addition,

while most conflicts involve non-state actors, the dimension of non-state sponsorship has received minimal attention in both academic research and policy discussions.

“States are neither the only nor necessarily the most important sponsors of insurgent movements. Diasporas [...] frequently support insurgencies in their homelands” (Byman et al., 2001, p. 41). This quote emphasizes the pivotal role of diaspora support for insurgencies and thereby, rebel organizations. This is exemplified in various instances, including the Tamil diaspora supporting the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), or the Tuareg and Afar diaspora supporting the Ar and Azawad Liberation Front (FLAA) and the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF), respectively. Nevertheless, the dimension of non-state sponsorship in intrastate conflicts remains relatively unexplored. While a few case studies exist, there is a lack of systematic theoretical and empirical analysis. This gap raises critical questions regarding the causes of non-state actors’ sponsorship of warring parties and the consequences of such support for conflict dynamics, the civilian population, and more broadly, international relations.

The Tamil diaspora in Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom contributed approximately 1.5 million USD per month to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (Byman et al., 2001, p. 50), while estimates suggest that the Kurdish diaspora in Germany annually provided between 30 to 50 million Deutsche Mark to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) during the 1990s (Adamson, 2013, p. 82). Contributions from the Tamil diaspora encompassed donations, support funneled through non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and investments in Tamil businesses, cumulatively yielding between 200 and 300 million USD annually for the LTTE (Chalk, 2008, p. 101), in addition to facilitating connections for weapon procurements (Fair, 2005, p. 143). Such financial, material and political support proved crucial for the LTTE’s combat with the Sri Lankan government. Likewise, segments of the Somali diaspora in the United States financially supported Al-Shabab through the practice of “cash flying to Somalia” in the 2000s (I3).¹ This type of support gained popularity as a means to circumvent restrictions on remittances following the U.S. government’s

¹Project title: *Diaspora-Civilian Relationship* and project number: 1977139-1. The project received ethical approval by the institutional review board of the University of Maryland, College Park on November 11, 2022. See appendix A for a detailed description of the procedure and list of interviewees.

designation of Al-Shabab as a foreign terrorist organization. This example is based on the semi-structured interviews I conducted to gain a deeper understanding of connections between members of the diaspora and local population/civilians in the homeland. Interviewees were members of the diaspora residing in the DMV area, experts and researchers at think tanks and institutions in Washington DC. Furthermore, the Eritrean diaspora engaged in lobbying efforts in host countries to raise awareness about the situation in their homeland, thereby legitimizing the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) (Radtke, 2009, p. 189). These examples underscore the existence of the phenomenon and impact of diaspora sponsorship to rebel organizations involved in intra-state conflicts around the globe.

Diasporas can play a crucial role in conflict onset, duration and termination and peace processes, as well as post-conflict reconstruction and development. However, the role of diasporas during civil wars remains less explored. Diaspora support can impact rebel group's switch to nonviolent actions, in contrast to state support (Petrova, 2019, p. 2171). Additionally, diasporas can substantially influence conflict development and dynamics in the home country (e.g. Mariani et al., 2018, p. 761). Possessing resources, diasporas may leverage their access to the host country, international organizations, civil society organizations, and media channels to influence conflict dynamics, extending their impact beyond their current place of residence (Bercovitch, 2007, p. 21). Diasporas are also engaged in homeland politics, elections, lobbying in the host country, and various forms of activism. They can also affect home and host country relations (Shain & Barth, 2003, p. 461).

The means of the diaspora are diverse, spanning “from political lobbying to financial support and direct involvement in fighting” (Mariani et al., 2018, p. 761). An example from interviews conducted is one interviewee who recalls experiences from his upbringing outside Queens, New York, where they were exposed to the Irish diaspora's substantial support for the Provisional IRA; “the Irish-American community was very pro IRA [they] sent money, which was used for weapons and other things”.² For more details regarding the interviews conducted, please see Appendix A. Moreover, diasporas can engage in direct lobbying in the country of residence to influence changes in

²Author interview with interviewee 5, 10th January 2023, on a virtual platform.

their homelands, or indirectly through external support to rebel groups (Byman et al., 2001, p. 41; Mariani et al., 2018, p. 761; Huntington, 1997, p. 39). This involvement of diasporas as non-state actors differs from state-based support and is thus categorized as an instance of non-state actor support for non-state armed actors. Diasporas' involvement as a transnational actor is a reason for the internationalization of intrastate wars (e.g. Byman et al., 2001; Bercovitch, 2007, p. 17; Pettersson & Öberg, 2020, p. 603; Salehyan, 2010, p. 510; K. S. Gleditsch, 2007). Additionally, diasporas can share ideas and exert influence across borders and beyond their location (Adamson, 2016, p. 291).

For instance, the African diaspora in the Netherlands transferred equipment to insurgents (Dufoix, 2008, p. 99), whereas the Tamil diaspora provided financial support for the LTTE (Byman et al., 2001, p. 107). Furthermore, an interview with a second-generation Filipino in the United States underscores the enduring nature of connections: “My father, immigrated young age, and I have very close ties to my Filipino family and heritage is very important to me” (I8).³

1.1 Research questions

Salehyan et al. (2011, p. 710) state that “[o]ne cannot fully understand civil conflicts without noting the pervasiveness of external support for rebels”, highlighting the necessity to understand sponsorship for rebel organizations that predominantly focuses on state sponsorship of rebel organizations. For decades, diaspora populations have grown and become involved in numerous conflicts across the world. The motivations behind diaspora mobilization, and their subsequent involvement in intrastate conflicts, are multifaceted. The first part of this dissertation systematically investigates the reasons of diaspora support, particular reasons for delegation, and conditional factors which influence the likelihood of diaspora support to rebel organizations. In summary, this dissertation is guided by two key research questions that aim to explore and understand the causes of diaspora support for rebel organizations, and one research question that addresses the consequences of diaspora support:

1. Why do diaspora groups externally support rebel organizations?

³Author interview with interviewee 8, 13th January 2023, on a virtual platform.

2. Under which conditions is diaspora support more or less likely?
3. How does diaspora sponsorship of rebel organizations impact civilian victimization or rebel governance?

There is limited research about diasporas as external actors in civil wars beyond peacemaking, peace-wrecking, post-conflict reconstruction or development actors (Bercovitch, 2007; Brinkerhoff, 2009; R. Cohen, 2008; Koinova, 2009; Orjuela, 2008; Petrova, 2019; H. Smith & Stares, 2007). Empirical studies examining diaspora sponsorship and armed groups are scarce. In particular, the relationship between rebel groups and external sponsorship is often explored only on the case study level. Notable examples include case studies on Liberia (Lidow, 2016) and Sri Lanka (Radtke, 2009), which demonstrate diaspora support to rebel groups in conflicts. I use the terms *rebel organizations* and *rebel groups* interchangeably in this dissertation. While there is growing interest in non-state armed actors (Moghadam & Wyss, 2020), and diasporas (e.g. Baser, 2014), a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon and extent of diaspora support in a quantitative, large-N framework remains limited. This uncertainty underscores the need for more extensive research to understand diaspora support in a broader empirical context.

Salehyan et al. (2014) demonstrate in a large-N analysis that rebel groups with state sponsors, particularly those with human rights lobbies and democracies, are less likely to target civilians. However, the literature does not consider non-state sponsors, such as diaspora groups, which may have a strong preference for civilian protection. Conversely, research by Asal and Ayres (2018) indicates that more violent and contentious ethno-political organizations receive more diaspora support, attributing this to a hawkish diaspora responding to the attention generated. In contrast, Piazza (2018) finds that Islamic organizations with a diaspora are associated with fewer terrorist casualty events. A critical limitation of this study is the operationalization of diaspora support, which is defined as having kin abroad, a measure that does not necessarily reflect actual diaspora support to the organization.

The most relevant existing research is by Bird (2022) who examines the relationship between diaspora support for armed groups and the diaspora's degree of integration in the host country, focusing on motivations and capacity to mobilize. Bird (2022)

utilizes a unique dataset and concludes that moderately integrated diaspora groups are most likely to provide support. However, the dataset, while focusing on diaspora support, also includes transnational support broadly defined, and is further limited to migration data from OECD countries. In summary, the existing literature lacks a theoretical exploration of the diaspora's interest in co-ethnic and civilian protection and diaspora sponsorship of insurgents beyond ethno-political organizations. Furthermore, research is often confined to specific regions, such as the Middle East (Asal & Ayres, 2018), or considers a broader sample but does not include diaspora as a sponsor (e.g. Meier et al., 2022; Salehyan et al., 2014). Therefore, this dissertation examines the logic of diaspora support to rebel organizations, thereby analyzing non-state support to non-state actors and investigating the consequences for civilians in the context of diaspora sponsorship. This research shows the unique principal-relationship between the two actors and highlights the conditionality of diaspora support on restraint violence. Additionally, I distinguish between violence against civilians, ethnic violence against civilians, and elements of rebel governance.

1.2 Theoretical framework and expectations

This dissertation is embedded in the scholarship on external sponsorship and intrastate conflicts, drawing upon existing research from migration studies, particularly diaspora politics and social mobilization literature. In this dissertation, I conceptualize the diaspora as a unique actor due to the features of a diaspora including (1) migration, (2) collective memory, (3) connection, (4) group consciousness, (5) kinship (IOM GM-DAC, 2018). The term *diaspora* refers to a distinct group comprised of individuals termed *diasporans*. The focus is primarily on ethnic diasporas, where the ethnic link is the crucial tie shaping the diaspora, transcending other aspects like religion or caste. This emphasis highlights the extensive overlap between ethnic groups, ethnicity and diaspora, underscoring the dynamic concept of a diaspora. A diaspora has agency and can be differentiated from migrants and refugees. I discuss the conceptualization, formation and mobilization of a diaspora in greater depth in chapter 3.

While recognizing the diversity within and among diasporas, I focus on the group-

level for reasons related to feasibility of the empirical analysis, particularly considering the data availability and coherence among the other considered actors being a rebel organization, civilian population and incumbent government in the homeland of the diaspora. The analysis proceeds under the assumption of collective, inter-generational preferences that lead to collective action of the diaspora, being a unitary actor. Following this set-up, I analyze drivers of diaspora support for rebel organizations, addressing the first research question posed in this study.

I argue, based on the aims presented, that the collective preferences of the diaspora are well-being of co-ethnics and civilians and government changes in the homeland. The decision to support a rebel organization is primarily driven by two aspects: alignment of aims between the diaspora and rebel organization, and kin support. Alignment of aims fosters execution of delegated tasks. Kin support is mostly achieved through the actors on the ground, making delegation a less risky option for the diaspora compared to direct involvement. Furthermore, the diaspora benefits from lower costs, time savings, reduced risk compared to direct involvement. Ethnic ties can serve as a signal. The underlying motives for diaspora support through delegation include, for example, solidarity, guilt or obligation, anger, frustration, or a general perspective of opposition. Additionally, I develop theoretical expectations concerning the determinants of diaspora sponsorship to rebel organizations. I hypothesize relationships between four categories of determinants: conflict, rebels, diaspora, and homeland characteristics. These are summarized in table 7.1.

To investigate the consequences of diaspora sponsorship, I adopt a principal-agent perspective to understand the logic of diaspora sponsorship for rebel organizations. The diaspora, acting as a principal aiming for kin support and seeking changes in the homeland, delegates the task of limited violence against co-ethnics and civilians as well as combat against the government for homeland changes to a rebel organization. This delegation is in exchange for political, material and financial support. While the rebel group benefits from diaspora support, it has incentives to use violence against civilians if this enhances rebel group's victory or is the more beneficial strategy. The theoretical framework consists of two steps:

1. The diaspora decides between support or non-support for one rebel organization.

2. The rebel organization makes a decision to apply or limit violence against civilians, and respectively elements of rebel governance or no rebel governance.

An information-sharing mechanism is incorporated that fosters monitoring possibilities of the diaspora because co-ethnics share information about the conflict and rebel behavior with diasporans. This information-sharing mechanism is based on McCubbins and Schwartz's (1984) concept of fire-alarm, where a third-party observes an agent's behavior and reports it back to the principal. Consequently, diaspora support to rebel organizations decreases violence against civilians and ethnic violence against civilians compared to no diaspora support. Furthermore, diaspora support to rebel organizations makes the provision of social services and public goods, or governance elements more likely compared to no diaspora support.

The hypothesized relationships between diaspora support and its consequences are not isolated from contextual factors. Accordingly, I formulate testable hypotheses concerning conditional factors that may influence the dynamics between diaspora support and civilian victimization, or rebel governance. Drawing on existing scholarship regarding ethnic groups, civil wars and diaspora's role in peace and conflict, I propose several hypotheses. I hypothesize that the existence of alternative sponsors, a multi-ethnic homeland population, or a biased media in the homeland have a smaller negative effect on one-sided violence compared to no diaspora support. Conversely, a diaspora originating from multiple homelands or a diaspora's ethnic group being discriminated in the homeland have a more pronounced negative effect than no diaspora support. Non-voluntary-migration and possibility to return to the homeland, in conjunction with diaspora support, also have a more pronounced violence-reducing effect on ethnic one-sided violence effect compared to no diaspora support.

1.2.1 State and non-state support

This section briefly explains the key distinctions between state and non-state support, with a particular emphasis on diaspora support for rebel organizations. Table 1.1 summarizes the three distinct categories of sponsorship with the corresponding sponsors. State and non-state support for rebel groups differ in logic and means across at least five dimensions (Byman et al., 2001; Daub, 2023; Karlén et al., 2021; Lichbach, 1995;

Category of sponsorship	Sponsor
State sponsorship	States
Non-state armed sponsorship	Rebel organizations
Non-state sponsorship	Diasporas

Table 1.1: Categorization of sponsorship

Lidow, 2016; Loidolt et al., 2013; Moghadam & Wyss, 2020). For example, Petrova (2019, p. 2157) argues that the reasons for material support from state and non-state actors vary, encompassing self-interest, destabilization of a country, concerns regarding international security, the pursuit of expanding influence, or the objective of changing power (see also Byman et al., 2001; Karlén et al., 2021; Lidow, 2016; Loidolt et al., 2013). The concept of proxy wars is predominantly associated with state sponsorship (e.g. Karlén et al., 2021). Additionally, states often provide external support to circumvent direct military intervention (Karlén et al., 2021; Salehyan, 2010). An example of this is Saudi Arabia’s support of the Syrian opposition, reflecting the strategic and destabilization logic of the state sponsor (Jenkins, 2014; Petrova, 2019, p. 2161). In contrast, diaspora support is often motivated by kinship, non-strategic interests, or emotional and cultural ties (Loidolt et al., 2013, pp. 5, 14), sympathy for the rebel group’s cause or a sense of guilt for being safe while kin endure hardship (Byman et al., 2001, p. 55).

Additionally, the duration and persistence of sponsorship differs between non-state and state support. States tend to favor direct military assistance for the insurgency (e.g. Petrova, 2019, p. 2162), whereas diasporas pursue long-term strategies, for example, rebel governance (e.g. Huang & Sullivan, 2020; P. L. Sullivan, 2012). Furthermore, states are less reliable sponsors, as they may rapidly alter their strategies in response to domestic pressures or international constraints (Moghadam & Wyss, 2020, p. 122). Conversely, diasporas demonstrate a greater inclination and capacity to support nonviolent tactics of rebel groups, unlike state sponsors (e.g. Petrova, 2019, pp. 2162–2163, 2171). However, an exception occurs for state support when the public supports nonviolent strategies and opposes or deems violent state support as illegitimate (Petrova, 2019, p. 2162). A notable instance of the impact of diaspora support is the Tamil diaspora supports in transitioning the LTTE towards a nonviolent strategy (e.g. Fair, 2005).

There is a debate whether the organizational structure, specifically the degree of centralization, distinguishes diaspora from state support (e.g. Loidolt et al., 2013). Loidolt et al. (2013) suggest that diaspora support necessitates a centralized insurgent group for successful utilization, thereby implying that pre-existing capacity is more crucial for leveraging diaspora support compared to state support.⁴ Similarly, Moghadam and Wyss (2020, p. 122) contend that organizational capacity and external constraints of sponsor's actions are factors differentiating state from non-state support. Additionally, Asal et al. (2012, p. 10) posit that diaspora support is typically less conditional than state support but also offers fewer options for monitoring. However, these authors do not take into account the information-sharing between co-ethnics and diasporans and focus on ethno-religious groups.

The types of external support rendered by state and non-state actors differ. A comprehensive presentation of various types of diaspora support is detailed in chapter 4.2. Types of support, ranging from safe haven among the diaspora population or foreign fighters to military support such as troop deployment, differentiates sponsors (e.g. Byman et al., 2001; Lidow, 2016, p. 73). For instance, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United States actively encourages the diaspora in the US to report members affiliated with rebel organizations (“Liberia: FBI Tracks War Criminals - Could It Be of Concern for Liberian War Criminals?”, 2015) or those seeking safe haven in the community despite having committed war crimes or human right violations during conflicts such as the Bosnian civil war (FBI, 2015). Moreover, in contrast to state support, diaspora support can be involuntary, coerced by rebel groups, or influenced by the homeland state (e.g. Fair, 2005; Loidolt et al., 2013, p. 5; Wayland, 2004, p. 411). Conversely, diasporans may also find ways to support their families or directly support armed groups through cash transfers when flying to their home country. Despite the risks and potential persecution, especially if the group is a designated foreign terrorist organizations, examples like Somali-Americans' support for Al-Shabab underscores this method of support (I3).⁵

I recognize a third category of sponsorship illustrated in table 1.1, specifically non-

⁴Similar to the discourse surrounding diaspora support, non-state armed sponsorship struggle with a potential capacity gap (Moghadam & Wyss, 2020, p. 123). This capacity gap can affect the extent and effectiveness of the support provided to insurgent or rebel groups.

⁵Author interview with interviewee 3, 3rd January 2023, on a virtual platform.

state armed group support. Within the literature this type of sponsorship is frequently referred to as non-state proxy relationships (e.g. Karlén et al., 2021). Distinct from state support, non-state armed support is predominantly characterized as asymmetrical (e.g. Moghadam & Wyss, 2020, p. 123). This type of sponsorship often entails overt acknowledgment and is less stable and less predictable, contrasting with states that typically conceal or deny their sponsorship (Moghadam & Wyss, 2020, pp. 135, 156–157). While non-state armed group support encompasses armed actors, which are violent by definition, diaspora groups are generally non-violent. Furthermore, preferences and strategies differ between diaspora support and non-state armed support.

1.2.2 Conflict setting and main actors

In a conflict setting, the typical actors encompass the rebel group, local population and government as illustrated by the oval in figure 1.1. In this setting, I propose the inclusion of a fourth actor: the diaspora. Rather than examining internationalized civil wars focusing on state sponsors, I examine intrastate conflicts that have a diaspora as an actor potentially supporting a rebel organization. Figure 1.1 visually represents the conflict setting and the interrelations among these actors. For an in-depth review of types of conflict, conflict dynamics, nuances of external sponsorship, diaspora’s role and how this dissertation’s research integrates into the broader academic discourse, please refer to chapter 2.




Figure 1.1: Conflict setting with four actors

The diaspora act as an external actor indirectly engaged in the conflict. The dashed line *fight* in figure 1.1 represents the primary conflict dyad between the respective government and rebels. Importantly, in line with the academic literature (e.g. Kasfir, 2015, p. 22; Salehyan, 2010, p. 511), this dissertation uses the terms *rebels*, *insurgents*, and *non-state armed actors* interchangeably. A rebel group comprises individuals who associate with or identify as part of a specific group that engages in combat with the incumbent government.

Violence against civilians is defined as one-sided violence (UCDP, 2019). When such violence against non-combatants occurs along ethnic lines, it is labeled as ethnic one-sided violence (Fjelde et al., 2021). I define rebel governance as the governance over civilians and the provision of public goods and services by rebel organizations in a territory inhabited by civilians. For a comprehensive overview of the conceptualization of rebel governance, including its various forms and types, readers are directed to chapter 2.4.

The incumbent government is recognized as the official and legitimate government in a country experiencing an intrastate conflict, thus representing one of the belligerent parties. The government's primary goals are to maintain its dominant position as the strongest player, retain power, or reclaim control over territories held by the rebel organization and defeat of the rebel group. The rebel group is a non-state armed actor with one or more political aims (e.g. Balcells & Stanton, 2020, p. 47). The goals of such groups can diverge widely, both across different groups and within the same group over time (e.g. Kasfir, 2015, p. 41). These goals may include survival of the organization, territorial control, state-building, or secession, among others (e.g. Jo, 2015, p. 69; Schlichte & Schneckener, 2015, pp. 409–410; Agbiboa, 2015; Kalyvas, 2008, p. 128; RSADO, 2021; Anders, 2020; D. E. Cunningham et al., 2009; D. E. Cunningham et al., 2013). To fulfill its goals the rebel organization typically resorts to at least a minimal level of violence. For an in-depth analysis of rebel organizations' preferences and their behavior in the considered conflict setting, refer to chapter 5.

Civilians are impacted by violence employed by rebel organizations. The definition of civilians adheres to the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and concerning the protection of victims of international armed conflict (Protocol

1), dated 8 June 1977, Article 50. Civilians “are persons who are not, or no longer, members of the armed forces” (*The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić*, 2000, p. 60). “The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians. The presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character” (“1225 UNTS 3”, 1977, article 50, sec. 2, 3). The term *civilians* is employed interchangeably with *non-combatants* (e.g. Kalyvas, 2006, p. 19). Co-ethnics refer to the civilians residing in the country of origin and belonging to the same ethnic group as the diaspora.

In my analysis, while recognizing that diasporas can directly support civilians, I primarily concentrate on the diaspora group that may support the rebel group (*support* arrow). This focus is particularly relevant in the context of the rebel group’s employment of violence against civilians within the conflict area (*violence* arrow). Although the interaction where civilians support rebels exist, this dissertation does not delve into this aspect. I do not focus on this interaction, as it introduces an additional dimension: domestic support. Theoretically, civilians may also lend support to the government. The government can provide direct support to civilians, such as through the provision of public goods and services. However, the government’s ability to do so may be hindered by limited state capacity or its weaker position compared to the rebel group, resulting in restricted access or inability to reach civilians. Consequently, I do not further analyze the state-civilian relationship in this dissertation, as it falls outside the scope. I assume a minimal level of violence in this conflict context. Within this setting, civilians possess limited agency. I concentrate on civilians’ possibility to share information with the diaspora through a “fire-alarm” mechanism.

The *fire-alarm* concept by McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) allows for information-sharing where the diaspora is informed by co-ethnic civilians about any deviations of the rebel group from the diaspora’s interests. The diaspora is continuously updated on the conflict situation through various means, such as messenger apps or virtual platforms. This use of intelligence is enhanced by advancements in information and communication technology (e.g. Dufoix, 2008, p. 98). Empirical data gathered from multiple interviews provide anecdotal evidence of regular communication between diaspora members and their extended family or friends residing in their homeland. For instance, a member of

the Filipino diaspora in Washington D.C. shared that the interviewee frequently uses Facebook and WhatsApp to stay connected and often visits family members biweekly in the region, who then relay news from extended family and local news that they heard (I8).⁶ Similarly, a member of the Nigerian diaspora in the Washington D.C. area described routinely traveling back to their homeland for family and occasionally business purposes (I4).⁷ This continuous flow of information plays a crucial role for diaspora support decisions and conflict dynamics.

External support provided by a diaspora to a rebel organization includes financial, material, and political support. The *support* arrow in figure 1.1 visualizes diaspora support for rebels. The definition of external support aligns closely with Salehyan et al.'s (2014) and Salehyan et al.'s (2011) understanding of external support by states, Petrova's (2019, p. 2159) definition of material and non material support, and definitions applied by Chalk (2008) and Piazza (2018) in the context of diaspora support for terrorist organizations. Notably, external support is considered complementary to domestic support (Huang & Sullivan, 2020, p. 4). This external support can be easily utilized or sold by rebel groups, meaning it is a fungible resource. Byman et al. (2001, p. 51) illustrate this point with the example of the Tamil diaspora financially supporting LTTE-related NGOs, demonstrating the potential redirection of external support by rebel groups.

1.3 Empirical approach and findings

In my empirical approach, I adhere to the theoretical framework and test the formulated hypotheses in order to address the second and third research questions through a large-N analysis. I employ a mixed-method research design, which aims to speak to the causes and consequences of diaspora sponsorship to rebel organizations. This approach integrates insights from 14 semi-structured interviews conducted in the Washington D.C. area, involving members of different diaspora communities, leaders of diaspora organizations, and experts.⁸ These qualitative findings are complemented by a large-N

⁶Author interview with interviewee 8, 13th January 2023, on a virtual platform.

⁷Author interview with interviewee 4, 7th January 2023, via phone call.

⁸For a detailed description of the interview procedure, readers are referred to appendix A, and for comprehensive presentation of the data and methodological, please see chapter 6.

analysis focusing on four distinct outcomes of interest: diaspora sponsorship, violence against civilians, ethnic violence against civilians, and rebel governance.

Diaspora Support Dataset

Johnston et al. (2023, p. 23) observe, “[d]ata on other sources of external support, such as charities and diaspora communities, are not as broadly collected as data on state sponsors.” Despite this, there is a shared understanding among scholars regarding the need for more systematically collected data (e.g. Petrova, 2019), moving beyond the 10 types of external support identified by the external support dataset (Meier et al., 2022), which notably excludes diaspora as a sponsor, and the Non-state actor dataset (D. E. Cunningham et al., 2013). To address the limitations in existing data on external sponsorship and facilitate the outlined research, I have developed a novel dataset on diaspora support for rebel organizations. This dataset captures material, financial and political support, drawing on publicly available sources and newswires. It encompasses all intra-state conflicts with starting years between 1989 and 2014 in Africa and Asia, as per the dyadic version of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Harbom et al., 2008; Pettersson & Öberg, 2020). I chose Africa and Asia since they were the most affected regions by intrastate conflict, due to resource constraints. Chapter 6.1 provides an in-depth description of the dataset and the coding procedures employed.

Methodology

To address the second research question and empirically investigate the determinants of diaspora sponsorship, I conduct an extreme bounds analysis to identify robust drivers of diaspora support to rebel organizations. Upon identifying these robust determinants, a logistic regression analysis is conducted to assess the direction and magnitude of their effects. This foundational research related to the causes of diaspora sponsorship to rebel organizations is cross-sectional in nature, attributed to the time-invariant dependent variable, diaspora sponsorship. In contrast, the empirical examination of the consequences of diaspora support employs a time-series cross-sectional analyses. The primary models, which include count variables, utilize negative binomial models due to the detected overdispersion in Poisson models. For dichotomous variables, I

implement logistic regression models. The robustness of the results is further ensured by employing clustered standard errors at the conflict- and dyad-level, alongside the consideration of various confounding factors and thorough model specification. These specifications demonstrate the rigorous analysis and provide nuanced insights in the phenomenon of diaspora sponsorship in intrastate conflicts.

Key findings

After conducting thorough analyses, I find that conflict characteristics and the presence of transborder ethnic kin, pertaining to diaspora characteristics, serve as robust determinants of diaspora sponsorship. Additionally, rebel group determinants are partially robust for predicting the existence of diaspora sponsorship. Contrary to expectations, homeland characteristics, especially media biases, do not yield robust results. Moreover, diaspora sponsorship has the potential to reduce violence against civilians by up to 50%. The outcomes regarding the consequences of diaspora sponsorship align with the hypothesized effects on one-sided violence, yet only find limited support concerning rebel governance. This is particularly true in governance aspects, contrasting with the insignificant findings related to the provision of public goods and services. The results for ethnic one-sided violence necessitate further exploration due to the frequent insignificant effects and limited number of observations.

In terms of conditional factors, when diaspora sponsorship is paired with lower levels of media bias against the opposition, a more pronounced effect on the reduction of violence against civilians is observed. Similarly, the violence-reducing effects of diaspora sponsorship are notable when combined with discrimination against the ethnic group in the homeland. However, the influence of a multi-ethnic population on reducing violence remains consistent regardless of the presence of a larger or smaller number of ethnic groups in the homeland.

1.4 Roadmap and key contribution

This dissertation, structured into nine chapters, offers a detailed examination of the causes and consequences of diaspora sponsorship to rebel organizations. In this section,

I briefly outline the contents of each chapter, providing a succinct overview of the dissertation's structure. This is followed by a section highlighting the key contributions of this dissertation.

Roadmap

Chapter 1 sets the stage by explaining the conflict setting and explaining the distinct differences between state and diaspora support. I also offer an overview of the theoretical framework and empirical approach, I employed in this dissertation. The chapter ends with a summary of the main contributions of this dissertation.

Chapter 2 offers a comprehensive review of the existing scholarship in conflict and migration research. I focus on the activities and relationships of diasporas, examine their roles as development actors in conflict settings and their relations with states. Additionally, I delve into secondary literature on civil wars and external sponsorship, identifying the research gap in the area of diaspora sponsorship. I also identify various drivers of civilian victimization, with a focus on one-sided violence, ethnic violence, and the presence of rebel governance, including its various forms and types. This chapter bridges diverse research streams, including diaspora politics, migrating studies, international relations and comparative research, especially conflict studies. I demonstrate how this dissertation integrates with and contributes to the existing body of knowledge regarding rebel organizations in civil wars and their use of violence as well as external sponsorship decisions and conflict dynamics.

Chapter 3 delves into the conceptualization of a diaspora. I emphasize the diversity of diasporas while identifying common features that unify the concept of a diaspora. Despite the inclusivity of the term diaspora and the complexity of diaspora relations, I outline the formation processes of diasporas, highlight the significance of ethnicity, yet distinguishing diasporas from ethnic groups and the concept of nationalism. The chapter further refines the concept of a diaspora, underscoring the crucial role of ethnic ties. I specifically focus on ethnic diasporas. Four main aims of a diaspora are explored: kin support in the homeland, re-connection to the homeland, preservation of identity, and seeking changes in the homeland. The chapter also provides explanations why and how diaspora mobilizes, discusses drivers of mobilization, strategies and targets, and

factors that lead to demobilization. The chapter concludes with diaspora's collective, and inter-generational preferences and their collective action.

Chapter 4 explain the theoretical framework related to the causes of diaspora support to rebel organizations. I provide reasons why a diaspora support a rebel organization, focusing on the concept of delegation. The chapter present the various forms of diaspora sponsorship, differentiating between financial, material and political diaspora support. I also discuss why diaspora support may terminate, followed by an investigation of four sets of determinants influencing diaspora sponsorship. These determinants are conflict, rebel group, diaspora, and homeland characteristics, all of which function as conditional factors making diaspora support more or less likely. Furthermore, this chapter formulates six hypotheses in relation to the second research question: Under which conditions is diaspora support is more likely or less likely?

Chapter 5 develops the theoretical framework for addressing the third research question: How does diaspora sponsorship of rebel organizations impact civilian victimization or rebel governance? In this chapter, I explore characteristics that define a diaspora as a unique principal and discuss how the principal-agent lens can be applied to understand diaspora sponsorship for rebel organizations. After explaining the scope conditions of the theoretical framework, I delve into the actor's preferences and argue why rebel organizations apply violence against civilians opposed to the diaspora's interest. I then formulate hypotheses suggesting that diaspora support makes violence against civilians and ethnic violence against civilians less likely.

I also examine conditional factors such as a multi-ethnic population, discriminated ethnic group, media bias, and multiple homeland origin that may influence the outlined hypotheses relation between diaspora support for rebel organizations and violence against civilians. Other factors like non-voluntary migration, and the possibility to return are also discussed for their potential impact on the hypothesized relationships between diaspora support and ethnic violence. Furthermore, I explain the relationship between diaspora support and rebel governance. This includes the development of hypotheses positing that diaspora support is more likely to enhance the rebels' governance structures, and their provision of social services and public goods. The chapter concludes with a comprehensive summary of the 11 hypotheses developed, providing a

clear overview of the theoretical expectations of diaspora sponsorship to rebel organization and the potential impact on violence against civilians, ethnic violence against civilians, and rebel governance.

Chapter 6 details the data and methodological approaches. I offer a comprehensive overview of the novel diaspora support dataset, including an in-depth explanation of the coding procedures employed. This chapter outlines the methodological approaches for understanding the determinants of diaspora sponsorship to rebel organizations and the consequences of diaspora support for rebel organizations on civilian victimization and rebel governance. I also elaborate on all additional data sources that have been integrated into the research through confounding variables.

Chapter 7 presents and explains the results of the analysis concerning the determinants of diaspora sponsorship based on the extreme bounds analysis and the logistic regression analysis. I explain the findings, situate them within a broader context, and offer a nuanced perspective on determinants of diaspora sponsorship.

Following this, *chapter 8* showcases and interprets the results of the various analyses exploring the consequences of diaspora sponsorship. I differentiate across three specific outcomes: violence against civilians, ethnic violence against civilians, an exploratory analysis of rebel governance.

The concluding *chapter 9* synthesizes the insights generated through this dissertation. I underscore the key contributions and crucial findings. Additionally, I outline policy implications and potential avenues for future research.

Key contributions

This dissertation offers various novel contributions to the existing scholarship, particularly in the realms of conflict and migration, with a focus on intrastate-conflicts, external sponsorship, diaspora politics, and interactions and behavior between rebel organizations and civilians. Below is an overview of the conceptual, theoretical and empirical contributions that this dissertation provides.

Conceptual contributions: The dissertation builds upon the relatively limited secondary literature on the role of diasporas during intrastate conflicts. It conceptualizes the diaspora as external actors in conflict dynamics, thereby illuminating the

international dimension of civil wars and positioning diaspora as important transnational actors. In doing so, it draws from scholarship in migration studies to present a nuanced view of key features of a diaspora, their formation, mobilization and diverse means of material, financial and political support. This dissertation is pioneering in categorizing three types of external sponsorship, with a specific focus on diaspora support as a form of non-state actor support to non-state armed actors. This categorization not only provides a framework for analyzing diaspora support to rebel organizations but also opens further insights on the comparison between state and non-state sponsorship to militant organizations.

Theoretical contributions: In the theoretical framework of this dissertation, I conceptualize diasporas as unitary actors, adopting a principal-agent lens. However, I also acknowledge the diversity across and within diasporas and discuss the implications and future research potential in considering different segments of the diaspora. This theoretical approach demonstrates the applicability of the principal-agent model in this context and elaborates on how diasporas function as unique principals in this context. Additionally, I introduce the information-sharing mechanism between co-ethnics and diaspora, further illuminating the importance of the transnational ties. The hypotheses developed from this theoretical framework, summarize the expected relationships concerning the determinants of diaspora sponsorship, showcasing the novelty of integrating various determinants that can influence the presence of diaspora sponsorship. I consider four set of determinants: conflict, rebel organization, diaspora, and homeland characteristics. This approach moves beyond the literature focusing on diaspora's integration or mobilization and provides a more nuanced understanding of diaspora sponsorship.

Furthermore, the novel argument regarding the violence-reducing impact of diasporas, their potential to restrain rebel behavior, and the information tie to co-ethnics introduces a new perspective on the role of diasporas in conflict dynamics and possibilities of limiting violence in civil war. By incorporating potential conditional factors into the theoretical framework, the dissertation underscores the nuances of the diaspora-rebel group relationship, particularly in relation to civilian victimization. I also indicate how more pronounced effects might be achieved under specific conditions.

The distinction between ethnic one-sided violence and one-sided violence adds further depths to the analysis, providing additional opportunities to test the theoretical hypotheses. By incorporating elements of rebel governance, besides a focus on civilian victimization, in the theoretical framework, this dissertation aligns with cutting-edge research and highlights the broader implications of diaspora sponsorship on civilian well-being, extending beyond the mere reduction of violence against civilians. This theoretical framework offers a multifaceted view of diaspora sponsorship's impact during civil wars.

Empirical contributions: The generated diaspora support dataset represents a substantial contribution to the scholarship and serves as a valuable public good, enhancing the scope for studying diaspora support through large-N analyses. The empirical findings of this dissertation underscore the critical role of conflict and rebel characteristics in determining the presence of diaspora support to rebel organizations. This dissertation lays a foundation for further research into the diaspora and homeland related determinants, as well as the interplay between these determinants. I also demonstrate the utility of extreme bounds analysis in such investigations regarding robust determinants of external sponsorship.

Moreover, my analysis of diaspora sponsorship in relation to civilian victimization, including ethnic one-sided violence, is the first one to systematically examine the phenomenon across all intrastate conflicts in Africa and Asia, spanning from 1989 to 2014. One of the most relevant findings of this analysis is that diaspora support reduces one-sided violence by 50%. This result is not only statistically significant, but also highlights the profound impact diaspora support can have in limiting violence against civilians. This has far-reaching implications for civilian well-being in conflict zones.

Overall, this dissertation advances our understanding of the role of diasporas as sponsors of rebel organizations, particularly in terms of its implications for civilian victimization and rebel governance. The insights gained from this research not only enhance academic discourse by offering future research possibilities but also provide new perspectives for practitioners and policymakers engaged diaspora politics and conflict processes.

Chapter 2

Diaspora, external sponsorship, and civilian victimization

This chapter bridges scholarship from conflict and migration studies in a novel way to examine diaspora as external sponsors in armed conflicts. While diasporas are extensively studied in migration studies, their involvement as sponsors of warring parties is overlooked. Similarly, external sponsors are analyzed in conflict research, but non-state sponsors, particularly diasporas, are mainly omitted. Therefore, I position this dissertation within the broader academic context, highlighting the gaps in existing scholarship and showing how combining these research fields offers opportunities to study the three research questions underpinning this dissertation.

Specifically, I delve into the literature on civil wars, for instance, its conceptualization and sub types, highlighting the missing inclusion of a diaspora as an actor during conflict. The literature on civil wars encompasses the core context I investigate. I also provides a comprehensive overview of the scholarship on civilian victimization, and the concept of rebel governance, where rebel organizations serve as providers of public goods and services. Furthermore, I present reasons and determinants of civilian victimization, define ethnic violence and rebel governance, and describe different types of rebel governance, elements of rebel governance and both domestic and international reason for the establishment of it. Subsequently, I examine the existing scholarship on foreign intervention, including determinants, consequences and types of sponsors. I further point out the concept of conflict delegation which is frequently employed to analyze external sponsorship.

Although external state sponsorship has been dominating the literature, non-state actor sponsorship, such as diaspora sponsorship, has often been overlooked. One reason for this oversight is the complexity of non-state actors and the division between conflict and migration studies. While the latter has extensively studied diasporas as actors, the primary focus is on diaspora's role in development and the homeland as well as its engagement as peacemakers or peace-wreckers. Additionally, homeland-diaspora relations are extensively studied. However, the diaspora's role as a sponsor of conflict parties and its impact on the civilian population has often been neglected. By addressing the first and second research question, this dissertation sheds light on the causes and conditions under which diaspora sponsorship occurs, thus bridging the conflict and migration literature and providing new insights into the role of diasporas

during conflict. While the application of violence by rebel organizations in relation to external state support and surrounding factors is researched, little theorizing exists for the potential linkages between diaspora sponsorship and civilian victimization or rebel governance. The third research question of this dissertation tackles these aspects and contributes to narrowing the gap in the literature.

2.1 Civil wars and behavior of actors

This section examines the existing literature on civil wars, which constitutes the primary context of this dissertation's focus. After conceptualization civil wars, I briefly discuss conflict onset, duration, termination and re-occurrence. Then, I delve into the scholarship on civilian victimization, focusing on rebel groups employment of violence against civilians. I specifically present existing knowledge concerning the types of violence, reasons and determinants, and conclude with defining ethnic violence as a distinct form of violence against civilians. Violence against civilians and ethnic violence are crucial outcome variables in the analysis underpinning this dissertation as is rebel governance. Therefore, I also provide an overview of the literature on rebel governance. Rebel governance is another outcome variable, integrated within the third research question of this dissertation. Finally, I examine the scholarship on foreign intervention and external support by explaining the reasons, determinants and consequences of external support. While the existing literature is dominated by external state support, I also highlight the limited knowledge about non-state support.

Political science has long studied conflict and war (e.g. Clausewitz, 2010; Mason & Mitchell, 2016; Wright, 1942), demonstrating its policy relevance. Notably, the World Bank Report 2003 (Collier et al., 2003) underscores this. This literature review concentrates on intrastate conflicts which can be distinguished from interstate conflicts (N. P. Gleditsch et al., 2002; Kalyvas, 2006; Mwangi, 2015; Salehyan, 2010; Weinstein, 2007). Intrastate conflicts, characterized by battles between a government and non-state armed actors (D. E. Cunningham et al., 2009, p. 570; D. E. Cunningham et al., 2013, p. 526), mostly involve asymmetric warfare and actors sometimes employ guerrilla or terrorist tactics (Anders, 2020, p. 703; D. E. Cunningham et al., 2009, p. 575; Kasfir,

2015, p. 47; Mwangi, 2015, pp. 70–71; Weinstein, 2007, p. 203; Polo & Gleditsch, 2016; Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010), with insurgents hiding among the population (Weinstein, 2007, p. 201).

2.1.1 Conceptualization of civil wars

One example of asymmetric wars are civil wars (D. E. Cunningham et al., 2009, p. 570; D. E. Cunningham et al., 2013, p. 526). However, scholars emphasize different factors and propose various definitions for these type of conflicts (e.g. Kalyvas, 2001; Sambanis, 2004).¹ For example, a conflict between a central government and ethnic minority (Kloos, 2001, p. 178), a “violent contest between a state and a non-state actor over some political objective such as control over the government or secession that generates battle deaths exceeding some threshold” (D. E. Cunningham et al., 2013, pp. 517–518). Other examples include conflicts centered on identity and exclusion/inclusion which can vary over time (Terpstra & Frerks, 2017, pp. 290–291; van Houten, 1998), or the importance of securing civilian loyalty and support being crucial for the state or insurgent group (Arjona et al., 2015, p. 1; Mwangi, 2015, p. 74). Furthermore, Gates (2002, p. 111) distinguishes civil wars by their “incentive systems”, for example, “loot seeking, ethnic-nationalist or ideological”. Overall, civil wars are dynamic processes.

Civil wars as social processes. Another perspective is provided by Shesterinina (2021, 2022), who conceptualizes civil wars as social processes, connecting actors and their interactions over time and after the conflict. This approach underscores the trajectories of civil wars and their linkages. Similarly, E. J. Wood (2008) argues for social processes in war and peace with different effects and impact on social networks exemplified with case studies on Peru, El Salvador, Sri Lanka, and Sierra Leone. Kalyvas (2008) also highlights the endogenous aspect of ethnic civil war dynamics.

Internationalized civil wars. A key distinction exists between civil wars and internationalized civil wars. The latter requires at least one of the conflict parties to receive troop support, thus active involvement of a government (UCDP, 2021a). Civil wars involving more than two conflict parties are labeled multi-actor civil war. Fur-

¹For an insightful review of two decades of civil war literature see Cederman and Vogt (2017). Additionally, Walter (2017) argues for a new type of civil wars since the prominence of information technology.

thermore, transnationalization of civil wars occurs due to spill-over effects, contagion, diffusion or the involvement of transborder ethnic kin (Cederman, Gleditsch, Salehyan, & Wucherpfennig, 2013; Cederman et al., 2009; K. G. Cunningham, 2013; Forsberg, 2014, 2016; K. S. Gleditsch, 2007; Saideman & Jenne, 2009).

Ethnic civil wars. Buhaug et al. (2014, p. 425) emphasizes that “not all conflicts are the same”, differentiating between ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts. Therefore, I adopt their distinction and partially follow their definition of ethnic conflicts²; “conflicts are considered ethnic if a rebel group makes claims on behalf of a specific ethnic community” (Buhaug et al., 2014, p. 423). The recruitment of ethnic group members by a rebel group (see Buhaug et al., 2014, p. 423) is not a necessary condition. Alternatively, the conflict can be considered ethnic if there is a link between an relevant ethnic group and a rebel group (Buhaug et al., 2014; Piazza, 2018; Vogt et al., 2015). In short, a secondary supporting party, whether warring or non-warring (UCDP, 2021b, 2021c) with an ethnic link, such as transnational ethnic groups or an ethnic diaspora community.

Irredentist and separatist conflicts. In the context of identity, homeland, and intrastate conflict, both irredentist and secessionist/separatists conflicts exist. Secessionist conflicts occur if an ethnic group wants to secede from a larger state (Chazan, 1991; Horowitz, 1981, 1991). An example of a temporary secessionist conflict would be South Sudan-Sudan. In contrast, irredentist claim and potentially an irredentist conflicts arise if an ethnic group aims to join a larger territory, or when a state seeks to incorporate this homeland into its territory its own area (Ambrosio, 2001; Chazan, 1991; Horowitz, 1991; Koinova, 2011). An example is the Afars’ efforts to unite the Afar regions in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Research shows that ethnic ties often play a more significant role in secessionist movements than the vulnerability argument of the state (Saideman, 1997, 2001). Additionally, the likelihood of successful secessionist outcomes is influenced by external state support, which is often determined, among

²Ethnic conflicts often follow a different causal mechanism than non-ethnic conflicts. When an ethnic group is excluded from state power, civilians tend to develop stronger group solidarity (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012, p. 111). Additionally, existing grievances are fostered and rebel groups can “recruit and fight on behalf of such groups” (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012, p. 111). Buhaug et al. (2014) further argue that besides political discrimination, economic inequality between ethnic groups supports the probability of civil conflict onset. Two aspects are relevant for my research: smaller, economically disadvantaged ethnic groups tend to seek autonomy and separation, while larger groups often aim for regime change (Buhaug et al., 2014, pp. 425–426).

others, by shared ethnic ties to the leader (Bélanger et al., 2005; Saideman, 1997). Importantly, Koinova (2011) demonstrates that diasporas such as the Armenian, Albanian and Chechen diaspora mobilize in support of secession only after being included by someone, rather than initiating mobilization for secession.

2.1.2 Conflict onset, duration, termination and re-occurrence

The literature differentiates between the onset of conflict (Fearon, 2003; Lake & Rothchild, 2020; Ross, 2003; Walter, 2009), its duration (Basedau et al., 2022; Buhaug et al., 2009; D. E. Cunningham, 2006; D. E. Cunningham et al., 2009; Wucherpfennig et al., 2012), and the termination and outcome of civil wars (D. E. Cunningham et al., 2009; Filson & Werner, 2002; Fortna, 2015; Joshi, 2023; Tir, 2002; Toft, 2010). Walter (2009) argues that information and commitment problems can explain civil war outbreak, while Fearon (2003) points to factors like weak states and poverty impacting rebel financing, as opposed to ethnic or religious differences. Buhaug et al. (2014), Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013), and Gubler and Selway (2012) argue that grievances based on horizontal economic inequalities and ethno-political exclusion play a pivotal role in civil war onset, extending beyond the associations with grievances and political economy explanations on the individual level found in earlier work (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Collier & Hoeffler, 1998). Moreover, foreign aid can minimize the risk of conflict onset given the softening effect of negative economic shocks (Savun & Tirone, 2012). The final category encompasses civil war recurrence and durable peace, with recurrence linked to factors like access to natural resources (Rustad & Binningsbø, 2012), rebel rivalry within coalitions (Zeigler, 2016), political exclusion (Call, 2012) and nature of victory (Mason et al., 2011). While negotiated settlements increase re-occurrence, peacekeeping supports durable peace (Mason et al., 2011).

2.1.3 Civilian victimization

Following the review of civil wars, this section shifts focus to the behavior of rebel organizations. I summarize key scholarship on civilian victimization by rebel organizations and rebel governance. In the literature, there is no consensus on the definition of rebel groups; they are treated as a black box (Weinstein, 2007, p. 37), or used interchange-

ably with insurgents (Kalyvas, 2006), non-state armed actors (D. E. Cunningham et al., 2013), militant organizations (Malone, 2022; Mapping Militant Organizations, 2018b), or terrorists (e.g. Piazza, 2018).

Gates (2002, p. 112) underscores that “a rebel group exists outside the legal realm of the state” making the group’s social context and history (Schlichte, 2009, p. 19) as well as its surrounding environment (Weinstein, 2007, p. 51) relevant factors. Regardless of these varied definitions, rebel groups vary in their organizational structure (Gates, 2002; Haer, 2015; Staniland, 2014), constituencies (Balcells et al., 2020; Mosinger, 2018; Ottmann, 2017), goals (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 128; Schlichte & Schneckener, 2015, pp. 409–410; Jo, 2015, p. 69; Agbiboa, 2015, pp. 85–86; Anders, 2020; D. E. Cunningham et al., 2009, 2013), endowments and financing (Belgioioso, 2024; Walsh et al., 2018; Weinstein, 2007; R. M. Wood, 2014b), as well as strategies and actions (Arves et al., 2019; Asal et al., 2015; Balcells & Stanton, 2020; Huang, 2016a; Kalyvas, 2006). Moreover, these aspects can change over time (e.g. Kasfir, 2015, p. 41).

Reporting of violence. While violence is a central feature of conflicts (Schmidt & Schroeder, 2001, p. 4), its measurement and reporting are often subject to biases (Baum & Zhukov, 2015; Davenport & Ball, 2002; Kalyvas, 2006; Krüger et al., 2013). For example, Baum and Zhukov (2015) illustrates how media in autocracies under-report non-violent protests while over-reporting rebel’s violence, as seen in the case of the Libyan civil war. Additionally, scholars advocate for differentiating between episodes of violence and civil war onset, moving beyond the threshold of battle-related casualty (Florea, 2012). Another approach is to employ machine-learning techniques to accurately measure conflict zones (e.g. Bara et al., n.d.; Kikuta, 2022). The challenges in observing violence in conflict settings are widely acknowledged, particularly in distinguishing between rebels and civilians (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 101; Weinstein, 2007, p. 306). There is also a debate whether violence is unique or comparable across cultures and societies (Schmidt & Schroeder, 2001, pp. 6, 8).

Lethal and non-lethal violence. The academic discourse distinguishes between lethal and non-lethal forms of violence (Balcells & Stanton, 2020, p. 49). Lethal violence encompasses “repertoires or forms of violence that involve killing”, whereas non-lethal violence refers to “repertoires or forms of violence that harm civilians with-out killing”

(Balcells & Stanton, 2020, p. 49). Conflict-related displacement serves as an example of non-lethal violence (Greenhill, 2010; Lichtenheld, 2020).

Forms of civilian victimization. Rebel organizations, like states and other actors, can victimize civilians. Below, I explain the reasons of violence applied by rebel organizations. Civilian victimization encompasses a range of actions, including sexual violence and rape (D. K. Cohen, 2013; Dumaine et al., 2022; Johansson & Sarwari, 2019; Krüger & Nordås, 2020; E. J. Wood, 2009), recruitment of child soldiers (Gates, 2017; Gates & Reich, 2010; Haer et al., 2020), displacement (Braithwaite et al., 2021; Greenhill, 2010; Lichtenheld, 2020; Schaub & Auer, 2022; Steele, 2009), and various forms of physical or psychological violence.

A specific aspect of civilian victimization is applied violence against civilians, defined as “the deliberate infliction of harm on people” (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 19). This form of violence is often categorized as one-sided violence (UCDP, 2019). When such violence is directed along ethnic lines, it is labeled ethnic one-sided violence (Fjelde et al., 2021).

Types of violence against civilians. Most research on civilian violence during intrastate conflicts draws a distinction between between micro-and macro-level approaches, as well as between intentional and unintentional violence (Balcells & Stanton, 2020). The former is referred to as civilian targeting, and the latter as collateral damage (Balcells & Stanton, 2020). However, Balcells and Stanton (2020) criticize this categorization, arguing instead for a more comprehensive approach that combines determinants of violence with varying levels of analysis, spanning individual, domestic, and international levels. Further categorization in the literature include distinctions between direct or indirect violence, violence as a policy versus violence as a practice, strategic versus opportunistic, lethal versus non-lethal, and indiscriminate³, versus collective or selective violence (e.g. Balcells & Stanton, 2020).⁴ Despite these distinctions,

³Indiscriminate violence often occurs in the absence of precise information about responsible individuals or perpetrators, leading rulers to punish anyone who is somehow linked (Kalyvas, 2006, pp. 149–150). This type of violence is also referred to as categorical violence (Fortna et al., 2018; Goodwin, 2006). However, indiscriminate violence can be ineffective or counterproductive (Kalyvas, 2006, pp. 144, 151) due to loss of information (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 153), disproportionate reactions (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 155), or causes resistance from noncombatants (Weinstein, 2007, p. 301). Such resistance may lead to a shift in allegiances or counteractions (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 154) .

⁴Kalyvas (2006) differentiates between indiscriminate and selective violence and examines the Greek civil war finding support for selective violence. Whereas indiscriminate violence is cheaper (Kalyvas,

studies like Salehyan et al. (2014, p. 637) do not differentiate between these types of violence in their analysis. They argue that “both types [selective or indiscriminate] of deliberate violence against civilians are considered to be war crimes under international law and by the global human rights community” (Salehyan et al., 2014, p. 637).

2.1.3.1 Reasons and determinants of violence against civilians

Extensive research investigates why individuals and rebel organizations apply violence against civilians (for reviews see, Balcells & Stanton, 2020; Valentino, 2014). A prevalent perspective considers violence as an instrumental and rational strategy, employed to serve specific goals (Arendt, 1970, p. 79; R. M. Wood, 2010; Valentino, 2014, p. 98). Violence can serve various goals, such identifying complicit civilians (Goodwin, 2006), punishing defectors and signaling protection of supporters (Weinstein, 2007, p. 204), controlling population (Sémelin, 2000), competing for, maintaining, or demonstrating power (Weinstein, 2007, p. 202; Kalyvas et al., 2008, p. 1; Schlichte & Schneckener, 2015, p. 416), seeking legitimacy or delegitimacy for rebels (Radtke, 2009, p. 78; Schmidt & Schroeder, 2001, p. 6; Schlichte & Schneckener, 2015, p. 416), imposing costs by targeting civilians (Hultman, 2007, p. 207), ethnic cleansing (Hägerdal, 2019; Valentino, 2004; Valentino et al., 2004), or resource extraction (e.g. D. E. Cunningham et al., 2009, p. 575; Kalyvas, 2006, pp. 23, 26, 28; R. M. Wood, 2014b). It “is never so specific and culturally bounded that it cannot be compared” (Schmidt & Schroeder, 2001, p. 6).

2006, p. 165) than selective violence, selective violence offers various purposes such as displacing people or plundering goods (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 147) and is often more effective (Weinstein, 2007, p. 204). Selective violence is based on asymmetrically distributed information between actors (Kalyvas, 2006, pp. 173, 175). Whereas paid informers are more expensive, denunciation is often motivated by personal motives and lead to misinformation (Kalyvas, 2006, pp. 176, 178; Weinstein, 2007, p. 204) or “counterdenunciation” (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 195). Cross-checking of information is a solution, but “requires a high level of control and an efficient bureaucracy; it is therefore, very hard to achieve in civil war, when resources are stretched thin, especially in contested zones” (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 187). While studies like Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) and Valentino et al. (2004) investigate violence against civilians at the individual or group level, Lyall’s (Lyall) research centers on actors including the government. Similarly, Joshi and Quinn (2017) distinguish between combatant or non-combatant settings, and the agency of civilians (Condra & Shapiro, 2012). Studies such as Balcells (2010) emphasizes, in a case study on the Spanish civil war, the role of direct violence, particularly highlighting the significance of pre-war identities. Cantin (2021) offers a different perspective by analyzing the individual behaviors within the lower ranks of the Revolutionary United Front, linking their targeting strategies to processes of socialization. This aspect of individual behavior in conflict is fundamentally driven by Fujii’s (Fujii) work on the Rwandan genocide, where she examines extra-lethal violence.

There is also a body of literature analyzing the effectiveness of civilian targeting (e.g. Downes, 2007) and related factors such as geographically concentration, population size, and methodological problems given endogeneity of chosen strategy and outcome, and the non-random targeting of mass killings (Valentino, 2014, p. 99). Scholars also examine conditions that make civilian targeting more likely (e.g. Valentino et al., 2004) and how it is related to (state) sponsorship (e.g. R. M. Wood, 2014b).

Determinants of violence against civilians are multifaceted. Exemplary factors include a lack of information (Kalyvas, 2006), political education (Oppenheim & Weintraub, 2017), ideology (Thaler, 2012), and group structure (Haer, 2015; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006). Other fundamental determinants are the rebel group's command structure (Doctor & Willingham, 2022), competition among groups (Raleigh, 2012), "insurgent embeddedness" referring to relations with other actors such as states or other rebels (Asal et al., 2022), and the capabilities of the rebel organization (e.g. R. M. Wood, 2010). The involvement of foreign fighters, especially co-ethnic fighters, can influence civilian targeting patterns; co-ethnic foreign fighters may reduce civilian targeting compared to non co-ethnics (Moore, 2019). Additionally, rebel's civilian constituencies, whether shared or fractionalized with the government (Ottmann, 2017), the backlash of peacekeeping missions (e.g. R. M. Wood, 2014a), loss of material support, predation or looting opportunities (e.g. Azam & Hoeffler, 2002; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006; R. M. Wood, 2014a), and funding⁵, including external support or alternative resources (Belgioioso, 2024; Salehyan et al., 2014; Weinstein, 2007; R. M. Wood, 2014b). An interesting case is presented by Oswald et al. (2020) in their study of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone. They demonstrate that rebels targeted civilians until they gained territorial control and the capability for peaceful rebel governance.

⁵Rebel organizations secure resources and finance themselves through various means such as foreign aid, natural resources, coup, autonomy, criminal activities, taxation of goods and services, or remittances (Huang, 2016b, pp. 57–59; Salehyan et al., 2014, p. 634; Belgioioso, 2024; D. E. Cunningham et al., 2013; Walsh et al., 2018). The majority of literature suggests that the presence of natural resources is associated with higher levels of violence, conflict onset and conflict duration, due to reduced dependency on civilians (e.g. Weinstein, 2007, pp. 7, 309; Zhukov, 2017). Salehyan et al. (2014, p. 636) support this, noting that rebels relying on the local population are more likely to act benevolently compared to those relying on other sources of support. Additionally, Rudner (2010) presents an insightful case study on the funding structure of a terrorist organization, specifically examining the financing mechanisms of Hezbollah.

2.1.3.2 Ethnic violence against civilians

The determinants of violence against civilians have been extensively studied (e.g. Eck & Hultman, 2007). Recently, there has been an increasing focus on the literature specifically examining the determinants of ethnic violence, which often involves the collective targeting of ethnic groups.⁶ Fjelde and Hultman (2014) show, using an African sample, that rebel groups target civilians based on ethnicity, especially co-ethnics of the warring party for strategic reasons. R. M. Wood and Sullivan (2015) highlights that competition among non-state actors positively influences civilian targeting. Furthermore, Fjelde et al. (2021) investigate ethnic targeting and ethnic violence using a novel dataset on ethnic one-sided violence (EOSV), which identifies the ethnic group of battle-related deaths. The replication of Fjelde and Hultman’s (2014) study suggests that rebel constituency is a significant determinant of ethnic violence and targeting globally.⁷ However, it is important to note that this sample includes many missing observations for ethnic targeting and follows the underlying OSV data structure, which should be considered in the interpretation of results. Wimmer and Miner (2020) propose a theory arguing that ethnic targeting is applied to expand territorial control by altering the balance of power through civilian killings in areas where co-ethnics are equally represented between rebels and the government. This theory, also focusing on targeting border areas to expand contiguous areas, is empirically tested in Africa using geocoded data (Wimmer & Miner, 2020). The findings support the notion of political struggles along ethnic lines over control of natural resources (Wimmer & Miner, 2020, p. 405).

K. G. Cunningham et al. (2012) demonstrate that self-determination groups, when

⁶For insights into ethnic violence against civilians perpetrated by governments, key references include Cederman et al. (2020), Downes (2008), Fjelde and Hultman (2014), and Lyall (2010). Studies also explore local ethnic heterogeneity leading to violence based on enhanced grievances (K. G. Cunningham & Weidmann, 2010). Stanton (2015) delves into militia violence against civilians with a focus on ethnicity, while K. S. Gleditsch and Polo (2016) investigate ethnic terrorism. R. D. Petersen (2002) provides an analysis of the determinants of individuals applying ethnic violence in Eastern Europe. In the context of interstate conflict, Gagnon (1994) analyzes ethnic cleavages and domestic threats to elites, particularly in Serbia. Conrad et al. (2021) reveal that inter-group fighting among rebels is partially driven by ethnic motives and power disparities. Furthermore, the likelihood of armed conflict increases by ethnic group-based political discrimination and economic marginalization (Buhaug et al., 2014).

⁷These findings are in line with Ottmann (2017), who underscores the significance of rebel constituencies, whether they align with or oppose the government. These results supports the OSV findings and relevance of rebels constituencies whether shared or opposed to the government.

confronted with new factional competition, conduct more violence against co-ethnics and co-factions. Similarly, militant groups embroiled in ethnic rivalries often resort to tit-for-tat violence, targeting opposing ethnic civilians to undermine rival militant groups, though at the cost of civilians (Asal et al., 2022, pp. 35, 218). In a case study of the Lebanese civil war, Hägerdal (2019) presents a theory on intelligence gathering by militias across ethnic groups and examines restraint of violence. His study suggests that selective violence will occur in ethnically heterogeneous regions, while ethnic cleansing occurs in ethnically segregated areas. Hägerdal (2019, p. 65) argues that “information need not equal denunciation” and non co-ethnics provide information to militias as a survival strategy. However, it is important to note that this research is confined to the Cold War period and focuses on Lebanon, limiting its broader applicability.

Summary of gaps

While external state support has been linked to increased civilian victimization due to rebels’ reduced reliance on domestic populations, support from democratic states appears to decrease such victimization (Salehyan et al., 2014). Nonetheless, these observations lead to intriguing questions about the influence of non-state sponsors, especially diasporas, in limiting violence against civilians and ethnic-driven violence against civilians.

Can diasporas, from afar, protect civilians through limiting civilian victimization? Or, conversely, might diaspora sponsorship actually contribute to an escalation in violence against civilians? This dissertation addresses these gaps in the literature and aims to deepen our understanding of the impact of diaspora sponsorship on violence against civilians, including ethnic targeting.

2.1.4 Rebel governance

While the study of civilian victimization has been a focus for decades, the topic of rebel governance has gained increasing attention in recent years.⁸ Rebel governance is defined

⁸Notable overviews include the “Special Feature: Dynamic Processes of Rebel Governance” (K. G. Cunningham et al., 2020), a reflection on the future directions of rebel governance research (Loyle et al., 2021), and the forum article by Loyle et al. (2022). Additionally, the special issue “Politicising the Rebel Governance Paradigm” emphasizes the political aspects of rebel governance, advocating for analyses that consider the social environment and normative structures beyond an instrumentalist

as “the development of institutions and, importantly, informal and formal norms and rules of behavior, by insurgents that regulate civilian social, economic, and political life” (Mampilly, 2015, p. 77). Albert (2022, p. 623) describes rebel governance as quasi-institutions “to highlight the state-like behavior of these actions”. A key prerequisite for rebel governance is the presence of civilians in areas controlled by rebels (e.g. Kasfir, 2015, p. 25). Arjona et al. (2015, p. 2) emphasizes that rebel governance significantly affects civilian life during wartime. It is crucial to understand that rebel governance does not emerge in an ungoverned space (e.g. Mampilly & Stewart, 2020, p. 7), and may be endogenous to prior social beliefs and cultural values (Kasfir, 2015, p. 40). The institutional process of state formation, as it is affected by rebel governance, has been explored in depth by Péclard and Mechoulan (2015).

Types of rebel governance. Rebel governance exists in various degrees and forms. It is also often seen as a dynamic process (K. G. Cunningham et al., 2020). Glawion and Le Noan (2023) examine this dynamic process in the Central African Republic, highlighting how rebels established governance structures and then delegated them to other actors, allowing themselves to focus on resource extraction. Additionally, Berti (2020) analyzes the relational aspect between rebels, civilians or the state in establishing rebel governance at the local level during the Syrian civil war, demonstrating that rebels can cooperate or compete with other local actors on local governance.

Florea (2020) argues that factors such as threat environment, organizational structure and endowments are crucial in determining the implementation of rebel governance. In examining the conditions under which de facto states like Somaliland have developed governance institutions between 1945 and 2016, Florea (2020) finds that the presence of lootable resources tends to hinder such institutions, while factors like military support, the presence of peacekeepers, territorial control, and Marxist ideology foster their development. The study distinguishes between political institutions, redistributive institutions, and extractive institutions (Florea, 2020). Furthermore, Furlan (2020) develops a typology to understand “how insurgent groups do actually govern”, moving beyond merely identifying the existence of rebel governance. The study analyzes three case studies - LTTE, the FARC, the RCD-G - identifying key criteria for

view (Pfeifer & Schwab, 2023). The articles in this issue take into account the spatial or temporal context of rebel governance (Pfeifer & Schwab, 2023, p. 5).

rebel governing, including inclusivity, civilians, generation of compliance, other actors, institutions and personnel maintenance, bureaucratization, as well as executive style (Furlan, 2020).

Territorial control. Territorial control is often seen as simplifying rebel governance (e.g. Anders, 2020; Kasfir, 2005; Mampilly & Stewart, 2020; Weinstein, 2007) and thus considered as a pre-condition. However, a minority of studies challenge this notion (e.g. Jackson, 2018; Waterman, 2023). For instance, Waterman (2023) demonstrates that in the case of the United Liberation Front of Assam, rebel governance was established without territorial control and was enhanced through social embeddedness, state penetration, and media presence. Hence, full territorial control is not essential; being the strongest actor in an area (see Weinstein, 2007, p. 163) is sufficient for establishing rebel governance.

2.1.4.1 Elements of rebel governance

Rebel governance encompasses, among others, the provision of civilian administration (Kasfir, 2015, p. 24), taxation, cultural ceremonies (Arjona et al., 2015, p. 3; Kasfir, 2015, p. 22), provision of public goods and social services (Albert, 2022; Huang, 2016b; Huang & Sullivan, 2020; Kasfir, 2015; Stewart, 2018), the establishment of a legal system (Albert, 2022; Loyle, 2021), and elections (Albert, 2022; K. G. Cunningham et al., 2021; Huang, 2016a; Loyle, 2021). The provision of public goods, such as security, education, and healthcare, represents a specific form of rebel governance. For instance, Stewart (2020a) utilizes education and healthcare services as measures of social service provision. The most extensive data on rebel governance, covering the period from 1945 to 2012, includes 25 different institutions, with rebel organizations identified based on the UCDP conflict termination dataset (Kreutz, 2010).

In the context of provision of healthcare, rebels provide such services particularly when they benefit from natural resource extraction, using civilians as a workforce (Conrad et al., 2022). Another example are elections held by rebels. Such elections involve a trade-off between the uncertainty and potential negative election outcomes and the benefits of gaining legitimacy and power, signaling a distinct governing actor in opposition to the state (K. G. Cunningham et al., 2021, p. 90). K. G. Cunningham

et al.'s (2021, p. 83) large-N study, examining the period from 1950 to 2006, indicates that rebels applying social service provision and international diplomacy, in addition to possessing capacity, are more likely to hold elections.

A distinction in rebel governance is between inclusive and exclusive service provision (Stewart, 2018, 2020b). Inclusive service provision offers governance services to all civilians in the rebel controlled area, while exclusive rebel governance targets specific civilians, often associated with recruitment purposes (Stewart, 2018, p. 206). This dichotomy aligns with the concepts of public and club/toll goods (Ostrom, 2005). For example, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) provided inclusive social services, whereas the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) offered education and healthcare to potential co-ethnic recruits (Stewart, 2018, pp. 21–212).

Rebel governance in the Middle East. Within rebel governance literature, a predominant body of academic literature focuses on the Middle East, with particular attention to the Islamic State (IS) and affiliated entities that implement rebel governance. As an illustrative instance, Bamber and Svensson (2022) delve into an examination of the variances in rebel governance within Syria, established by diverse Salafi-Jihadi rebel groups. They posit that this variation can be explained by opportunities for civilian mobilization against rebels, including civilian collaboration and possibilities to express discontent. Furthermore, Revkin (2021) argues, drawing upon qualitative interviews and immersive fieldwork, that civilians opted to stay within territories under rebel governance, particularly in Mosul, where the IS held rebel governance territory. The decision to stay was largely driven by perceived improvements under the IS in contrast to the former state government (Revkin, 2021). This study underscores the relevance of historical experiences, rule of law and bad state governance (Revkin, 2021, p. 71). Considering the rebel governance enacted by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, marked by elements of coercion, indicates that civilian response was characterized by a heterogeneous and inconclusive nature concerning the social contract between the IS and civilian population highlighting the need for future research projects (Revkin & Ahram, 2020).

2.1.4.2 Domestic and international reasons for rebel governance

The provision of public goods by rebel groups can be unstable and is often contingent upon rebels legitimacy strategies, ranging from coercive to quasi-voluntary, or even voluntary (Kasfir, 2015, pp. 34–35, 39; Gates, 2002, p. 116; Podder, 2017; Schlichte & Schneckener, 2015.) Podder (2017, p. 688) defines quasi-voluntary as civilian’s willingness to comply with coercive elements being present to ensure their obedience. Voluntary compliance is non-existent as “participation is often forced at gunpoint” (Gates, 2002, p. 116).

Domestic reasons. Civilians might support rebel groups due to various factors, such as experiencing state-based violence, political marginalization, sympathy with the rebel’s cause, or fear of punishment (Huang & Sullivan, 2020, pp. 3–4). Additionally, factors like rebels’ rhetoric, increasing income or protection of families can influence civilian support (Kasfir, 2015, p. 32). Alijla (2023) notes that “civilians perceive a rebel group as legitimate when it can provide them with services, such as health, infrastructure, education, and welfare along with security and protection”. A study on Hamas in Gaza Strip, implementing a survey design, reveals that civilians primarily associate the group with the provision of security and protection, or with nothing (Alijla, 2023, p. 211). Another instance is seen in Mosul under Islamic State occupation, where oppressed Sunnis received food and fuel rations, exemplifying quasi-voluntary compliance (Podder, 2017, p. 688). Moreover, Baalen (2021, p. 941) illustrates for Côte d’Ivoire that civilian responsiveness to rebel governance varies and is influenced by local elites clientelist networks and ethno-political affiliation between rebels and civilians.

Legitimacy. Rebel governance can serve as a critical source of legitimacy for rebel groups. Terpstra and Frerks (2017, p. 289) highlight that rebels apply rebel governance “to guide and inspire civilians living under their auspices”, legitimizing their actions and fostering a common interpretation of events within their controlled territory (Terpstra & Frerks, 2017, p. 289). Additionally, Schlichte and Schneckener (2015, p. 419) emphasize that while performance-based sources of legitimacy are crucial in the long run, symbolic sources are relevant in the short term. Importantly, rebel groups must meet the expectations of their target audience(s), which can vary over time and

be constrained by resources (Schlichte & Schneckener, 2015, p. 419). In the case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Terpstra and Frerks (2017, pp. 280–282) illustrate how rebels gained and acquired legitimacy through interaction with civilians in their controlled territory, alongside the use of coercion. Civilians experienced coercion but also voluntarily supported the rebels with financial contributions, food, shelter, intelligence, and even potential recruits of children (Terpstra & Frerks, 2017, p. 280). On the other hand, Malthaner (2015) points out that legitimacy involves an active and participatory relationship, highlighting the influence civilians have on rebels, not just the reverse (Duyvesteyn, 2017, p. 678; Arjona, 2017).

International reasons. Beyond domestic reasons, rebel groups also establish rebel governance to signal their territorial control and competence of state activities to the international level (Schlichte & Schneckener, 2015, p. 419) or to external sponsors (Coggins, 2015; Huang & Sullivan, 2020, p. 3; Mampilly & Stewart, 2020, p. 2). This governance demonstrates their organizational capacity, and in combination with military strength, indicates coherence (Huang & Sullivan, 2020, p. 3). However, when there is a divergence between actions and rhetoric, especially regarding civilian services, rebels are compelled to offer explanations, which may involve blaming others or referring to defection or disloyalty (Schlichte & Schneckener, 2015, p. 419). Stewart (2020b) shows empirically that a rebel group's military strength does not necessarily dictate its governance capacity, opening avenues for further research into the motives behind rebel's governing.

Summary of gaps

In summary, scholarship on rebel governance has made progress and continually evolves. It offers critical perspectives and recognizes the diversity in the implementation of rebel governance and responsiveness. However, it is worth noting that the predominant geographical focus remains on the Middle East.

There is a notable gap in studies examining the impact of external sponsorship, particularly with regard to diaspora sponsorship. This dissertation addresses the existing gap in the literature through an exploration of the influence of diaspora sponsorship on rebel governance. Thereby, it addresses the second segment of the third research ques-

tion: How does diaspora sponsorship of rebel organizations impact rebel governance?

2.1.5 Foreign interventions and conflict stages

Foreign intervention often plays an important role in the different stages of conflicts (e.g. Balch-Lindsay & Enterline, 2000; Balch-Lindsay et al., 2008; Regan, 2002b; J. Roberts, 2019; Salehyan et al., 2011; Sawyer et al., 2017). A substantial body of research explores the reasons behind external interventions in conflicts.⁹ Thereby the importance of signaling is highlighted. Common reasons for foreign intervention in a conflict are geopolitical factors often linked to an interest to destabilize a rival state, support for allies, self-defense or access to resources and economic incentives (Bove et al., 2016; Findley & Marineau, 2015; Henke, 2020; Kathman, 2010, 2011). Other conditional factors, such as ideological closeness, ethnic ties, or normative elements, including democratic regime type are also fundamental (Bélanger et al., 2005; Garmant & James, 2000; Koga, 2011; Sambanis et al., 2020). Humanitarian aspects, like shortening the duration of conflicts, fostering conflict termination or peace, are also drivers (Balch-Lindsay & Enterline, 2000; Walter, 1997). The U.S. intervention in Iraq exemplifies habitual intervention for conflict resolution (Howard, 2015). While some studies focus on military interventions (e.g. Henke, 2017; Woo, 2017), others adopt a broader perspective, encompassing economic and diplomatic interventions (e.g. Ilgaz, 2021; Paquin & Saideman, 2017; Regan, 2002a, 2002b; Saideman, 2001).

Reasons of foreign intervention. Following Saideman (2001) three explanations occur for foreign intervention, particularly in supporting separatist parties. Firstly, rooted in neoliberalism, the argument of state vulnerability. This view posits that states are less likely to support separatists if they themselves fear internal fragmentation. States will support international institutions and norms for fostering non-interference and maintaining existing boundaries. However, empirical evidence, such as the support for Biafran separatists during the Nigerian civil war indicate the opposite as vulnerability was high and consequently support should not have occurred (Saideman, 2001, p. 31).

A second theoretical explanation, derived from neorealism, relates to the percep-

⁹An example of an actor-centric approach is Findley and Teo (2006).

tion of threat. Here, stronger states support secession in their neighboring states or separatists in weak states, forming coalitions. This support is more likely, the stronger a state is perceived following the concept of balance of powers (Saideman, 1997, 2001). The third explanation centers around ethnic ties. This perspective argues that ethnic identities influence constituencies and leaders preference, thus influencing state behavior. A state supporting separatists would share an ethnic tie with them, and enemy's ties would predict opposition behavior (Saideman, 1997, 2001, 2002). However, Bélanger et al. (2005) critiques the vulnerability and ethnic ties arguments, proposing regime type as a normative explanation for foreign support of secessionist claims. In response, Saideman (2007) demonstrates that with precise operationalization, ethnic ties are crucial in supporting secessionists, while the effect of democratic regimes is minimal.

Conflict delegation. Numerous studies examine the reasons and impacts of foreign sponsorship on conflict dynamics. Salehyan (2010) introduces the concept of conflict delegation into conflict research. He explains state sponsorship to rebel organizations through a principal-agent framework of external support between states and rebels (Salehyan, 2010). However, multiple variations and modification to the principal-agent framework in conflict scholarship exist. Exemplary aspects include the number of principals involved, dual delegation, specialized or simultaneous delegation, the role of regional actors, and the changes and persistence of proxy relations over time (e.g. Karlén & Rauta, 2023; Karlén et al., 2021).¹⁰

Orchestration. Alternative theoretical frameworks that examine external sponsorship and conflict include the concept of orchestration (Heinkelmann-Wild & Mehrl, 2022), state-non-state actor cooperation (Maoz & San-Akca, 2012; San-Akca, 2016),

¹⁰Studies such as Berkowitz (2018), Byman and Kreps (2010), and Carter (2012) offer insights into state support for terrorist groups, and research by Hoffman et al. (2007), Piazza (2018), and Piazza and LaFree (2019) mentions and discusses diaspora support for terrorists. I do not examine external support for terrorist organizations in-depth given the distinction between terrorist and rebels. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize the inherent challenges in differentiating between these two types of actors, which often involves subjective judgments (Salehyan et al., 2014, p. 638). The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), for example, were viewed as a rebel group until designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States and other countries, affecting the LTTE's external sponsorship opportunities (Radtke, 2009). Al-Shabaab is another actor analyzed as both an insurgent group and a terrorist network by Mwangi (2015, p. 70). For the purposes of this dissertation, I examine all actors that are listed as rebel organizations in accordance with the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) definition.

or utilization of proxy relations and proxy wars (Abbink, 2003; Berman et al., 2019; Costantini & Donelli, 2022; Farasoo, 2021; Moghadam et al., 2023a; Phillips & Valbjørn, 2018; Rauta, 2020; Sozer, 2016). Orchestration differs from principal-agent models by focusing on incentives for support and deniability, without the monitoring mechanism or sanctions in case of agency slack (Heinkelmann-Wild & Mehrl, 2022). This theoretical lens can be linked to the ethnic tie argument as Heinkelmann-Wild and Mehrl (2022) find that state sponsors sharing an ethnic tie are more likely to engage in orchestration. Another framework is provided by Maoz and San-Akca (2012), who analyzes state sponsorship of armed actors within the context of state rivalries. This framework posits that states circumvent direct confrontation with rivals by sponsoring rebel groups. Such state-rebel cooperation can exacerbate rivalries and is more likely when states seek to change the status quo but lack sufficient power (Maoz & San-Akca, 2012).

Proxy wars. The framework of proxy wars is often divided between the logic, process, and relationship (Moghadam et al., 2023b) whereby the first can be linked to delegation of armed conflict between sponsors and proxy (Moghadam et al., 2023b; Rauta, 2021). As a process the concept of proxy wars refers to dynamics and surrounding factors, whereas the relationship captures the interactions between proxy and sponsor, thus proxy relations (Moghadam et al., 2023b, pp. 4–5; Mumford, 2013; Karlén et al., 2021).

External support data. Further advancing empirical studies, Meier et al. (2022) introduce a novel dataset on external support, differentiating ten distinct types of support, including alleged support and coalition-based support (Meier et al., 2022). Their research indicates an increase in supporters from 1975 to 2017, with military intervention being the predominant form of external support. However, the dataset intentionally excludes diasporas as sponsors due to the complexity in conceptualization a diaspora.

2.1.5.1 Determinants of external sponsorship

External state support is more likely for: a) rebels holding territorial control, b) rebels with relative strength- neither too weak nor too strong, b) those with transnational con-

stituencies, c) rebels in a state having a rivalry, and d) rebels where the government also receives external support (Salehyan et al., 2011). Interestingly, country characteristics often associated with civil war onset do not significantly relate with external support (Salehyan et al., 2011). Furthermore, Jones and Linebarger (2021) demonstrate that external support for rebels based on transborder ethnic kinship is more likely when the supporter's ethnic group is in power and the co-ethnics in the conflict country are marginalized, particularly when the supporter faces domestic political insecurity. The argumentation follows diversionary theory and aligns with the ingroup/outgroup argument (Jones & Linebarger, 2021).

Individual characteristics. A remaining body of the literature argues for individual characteristics that determine external support (Huang et al., 2021). Huang et al.'s (2021) analysis reveals that rebel leaders' experiences abroad and their international networks explain the external support they receive. For instance, rebel leaders may have formed robust networks during their periods abroad, which can enable them to secure external state support from the countries where they have resided during their studies (Huang et al., 2021). Contrary to common research, Popovic (2017) notes that agency slack can arise due to ethnic ties. This is more likely in multi-actor civil wars or among decentralized and fragmented rebel groups while multiple state sponsors and rebel strength do not have an effect on defection of agents (Popovic, 2017). The positive relationship between defection onset and ethnic ties is explained by shared ethnic connections between the rebels and the population of the state sponsor, assuming continued support from the state irrespective of the rebels' defection (Popovic, 2017, pp. 936–937).

2.1.5.2 Consequences of external sponsorship

The literature on external sponsorship also delves into the consequences of external sponsorship on warfare, conflict duration, recurrence, and termination. Sawyer et al. (2017) argue that fungible support, such as financial support, enhances the short-term fighting capacity of rebel organizations and increases uncertainty for states. This leads to a reduced likelihood of bargaining of conflict settlement, regardless of the supporting actors. Furthermore, conflict termination becomes less probable unless

there is a withdrawal of highly fungible support which incentives conflict resolution processes (Sawyer et al., 2017, p. 1195). Additionally, financial support can have reverse effects. For instance, financial aid to the Syrian opposition led to fragmentation and increased competition among state sponsors, due to a lack of accountability, rather than fostering unity (Baylouny & Mullins, 2018). Moreover, the type of support can also influence the rebel groups provision of public goods and services, or establish rebel governance (e.g. Huang & Sullivan, 2020). Studies on external support and rebel governance indicate that fungible support and training positively impact the provision of social services by rebels, enhance their fighting capacity, and increase recruitment demand (Huang & Sullivan, 2020). In contrast, direct military support does not affect these outcomes (Huang & Sullivan, 2020).

Another distinction in types of support is between targeted support, which is offensive and increases rebel capacity fighting against the state, and resistance support, which is defensive and focuses on the survival of rebels (J. Roberts, 2019, p. 363). The latter tends to prolong conflict duration, whereas the former is often linked to shorter conflict duration (J. Roberts, 2019). When considering conflict re-occurrence, Karlén (2017) argues that continuous support for rebels plays a more critical role than the presence of multiple state sponsors, facilitating fighting capabilities and re-mobilization. Consequently, rebels anticipating external support in the short-term are more likely to increase the likelihood of conflict re-occurrence, which does not hold for governments external support. Similarly, Testerman (2015) posits rebels who lose external support face a higher probability of extended conflict duration compared to those that did not receive support. External backing for the government can also increase the moral legitimacy of rebels fighting against foreign intervention (Terpstra, 2020). However, it may also undermine rebel governance, as exemplified by the Taliban in post-2001 Afghanistan (Terpstra, 2020).

Warfare and behavior of conflict parties. External sponsorship affects warfare and the behavior of conflict parties. Lockyer (2017) argues that foreign support alters the balance of military capabilities, thereby influencing warfare over time and space. This effect is exemplified in the civil wars of Angola and Afghanistan (Lockyer, 2017). Moreover, focusing on a specific type of warfare, terrorism, suggests that rebel

organizations receiving external support are less likely to use terrorism within the context of the intrastate conflict (Fortna et al., 2018). This is due to their concern about international legitimacy, as opposed to groups that rely on civilian support (Fortna et al., 2018). However, rebel organizations may intensify inter-rebel fighting during multi-actor civil wars due to external state support, influencing their incentives of violence (Stein & Cantin, 2021). In contrast, rebels tend to employ nonviolent tactics when material support comes from a diaspora (Petrova, 2019). Conversely, material state support prolongs violence conducted by rebels because of the state's lower ties and interest in the conflict, paired with limited control mechanisms (Petrova, 2019). When rebels receive external military support from states, it can escalate lethal violence and increase the risk of interstate militarized disputes (Schultz, 2010). Such risks persist unless effective monitoring mechanisms are in place and restraint policy exists (Schultz, 2010).

Civilian victimization. Scholarship on rebels behavior towards civilian victimization reveals an increase in violence against civilians with external support (Salehyan et al., 2014). This increase is particularly evident in cases of direct troop support (R. M. Wood et al., 2012) and contrasts with a lower likelihood of civilian violence in instances of overt support for rebels (Stein, 2022), or foreign military support (R. M. Wood et al., 2012). External support indicates positive but statistically insignificant effects highlighting the potential conditionality on military capability (R. M. Wood, 2014b). While external state support shows a positive, albeit statistically insignificant effect, on violence against civilians, conditional factors can influence the effect (e.g. Salehyan et al., 2014). The presence of multiple sponsors heightens the likelihood of civilian victimization, as the control possibilities of any single principal diminish with the addition of more sponsors (Salehyan et al., 2014, p. 650). Interestingly, the effect of democratic sponsors indicates no statistically significant effect (Salehyan et al., 2014, p. 650). Similarly, the role of natural resources appears statistically insignificant, suggesting that state sponsorship may have a more substantial effect on civilian victimization than lootable resources (Salehyan et al., 2014, p. 650). Notably, Salehyan et al. (2014, p. 651) demonstrate that external support can reduce violence against civilians by half if the sponsor is a democratic state with human rights lobby, as opposed to a

nondemocratic state. However, this study does not differentiate between various types of violence, including the intentional targeting of ethnic groups.

2.1.5.3 Termination of external support

In this review, I have explored various dimensions of external sponsorship, including its impact on conflict variables and types of sponsorship. It's important to note that external support is not static and can either change over time or terminate. An exemplary study by Karlén (2022) emphasizes the role of adverse feedback in determining policy failures, which can be attributed either to the rebels or the sponsor. This feedback mechanism can lead to an increase in support, particularly in cases where sponsors need to demonstrate commitment, or to termination if the failure is on the rebels' side (Karlén, 2022). Karlén's (2022) analysis of US support for the Contras, in Nicaragua during the 1980s, illustrates the dynamic nature of external sponsorship using process-tracing. Additionally, the termination of external state support can occur, and the factors influencing this decision are largely similar to those that explain external state support (Karlén, 2019). For instance, the absence of ethnic kinship between state sponsors and rebels or post cold war period make the termination of sponsorship more likely. However, factors such as having a democratic sponsor, the threat or implementation of sanctions, changes in leadership, or conflict onset do not significantly impact state sponsorship termination (Karlén, 2019).

2.1.5.4 Non-state actor sponsorship

Existing scholarship on external sponsorship in civil wars predominantly focuses on state support for rebel and terrorist organizations, or states. However, it often overlooks the role of external non-state actor support. A notable exception is Moghadam and Wyss's (2020) actor-centric analysis of rebel support for other rebel organizations within the framework of proxy relations.¹¹ This type of sponsorship is categorized as symmetric, where both sides face military capability and survival issues with support focusing on needs rather than interests (Moghadam & Wyss, 2020, p. 123). This is in contrast to asymmetric state-rebel sponsorship relations, which follow different types

¹¹Daub (2023, 209ff) demonstrates how diaspora support compares with proxy war dynamics and what differences exist between the two concepts.

of support and underlying logic.¹² However, Moghadam and Wyss's research is limited to three Middle Eastern case studies - Al-Qaida, the People's Protection Units and Hezbollah - and does not address non-state actor sponsorship from diasporas or other non-armed actors (Moghadam & Wyss, 2020, pp. 123–124). Likewise, Mumford (2013) and Phillips and Valbjørn (2018, p. 427) acknowledge the presence of non-state support but primarily offer an illustration of the PKK's role in the Syrian civil war in the latter case. This highlights the need to further investigate non-state actor support for non-state armed actors.

Diaspora sponsorship. While a growing body of literature explores armed group sponsorship to armed groups (e.g. Moghadam & Wyss, 2020), non-state actor support for rebel organizations remains under-explored. Specifically, diasporas as non-state actors sponsoring conflict parties has been often neglected or studied with major limitations. Conversely, there exists scholarship around diaspora's roles which falls short on diaspora's role as sponsors.

The next section reviews the existing scholarship about the various roles of diasporas. The last section focuses explicitly on the limited research on diaspora sponsorship and conflict and concludes with the contribution of this dissertation to fill the gap in conflict and migration scholarship.

2.2 Diaspora's activities and relations

I define a diaspora, including its formation, mobilization and aims in detail in chapter 3. In brief, a diaspora is a distinct actor that is defined along five criteria: (1) migration, (2) collective memory, (3) connection, (4) group consciousness, (5) kinship (cf. IOM GMDAC, 2018). This chapter examines the primary roles of a diaspora: as a development actor, homeland influencer, peacemaker or peace wrecker.¹³ This review

¹²For the latter see also Chapter 1.2.1 explaining the differences between state and non-state sponsorship.

¹³For a comprehensive overview of the roles of diasporas, see for example, R. Cohen and Fischer (2019). I acknowledge that diasporas motivation and capacity are crucial for the actions (Baser & Toivanen, 2019; Freitas, 2012; Geukjian, 2014). Additionally, scholars distinguish between passive and active engagement of a diaspora (Shain & Barth, 2003, p. 449) and their actions are categorized as either intended or unintended, with potential positive or negative effects on their homelands or host countries (Brinkerhoff, 2011, pp. 132–133). Given the focus of this dissertation on diaspora sponsorship, I do not delve into the aforementioned subcategories of diaspora engagement.

also encompasses homeland- diaspora relations by discussing how the homeland can utilize the diaspora. Bercovitch (2007, p. 21) highlights the fundamental influence diasporas have at home and abroad, stating: “Diasporas have come to be seen as politically active actors who can influence events within their territory (e.g. elections) or outside it (e.g. a foreign policy action or a vote in the United Nations)”. The subsequent section points out the limited scholarship on diaspora sponsorship and positions diaspora support within the broader academic discourse.

The review of diasporas as development actors, homeland influencers, and peacemaker or peace wreckers reveals a crucial gap in diaspora scholarship on diasporas. Despite extensive research on diasporas, the role of diasporas as external actors in conflicts, especially beyond their involvement in development or humanitarian efforts is often overlooked. Furthermore, the literature on internationalized civil wars and external sponsorship predominantly concentrates on state sponsors, with relatively scant attention given to diaspora sponsorship. In addressing this gap, my work offers a nuanced understanding of diaspora’s behavior during civil wars, in particular diaspora sponsorship. This approach not only moves beyond the traditional perspective of viewing diasporas solely as development actors, homeland influencers, peacemakers, or peace wreckers, but also extends the research on external non-state actor support to armed non-state actors in civil wars.

2.2.1 Development actor and homeland influencer

Development actor. The most prominent role of diasporas associates diasporas as development actor. Numerous studies, reports, and policy outlets emphasize diaspora’s involvement and potential long-term impact in development (e.g. Hear & Cohen, 2017; World Bank, 2023). A key tool for development is remittance. The ongoing ties diasporans maintain with their co-ethnics in the homeland are reinforced through remittances, as exemplified by the case between the Sikh diaspora and the Sikh community in the Punjab region (Fair, 2005, p. 132). The World Bank’s data from 2015 underscores this impact, showing that remittance inflows to developing countries were three times the amount of official development aid (World Bank, 2016, p. 17). Beyond remittances, Orjuela (2008, p. 439) highlights the multifaceted economic contributions of

diaspora members as “consumers of homeland products, as investors in businesses in the homeland and as contributors to a variety of charity organizations”, thereby bolstering the homeland economy and preserving diaspora-homeland ties (Kapur, 2014). Additionally, members of the diaspora can support rebuilding efforts, such as financing the salaries of civil servants in Somalia (K. Roth, 2005, p. 298), establishing collective funds to cover repatriation costs (Lacroix, 2019, p. 175), funding development projects like schools and health centers in their places of origin (Lacroix, 2019, p. 175). An illustrative case of development effort by the diaspora is provided by the president of a Nigerian diaspora organization in Washington DC: “name [organization] collects everyone to focus on gathering together, synergies of pockets; combine with resources here and with resources folks have back home. Economic and social development while giving back to jurisdiction where diaspora is residing” (I11).¹⁴

(Social) Remittances. Remittances can contribute to development but also influence the prospects of democracy in party-based regimes by changing voting behavior and reducing the population’s reliance on state transfers (Escribà-Folch et al., 2015). This effect extends beyond economic impact to encompass social remittances, which involve the transmission of skills, knowledge, and values (Kapur, 2004, 2016; Moss, 2020). However, challenges such as a “lack of trust towards local institutions and financial instruments” (Baser & Toivanen, 2019, p. 350) can impede the diaspora’s effectiveness as a development actor in the homeland (e.g. Paasche, 2016).

Homeland influencer. Dickinson (2019) emphasizes that diasporas possess multiple identities and their contributions go beyond being mere remittance senders or development agents in the homelands.¹⁵ Diasporans can influence the homeland more broadly. For example, diasporans can challenge authoritarian governments in the homelands, as seen in Rwanda and Zimbabwe (Betts & Jones, 2016). Additionally, diasporas can contribute to stability in the homeland (Baser & Toivanen, 2019; Brinkerhoff, 2008, 2009, 2011; R. Cohen, 2008; Koinova, 2009) or use political means in the host countries to promote democratization back home (Adamson, 2020, p. 150). For instance, the Kurdish diaspora in Europe has engaged in petitions and campaigns to advocate

¹⁴Author interview with interviewee 11, 17th February 2023, on a virtual platform.

¹⁵These multiple identities may also limit the diaspora’s influence in their homelands due to factors like dual loyalty, which can restrict their engagement (Shain & Barth, 2003, p. 463).

for freedom of speech regarding the Turkish government (Baser & Swain, 2010, p. 53). Diasporans have also mobilized in the host countries, including “the storming of the embassies in Paris and Berlin” as illustrated for the Ambazonia conflict (Ketzmerick, 2023, p. 257).

Democracy and accountability. Research from scholars like Batista and Vicente (2011) and Docquier et al. (2016) highlight the diaspora's support for democracy and accountability. Diasporas may “pressure their home governments to adopt more nationalist and assertive policies towards neighboring countries” (Huntington, 1997, p. 39). They might also adopt more extreme positions due to their distance from the direct consequences of conflicts (Adamson, 2013, p. 65; Collier, 2006). On the other hand, diasporas can promote human rights and facilitate the exchange of ideas, promoting principles that may not be as prevalent in the homelands (Kapur, 2001, 2004). However, under certain circumstances, such as human rights violations in the homelands or unmet expectations of elites, diasporas may radicalize their influence (Koinova, 2011, p. 334). Diasporans can also integrate or transport host country values, such as human rights, democratic and liberal principles, and freedom of expression in the host country plays a crucial role in bringing human rights violations in the homeland to attention (Adamson, 2013, p. 66; Brinkerhoff, 2011, p. 125; Chalk, 2008, p. 298; IOM GMDAC, 2020; Shain & Barth, 2003, p. 459; Kapur, 2004; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001, p. 271).

Political obligation. Additionally, diaspora- homeland relations are impacted by the diaspora's sense of political obligation (Baron, 2014, 2019). An illustration combining involvement in the homeland with development actions is mentioned by a Nigerian diasporan in Washington DC: “D-day [diaspora day] is done mostly in Abuja: members of the diaspora go back [home] to engage with the federal government and local entities, to see where the need is, what projects can be accomplished within a specific time period, or what is going on. People self-sponsor to attend those as well” (I11).

Homeland-host country relations. Diasporas shape and influence the dynamics of relations between their homeland and host countries (Shain & Barth, 2003, p. 461). Diasporas also serve as a bridge between actors in the homeland and the host country, exemplified by connections between actors in the US and Ethiopia (Lyons, 2007). Baser

and Swain (2010, p. 40) describe the diaspora's engagement in homeland politics, stating: "try to become involved in homeland politics, try to affect decision making in both home and host countries. They try to make things better in their terms for a country to which they may never return". This statement underscores the diaspora's political involvement, whose economic consequences are analyzed by Kapur (2014). Supporting Huntington's (1997, p. 39) observation that "diasporas supply expertise, military recruits, and on occasion political leadership to the homeland", the quote also emphasizes the diaspora's potential impact on host country policies based on homeland policies. This is illustrated by the influence of second-generation Turkish diasporans in Sweden (Baser & Swain, 2010).

Diasporas may also utilize elections and voting as leverage with US policymakers in the host country (Demmers, 2007, p. 21). This approach not only advances the interests of the United States, channeled through the diaspora, but also allows the diaspora to sway US policies in a direction favorable to their own interests (Demmers, 2007, p. 21). Notable examples of this approach include the Israeli and Armenian diasporas in the United States (Demmers, 2007, p. 21).

Studies indicate that diasporas, particularly in liberal democracies, are skilled at leveraging the host country's political systems to lobby for causes that align with their interests. Examples include the Sikh and Armenian-American diasporas influencing US Congress members (Fair, 2005, p. 147; Prasad & Savatic, 2021, p. 2). Furthermore, the Kurdish diaspora has effectively utilized the media freedoms and resources available such as support for special language programs for children or labour costs in European cities to broadcast their messages (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007, p. 510).

It is important to note that diaspora engagement is influenced by various factors, including statelessness, continuous oppression, homeland crises (Baser & Toivanen, 2019, p. 346), generational differences (Baser, 2015), and can fluctuate over time. This can also be related to developments in the homeland, as exemplified by the Aceh diaspora and Indonesia (Missbach, 2013). I delve deeper into the formation, mobilization, and aims in chapter 3. In summary, as Baser and Swain (2010, p. 38) state "what we have at hand is many different diaspora groups in many different host countries that are trying to influence policy making in both home and host countries".

2.2.2 Homeland-diaspora relations

Having reviewed the diaspora's role as development actors and homeland influencers, I briefly discuss the homeland-diaspora relations and how the homeland may utilize the diaspora for its own interest. Diasporas can exert influence on their homeland's foreign policy in various ways. For instance, they can manipulate international images, as demonstrated by the Armenian victim diaspora (Shain & Barth, 2003, p. 473), or leverage lobbying opportunities in their host states (Bercovitch, 2007, p. 21; Shain & Barth, 2003, p. 450). Conversely, the state may proactively reach out to the diaspora to foster engagement. The nature of this proactive outreach and the roles diasporas play vary considerably (Adamson, 2020, p. 152; Adamson, 2016, p. 294; Adamson & Demetriou, 2007; Baser & Swain, 2009; Mirilovic, 2016; Patterson, 2006; Ragazzi, 2014; Tsourapas, 2016).¹⁶

Diaspora institutions and voting rights. Countries employ various strategies to engage their diasporas, including establishing dedicated diaspora institutions like ministries or departments, offering dual citizenship, and reacting to diaspora actions (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007, pp. 501, 507–508; Kenny, 2013, p. 107; Shain & Barth, 2003, p. 461; Gamlen et al., 2019). Some policies extend voting rights to the diaspora (Kenny, 2013, p. 107; Gamlen, 2019a, p. 47), which can impact transnational political engagement (Chaudhary, 2018). An example is the Croatian diaspora in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who have voting rights (Kasapović, 2012). However, the case of Kenyan diasporans exemplifies a notable gap between legal provisions and practical implementation. Despite the adoption of the constitution 2010, allowing diasporans voting in presidential elections, its actual execution was constrained, partly due to a lack of political will, and the uncertainty of diaspora's political preferences (Wellman & Whitaker, 2021).

Homeland rhetoric about diasporas. A homeland government may also shift its rhetoric regarding diasporans (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007, p. 507; Basch et al., 1994). For example, the Cypriot government, transitioned from giving minimal attention to diasporans to the “status of VIPs for diaspora leaders” and diasporans are

¹⁶For a comprehensive review of diaspora-state relations, see for example, *Special Issue: The Microfoundations of Diaspora Politics* (Délano Alonso & Mylonas, 2019).

labeled “honorable and distinguished citizens” (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007, p. 507). Similarly, the Comoran diaspora in countries, including former colonial powers, are referred to as a “source of neighbourly welfare” (G. Roberts, 2021, p. 428). These changes in approach can be motivated by various factors, including the economic potential of remittances (Gerber, 2006, p. 241) or political interests (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007, p. 501; Mylonas & Žilović, 2019; Portes, 1999). Portes (1999, p. 467) captures this phenomenon, noting that “it is clear that sending governments do not want their immigrants to return, but rather to achieve a secure status in the wealthy nations to which they have moved and from which they can make sustained economic and political contributions in the name of patriotism and home town loyalties”.

Homeland interests. A diaspora can be utilized for political mobilization (Kenny, 2013, p. 109), political lobbying within the host country (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007, pp. 507–508; DeWind & Segura, 2014; Heindl, 2013; Baser & Swain, 2010; Kopchick et al., 2021), or in the formation of national identity abroad (Mügge, 2013); “diaspora[s] can therefore serve to strengthen rather than undermine nation states” (Kenny, 2013, p. 107). An instance of this is seen in embassy and consular services’ linkage to diaspora extra-territorial taxation, as demonstrated by the withholding of consular services by the Eritrean embassy in Canada if payments were not done (Gamlen, 2019a, p. 98). Koinova (2011, p. 355) mentions that “diasporas are identity-based actors like kin-states” and Adamson (2013, p. 71) adds that “diaspora organizations can operate in a manner similar to ethnically defined political parties (sometimes they are directly affiliated with home-state political parties)”.

Transnational repression and surveillance. States may employ diaspora policies as tools for transnational repression (Moss, 2016) or surveillance abroad (Adamson, 2020, p. 153). This is particularly prevalent in authoritarian regimes, especially when diasporas reside in host states that offer more fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression or the right to protest (Adamson, 2020, p. 153; Ketzmerick, 2023, p. 256). Additionally, governments might engage in “proxy punishment” of diasporans by targeting their relatives or co-ethnics (Moss et al., 2022). Authoritarian or quasi-authoritarian states may also freeze financial support for members of the diaspora abroad or monitor diasporans through consular services (Adamson, 2020, p. 154).

Furthermore, diasporas can also serve as a valuable source of information; for instance, Huntington (1997, p. 39) concludes that diasporans in the US “can be a source of spies used to gather information for their homeland governments”.

Diaspora and host country. While the diaspora may utilize the host country for lobbying or other activities¹⁷, the host state can also leverage the diaspora to advance its own interests (Demmers, 2007; Lyons, 2007; Marinova, 2017). For example, Marinova (2017, p. 261) characterizes this relationship as “a two-way process, and one in which both sides further their goals”. According to Marinova (2017) the host state can employ the diaspora in pursuit of its own foreign policy on the international and local level. These interests may encompass diplomatic relations, security concerns, economic negotiations, or shaping public opinion in the diaspora’s country of origin or on the international level (Marinova, 2017, p. 56). In summary, the diaspora’s engagement as development actor and homeland influencer impacts both the homeland and host country. Nevertheless, both the homeland and host countries can also utilize the diaspora’s influence for their own respective objectives.

2.2.3 Diaspora as peacemaker or peace wrecker

While the literature shows that diasporas influence homeland conflicts (Bercovitch, 2007; Orjuela, 2008; Shain & Barth, 2003), peace processes (Lyons, 2007; Petrova, 2019; H. Smith & Stares, 2007), peace building (Baser & Swain, 2008; Horst et al., 2010) and post-conflict reconstruction (Orjuela, 2008, p. 439), more systematic research is needed to understand diaspora’s involvement in conflict dynamics (Adamson, 2013, p. 65). It is crucial to recognize that specific conditions play an important role, as argued by Orjuela (2008, p. 439), who suggests that diaspora support contributes to peace “if it can provide alternatives to the dependency on a war economy, address grievances that are at the roots of the armed conflict or provide incentives for cooperation across enemy lines”. In this section, I review two perspectives within the literature: how diasporas positively impact peace-making, and the diasporas’ negative impact, thus leading to peace-wrecking.

Peacemakers. The body of literature focusing on the diaspora’s roles of promo-

¹⁷I examine external diaspora support, including diaspora lobbying in chapter 4.

tion and contribution to peace underscores their involvement in peace processes and mediation, for example, in Afghanistan and Somalia (Baser & Swain, 2008; Brinkerhoff, 2011; Lyons, 2007). A motive underlying the diaspora's behavior can be selfish interest to return to a peaceful homeland (Petrova, 2019, pp. 2162–2163). Diasporans may also take over positions in the administration after peace processes and participate in post-conflict reconstruction efforts, as demonstrated by the Liberian diaspora (Hear & Cohen, 2017, p. 8).

While some diasporas support conflict resolution and conflict de-escalation (Huntington, 2002; Petrova, 2019; A. Roth, 2015), others advocate for political solutions among conflict parties, facilitating negotiations (Fair, 2005), or engaging in transnational justice and truth commissions (Baser & Toivanen, 2019; Young & Park, 2009). For instance, the Armenian diaspora provides an illustration of involvement in conflict resolution and peace processes (Geukjian, 2014, p. 563), while the Sudanese diaspora used informal and formal channels to discuss the peace process and promote peace-building through radio stations (A. Roth, 2015, p. 298). A diaspora can also influence the rebel organizations to switch to non-violent tactics (Petrova, 2019), and condemn violence by all conflict parties, advocating for dialogue across ethnic groups as cases of the Sinhalese and Tamil diasporas show (Orjuela, 2008, p. 437).

Peace wreckers. A stream of scholarship characterizes the diaspora's role as a "peace-wrecker" (H. Smith & Stares, 2007). This literature delves into the diaspora's, and often their related transborder ethnic kin's, influence on the onset of conflicts (e.g. Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013; Cederman, Gleditsch, Salehyan, & Wucherpfennig, 2013), or their involvement in conflicts around identity and culture (Bercovitch, 2007, p. 24). Furthermore, diasporas can influence the intensity of conflict (Mariani et al., 2018, p. 788).¹⁸ Additionally, Collier and Hoeffler's (Collier and Hoeffler, p. 588) research finds that "diasporas substantially increase the risk of conflict renewal". However, the result received major critique for its methodological approach, particularly in the failure to differentiate between ethnicity, minority groups, and diasporas (e.g. Hear & Cohen, 2017).

¹⁸It is important to note that Mariani et al. (2018) examine diaspora and find their influence on conflict intensity, but the study offers a limited definition focusing solely on migrants, which does not represent the concept of a diaspora concept.

Beyond the positive or negative roles of diasporas in conflict settings, the aspect of importing a conflict by a diasporas needs to be examined. For example, Shain and Barth (2003, p. 450) notes that diasporas “can even broaden the conflict by importing it to hostlands or by dealing in international crime and terrorism”. Furthermore, Baser and Swain (2010, p. 41) demonstrate that diasporas “tend to create a softer version of the conflict dynamics back home in the hostland” through activities like protests or other forms of public engagement and lobbying.

View on homeland conflict. The diaspora’s distance from the conflict place can also influence their views towards homeland conflicts (Baser & Swain, 2008; Brinkerhoff, 2011). While the diaspora can contribute to conflict resolution from a safe host country (Orjuela, 2008, pp. 438–439), they can also idealize the homeland (Abebe, 2019; Lyons, 2007) and foster goals divergent from those of the homeland population. An example is the Jewish diaspora in the United States with regards to the Clinton peace plan (Shain, 2002, p. 126; Shain, 2007, p. 107).

Conflict termination. Diasporas can influence each stage of a conflict, whether through military or financial support, or by promoting dialogue (Bercovitch, 2007). Their most visible role, however, is the engagement in conflict termination (Bercovitch, 2007). Consequently, there is a pressing need for further research to understand how diasporas integrate into conflict resolution (Baser & Toivanen, 2019, p. 350) and post-conflict reconstruction.

Peacemakers or peace wreckers. Diasporas can act as peacemakers or peace-wreckers (H. Smith & Stares, 2007), with various conditional factors influencing their roles. Examples include institutional settings that limit self-serving diaspora activities in post-conflict reconstruction (Koinova, 2013, p. 436), costs of mobilization and involvement in the host country (Brinkerhoff, 2011; Esman, 1986, p. 119), and diaspora’s access to resources (Brinkerhoff, 2011, p. 71; Adamson, 2013). Furthermore, disruptions in peace processes or new outbreaks of violence can drive the actions of a diaspora that exacerbate violence and ongoing conflict as the Tamil diaspora showcases for the civil war in Sri Lanka in 2002 (Orjuela, 2008, p. 437). Rebel groups can also influence diasporas, for example, by redirecting causes of charity funds to acquire weapons for insurgents (Brinkerhoff, 2011; Vertovec, 2005, p. 127). This is further discussed in the

next section.

Future research should consider the diaspora's level of influence (Bercovitch, 2007, p. 21), perspectives and temporal factors (Orjuela, 2008, p. 439), host state conditions, for example, a pluralistic or democratic system (Koinova, 2013, p. 450), available resources, and circumstances. This includes analyzing variations in diaspora's motives (Shain & Barth, 2003, p. 436; Bird, 2022), formation and mobilization strategies, and differences within a diaspora. For instance, a segment of the diaspora might develop more partisan views or extreme views regarding the homeland and geopolitics (Baron, 2014; Shain, 2007), while others contribute to conflict resolution (Baser & Swain, 2008) and advocate for non-violent behavior beyond ethnic ties (Orjuela, 2008).

Summary of gaps

To summarize this section, diasporas frequently serve as development actors through economic and social remittances, act as homeland influencers by sharing values of democracy or influencing the host country's foreign policy towards the homeland. Furthermore, homelands may leverage diasporas for their own interest, establishing diaspora institutions, extending voting rights or implementing surveillance and measures of transnational repression. While diaspora's role as a peacemaker or peace-wrecker is studied, particularly in terms of their engagement in peace processes or conflict onset, and import of conflict issues to the host country, their role during conflict remains largely neglected. Specifically, diaspora's role as sponsors of conflict parties is not explored in-depth in this literature. To conclude, systematic analyses of diaspora-rebel group dynamics as well as theoretical explanations of diaspora-civilian relationships concerning civilian victimization is underexplored.

2.3 External diaspora sponsorship in civil wars

Building upon the insights from the preceding sections on civil wars and the behavior of rebel organizations, which includes topics such as civilian victimization and the establishment of rebel governance, this section's emphasis is on the limited knowledge about diaspora sponsorship in civil wars. I elaborate on the existing studies addressing

diaspora sponsorship and conclude by outlining how this dissertation contributes to narrowing the identified gaps.

Diaspora sponsorship. Up to now, only a select number of studies have focused on external diaspora support, each with its own set of limitations. Radtke (2009) explains how armed groups can mobilize the diaspora in civil wars, specifically in Sri Lanka and Eritrea. Lidow (2016) offers a case study on Liberia, employing a principal-agent model to examine resource availability, civilian abuse, and group fragmentation. He demonstrates that the diaspora, as a specific type of sponsor, can influence rebel groups' rewards, thereby potentially reducing the relevance of violence against civilians (Lidow, 2016). While D. E. Cunningham et al. (2009, p. 592) theoretically acknowledge diaspora support for rebels, this aspect is not examined. In contrast, Petrova (2019) conducts a large-N analysis comparing diaspora and state support on rebel group behavior, illustrating that diaspora support, as opposed to state support, can influence changes in rebel tactics. However, this analysis mainly focuses on violent or non-violent campaign outcomes (NAVCO 2.0, Chenoweth & Shay, 2019a) and the potential for militant groups' participation in elections (MGEP, Matanock, 2016). Consequently, the study offers a restricted view of diaspora support, considering diaspora support as material support for campaigns (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019b). Additionally, diaspora influence on rebel tactics is highlighted in the case of the Irish-American diaspora organization Noraid and its impact on the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), particularly when there is intra-organizational competition among leaders' choice of tactics (Berger Hobson & Matesan, 2023).

The size of the diaspora is a potential source of foreign fighters and in the transition from peace-wrecking to peace-building activities (Mariani et al., 2018). However, Mariani et al. (2018) claim to examine the diaspora's impact on war, they operationalize diasporans with migrants and use these concepts interchangeably, thus not precisely examining diasporas' influence on conflict. In summary, despite recognizing diasporas' involvement in conflicts (Baser & Swain, 2008, 2010; Brinkerhoff, 2011), the focus of diaspora mobilization for secessionist groups (Koinova, 2011) and the diaspora's origin related to conflict and discourse around securization (Féron & Lefort, 2019), the systematic analysis of diaspora sponsorship is still lacking.

Diaspora support, integration, and prolonging of insurgency. The research most closely aligned with the focus of this dissertation is conducted by Bird (2022), who investigates diaspora support to armed groups in relation to the diaspora's degree of integration within the host country, emphasizing motivations and capacity to mobilize. Utilizing a unique dataset, Bird (2022) concludes that diaspora support is most likely for moderately integrated diaspora groups. However, while the dataset focuses on diaspora support, its coding of diaspora also encompasses broadly defined transnational support, and the migration data is restricted to OECD countries. Similarly, Byman et al. (2001) analyze external support for rebels, including diaspora support. This study shows how diaspora support, driven by guilt and sympathy, can extend insurgencies, exemplified by the Tamil diaspora's support for the LTTE in the Sri Lankan civil war (Byman et al., 2001, 41ff). The study identifies key forms of diaspora support, such as funding, arms transfers, or networks, as crucial factors in the duration and prolonging of insurgencies (Byman et al., 2001; Lidow, 2016). Although the report differentiates between diaspora and refugee support for armed groups, it focuses on the most prominent cases like the Tamil diaspora and adopts a narrow understanding of diasporas. Nonetheless, it provides a comprehensive overview of diaspora support from 1991 to 2000 (Byman et al., 2001, Appendix A) and serves as a foundation for further research. Despite its conceptual, analytical and methodological shortcomings, it offers a valuable baseline for this dissertation on diaspora support in civil wars.

Diaspora-rebel group relations. Analyses that do address diaspora sponsorship of rebel groups tend to focus either on the diaspora's degree of integration in the host country, affecting motivation and capacity to mobilize (Bird, 2022), the duration of conflicts (A. Roth, 2015; Wayland, 2004), the survival of (terrorist) organizations (Piazza, 2018), or the impact on rebel group's likelihood to switch to nonviolent actions, contrasting with state support (Petrova, 2019, p. 2171). Additionally, diaspora-rebel relations are examined in the context of diasporas' lobbying as part of rebel diplomacy (Huang, 2016a) and the rebel groups' commitment to international law through diaspora's transmission of the related knowledge and value (Jo et al., 2021).

Diaspora support and violence against civilians. Scholarship on diaspora sponsorship for rebel organizations and its consequent impact on civilian victimiza-

tion remains limited. Asal and Ayres (2018) find that violence against civilians by ethno-political organizations can increase diaspora support, attributed to heightened visibility and a more hawkish diaspora perspective. In contrast, Lidow's (2016) case study on Liberia suggests a diminished relevance of civilian victimization. Piazza and LaFree (2019) show that observed Islamist organizations with a diaspora tend to restrain violence, unlike their non-Islamist counterparts. However, this segment of the literature is constrained by specific geographical focuses, such as the Middle East (Asal & Ayres, 2018), or by its case studies, raising questions about the generalizability to other regions and types of rebel organizations, and segments of diasporas. A fundamental limitation in Piazza and LaFree's (2019) study is the operationalization of diaspora support as having kin abroad, which does not accurately reflect active diaspora support for a rebel organization. Systematic large-N analyses exploring external sponsorship exist (e.g. Meier et al., 2022; Salehyan et al., 2014), but they often fail to explicitly distinguish types of sponsors, such as a diaspora regarding its effect on civilian victimization. Furthermore, theoretical insights about diaspora's interest in kin support through delegation are lacking.

Summary of gaps

This literature review has demonstrated the large body of scholarship which analyzes external support in civil wars, with a particular emphasis on state support. Simultaneously, there exists extensive research exploring diaspora's roles as development actors, homeland influencers, peacemakers or peace wreckers exist. However, the focus on diasporas as sponsors of conflict parties remains limited. While there is an increasing focus on proxy relations and armed groups sponsorship for each other, non-state sponsorship, such as those of diasporas, is frequently overlooked.¹⁹

The existing limited research on diaspora support focuses on case study approaches to highlight specific examples, yet it falls short on providing insights into the generalizability of findings and the broader phenomenon of diaspora sponsorship. Specifically, reasons of diaspora support to rebel organizations are lacking theoretical argumentation and empirical evidence of global coverage. Moreover, the conditions under which

¹⁹For insights into how diaspora support compares with proxy war dynamics see Daub (2023, 209ff).

diaspora sponsorship occurs remains unclear. To address these gaps, this dissertation poses two research questions. Firstly, why do diaspora groups externally support rebel organizations? Secondly, under which conditions is diaspora support more likely or less likely?

Although efforts have been made to assess the impact of diaspora sponsorship to specific types of armed organizations, the geographical focus is mainly the Middle East. In contrast, broader coverage exist for the impact on civilians but only focuses on particular segments of diasporas, such as Islamist or religious diaspora groups, and operationalizes diaspora support with the presence of kin abroad. In addition, the distinction between ethnic violence and violence in general is not yet examined in the context of diaspora support. However, it could offer crucial insights into the patterns of ethnic-driven violence against civilians versus general violence against civilians.

Research linking diaspora sponsorship to the establishment of rebel governance does not exist, yet. Furthermore, existing studies mainly concentrate on the Middle East. However, this dissertation's empirical analysis focuses on Africa and Asia, thereby broadening the scope of rebel governance research. Consequently, questions around the impact of diaspora sponsorship on the civilian population in the conflict zone arise, particularly the influence on civilian victimization and rebel governance. The third research question tackles these gaps of knowledge by answering the question: How does diaspora sponsorship of rebel organizations impact civilian victimization or rebel governance?

Chapter 3

What makes a diaspora?

In this dissertation, I define the diaspora as a unique actor characterized by several key features, including (1) migration, (2) collective memory, (3) connection, (4) group consciousness, and (5) kinship (IOM GMDAC, 2018). The term *diasporas* refers to multiple groups of a diaspora such as Tamil, Sinhalese and Eritreans whereas the term *diaspora* indicates a single group, for example the Tamil diaspora. The subsequent sections provide a review and explanation of how diasporas emerge, the different types of diasporas, the connection between ethnicity and diaspora and the differentiation from the concept of nationalism. Then I examine the primary objectives that diasporas typically pursue, encompassing aspects such as kin support, homeland re-connection, identity preservation, and seeking change in the homeland. Furthermore, I discuss mobilization of a diaspora, its various strategies, influential factors and targets. The chapter concludes by outlining the collective and inter-generational preferences of a diaspora and discussing diaspora's collective action.

The concept of a diaspora remains a subject of ongoing debate within existing literature, with no conclusive and universally accepted definition to date (Butler, 2001; R. Cohen, 1996, 2008; Dufoix, 2008; Gamlen et al., 2019; Grossman, 2019; Hall, 1990; IOM GMDAC, 2020; Kenny, 2013; Koinova, 2019; Nieswand, 2018; Sheffer, 2003; Skribis, 2007; Vertovec, 2005).¹ Van Hear (2019, p. 133) characterizes members of the diaspora as “neoliberal subjects’ like everyone else”, while Tsuda (2019, p. 189) remarks that the definition of diaspora is part of an “ongoing debate”. Scholars like Adamson and Demetriou (2007, p. 498) and Tsuda (2019, p. 189) note that the meaning of the diaspora concept has evolved over time. The term diaspora was initially used in reference to the displaced Jewish people in the sixth century BC (R. Cohen, 2008, p. 20; Nieswand, 2018), often bearing a negative connotation (Eliassi, 2019, p. 120).

Common features of a diaspora: Despite the varied interpretations and definitions of diaspora in academic discourse, certain common characteristics can be identified. A diaspora refers to a group of individuals residing outside their country of origin, in minimum one host country, and often maintain transnational ties to their homeland²

¹Exemplary concepts are a metaphorical understanding (Hall, 1990), conceptual tool (Weber in Dufoix, 2008, p. 33), “historic component”, “distinct spatiality” (Knott, 2010, p. 81), “processes” (Féron & Voytiv, 2021, p. 221), or “an umbrella term for extra-territorial groups that, through processes of interacting with their origin state, are in various states of formation” (Gamlen, 2019b, p. 303).

²See for example, Bercovitch (2007, p. 19), Brinkerhoff (2011, p. 116), Levitt (2010, p. 42), A. Roth (9-10 2015, p. 290), Shain and Barth (2003), Sheffer (2003), Sironi et al. (2019, p. 49), Skribis

and have “connections to co-ethnics, [...] around the world” (Levitt, 2010, p. 42). The reasons behind the formation of diasporas, such as whether migration is forced or voluntary, or factors like the creation of new states or changes in international borders, do not alter the fundamental definition of a diaspora. The presented definition draws upon existing scholarship on diaspora and emphasizes the shared features of diaspora identities. Broadly, a “diaspora is a **transnational community** whose members (or their ancestors) **emigrated or were dispersed** from their **original homeland** but remain **oriented** to it and preserve a **group identity**” (Grossman, 2019, p. 1267).

Homeland. The concept of a homeland is crucial to the understanding of a diaspora and refers to the place of origin of a diaspora. This homeland does not need to exist within the borders of a nation state, and multiple diasporas can have the same homeland, as seen in the case of Turks and Kurds (Grossman, 2019, p. 1272). Additionally, the homeland can be an imagined or symbolic homeland (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007; Baser & Swain, 2010, p. 40; Brinkerhoff, 2011; Shain & Barth, 2003; Sökefeld, 2006, p. 267), which can be idealized (Abebe, 2019). For example, the Sikh homeland, Khalistan, is an imagined homeland that is not recognized in practice (Sökefeld, 2006, p. 273; Axel, 2001). Brah (1996, p. 192) argues that home can be a “mythic place of desire in the diasporic imagination” that may not physically exist, but in reality “is also the lived experience of a locality”. Furthermore, Um (2019, p. 333) emphasizes that the link to the homeland is “not static but reflective of political, generational and other shifts that impact memory works”. This perspective highlights the relevance of framing, for instance, a home or imagined community which in turn influences the formation of a diaspora (Sökefeld, 2006, p. 270). Toft (2002, p. 87) asserts that “‘homeland’ is therefore a special category of territory: it is not an object that can be exchanged, but an indivisible attribute of group identity.” The collective memory of a homeland, therefore, is a core feature in conceptualizing a diaspora. An interview with a second-generation Filipino diasporan illustrates this connection to the homeland, even without having physically been in the homeland: I was “fortunate enough to emerge myself in my culture and through [diaspora organization] help people in the Philippines who I feel connected to despite never having been there myself” (I14).

(2007), Stock (2010, p. 24), and Van Hear (542 2010, p. 37).

In this dissertation, I adopt the conceptualization of a diaspora as defined by the International Organization’s Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC). The key aspects that define a diaspora include (1) migration, (2) collective memory, (3) connection, (4) group consciousness, (5) kinship (IOM GMDAC, 2018). This conceptualization underscores the uniqueness of a diaspora, distinguishing it from other actors such as migrants or refugees (e.g. Baser & Swain, 2010; Sökefeld, 2006). Adamson (2013, p. 63) emphasizes the uniqueness of the diaspora, noting its external and internal elements. Similarly, Shain and Barth (2003, p. 451) capture this distinct quality by describing the diaspora as “geographically outside the state, but identity-wise perceived (by themselves, the homeland, or others) as ‘inside the people’.” An example of a diaspora is the Russian-speaking diaspora in the former post-Soviet states (Kosmarskaya, 2011). To exemplify the external and internal elements that define a diaspora, a quote from an interview I conducted with a second-generation Ugandan-American diasporan is particularly illustrative: “It means being away from home, for an extended period, but also having strong roots to your community back home, I would say we are also very proud of who we are, and also acknowledge we benefited from being in this country, definitely felt both parts of our identity, American or Ugandan or wherever you are in the diaspora, some are in England, some are in Australia” (I9).

It is important to recognize that there can be significant variation both between different diasporas and within a single diaspora regarding their perceptions of identity, whether from an internal perspective or as labeled by externals (Brah, 1996; Sökefeld, 2006, pp. 267–268). “Yet the dispute about the precise formulation of an identity affirms the idea that there is a common identity, however it is to be understood” (Sökefeld, 2006, p. 267). This common identity is a defining feature of a diaspora (IOM GMDAC, 2018; Sökefeld, 2006, p. 267). Collective memory also plays into the diasporic identity, for example, through collective remittances (Lacroix, 2019, p. 177).

Different types of diasporas. While it is possible to identify common characteristics and aspects of diasporas, it is essential to recognize the existence of different types of diasporas. A diaspora is not a homogeneous class of actors according to scholars such as Scully (2019, p. 97), Barabantseva and Sutherland (2011, p. 3), and Houston (2005, p. 407) or H. Smith and Stares (2007, p. 5), Marinova (2017, p. 21), and Baser and

Swain (2010, p. 40). Conversely, scholars like Brah (1996), Müller-Funk (2019, p. 253), H. Smith and Stares (2007, p. 331), and Um (2019) advocate for a nuanced understanding of diasporas, taking into account factors like class, ethnicity, gender, sex, or race. Moreover, diasporas can embody multiple identities (Dickinson, 2019; Soysal, 2000), which may be fluid (Schiller et al., 1992), and vary in composition and preferences (Anthias, 1998; Moss, 2020, p. 1688; Van Hear & Cohen, 2017, p. 19). Furthermore, there are distinguishable differences within and between diasporas. Factors contributing to these distinctions include, among others, individual characteristics, time and distance, religion and ethnicity, migration-related subcategories, organizational structure as well as variation in the level of mobilization. However, circumstances such as marginalization may hide these differences within a diaspora (Wayland, 2004, p. 411).

An illustrative example of the diversity among diasporas is R. Cohen's (2008) typology of diaspora, which categorizes diasporas based on their reasons for migration. This typology includes pursuit of work or imperial working exemplified by the Indians in Britain or in Fiji and the Caribbean (labour and imperial diaspora), traumatic experience for the Jewish or Armenians (victim diaspora), trade and business related diaspora showcased by the Chinese and Lebanese, or the Caribbean diaspora labeled as deterritorialized diaspora (R. Cohen, 2008).

The Tamil diaspora serves as an example of a refugee-related diaspora, while the Sikh diaspora primarily consists of labour migrants (Fair, 2005). Within each diaspora, there exist different segments with distinct interests, aims, and origins (Marinova, 2017, p. 21; Baser, 2014, p. 364; Sökefeld, 2006, p. 278). However, diasporas are often defined by more than one factor (H. Smith & Stares, 2007, p. 5). An example highlighting a diaspora organization, serving as an umbrella organization for diasporans is the statement by a Nigerian organization's president noting that "wherever Nigerians are, stay together across religious affiliations, ethnic or professional" differences.

Variations in time and distance are distinction criteria for types of diasporas. The terms "near diaspora" and "wider diaspora", for instance, refer to the geographical proximity of a diaspora to its homeland (Van Hear, 2019, p. 130). In terms of temporal aspects, scholars argue that newer diasporas tend to maintain deeper ties to the homeland and co-ethnics around the globe compared to older diasporas, which may have

assimilated more over time (Tsuda, 2019, p. 192). Conversely, while second or third generation diasporans may exhibit weaker ties to the homeland than first generation diasporans, these ties can be activated as illustrated by second generation Turks in Sweden (Baser, 2014).

Additional criteria for categorizing diasporas include state or stateless, ethnic or religious diasporas. Koinova (2019, p. 312) offers the most detailed distinction, differentiating between state-related diasporas, those related to de facto states like Kosovo or Palestine, and stateless diaspora such as the Kurdish diaspora. With regards to religion and diaspora, Liberatore and Fesenmyer (2019, p. 238) illustrate the dynamic nature. Religious practices can either reinforce ties with the homeland or foster connections to new spiritual homelands, as seen in the case of Somalis in Britain relating to the Middle East (Liberatore & Fesenmyer, 2019, p. 238). Such connections support a universal diaspora that transcends physical place and time, representing an imagined community (Liberatore & Fesenmyer, 2019, p. 238). On the other hand, religion can also unify co-religionists, as observed in the Palestinian diaspora (H. Smith & Stares, 2007, p. 5). This illustrates a diaspora that encompasses different religious communities. Conversely, religion and its practices can generate divisions within diasporas. Pentecostal Kenyans, as a specific religious segment, who break with their family given religious differences exemplifies a fractional diaspora (Liberatore & Fesenmyer, 2019, p. 238).

In summary, five criteria of a diaspora - (1) migration, (2) collective memory, (3) connection, (4) group consciousness, (5) kinship - are applicable across different types of diasporas. However, diasporas can be further differentiated based on various factors, such as the number of countries in which a diaspora settles, the predominant reason for initial migration, whether they are stateless, or have a real or imagined homeland. These distinctions help to understand the nuanced and multifaceted nature of diasporas across the globe.

3.1 Features of diaspora identity

Prior to studying the main characteristics of a diaspora, I briefly focus on the factors contributing to the formation of a diaspora. The emergence of a diaspora is influenced by a multitude of factors, which can be interconnected or mutually reinforcing. Table 3.1 summarizes the main factors driving the formation of a diaspora. A common feature of a diaspora is dislocation, often linked to migration (Brubaker, 2005; Eliassi, 2019, p. 120; Kenny, 2013, pp. 40–41; Sökefeld, 2006; Grossman, 2019). Dislocation refers to the phenomenon of individuals living outside their homeland, whether this relocation is forced or voluntary. A diasporan, therefore, is a dislocated person. In addition to various reasons of migration, other reasons behind dislocation can include ethnic cleansing or previous colonial ties.

Additionally, time and context are critical in understanding diaspora formation (e.g. Brubaker, 2005, p. 7; Sökefeld, 2006, p. 276). Mobilization is required at all stages, not only during the formation process but also subsequently (Sökefeld, 2006, p. 276). Importantly, time span of diaspora formation can vary (Sökefeld, 2006, p. 275; Brubaker, 2005). The formation of diaspora may occur simultaneously with dispersal or may follow after a time lag (Sökefeld, 2006, p. 275). Technological progress has facilitated communication, significantly influencing the time lag; “without communication facilities the chance of a dispersed collection of people developing a shared imagination of community is rather small” (Sökefeld, 2006, p. 275). The portrayal of violent events or human rights violations in the media can confront and shape conflict-generated diaspora’s identity (Koinova, 2011, p. 352).

Additional factors influencing the formation of a diaspora include group identity, kinship and ties, as well as transformative events, experience of violence, conflict or discrimination (Baser, 2014; R. Cohen, 2008; Demmers, 2007; Faist, 2000; Houston, 2005; Koinova, 2019; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001; Redclift, 2017; Sökefeld, 2006). The role of external actors and patronage can also be significant in shaping a diaspora. For example, financial support by states can enhance the formation of a diaspora (Lacroix, 2019, p. 179; Oonk, 2019, p. 285). Additionally, central figures, such as Jorge Mas Canosa in the Cuban American diaspora, and entrepreneurs can facilitate group formation (Prasad & Savatic, 2021).

Main factors
Dislocation, implying migration
Group identity
Kinship
Ties to the homeland
Transformative events
Democratic politics outside homeland
Experience of violence, conflict or discrimination
Patronage

Table 3.1: Main factors driving formation of a diaspora

The process of mobilization itself can influence the formation of a diaspora (Adamson, 2012; Müller-Funk, 2019). Political exclusion or discrimination within the host country can also be a contributing factor (Faist, 2000; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001, p. 263). Furthermore, grievances and traumatic experiences strengthen a common identity, which is crucial for the formation of a diaspora (Kopchick et al., 2021; Redclift, 2017). Experiences with democracy or democratic politics outside the homeland can also drive the formation of a diaspora. For example, the Alevi diaspora was primarily formed by Alevi diasporans who “had been involved in other political contexts before” (Sökefeld, 2006, p. 287). The following subsections of this dissertation delve deeper into these diverse factors which can drive the formation of a diaspora.

3.1.1 Migration

While dislocation implies migration, it is important to recognize that a variety of reasons can lead to migration in the first place. In this context, I briefly review push and pull factors³ that influence individual or household decisions to migrate and have been extensively discussed in the literature (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007, p. 498; Van Hear, 2019; Fafchamps & Shilpi, 2013; W. Petersen, 1958, p. 258). Indeed, social and economic constraints play an important role in determining both the feasibility and the destinations of migration (Van Hear, 2019, pp. 129–130; Hollifield, 2006, p. 138). While migration contributes to the creation of diasporas, existing diasporas can also shape future migration patterns (e.g. Van Hear, 2019, p. 129).

³Push and pull factors refer to two opposing factors leading to migration. While push factors are negative factors in the homeland, pull factors are positive factors in the country of destination making migration more attractive (cf. W. Petersen, 1958, p. 258; E. S. Lee, 1966, p. 56; Fafchamps & Shilpi, 2013).

Aligned with one stream of the literature, I apply a perspective that considers migration along a continuum, rather than being confined to a dichotomous typology (Erdal & Oeppen, 2018). The term mixed migration is increasingly used to overcome the dichotomy of forced and voluntary migration, recognizing the complex and intertwined drivers (IOM GMDAC, 2021). Furthermore, different reasons of migration lead to different groups of migrants: for example, labour migrants, elites, students, political activities, refugees and asylum seekers, or family-related migrants (Brah, 1996, p. 178; Van Hear, 2019, p. 131). The extent to which migration is voluntary or coerced varies among these migrant types (Van Hear, 2019, p. 132). For instance, the Middle Eastern diaspora is highly heterogeneous, encompassing different groups (Baser & Toivanen, 2019, p. 350), which often experience conflict and question political legitimacy of governments, both in their homelands and host countries (Baser & Toivanen, 2019, p. 350). Importantly, “people who leave the same place during the same period can do so for radically different reasons. Even during periods of catastrophe and political upheaval, not everyone who leaves is forced to do so” (Kenny, 2013, p. 16).

The primary factors influencing migration encompass a range of elements, including geographic proximity (Melander & Öberg, 2007; Rügger, 2018), previous migration flows and colonial ties (Rügger & Bohnet, 2018), social networks (Melander & Öberg, 2007; Rügger, 2018), ethnic ties (Fafchamps & Shilpi, 2013; Rügger & Bohnet, 2018; Kivisto & Faist, 2010, p. 62; Tsuda, 2009, p. 24), economic, ecological, and political factors (Rügger & Bohnet, 2018; Tsuda, 2009) as well as violence and persecution (Rügger & Bohnet, 2018, p. 78; Van Hear, 2019). “Critical events can be considered a necessary condition for the emergence of an imagination of community among transnationally dispersed people, but they are an insufficient condition” (Sökefeld, 2006, p. 275). This quote underscores the relation between critical events and the imagination of community. However, the impact of such events is contingent upon their representation and interpretation (Sökefeld, 2006, p. 275). For example, “the storming of the Golden Temple” for the Sikh diaspora (Sökefeld, 2006, p. 272), or “the focus of Alevis in Germany and other West European countries on political and legal conditions for Alevis in Turkey particularly contributed to imagining the Alevi community as a transnational community” (Sökefeld, 2006, p. 274). Furthermore, conflict can be a key

catalyst in the formation of a diaspora (Lacroix, 2019, p. 179). Koinova (2011, p. 352) explains that the experience of, or exposure through media to, violent events or human rights violations can shape the identity of conflict-generated diasporas. An illustration of this is the Kurdish identity, which is largely constituted “through narratives of violence, exile, and displacement” (Houston, 2005, p. 407).

Neighboring countries often emerge as the most attractive destinations for migrants due to their geographical proximity, which generally requires fewer resources for relocation compared to more distant countries. The proximity also makes the prospect of returning to the country of origin easier. Additionally, geographical obstacles like lakes or mountains significantly impact migration flows. Particularly, in conflict affected countries “some, typically the less endowed, are dispersed within their own countries as internally displaced people; some find their way to neighbouring countries; and still others, with the resources to do so, are able to move to countries further afield” (Van Hear, 2019, p. 131). Existing ties and prior migration flows are also pull factors (Rüegger & Bohnet, 2018). Previous colonial ties, social networks and ethnic ties influence migration flows. Migrants often rely on existing social networks, which facilitate the flow of information. When previous migrant flows exist, new migrants benefit from the existing network structures, easing integration through shared information and experiences (Melander & Öberg, 2007; Rüegger, 2018). Transborder ethnic kin is a key element in this context (Rüegger & Bohnet, 2018). For example, the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka shares transborder ethnic ties with India, making it a primary destination for Tamils during the Sri Lankan civil war (Kivisto & Faist, 2010, p. 62). Political conditions as well as discrimination or genocide can lead to a preference for a democratic state where rule of law and peace prevail, for example France (Rüegger & Bohnet, 2018, p. 767). Additionally, a higher standard of living and employment opportunities can foster voluntary migration to more developed countries (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007, p. 498).

The Rwandan migrant stock exemplifies the interplay of factors such as geographical distance, ethnic ties and prior migration flows. In 1990, the majority of Middle African migrants of Rwandan origin were found in neighboring countries, specifically Burundi and Tanzania (UN DESA, 2017). Rüegger and Bohnet (2018, p. 78) highlight that

politically powerful ethnic kin groups act as a pull factor for refugees. This path dependency is evident in the increased numbers of Rwandans in the country's four neighboring states in 1995 (UN DESA, 2017). A smaller number of Rwandan migrants were present in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which can be partly attributed to the Lake Kivu acting as a geographical barrier impeding migration flows (Rüegger & Bohnet, 2018, p. 67). Additionally, the presence of Rwandan migrants in France can be linked to state ties similar to colonial connections, especially considering France's support for the Hutu in Rwanda.

The experience of migration can significantly influence the common identity of a diaspora (Kopchick et al., 2021, p. 3). However, Kenny (2013, p. 39) mentions that "regardless of the form of migration, a sense of diaspora can emerge from the connections forged in the new communities". This suggests that while migration itself does not generate a diaspora, an active identification is essential to be classified as a diaspora.

Migrant. For example, "an *international migrant* is typically defined as *any person who changes his or her country of usual residence*" (UN DESA, 1998, p. 9). "Migrants do not necessarily form a diaspora but they may become a diaspora by developing a new imagination of community, even many years after the migration took place" (Sökefeld, 2006, p. 267). This perspective is further reinforced by Barabantseva and Sutherland (2011, p. 3), who highlight that "not all migrants belong to a diaspora, because they might not identify with their country of origin, or homeland". In contrast, migrants often assimilate and integrate into their host societies without the desire to foster ties with their homeland (Bercovitch, 2007, p. 19; Oonk, 2019, p. 285).

3.1.2 Group consciousness

Diasporas have a group identity and often share kinship with members of the diaspora worldwide (e.g. R. Cohen, 2008; IOM GMDAC, 2020). This group identity can be rooted in various elements such as a religious homeland, nation or country, ethnic kinship or a combination of these factors, leading to, for example, ethno-national diasporas (e.g. Sheffer, 2003). While grievances can contribute to the strengthening of a common identity, a diaspora "must work to actively maintain their identity, as opposed to fully

assimilating into their host state's dominant identity" (Kopchick et al., 2021, p. 3). An illustrative example of this group consciousness is the Armenian diaspora in Lebanon (Geukjian, 2014). Their identity is based on "collective symbolic foundations" such as "common language, shared historical memories, common ancestry, biological connections, a discernible degree of national solidarity and shared cultural and behavioural patterns" (Geukjian, 2014, p. 555). Therefore the Armenian diaspora exemplifies group consciousness which consists over time, including the genocide.

Members of the diaspora "tend to reproduce their culture, values, language and religion as much as possible" (Oonk, 2019, p. 285). Pride, especially in their collective history, plays a crucial role in sustaining this collective identity (Redclift, 2017, p. 511; Takenaka, 2009). An interviewee from the Filipino diaspora exemplifies this sentiment, expressing a "very strong pride about being Filipino and very strong sense of, I think, family identity. And community is really big and coming together on food is a huge [thing]" (I8).⁴ The essence of a diaspora lies in its consciousness of being a diaspora. As Sökefeld (2006, p. 267) articulates "there can be no diaspora community without a consciousness of diaspora, in other words without an idea of shared identity, of common belonging to that group. [...] A diaspora is distinct from other kinds of imagined communities because its imagination relates to a transnationally dispersed community". This perspective highlights that a diaspora's identity is not just about shared origins or cultural practices, but also about a collective recognition of belonging to a diaspora.

3.1.3 Connection to the homeland

A fundamental characteristic of a diaspora is its connection to the homeland. Events such as pilgrimage ensure connections among the diaspora, for instance the Sikh diaspora, and fosters a common identity as well as ties to the homeland (Fair, 2005, p. 133). While the connection to the homeland can manifest in various forms: it can be direct, indirect, sustained through family ties or institutionalized through rights such as voting possibilities, the homeland itself can also foster connections (Wellman & Whitaker, 2021). Examples of such connections include granting diasporans the

⁴Author interview with interviewee 8, 13th January 2023, on a virtual platform.

right to vote, ensuring support for homeland politics, and facilitating lobbying opportunities in host states (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007, p. 502; Kapur, 2014; Prasad & Savatic, 2021, pp. 13–14; Shain, 2007, p. 109; Spiro, 2006). States can also actively support the formation of a diaspora through, for instance, financial support (Lacroix, 2019, p. 179; Oonk, 2019, p. 285). Additionally, remittances sent by diasporans can strengthen homeland ties and may support the homeland financially (Kapur, 2014).

Members of a diaspora may travel back to the homeland to re-connect and maintain connections (Redclift, 2017, p. 511). This practice is particularly important for preserving heritage claims, which for second-generation members and beyond, are frequently “subject to challenge and contestation” and often require some form of “proof” (Scully, 2019, p. 97). These “proofs” of authentic diaspora heritage are symbolic or genealogical (Scully, 2019), including proof of descent, material objects (e.g. Turan, 2010), or cultural practices such as food (Kneafsey & Cox, 2002). As a result, the formation of a diaspora identity is not an automatic process, it involves agency by the individual or the group to testify (Scully, 2019, p. 101). To put it differently, “it is not self-evident that people in the diaspora wish to reconnect with their home countries. It needs promoting and nurturing” (Oonk, 2019, p. 289).

The proof of heritage is showcased by a second generation Filipino diasporan in the US: “I think there’s more pressure than for those who are not from the motherland. I think they also feel a lot of pressure within the community to prove their Filipinoness. And I think especially when we get to areas where they’re more Filipinos, there’s kind of a hierarchy like California is where a lot of Filipinos are. So there’s a degree of, are you born in the Philippines or you born in the US, is your whole family here, are they in the Philippines? Do you speak [local language X] or other languages? How involved are you? There is a level of proving your Filipinoness. So that’s something that a lot of are like that, because you work, that I work on the affiliate community has been trying to talk about validating a Filipino identity and making authentic spaces” (I8).

3.1.4 Kinship

Kinship is indeed a crucial aspect of a diaspora (e.g. IOM GMDAC, 2018). Kinship is visible through transnational ties. It can contribute to social capital (Hollifield, 2006,

p. 138). The strengthening of these ties has been greatly facilitated by technological progress and globalization (e.g. Oonk, 2019, p. 285). Examples such as media, the internet, and visits to the homeland are common ways through which diaspora communities maintain connections (Brah, 1996, p. 195; Kenny, 2013; Oonk, 2019, p. 285). However, Sökefeld (2006, p. 268) points out, that a transnational tie does not necessarily equate to “actual transnational social relationships”, and “the transnational quality of the community may be purely imaginary and symbolic”. Additionally, factors such as time and available resources can influence the duration and intensity of these ties (Redclift, 2017; Um, 2019, p. 333; Werbner, 2002).

The aspect of kinship is pivotal in understanding the ties with co-ethnics. Co-ethnics are civilians who share a common diasporic background and either (1) reside in the homeland or 2) inhabit other host countries while belonging to the same diaspora as the one under consideration. For example, the Tamil diaspora in the US has co-ethnics in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, this extends to Tamils living in countries other than the US, such as Canada. In this dissertation, my focus is mainly on co-ethnics residing in the country of origin of the respective diasporas.

While citizenship is often regarded as an identity criteria (Barabantseva & Sutherland, 2011, p. 6), Adamson and Demetriou (2007, p. 498) underscore the relevance of a global context that transcends national boundaries, thereby, emphasizing the transnational dimension. Additionally, factors contributing to shared ties between the diaspora and kin in the homeland also play a role in shaping the diaspora’s ethnic identity (Shain, 2007, p. 118). Consequently, the ensuing section will review the concept of ethnicity and explore interconnections with the conceptualization of diasporas.

3.2 Ethnicity and diasporas

I argue that the concept of diaspora extends beyond the notion of a “deterritorialised ethnicity” (Anthias, 1998, p. 569). While ethnicity and ethnic ties constitute a key element of a diaspora, it is imperative to recognize that additional features are essential to be classified as a diaspora. Ethnic ties represent one feature of diasporas (Anthias, 1998, p. 576; Kopchick et al., 2021, p. 2). Scholars such as Adamson (2016,

p. 292) demonstrate that various types of diaspora exist and a reduction to ethnicity is misleading because it ignores the context of a diaspora and its process of formation. Sökefeld (2006, p. 266) describes the formation of a diaspora as “a special case of ethnicity”, while Tölölyan (1996, p. 17) observes that “lines separating ethnic groups from diasporas are not clear-cut”.

3.2.1 What is ethnicity?

The concept of ethnicity is multifaceted, as evidenced by various perspectives and definitions presented in the literature (Baumann, 2004; C. P. Cunningham, 2013; Fishman, 2010; Rex, 1995; Varshney, 2003).⁵ In this dissertation, I adopt Eriksen’s (2019, pp. 34–35) approach, which views ethnicity as a concept with “(at least) two levels, that of the analyst and that of the native”. This perspective also emphasizes the elements of social construction (Fearon & Laitin, 2000, p. 848). The various understandings of ethnicity are further highlighted by a statement by a first-generation Afar diasporan, who identifies as *African-American* in the United States and *Afar* in Africa. He notes: “My ethnicity is Afar. The way Americans define ethnicity, and the way we explain it in Africa, is what we speak, in America it is skin color” (I13). This statement underscores the varying understandings and contextual nuances of ethnicity across regions.

In summary, my approach employs a broad definition of ethnicity, conceptualizing it as socially constructed (Fearon & Laitin, 2000, p. 846) and a fluid concept (Baumann, 2004, p. 13; Siroky & Dzutsati, 2015, p. 812; Kalyvas, 2008, p. 1046) that nonetheless possess stability in meaning. The latter is closely linked to the concept of ethnic identity, which fosters a sense of community and belonging. This viewpoint is based on Weber’s (1978) narrow understanding of ethnicity⁶ which Cederman (2013, p. 533) summarizes as “any subjectively experienced sense of commonality based on the belief

⁵Scholars often distinguish between three traditions: Primordialism, constructivism, and instrumentalism (see for an overview C. P. Cunningham, 2013, pp. 30–32; Sökefeld, 2006; Kataria, 2018; Wimmer, 2002). However, all traditions are inconclusive. Following Baumann (2004, p. 14) ethnicity “is a product of self and group identity that is formed in extrinsic/intrinsic contexts and social interaction”, while Eriksen (2019, p. 35) stresses that “Ethnicity can be seen as a universal social phenomenon”. Scholars such as Brubaker (2002) criticize the conceptualization of ethnicity itself and the term ethnic group and instead argue for discursive frames.

⁶For a critique on Weber’s definition of ethnicity and ethnic groups see, readers are referred to perspectives from sociologist and postcolonial viewpoints, Banton (2007), Boatcă (2013), and Hechter (1976).

in common ancestry and shared culture.” Importantly, whether ethnicity is used as an instrument to foster, for example, group consciousness or for preservation, to generate group coherence, is not a focal point of my analysis.

Ethnicity encompasses a range of aspects including both non-visible and visible “markers” (Horowitz, 2000, pp. 51–52), as well as descent-based linkage (Fearon, 1999; Horowitz, 2000). It also involves the choice for and acceptance by a group, solidarity (Olzak, 1983, pp. 356–357; Tilly, 1973, p. 214), and loyalty within the group (Horowitz, 2000, p. 64). Notably, ethnicity and kinship are often connected (Horowitz, 2000, p. 59) where solidarity goes along with kinship being “the language of ethnicity” (Horowitz, 2000, p. 57) and “a threat to any member of the group may be seen in somewhat the same light as a threat to the family” (Horowitz, 2000, p. 64). While “ethnicity is “sticky” and cannot easily be transcended” (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012, p. 85), changes can occur (Horowitz, 2000, pp. 51–52). Importantly, an ethnic identity⁷ is situated within a political context (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012, p. 80) and can be exploited by states (Brumfiel, 2001, p. 374). Furthermore, ethnic identity is composed of both “individuals’ own sense of group membership” and “characteristics of the group as defined by outsiders” (Brumfiel, 2001, p. 374).

3.2.2 Nationalism and ethnic groups

Before I differentiate between ethnic groups and diaspora groups, I briefly define nationalism to distinguish the concept from ethnicity.⁸ Gellner (1983, p. 1) posits that “[n]ationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” and “a theory of political legitimacy, which requires

⁷Given the scope of this dissertation, I cannot review the conceptualization of identity itself. I follow Chandra (2006, p. 400): “By “identity,” I mean any social category in which an individual is eligible to be a member. [...] Ethnic identity categories are a subset of this larger set, defined by the following restrictions: (a) They are impersonal—that is, they are an “imagined community” in which members are not part of an immediate family or kin group; (b) they constitute a section of a country’s population rather than the whole; (c) if one sibling is eligible for membership in a category at any given place, then all other siblings would also be eligible in that place; and (d) the qualifying attributes for membership are restricted to one’s own genetically transmitted features or to the language, religion, place of origin, tribe, region, caste, clan, nationality, or race of one’s parents and ancestors.”

⁸I reviewed the scholarly debates surrounding the conceptualization of nationalism. I do not detail these discussions within this dissertation, due to its specific focus. Instead, I have selected an approach that aligns with the objectives of this section, which is to delineate nationalism as distinct from ethnicity.

that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones". However, Calhoun (1993, p. 235) highlights that nationalism and ethnicity cannot completely be separated and points out the absence of a clear-cut relationship, even though identity construction bridges nationalism and ethnicity. Additionally, multiple ethnic groups can coexist within a nation, and ethnic groups "can exist in a world without modern states" (Cederman, 2013, p. 533). "An ethnic group, then, is as a cultural community based on a common belief in putative descent.[...] Ethnic groups can, but do not have to, be based on religious traits" (Cederman, 2013, p. 533).⁹ While specific territory is often associated with nationalism and nations, it does not necessarily have to be linked to ethnicity (Eriksen, 2004, p. 55; Cederman, Gleditsch, Salehyan, & Wucherpfennig, 2013; Davis & Moore, 1997; Rügger, 2018, p. 68; Saideman, 2002; Varshney, 2003, p. 86). Furthermore, national groups frequently aspire to possess their own territory, as evidenced by secessionist movements (e.g. Horowitz, 1981, p. 165), whereas ethnic groups and ethnicity do not inherently imply a common territorial residence. Finally, kinship is not a crucial determinant of a nation (e.g. Eriksen, 2004).

Ethnic nationalism, also referred to as ethnonationalism, represents a specific form of nationalism (Connor, 2015). Diasporas have to actively maintain their diaspora identity (Kopchick et al., 2021, p. 3). For instance, the Kurdish diaspora actively sustains its identity through transnational ties and activities such as newspapers, or language classes for children. A key characteristic of diasporas is their triadic relationship, which consists of the diaspora group itself, the homeland from which they originate, and the host state where they currently reside (Vertovec, 1997, p. 5). This triadic relationship is crucial for understanding diaspora politics and its involvement in civil wars. In contrast, an ethno-national group typically does not exhibit this triadic relationship. Ethno-national groups are usually more closely associated with a specific national territory and do not maintain the same kind of ties between homeland and host country as diasporas do. Specifically, migration and the connection to the homeland are fundamental to the formation of a diaspora, whereas these are not

⁹This definition is aligned with Weber (1998, p. 21) who states: "We shall call "ethnic groups" those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonialization and migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists."

necessary conditions for an ethno-national group. Ethno-national groups are primarily concentrated within a specific territory, with identity being related to shared ethnicity. Migration is not a typical characteristic of ethno-national groups; they are not distanced from the homeland, as is the case with diasporas. While diasporas maintain ties to the homeland and co-ethnics while residing in the host country, ethno-national groups are more focused on achieving recognition or sovereignty within a nation.

3.2.3 Ethnic groups and diasporas

I follow Cederman's (2013, p. 533) definition of an ethnic group as outlined in the previous section. This definition acknowledges the origin and endurance over time, as well as elements such as a religion, which bear similarities to the characteristics of a diaspora. Additionally, the inter-generational aspect of a diaspora aligns with the understanding of an ethnic group (Horowitz, 2000, p. 52; Cederman, 2013, p. 533). A collective memory may also exist for ethnic groups. Scholars, including Wayland (2004, pp. 406, 410), use the term diaspora interchangeably with transnational ethnic actor, characterized by a political network and common identity of members that extends beyond state borders.

Ethnic groups can be transnational, for instance, due to changes in national borders. This is not only a characteristic of a diaspora but also pertains to transnational ethnic kinship. Additionally, an ethnic group may possess a sense of group consciousness, which is also a fundamental element of a diaspora. Furthermore, the aspect of (ethnic) solidarity kinship is emphasized in most conceptualizations of ethnicity (Eriksen, 2004; Horowitz, 2000; Olzak, 1983). Similarly, it is a key element in many diaspora definitions, such as the Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GDMAC) (IOM GMDAC, 2018). Overall, I align with Demmers (2007, p. 8), who underscores that both ethnic and diaspora identity are constructed, but still differentiates an ethnic group from a diaspora group.

Despite the similarities between ethnic groups and diasporas, I identify distinct differences. While an ethnic group does not necessarily maintain the connection to the homeland, a diaspora does. A key distinction lies in the aspect of migration and group's residence in relation to the homeland (e.g. Scully, 2019, p. 97). While a diaspora lives

outside the imagined or real homeland, an ethnic group often lives in the homeland. Despite varying conceptualization of diasporas, the definitions include the experience or background of migration.

Additionally, membership in an ethnic group is often ascribed and does not necessarily involve an active decision. In contrast, most definitions of a diaspora encompass an element of active decision-making in being part of a diaspora, choice-based group membership, which extends beyond external labeling. Some scholars even argue that proof of heritage is required to be part of a diaspora (Kneafsey & Cox, 2002; Scully, 2019; Turan, 2010). The main similarities and differences between ethnic groups and diasporas are summarized in table 3.2.

In summary, a diaspora is distinguishable from an ethnic group, whether or not the latter has a transnational component, due to the distinctive triadic relationship involving the homeland, host country, and diaspora group. This distinction is evident through factors such as the migration background of the diaspora, their country of residence, and the dual aspect of being externally recognized as a diaspora while also possessing a self-described identity, highlighting the choice-based component of this identity. Diasporas maintain ties to the homeland while living in the host country. On the other hand, an ethnic group typically lives within the homeland or does not possess the same kind of ties to the homeland that diasporas maintain. Unlike diasporas, ethnic groups may not experience the same level of connection or obligation stemming from residing in a host country to the homeland. Given these differences between ethnic groups and diasporas, it follows that a diaspora also differs from an ethno-national group, which can be considered a subgroup of an ethnic group.¹⁰ The unique elements of a diaspora set them apart in the broader context of ethnic and ethno-national groups.

3.2.4 Ethnic diasporas

In this dissertation, I focus on ethnic diasporas, where the ethnic tie is the most significant linkage.¹¹ The rationale behind this focus is threefold. Firstly, the substantial

¹⁰For example, Butler (2001, p. 192) argues that diasporas can be part of an ethno-national group given the dispersal.

¹¹This approach is underscored by Sökefeld (2006, p. 266), who highlights the formation of a diaspora as “a special case of ethnicity”, and Piazza (2018), who apply the term ethnic diaspora in their study on diaspora support for terrorist organizations’ survival.

	Diaspora	Ethnic group
Similarities	origin and endurance over time, inter-generational, collective memory kinship or ethnic solidarity, group consciousness	
Differences	connected to homeland lives outside homeland choice-based group membership triadic relationship	not necessarily connected to homeland lives in or outside homeland group membership ascribed dual relationship

Table 3.2: Key similarities and differences between diasporas and ethnic groups

overlap between the concepts of ethnicity and ethnic groups with diasporas (A. D. Smith, 1993, p. 49), makes it reasonable to choose an ethnic diaspora. Secondly, ethnicity is the primary tie shaping a diaspora, in contrast to religion, caste or other identity-characterizing group factors. Thirdly, ethnicity provides one explanation for the contextual relevance of a diaspora and the potential for changes over time in the understanding of a diaspora, emphasizing it is a dynamic concept (cf. Anthias, 1998, p. 569). For instance, the Rwandan diaspora, comprising of Hutu and Tutsi, underscores the importance of ethnic diasporas (Féron & Lefort, 2019, p. 37). Consequently, in this dissertation, a diaspora is centered around an ethnic diaspora.¹²

One example from the Filipino diaspora in the US illustrates the ethnic identity: “I think being Filipino American is really strong. I mean it’s probably the biggest identifier. I’m also from a biracial family. My mom’s family is half white, but I grew up in [X , US]. I was the only Filipino in my school. It was a predominantly white space. It was [state name] public education, no one knew where the Philippines was. I think I really didn’t have a space to connect with my identity. I think in college when I was in a different space, I went to New York. I didn’t connect as much the Filipino community there, but I was around a lot more people of color who were talking about their heritage. And that really helped me grow out of my shell. And then when I came to Washington, DC after my graduation from college, I connected the Filipino community. And that’s been a huge source of support and connection. When I went to the motherland recently for the first time, that was really life changing for me and

¹²There are alternative distinctions of diaspora subtypes, such as ethno-national diasporas (e.g. Geukjian, 2014; Sheffer, 2003). Dufoix (2008, p. 62) and Miles and Sheffer (1998) differentiate between nonethnic and ethno-national diasporas. Alternatively, Tsuda (2019, p. 189) suggests distinguishing diasporas based on diasporicity, “where some ethnic groups are more diasporic than others”. If diasporans share characteristics such as culture, religion or language, they “will likely be more diasporic than those that do not” Tsuda (2019, p. 191).

validating my Filipino identity. I think, I broadly identify as Filipino American” (I8).

3.3 What are aims of a diaspora?

In this section, I explain the four main aims of a diaspora, as discerned from an extensive review of relevant literature. These aims are: (1) kin support, (2) re-connection with the homeland, (3) preservation of identity, and (4) seeking (policy-) changes in the homeland. These four aims may serve as catalysts for the mobilization of diasporas, thereby acting as primary drivers of external diaspora support to rebel organizations.¹³ Generally, these aims are applicable to most diasporas; however, these aims are not always distinct and frequently intersect. Subsequent to the section on the aims, I review drivers of diaspora mobilization.

3.3.1 Kin support in homeland

A central aim of diasporas is kin support in the homeland. This aim can act as a driver for mobilizing a diaspora (Kopchick et al., 2021, p. 3). Hear and Cohen (2017, p. 7) argue that the desire to mobilize can be driven by kin and family support and their protection whereas the capacity to get engaged in the conflict is dependent on the host country setting as well as the diasporas capacity. For instance, Hockenos (2003) illustrates how the Croatian diaspora in the US was mobilized during the 1990-1991 war to support their kin. Factors such as solidarity, obligation, and guilt can drive support for one’s kin (Adamson, 2013, p. 70; Brinkerhoff, 2009; Brinkerhoff, 2011; Hammond, 2006; Shain, 2007, p. 35). Similarly, humanitarian reasons can also be a mobilizing factor, as evidenced by diasporas from Rwanda and Zimbabwe (Betts & Jones, 2016, p. 223). However, Moss (2020) illustrates that diaspora support for homeland kin during the Arab spring could be restricted under certain conditions, such as as skills of diaspora activists or external sponsors.

Kin support can also serve as an aim in the engagement of diasporas in conflict.

¹³I acknowledge the differing motivations of diasporans and kin in the homeland for mobilization (Kopchick et al., 2021, p. 3). Whereas the the kin in the homeland aims for policy change and material benefits due to the mobilizing of the diaspora, the diaspora itself might only receive indirect benefits, predominantly through family and close kin ties (Kopchick et al., 2021, p. 3). The focus of this discussion is primarily on the four identified aims of a diaspora.

Féron and Voytiv (2021, p. 221) show that conflict in the homeland can trigger diaspora mobilization, though this is not an automatic response. Similarly, Koinova (2013) illustrates how the interaction between conflict-related violence and other conditional factors as well as specific stages in the conflict cycle, influence the mobilization and radicalization of the Albanian diaspora in the United States and the United Kingdom, particularly in relation to the Kosovar independence movement. Further contributing elements include different generations of migrants (Baser, 2015) and media coverage (Féron & Voytiv, 2021). Conversely, Kopchick et al. (2021) show that conflict in the homeland does not affect diaspora mobilization. This disparity underscores the need for more nuanced research to understand constraints and conditions that shape diaspora mobilization. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for assessing how diaspora support can either contribute to or mitigate conflict dynamics.

3.3.2 Re-connection with homeland

Another aim of the diaspora is re-connection with the homeland (Oonk, 2019, p. 289). A mobilized diaspora can provide various resources to facilitate this re-connection, including financial support for activities in the homeland. This support often stems from an interest to maintain a connection with the homeland or “a desire to feel part of the homeland experience” (Shain, 2007, p. 33). This re-connection is often related to the diaspora’s interest in returning to the homeland and gaining access to power (Anderson, 1999; Stefanovic & Loizides, 2017; Tsuda, 2013). For instance, a first-generation diasporan from southern Nigeria expressed a “dream to return to Nigeria, after retirement to sit at the square in his village” (I4). Additionally, a second-generation Ugandan diasporan mentioned his “strong roots back home and that’s a very important part of my identity” (I9).

By providing support to rebel groups, diasporans not only maintain their ties to the homeland and its values, but also contribute to the “survival of their homeland” (Bercovitch, 2007, p. 36). Furthermore, diasporans who lack a distinct homeland, and consequently a place to return to, often foster the idea of a homeland and mobilize in support of it, as illustrated by the Armenian diaspora (Kenny, 2013, p. 61). However, Oonk (2019, p. 289) cautions that “it is not self-evident that people in the diaspora

wish to reconnect with their home countries. It needs promoting and nurturing”.

3.3.3 Preservation of identity

The preservation of identity is a third aim of a diaspora. Identity preservation is a driver of mobilization (Kopchick et al., 2021, p. 2). It can also lead to the establishment of organizations dedicated to preserving the identity. For instance, Fair (2005, p. 140) details how the Tamil diaspora formed specific organizations like the *Tamil Relief Organization USA* and other virtual organizations to foster Tamil nationalist identity among diasporans. Furthermore, festivals, exchanges or the celebration of holidays play a crucial role in preserving identity within the host country (Kopchick et al., 2021, p. 7; Sökefeld, 2006, p. 277). These celebrations and various cultural events also demonstrate that identity preservation among diasporans can occur outside formal organizations. This is exemplified by an observation from a Nigerian diasporan leading a diaspora organization in Washington DC: “When there are events, more [diasporans] show up than those who are members [of the diaspora organization]” (I11). Another example is from a Filipino diasporan: “the social events we had like costume parties, and Halloween, are really important for us, for the community building” (I8).

Mobilization can “reinforce[s] ethnic group solidarity and identity” (Gerber, 2006, pp. 233–234). This phenomenon is evident in examples like the Kurdish diaspora in Germany and the Greek-Cypriot diaspora. In these cases, mobilization in the diaspora (re)defined identity, partly to distinguish its ethnic identity from the Turkish state identity (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007, p. 513). Diasporans who “tend to reproduce their culture, values, language and religion as much as possible” (Oonk, 2019, p. 285) support this idea of persevering identity despite physical distance from the homeland. The Sikh diaspora exemplifies how pilgrimage can be a means to maintain ties to the members of the diaspora, preserve the identity, and mobilize the diaspora (Fair, 2005, p. 133).

3.3.4 Seeking changes in the homeland

Diasporas often aim for changes in the homeland, which may coincide with their increased visibility in the international arena (Baser & Swain, 2010, p. 54; Fair, 2005,

p. 137). Baser and Toivanen (2019), Geukjian (2014), Marinova (2017), and Shain (2007) demonstrate that diasporas have agency and aim for changes in the homeland. For example, the Sikh diaspora mobilized to cultivate a specific perception of their homeland, “Khalistan” (Fair, 2005, p. 133; Tatla, 1999). This mobilization extends to redefining the “past homeland”, for instance, the Sikh diaspora promoting their own history and heritage (Fair, 2005, p. 137). Furthermore, the aims of diaspora mobilization related to homeland changes can be diverse. They range from influencing regime change and policy influence (Mohamoud, 2005, p. 33; Koslowski, 2006), to pursuing autonomy or secession (Collier, 2006, p. 15).

Diasporas can also mobilize to support reconstruction and development in the homeland. An illustrative example of this is the Somali diaspora, which has been actively involved in providing emergency aid and fostering local development in Somalia (Kopchick et al., 2021; Sheikh & Healy, 2009). Additionally, diasporas may mobilize to raise awareness of the situation in the homeland and either support or oppose specific actions related to the homeland (Orjuela, 2018; Prasad & Savatic, 2021, p. 4). However, Van Hear (2019, p. 134) points out that “few diasporans are centrally motivated by the idea of social transformation, but prefer to focus on shifting the balance of power among ethnic groups or other affinities.” The case of the Palestinian diaspora, for instance, exemplifies how the desire for change in the homeland, such as sovereignty, can become intertwined with religious identity (Koinova, 2013, p. 451). Diasporan entrepreneurs often navigate and leverage these interactions (Koinova, 2013, p. 451). Conversely, the Kosovar Albanian diaspora presents a contrasting example where religious identity acts more as a barrier than a facilitator for mobilization (Koinova, 2013, p. 451). In summary, the examples provided illustrate the diaspora’s aim of changes in the homeland and underscore how a range of factors including political, social, and religious identities, can influence diaspora’s mobilization.

3.4 What drives the mobilization of a diaspora?

Having conceptualized diasporas and explained their aims, I briefly review the drivers, strategies, and targets of mobilization. I posit that mobilization is a prerequisite for

external support a diaspora might offer. Drawing on Kopchick et al.'s (2021, p. 3) conceptualization of mobilization, I define mobilization as the collective action of a diaspora and its collective participation in (interest) groups that focus on the diaspora's identity and aims. Importantly, I acknowledge the endogeneity when classifying the mobilization of a diaspora along kinship, which itself underpins the formation of a diaspora (Kopchick et al., 2021, p. 6). For example, a diaspora would not be considered for mobilization if they do not self-identify as a group and lack kinship ties (Kopchick et al., 2021, p. 6). Furthermore, diaspora formation itself can also be based on mobilization processes (Sökefeld, 2006, p. 280). This perspective highlights the interdependent element of diaspora formation and mobilization.

Mobilization approaches vary. Exemplary approaches focus on social movements¹⁴, including mobilization structures, framing processes¹⁵, and political opportunity structures (Baser & Swain, 2010; McAdam et al., 1996, 2001; Sökefeld, 2006; Tarrow, 2011; Wayland, 2004). Other mechanisms include political obligations as a diasporan (Baron, 2014), transnational brokerage (Adamson, 2013, p. 68; McAdam et al., 2001), and ethnic outbidding (Adamson, 2013, p. 68). Additionally, both endogenous and exogenous factors (Baser, 2014, p. 358) of diaspora mobilization, such as conflict cycles, geographic concentration, temporal and contextual factors, and the influence of external actors (Adamson, 2013; Baser, 2014; Fair, 2005; Gurr, 2000; Horowitz, 2000; Koinova, 2013; Kopchick et al., 2021; Toft, 2010) have been identified. It is important to note that these factors may also be interrelated.

Mobilization is not a homogeneous process and happens over time (Moss, 2020, p. 1680; Baser, 2014, p. 373; Féron & Voytiv, 2021, p. 221). Variations in socioeconomic status, demographics, and other salient characteristics within a diaspora can influence mobilization (Redclift, 2017; Werbner, 2002, p. 511) and may also silence voices (Moss, 2020, p. 1688). My analysis is conducted at the group-level, and as such, it does not differentiate between core, passive, and silent members of a diaspora (cf. Shain & Barth, 2003, p. 542). The mobilization of diasporas is also shaped by the

¹⁴Exemplary social movement approaches are Della Porta and Diani (2020), McAdam et al. (1996, 2001), Müller-Funk (2019), Redclift (2017), H. Smith and Stares (2007), Sökefeld (2006), and Tarrow (2011).

¹⁵For example, the framing of belonging and kinship as well as obligation and/or guilt (e.g. Adamson, 2013, p. 70). However, Demmers (2007, p. 8) highlights the various degrees of power external actors have in framing the diaspora's identity and thereby its mobilization.

surrounding social and political contexts, including factors such as diplomatic relations between host and home states, and the (in-)formal labeling or link of a diaspora to terrorist organizations (Baser & Toivanen, 2019). Furthermore, the mobilization of diasporas is influenced by factors such as social capital and financial resources as well as their emotional connections to the homeland (Redclift, 2017, p. 511). Moreover, Adamson and Demetriou (2007, p. 492) argue that “*territoriality* provides only one possible organizational basis for the mobilization and formation of political identities”.

3.4.1 Mobilization strategies

Various strategies of mobilization exist. These can be initiated internally, influenced by external factors, or a combination of both (Baser, 2014; Biswas, 2004). Mobilization can also vary, ranging from a top-down approach centered on a leader or political entrepreneur, to grassroots mobilization as well as timing within a conflict spiral (Adamson, 2013; Baser, 2014; Fair, 2005; Koinova, 2013; Kopchick et al., 2021; Prasad & Savatic, 2021). Another critical distinction lies between voluntary mobilization and coerced or forced mobilization (Adamson, 2020; Bamyeh, 2007; Koinova, 2016; Redclift, 2017). Notably, these factors often interconnect and can change over time.

The formation of a diaspora and mobilization are closely linked, and they may not always be clearly distinguishable at every point in time. For instance, the Tamil diaspora shows that the mobilization has been influenced by various aspects, in contrast to the Sikh diaspora, which was predominantly mobilized by a few specific events (Fair, 2005, p. 148). Aims such as (re-)connection with homeland, supporting kin, preservation of identity and seeking changes in the homeland can be both goals and drivers of diaspora mobilization.

3.4.2 Leaders, rebel organizations and states

Leaders within a community, elites, entrepreneurs, state officials and governments, and non-state actors, including rebel groups possess the capability to mobilize a diaspora. For instance, secessionist elites effectively mobilized the Armenian diasporas, where the strength of the connection played a crucial role in this mobilization (Koinova, 2013, p. 451). Similarly, Kurdish political entrepreneurs mobilized the Kurdish diaspora,

fostering an identity in opposition to the Turkish state's representation (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007, p. 509).

The Sikh diaspora presents an example of the important role a leader may have, as evidenced by Ganga Singh Dillon (Fair, 2005, p. 140). In contrast, diaspora entrepreneurs within the UK Kosovar Albanian diaspora refrained from mobilization in response to violent events, demonstrating that leaders and entrepreneurs are not always pivotal for diaspora mobilization (Koinova, 2013, p. 449). This variation underscores the different factors that can influence mobilization of a diaspora.

Additionally, the presence and influence of other diasporas or interest groups can also impact a diaspora's mobilization, as can the host country's stance towards a particular conflict party (Koinova, 2013, p. 450). For example, the Palestinian diaspora in the US is less mobilized due to the presence of a strong Israeli lobby, in contrast to the situation in the UK (Koinova, 2013, p. 450). Importantly, Adamson (2013, p. 70) posits that diaspora mobilization is also conditioned on the framing of it, and diaspora entrepreneurs, which may evoke kinship ties or a sense of guilt and obligation to support the homeland.

Scholars such as Prasad and Savatic (2021, p. 5) emphasize the pivotal role of leaders or political entrepreneurs in mobilization, often attributed to their capacity and knowledge. Patrons, providing essential support such as financial or material support, are crucial for mobilization (Nownes & Neeley, 1996; Prasad & Savatic, 2021, p. 3). Leadership is crucial not only for the initial formation of groups but also for sustaining their mobilization efforts (Haney & Vanderbush, 1999; Nownes & Neeley, 1996, p. 138; Rytz, 2013, p. 60; Salisbury, 1969). Furthermore, "the availability of new communication technologies and cheap transportation has led to the emergence of diaspora mobilization as a preferred strategy of both state elites and non-state political entrepreneurs" (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007, p. 514). This technological evolution has enabled more widespread coordination and communication among diasporas.

Rebel organizations can mobilize a diaspora. They might organize conventions, commemorative events, and festivals to mobilize the diaspora which has been demonstrated in the context of the Alevis, Sikh, and Tamil diasporas (Sökefeld, 2006, p. 277). Such events play a critical role in strengthening the identity of the diaspora as a

transnational community and in garnering support in various forms, such as financial contributions (Sökefeld, 2006, p. 277). However, the designation of a rebel group can also influence diaspora mobilization. For instance, the US listing of the LTTE as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) led to a decline in the mobilization of the Tamil diaspora (Fair, 2005, p. 144). Additionally, rebel organizations can also indirectly mobilize a diaspora by forging connections between the diaspora and local insurgents (Adamson, 2013; Kopchick et al., 2021), as evidenced by the case of the Kosovo Liberation Army (Koinova, 2013, p. 446).

In addition to activities that emphasize identity and opportunities for donations, rebel groups employ a variety of techniques to mobilize diasporas. One such method involves the use of propaganda. For example, the LTTE utilized propaganda to highlight the victimization of Tamils in Sri Lanka, positioning themselves as the sole representatives of Tamil interests (Chalk, 2008, p. 99). Rebel organizations, akin to state actors, may also resort to coercive methods to mobilize diasporas (Adamson, 2020). These tactics can include assassination or threats, as observed in various contexts (Adamson, 2020). However, non-state actors typically have fewer resources available for such strategies compared to states (Adamson, 2020, p. 162).

State and their institutions can also play a significant role in mobilizing diasporas (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007; Betts & Jones, 2016; Marinova, 2017). For instance, Baser (2014, p. 372) illustrates how Turkish embassies in Sweden actively strengthened ties with diaspora organizations, thereby supporting their mobilization. States may have a preference for diasporas living in host countries that offer favorable conditions for lobbying (Koinova, 2013, p. 450). Local elites can also indirectly mobilize diasporas by leveraging emotional identity, for instance, triggering the diaspora through a declaration of independence (Koinova, 2011, p. 343). In such cases, the diaspora responds to mobilization, supporting the claim but does not initiate mobilization (Koinova, 2011, p. 342). This highlights the diverse strategies employed by various actors, including states, local elites, rebel organizations, and patrons in diaspora mobilization.

3.4.3 Experience, events, and emigration

A range of factors, including experience in the homeland or host country, international events and meetings, the legacy of events and experiences as well as the process of migration itself and the subsequent generations can influence the mobilization of diasporas. While elements such as generational changes can be considered internal factors, most of these aspects are external factors affecting the mobilization of a diaspora. For instance, the experience of discrimination or political exclusion (e.g. Baser, 2014, p. 366; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001, p. 263; Schiller, 2005), as well as democratic governance (Wayland, 2004, p. 417; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001, p. 264; Prasad & Savatic, 2021) can shape diaspora mobilization. Moreover, the occurrence of large-scale violence and violations of human rights in the homeland can mobilize a diaspora (Féron & Voytiv, 2021; Koinova, 2011). Koinova (2011, p. 347) demonstrates that such transformative events often trigger emotional responses, posing threats to kin and collective identity, which in turn can lead to the mobilization or even radicalization of a diaspora. However, there is no consensus at this point. For example, Kopchick et al. (2021) find no significant impact of violence on diaspora mobilization. The reasons for this unexpected result could be attributed to the conditional factors of conflict on diaspora mobilization, such as constraints on activism, or case-specific mechanisms and contexts that might go unnoticed in a large-N analysis (Kopchick et al., 2021, p. 11).

International meetings serve as a significant factor in unifying and mobilizing diasporas, as Fair (2005, p. 133) demonstrates in the context of the Sikh diaspora. Furthermore, Koinova (2019, p. 316), Orjuela (2018), and Young and Park (2009) show that transitional justice processes, such as the truth and reconciliation commission of Liberia (LTRC), influence diaspora mobilization. The host country's actions can also impact diaspora mobilization. An example of this is the mobilization of the Kurdish diaspora following the passage of the Armenian Genocide Bill in Sweden (Baser, 2014, p. 365). The likelihood of mobilization is also reduced by dissimilarities between the diaspora and the host country's population, particularly in terms of language, religion, and race (Kopchick et al., 2021, pp. 10–12). Conversely, Koinova (2013, p. 411) shows that well-integrated diasporans are less attached to the homeland and less likely to mobilize for sovereignty.

Timing plays a critical role in the mobilization of diasporas. Koinova (2013, p. 450) demonstrates that in the case of secessionist aims, elites utilize the diaspora over the long term, whereas the relationships of diaspora entrepreneurs might weaken as time progresses. Additionally, generational differences within diasporas can alter their interest in mobilization as first generation diasporans may aim to return to the homeland, while second-generations may call the host country the homeland (Oonk, 2019, pp. 287–288; Redclift, 2017, p. 506). Furthermore, diasporas originating from different time periods and migration backgrounds may not necessarily interact with each other (Oonk, 2019, p. 287). However, the longer a diaspora exist, the more resources it accumulates, which can be instrumental in mobilization efforts (Esman, 1986; Kopchick et al., 2021, p. 4). Globalization fosters interconnections and ties, regardless of the passage of time (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007, p. 506; R. Cohen, 2008; Fair, 2005, p. 131; A. Roth, 2015, p. 292).

Different types of migration can yield distinct impacts on mobilization of a diaspora (Bamyeh, 2007; Koinova, 2016; Redclift, 2017). Diasporas resulting from voluntary migration tend to exhibit less concern with identity preservation, consequently diminishing the likelihood of mobilization (Kopchick et al., 2021, p. 3). In contrast, diasporas primarily composed of forced migrants often develop a strong common identity, grounded in shared traumatic experiences. The presence of grievances can further reinforce this traumatic experience and shared identity (Redclift, 2017). This distinction highlights the nuanced relationship between the circumstances of migration and the subsequent mobilization dynamics within diasporas which should be considered when analyzing mobilization of a diaspora and support decisions.

3.4.4 Targets of mobilization

Diasporas, influenced by both external and internal factors, exhibit diverse mobilization targets. I differentiate between various audiences that a diaspora may engage with. Specifically, diasporas can mobilize within the homeland, in the host country, or at the international level, such as the United Nations General Assembly. Furthermore, their mobilization efforts may be directed towards supporting the community in the host country, the kin in the homeland, or both (Müller-Funk, 2019, p. 254). Diasporas often

aim for political change in the homeland or provide support for the kinship (Kopchick et al., 2021, pp. 4–5; Wayland, 2004, p. 11). The “boomerang effect” is particularly pertinent in this context (e.g. Adamson, 2013). This effect involves diasporas lobbying internationally on behalf of groups unable to represent themselves, such as a rebel group (Adamson, 2013, p. 72) or “win the hearts of the overseas public and in turn pressure the host government to take action on the target state, constituting a boomerang effect” (Loidolt et al., 2013, p. 7). The “bommerang pattern” is one example (Adamson, 2013, p. 72) which has been effectively employed by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) (Radtke, 2009, pp. 188–189).

3.4.5 Demobilization of a diaspora

Diasporas may also intentionally demobilize. Demobilization can arise when a diaspora identity is not nurtured over time (Adamson, 2013). Furthermore, factors such as disappointment (Koinova, 2013, p. 448), lack of trust and corruption (Baser & Toivanen, 2019, p. 350; Paasche, 2016), radicalization and potential violence can also contribute to demobilization of a diaspora. Cochrane (2012) exemplifies this for the case of the Irish diaspora in the US post-1998. Negative associations, such as poverty or stigma linked to the identity of the diaspora, can lead to demobilization of a diaspora and its ties (Redclift, 2017, p. 511). Disappointment is another driver of demobilization. For instance, the Kosovo diaspora in the UK experienced disillusionment due to insufficient attention from the new government and inclusion in the process. Additionally, some diasporans were disappointed by the rebel groups such as Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) due to potential misuse of funds (Koinova, 2013, p. 448). Consequently, experiences such as corruption can impede diaspora mobilization (Baser & Toivanen, 2019, p. 350). However, host countries themselves may limit diaspora mobilization for domestic reasons like national elections or foreign policy reasons (Demmers, 2007).

3.5 Diaspora's collective action

The diaspora consists of individuals dispersed globally, unified by a shared identity and ties to co-ethnics. I acknowledge the heterogeneity inherent within a diaspora and coexistence of various types of diasporas under a singular umbrella term for a specific ethnic diaspora. Nonetheless, the empirical focus of this dissertation is at the group-level. Consequently, I theorize preferences on the group-level, specifically collective preferences. Here, I explain collective, inter-generational preferences and also examine how a diaspora can overcome the collective action problem.

I align with Buhaug et al.'s (2014, p. 421) approach who advocate for the cohesion of ethnic groups, while acknowledging the assumption as a simplification of reality.¹⁶ Globalization, particularly enhanced communication opportunities and mass media, support group identity (Buhaug et al., 2014, p. 421; Fair, 2005, p. 131). For instance, the Tamil diaspora has leveraged both physical and virtual organizations to foster a transnational identity (Fair, 2005, p. 140).

Shared values contribute to a strong sense of solidarity within the group (Buhaug et al., 2014, p. 421) and kin. The Kurdish diaspora serves as an exemplar of such unity, notwithstanding the presence of some outliers (Adamson, 2013, p. 80). Both social and material benefits foster group solidarity and facilitate collective action (Haer, 2015, p. 58; Prasad & Savatic, 2021, p. 3). The experience of a specific event, conflict or marginalization can also suppress within group differences (Wayland, 2004, p. 411), enhancing individual ties and thereby reinforcing group identity and unity. Furthermore, the literature on ethnic grievances and civil wars shows that such grievances are impacted by inequalities (Buhaug et al., 2014), and the degree of exclusion from power (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008), activating collective grievances (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012, p. 80; Wucherpfennig, 2011, p. 30). These ethnic grievances support group solidarity (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012, p. 80), which is an important factor for collective preferences of a diaspora.

The Khalistani movement shows that Sikh diasporans driven by economic migration

¹⁶I acknowledge that a diaspora is composed of individuals who may have varying preferences (Baser, 2014, p. 364) and identities (Della Porta & Diani, 2020, p. 94). Scholars, including Marinova (2017) have critiqued the unitary actor approach, emphasizing that a diaspora is not a homogeneous actor and comprising diverse subgroups, each with distinct goals and internal cleavages.

still have a strong link to the homeland as do Tamils whose migration was dominantly conflict-driven.¹⁷ Both examples indicate that the main reason behind migration does not impact the homeland tie nor the kinship aspect. Following the group identity of a diaspora (e.g. Bercovitch, 2007, p. 19) and this dissertation's empirical approach and focus on factors that promote social cohesion or overcome intra-group differences, it is reasonable to view the diaspora as a unitary actor.¹⁸

Unitary actor assumption and diaspora's agency. The unitary actor assumption facilitates a concentrated examination of the preferences, and actions of diasporas. Theoretically, each diaspora may possess its own combination of preferences. However, Lyon (2004) notes that factors such as group identity, ties, and opinions about the homeland unify. The unitary actor assumption underscores the notion of diasporas as actors with agency (Geukjian, 2014, p. 565) and consequently, power (H. Smith & Stares, 2007, p. 5). Scholarship indicates that diasporas exert influence on various aspects such as homeland conflicts (Bercovitch, 2007), peace processes (Petrova, 2019; H. Smith & Stares, 2007), post-conflict reconstruction (Orjuela, 2008, p. 439), development (Brinkerhoff, 2008, 2009; R. Cohen, 2008; Koinova, 2009), and homeland and host country relations (Shain & Barth, 2003, p. 461).

Inter-generational preferences. In accordance with the unitary actor assumption, I assume that the ethnic homeland tie is time-invariant and, is, for example, augmented by globalization, particularly through advancements in telecommunications and technology in flights (Mohamoud, 2005, p. 31). The time-invariant relationship implies inter-generational preferences. Although the assumption of inter-generational preferences may be subject to critique, numerous examples indicate evidence. For instance, Portes and Rumbaut (2001) argue that second-generations exhibit fewer ties to the

¹⁷For instance, Gunawardena (2001, p. 132) emphasizes the voluntary migration of Sikhs and diasporas support or Fair (2005). Further exploration of this topic can be found in Gunawardena's (2001, p. 17) dissertation, which offers an in-depth analysis of the Sikh diaspora and the Khalistan movement. For comparative studies, Fair (2005) and Purewal (2011) provide insights into the contrasts between Sikh and Tamil diaspora support. Additionally, Biswas (2004) presents a comparative analysis between Sikh and Hindu diaspora support.

¹⁸If the unitary actor assumption were relaxed, the approach proposed by Mariani et al. (2018, p. 767) could be adopted. This approach, centered on a leader's decision-making, assists in addressing and resolving issues such as collective action problems and free-riding. Petrova (2019, p. 2173) emphasizes the need for more detailed data to deconstruct the diaspora as an actor. Despite the potential benefits of alternative approaches, the unitary actor assumption currently remains the most appropriate and effective approach for analyzing diaspora support in armed conflict.

homeland when compared to first generations. A case in point is the Bahari diaspora identity, which has become less salient for second-generation diasporans who predominantly identify as Pakistani (Redclift, 2017, p. 506). Conversely, Baser (2014, p. 366) demonstrates that younger Turkish generations in Sweden continue to engage and identify with homeland issues, albeit in a manner that integrates them with Swedish politics, unlike the first generation. Similarly, Østergaard-Nielsen (2001, p. 266) argues that younger generations may have distinct perspectives on the homeland from afar and are more inclined to mobilize compared to the first generation. An illustrative example is the Red Sea Afar Youth Conference in Diaspora in January 2021, which indicates the close ties between the younger generations and the insurgent group (RSADO, 2021). The conference was organized by the Red Sea Afar Democratic Organization (RSADO) (RSADO, 2021). Additionally, the insights from a conducted interview with a second-generation diasporan suggest the relevance of homeland ties beyond the first-generation diasporans. The interviewee noted: “strong roots back home and that’s a very important part of my identity” (I9).

Hilker (2009) shows that, in the Rwandan context, ethnic identity endures in daily life over time, despite governmental efforts to foster a unified Rwandan identity. The absence of open discussion and the silent treatment of ethnic issues have resulted in newer generations continuing to define themselves along ethnic lines (Hilker, 2009). Additionally, Baser (2014, p. 361) summarizes that later generations maintain a sense of belonging to the homeland, even in the absence of personal experience there, often framing their identity in the context of their socialization. This phenomenon is exemplified by the strong Kurdish identity of the second and third-generations of Turkish (Kurdish) immigrants in Germany (Adamson, 2013, p. 78). The establishment of Kurdish language and cultural activities, such as New Year celebrations which are prohibited in Turkey, further reinforces these time-invariant ethnic ties. Moreover, Brinkerhoff (2011, p. 119) illustrates the keen interest of later generations of Afghan-Americans in maintaining their Afghan ties. In conclusion, I assume collective preferences of a diaspora.

Collective action. I propose that a mobilized diaspora is capable of collective action. This collective action arises from shared interests (Baser, 2014, p. 373), which

foster collective preferences. Group identity supports collective action and is influenced by social-psychological factors (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). However, fear or anticipation of repression may diminish the propensity for collective action (Lacina, 2014; Salehyan, 2007, p. 211; Siroky et al., 2020, p. 700). Notably, grievances and attitudes do not invariably translate into action (Lichbach, 1995, p. 283).

I follow Tilly's (1977, p. 11) conceptualization of collective action, as a concept that "includes all the ways in which people join their efforts in pursuit of common ends". The aspect of relation and self-identification is highlighted in Melucci's (1995, pp. 47–48) understanding in which collective action "rests on the ability of a movement to locate itself within a system of relations." (Melucci, 1995, p. 47). Thus, collective action is a process (Baser, 2014, p. 373), influenced by factors such as mobilization strategy, common interests and the accumulation of grievances (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013, p. 46; Siroky et al., 2020, p. 696). Additionally, it is driven by emotional satisfaction, a sense of belonging (Barreto, 2009; C. P. Cunningham, 2013, p. 46), as well as group identity (Della Porta & Diani, 2020, pp. 94, 112).¹⁹ Tilly (1977, pp. 12, 14) also notes that collective action is contingent upon group's internal capacity and external opportunities.

The common aims of a diaspora facilitate its organization and mobilization, which in turn leads to collective action. Furthermore, the collective action of a diaspora is influenced by its formation process, which encompasses aspects such as repression, opportunities, threats, and the level of power. The Lebanese Armenian diaspora (LAD) exemplifies this. The emphasis placed by elites on ties and solidarity has influenced mobilization and the formation of a composite identity, thereby fostering collective action (Geukjian, 2014, p. 556). The role of entrepreneurs and leaders may be critical in overcoming the collective action problem, and support the mobilization, for example through lobbying and fundraising (Prasad & Savatic, 2021, p. 4).

Various strategies and their combinations can mitigate the collective action problem or offer partial solutions (Goldstone, 2001, p. 163; Lichbach, 1995). Diaspora groups, for example, may be incentivized through solidarity and expressive benefits (see for

¹⁹Olson (1993, p. 568) and Olson (1971, pp. 45, 53–54) argues that smaller groups can better engage in collective action. Given that many diaspora groups are not large, Olson's (1993, p. 568) argument appear to be relevant and applicable in these contexts.

selective incentives and benefits Lichbach, 1994, p. 417; Nownes, 2012; Prasad & Savatic, 2021, p. 3). The fight for change in the homeland or the aspect of solidarity can serve as key motivations. Bird (2019, p. 81) argues that loyalty and care for diasporans in the homeland and globally can be factors in overcoming the collective action problem. Tamil diasporans, despite living away from Sri Lanka, maintain strong ties to family or co-ethnics in the homeland who may be experiencing violence, and become engaged (Fair, 2005, p. 139). This illustrates how kinship can play a role in overcoming collective action problem.

3.6 Why is conceptualization of a diaspora important?

To analyze the involvement and behavior of diasporas in intrastate conflicts, as well as their potential support for rebel organizations, it is fundamental to first define the actor itself. A diaspora, as a distinct actor, should not be conflated with an ethnic group, migrant, or refugee. According to IOM GMDAC (2018), a diaspora comprises up to five common features: (1) migration, (2) collective memory, (3) connection, (4) group consciousness, and (5) kinship. Following the relevance of kinship and ethnic ties, I focus on ethnic diasporas, aiming for kin support, and seeking changes in the homeland, whereby re-connection and preservation of identity can follow as subsequent aims.

As previously discussed, a diaspora possesses agency, collective preferences, and engages in collective action. This forms the foundation for diaspora support. As a non-state actor, a diaspora can engage in politics within both its homeland and hostland, and can play a role during wartime. Diaspora support encompasses various forms such as material support, financial support or political support, the latter involving lobbying. The subsequent chapter delves into the reasons of diaspora support, the forms of external support, and the determinants influencing diaspora support for rebel organizations.

Chapter 4

Causes of diaspora support

This chapter addresses the first research question: Why do diasporas support rebel organizations? It builds upon chapter 3, where I conceptualized diasporas as an external actor, discussing their aims, mobilization, preferences, and collective action. In this chapter, I also illustrate how diaspora can support rebel organizations by providing various examples of such support. This dissertation reveals that 44% of dyad-year observations indicate diaspora sponsorship to a rebel organization between 1989 and 2014 for African and Asian intrastate conflicts. Furthermore, I investigate conditional factors based on homeland, conflict, rebel group, and diaspora characteristics and develop testable hypotheses for the empirical analysis. The hypotheses developed in this chapter aim to answer the second research question: Under which conditions is diaspora support for rebel organizations likely?

4.1 Reasons of diaspora support through delegation

Building on the discussion in chapter 3, a diaspora is characterized as a distinct actor, distinguishable from migrants and refugees. While various types of diasporas exist, both among and within a specific diaspora, common features are migration, collective memory, connection, group consciousness, and kinship.¹ Diasporas may pursue four different aims that can be interrelated: kin support, preservation of identity, re-connection to the homeland and seeking changes in the homeland. Furthermore, diaspora have agency, collective preferences and collective action, as previously explained. This dissertation specifically examines ethnic diasporas, where ethnic ties constitute the most relevant connection. Accordingly, I focus primarily on kin support and seeking changes in the homeland, with re-connection and preservation of identity being secondary, yet interlinked, aims. An example of this is the preservation and survival of ethnic identity, which occurs through kin support.

Ethnic diasporas, aiming for kin support and seeking changes in the homeland, may directly support their kin, as well as opposition or rebel organization, particularly when they aim for policy and leadership transformations in the homeland. This support can target the homeland, host country or international level, either directly or indirectly, by

¹I follow the definition of a diaspora as provided by the International Organization's Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC) (IOM GMDAC, 2018).

providing support or legitimacy for rebel organizations (Kopchick et al., 2021, pp. 4–5; Wayland, 2004, p. 11; Adamson, 2013, p. 72; Loidolt et al., 2013, p. 7; Müller-Funk, 2019, p. 254). While direct support is costly, time-consuming and bears potential risk, delegating of tasks to an agent presents a less risky and cost-saving opportunity to achieve these aims (Feaver, 2005; Haer, 2015; Karlén et al., 2021; Mitchell, 2021; Salehyan, 2010).

In alignment with the diaspora's aims of kin support and effecting changes in the homeland, I argue that the collective preferences of the diaspora center on governmental changes in the homeland and the well-being of co-ethnics and civilians, with the goal of ensuring good treatment of co-ethnics. Consequently, the tasks delegated by the diaspora encompass limiting violence against co-ethnics and civilians, as well as fighting against the government to instigate change in the homeland.

Diaspora support through delegation. In a stylized way, two key reasons for diaspora support for rebel organizations through delegation can be identified: alignment of aims and kin support. The alignment of aims enhances the likelihood of successful task execution and diminishes the risk of agency slack. Conversely, kin support is most effectively realized by actors on the ground, presenting a lower risk for the diaspora when executed through delegation compared to direct involvement. Importantly, these reasons are often interwoven and cannot be entirely separated. Additionally, these reasons can partially account for diaspora mobilization, thereby motivating external diaspora support to rebel organizations. I focus on voluntary support, intentionally excluding forced support, which follows a different rationale. Moreover, three different attributes of diaspora delegation- low costs, time saving, and reduced risk - constitute positive attributes.

I argue that kin support constitutes the primary reason of diaspora support of rebel organizations through delegation. For instance, Hear and Cohen (2017, p. 7) illustrate that kin support, encompassing family support and their protection, is relevant for diasporas. Additionally, diasporas can identify with the goals underpinning the conflict, thereby supporting the corresponding rebel organization (Huntington, 2002, p. 273). Ives (2019, pp. 1549, 1551–1552) further shows that ethnic ties enhance the likelihood of support and function as a signal. The underlying motives for diaspora support of rebel

organizations via delegation can include solidarity, guilt, or obligation (e.g. Adamson, 2013, p. 70; Brinkerhoff, 2009, 2011; Hammond, 2006; Shain, 2007, p. 35), as well as emotions like anger, frustration, or a general oppositional stance.

4.2 How do diasporas support rebel organizations?

Diasporas can support rebel organizations in various ways (Byman et al., 2001; D. E. Cunningham et al., 2013; Lichbach, 1995; Piazza, 2018; Salehyan et al., 2014). External support for rebel organizations falls into two distinct categories: voluntary versus forced support, and regular versus irregular support (Weber & Winckelmann, 1990, 114ff; Radtke, 2009, p. 199). In addition to external support by diasporas or alternative sponsors, it is important to acknowledge other forms of support for rebel organizations. These include foreign aid (Huang, 2016b, p. 58; Zürcher, 2019; Zürcher, 2017), non-external income streams such as natural resources (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; Huang, 2016b, p. 57; Radtke, 2009, p. 38), narcotic smuggling (Fair, 2005, p. 141), drug trafficking (Adamson, 2020, p. 159), and informal remittances through methods like the “trust-based traditional human courier system” (Adepoju, 2019, p. 242) or Hawala transfers (FATF/OECD, 2013; Malik, 2019; Piazza, 2018, p. 613). Furthermore, taxation of goods, engagement in criminal activities or civilian support through, for instance, the People’s Revolutionary Army in El Salvador’s exchange of education for food (Kasfir, 2015, pp. 36–37), and independent gangs which might use the rebels name for coercing diaspora support for their own purposes (Radtke, 2009, pp. 180–181) are additional strategies employed by these organizations.

Diaspora support for rebel organizations, as a form of external support, is complementary to domestic support.² This synergy between domestic and external support can strengthen the legitimacy of the rebel group. The extent of domestic support is influenced by the group’s treatment of civilians. Building on the argument that domestic support differs in nature and implications from external support (R. M. Wood, 2014b), I primarily focus on external support.

In this dissertation, the emphasis is placed on voluntary diaspora support.³ This

²External support is complementary to domestic support (Huang & Sullivan, 2020). Consequently, external diaspora support, as a subtype of external support, also exhibits this complementary.

³I acknowledge that the distinction between voluntary and forced support is not always clear-cut.

category encompasses various forms of diaspora support, including military support, political support, financial support, provision of training and weaponry, supply of foreign fighters and organizational support (Byman et al., 2001, pp. 84–99), as well as the provision of “money, logistics, manpower and intelligence” (Loidolt et al., 2013, p. 3). While the offering of safe havens and transit routes is often associated with states or neighboring countries (Byman et al., 2001, pp. 84–99), diasporas can also facilitate such safe havens within their communities, notably for rebel leaders. I focus on external diaspora support, which includes financial, material and political support.

4.2.1 Financial and material diaspora support

Material and financial support from diasporas encompass a range of activities including remittances, various forms of financial contributions, weaponry or arms transfers, and the provision of foreign fighters. Specifically, this includes remittance flows directed towards rebel organizations, rebel group affiliated non-governmental organizations and associations, arms transfers, investments in assets such as stocks, restaurants and real estate, as well as purchasing rebel group affiliated products or shopping in affiliated stores (Byman et al., 2001; Chalk, 2008, p. 101; Demmers, 2007, p. 11; Fair, 2005, p. 142; Lidow, 2016; Wayland, 2004, p. 422; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001, p. 271). Additionally, military diaspora support for rebel organizations can manifest in the provision of weaponry, as illustrated by the Irish diaspora in the United States, or through the recruitment of diasporans from host countries, such as Germany, in conflicts like the Bosnian War (Bercovitch, 2007, p. 31).

An example of financial support by the diaspora is “cash flying to Somalia” (I3). In the 2000s, this practice was prevalent among certain segments of the Somali diaspora, who would physically transport suitcases filled with money. This method became popular as remittances were difficult. However, the risks associated with this practice increased due to the emergence of the designated FTO Al-Shabab. Despite stricter

Radtke (2009, p. 202) the categories of voluntary and forced support among diasporas are not mutually exclusive. For instance, donations that ostensibly appear voluntary may not be entirely so, especially if the members of the diaspora are under surveillance. If certain donation thresholds are not met, these individuals might face significant personal consequences. These repercussions could include the inability to inherit land in Eritrea or challenges in obtaining essential official documents, such as visas or marriage certificates (Radtke, 2009, pp. 215–216).

legal restrictions being implemented in the United States in recent years, money continues to be channeled through charities and other entities.⁴ Another example is the Tamil diaspora support through donations, which includes donations, funneled support through non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and investments in Tamil businesses (Chalk, 2008, p. 101).

Financial and material support from diasporas can sometimes involve coercive elements. This is evident in the experiences of the Tamil and Kurdish diasporas, who have faced intimidation and violence against their own people by organizations like the LTTE and PKK (Demmers, 2007, p. 11). Another illustration is the Tamil Tiger's (LTTE) "tax by force" (Fair, 2005, p. 141). In cases where Tamil diasporans did not voluntarily contribute donations, they often found themselves compelled to pay their tax under conditions of social surveillance, extortion and threat of torture against family members in the LTTE areas (Byman et al., 2001, p. 50).

Forced donations, smuggling fees, and extortion from illegal migrants constitute additional sources of external support (Demmers, 2007, p. 11; Fair, 2005, p. 141). Protection money from businesses may be another form of such support. An example of this is the protection money collected by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Germany (Adamson, 2013, p. 83). The close-knit nature of diaspora communities as "self-contained units" makes them prone to influence of rebel groups where coerced support from diasporans is extracted (Byman et al., 2001, p. 56), as evidenced in the cases of the Tamil and Kurdish diasporas with respect to the PKK and LTTE.

4.2.2 Political diaspora support

External political support encompasses various activities, such as influencing the politics of the host country (Mohamoud, 2005, p. 28), including influencing the foreign policy towards the country of origin (Shain & Barth, 2003, p. 453), signing petitions to garner public attention (Baser & Swain, 2010, p. 53), hunger-strikes (Baser & Swain, 2010, p. 55), and lobbying at both at the domestic and international levels to influence the homeland (Bercovitch, 2007, p. 21; Shain & Barth, 2003, p. 450). The latter

⁴This example draws from an interview (I3) with a former director of a Counterterrorism Bureau. The interviewee possesses extensive experience in working with foreign terrorist organizations, sanctions, and state sponsors.

increased over time in the US as observed by Kopchick et al. (2021, p. 8) and is most successful if the host government aligns with the diaspora's interest (Haney & Vanderbush, 1999). Marinova (2017, p. 205) refers to diaspora lobbying as "a form of diplomacy". A notable example is the Armenian diaspora's successful lobbying in the US Congress, which hindered financial support for Azerbaijan (Koinova, 2011, pp. 346–347). An interview with a second-generation Ugandan diaspora member further illustrates political diaspora support: "I think there are ways of staying engaged even when you are in the diaspora: contact legislators, talk about human rights violations back home, use social media to get in engaged, work with activists and share their stories" (I9). Additionally, Chalk (2008) shows how Tamil diasporans contributed to political support for the LTTE by enhancing its international reputation and denouncing human rights violations by the government.

Diaspora support can be directed towards various targets, including the US or another host country, international organizations like the United Nations, or the homeland government (Lyons, 2014, p. 165; Demmers, 2007). The Ethiopian diaspora illustrates this multifaceted approach to support strategies (Lyons, 2014). Examples of lobbying can be a call "for international interventions in the conflict or for sanctions" (Orjuela, 2008, p. 438). Additionally, the diaspora may support the rebel group within the host country (e.g. Byman et al., 2001; Shain & Barth, 2003, p. 450). For example, the diaspora lobbying for the Burundian Front National de Libération (FNL) in the Dutch government (Mohamoud, 2005, p. 31), and the Eritrean diaspora garnering, for example, civil society support in Germany for the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), while also raising public awareness about the situation in Eritrea (Radtke, 2009). The success of such lobbying efforts may depend on the conflict situation, for instance, is accused of human rights violations, while the rebels are perceived as less culpable or not at all (Mohamoud, 2005, p. 31). In short, diasporas can advocate for the legitimacy of armed actor struggles and inform the public of the host country about these issues.

The diaspora can also provide moral support to the rebel organization and engage in lobbying at the international level (Buhaug et al., 2014, p. 421; Byman et al., 2001; Loidolt et al., 2013), as well as organize media campaigns (Baser & Toivanen,

2019, p. 348), or share information with host governments, which often trust diaspora information due to the civilian background of the group (Loidolt et al., 2013, p. 7). The efforts of the Kurdish diaspora in creating an imagined community supported the rebels' cause (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007, p. 150). Diaspora's disclosure of homeland information or state activities, such as human rights violations by the government, can enhance the international reputation of the rebel organization (Chalk, 2008; Piazza, 2018, p. 615; A. Roth, 2015). This is particularly evident in diaspora communities residing in more democratic host countries, compared to their homelands (Piazza, 2018, p. 615; A. Roth, 2015, p. 294). For example, the PKK ran information centers and worked together with press outlets, in addition to releasing their own press statements, as well as the establishment of exile representations, such as the "Kurdistan parliament-in-exile" in 1994 and "disseminating alternative sources of information on the situation in Kurdistan" (Adamson, 2013, p. 86).

4.2.3 Why does diaspora support terminate?

Multiple drivers can contribute to the termination of diaspora support for rebel organizations. In addition to coercive practices, I highlight four reasons that influence the discontinuation of diaspora support. Coercive practices, encompassing extortion and taxation, or the direct use of force, can be reasons to terminate support (Adamson, 2020; Byman et al., 2001; Fair, 2005). Whether members of the diaspora themselves or their relatives and kin in the homeland are directly affected is immaterial. The identified four main reasons include: (1) deviation from the diaspora's preferences, leading to agency slack, (2) inefficient use or misuse of diaspora support, (3) suitability of rebels, and (4) negative appearance or consequences for the diaspora. Moreover, the diaspora's affinity towards the host country or the presence of dual loyalties may limit their willingness to support (Shain & Barth, 2003, p. 463). The decision to withdraw or continue support for a rebel group externally may also be influenced by the embeddedness of the diaspora (Della Porta & Diani, 2020, p. 118).

In the first case, if the rebel group fails to execute the tasks delegated by the diaspora, such as the protection of kin, continuing support may become meaningless. If kin support is driving the diaspora's decision to support, harm to co-ethnics in the

homeland can lead to the withdrawal of support. Secondly, diasporas may withhold support from rebel groups due to concerns about potential misuse (Koinova, 2013, p. 448). Loidolt et al. (2013, p. 8) also argue that the inefficient use of resources or uncertainty regarding the success of a rebel group influences the ongoing or extended support from the diaspora. The characteristics and organizational structures of a rebel group, including professionalism and hierarchy, can mitigate risks associated with the incapability of efficient use of diaspora support (Haer, 2015, pp. 48, 52; Hechter, 1987; Whitford, 2002), as exemplified by the PKK and its diaspora support (Adamson, 2013, p. 81). Moreover, a decline in the rebel group's performance and a reduced probability of a successful insurgency can result in the termination of diaspora support.

Thirdly, the suitability of a rebel organization to the diaspora's interests can drive the termination of diaspora support. The diaspora may find a more suitable or closely aligned rebel group and, as a result, redirect its support to this new rebel group. Furthermore, the diaspora's interests may evolve or differ from those of the rebel group. . . Conversely, a shift in the rebel group's interests might lead to a misalignment with the diaspora's aims, prompting a termination or interruption in support if the delegated tasks no longer overlap in interests. Additionally, a transition from rebel organization to government can halt diaspora support. An example is the Eritrean diaspora's support for the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) during its struggle for independence, which was de facto reached in 1991. Subsequently, when the EPLF leadership transitioned into a provisional government and introduced a rehabilitation tax, support persisted, albeit existence of practices of surveillance and coercion, in addition to government performance.⁵ Nonetheless, this case demonstrates an instance where diaspora support to a rebel group initially directed at a rebel group evolved into support

⁵Eritreans residing abroad are subject to a rehabilitation tax of two percent of their monthly gross income, as mandated by the Eritrean government (Provisional Government of Eritrea, 1991). Additionally, they often make donations and voluntary contributions during festivals and celebrations (Hirt, 2013, p. 12). Initially, members of the diaspora voluntarily contributed, recognizing their role in supporting the state-building efforts of their homeland (Hirt & Mohammad, 2018, p. 233). Approximately one-third of Eritrea's state budget is derived from this tax, in addition to further remittances sent by the diaspora to families within Eritrea (Hirt & Mohammad, 2018, p. 237; Hirt, 2014). Access to consular services, such as passport renewal or land inheritance, imposes further obligations for the diaspora (Bozzini, 2015, p. 35). However, since 2001, there has been a growing divide within the diaspora, characterized by those supporting the government, thereby stabilizing the system, and those opposing the government, particularly its surveillance practices and coercive taxation system (Hirt, 2014, 2021; Hirt & Mohammad, 2018; Müller, 2012).

for a government due to the successful combat of the rebel group.

Lastly, the potential for negative perceptions and consequences for the diaspora may lead to the termination of diaspora support for a rebel organization. The designation of a rebel group as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO), for instance, can diminish diaspora support. This was evident in the reduced voluntary contributions from the Tamil diaspora to the LTTE following its classification as an FTO by the US (Fair, 2005, p. 144). Diasporans who are interested in assimilating into the host country and are more deeply embedded, may also fear negative repercussions if they are associated with rebel groups involved in an intrastate conflict (Shain & Barth, 2003, p. 463; Della Porta & Diani, 2020, p. 118). In summary, circumstances and coercive practices by rebel organizations, misalignment of preferences such as civilian harm, misuse of support, decreasing suitability of the rebel group, and negative consequences stemming from connections to labeled groups, can all contribute to the termination of diaspora support.

4.3 Determinants of diaspora support for rebel groups

In this section, I address the second research question: Under which conditions is diaspora support for rebel organizations likely? While numerous factors can influence the diaspora's decision to support a rebel organization, I focus on four set of determinants: conflict, rebels, diaspora, and homeland characteristics. These determinants are grounded on the two main aims of a diaspora: kin support and seeking changes in homeland. Conditional factors may also serve as signals for actors seeking support from the diaspora. Importantly, the conditions examined here are not exhaustive and may also be interrelated.

4.3.1 Conflict and rebel group characteristics

Conflict and rebel group characteristics can influence a diaspora's decision regarding external sponsorship in armed conflicts. I focus on the group-level and therefore omit individual factors such as experience of leadership abroad (Huang et al., 2021). I argue that diaspora support is less likely in multi-actor conflicts. Although a greater

number of rebel organizations presents a wider range of suitable recipients of diaspora support, this diversity may weaken the influence of the diaspora as a sponsor to a rebel organization, especially compared to a conflict with a single rebel organization where their support could be more influential. Additionally, longer conflicts may require a sustained, long-term commitment for diaspora support to be effective. Consequently, diasporas are less inclined to support rebels in conflicts of prolonged duration. In contrast, shorter conflicts, offering more immediate solutions and may be more appealing for diaspora support.

However, in the context of ethnic conflicts, the aim of kin support may persist over time. Therefore, I also explore whether ethnicity in intrastate conflicts is of relevance, hypothesizing that ethnicity is relevant, and increases the likelihood of diaspora support, regardless of conflict duration. Another crucial factor is previously applied violence. I posit that diasporas are less inclined to support rebel groups with a record of conducted violence against civilians or co-ethnic civilians, due to the inherent objective of kin support. Following the aspect of path dependency, there is a higher likelihood that such a rebel organization will continue or escalate their violence against civilians or co-ethnics. In summary, I assume that certain conflict characteristics, namely the number of rebel organizations, the duration of conflict, and prior violence against civilians, diminish the likelihood of diaspora support to rebel organizations.

Hypothesis 4.3.1 *Diaspora support to rebel organizations is less likely if the number of rebel organizations is high, the duration of conflict long, or violence against civilians was previously conducted.*

The examination of rebel group characteristics is boundless. Consequently, I limit it to characteristics pertinent to sponsorship and ethnic ties. One notable aspect is the designation of a rebel group as an US designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO). Such a designation reduces the likelihood of diaspora support due to legal consequences for the supporting diaspora. My research relies on publicly accessible sources and does not investigate potential support extending beyond this scope. A second conditional factor is the presence of alternative sponsors. Echoing Salehyan et al.'s (2014) argument of multiple sponsors diminishing the individual principal's influence, similarly, the diaspora's sway over the rebel organization is less likely when other sponsors are

involved. This is specially relevant if these alternative sponsors pursue aims that conflict with the diaspora's aim, such as a lack of interest in kin support. Furthermore, the rebel organization can exploit its bargaining position, leveraging various principals' demands while gaining their support. This leverage power is amplified when the diaspora lacks alternative agents to delegate kin support to. Conversely, existing state support can act as a driving factor for diaspora support, aiming to counter balance other sponsors.

The military strength vis-à-vis the government is crucial (Haer, 2015; Loidolt et al., 2013; Salehyan et al., 2011). A relative strong rebel organization is more likely to attract support than a weaker one. Such organizations, possessing greater potential for victory, are more appealing to diasporas seeking policy change and kin support. Additionally, domestic support can act as a signal of compliance, potentially influencing the diaspora's decision to provide complementary support. However, this is no reliable signal. Diasporas, from afar, cannot accurately differentiate whether domestic support is given voluntarily or under coercion. Generally, indications of voluntary support are more detectable in contexts where information-sharing works best, such as co-ethnic setting, or where media is less biased. If the rebel organization also recruits from a specific ethnic group (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012), this may suggest the presence of coercive elements. Moreover, a rebel group claiming to exclusively fight on behalf of an ethnic group (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012), makes diaspora support more likely to foster successful fighting, aligning with the diaspora's interests. Summarizing the expectations, I hypothesize that diaspora support is less likely if the rebel organization is designated as a US foreign terrorist organization (FTO), recruits from an ethnic group, or if state sponsors are present in the conflict. Conversely, diaspora support is more likely if a rebel organization is relatively strong compared to the government, claims to fight on behalf of an ethnic group, receives support from its ethnic group in the homeland, and multiple sponsors exist.

Rebel groups "may pursue 'state-like' projects such as social service provision in order to showcase their organizational sophistication to their foreign sponsors so that the latter is enticed to continue supplying the group with aid" (Huang & Sullivan, 2020, p. 4). This enables the rebel groups to signal commitment and attract external

sponsors, including diasporas focused on kin support. Consequently, I argue that a diasporas is more inclined to support a rebel organization that executes elements of governance. Such elements may include holding elections, establishing a justice system, providing aid, education, and health services, and more broadly, functioning in a manner akin to an organized government.

Hypothesis 4.3.2 *Diaspora support to rebel organizations is less likely if the rebel organization is a designated US foreign terrorist organization, recruits from an ethnic group, or state sponsors exist in the conflict.*

Hypothesis 4.3.3 *Diaspora support to rebel organizations is more likely if the rebel organization is relative strong compared to the government, claims to fight on behalf of an ethnic group, receives support from the ethnic group in the homeland, multiple sponsors exist or the rebels provide elements of rebel governance.*

4.3.2 Homeland characteristics

In addition to conflict and rebel group characteristics, homeland conditions related to ethnic ties and information-sharing can influence the likelihood of diaspora sponsorship to rebel organizations. A discriminated or excluded ethnic group can intensify grievances, thereby increasing the probability of diaspora support for rebel organizations. This can also enhance grievance-driven information-sharing. If the diaspora's ethnic group holds a monopoly status in the homeland, diaspora support is more likely to support the dominant status. Other conditional factors include the economic wealth and population size of the homeland. A diaspora with interest to return and support its kin may be more likely to support a rebel organization fighting in an economically wealthier homeland. Furthermore, it can be argued that a diaspora originating from a richer homeland is more likely to support a rebel organization, considering its greater possibilities of support.

A larger population enhances the likelihood of information-sharing and reduces the likelihood of ethnic targeting, thereby potentially providing incentives for diaspora support to rebel organizations. Another condition that makes diaspora support to rebel organizations more likely is access to information. Homeland media can provide additional news outlet for diasporas residing in the United States, offering insights into

behavior of rebel organizations vis-à-vis the population. Besides information-sharing through co-ethnic civilians, the extent of media bias in the homeland can affect diaspora support. If the media is biased towards the government or faces restrictions, the diaspora's access to comprehensive information is limited and their ability to exercise control mechanisms is diminished. This, in turn, leads to a control mechanisms restricted, leading to a lower likelihood of diaspora support to rebels.

Hypothesis 4.3.4 *Diaspora support to rebel organizations is more likely if the diaspora's ethnic group is discriminated or excluded from power, the homeland is economically wealthy or has a large population.*

Hypothesis 4.3.5 *Diaspora support to rebel organizations is less likely if the media in the homeland is biased or restricted.*

4.3.3 Diaspora characteristics

The last set of conditions assesses the characteristics of a diaspora. The degree of affinity that a diaspora exhibits towards civilians can hinge on its place of origin. When a diaspora originates from more than one country, it has multiple homelands. For example, the Filipino diaspora in the United States traces its origin to the Philippines, whereas the Afar diaspora originates from multiple homelands, including Djibouti and Ethiopia. I argue that a diaspora originating from multiple homelands is more affiliated to civilians due to different countries of origin. Conversely, when a rebel organization is engaged in conflict against the incumbent in a single country, it becomes more plausible to receive sponsorship from the diaspora if the diaspora itself originates from a single country rather than multiple ones. This argument is grounded in contact theory, where a main principle is that intergroup contact can reduce prejudice and discrimination under certain conditions (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005; Uluğ & Cohrs, 2017). Empirical applications include a study of the Korean diaspora in the People's Republic of China (R. M. Lee et al., 2007) and a study on Liberian refugees and the impact of intergroup contact on ethnic identities during the reconciliation process following the Liberian civil war (De Tezanos-Pinto et al., 2017).

Based on kin support and seeking policy change in the homeland, a diaspora with conflict-driven migration background, in contrast to those driven by economic or mixed

reason, may have stronger grievances and and display greater sympathy towards rebel organizations opposing the incumbent government. Consequently, I hypothesize that a diaspora with a conflict-driven background is more inclined to support such rebel organizations. Similarly, a diaspora having a transborder ethnic kin can act as a determinant for diaspora sponsorship, primarily due to the geographical proximity to the conflict. Furthermore, a conditional factor is the diaspora's possibility to return to the homeland. In line with the diaspora's aims of re-connecting with the homeland and preserving their identity, a diaspora is more likely to support a rebel organization when there exists a viable possibility for them to return to their homeland.

Hypothesis 4.3.6 *Diaspora support to rebel organizations is more likely if the diaspora originates from a single homeland, has a possibility to return, has a transborder ethnic kin, or a conflict-driven migration background.*

Chapter 5

Consequences of diaspora sponsorship to rebel organizations

Chapter 4 has focused on the diaspora's aims of kin support and seeking changes in the homeland. It explained that the diaspora's collective preferences center on the well-being of co-ethnics and civilians, alongside the pursuit of governmental changes. Consequently, the diaspora delegates the tasks of limited violence against co-ethnics and civilians as well as fighting against the government for change in the homeland to a rebel organization in return of political, material and financial support. I also formulated testable hypotheses for the conditions under which diaspora support is more or less likely based on four categories of determinants of diaspora support: conflict, rebel group, diaspora and homeland characteristics.

This chapter 5 examines consequences of diaspora support. Specifically, I address the third research question: How does diaspora sponsorship of rebel organizations impact civilian victimization or rebel governance? Given the diaspora's aim of kin support, I focus on limited violence against civilians and co-ethnics, as well as provision of elements of rebel governance. This includes the provision of public goods and social services as well as participatory elements of governance provided by the rebel organization.

It is of academic and policy relevance whether diasporas can effectively limit civilian victimization from afar, or conversely, if diaspora sponsorship exacerbates violence against civilians. Additionally, the influence of diaspora sponsorship on rebel governance concerning civilians in intrastate conflicts requires further investigation. I tackle these aspects through the principal-agent perspective in this chapter. Diaspora support is an instance of external support by non-state actors for armed non-state actors.

I employ an information-based theory to analyze the consequences of diaspora sponsorship. Agency slack occurs if a rebel group fails to adhere to the tasks delegated by the diaspora. I use the terms *agency slack* and *shirking* synonymously.¹ However, the successful identification of agency slack hinges on an informed diaspora. Thus, a diaspora needs regular access to information regarding the behavior of rebel groups and the conflict situation in the homeland. While direct control of the rebel organization by the diaspora is possible, it is often impractical due to the high costs and challenges

¹Theoretically, various types of diaspora support might have distinct effects on the degree of agency slack. Nevertheless, theorizing how different types of support, such as political or financial support, influence the rebel groups dependency and potential shifts of agency slack fall outside the scope of this dissertation.

associated with monitoring a distant actor in a conflict zone. Additionally, this would impose an additional burden on the diaspora. Consequently, I focus on indirect control as a mechanism.

Information-sharing mechanism.

In this principal-agent framework, I utilize an information-sharing mechanism, adapting McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) concept of fire-alarm to the conflict setting.² This approach posits that the diaspora, acting as the principal, is informed about the rebel group's action through information shared by co-ethnic civilians on the ground. This information-sharing mechanism underscores the crucial relational dynamics between the diaspora and co-ethnics. It also emphasizes the importance of these connections in understanding sponsorship and its consequences for civilians in the conflict zone.

Anecdotal evidence from interviews conducted indicates active information exchange between members of diaspora communities residing in the United States and their respective family and kin in the homeland. For instance, members of the the Afar, Filipino, Nigerian, and Ugandan diasporas in the United States maintain contact with the populations in their respective homeland through various messenger channels and news outlets, as illustrated by interviews conducted (I4, I8, I9, and I13). “My grandfather is very politically engaged. He watches the news all day long. [...] He is 87 years old. And he sits in front of the news all day watching and calling his friends in the Philippines. [...] Then he'll tell me about what he thinks, what's going on right now” (I8). The interviewee mentions further local contacts for gaining information: “I have a lot of colleagues and friends in the Philippines. So my colleagues who live in the Philippines, they sometimes just send me articles for very, very local coverage. I don't read them. I mean, I read the articles consistently, but like the news outlets I don't look at consistently” (I8).

Modern technology and communication channels enhance the facilitation of such exchanges, particularly through virtual platforms or messenger apps (e.g. Dufoix, 2008, p. 98; Brinkerhoff, 2009). An example involves an Afar diasporan, who in 1999, relied

²The *fire alarm* refers to a situation where third parties notify the principal about instances of “agency transgressions” (Haer, 2015, p. 46). This fire-alarm mechanism is akin to Shesterinina's (2021) information-filtering mechanism. However, there is a distinct focus in each mechanism. The information-sharing mechanism is mainly concerned with identifying and addressing agency slack. In contrast, the information-filtering mechanism is often employed in the context of collective threat perception and mobilization within civil wars.

on neighbors' support to call his mother, whereas "now, WhatsApp messenger, phone, to be everyday in touch with family and friends" (I13). Additionally, "WhatsApp is main channel and social media to stay in touch; visit Uganda once a year, messaging varies, once a month or every two weeks at least stay in touch with someone back home [...] I am always on twitter to check what's going on" (I9). Furthermore, research on social media shows its intentional use in supporting opposition actors, even though this is often contingent upon overcoming restrictions on freedom of expression (Gohdes & Steinert-Threlkeld, n.d.; McGarty et al., 2014; Moss, 2021).

Principal-agent framework. The Principal-agent (PA) model is a framework that involves at least two actors: the principal and the agent. In this framework, the principal delegates specific tasks to an agent. The reasons for such delegation are multifaceted, for instance, kinship, cost and time efficiencies, less-risk strategy, gains in efficiency, access to local expertise, and the possibility for delegating blame (cf. Feaver, 2005; Haer, 2015; Mitchell, 2021; Salehyan, 2010). Following the delegation of tasks, the issue of moral hazard may arise. Moral hazard refers to hidden action by the agent (Berman et al., 2019; Popovic et al., 2012; Rauchhaus, 2009; Varian, 2020).

In this dissertation, the diaspora functions as the principal who delegates the tasks of combatting the incumbent government and limiting civilian victimization to the agent, which in this case is a rebel organization. I follow Lidow (2016) and Salehyan et al. (2011, 2014) who apply principal-agent perspectives to model similar dynamics of external sponsorship. Notably, the preferences of rebel organizations and the diaspora regarding the limitation of civilian victimization do not always align. Nevertheless, acquiring additional support aligns with the interests of the rebel organization, provided that its minimally acceptable level of autonomy is maintained.

In a stylized way, two distinct reasons for diaspora support via delegation can be distinguished: (1) alignment of aims, and (2) kin support. Importantly, these reasons are often interrelated. Furthermore, alignment of preferences between a rebel organization and a diaspora is not necessarily given, particularly since the employment of violence often represents a divergence in their preferences.³ The acquisition of additional support is in the interest of the rebel group, as long as such support does not

³Following Mitchell (2021, p. 148), the aims of the principal and agent can be different, in particular regarding their motivation but do not always need to be conflicting.

compromise its minimally acceptable level of autonomy. A trade-off exists for the diaspora between the benefits derived from delegating policy change in the homeland and specifically, protection of civilians, and the risk of agency slack. Concurrently, the rebel group faces a trade-off between securing additional resources through external support and losing autonomy.

My research concentrates on external diaspora support as a strategy to achieve the aim of policy change in the homeland and kin support, subsequently preservation of identity and (re-)connection with the homeland. An initial point of divergent preferences between the diaspora (principal), and the rebel organization (agent) is the victimization of civilians. Given the advantages of delegating the responsibility of limited violence, it is most likely that the diaspora will opt for external support of a rebel group rather than direct intervention. However, I acknowledge that theoretically the diaspora might choose to directly fight against the government, employ mercenaries, or exclusively support the civilians through means such as direct remittances, rather than supporting a rebel group externally. Despite these possibilities, I focus on the external support of rebel organizations by the diaspora as the most beneficial and practical strategy for achieving the aims of the diaspora.

5.1 Diaspora: A unique principal

Discussions regarding the strength (Petrova, 2019, p. 2171) or weakness of a diaspora as a principal (Loidolt et al., 2013, p. 8) are prevalent. Within the considered context presented in chapter 1.2.2, I argue that the diaspora is a strong principal capable of ensuring that the supported rebel organization acts in compliance of the diaspora's aim of kin support. However, I recognize Melucci (1995, p. 59) who points out that "collective actors are never completely in control of their own actions". Independent of a weak or strong principal, the principal-agent model remains applicable to the phenomenon of diaspora sponsorship of rebel organizations.

Coerced diaspora support highlights the limitations of the diaspora as a strong principal. It can be argued that the rebel group, acting as an agent, possesses greater power, thereby constraining the diaspora's actions as a principal. Instances of coerced

diaspora support include the support of the Eritrean diaspora for the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), which, while voluntary, involves a "forced tax" affecting consular services for Eritreans living abroad (Radtke, 2009). In addition to donations and voluntary contributions, the LTTE also enforced a tax (e.g. Fair, 2005, p. 141). However, the examples of the Tamil, Irish, and Kurdish diasporas demonstrate notable voluntary contributions and donations, illustrating the diaspora's leverage and the concurrent existence of coerced and voluntary support (Byman et al., 2001; Fair, 2005).

Petrova (2019, p. 2171) demonstrates that the diaspora significantly influences the strategic decisions of rebel groups, enhancing the shift towards non-violent tactics. The diaspora's resource capabilities support this change in means (Petrova, 2019, p. 2171). The Tamil diaspora, for example, has had a profound effect on the LTTE (Fair, 2005, p. 146; Orjuela, 2008). Specifically, the influence of the Tamil diaspora on the LTTE included facilitating platforms for human rights advocacy and democratic processes (Orjuela, 2008, p. 446; Zunzer, 2004). Furthermore, diasporans can also engage as foreign fighters, directly participating in conflicts on the ground. Examples include Bosnian diasporans residing in Germany (K. Roth, 2005, p. 296) or Armenian diasporans (e.g. Koinova, 2011, p. 348; Moss, 2020, p. 1672; S. Sullivan, 2004). Consequently, foreign fighters indicate a strong principal that can also impose control directly within conflict zones.

Additionally, the diaspora constitutes a unique principal endowed with a considerable degree of control and insight on the ground, due to the fire-alarm mechanism. The fire-alarm mechanism refers to the information-sharing between co-ethnics in the homeland and the diaspora with regards to the rebel group's behavior. Variation in speed and degree of punishment can vary depending on the centralization of the diaspora, although the capacity for punishment remains viable even in a more loose setting. The diaspora presents unique opportunities for rebel organizations distinct from those offered by state sponsors, a situation that can be explained through the principal-agent framework incorporating the fire-alarm mechanism.

Delving into the diaspora as a principal, encompassing a diversity of individual principals and a network of actors, exceeds the scope of this dissertation. Nonetheless, I acknowledge possibilities of considering the diaspora's heterogeneity, thereby moving

beyond the unitary actor assumption. Specifically, the organizational structure and hierarchy, alongside the size of the group⁴, concentration⁵, availability of resources and the strength of ethnic ties with co-ethnics civilians, offer avenues for future research.

5.2 A principal-agent framework

The diaspora, acting as the principal, delegates the tasks of combating the incumbent government and protecting civilians to the rebel organization, which serves as the agent. The diaspora faces a trade-off: the advantages of task delegation against the risks of agency slack. Concurrently, the rebel group deals with a trade-off between acquiring additional resources through external support and losing autonomy.

The diaspora as a principal chooses between supporting a rebel organization and withholding support. Upon receiving diaspora support, the rebel group may be incentivized to employ violence against civilians if it is deemed to enhance the group's chances of victory or represents a more beneficial strategy. The aims of the rebel organization can differ across and within groups and change over time (e.g. Kasfir, 2015, p. 41), encompassing aims such as survival, territorial control, state-building, or secession (e.g. Jo, 2015, p. 69; Schlichte & Schneckener, 2015, pp. 409–410; Agbiboa, 2015; Kalyvas, 2008, p. 128; Anders, 2020; D. E. Cunningham et al., 2009; D. E. Cunningham et al., 2013). In pursuit of these aim(s), rebel groups apply at least a minimal level of violence. Violence against civilians may serve to secure domestic support (R. M. Wood et al., 2012) and open up additional resource opportunities (Asal & Ayres, 2018; R. M. Wood, 2014a), increase attention, highlight the government's failure to protect civilians (Hultman, 2009, 2012), or enhance negotiation leverage with the government (Hultman, 2007). This dissertation specifically concentrates on the analysis of lethal, intentional, selective or collective violence by rebel organizations.⁶

Figure 5.1 visualizes the model in a stylized way. While I model diaspora support for a single rebel organization, I recognize that multiple organizations may exist and

⁴The impact of diaspora thresholds on the escalation of violence and war outcomes is exemplified by the research conducted by Mariani et al. (2018).

⁵Prasad and Savatic (2021, p. 8) highlight the importance of these factors by incorporating them as control variables in their analysis. These factors are also relevant in the context of diaspora mobilization.

⁶For a detailed overview of types of and reasons for violence, please refer to chapter 2.1.3.




Figure 5.1: External diaspora support for a rebel organization

receive support from various external sponsors. Furthermore, I explain modifications of the theoretical framework, particularly regarding violence against civilians and co-ethnics in section 5.4.

The principal-agent model of diaspora support involves two sequential steps: (1) The diaspora decides between support or non-support for one rebel organization. (2) The rebel organization then decides whether to escalate or limit violence against civilians. Should the rebel organization opt to minimize civilian harm, it can anticipate ongoing support from the diaspora, and conversely, increased violence against civilians may lead to a withdrawal of support. I focus on limited violence against civilians, which refers to the implementation of relatively low levels of violence, acknowledging that the complete absence of violence is highly improbable within the framework of intrastate conflict.

The developed principal-agent framework includes endogeneity between external diaspora support and the behavior of rebel groups towards civilians, particularly co-ethnic civilians. Due to the connection between co-ethnics and a diaspora, the reverse causality is of importance for the principal-agent model. My focus is on the relationship between the diaspora and civilian victimization by rebel organizations. However, it's crucial to note that the diaspora's decision to either support or withhold support from a rebel group is endogenous to how that group treats civilians. This connection underscores a reverse causality in the actions of the involved actors, indicating that the behavior of the rebel group can impact the diaspora's decision to provide support to the rebel organization.⁷ The influence of rebel groups' behavior on diaspora support is a crucial aspect within the presented principal-agent framework. However,

⁷I concentrate on the aspect of reverse causality, but theoretically within a simultaneous framework, I would also take simultaneity into account.

the reciprocal dynamic between the actions of rebel groups and the diaspora's support decisions introduces endogeneity, particularly in the form of reverse causality. I adopt the approach of Salehyan et al. (2014, p. 646), who, in examining the context of external state support, highlight the importance of this endogenous relationship and argue for analyzing correlation instead of causation. They further suggest that while an instrumental variable method could potentially mitigate the issue of endogeneity, it would not fully address the theoretical implications of the principal-agent framework, which necessitates consideration of reverse causality (Salehyan et al., 2014, p. 646). Therefore, my theoretical framework recognizes the reverse causality wherein diaspora support influences rebel group actions, and, conversely, the actions of rebel groups towards co-ethnic civilians affect the diaspora's decisions. This endogeneity is crucial for understanding the relations and behavior within a principal-agent model. Echoing Lidow (2016, p. 189), this analysis does not claim causality but instead evaluates the extent to which the proposed aspects are empirically observable.

Screening process. The screening process occurs prior to the diaspora's decision to support a rebel organization, and falls outside the scope of this dissertation. For the sake of completeness, I briefly outline it here. The diaspora engages in a screening process to identify a compliant rebel group among potential agents (rebel organizations). This screening predominantly relies on shared information with the co-ethnics in the homeland, which regularly share relevant information with the diaspora. The fire-alarm mechanism further impacts the screening process. Following the argument of Siroky and Dzutsati (2015, p. 812), highlighting that ethnically homogeneous settings facilitate monitoring mechanisms and mitigate information leakage, I posit that an ethnically diverse setting complicates the successful screening of a compliant rebel group. This argument is also relevant for the information-sharing mechanism. I further assume both incomplete and perfect information. The information asymmetry is two-fold: firstly, the diaspora lacks comprehensive knowledge about the rebel group's capacity to combat the government; secondly, the diaspora is uncertain about whether the rebel group employs violence against civilians and, if so, to what extent. Consequently, the diaspora's decision to provide external support to a rebel organization is made while it is uncertain about the type of rebel organization. Although in both settings,

the diaspora prefers no violence against co-ethnic civilians, the underlying intention of delegation may vary depending on the setting. In the first situation, the diaspora seeks to influence the agent to refrain from violence, whereas in the subsequent case, it advocates for a reduction in the level of violence. In this dissertation, I do not differentiate between these two intentions of support.

5.2.1 Why apply a principal-agent framework?

There are several reasons for employing a principal-agent (PA) framework to examine diaspora support to rebel organizations. First and foremost, the diaspora represents a unique principal characterized by its organizational structure and preferences. As explained in chapter 3, the diaspora can have collective preferences. Moreover, the assumption of a unitary actor aligns well with the theoretical framework, as it allows to model the dynamics between the diaspora and rebel groups regarding support and civilian victimization.

Karlén (2020, p. 12) outlines the concept of a collective principal. By extending the principal-agent model to include multiple principals, the diaspora can be regarded as a collective principal. Given that individual diaspora groups are dispersed globally across various host countries, they collectively embody a collective principal. For instance, the collective Tamil principal comprises Tamil diaspora groups in Canada, the US, India and other host countries. Considering the group-level perspective and collective action, I do not distinguish among individuals within the collective principal nor explore the empirical implications thereof. Instead, I acknowledge the collective principal and assume, for the purposes of the dissertation's scope conditions, that all diaspora groups across different countries can be treated as a single unitary actor.

The diaspora may feature a centralized leader who still executes the power and ensures coherent action. Conversely, the diaspora might be characterized by a loose network lacking formalization. Scholars such as Loidolt et al. (2013, p. 8) suggest that rebel groups find an unorganized diaspora appealing because it allows them to retain more autonomy while still receiving support. The structural characteristics of a diaspora diminish its capacity to impact military strategies of a rebel group, rendering it less powerful than a state (Loidolt et al., 2013, p. 8). Nonetheless, the diaspora can

engage in activities, such as political lobbying, on behalf of the rebel organization and play a crucial role in legitimizing the group within the host country or internationally. Thus, the diaspora offers unique possibilities for the rebel organization in comparison to a state sponsor, which the principal-agent relationship can model partially.

The selected theoretical framework allows for a direct comparison of diaspora support and external state support in the PA framework. My analysis is centered on support for rebel organizations; however, I also recognize instances of diaspora support for states, such as the case of Eritrea after its independence.⁸ Moreover, the distinct preferences of diaspora and rebel organizations, along with the trade-offs encountered by both, underscore the applicability of employing a PA model to understand diaspora sponsorship in more detail.

An ethnically diverse population makes an information-sharing mechanism less likely, potentially leading to a less informed diaspora. However, the diaspora maintains the option to withdraw its support or terminate it. Furthermore, the diaspora's reasoning of support is less likely associated with an interest in sponsorship denial. Thus, the concern for non-association with the rebel organization becomes irrelevant, as the principal's aim of limited violence, aligns with internationally acceptable standards. It is more plausible for the diaspora to stop its support, thereby sanctioning the agent, rather than continuing support with minimal visibility of its sponsorship role. Additionally, if the diaspora has an interest in compliance from the rebel group, thus conditions its support on the group's treatment of co-ethnics, this indicates a preference for protecting co-ethnic individuals over support for the rebel organization without further instructions on interactions with co-ethnic civilians. While Heinkelmann-Wild and Mehrl (2022) find that state sponsors with an ethnic tie are more likely to engage in orchestration instead of delegation, I argue that the diaspora's interest in reducing violence against civilians or co-ethnics does not necessarily align with the goals

⁸The Eritrean diaspora supported the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) during its quest for independence, which was de facto achieved in 1991. The EPLF leadership transitioned into a provisional government and implemented a rehabilitation tax. Initially, diaspora members voluntarily contributed, acknowledging their role in supporting the state-building efforts of the homeland (Hirt & Mohammad, 2018, p. 233). However, from 2001 onwards, the diaspora community has been divided between those who support the government, thereby contributing to the stabilization of the system, and those who oppose the government due to its surveillance and coercive taxation system (Hirt, 2021; Hirt & Mohammad, 2018; Hirt, 2014; Müller, 2012).

of the rebel organization.⁹ Therefore, monitoring and sanctioning become essential components of diaspora sponsorship.

5.2.2 How can the diaspora increase compliance?

The diaspora, as a principal, can enhance compliance by the rebel organization through four channels: 1) punishment and sanctions, 2) reward, 3) reciprocity, and 4) improved monitoring. For instance, the diaspora can punish non-compliance of adhering to limited violence by stopping support, thereby reinforcing the conditionality of its external support. Such actions also foster a learning effect over time, as the discontinuation of support from the diaspora due to non-compliant behavior by the rebel group serves as a deterrent. Nonetheless, Mitchell (2021, p. 75) points out that signaling punishment may lead the agent to diminish efforts in carrying out the delegated tasks. Consequently, the diaspora may tolerate a minimal level of violence to maintain the rebel group's efforts rather than risking total non-compliance due to withdrawal of further support. Sanctioning non-compliant behavior is a strategy to overcome the moral hazard problem (Haer, 2015, p. 46; Rauchhaus, 2009, p. 881). The speed and extent of punishment can vary depending on the centralization of the diaspora, although the option to punish remains in a more loose setting.

Conversely, the diaspora can reward the rebel organization through, for instance, increasing or prolonging support.¹⁰ The diaspora sustains its support over time. Moreover, it might contribute to promote the rebel organization's image in the host country or on the international level to reward the rebel group's behavior. Consequently, the rebel organization may experience legitimacy or a boost in legitimacy, both domes-

⁹An alternative theoretical framework to consider is the orchestration model. Heinkelmann-Wild and Mehrl (2022) contrast delegation and orchestration in the context of external state support. Unlike delegation, orchestration, does not imply control mechanisms that enable the monitoring and sanctioning of agency slack. Instead, it offers external support through incentives without leading to withdrawal (Heinkelmann-Wild & Mehrl, 2022, p. 119). The sponsors benefits from plausible deniability and adopts a hands-off approach by foregoing control mechanisms, which are typically incorporated to varying extents in PA models. Moreover, shirking by the rebel organization often go unnoticed by the state sponsor (Heinkelmann-Wild & Mehrl, 2022, p. 119). Transferring the framework of orchestration to diaspora sponsorship could be considered partially feasible, although it would entail distinct mechanisms due to the reliance on information-sharing mechanisms that depend on the sponsor's interest in monitoring.

¹⁰See Haer (2015, p. 58) and Rauchhaus (2009, p. 881) for a strategy of reward to overcome moral hazard.

tically and internationally, due to the support from the diaspora and adherence to its delegated tasks. Such an outcome could be particularly advantageous for rebel groups combating the incumbent government to demonstrate a contrasting behavior by limiting violence against civilians.

In the context of repeated interactions, reciprocity affects the likelihood of rebel organizations exhibiting agency slack, such as conducting violence against civilians, due to the potential loss of diaspora support in subsequent periods. Reciprocity enhances the principal's options of "social" control and complicating the agent's capacity for dissent (Gubler & Selway, 2012, p. 210; Haer, 2015, p. 35). Reciprocity, fostered by shared ethnic ties, increases compliance (Haer, 2015, p. 33). Further opportunities occur through the choice of support, including provision of training.¹¹

Monitoring

Haer (2015, p. 45) illustrates that reporting all activities of agents is one way to enhance compliance. "However, agents have no incentive to reveal their individual actions. On the contrary, because of the existence of a preference asymmetry they have all reasons not to reveal their actions." (Haer, 2015, pp. 45–46). Consequently, this strategy proves unfeasible for the diaspora-rebel organization relationship. Nonetheless, the diaspora can lower the monitoring costs.¹² Unlike an external state sponsor, the diaspora benefits from the fire-alarm mechanism through information-sharing by the ethnic population. The diaspora leverages the ethnic group in the homeland, which offers reliable, and more cost-effective monitoring options. Although a state's intelligence apparatus might be beneficial, it is more costly for a state than a diaspora.

The mechanism of information-sharing, as a means of enhancing monitoring, is most relevant in my dissertation, particularly following the analysis I have conducted. The diaspora is unable to comprehensively monitor the rebel organization's behavior, specifically in terms of its efforts to mitigate violence against civilians. While I recognize the potential for sanctions and rewards in the context of repeated interactions as

¹¹The hypothesis by Haer (2015, p. 58): "The more training the combatants receive, the higher their level of effective organizational commitment", suggests that training has a positive effect on compliance levels. Training support not only increases the rebel group's professionalism and fighting capacity, but also ensures indoctrination and compliance with the interests of the diaspora.

¹²For instance, Haer (2015, p. 46), Rauchhaus (2009, p. 881), and Pollack (1997) discuss improving monitoring costs for a principal.

previously discussed, this dissertation concentrates on the concept of indirect monitoring facilitated by the fire-alarm mechanism. This mechanism serves as an indirect way through which the diaspora can influence the behavior of the rebels. By leveraging indirect control through the fire-alarm mechanism, the diaspora achieves benefits in terms of cost and time savings, alongside enhanced monitoring capabilities. This is one possibility of mitigating agency slack, which is characterized by deviating from the delegated task of limiting violence against civilians.

The diaspora is informed about the behaviors of rebel organizations through co-ethnic civilians on the ground. This process of information-sharing enables civilians with agency. Such a mechanism of information exchange proves most applicable when there exists a shared ethnic tie between civilians and diaspora. This is particularly the case when the diaspora has co-ethnics in the country of conflict. Chapter 3 describes the importance of ethnic ties in relation to the diaspora. For instance, the capacity for monitoring is diminished in settings characterized by ethnic diversity (Siroky & Dzutsati, 2015). Within a multi-ethnic group of civilians, the prospects for information-sharing diminish due to the reduced presence of co-ethnics. Furthermore, the process of sharing information can be biased by noise, thereby making trustworthy information more costly due to the necessity of additional verification processes.

5.2.3 Scope conditions

I acknowledge that the characteristics of a diaspora, a rebel organization, and civilians can influence the decision to support or engage in violence at both stages. I maintain all factors constant in order to analyze, *ceteris paribus*, the dynamic between a diaspora and rebel organization, with a focus on civilian victimization or rebel governance. In line with the principal-agent literature and scholarship on external state sponsorship, I consider actors to be unitary and boundedly rational.¹³ Furthermore, I follow the modeling approach of Mariani et al. (2018), assuming migration is exogenous.

Drawing on the detailed argumentation in chapter 3.5, I theorize that a diaspora is a unitary actor with collective preferences. Similarly, rebel organizations, states, and civilians are conceptualized as single actors due to a group-level analytical framework.

¹³See for example, Simon (1990).

From a theoretical standpoint, the preferences of a diaspora group may be endogenous to the host countries value system and legal principles such as human rights or democratic principles. Consequently, a diaspora group's preferences could be influenced by the host countries values, leading to modifications in their stances on issues such as the acceptability of civilian victimization. Conversely, a diaspora may influence the host countries values or might not be impacted. The members of the diaspora are spread across the globe and reside in various countries with different values and principles.

Given the unitary actor assumption, alongside the extensive range of potential interactions between influencing and being influenced by the host country, and considering the wide dispersion of values and principles across nations, I do not explore the interplay between the diaspora's and the host country's principles and values. This is due to the challenge of discerning which actor predominates in terms of specific values and preferences. Additionally, this dissertation omits the examination of circumstances that fall within the window of opportunity, such as scenarios where the low costs of violence render coerced domestic support more beneficial.¹⁴

5.2.4 Actors' preferences

The diaspora can have a preference for policy change in the homeland, such as the replacement of the government, a view that can reflect in alignment of aims between the diaspora and rebel organization. Following the diaspora's aim of kin support, the diaspora's main preference is limited violence against co-ethnic civilians.¹⁵ For instance,

¹⁴The low costs of violence present an opportunity for rebel organizations to coerce domestic support, thereby enhancing their likelihood of achieving victory or territorial gains from the government. Additionally, rebel organizations may target civilians as a strategic approach to their combat tactics. Should higher instances of violence augment the probability of attaining their aims, such groups are inclined to adopt this strategy. Moreover, the time horizon of a rebel group may impact its decision to limit violence against civilians. A rebel group with a short-term focus may perceive immediate benefits from violence against civilians, considering the lag in detection and response to internal discrepancies which do not automatically translate into withdrawal of diaspora support. Conversely, a long-term focused rebel group may exhibit a different behavior. Anticipating repercussions, specifically punishment, from the diaspora for agency slack, a group with long-term goals seeks to maintain ongoing support from the diaspora. By executing the delegated task of limited violence, the group secures sustained support from the diaspora. Furthermore, limiting violence can enhance the rebel group's legitimacy as an actor both internationally and domestically. By adopting a strategy of limited violence, the rebel organization may not only bolster diaspora support but also attract additional sponsors. In conclusion, the factors described herein offer a starting point for future research in this area.

¹⁵I acknowledge that the diaspora is heterogeneous and the possibility that they may endorse civilian victimization where kin support does not constitute their primary aim. For example, Asal and Ayres

Bercovitch (2007, p. 36) underscores the diaspora's focus on their kin, emphasizing their "concern for, the state or group they left behind". Although diasporas can have strong interests in lower levels of violence against co-ethnics given kinship, their interest may extend to the broader civilian population as well. In this context, I differentiate diaspora's interests and propose related hypotheses, following a detailed explanation of the main implications derived from my theoretical framework.

The preferences of civilians center on survival and the attainment of the highest possible quality of life, and rejects being victimized by any actor involved in the conflict. Individuals who are co-ethnics reside in the country of origin and share the same ethnic identity with those in the diaspora. Their agency is limited. They are, however, able to share information to a diaspora through the fire-alarm mechanism. On the other hand, the government aims to remain in power, thereby avoiding defeat in its combat with a rebel organization.

The rebel organization aims for victory and maximum autonomy. Additional support provides more resources, which in turn, positively influences the probability of victory. As a result, the rebel organization may be indifferent towards the employment of limited violence. Generally, the rebel organization's preference for violence against co-ethnics or civilians can be subject to variation based on a multitude of factors (e.g. R. M. Wood, 2014a; R. M. Wood et al., 2012).

5.3 Why do rebel organizations apply violence against civilians?

In the principal-agent framework discussed in this chapter, the preferences of the diaspora and the rebel organization do not necessarily align. Although rebel organizations may receive support from the diaspora, they possess their own goals and preferences, which I briefly elaborate upon here. Under the outlined scope conditions, the rebel organization is a unitary actor¹⁶, legitimating its presence among the civilian popula-

(2018) or Jo (2015) argue that diasporas may promote violence against non co-ethnics as a means to victory.

¹⁶Even when relaxing the assumption of the unitary actor, it is observed that the majority of rebel groups possess centralized leadership structures. A strong leader, exemplified by Abdullah Öcalan in the case of PKK (Adamson, 2020, p. 159), indicates the authority to issue orders for operations and

tion through either coercion or voluntary support. Given the increased costs associated with coercive means, I assume that voluntary support offers greater benefits to rebel organizations in comparison to support that is obtained through coercion.¹⁷

The rebel organization fights against the government, striving for victory in the intrastate conflict. It seeks to maximize its support and, as a result, appreciates diaspora support. Concurrently, it wants to maintain the highest degree of independence from external sponsors, including the diaspora. To achieve its aims, the rebel group employs at least a minimal level of violence. Various factors may affect the group's utilization of violence (e.g. R. M. Wood, 2014a; R. M. Wood et al., 2012), as discussed in chapter 2.1.3. Additionally, the rebel organization may also provide public goods to enhance its legitimacy and signal its capacity on an international scale, such as attracting new sponsors or inciting further interest from the diaspora for sponsorship.

In this dissertation, I focus on strategic reasons for rebel organizations to use violence against civilians or co-ethnics. Rebel organizations may employ violence against civilians to: (1) limit and deter collaboration with the government, (2) enhance negotiation leverage, (3) increase legitimacy and garner attention, (4) attract sponsors, and (5) implement a strategy characterized by high benefits and low costs. I also outline the risks associated with rebel groups accepting support from the diaspora.

When a rebel organization engages in violence against civilians, it can limit the agency of civilians and potential collaboration with the government (e.g. Valentino, 2014). Such violence can also lead to the displacement of populations and shelter possibilities among the population, thereby fostering conditions that can be exploited by rebel organizations (Fjelde & Hultman, 2014). Moreover, civilian victimization by rebels can undermine the workforce available for the government's military supply (Valentino et al., 2006, p. 351). Consequently, it limits the government's military capabilities over the long term.

Secondly, violence against civilians may bolster the negotiating position of rebel organizations vis-à-vis the incumbent government, underscoring the government's inability to provide security and protection (Hultman, 2007). Consequently, one can

serves as the principal negotiator with government.

¹⁷Although civilians possess agency, the dynamics of the relationship between rebels and civilians are characterized by a certain degree of asymmetry. Rebel organizations may employ force to receive resources (R. M. Wood, 2014a, p. 982), leading to the targeting of civilians to secure coerced support.

argue that the government fails in its fundamental tasks, including the protection of civilians, necessitating changes within the homeland to guarantee civilian protection. Moreover, the rebel organization has no internal incentive to limit civilian victimization.

Thirdly, rebel organizations may employ violence against civilians to enhance their domestic and international legitimacy and garner attention. By employing terrorist tactics, insurgents aim to instill fear (e.g. Goodwin, 2006), capture the attention of an audience, potentially increasing external support from, for instance, aligned diaspora communities (Asal & Ayres, 2018).

The position of state sponsors towards civilian victimization presents another rationale for an insurgent group's engagement in violence against civilians. Multiple sponsors are beneficial for the rebel group, which, in turn, seeks to attract a diverse range of external sponsors and opts for strategies enhancing victory over the government. Violence against civilians or co-ethnics may be legitimized within an insurgent group's strategy and not necessarily face condemnation from non-diaspora sponsors. While the diaspora may strongly favor minimizing violence against civilians, other sponsors, such as state sponsors, might not share this preference or may even support civilian victimization. Unless the loss of autonomy exceeds the benefits of additional support, rebel organizations will strive to engage a variety of external sponsors to gain further support and leverage the demands of each sponsor against the others. An increase in the number of sponsors diminishes the influence of any single sponsor over the rebel organization's autonomy as well as the degree of dependence on any particular principal.

Further strategic reasons for civilian victimization include the low cost of violence against civilians, the unpredictability of diaspora behavior, and the minimal likelihood of detecting agency slack, thereby reducing the chance of punishment and withdrawal of diaspora support. When the costs of violence against civilians are negligible, rebel groups may have an incentive to pretend no violence to gain diaspora support, while opting for violence. Over time, this results in the loss of diaspora support. However, a potential concern for a rebel organization is the credibility of diaspora support. For instance, the rebel group faces uncertainty regarding the consequences of deviating from

the delegated tasks as it does when it engages in violence against civilians. Mitchell (2021, p. 136) mentions this uncertainty within a principal-agent framework, where the actions anticipated by the agent in response to the principal's decisions may not align with the actual outcomes. The rebel organization may anticipate a decrease or termination of support upon non-compliance, whereas the diaspora's reaction can vary. Conversely, the agent may expect continued support, hoping the diaspora remains unaware of any agency slack, only for the diaspora to withdraw its support promptly. As discussed in chapter 4, the presence of ethnic ties serves as strong signal of commitment.

Violence against co-ethnics

Rebel organizations use violence against co-ethnics of the diaspora. Such actions are driven by strategic considerations. For instance, targeting co-ethnics can underscore the government's failure to provide protection (e.g. Fjelde & Hultman, 2014; Hultman, 2009). Additionally, it may serve as a deterrent to collaboration with other ethnic constituencies (e.g. Fjelde & Hultman, 2014; Kaufmann, 1996). Ethnic markers enhance visibility and simplify targeting choices (e.g. Fjelde & Hultman, 2014). As a result, rebel organizations perpetrate acts of violence against co-ethnics, victimizing them either as part of the civilian population or through collective violence against the entire ethnic group.

Rebels risks from diaspora support

Risks and costs occur for rebel organizations associated with diaspora sponsorship. Firstly, the rebel group may experience a loss of autonomy upon accepting support from the diaspora, potentially leading to a deviation from its own preferences in order to fulfill the diaspora's delegated tasks. The costs of violence play a crucial role in determining whether the opportunity costs for the rebel organization increase or decrease relative to the completion of these tasks. The alignment of interests is also critical; a rebel group may struggle to attract additional sponsorship if its interests do not align with those of the diaspora, or it may risk losing existing diaspora support. Additionally, compliance with the diaspora's preference for non-violence against civilians can diminish a rebel group's negotiating leverage against the government. A

lack of capacity or sufficient centralization within the rebel group to effectively utilize the diaspora's support further complicates these dynamics (e.g. Loidolt et al., 2013, p. 8). In summary, a rebel organization assesses the potential benefits of using violence against civilians or co-ethnics, thus agency slack, and acts accordingly. Should employing violence against civilians or co-ethnics serve the rebel group's aims, it becomes likely and rational to employ violence.

5.4 Diaspora support and civilian victimization

Within the framework of the principal-agent model and according to the preferences defined, I develop hypotheses concerning diaspora sponsorship for rebel organizations and its consequences for civilians in intrastate conflicts. The diaspora delegates combat and civilian well-being to the rebel organization, offering support to the latter provided that the use of violence remains limited. However, the diaspora's preference for limited violence against co-ethnic civilians and civilians is contingent upon its level of affinity to civilians. In this context, I identify three distinct types of diaspora-civilian relationships, each bearing unique implications for the diaspora's preferences regarding civilian victimization and the underlying mechanism of shared information.

Diasporas, aiming for kin support, delegate the tasks of combating the incumbent government and protecting civilians to the agent. The rebel organization, acting as this agent, possesses the autonomy to either align with the diaspora's preferences, thereby minimizing civilian harm, or to diverge from them. While the rebel group gains diaspora support, it also has incentives to apply violence against civilians if such actions contribute to the group's chances of victory. The baseline preference of the diaspora is to limit violence against co-ethnics, driven by their aim of providing kin support.

Looking at Figure 5.1 through the lens of a diaspora and violence against co-ethnic civilians, the preferred outcome for the diaspora is *civilian protection and support*. Here, agency slack affects the diaspora the most. Conversely, in the short term, the rebel organization benefits the most from deviating from the delegated tasks, thus engaging in violence against co-ethnics while still being supported by the diaspora. In the long-

run, the rebel organization will align with the diaspora's preference for limited violence against co-ethnics contingent upon the desire to maintain ongoing support from the diaspora.

The reasons for the diaspora's interest in kin support, and consequently, their support for rebel organizations due to delegated tasks, are discussed in chapter 4. This includes driving factors such as guilt over leaving the conflict zone, empathy towards the suffering of co-ethnics, and a sense of solidarity. The diaspora is regularly informed by co-ethnics about the situation on the ground, including rebel group's employment of violence against them. The efficacy of this information-sharing mechanism is attributed to kinship ties.

Given the diaspora's preference for limiting violence against co-ethnic civilians, and the potential advantage for rebel organizations in employing violence against co-ethnic civilians, I derive the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 5.4.1 *Diaspora support to rebel organizations decreases the likelihood of violence against co-ethnic civilians compared to no diaspora support.*

A diaspora can have strong interests in low levels of violence against co-ethnics due to kinship ties. This interest can extend to the well-being of civilians at large, driven either by the indirect protection of their kin—under the premise that a general reduction in violence decreases the likelihood of their kin being victimized or by a generally benevolent preference.

In contrast, states may be indifferent towards violence against civilians, perceiving such violence as either a side effect or a necessary tactic employed by rebel groups to secure victory. Asal, Ayres, and Kubota (2019, p. 217) find that violence against civilians can be a driver for external state support to a rebel organization. While kin states share an ethnic tie with civilians, the non-state actor perspective of belonging to the civilian population can foster the diaspora's preferences from a humanity's point of view. Having this affinity to civilians, the diaspora's preference is limited violence against civilians. Consequently, the most favored outcome depicted in figure 5.1 is *support and civilian protection*, whereas *civilian victimization and support* is opposed to the diaspora's preferences due to agency slack.

The motives behind the diaspora's preference in limited violence against civilians may mirror those concerning co-ethnic civilians. The diaspora often exhibits a preference for non-violent approaches to differentiate itself from alternative sponsors whose strategies may not be congruent with such preferences. This enhances a positive image and international perception of diaspora support for rebel organizations, in light of adherence to international laws, norms, and human rights principles. In a conflict zone where it is challenging to distinguish between co-ethnics and civilians from the perspective of the principals, restrained violence inevitably impacts co-ethnic civilians as well. Regardless of the reasons and motivation of diaspora's care for civilians, the outcome of limited violence should be visible.

Drawing on the diaspora's preference for limited violence against civilians, the potential benefits for rebel groups in employing violence against civilians, and the principal-agent relationship, the main hypothesis is formulated:

Hypothesis 5.4.2 *Diaspora support to rebel organizations decreases the likelihood of violence against civilians compared to no diaspora support.*

While the two developed hypotheses primarily focus on limited violence against civilians or co-ethnics, it is plausible that the diaspora's preference for kin support is less important than seeking changes in the homeland. The diaspora may adopt more radical policy positions regarding the homeland than the domestic population. A diaspora might prefer a change in the homeland or the victory of a rebel group by any means necessary. For instance, Shain (2007, pp. 106–107) points out that the interests and responses of the diaspora and the civilians in the homeland towards the government may diverge, for instance, regarding peace policies. An instructive case is the Jewish-American diaspora's critique of Bill Clinton's peace plan concerning the Temple Mount in 2000 (Shain, 2002, p. 126; Shain, 2007, p. 107). Whereas the diaspora prioritized identity preservation and opposed the peace plan, the homeland population was more inclined towards enhancing security on the ground. Similarly, the perspectives of the Armenian diaspora and the Armenian population on negotiations with Turkey illustrate a division: the diaspora opposed these efforts while national and security concerns were favored by those on the ground (Shain, 2002, p. 131; Shain, 2007, p. 145).

Drawing on examples that relax the unitary actor assumption by focusing on segments of the diaspora holding extreme views, the preference of the diaspora for limited violence is pointless. The diaspora is either indifferent between violence against co-ethnics and non-violence or it actively endorses violence against co-ethnics as a means to achieve desired changes in the homeland. This stance diverges from the two settings presented earlier. Importantly, in this context, violence against civilians or co-ethnics is not viewed as agency slack and, consequently, does not result in punishment by the diaspora. Nevertheless, it follows principal-agent theory which posits that the principal “willfully ignore the agent’s actions as long as they derive some benefit from the delegation relationship” (Mitchell, 2021, p. 147). Moreover, the diaspora retains the option to attribute responsibility to the rebel organization, in case negative consequences occur for the principal by the host state or international community.¹⁸

The mechanism of information sharing between the diaspora and their co-ethnics in the homeland plays a crucial role for diaspora support to rebel organizations, contingent upon the rebels’ treatment of co-ethnics and civilians. Driven by kin support and a preference for limited violence against civilians or co-ethnics, the diaspora benefits the most from the fire-alarm mechanism. This process involves co-ethnics within the homeland sharing information to the diaspora regarding the behavior of rebel groups towards co-ethnics and civilians. This information-sharing mechanism may hinge on conditional variables, such as a multi-ethnic population, a topic that is explored in section 5.4.1.3.

Additionally, the information-sharing mechanism is of limited interest if the diaspora prefers change in the homeland by all means and kin support is preferred. Nonetheless, violence can signal commitment to the diaspora’s aims and its capacity to advance them, thereby ensuring the continuation of external support.¹⁹ Conse-

¹⁸Theoretically, the employment of violent tactics by rebel organizations may serve as a strategic tool imposed by the principal, diverging from the interests of a rebel organization’s interest in minimizing violence against co-ethnics or civilians (Haer, 2015, p. 17; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006). This perspective suggests that violence against civilians is likely to escalate with the presence of diaspora sponsorship. Nonetheless, conceptualizing the diaspora as a principal complicates the argument that it can impose violent behavior on a group given two reasons. Firstly, it may fear or expect negative consequences in the host country or by the homeland government. Secondly, although providing support is one logistical aspect, the ability of a diaspora, comprising communities dispersed across various nations with different access to resources and transfer capabilities.

¹⁹See a similar argumentation for external state support by Salehyan et al. (2014, p. 639).

quently, information-sharing of rebel groups' treatment of civilians remains relevant to the diaspora in achieving its aims. Violence against co-ethnics and civilians could be reported and, subsequently rewarded by the diaspora through enhanced support for the rebel organization committing such acts. However, it is less likely that co-ethnics will share information with the diaspora, as part of their agency, if the diaspora exhibits a limited interest in their kinship ties.

5.4.1 Conditional factors of limited civilian victimization and diaspora support

Within the context of the theoretical framework, the main hypothesis suggests a negative correlation between the support provided by diasporas to rebel organizations and violence against civilians. However, this relationship does not exist in a vacuum and may be influenced by a variety of conditional factors. This dissertation specifically examines factors related to external sponsorship, and homeland characteristics, in addition to elements that may affect the information-sharing, thereby influencing the indirect control possibilities of the diaspora. I acknowledge that other contextual factors as well as characteristics of the actors involved can influence the sponsorship-victimization dynamic.

5.4.1.1 Alternative sponsors and violence against civilians

From a theoretical perspective, the support of a diaspora to a rebel organization is presumed to be less likely when multiple sponsors are present. Nevertheless, such support persists. This setting may amplify the impact of diaspora support on the victimization of civilians by rebel groups, as it provides a counterbalance to alternative sponsors with divergent interests. Conversely, the presence of multiple sponsors might weaken the effect of diaspora support by granting the rebel group greater leverage to navigate the interests of these sponsors, potentially limiting violence against civilians.²⁰ Therefore, I formulate a testable hypothesis that explores this conditional aspect:

²⁰See for example, Karlén et al. (2021), Nielson and Tierney (2003), and Salehyan et al. (2014) for multiple sponsors and the limitation to control the agent.

Hypothesis 5.4.3 *Diaspora support to rebel organizations decreases the likelihood of violence against civilians compared to no diaspora support if an alternative sponsor exists.*

5.4.1.2 Single homeland and violence against civilians

I explained the distinct interest of a diaspora in co-ethnics or civilians. The diaspora's origin, in relation to its homeland, may also influence these dynamics. A diaspora originating from multiple countries has multiple homelands. For instance, the Filipino diaspora in the United States originates from the Philippines whereas the Afar diaspora has roots in multiple homelands, including Djibouti and Ethiopia. I argue that diasporas originating from multiple homelands exhibit a stronger affiliation with civilians, given the different origin countries. The emergence from varied countries, encompassing multiple ethnic groups, fosters increased interactions in multi-ethnic contexts and a potential for greater affinity with civilians.²¹ Consequently, I anticipate that support from a diaspora connected to multiple homelands has a decreasing effect compared to diaspora support from a single homeland.

Hypothesis 5.4.4 *The one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is more pronounced if a diaspora originates from multiple countries.*

5.4.1.3 Discriminated ethnic group and violence against civilians

The status of the homeland population serves as a conditional factor influencing diaspora support for civilian victimization. If the co-ethnics of the diaspora are discriminated in the homeland, the effect of diaspora sponsorship on a rebel group may be more pronounced. This is partly due to discrimination fostering grievances (e.g. Cederman et al., 2010; Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013; Wucherpfennig et al., 2012, p. 80), which, in turn, enhance information-sharing mechanism.²² Another reason can be the rebel organization's incentive to limit violence in order to distinguish itself positively in

²¹This is based upon the scholarship on contact theory, where a key aspect is that inter-group contact can reduce prejudice and discrimination under certain conditions (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005; Uluğ & Cohrs, 2017).

²²Discrimination can drive mobilization of a diaspora (e.g. Baser, 2014, p. 366; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001, p. 263; Schiller, 2005), and potentially increasing diaspora support.

contrast to the government.²³ Such a strategy aims to maintain diaspora sponsorship and potential long-term support in the event of a rebel victory.

Hypothesis 5.4.5 *The one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is more pronounced if diaspora's ethnic group is discriminated in the homeland.*

5.4.1.4 Multi-ethnic population and violence against civilians

Research shows that settings characterized by greater heterogeneity can be associated with increased violence (Balcells, 2017) and the likelihood of collective targeting escalates in areas where opposing ethnic groups reside (Fjelde & Hultman, 2014; Steele, 2017). Conversely, examining Lebanon Hägerdal (2019) finds restrained violence in more ethnic heterogeneous settings, whereas research by Wimmer and Miner (2020) shows violence intensifies in environments where ethnic groups maintain a balance of power against each other. Moreover, in a multi-ethnic population, fewer co-ethnics are able to disseminate information to the diaspora.

I argue that the fire-alarm mechanism works best among a homogeneous population in the homeland. Nonetheless, in a multi-ethnic context, the value of shared information between co-ethnics and the diaspora is enhanced due to its scarcity. Rebel organizations benefit in multi-ethnic settings, due to the reduced likelihood of information exchange between civilians and the diaspora. This setting, in turn, enhances the potential for undetected agency slack.

Building on existing research and the fire-alarm mechanism, it remains uncertain whether sharing limited but highly valuable information or engaging a larger group for potential information exchange exerts more impact. Furthermore, the rebel organization may garner increased domestic support if the ethnic composition of the incumbent government is small, which is more likely within a multi-ethnic settings.²⁴ Conversely, a major ethnic constituency, if aligned with the rebel group, may augment the latter's

²³This argument is in line with Jo (2015), Jo et al. (2021), and Stanton (2016) who demonstrate that rebel organizations engage in restraint behavior if, for example, lobbying for external support is of interest or they are legitimacy-seeking.

²⁴For example, Fjelde and Hultman (2014) and Fjelde et al. (2021) show how ethnic constituencies of government and rebels are related with one-sided violence. Additionally, Kaufmann (1996) illustrates how ethnic identities demonstrate loyalties.

inclination towards limited violence to foster domestic support.²⁵

Rebel organizations also benefit from intelligence collected within the population regarding civilian allegiance to the government or neutrality.²⁶ Notably, rebel organizations are capable of distinguishing between forms of violence, such as violence against co-ethnics and violence against civilians (e.g. Fjelde & Hultman, 2014; Fjelde et al., 2021). While this distinction is driven by operational reasons, I recognize the continuum of civilian victimization in practice. Assuming the absence of recent ethnic cleansing to foster a more ethnically homogeneous environment, I expect the following in a multi-ethnic population. The selective yet potentially invaluable information disseminated to the diaspora, coupled with the rebels' benefits of violence against civilians against a small incumbent ethnic constituency, will result in diminished violence towards civilians given diaspora sponsorship.

Hypothesis 5.4.6 *The one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is smaller if the population in the homeland is multi-ethnic.*

5.4.1.5 Information bias and violence against civilians

The diaspora may present additional opportunities to enhance information sharing, besides the fire-alarm mechanism. This potential arises not only from the access of the diaspora to information through connections with the homeland population but also from the impact of media availability in the homeland on civilian victimization, particularly under the influence of diaspora sponsorship. Support from the diaspora for rebel organizations is often interpreted as opposition to the incumbent regime. Hence, the presence of unbiased media access can either facilitate or restrict the diaspora's support and its subsequent effects on civilian victimization.²⁷ Homeland media can

²⁵See for example, the scholarship on violence against civilians and ethnic constituencies (De La Calle, 2017; Fjelde & Hultman, 2014; Ottmann, 2017).

²⁶See for example, Hägerdal (2019) showing the relevance of intelligence gathering related to ethnicity for civilian targeting, and in particular ethnic cleansing by the militia for the case of the Lebanese civil war.

²⁷This argument draws upon scholarship on information and communication technology (ICT), diaspora and conflict (e.g. Brinkerhoff, 2009; Dufoix, 2008; Walter, 2017) as well as studies focusing on the interplay between social media and support for opposition parties, alongside the dynamics of social media within the context of civil wars (Gohdes & Steinert-Threlkeld, n.d.; McGarty et al., 2014; Moss, 2021). A prominent example that exemplifies the critical role of media in bolstering opposition support and facilitating mobilization is the Arab Spring (e.g. Bruns et al., 2013; Moss, 2021). Furthermore, Baum and Zhukov (2015) demonstrate how non-democratic and democratic

act as a supplementary channel for the diaspora in the host country to obtain news regarding the homeland (cf. Kopchick et al., 2021). Therefore, I anticipate that the influence of diaspora sponsorship on civilian victimization diminishes in settings where the media is restricted or biased in favor of the incumbent in the homeland.

Hypothesis 5.4.7 *The one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is smaller if the media in the homeland is biased towards the government.*

I use a principal-agent framework to examine the dynamics between the diaspora and rebel groups concerning limited violence towards civilians and co-ethnics. However, a trade-off for both actors exist. The diaspora's trade-off emerges between kin support through the delegated tasks for the rebel organization and risking support in the absence of accomplishing the designated task of limited violence against civilians or co-ethnics. Conversely, the rebel organization faces a trade-off between garnering diaspora support and maintaining autonomy from the sponsor. The diaspora prioritizes kin support, thereby supporting limited violence against civilians. Nonetheless, certain conditional factors, such as the presence of alternative sponsors for the rebel group, a multi-ethnic population, the accessibility of unbiased information concerning the homeland, the diaspora's affiliation with multiple homelands, and the status of co-ethnics in relation to discrimination may either strengthen or weaken the effect of diaspora support on victimization of civilians.

5.4.2 Conditional effects on violence against co-ethnics

The preceding sections focused on conditional factors that influence the effect of diaspora support on violence against civilians. This section addresses conditional factors that impact the effect of diaspora support on violence against co-ethnic civilians, thus modifying the relationship formulated in hypothesis 5.4.1.

The conditional factors influencing violence against co-ethnics follow a similar rationale to those for violence against civilians. Building upon the arguments presented in preceding sections, I expect that the hypothesized relations concerning a single homeland, a discriminated ethnic group, a multi-ethnic population, and information bias are

news reporting is biased with the latter focused on political survival, using the Libyan civil conflict as a case study.

applicable to violence against co-ethnics. Specifically, the interaction between diaspora support and either discrimination or a multi-ethnic population are expected to be more pronounced than diaspora support alone. This is due to the crucial relevance of ethnic ties and the consequences of violence against co-ethnics resulting from the mechanism of information sharing. Therefore, the violence-reducing effects of these interaction effects are hypothesized to be more pronounced on violence against co-ethnics than on violence against civilians.

Additionally, I argue that diaspora characteristics can impact the effect of diaspora support on violence against co-ethnics. When the diaspora retains the option to return to the homeland, it may intensify its interest to support its kin and seek changes in the homeland.²⁸ Therefore, the diaspora's interest in change by any means, as outlined in chapter 5.4, is very low, given its potential to return to the homeland. As a result, I hypothesize that diaspora support, in conjunction with the possibility to return to the homeland, intensifies the preferences and leads to a more pronounced effect on violence against co-ethnics compared to situations where this possibility does not exist.

Hypothesis 5.4.8 *The ethnic one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is higher if the diaspora has the possibility to return to the homeland.*

Lastly, the migration background of the diaspora may influence the rebel group's behavior towards co-ethnics, paired with diaspora support for the rebel organization. The hypothesized effect of diaspora support on violence against co-ethnics may further be backed by grievances and other factors, especially if the migration was prompted by conflict, political violence, or other forms of involuntary means. This argument draws upon scholarship about diaspora mobilization and non-voluntary migration (Koinova, 2011, 2016; Kopchick et al., 2021), particularly how grievances and experiences can impact mobilization (Redclift, 2017). This is discussed in detail in chapter 3.4.3. Consequently, I investigate the non-voluntary migration background of the diaspora as a

²⁸This idea is an implication of Kopchick et al.'s (2021, p. 10) analysis, which suggests that diasporas with the option to return may exhibit different mobilization patterns compared to those without such an option. Consequently, I deduce that the ability to return to the homeland may also affect how diaspora support influences violence against civilians. I also align with Tsuda's (2009) findings, which suggest that connections to the homeland exists and are nurtured by homeland governments through the support of return migration and the implementation of corresponding immigration policies.

conditional factor influencing the extent to which diaspora support can reduce ethnic one-sided violence.

Hypothesis 5.4.9 *The ethnic one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is higher if the diaspora has a non-voluntary migration background.*

5.5 Diaspora support and rebel governance

Rebel organizations can employ violence against civilians or co-ethnics; however, they also have the potential to implement rebel governance. This form of governance serves as an indicator of rebel groups' ability to perform state functions, signaling to both diasporas and stakeholders at the domestic and international levels (Huang & Sullivan, 2020, p. 4). Diaspora support can offer additional advantages to the rebel organization, such as being perceived as a cooperative partner or gaining inclusion in negotiation processes (Duyvesteyn, 2017, p. 675).

Rebel governance impacts civilian life during wartime (Arjona et al., 2015, p. 2). Consequently, I argue that the diaspora may favor rebel governance when it aligns with its aims, including kin support and pursuit of changes in the homeland. The well-being of civilians and co-ethnics is directly influenced by elements of rebel governance, which may include the provision of healthcare, education or infrastructure. Furthermore, rebel organizations that conduct elections, write constitutions or establish laws offer the potential to positively impact civilian life through opportunities for participation.

Building upon the preferences unfolded in chapter 5.2.4, I incorporate the diaspora's preference of provision of public goods and services, alongside elements of participation within rebel governance. The rebel organization might undertake the establishment of rebel governance provided that the anticipated benefits surpass the associated costs of such governance. Notably, the provision of public goods and the establishment of rebel governance incurs significant costs for rebel organizations (Mampilly, 2015, p. 86). The information-sharing mechanism mirrors the process described in chapter 4.2, whereby the diaspora receives information about the provision of public goods and services by their co-ethnics in the homeland. Agency slack occurs when the diaspora extends




Figure 5.2: External diaspora support for a rebel organization and rebel governance

support to a rebel organization, which subsequently fails to deliver elements of rebel governance.

Figure 5.2 visualizes the framework for diaspora support and rebel governance. In a manner akin to figure 5.1, the diaspora decides whether it supports a rebel organization or not. The subsequent step diverges between the two game trees: in this instance, the rebel organization is faced with the decision of either offering public goods and services along with opportunities for participation (rebel governance) or refraining from doing so. The underlying assumption is that civilians benefit more from the availability of these provisions and opportunities than from their absence. As a result, the diaspora's preferred outcome is providing support to the rebel group, alongside the well-being of civilians, enhances through elements of rebel governance.

Building on the presented argument regarding rebel governance and diaspora support, I formulate two hypotheses. Importantly, the hypotheses and argumentation serve as a preliminary framework for analyzing the impact of diaspora support on rebel governance concerning civilian well-being. Further research is required to examine various aspects of rebel governance, and to draw comparisons with the state's provision of public goods and services, as well as opportunities for civilian participation.

Hypothesis 5.5.1 *Diaspora support to rebel organizations increases the likelihood of a rebel group providing public goods and service compared to no diaspora support.*

Hypothesis 5.5.2 *Diaspora support to rebel organizations increases the likelihood of rebel governance compared to no diaspora support.*

Type	Hypothesis #	Hypothesis
Civilian victimization	Hypothesis 5.4.1	Diaspora support to rebel organizations decreases the likelihood of violence against co-ethnic civilians compared to no diaspora support.
	Hypothesis 5.4.2	Diaspora support to rebel organizations decreases the likelihood of violence against civilians compared to no diaspora support.
Conditional factor	Hypothesis 5.4.3	Diaspora support to rebel organizations decreases the likelihood of violence against civilians compared to no diaspora support if an alternative sponsor exists.
	Hypothesis 5.4.4	The one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is more pronounced if a diaspora originates from multiple countries.
	Hypothesis 5.4.5	The one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is more pronounced if diaspora's ethnic group is discriminated in the homeland.
	Hypothesis 5.4.6	The one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is smaller if the population in the homeland is multi-ethnic.
	Hypothesis 5.4.7	The one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is smaller if the media in the homeland is biased towards the government.
	Hypothesis 5.4.8	The ethnic one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is higher if the diaspora has the possibility to return to the homeland.
Rebel governance	Hypothesis 5.4.9	The ethnic one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is higher if the diaspora has a non-voluntary migration background.
	Hypothesis 5.5.1	Diaspora support to rebel organizations increases the likelihood of a rebel group providing public goods and service compared to no diaspora support.
	Hypothesis 5.5.2	Diaspora support to rebel organizations increases the likelihood of rebel governance, specifically governance elements, compared to no diaspora support.

Table 5.1: Hypothesized relationship between diaspora support to a rebel organization and civilian victimization or rebel governance

5.6 Overview of hypotheses

To summarize this chapter, I examine what the consequences of diaspora support to rebel organizations are for civilians. My analysis centers on three distinct outcomes: (1) violence against civilians, (2) violence against co-ethnics, and (3) rebel governance. Additionally, I study six conditional factors grounded in theoretical arguments. Table 5.1 offers a comprehensive overview of the hypotheses developed in this chapter, which I empirically analyze in chapter 8.

Chapter 6

Data and methodology

The preceding chapters have elaborated the theoretical framework and formulated the hypotheses related to the second and third research question of this dissertation. This chapter explains the data and methodology that underpin the empirical analyses. I introduce the novel diaspora support dataset, detailing the coding procedures and acknowledging the limitations of the data. Subsequently, I explain the methodology and outline the approaches and empirical strategies for the three sets of analyses applied to capture the causes and consequences of diaspora support to rebel organizations. The analysis, which focuses on the conditions under which diaspora sponsorship is more or less likely, is grounded in two distinct methods. Firstly, I employ an extreme bounds analysis to assess the fragility of the various determinants of diaspora sponsorship, categorizes under conflict, rebel, diaspora and homeland characteristics. Secondly, I apply a logistic regression analysis. For each subanalysis, I describe the variables I utilized and their corresponding data sources. Additionally, I explain the methodological approach underpinning the analyses of the consequences of diaspora sponsorship to rebel organizations. I differentiate between the outcome variables one-sided violence and ethnic one-sided violence as well as the analysis of the conditional factors. I also present the variables and data sources for the confounding factors. I conclude with the methodological approach and description of data sources for the analysis concerning rebel governance. This chapter lays the foundation for the upcoming two empirical chapters by explaining the methodological approaches used and presenting the data utilized.

6.1 Diaspora Support Dataset

Scholars widely agree on the necessity for more comprehensive and detailed data to investigate non-state sponsors in intrastate conflicts. Particularly, a deeper understanding of the different forms of support and their various implications is noted (e.g. Asal & Ayres, 2018; Bird, 2022; Petrova, 2019). For instance, Johnston et al. (2023, p. 23) state that diaspora support data is mostly lacking as “including these data would dramatically constrain our empirical tests”. This dissertation tackles this challenge and generates a unique dataset on diaspora sponsorship to rebel organization. In this chap-

ter, I introduce the data employed in the empirical analysis and provide details of the coding process for the data used in the empirical analysis.

To address limitations in existing datasets, I have undertaken a manual coding of diaspora support, thereby enhancing the scope of existing data sources. This new dataset represents a comprehensive compilation of information on diaspora support for rebel organizations, derived from publicly accessible sources and newswires. Resource constraints necessitated a focus on the two most conflict-affected regions: Africa and Asia.¹ The dataset encompasses all state-based armed conflicts within these regions starting between 1989 and 2014. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) coding method a state-based armed conflict is “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year” (Pettersson, 2020). In summary, the sample includes all internationalized intrastate and intrastate conflicts that started between 1989 and 2014 in Africa and Asia.

Diaspora support encompasses financial support to the rebel organization, material support and political support such as diaspora lobbying in favor of the rebel organization. The baseline data for the intrastate conflicts is taken from the UCDP Dyadic Dataset version 20.1 (Harbom et al., 2008; Pettersson & Öberg, 2020) which is a dyadic version of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. I transform the dyadic form into a spell. The unit of observation is the conflict dyad ID - diaspora group, ensuring each observation possesses a distinct ID.² Due to constraints in time and financial resources, I do not include coding for annual variations in diaspora support. Instead, the spell format captures diaspora support as a static, time-invariant variable. The temporal scope of the study is confined to the Post-Cold War era, intentionally excluding potential distortions in diaspora influences attributable to external state support linked to Cold War dynamics.³

¹Pettersson and Öberg (2020, p. 599) demonstrate that the highest number of intrastate conflicts occur in Africa and Asia.

²I interchangeably use the terms conflict dyad ID - diaspora group spell and conflict dyad ID - diaspora group observation. This is because the observation covers a time span of the conflict not a single year.

³For instance, Asal, Ayres, and Kubota (2019) conduct a comparison between external sponsorship during cold war and post-cold war period.

Global data on diasporas are limited, and, “currently there are no attempts to measure global diaspora populations per se” (IOM GMDAC, 2020). This deficiency mainly arises from depending on migration data collected by individual countries, which often varies in definitions of a diaspora and its data formats, such as voluntary registration or additional studies (e.g. IOM GMDAC, 2020; UN DESA, 1998, 2019a). Additionally, these data collection efforts are hindered by varying capacities. For instance, it is observed that data disproportionately represent South-North migration, overshadowing South-South migration patterns (IOM GMDAC, 2020). Most studies in this field depend on migration stock or flow proxies, such as the United Nation’s Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) matrix, which utilizes official country statistics of foreign population (UN DESA, 2019b). Alternatively, some studies, including Abel and Cohen (2019) employ estimation techniques to approximate migration flows. However, Abel and Cohen (2019) also highlight the divergence of results between the different estimation methods.

The United Nation’s total migration stock data has its limitations. Predominantly, countries record data based on foreign-born population, utilizing citizenship data when the previous mentioned data is not available. The related data documentation (UN DESA, 2019a) points out various challenges associated with this measurement, such as varying national definitions of citizenship or naturalization. This inconsistency means that international migrants may be counted in some instances, such as the former, but not in others, as the latter measurement of citizenship. Given these constraints, the diaspora support dataset in this study is focused on diaspora groups residing in the United States, based on the only diaspora dataset by Kopchick et al. (2021). Considering that the United States is the largest host country and a primary destination for migrants (IOM, 2021, p. 9), it is reasonable to posit that the largest share of diaspora groups exist in the United States. Therefore, examining diasporas within the United States emerges as the most pragmatic approach in light of the data limitation.

6.1.1 Summary statistics

Here, I briefly illustrate the diaspora support dataset, representing the outcome of the coding procedure. This dissertation identifies 231 unique diaspora-conflict dyad

observations (diaspora- rebel group- government spell).⁴ Approximately 35% of the dyad-year observations in the diaspora support dataset indicate diaspora support, as illustrated in figure 6.1. When considering both likely diaspora support and diaspora support, this proportion increases to 44% of dyad-year observations, indicating diaspora sponsorship to a rebel organization.




Figure 6.1: Distribution of observations (N=231) by diaspora support category




Figure 6.2: Rebel organizations (N=226) with and without diaspora support

Figure 6.1 depicts the distribution of the categorical variable *diaspora support* in a time-invariant format. Furthermore, figure 6.2 offers insights into the dichotomous

⁴In the spell format, the number of unique conflict dyad-diaspora spells (N=231) is different from the number of unique rebel organizations (N=226). This discrepancy is due to factors like territorial divisions and changes over time. For instance, in South Sudan, certain rebel groups, such as MUJAO, are associated with multiple potential diaspora groups.




Figure 6.3: Distribution of observations (N=939) by diaspora support category (dyad-year)

variable diaspora support at the rebel group level, revealing that about 50% of the rebel groups receive diaspora support. Additionally, figure 6.3 displays the distribution of the coded categorical variable diaspora support at the diaspora-dyad-year level, which is the unit of the time-series cross-sectional analysis.

6.1.2 Coding procedure

This section explains the comprehensive coding procedures employed in the compilation of the diaspora support data. Data wrangling was conducted using RStudio, while the main coding was executed in MS Excel. The UCDP dyadic dataset (v20.1, Harbom et al., 2008; Pettersson & Öberg, 2020) serves as the foundational dataset, from which interstate conflicts are excluded. Furthermore, all observations preceding the year 1989 are also excluded. Subsequent to these initial steps, I merge the dataset with the ACD2EPR 2021 dataset (Vogt et al., 2015; Wucherpfennig et al., 2012) utilizing *dyad_id* as the key merging variable. This process is followed by another merger with the TEK 2021 dataset (Vogt et al., 2015), in this instance employing *gwgroupid* as the merging variable.

6.1.2.1 Merging of existing data

The next phase consists of the preparation of the diaspora dataset (Kopchick et al., 2021). This dataset encompasses 252 unique diaspora group spells, spanning from 1989

to 2010. Among the 822 potential ethnic groups in 160 countries identified by Fearon (2003), the dataset specifically codes diaspora groups in the United States from 1980 to 2010. It includes annual data along with additional characteristics such as group size, language, religion or voluntary migration. Subsequently, I generate an ethnic group-country spell for each listed group in the diaspora dataset. I then manually align the country names to conform with the spelling conventions used in the UCDP. The dataset is further segmented for each country (1-5), and individually merged based on the variable *country1* to *country5* (Kopchick et al., 2021) and variable *location* (Harbom et al., 2008; Pettersson & Öberg, 2020). In intrastate conflicts, the variable *location* serves as a good indicator for the location of the conflict (country's government having an incompatibility). Following these steps, I generate a unique dyad-ethnic group spell ID. The resulting dataset comprises 1170 unique spell observations, encompassing all geographical regions. Figure 6.4 is designed to illustrate the integration of various data sources into the coded dataset, particularly, the diaspora support variable.

6.1.2.2 Newly generated diaspora support variable

In a second step, I construct a vector for the diaspora support variable (*diaspora support*). It encompasses four distinct values: support, likely support, no support, and missing information. In chapter 6.1. I present summary statistics for the diaspora support variable (refer to figures 6.1 and 6.3). Additionally, I code a numerical variable to represent the number of sources that corroborate the assigned value of the *diaspora support* variable. Although my aim is to include at least three sources for each observation, the availability of information occasionally limits this to only one source. I also develop a variable listing abbreviated source information, which can be cross-referenced in the list of references utilized for coding diaspora support. Furthermore, in the *comment* variable, I record supplementary information about the diaspora, such as the organizational setting or specific details about the type of support, when available.

I initiate the manual coding process by going through each of the rebel groups listed in the dataset to ascertain whether the corresponding ethnic diaspora group provided sponsorship to the rebel organization. This examination also involves noting instances where no information is available. In a case where information is absent,




Figure 6.4: Visualization of coding steps, including data sources used

but the ethnic group is associated with a TEK 2021 and ACD2EPR 2021 variable, indicating $support=1$ and/or variable $claim=1$ (Vogt et al., 2015), I categorize the diaspora support variable as *likely*. The coding of diaspora support begins with all dyads located in Asia, as indicated by the UCDP variable $region=3$, and then proceeds to those in Africa ($region=4$) based on information from existing case studies. Further projects can build upon the newly coded diaspora dataset by extending the

geographical scope and time period.

The categorical variable *diaspora support* is coded based on existing data, which is then supplemented and validated with case-specific information when available. The coding procedure with utilized sources is displayed in figure 6.4. In an initial step, I rely the information of diaspora support from the following datasets:

- Byman et al. (2001), generating a dataset based on the authors table A.1 with main interest in diaspora support
- Höglbladh et al. (2011), focusing on the variable *external_name*
- Loidolt et al. (2013), focusing on the variable *diasupport*
- Lidow (2016), focusing on variables *diaspora* and *diaspora2*
- D. E. Cunningham et al. (2013), checking whether variables *transconstsupport* and *repxpart* entail diaspora support. I also go through the coding notes using the search key *diaspora*.

I start by manually linking each dataset from the aforementioned sources to the UCDP *dyad_ids*, a necessary step before coding diaspora support. I refer to Lidow (2016), who developed the Rebel Abuse and Fractionalization dataset (RAFD) covering the period from 1980 to 2003, as well as his narratives. I particularly focus on his variables *diaspora support* and *ethnic tie*.⁵ Additionally, I consult the work of Loidolt et al. (2013), as well as their subsequent dataset, which lacks validation by the authors.⁶ Consequently, I approach the information from Loidolt et al. (2013) with caution and do verification.

I also utilize the Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict Dataset (NSA) by D. E. Cunningham et al. (2013), converting the older *dyad_ids* to the newer ones used for UCDP dyadic data from v17.1 onward with the help of the *translate dyad* table.⁷ Subsequently, I merge the the dataset with the main dataset, aligning the variables *dyad_id* and *year of startdate*. Moreover, I draw upon Byman et al. (2001, A.1)

⁵Lidow (2016) differentiates between diaspora support and ethnic ties. The latter refers to ethnic ties an external sponsor has with civilians in a conflict area. In his analysis, the issue of multicollinearity arises, leading to the omission of one of these two variables.

⁶The preliminary dataset is not available to the public. I got access through direct correspondence with Stephen Gent.

⁷This document outlines the conversion possibilities: https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/actor/translation_tables.pdf and the translation ID tables are available here: <https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/index.html#idtranslation>.

to gather information about diaspora support from 1991 to 2000, noting that this data has not been validated by the authors. The UCDP External Support – Primary Warring Party Dataset (Högbladh et al., 2011) is another source for information on diaspora support (*external_name*), covering the period from 1975 to 2009. An initial screening reveals ten different diaspora groups that provide support: Algerian, Sikh, Mozambicans in Brazil and South Africa, Tamil, Fur, Kurdish, Albanian, Eritrean, Somali, and Oromo.

Illustrative examples of the coding procedure include the UCDP conflict (dyad_id 571), which captures the conflict between the Government of Ethiopia and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). I find evidence for diaspora support for the EPLF by going through the data by Högbladh et al. (2011) and Lidow (2016), the UCDP actor description for EPLF, academic sources such as Radtke (2009), along with articles from the Factiva database. Consequently, in this instance, the variable *diaspora support* is assigned a value of 2, indicating diaspora support for the EPLF. Furthermore, the intrastate conflict between the Government of Pakistan and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) exemplifies diaspora support by Uzbeks. This diaspora support is evidenced by Mapping Militant Organizations (Resources section, 2018a) which state, “The IMU also receives funds from the Uzbek diaspora”, the US Bureau of Counterterrorism country reports on terrorism 2016 (United States Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2023) and articles from the Factiva database.

The Afar diaspora’s support for the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF) in its conflict against the Ethiopian government (dyad_id 791) is primarily derived from D. E. Cunningham et al.’s (2013) coding notes, listing explicit diaspora support. Factiva newswires applying the mentioned key words corroborate this finding. Conversely, the conflict (dyad_id 714) between the Angolan Government and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (UNITA) demonstrates an absence of Angolan diaspora support in the sources reviewed and displayed in Figure 6.4. Therefore, I utilize the Factiva database, checking each keyword to ascertain whether any sources indicate diaspora support for UNITA. Despite extensive review, not a single article related to these keywords suggested diaspora support for UNITA. However, domestic support is mentioned. Consequently, for the *diaspora support* variable, I assign a value

of 0, indicating the absence of such support.

I have also explored the Global Terrorism Dataset (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2022) to gather additional information on external support for armed groups, which are also referenced UCDP dataset. The NAGs dataset (San-Akca, 2016) as well as the NAVCO 2.1 (Chenoweth et al., 2019) do not include data on diaspora support. Furthermore, I have extracted information from profiles of the organizations listed in the Big Allied and Dangerous dataset (BAAD) (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2015). To further validate the coding of diaspora support, I have conducted a qualitative assessment using sources such as articles, books, and reliable online information. Additionally, I coded information derived from the group profiles by the *Mapping militant organizations project* (Mapping Militant Organizations, 2018b), *United States Bureau of Counterterrorism Country Reports on Terrorism, CIA factbook*, Globalsecurity.org (“GlobalSecurity.org”, 2024) and Britannica.com (“Britannica”, 2024).

The primary coding is grounded in Newswires accessed through the FACTIVA database. Due to the limited availability of information, the coding of diaspora support is time-invariant. I consider all newspaper articles from the period of 1989 to 2015. Predominantly, the search is conducted in English, supplemented by French-language sources to accommodate the context-specific official languages. Key words utilized in the search include *Diaspora, External support, Sponsorship, Resources, Financing, Lobbying, Engagement, Sponsor, funding, ethnic kin, ethnic support, name of the rebel organization in English* and a combination of keywords. For more information on the coding process, the codebook of the diaspora support dataset is available upon request.⁸

6.1.2.3 Limitations

This section describes additional data sources I considered and limitations of the current version of the dataset. In assessing the occurrence of diaspora support, I reviewed remittance flows and migration stock data. My initial approach involved using data on both remittance inflows and outward remittances (measured in US Dollars) from 1980 to 2019 (World Bank, 2020) as indication of potential diaspora support. Even

⁸My goal includes achieving inter-coder reliability to enhance the validity of my research. However, due to constrained resources, I am currently unable to implement this.

though only legal transfers are accounted for, the premise is that higher remittances might correlate with an increased occurrence of diaspora support. This correlation is considered in the context of the origin and destination of migration patterns and the hierarchy of destinations due to endowments. An illustrative case is the Tamil diaspora (Chalk, 2008). Wealthier Tamils migrated to North America and Europe, while poorer Tamils settled in closer regions to the homeland, such as India (Chalk, 2008, p. 98). An alternative approach could involve differentiating between Western and Non-Western host countries of the diaspora. However, the UN total migration stock data has limitations. Most countries document foreign-born population, or citizenship data if the former is not available.

The scarcity of data regarding bilateral remittance flows diminishes their explanatory capacity, due to the aggregation at the country level which overlooks ethnic groups, as well as remittance prices/transferring costs. The World Bank provides data on monthly remittance inflows in US Dollars for a selected group of countries between 2003 and 2012 (World Bank, 2020). However, my request for a World Bank bilateral remittance matrix covering the period from 1989 to 2019 was not approved. Furthermore, the available data on remittance flows do not facilitate differentiation among ethnic groups. This limitation makes it challenging to generally infer from the remittance data whether the financial flows were utilized to support rebel groups. Consequently, I have not integrated remittance flows or migrant stock data as sources in the coding process.

A limitation of the diaspora support dataset is the coding procedure based on publicly available information. While I have learned through interviews, specifically I1 and I3, some researchers' work benefits from access to classified documents, human intelligence in the field, signal and social media intelligence, as well as foreign intelligence sharing, these sources are not accessible to me.⁹

Notably, the categorical variable *diaspora support* is time-invariant due to resource constraints and the feasibility requirements of this dissertation research. Future research can expand the coding to include a time-varying diaspora support variable,

⁹In an approach analogous to utilizing the Electronic Freedom of Information Act (eFOIA) in the United States, I reached out to the foreign intelligence service of the Federal Republic of Germany to request information but did not receive a response.

offering a more nuanced view to study diaspora sponsorship. Furthermore, the *comment* variable is not systematically coded, thereby serving as a starting point for future coding efforts. I also aim to gather data on aspects such as the size of the diaspora group and the degree of its organizational structure in subsequent research and coding efforts. In summary, while the diaspora support dataset has its limitations, it nonetheless provides novel insights into diaspora support to rebel organizations involved in intrastate conflicts in Africa and Asia by systematically coding such a variable through publicly available sources.

6.2 Methodology

To empirically evaluate the proposed hypotheses, I have conducted three comprehensive large-N analyses employing novel diaspora support data. These analyses were executed in RStudio using R version 4.3.0. My focus is primarily on two of the most conflict-affected regions: Africa and Asia. Due to the varying nature of the dependent variables — time-invariant for the first analysis and time-variant for the subsequent two — the number of observations differs across the analyses. The first set of analyses adopts a cross-sectional approach and delves into the determinants of diaspora support. Here, the unit of analysis is the conflict-dyad diaspora observation. The subsequent two sets of analyses explore the consequences of diaspora support by examining three distinct outcomes: 1) civilian victimization, and 2) ethnic violence, as well as 3) elements of rebel governance. In these instances, the unit of analysis is the conflict dyad-diaspora-year, following a cross-sectional time-series analysis. The following three subsections describe the methodological approaches, the potential confounding factors considered, and the robustness checks employed in this empirical research.

6.2.1 Summary statistics

In the analysis, I utilize the categorical variable *diaspora support* and transform it into a dichotomous diaspora support variable. To ensure robustness of the analysis, I have created various dichotomous variables, each treating the value *likely* in different ways - in some instances, it is included as an indication of diaspora support, while in others,




Figure 6.5: Distribution of observations (N=939) by diaspora support dummy variable, likely category excluded (dyad-year)




Figure 6.6: Distribution of observations (N=939) by diaspora support dummy variable, strict coding (dyad-year)

it is excluded. Figure 6.5 depicts the distribution of observations, where the likely value is excluded. Conversely, figure 6.6 presents the distribution, which employing strict coding criteria, where any missing information is assigned a value of zero. Both figures use dyad-year as the unit of observation. Furthermore, figure 6.7 illustrates the distribution of values for the main coding of the dichotomous variable diaspora support, also in the dyad-year format.




Figure 6.7: Distribution of observations (N=939) by diaspora support dummy variable (dyad-year)

6.2.2 Determinants of diaspora sponsorship

This section explains the methodological approach for the first set of analyses. This analysis empirically investigates the second research question: Under which conditions is diaspora support more likely? To address this, two distinct types of regression analyses are employed: (1) an extreme bounds analysis and (2) cross-sectional logistic regression analysis. Furthermore, to ascertain the robustness of the model specification, I conduct a probit regression analysis. Each methodological section is flowed by a section describing the variables and sources utilized in the analysis. For a detailed overview of the diaspora support variable, please see chapter 6.2.1.

6.2.2.1 Extreme bounds analysis (EBA)

Extreme bounds analysis (EBA) is a methodology used to identify variables that are robustly correlated with a specific dependent variable across multiple regression models (Hlavac, 2016; Leamer, 1985; Sala-i-Martin, 1997). For example, Hegre and Sambanis (2006) applied this approach to review existing empirical results on conflict onset, determining which factors are fragile and demonstrating the sensitivity of drivers of civil war onset.¹⁰ In this dissertation, I utilize extreme bounds analysis, also referred to as sensitivity analysis, to examine which factors drive diaspora support for rebel organizations. This examination is grounded in theoretical expectations surrounding conflict, rebel group, diaspora and homeland characteristics. Additionally, this analysis aims to detect which factors remain robust and which are fragile to changes in model specifications.

To assess which conditional factors are robustly correlated with diaspora support, I conduct two types of EBA using the Rpackage *ExtremeBounds* by Hlavac (2016). Leamer's Extreme Bounds Analysis provides insights into whether a variable is robust or fragile, whereas Sala-i-Martin's Extreme Bounds Analysis presents the distribution of the normal and generic cumulative density functions for each variable (Leamer, 1985; Sala-i-Martin, 1997). Leamer's EBA adopts a more stringent criterion: a single

¹⁰Extreme bounds analysis (EBA) is frequently employed in the field of economics, particularly in the examination of trade, growth, and gravity models. Notable examples of such applications are Ghosh and Yamarik (2004), Granger and Uhlig (1990), Moosa (2009), Sturm and De Haan (2005), and Sturm et al. (2005).

regression that exhibits opposing signs in the upper and lower 95% confidence intervals, is deemed fragile (Hlavac, 2016; Leamer, 1985). In contrast, Sala-i-Martin's EBA shows the value of the cumulative density function (CDF) focusing on "the fraction of the cumulative distribution function lying on each side of zero" (Sala-i-Martin, 1997, p. 4). While the normal CDF follows an asymptotic normal distribution of the estimated coefficients, the generic CDF does not presuppose any specific distribution type.

In the analysis, I examine estimated coefficients that are robust according to Leamer's classification, and conditional factors exhibiting at least 90% under the $CDF(0)$, thereby ensuring a high degree of robustness of these conditional factors across different model specifications. This approach aligns with methodologies employed in similar studies, such as the study by Sturm and De Haan (2005, p. 614), who investigated the determinants of long-term growth by evaluating results of the $CDF(0)$ exceeding 0.95 after employing extreme bounds analysis with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model specifications. Additionally, Moosa (2009) uses this method to study foreign direct investments in the Middle East and North African region, and Ghosh and Yamarik (2004) compared factors in various gravity models.

I adopt a conservative approach by setting a variance inflation factor (VIF) of five to limit multicollinearity. In robustness tests, all regressions are re-run using a higher VIF of ten, permitting more substantial levels of multicollinearity. I also employ robust standard errors and utilize a logistic regression model. The unit of analysis is the conflict dyad-diaspora observation, appropriate for a cross-sectional analysis given the time-invariant nature of the dependent variable: diaspora support. This variable is derived from the diaspora support dataset, which encompasses data on diaspora support for rebel organizations in armed conflicts within Africa and Asia starting between 1989 and 2014. This dataset is compiled from publicly available sources and newswires. The dependent variable is dichotomous, capturing whether there is diaspora support to a rebel organization.

Aligned with the theoretical expectations, I examine four categories of conditional factors: conflict and rebel group characteristics, homeland characteristics and those of the diaspora. Here, I present the individual conditional factors incorporated in the extreme bounds analysis. Table 6.1 summarizes these factors, categorizing them ac-

ording to the four aforementioned types. Informed by prior research, I treat gross domestic product (GDP) and size of population as free variables, while the remaining are focus variables. Free variables are included across all model specifications, whereas focus variables vary, reflecting the diverse determinants of diaspora support for rebel organizations. The data for the two free variables is sourced from World Bank data and United Nations Statistics Division displaying national accounts estimates of main aggregates. I transform values using logarithms. Importantly, a separate extreme bounds analysis is conducted exclusively for rebel characteristics associated with elements of rebel governance. This is due to the comparatively smaller dataset available, which limits the number of observations concerning rebel governance.

6.2.2.2 Data sources for conflict characteristics

In this section, I detail the data sources for the variables presented in table 6.1. I created a variable indicating the number of rebel organizations participating in a conflict by counting the number of rebel organizations per conflict dyad using the dyadic version of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Harbom et al., 2008; Pettersson & Öberg, 2020, p. v20.1). Additionally, I calculate the years since the conflict started, converting this into a logarithm scale. The violence variables are based on the UCDP one-sided violence dataset (UCDP OSV v20.1, Eck & Hultman, 2007; Pettersson & Öberg, 2020) and the ethnic one-sided violence dataset (Fjelde et al., 2021). These datasets are instrumental in quantifying violence against civilians and co-ethnics. To address potential time-dependency issues, a one-year lag is included for both violence variables. I also consider the relevance of ethnicity by incorporating an additional dichotomous variable, which indicates the presence of at least two active ethnic groups within the homeland. The data for this variable is sourced from the ETH-EPR data (Girardin et al., 2015; Vogt et al., 2015, p. 2021).

6.2.2.3 Data sources for rebel group characteristics

Drawing from the ACD2EPR dataset (2021, Vogt et al., 2015), I utilizes variables related to recruitment, claim and support. The data for external (state) support variables is sourced from the External Support Dataset (ESD, Meier et al., 2022). Additionally,

Determinant	Variables and data sources
Conflict	number rebel organizations (dyadic UCDP/PRIO ACD, v20.1), duration of conflict (dyadic UCDP/PRIO ACD, v20.1), relevance of ethnicity (ETH-EPR data, 2021), lagged (ethnic) one-sided violence (EOSV)
Rebel groups	rebel claim (ACD2EPR, 2021), domestic support (ACD2EPR, 2021), external support (ESD), rebel recruitment (ACD2EPR, 2021), state support (ESD), rebel strength (NSA), designated US foreign terrorist organization (extended DTO), in Power, Media, elections, law, justice system, organized like a government, taxation, embassy, constitution, armed forces, health, education, infrastructure, aid, member IO, attempt to join IO (all QSI dataset)
Homeland	status discriminated (ETH-EPR data, 2021), status excluded (ETH-EPR data, 2021), media bias (VDem, v13), critical media (VDem, v13)
Diaspora	multiple homelands, possibility of return, conflict-driven migration (all diaspora dataset)

Table 6.1: Examined conditional factors of diaspora support (variables and data sources)

information regarding the relative rebel strength is obtained from the Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict Dataset D. E. Cunningham et al. (2013). I take into account whether the rebel organization is a US designated foreign terrorist organization drawing on the Designated Terrorist Organizations Dataset by Tominaga et al. (DTO, 2022) which I further updated for comprehensiveness.¹¹ In addressing elements of rebel governance, I employ variables from the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions (QSI) dataset (Albert, 2022).

6.2.2.4 Data sources for homeland characteristics

For the homeland characteristics, I introduce a dichotomous variable to determine whether the diaspora’s ethnic group is discriminated in the home country, following the ETH-EPR classification (Vogt et al., 2015). Similarly, I incorporate a variable to identify if the diaspora’s ethnic group is excluded from power in the homeland. To capture media bias and critical media in the homeland, I rely on data from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data (v13, Coppedge et al., 2023).

6.2.2.5 Data sources for diaspora characteristics

The data for diaspora characteristics is derived from the diaspora dataset compiled by Kopchick et al. (2021). Within this dataset, I have encoded a dichotomous variable to distinguish whether a diaspora originates from a single homeland or multiple homelands. Additionally, the dataset includes information on the diaspora’s possibility to

¹¹The variable concerning whether a rebel organization is designated as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) was updated using the list released by the United States Department of State’s Bureau of Counterterrorism (United States Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2023).

return to the homeland, a factor that is incorporated into the analysis. Furthermore, I utilize this dataset to create another dichotomous variable. This variable specifically indicates whether the migration background of a diaspora is conflict-driven or encompasses mixed migration, including voluntary migration.

6.2.2.6 Logistic regression analysis

Following the results obtained from the extreme bounds analysis, I proceed to conduct cross-sectional logistic regressions, applying robust and clustered standard errors. The selection of model estimation is informed by the nature of the dependent variable, being a time-invariant and dichotomous variable. Additionally, all model estimations are replicated using probit regressions to further validate the results. The clustering in this analysis is implemented at the level of the conflict dyad. The robustness of the results is reinforced by the fact that clustering on the dyad level yields consistent findings. It is noteworthy, however, that the number of observations varies slightly among different model specifications, primarily due to the varying availability of data for potential confounding variables.

I run the regression models related to conflict, rebel group, homeland and diaspora characteristics, employing the same variables as those discussed in the section on extreme bounds analysis. Additionally, I include a variable to determine the presence of transborder ethnic kin for the diaspora group, with data coded from the ETH-TEK 2021 (Vogt et al., 2015). Furthermore, I control for the number of state and non-state sponsors, utilizing data from the External Support Dataset (Meier et al., 2022). Another control variable accounts for the ethnic group's status monopoly within the homeland (Vogt et al., 2015). However, due to the identification of a separation issue tends towards infinity, this particular variable is subsequently excluded from further analysis. I use the Rpackage by Kosmidis et al. (2022) to detect separation. Furthermore, I run penalized regressions to limit the separation issue.¹² However, this form of regression analyses does not solve the separation issues, therefore I decided to omit the variables suffering from separation to avoid biased results.

I also conduct an interaction effect analysis. These interaction effects models exam-


¹²Exemplary studies dealing with separation problems in logistic regression are Clark et al. (2023), Gelman et al. (2008), and Mansournia et al. (2018).

ine the combined effect of being discriminated or excluded from power, in conjunction with media bias or critical media. To assess the statistical distinction between these two interaction effects, I employ Wald tests. The results from the logistic regression analysis are presented in chapter 7.1.2. Meanwhile, the results of the interaction effects are included in the appendix and the results of the probit regression available upon request.


6.2.3 Diaspora support and civilian victimization

This section explains the methodological approach for the second set of analyses, which empirically investigates the first segment of the third research question: How does diaspora sponsorship of rebel organizations impact civilian victimization? In this dissertation, I make a distinction between violence against civilians and ethnic violence against civilians. Considering the count nature of the dependent variable, I employ both Poisson models and negative binomial models, each with robust standard errors that are clustered at the conflict-level. The time-series cross-sectional analysis integrates novel diaspora support data, as presented in the first section of this chapter, alongside data on one-sided violence (UCDP OSV v20.1, Eck & Hultman, 2007; Pettersson & Öberg, 2020) and ethnic one-sided violence (EOSV, Fjelde et al., 2021). Additionally, I rigorously check for overdispersion in all Poisson models. For the analysis involving the dichotomous variable, I execute both logistic and probit models, again using robust standard errors that are clustered at the conflict-level.

The primary dependent variable in this analysis is violence against civilians perpetrated by rebel organizations, as depicted in figure 6.8. My analysis comprises two distinct types: 1) the occurrence of one-sided violence, represented as a dummy variable, and 2) the number of one-sided violence events, which is a count variable. Figure 6.9 displays the distribution for the dichotomous variable of one-sided violence. Violence against civilians is defined as “the use of armed force [...] by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths.” (Pettersson, 2020). The count variable of violence against civilians is derived from the UCDP OSV (v20.1), specifically from the variable *best_fatality_estimate*.



(a) One-sided violence over time. The outlier refers to AFDL in 1996 in the Democratic Republic of Congo conducting 30110 events of one-sided violence.



(b) One-sided violence over time, normalized

Figure 6.8: Distribution of observations of one-sided violence over time




Figure 6.9: Distribution of observations (N=939) by one-sided violence variable (dyad-year)

6.2.3.1 Methodological approach for ethnic violence

In the analysis related to ethnic violence, I examine three different dependent variables. The first variable is ethnic violence and the second variable is ethnic targeting, both sourced from the Ethnic One-sided Violence (EOSV) dataset (Fjelde et al., 2021). Ethnic violence codes the ethnicity of the people experiencing one-sided violence. Ethnic targeting refers to the intentional targeting by ethnic group. To specifically address ethnic violence, I generate a new variable that codes for ethnic violence when the ethnicity of the diaspora aligns with the identified ethnicity based on the ethnic one-sided violence (EOSV, Fjelde et al., 2021). This newly created variable constitutes the third dependent variable. The distribution of this coded variable is illustrated in figure 6.10. The majority of violence events indicate non-ethnic violence.




Figure 6.10: Distribution of observations (N=939) by ethnic one-sided violence variable (dyad-year)

All three variables for the ethnic violence analysis are dichotomous. This is due to the limited information available regarding the ethnic identities of the victims, which renders a count variable impractical. The methodological approach is tailored to the time-varying nature of these dependent variables. Consequently, I conduct logistic and probit regression analyses within a time-series cross-sectional framework. Additionally, I run Poisson models and check for overdispersion.

6.2.3.2 Data sources for confounders

In my analysis, I incorporate controls for various potential confounding factors, as identified by existing scholarship on civilian victimization and ethnic targeting. The first set of control variables captures economic and population factors that are linked to civilian victimization. For instance, akin the approach of Fjelde et al. (2021), I include

population size and gross domestic product per capita as variables, both of which are logarithmically transformed. The data for these two variables are taken from the World Bank and the United Nations Statistics Division.

Additionally, I capture the presence of *transborder ethnic kin* for the diaspora group, using data from the ETH-TEK dataset 2021 (Vogt et al., 2015). To address potential time dependency and problems of auto-correlation between current and previous instances of one-sided violence, I incorporate a one-year lag of the dependent variable. Similarly, the current duration of the conflict in years is included, with this variable being left-censored starting from 1989. In the analyses focusing on ethnic one-sided violence, a one-year lag for this variable is also included. I also account for multiple ethnic violence through a dichotomous variable indicating if more than one ethnic group has been identified for the civilian killings. Moreover, I take into consideration external state and non-diaspora support, drawing upon data from the ESD (Meier et al., 2022).

In addition to external support, the domestic opportunities available to a rebel group can obscure the relationship described. To address this aspect, I have incorporated a variable capturing rebels *recruitment* among the ethnic population related to the diaspora. The *recruitment* variable is based on ACD2EPR (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012). The involvement of multiple actors in the conflict, referred to multi-actor conflict, can also complicate this relationship. As a result, I include a control variable for the number of rebel organizations involved in the conflict. While the recruitment variable captures a domestic resource possibly linked to diaspora support, the status of the co-ethnic population in the homeland may also influence the outlined relationship. To accommodate this aspect, I introduce a binary variable that signifies whether the ethnic group in the homeland is politically excluded, alongside a dummy denoting whether ethnicity is a relevant cleavage in the homeland, derived from EPR dataset 2021 (Vogt et al., 2015). Due to varying data availability of certain control variables, the number of observations differs slightly among the model specifications.

To empirically examine the conditional hypotheses, I incorporate additional data sources. To account for countries of origin, I utilize information from the diaspora dataset (Kopchick et al., 2021) to construct a binary variable that identifies whether the diaspora originates from a single homeland or multiple homelands. Furthermore,

Analysis; variable types	confounding factors
One-sided violence (OSV) count & dummy	population size and GDP (World Bank data & UN Statistics Division), lagged OSV (UCDP OSV v20.1), transborder ethnic kin (ETH-TEK, 2021), number rebel organizations (dyadic UCDP/PRIO ACD, v20.1), duration of conflict (dyadic UCDP/PRIO ACD, v20.1), recruitment (ACD2EPR, 2021), status excluded (ETH-EPR data, 2021), external (state) support (ESD)
Ethnic one-sided violence (EOSV) dummy	population size and GDP (World Bank data & UN Statistics Division), lagged EOSV (EOSV), transborder ethnic kin (ETH-TEK, 2021), number rebel organizations (dyadic UCDP/PRIO ACD, v20.1), duration of conflict (dyadic UCDP/PRIO ACD, v20.1), recruitment (ACD2EPR, 2021), status excluded (ETH-EPR data, 2021), external (state) support (ESD)
Conditional analysis OSV count & dummy	discriminated (ETH-EPR data, 2021)*diaspora support (DS), media bias (VDem, v13)*DS, multi-ethnic population (ETH-EPR data, 2021)*DS, single homeland (diaspora dataset)*DS, return (diaspora dataset)*DS, conflict-driven migration (diaspora dataset)*DS
Conditional analysis EOSV dummy	conflict-driven migration (diaspora dataset)*diaspora support (DS), status discriminated (ETH-EPR data, 2021)*DS, media bias (VDem, v13)*DS, multi-ethnic population (ETH-EPR data, 2021)*DS, single homeland (diaspora dataset)*DS, media range (VDem, v13)*DS, critical media (VDem, v13)*DS, news outlets (diaspora dataset)*DS, return (diaspora dataset)*DS

Table 6.2: Overview of confounders used in the analysis for (ethnic) one-sided violence and diaspora support (variables and data sources)

I introduce another dichotomous variable to reflect whether the diaspora group is discriminated in the home country, following the ETH-EPR classification (Vogt et al., 2015). The number of active groups in a country (Girardin et al., 2015), serves as an indicator of a multi-ethnic population. The data capturing media bias in the homeland is sourced from V-Dem data (v13, Coppedge et al., 2023). I compare diaspora support with and without these conditional factors. I conduct Wald tests to assess whether the interaction effects significantly differ from one another.

Table 6.2 provides a summary of the confounding factors for the analysis, which employs one-sided violence and ethnic one-sided violence as the dependent variables. Additionally, I also specify whether the dependent variable is dichotomous or a count variable. For robustness, I incorporate as control variables the number of external state supporters (Meier et al., 2022), as well as the presence of least one non-state actor providing external support (Meier et al., 2022). Moreover, I re-estimate the models with clustered standard errors at the dyad-level to ensure methodological robustness. As an additional robustness test, I also employ Poisson models.

6.2.4 Diaspora support and rebel governance elements

The final set of analyses explore how diaspora support may effect rebel governance. To this end, I use my diaspora support data and pair it with the most comprehensive data on rebel governance compiled by Albert (2022). I generate a sub sample to align with the temporal scope of the rebel governance (QSI) dataset. The sub sample encompasses 611 observations spanning from 1989 to 2012. Due to the limited availability of rebel governance data and the smaller number of observations, the analysis is exploratory in nature, serving as a preliminary investigation into the potential causal relationships between diaspora support and rebel governance.

Aligning with theoretical expectations, I focus on variables measuring governance, resources, political legitimacy and public goods and services as dependent variables. For each identified element of rebel governance, I perform cross-sectional time-series analyses. Considering the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables, I employ logistic and probit regression analyses, with robust standard errors clustered by conflict. Additionally, I test for separation issues utilizing the Rpackage by Kosmidis et al. (2022).

6.2.4.1 Data sources for dependent variables and confounders

In this section, I explain the 18 dependent variables that serve as proxies for various elements of rebel governance, alongside confounding factors and their corresponding data sources. Table 6.3 summarizes the categories of rebel governance, detailing the related variables and confounders I utilized in the analysis. The data for the rebel governance variables is sourced from the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset (QSI) (Albert, 2022). The selection of rebel governance variables was made after a comprehensive review of all variables listed in the dataset's codebook. The data sources for the confounding factors have been previously outlined in the section focusing on diaspora support and civilian victimization (chapter 6.2.3.2). For each of the 18 dependent variables, I conduct tests for detecting separation. I exclude variables from further analysis where separation is detected.

Rebel governance categories & confounders	Variables
Public goods and services	education, health, infrastructure, aid/welfare (all QSI dataset)
Governance	organized like government, national government, elections, justice system, law over civilian behavior, constitution, in power, armed forces, taxation (all QSI dataset)
Political legitimacy	embassies, member of IO, attempt to join IO (all QSI dataset)
Resources	illegal network, negotiation right natural resources (all QSI dataset)
Confounders	population size and GDP (World Bank data & UN Statistics Division), lagged OSV (UCDP OSV, v20.1), transborder ethnic kin (ETH-TEK, 2021), number rebel organizations (dyadic UCDP/PRIO ACD, v20.1), US FTO (extended DTO), duration of conflict (dyadic UCDP/PRIO ACD, v20.1), recruitment (ACD2EPR, 2021), status excluded (ETH-EPR data, 2021), external support (ESD), relevance ethnicity (ETH-EPR data, 2021), media bias (VDem, v13)

Table 6.3: Overview of variables and confounders used in the analysis on diaspora support and rebel governance (variables and data sources)

Chapter 7

Causes of diaspora support: Empirical results

Diaspora support to a rebel organization can be influenced by a lot of factors that may be intertwined. This chapter delves into the empirical findings of conditional factors that influence diaspora support to rebel organizations. I specifically examine the proposed hypotheses in chapter 4.3, focusing on four sets of determinants of diaspora sponsorship: conflict, rebel group, diaspora and homeland characteristics. The chapter is structured around the two main analyses conducted. I conduct a novel type of analysis in the context of external sponsorship that is mostly utilized in economic growth literature, extreme bounds analysis.¹ First, I present the findings from the extreme bounds analysis (EBA), going through the combination of the four set of determinants. Following this, I proceed with the findings from the logistic regression analysis. The findings indicate that conflict characteristics are the most robust determinants are the most robust determinants of diaspora sponsorship, whereas homeland characteristics are mostly statistically insignificant. Additionally, rebel group and diaspora related determinants provide mixed results. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the findings, offering insights into the various determinants of diaspora sponsorship to rebel organizations.

7.1 Determinants of diaspora support

This section delves into the empirical findings related to the second research questions: Under which is conditions diaspora support to rebel organizations more likely? The findings are structured around four distinct categories of determinants: conflict, rebel groups, homeland, and diaspora characteristics. For each category, I examine how the respective variables influence diaspora sponsorship, either making it more or less likely. It is important to note, however, that the list of determinants is not exhaustive. Given the scope of this dissertation, the analysis is concentrated on the determinants outlined in section 4.3 and summarized in table 7.1.

Table 7.1 offers an overview of the hypothesized determinants of diaspora sponsorship. Overall, I find support for the conflict determinants making diaspora support less likely. Some of the rebel group determinants encounter separation issues and are,

¹An exception is Hegre and Sambanis (2006) who employ an extreme bounds analysis in the context of civil war onset.

Hypotheses	Determinants	Direction of effect on diaspora sponsorship (↑, ↓)
conflict	high number of rebel organizations, long duration of conflict, previous violence against civilians exist	↓
rebels	designated US foreign terrorist organization, recruits from an ethnic group, or state sponsors exist	↓
homeland rebels	biased or restricted media in homeland relative strong compared to the government, claims to fight on behalf of an ethnic group, receives support from the ethnic group in the homeland, multiple sponsors exist, or the rebels provide elements of rebel governance	↓ ↑
homeland	diaspora's ethnic group is discriminated or excluded from power ethnic group, homeland is economically wealthy, or large population	↑
diaspora	single homeland, possibility to return, transborder ethnic kin, or a conflict-driven migration background	↑

Table 7.1: Overview of theoretically-motivated determinants of diaspora sponsorship

as a result, omitted from the analysis. However, determinants such as rebel's claim, domestic support, or external support demonstrate robustness, highlighting the mixed findings for the two rebel group related hypotheses. Apart from the exclusion of ethnic groups from power, most homeland characteristics suggest to be weak determinants of diaspora sponsorship to rebel organizations. Similarly, only the presence of a transborder ethnic kin follows the hypothesized robust relationship.

To examine the determinants of diaspora support to rebel organizations in a cross-sectional framework, I employ two distinct types of regression analyses. Initially, I conducted the Sala-i-Martin's Extreme Bounds Analysis (Sala-i-Martin, 1997) as well as Leamer's Extreme Bounds Analysis (Leamer, 1985) to identify robust factors that influence diaspora sponsorship; for detailed presentation of the methodology, please see chapter 6.2.2.1. The outcome of the analysis demonstrates which determinants are robust across model specifications and which ones are very dependent on the variables included as confounding factors. Further explanation of such types of analysis is provided in chapter 6.2.2.1. Once I identified the robust factors, I did a logistic regression analysis to indicate estimates of the effect size and statistical significance of the identified factors. For the robustness of link functions, I also carried out probit regression

analyses. The results of the probit analysis do indicate robustness and are available upon request.

7.1.1 Results for extreme bounds analysis

The determinants of diaspora sponsorship can be grouped as conflict, rebel group, homeland and diaspora determinants. The results from the Sala-i-Martin's Extreme Bounds Analysis and the Leamer's Extreme Bounds Analysis reveal insights on various theoretically informed determinants influencing the occurrence of diaspora support. In this analysis, I adopted a conservative approach by setting the variance inflation factor to five. I excluded the estimated regressions with a degree of multi-collinearity corresponding to this variance inflation factor from subsequent estimations in the extreme bounds analysis. The results for a variance inflation factor of ten, which allows for greater high multi-collinearity, are presented in the appendix B.

7.1.1.1 Conflict and rebel characteristics

The intuition behind employing extreme bounds analysis in this context is to explore the fragility of a determinant's impact on diaspora sponsorship against the backdrop of alternative specifications. These specifications encompass a range of varying determinants related to conflict, rebel group, homeland and diaspora characteristics. While this analytical approach is specific and novel in the realm of external sponsorship scholarship, it has been employed in conflict research. For instance, Hegre and Sambanis (2006) analyze the robustness of empirical findings in the literature explaining the onset of civil wars. This study distinguishes between determinants that are robust across specifications and those that are specification-sensitive and, consequently fragile drivers.

The examination of determinants relating to conflict and rebel characteristics compellingly suggests that the majority of factors are robust in the Sala-i-Martin's Extreme Bounds Analysis. This conclusion is drawn by focusing on beta coefficients that are normally distributed across models, with the percentage under the cumulative density function (CDF) being 90% or higher. According to Hlavac (2016, p. 5), a variable is classified robust, if a large portion of the CDF(0) is located either to the right or left of

zero. These findings imply that conflict and rebel group related determinants are crucial for the occurrence of diaspora sponsorship to rebel organizations. The histograms presented are based on 255 combinations of regressions, estimated as part of the extreme bounds analysis, with GDP and population as free variables that are included in all regressions. Table 6.1 in chapter 6 summarizes all variables included in this analysis, referring to four categories of hypotheses: conflict, rebel group, homeland, and diaspora characteristics. For a concise overview, table 7.1 displays the tested determinants for the conflict and rebel hypotheses. While the direction of the effects is examined in the logistic regression analysis, the findings of the extreme bounds analysis provide insights into which determinants demonstrate robustness in influencing diaspora sponsorship.

The conflict characteristics measured through a high number of rebel organizations, long duration of conflicts, a one-year lag of one-sided violence² demonstrate robustness when considering their proportion under the cumulative density function. In the context of Leamer's Extreme Bounds Analysis, a variable is deemed fragile if, the upper and lower coefficient bound possess opposite sign in one estimated regression (Hlavac, 2016, p. 4). Following this basic type of extreme bounds analysis identifies the duration of conflict as a robust variable.

Figure 7.1 displays histograms for the estimated regressions concerning the cumulative density function (CDF) with GDP and population being robust across model estimations, with both variables showing 97% coverage under the CDF. However, the findings for rebel characteristics yield mixed results. Due to the issue of separation, which introduces bias, variables such as rebel strength and designated foreign terrorist organization were excluded from the analysis. Their inclusion within the scope of this dissertation is not feasible. Variables like recruitment and external state support exhibit less robustness, as evidenced by the lower percentage falling under the cumulative density function. Conversely, variables such as rebel's claim, domestic support, or external support demonstrate robustness, indicated by the percentage that falls under the CDF. Notably, the variable denoting the relevance of ethnicity, referring to at least two distinct ethnic groups, shows less robustness with only 74% falling under the CDF. Furthermore, both state support and relevance of ethnicity display significant

²Although the conducted extreme bounds analysis is cross-sectional, this variable captures lagged violence summarized over diaspora-conflict dyad ID.




Figure 7.1: Cumulative density functions with normal distribution for conflict and rebel characteristics with variance inflation factor 5 (Sala-i-Martin's Extreme Bounds Analysis)

portions on either side of the zero line. Following Hlavac's (2016, p. 5) interpretation of Sala-i-Martin's Extreme Bounds Analysis' results, suggest less robustness.

Reviewing the results for rebel group characteristics, it becomes apparent that most of the 16 focus variables encounter separation problems. In brief this refers to variables predicting diaspora sponsorship too well (cf. Clark et al., 2023). In the considered cases the rebel governance variables tend towards extreme negative numbers as shown in figure 7.2. Variables such as being in power, having a justice system, and having an organized government are the three variables that indicate robustness. Additionally, figure B.2 in the appendix illustrates the results for a variance inflation factor of five for robustness. These 16 rebel characteristics are analyzed independently to mitigate the issue of limited observations in other analyses. This limitation occurs due to the restricted availability of data on rebel governance, specifically overlap in time periods, which consequently reduces the overall sample size. Hegre and Sambanis (2006, p. 514), in their analysis of drivers of civil war onset, point out that varying sample sizes in the analysis are problematic because "to identify whether changes in results are due to changes in the specification or to changes in the sample" is not possible. Therefore, I run a separate rebel governance analysis. This approach aims to minimize the ambiguity in identifying changes resulting from model variations as opposed to those arising from

sample size discrepancies, especially in cases where missing observations in a combined dataset occur, that include rebel governance variables.




Figure 7.2: Cumulative density function with normal distribution for rebel characteristics related to rebel governance with variance inflation factor 10 (Sala-i-Martin's Extreme Bounds Analysis)

7.1.1.2 Conflict, rebel, and homeland characteristics

The analysis of conflict, rebel group, and homeland characteristics is based on 1092 combinations of estimated regressions. Figure 7.3 presents the results for these three sets of hypotheses, encompassing determinants related to conflict, rebel and homeland characteristics. The results for conflict and rebel characteristics align closely with those depicted in 7.1. However, homeland characteristics, such as biased or restricted media and discriminated ethnic groups, exhibit less robustness, as indicated by their low percentage under the cumulative density function (CDF). Notably, the variable representing the exclusion of ethnic groups from power is an exception, with 91% of its distribution falling under the normal CDF. The results, particularly for interaction effects when considering restricted or biased media conditional on population size, do not yield robust variables across the various estimated model specifications.

In summary, including homeland characteristics as determinants of diaspora sponsorship does not significantly alter the conflict and rebel determinants. Additionally,




Figure 7.3: Cumulative density function with normal distribution for conflict, rebel and homeland characteristics with variance inflation factor 5 (Sala-i-Martin's Extreme Bounds Analysis)

the exclusion of ethnic groups from power is identified as a robust and relevant factor to predict diaspora sponsorship. However, the hypothesized relationship between homeland determinants and diaspora sponsorship, such as bias or restricted media in the homeland, discriminated population in the homeland, and interaction effects among these determinants, suggest a weak linkage due to the lack of robustness across the estimated models in the conducted Sala-i-Martin's EBA.

7.1.1.3 Conflict, rebel, homeland and diaspora characteristics

Investigating the results from the Sala-i-Martin's Extreme Bounds Analysis, which encompasses four sets of determinants (conflict, rebel group, homeland, and diaspora characteristics), reveals that three out of four variables associated with diaspora characteristics lack robustness. However, the variable representing transborder ethnic kin demonstrates robust, also in the Leamer's Extreme Bounds Analysis. Figure 7.4 displays the results for the 3213 estimated regressions, considering all four sets of hypothesized determinants. The overarching pattern suggests that the robustness of variables related to conflict, rebel group and homeland characteristics remains relatively unchanged when diaspora characteristics are introduced as additional variables.

While the conducted extreme bounds analysis indicates that most diaspora and




Figure 7.4: Cumulative density function with normal distribution for all four categories of conditional characteristics with variance inflation factor 5 (Sala-i-Martin's Extreme Bounds Analysis)

homeland characteristics do not exhibit robustness, the results for rebel group characteristics are mixed, and conflict characteristics appear to be among the most robust variables. Further research is needed to delve deeper into these findings and disentangle the extent to which the four categories of determinants might overlap. Further effort is also required to address how to account for variables suffering from separation and explore alternative variables and measurements to gain a more comprehensive understanding of determinants of diaspora sponsorship to rebel organizations.

7.1.2 Results for logistic regression analysis

In this section, I present and interpret the results of the logistic regression analysis, which utilizes cross-sectional data. This approach is necessitated by the time-invariant nature of the dependent variable.³ The results demonstrate that, consistent with the results from the extreme bounds analysis, conflict variables act as negative and statistically significant determinants of diaspora sponsorship. Furthermore, diaspora sponsorship is more likely if external support is presence, and the rebel group claims to

³To ensure the robustness of the results across different link functions, I also conducted a probit regression analysis. The detailed regression results are available upon request.

fight on behalf of an ethnic group, partially corroborating the hypotheses about rebel groups. Although most homeland determinants show statistically insignificant effects, the predominantly negative direction of these effects is align with the proposed hypothesis. Consistent with the results from the extreme bounds analysis, only the presence of transborder ethnic kin demonstrates a statistically significant effect on diaspora sponsorship when considering diaspora determinants.

7.1.2.1 Conflict and rebel characteristics

Table 7.2 showcases the estimated coefficients for conflict and rebel-related characteristics, based on the cross-sectional, logistic regression analysis. Due to the limited availability of data, the number of observation varies between 193 and 153.⁴ During the analysis, I identified instances of separation, which led to the exclusion of variables measuring rebel strength and US designated foreign terrorist organizations. Similar to the extreme bounds analysis results (as depicted in figure 7.1), conflict duration and number of rebel organizations both consistently are negative and statistically significant across various model specifications. In the baseline specification (Model 1 in table 7.2), the size of the population has a positive and statistically significant effect on diaspora support, whereas the estimated coefficient for GDP is negative and statistically significant.

In table 7.2 column 2 through 6, I introduce additional determinants related to conflict and rebel characteristics into the baseline regression. Column 2 and 3 indicate that a rebel group's claim to fight on behalf of an ethnic group, or domestic support by that group, both make diaspora support more likely. However, the recruitment variable does not demonstrate a statistically significant effect on diaspora support to rebel organizations, suggesting that it is not a statistically significant determinant of diaspora sponsorship.

Overall, the results lend empirical support for the conflict hypothesis. A high number of rebel organizations and long duration of conflict both exhibit negative and statistically significant effects, thereby making diaspora support less likely. The estimated coefficients in table 7.2 also affirm the hypotheses related to rebel groups.

⁴It is important to note that the baseline model does not account for 231 observations because of the dependent variable excluding observations with missing information.

Table 7.2: Conflict and rebel determinants of diaspora sponsorship (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Diaspora Support (dummy)</i>						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Population (ln)	0.422* (0.233)	0.247 (0.258)	0.340 (0.237)	0.313 (0.225)	0.296 (0.266)	0.274 (0.241)
GDP (ln)	-0.331* (0.185)	-0.257 (0.195)	-0.290 (0.178)	-0.286 (0.176)	-0.269 (0.202)	-0.249 (0.183)
lagged OSV	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)
# rebel groups in conflict	-0.062** (0.031)	-0.080*** (0.030)	-0.068* (0.037)	-0.086** (0.037)	-0.068** (0.032)	-0.070** (0.034)
duration since conflict start (ln)	-0.931*** (0.330)	-0.941*** (0.360)	-1.106*** (0.379)	-0.955*** (0.368)	-1.147*** (0.387)	-1.163*** (0.381)
ethnicity relevant (dummy)	1.316*** (0.285)	0.380 (0.496)	0.838** (0.411)	2.036*** (0.486)	0.102 (0.552)	0.674 (0.654)
claim		0.657*** (0.233)			0.534** (0.264)	0.574* (0.307)
domestic support			0.459** (0.196)		0.325 (0.218)	0.290 (0.224)
recruitment				0.490 (0.323)		0.611 (0.492)
Constant	-0.974 (2.154)	1.041 (2.532)	-0.026 (2.723)	-0.974 (2.607)	0.622 (2.830)	-0.652 (3.005)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	193	163	154	160	153	152
Log Likelihood	-113.636	-95.086	-88.494	-95.298	-86.301	-84.875
Akaike Inf. Crit.	241.271	206.173	192.989	206.595	190.602	189.749

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Domestic support and claim have an increasing effect, thus making diaspora sponsorship more likely. Conversely, the hypothesis regarding the effect of state sponsors is not supported; the direction of the estimated coefficient is positive, but statistically insignificant, which contrasts with the anticipated negative direction. This finding implies that state support rather than diminishing diaspora support, appears to be a statistically insignificant determinant, or it may even have a positive effect.

Accounting for various forms of external support yield consistent results. The presence of external support, as opposed to its absence, makes diaspora support to rebel organizations more likely. Nevertheless, while domestic support remains positive, it is statistically insignificant. This insignificance persists unless, I include a variable for count of non-state support, which, in itself is statistically insignificant. Moreover, examining state and non-state support, alongside the occurrence and the number of such supporters, indicates a positive yet statistically insignificant effect. These findings are presented in table C.2 in the appendix. The results for external support lend support to the hypothesis on rebel characteristics.

This analysis concentrates on the provision of governance elements to further examine the rebel related hypothesis. I divide rebel governance into two distinct categories: those related to governance and those concerning the provision of social services and public goods. In examining governance-related aspects, such as having an organized government, providing a constitution, law, justice system, hold elections, taxation,

armed forces or a rebel group related media, the results show that being organized like a government, having media and holding elections make diaspora support more likely. Conversely, the variable capturing embassies has a negative and statistically significant effect as shown in table 7.3.

Table 7.3: Rebel governance determinants of diaspora sponsorship (Logit model)

	<i>Dependent variable: Diaspora Support (dummy)</i>							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Population (ln)	0.377 (0.390)	0.313 (0.386)	0.236 (0.519)	0.137 (0.514)	0.075 (0.584)	-0.232 (0.637)	-0.076 (0.506)	-0.110 (0.501)
GDP (ln)	-0.318 (0.321)	-0.246 (0.324)	-0.286 (0.422)	-0.179 (0.423)	-0.153 (0.478)	0.094 (0.523)	-0.026 (0.414)	-0.018 (0.408)
In_Power	-1.376 (2.260)	-1.752 (2.066)	-1.503 (2.010)	-2.074 (1.969)	-2.346 (1.948)	-1.516 (2.443)	-3.315 (2.292)	-3.464 (2.310)
Organized like government		0.883 (0.661)		0.993 (0.760)	1.124 (0.897)	0.090 (1.438)	2.119* (1.191)	2.143* (1.276)
Constitution					-0.094 (1.294)	-0.217 (1.326)		0.352 (1.165)
Law					-0.153 (1.702)	2.033 (2.281)		
Justice system					1.509 (1.242)	3.959 (2.836)		
Taxation						-1.047 (1.502)		
Armed forces								1.357 (7.951)
Embassies							-7.052** (3.272)	-7.728 (4.882)
Media			0.813 (0.658)	0.907 (0.675)	0.863 (0.734)	1.742* (0.947)	1.068 (0.730)	1.027 (0.750)
Elections			1.316 (1.391)	1.093 (1.428)	-0.410 (1.942)	-7.173 (4.796)	6.260** (3.132)	5.454 (4.523)
Constant	0.587 (2.751)	-0.057 (2.911)	1.892 (2.713)	1.050 (2.919)	1.484 (3.463)	0.610 (3.937)	1.155 (3.118)	1.544 (3.529)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	69	68	59	58	55	48	57	57
Log Likelihood	-46.410	-45.370	-38.252	-37.003	-34.241	-27.386	-33.611	-33.557
Akaike Inf. Crit.	100.819	100.740	88.504	88.006	88.483	76.772	83.223	87.114

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

While the three estimated coefficients are positive and yield statistically significant support for the rebel hypothesis, the negative effect of embassies suggests a rejection, and the other proxies for rebel governance do not provide statistically significant estimated coefficients. Furthermore, the second set of rebel governance variables, measuring the provision of public goods and social services are shown in table C.3 in the appendix. These results are mixed: health and infrastructure variables exhibit a negative estimated coefficient, whereas aid and education related variables display a positive sign. However, I identified separation problems for those variables during the regression analysis. Despite the use of penalized regression methods, these separation issues persisted. Consequently, I refrain from further interpretation and discussion of these results given the introduced biases due to separation problems.

7.1.2.2 Homeland characteristics

The theoretically motivated hypotheses propose that homeland characteristics, including exclusion from power, discrimination, economic wealth and population size, increase the likelihood of diaspora support. In contrast, biased or restricted media in the homeland makes diaspora support less likely. Empirical results presented in table 7.4 indicate that homeland characteristics such as population size and economic wealth, along with exclusion of the diaspora's co-ethnics from power are crucial. Notably, if the diaspora's ethnic group is excluded from power, diaspora support is more likely, as evidenced in model 3 of table 7.4. Consistent with the hypothesized relationship, the estimated coefficients have a negative sign for critical or biased media; however, these coefficients are not statistically significant. These results necessitate further research to understand the impact of homeland characteristics and the role of media. This, in particular, requires further investigation due to the statistically insignificant results for interaction effects related to population size and biased or critical media.⁵

Table 7.4: Homeland determinants of diaspora sponsorship (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Diaspora support (dummy)</i>							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Population (ln)	0.522** (0.203)	0.517** (0.207)	0.426* (0.217)	0.518** (0.204)	0.503** (0.206)	0.407* (0.220)	0.377 (0.259)
GDP (ln)	-0.403** (0.160)	-0.399** (0.165)	-0.355** (0.167)	-0.389** (0.177)	-0.361* (0.187)	-0.329* (0.195)	-0.324 (0.218)
lagged OSV	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)
# rebel groups	-0.079** (0.033)	-0.079** (0.032)	-0.082*** (0.031)	-0.078** (0.033)	-0.078** (0.033)	-0.082*** (0.031)	-0.087** (0.035)
duration since conflict start (ln)	-0.971*** (0.374)	-0.904** (0.374)	-0.877** (0.352)	-0.960** (0.379)	-0.936** (0.374)	-0.860** (0.357)	-1.309*** (0.492)
external support	0.752** (0.319)	0.728** (0.312)	0.735** (0.318)	0.741** (0.321)	0.744** (0.321)	0.773** (0.325)	0.773* (0.429)
discriminated (dummy)		0.430 (0.477)				0.029 (0.539)	-0.242 (0.603)
excluded ethnic group (dummy)			0.708* (0.371)			0.692* (0.389)	0.403 (0.500)
media bias				-0.030 (0.139)		0.161 (0.303)	0.056 (0.350)
critical media					-0.065 (0.125)	-0.153 (0.273)	-0.094 (0.308)
relevance ethnicity (dummy)							-0.181 (0.545)
claim							0.418 (0.283)
domestic support							0.367 (0.237)
Constant	-0.053 (2.433)	-0.123 (2.374)	0.166 (2.335)	-0.274 (2.772)	-0.680 (2.879)	-0.145 (2.736)	0.344 (3.429)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	188	188	188	188	188	188	151
Log Likelihood	-107.457	-106.881	-105.328	-107.431	-107.312	-105.141	-80.962
Akaike Inf. Crit.	228.914	229.763	226.656	230.862	230.624	232.282	189.924

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

⁵The results for the interaction effects are presented in table C.1 in the appendix.

7.1.2.3 Diaspora characteristics

Table 7.5 presents the results for diaspora related determinants of diaspora support for rebel organizations. Notably, none of the examined factors such as conflict-driven migration background, possibility of return, originating from multiple or a single homeland, along with previous violence against civilians exhibit a statistically significant effect on diaspora sponsorship. However, the presence of transborder ethnic kin has a positive effect, thus making diaspora support more likely. With the exception of this factor, the remaining determinants do not support the diaspora hypothesis. Additionally, I incorporate lagged ethnic one-sided violence, which demonstrates no statistically significant effect and leads to a reduced sample size of less than ten observations. This limitation prohibits further interpretation due to the power problem. In summary, these preliminary findings underscore the necessity for future research to further examine how diaspora characteristics, specifically those related to origin and background of diasporas may influence the likelihood of sponsorship.

Table 7.5: Diaspora determinants of diaspora sponsorship (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Diaspora support (dummy)</i>							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Population (ln)	0.460 (0.290)	0.446* (0.240)	0.348 (0.271)	0.535** (0.238)	0.389 (0.273)	0.396 (0.278)	0.513** (0.250)
GDP (ln)	-0.321 (0.217)	-0.350* (0.184)	-0.337 (0.209)	-0.344* (0.195)	-0.337 (0.209)	-0.358* (0.214)	-0.353* (0.181)
Multiple homelands (dummy)	-0.220 (0.459)				-0.209 (0.510)	-0.344 (0.509)	-1.257** (0.629)
Return (dummy)		-0.149 (0.400)			-0.549 (0.539)	-0.399 (0.554)	0.053 (0.640)
Conflict-driven migration (dummy)			-0.001 (0.263)		0.209 (0.320)	0.099 (0.332)	0.115 (0.384)
Transborder ethnic kind (dummy)				1.673*** (0.379)			2.047*** (0.510)
lagged OSV (dummy)						-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Constant	-1.112 (2.514)	-0.143 (2.086)	1.285 (2.564)	-2.834 (2.022)	0.793 (2.772)	1.276 (2.914)	-1.875 (2.955)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	141	194	119	194	119	118	118
Log Likelihood	-85.453	-120.028	-75.427	-107.719	-74.430	-73.394	-63.660
Akaike Inf. Crit.	178.906	248.056	158.854	223.439	160.860	160.789	143.320

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

7.1.2.4 Four sets of determinants

Combining the four sets of determinants, encompassing conflict, rebel, homeland and diaspora characteristics, reduces the number of observations to 85 in the cross-sectional logistic regression analysis. The results are presented in table C.4 in the appendix. These results highlight that conflict and diaspora characteristics are the main factors driving diaspora support at a statistically significant level. Furthermore, these findings

hold for the results of the probit models, underscoring robustness across different model functions with varying link functions.⁶

In summary, the logit regression outcomes support the majority of the proposed hypotheses concerning conflict and rebel characteristics.⁷ It also provides partial support for the hypotheses related to homeland and diaspora characteristics, though it suggests further investigation, particularly into potential interaction effects between the various determinants of diaspora sponsorship.

7.2 Discussion

I conducted two distinct types of analysis: Extreme bounds analysis and logistic regression analysis, to investigate the conditions under which diaspora sponsorship is more or less likely. I employed a cross-sectional approach given the time-variant dependent variable: diaspora support. In alignment with the theoretical framework, I examined four categories of determinants: conflict, rebel group, homeland, and diaspora characteristics, to assess the related variables influence on the likelihood of diaspora support to rebel organizations. The results predominantly displayed robustness across various model specifications, including logistic and probit regression analyses. This robustness extended to different clustering levels, such as conflict-level or dyad-level, and incorporated confounding factors as well as various measures like the variance inflation factors to address varying degrees of multicollinearity. It is noteworthy that most of the rebel governance factors related to rebel group determinants, encounter separation problems and very limited number of observations. Consequently, these determinants offer possibilities for future research, particularly with the availability of more detailed data and time periods.

Table 7.6 summarizes the hypotheses developed in chapter 4.3 and indicates whether

⁶Results of the probit regression models conducted are available upon request.

⁷I utilize probit regressions to examine the robustness of the link specification in the models estimated. Analyzing the probit results demonstrates that the estimated coefficients related to conflict and rebel characteristics are robust across model specifications. The pattern observed for external support variables in the probit models confirms the logit findings; external support is relevant, although the different forms and numbers of sponsors do not significantly affect diaspora sponsorship at a meaningful level. The probit results for rebel governance elements and homeland characteristics also reinforces the findings from the logistic regression analysis, highlighting robustness. All probit regression analysis results are available upon request.

Hypotheses	Determinants	Direction of effect on diaspora sponsorship (↑, ↓)	Confirmed?
conflict	high number of rebel organizations, long duration of conflict, previous violence against civilians exist	↓	✓
rebels	designated US foreign terrorist organization, recruits from an ethnic group, or state sponsors exist	↓	no & (✓)
homeland rebels	biased or restricted media in homeland relative strong compared to the government, claims to fight on behalf of an ethnic group, receives support from the ethnic group in the homeland, multiple sponsors exist, or the rebels provide elements of rebel governance	↓ ↑	no ✓ & no
homeland	diaspora's ethnic group is discriminated or excluded from power ethnic group, homeland is economically wealthy, or large population	↑	✓
diaspora	single homeland, possibility to return, transborder ethnic kin, or a conflict-driven migration background	↑	no & (✓)

Table 7.6: Evaluation of hypotheses related to determinants of diaspora sponsorship

the proposed hypotheses receive support or rejection based on the two empirically analyses conducted. Notably, for most hypotheses related to the four categories of determinants, there is at least one determinant that is an outlier, thus deviates from the patterns observed in the other evaluated hypotheses. I highlight these outlier outcomes with parentheses in column 4 of table 7.6.

I identify conflict characteristics as the most reliable predictors of diaspora sponsorship. In contrast, determinants related to rebel group characteristics yield mixed results, partially attributable to the aforementioned challenges. Adding homeland characteristics as potential determinants does not significantly modify the influence of conflict and rebel group determinants. Furthermore, homeland characteristics, particularly those related to media biases and conditional effects such as media bias and population size, do not demonstrate robustness across specifications in the extreme bounds analysis. While the majority of hypothesized relationships concerning conflict and rebel group characteristics are upheld in the subsequent logistic regression analysis, the roles of homeland and diaspora characteristics, along with potential interaction ef-

fects among various determinants of diaspora sponsorship, require further investigation in future research projects.

The results regarding the conditions under which diaspora support is more or less likely offer important insights. Within the scope of this dissertation, I observed that diaspora and homeland characteristics which are related to the diaspora's origin and group are less relevant compared to the conflict and rebel group characteristics. These findings suggest additional analyses going beyond the group-level perspective and consider changes over time. Furthermore, future studies could collect time-series data to provide a more nuanced picture and robustness or alternative explanations, particularly for the insignificant results from the cross-sectional analysis conducted.

Overall, the findings offer empirical evidence for the presence of conflict, rebel, homeland and diaspora determinants of diaspora sponsorship to rebel organizations. Furthermore, they affirm the applicability of extreme bounds analysis in identifying the conditions that facilitate diaspora sponsorship. Nevertheless, the results warrant caution, as theoretically-relevant determinants such as elements of rebel governance, are omitted from the analyses due to problems of separation. The analysis also underscores the relevance of integrating insights from conflict and migration studies to comprehensively understand the phenomenon of diaspora sponsorship that intersect these research fields.

This research initiates discussions about the causes and conditions that influence diaspora sponsorship-decisions, and how these potentially differ from the drivers of state sponsorship. It presents an opportunity for future studies to explore the interplay between diaspora and state sponsorship or other non-state armed sponsorship. Such investigations could also explore in how far these actors consider these varying decisions when deciding to support an armed actor. Additionally, this analysis focuses on conditions influencing diasporas decision-making in supporting rebel organizations. This emphasis lays a foundational basis for comparative research which examines the decisions made by diasporas to support either rebel organizations or states. Moreover, it can analyze whether different causes and characteristics of homeland and diaspora of support are driving these decisions. This comparative angle would yield valuable insights into the nuanced factors driving diaspora support for state and non-state actors.

Chapter 8

Consequences of diaspora support:

Empirical results

This chapter describes and interprets the findings from the empirical analysis which addressed the third research question in this dissertation: How does diaspora sponsorship of rebel organizations impact civilian victimization or rebel governance? I argue that diasporas, aiming for kin support and seeking changes in the homeland, have a preference for limited violence against civilians, particularly ethnic violence and a preference for the establishment of rebel governance, specifically governance structures and provision of public goods and social services. This argument rests on a group-level perspective, adopting a unitary actor assumption and collective, inter-generational preferences that lead to collective action.

I apply a principal-agent perspective where the diaspora decides between support or absence of support to the rebel organization, whereas the rebel organization decides between employing violence against civilians or co-ethnics respectively or to opt for limited violence.¹ There exists a trade-off for both actors: diasporas risk agency slack but benefit from delegation, and rebel organizations gain additional resources but lose autonomy. The information-sharing mechanism between co-ethnics in the homeland and the diaspora in the host country enhances the monitoring of the diaspora and reduces the risk of moral hazard. The chapter explains the empirical results linking diaspora support to civilian victimization, analyzing the conditional effects that underscore the hypothesized relationship between diaspora support and both violence against civilians or ethnic one-sided violence. Additionally, I demonstrate the findings concerning diaspora support and rebel governance.

8.1 Civilian victimization and diaspora sponsorship

This section delves into the findings of the analysis on civilian victimization and diaspora support to rebel organizations. For a comprehensive overview of the hypotheses developed see table 8.1. This section is structured upon the analysis of two dependent variables: one-sided violence and ethnic one-sided violence. An in-depth discussion of the datasets utilized for both dependent and explanatory variables, as well as con-

¹The same framework is applied for rebel governance. Here, the difference is in the rebel organizations decision between conducting rebel governance or absence of rebel governance. While the former is costly it offers additional benefits for the rebel organization through means of power and the latter is costless but does not include state-like power.

Variable	Hypothesis #	Hypothesis
Civilian victimization	Hypothesis 5.4.1	Diaspora support to rebel organizations decreases the likelihood of violence against co-ethnic civilians compared to no diaspora support.
	Hypothesis 5.4.2	Diaspora support to rebel organizations decreases the likelihood of violence against civilians compared to no diaspora support.
Conditional factor	Hypothesis 5.4.3	Diaspora support to rebel organizations decreases the likelihood of violence against civilians compared to no diaspora support if an alternative sponsor exists.
	Hypothesis 5.4.4	The one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is more pronounced if a diaspora originates from multiple countries.
	Hypothesis 5.4.5	The one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is more pronounced if diaspora's ethnic group is discriminated in the homeland.
	Hypothesis 5.4.6	The one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is smaller if the population in the homeland is multi-ethnic.
	Hypothesis 5.4.7	The one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is smaller if the media in the homeland is biased towards the government.
	Hypothesis 5.4.8	The ethnic one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is higher if the diaspora has the possibility to return to the homeland.
	Hypothesis 5.4.9	The ethnic one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is higher if the diaspora has a non-voluntary migration background.

Table 8.1: Hypotheses developed concerning diaspora sponsorship and civilian victimization

founding factors, is presented in chapters 6.1 and 6.2.3.

The primary results are derived from negative binomial regression models, which are necessary due to the overdispersion observed in the Poisson model outcomes.² The findings demonstrate a strong and robust relationship between diaspora support to rebel organizations and civilian killings. Table 8.2 introduces the baseline model (model 1). The model reveals a negative marginal effect of diaspora sponsorship to rebel organizations on one-sided violence, lending support for hypothesis 5.4.2. This effect is statistically significant at the 5% level, thereby underscoring the inverse relationship between diaspora support to rebel organizations and the frequency of one-sided violence. When a diaspora supports a rebel organization with financial, material or political means during an intrastate conflict, the number of civilian killings decreases which is statistically significant. In contrast, the impact of external support, distinct from diaspora support, on one-sided violence is positive and statistically significant. The opposite effects related to distinct types of external support underscores the complexity of external sponsorship on conflict dynamics.³

²The inclusion of both the Poisson model and the results of the overdispersion test in the appendix serves to enhance transparency of results.

³The differences between diaspora and state support for rebel organizations is discussed in detail in chapter 1.2.1 as well as chapter 4.

Table 8.2: Diaspora support and violence against civilians (Negative Binomial model)

	<i>Dependent variable: One-sided violence (count)</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Diaspora support (dummy)	-1.132** (0.562)	-1.071** (0.508)	-0.986* (0.583)	-1.279** (0.609)	-0.992** (0.490)
Lag OSV (ln)	0.415*** (0.096)	0.422*** (0.092)	0.348*** (0.071)	0.418*** (0.088)	0.368*** (0.063)
Population (ln)	0.344 (0.315)	0.321 (0.354)	0.455 (0.334)	0.365 (0.303)	0.413 (0.328)
GDP (ln)	-0.466* (0.248)	-0.440* (0.255)	-0.520** (0.246)	-0.482* (0.248)	-0.471** (0.222)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	0.048 (0.152)	0.024 (0.170)	-0.092 (0.170)	0.067 (0.150)	-0.107 (0.179)
Transborder ethnic kin (dummy)	1.130* (0.594)	1.092* (0.600)	1.486** (0.685)	1.257** (0.614)	1.512** (0.646)
External support (dummy)	1.041*** (0.395)	1.018*** (0.356)	1.143*** (0.369)	1.172*** (0.349)	1.087*** (0.295)
# Rebel groups in conflict		0.026 (0.056)			0.071 (0.049)
Recruitment			-0.137 (0.637)		-0.044 (0.696)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)				-0.392 (0.281)	-0.107 (0.298)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)				3.333*** (0.874)	2.906*** (0.827)
Constant	7.763*** (1.612)	7.419*** (1.792)	6.925*** (1.935)	4.600*** (1.339)	3.251 (2.740)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	832	832	708	832	708
Log Likelihood	-2,315.405	-2,315.195	-1,985.408	-2,310.357	-1,978.969
θ	0.069*** (0.005)	0.069*** (0.005)	0.071*** (0.005)	0.071*** (0.005)	0.074*** (0.006)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,646.811	4,648.390	3,988.817	4,640.714	3,981.938

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 8.1 illustrates the effect of diaspora support, as opposed to the absence of such support, on the predicted number of civilian killings. This figure demonstrates that the presence of diaspora support exerts a substantial violence-mitigating effect, reducing one-sided violence (OSV) by 50%. Before investigating the conditional hypotheses, it is crucial to briefly consider the impact of the control variables employed in this study. These variables play an important role in providing a nuanced understanding of the relationship between diaspora support and one-sided violence.

While diaspora support appears to diminish one-sided violence, the converse is true for state support, which may boost it. Additionally, one-sided violence in the previous year exerts a positive influence on contemporary one-sided violence in the context of diaspora sponsorship to rebel organizations. This finding indicates time-dependency of diaspora sponsorship and the relevance of controlling for the number of one-sided violence cases from the preceding year. Furthermore, the presence of a transborder ethnic kin is associated with a marginally statistically significant, positive effect on one-sided violence. This observation not only supports that transborder ethnic kin and diasporas differentially impact one-sided violence but also underscores the distinct role a diaspora has as a unique actor in civil wars. Figure D.1 in the appendix provides a coefficient plot for the baseline model with 95% confidence intervals, illustrating the




Figure 8.1: Predicted one-sided violence in presence or absence of diaspora support

different effect sizes of the control variables.

The analysis demonstrates that the effect of diaspora sponsorship on one-sided violence remains robust across various model specifications, even when controlling for factors such as multi-actor conflicts, domestic recruitment, the status of the co-ethnics in the homeland and two or more relevant ethnic groups exist in the homeland (refer to table 8.2). The effect suggests a strong and stable relationship between diaspora sponsorship and the dynamics of one-sided violence. The comparison of model specifications 1, 2, and 4, particularly in terms of their fit⁴, suggests that the baseline model (model 1) represents a conservative estimate of the impact of diaspora sponsorship on one-sided violence. This observation implies that while model 1 reliably captures the effect of diaspora support, it potentially underestimates the magnitude of this effect.⁵ The coefficient plot D.2 in the appendix further clarifies this point by illustrating that the inclusion of additional control variables does not alter the negative and statistically significant effect of diaspora support on one-sided violence. Moreover, it shows that the potential confounding factors, such as recruitment, exclusion of ethnic groups, duration since conflict start, and population size, do not appear to significantly affect this

⁴I compare the robustness of the explanatory variable across different model specifications as well as the Akaike information criterion.

⁵The diminished sample size observed in model 3 and model 5 occur because the diaspora support data is based on Kopchick et al. (2021). This dataset extends beyond the scope of cases encompassed within the EPR universe. To ensure a robust and valid evaluation of the model fit, it is imperative to compare the model specifications using the same number of observations.

relationship. In summary, the findings lend empirical support to hypothesis 1, which posits that diaspora support for rebel organizations decreases one-sided violence.

8.1.1 Results for conditional hypotheses

The examination of the conditional hypotheses yields a range of heterogeneous results, as depicted in figure 8.2. This variability in outcomes highlights the multifaceted nature of the conditional factors influencing the relationship between diaspora support and violence against civilians. Specifically, I compare the effect of different conditional factors paired with diaspora support on one-sided violence. To assess statistically significant differences between interaction effects that share similar sample sizes and standard errors, employing 83% confidence intervals offers a practical method for approximating a significance test with $\alpha = 0.05$ (Payton et al., 2003, p. 5). The use of 83% confidence intervals in this context serves as a valuable tool for distinguishing between the significance of interaction effects. If the 83% confidence levels overlap, the interaction effects do not exert statistically significant effects from each other.




Figure 8.2: Coefficient plot for models with interaction effects, dependent variable: One-sided violence (count)

The results reveal that there is no statistically significant effect at the 5% level when considering factors such as multiple homelands, or the status of non-discriminated ethnic groups in the homeland, when diaspora support is absent. This is inferred from the 95% confidence intervals that encompass zero. However, a deeper analysis into the varying degrees of multi-ethnic populations in the homeland and differing

levels of media bias uncovers statistically significant differences. I undertake an in-depth examination of each conditional hypothesis. This allows to study the specific conditions under which diaspora support influences one-sided violence.

Single homeland and diaspora support

The empirical examination of hypothesis 5.4.4, summarized in table 8.1, yields the following insights. When a diaspora originates from a single homeland and diaspora sponsorship exists, the effect on one-sided violence is negative and more pronounced compared to a diaspora with multiple homelands. Contrary to the hypothesized relationship, the effect of diaspora sponsorship on rebel organizations by diasporas from multiple countries is statistically insignificant. The 95% confidence interval encompasses zero as visualized in figure 8.2. Although the results suggest a more substantial violence reducing effect for diasporas originating from a single country, the effect remains negative. This finding indicates another channel as it opposes the hypothesized relationship. Nevertheless, the 83% confidence intervals reveal a partially statistically significant difference between the two interaction effects, given that both confidence intervals partially overlap. This sets the foundation for future research to analyze the distinct effects of single versus multiple homelands in conjunction with diaspora sponsorship in various contexts.

It is noteworthy that 257 observations are dropped in this analysis due to the unavailability of comprehensive data for the additional explanatory variable of diaspora's origin. A plausible interpretation of these findings is that diaspora groups originating from a single homeland might represent unique diasporas with characteristics that facilitate a violence-reducing effect when they support rebels. Further research is needed to unravel the relations behind this specific effect and to identify any potential intervening or mediating factors that may influence these dynamics.

Discriminated group and diaspora support

The results, which illustrate the effect of discrimination against the ethnic group in the homeland that shares ethnic ties with the diaspora, alongside diaspora sponsorship, lend support to hypothesis 5.4.5, noted in table 8.1. The findings reveal that when

the ethnic group associated with the diaspora experiences discrimination and receives support from the diaspora, there is a substantial reduction in violence. The effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. An evaluation of the various models and the estimated interaction effects suggests that the combination of discrimination and diaspora sponsorship yields the most pronounced reduction in violence, as depicted in figure 8.2. The results remain consistent when controlling for the relevance of ethnicity as demonstrated in table D.5. Furthermore, figure 8.2 illustrates a statistically significant difference between the effects of diaspora support with discriminated ethnic group versus non-discriminated ethnic groups as indicated by the different 83% confidence intervals. Although these findings corroborate the hypothesized relationship, it is important to acknowledge that both the 95% and the 83% confidence intervals encompass zero for non-discriminated ethnic group status, rendering a statistically insignificant result.

It is worth investigating in future projects what the incentives are for rebel organizations, conditional on diaspora support, to minimize violence against civilians. One explanation is to distinguish themselves from the incumbent, another are grievances fostering information-sharing and thereby enhancing monitoring and contributing to rebel group's adherence to the delegated task. Nonetheless, the findings strongly support the argument that diaspora support to rebel organizations, in conjunction with diaspora's co-ethnics being discriminated in the homeland, reduces civilian killings.

Multi-ethnic population and diaspora support

Figure 8.2 and table D.5 demonstrate that both effects - having more ethnic groups or fewer ethnic groups in the homeland - exhibit a negative effect on one-sided violence when coupled with diaspora sponsorship. These effects are similar in magnitude and the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level. The 83% confidence intervals indicate barely statistically significant differences between the two interaction effects, as both confidence intervals overlap. This supports hypothesis 5.4.6, noted in table 8.1, particularly as the effect size is marginally larger in populations with less ethnic diversity. Nonetheless, both effects are negative, statistically significant at the 95% confidence intervals, and very similar in magnitude.




Figure 8.3: Conditional effect for diaspora support on one-sided violence (95% confidence interval) for different levels of multi-ethnic populations

Figure 8.3 displays the marginal effect of diaspora sponsorship on one-sided violence, varying with the the degree of multi-ethnic population. This supports the finding that the violence-reducing effect is very similar across different levels of ethnic diverse populations, with a minor decrease for populations with higher ethnic diversity. Consequently, it is plausible to argue that a violence reducing effect occurs, regardless of whether more co-ethnics can share information with the diaspora or fewer co-ethnics provide valuable information. The rebel organization also benefits from a smaller ethnic constituency of the government and a larger domestic population to draw intelligence and potential additional domestic support, or maintain diaspora support contingent upon adherence to the task of limited violence against civilians.

One caveat is that the marginal effect of diaspora sponsorship on violence against civilians is only statistically significant in less ethnically diverse homeland populations. This significance diminishes in contexts with more than ten different ethnic groups in the homeland, as indicated by the upper confidence interval encompassing zero shown in figure 8.3. It is worth noting that the majority of conflicts have less than ten ethnic groups in the country as illustrated by the density plot, in figure 8.3, visualizing the distribution of multi-ethnic population level observations. In summary, the marginal effect of lower levels of multi-ethnic populations when coupled with diaspora sponsor-




Figure 8.4: Conditional effect for diaspora support on one-sided violence (95% confidence interval) for different levels of media bias and density distribution of media bias

ship, depicted in figure 8.3, provides a more nuanced picture than the coefficient plot 8.2 displaying the overall coefficient sizes for 95% confidence intervals and underscores the relevance of this empirical finding.

Biased media and diaspora support

The results related to media bias and diaspora support reveal coefficients of similar magnitude for both lower and higher media bias, which are statistically significant as shown in figure 8.2 and table D.5. The effect of diaspora sponsorship in reducing violence against civilians is slightly higher in magnitude for biased media. Figure 8.4 visualizes the nuanced conditional effect of diaspora sponsorship given different levels of media bias on one-sided violence. Interestingly, at extreme levels of media bias, the impact of diaspora sponsorship on one-sided violence is not statistically significant, as the 95% confidence intervals encompass zero. Conversely, at lower levels of media bias, there is a statistically significant, larger conditional effect of diaspora sponsorship on one-sided violence. This finding is empirically substantial considering that the distribution of media bias levels is skewed towards less biased media.

While the hypothesized relationship (hypothesis 5.4.7, table 8.1) finds support by the results in the coefficient plot 8.2 and table D.5, it is statistically insignificant in the marginal plot. Nevertheless, the findings provide some support for the hypothesis,

indicating that less biased media has a larger effect on reducing one-sided violence with diaspora support. However, the 83% confidence intervals overlap to a large extent, suggesting very limited statistically significant differences between the interaction effects encompassing more and less biased media. It is also important to acknowledge that a relevant portion of the observations on media bias are concentrated on media bias or extreme media bias levels. This observation should be considered for a comprehensive understanding of the issue, even though the conditional effect at these levels does not attain statistical significance at standard thresholds.

In summary, it posits that diaspora sponsorship paired with a higher degree of media impartiality, characterized by less bias media levels towards the opposition and visible in higher values of media bias in figure 8.4, has a larger effect on reducing violence against civilians. The increased availability of information within homeland media potentially enhances the diaspora's access to relevant information, thereby influencing the impact of their sponsorship on rebel group's one-sided violence. Additionally, when media coverage is less biased towards the incumbent, it may provide an avenue for rebel organizations to disseminate their propaganda. This, in turn, could strengthen the diaspora's access to information through homeland media channels, further influencing the effect of diaspora sponsorship on civilian killings. However, additional variables measuring the range of media outlets (as shown in figure D.3) and the levels of critical media (as shown in figure D.4) indicate no statistically significant effects of diaspora support on one-sided violence, conditioned on the various levels of media variables. Consequently, further research is required to rigorously compare different measurements of media and access to information.

Summary of conditional results

Evaluating the results for the conditional effects of diaspora support on one-sided violence by rebel organizations, I observe partial support for the hypothesized conditional relationships.⁶ Notably, in cases where the ethnic group in the homeland experiences discrimination, diaspora sponsorship exhibits the most significant effect in reducing

⁶For a comparison of count and dichotomous outcome variables for one-sided violence, refer to the coefficient plots for interaction effects related to one-sided violence (dummy) displayed in figures E.1 and E.2 in the appendix.

violence, surpassing all other conditional effects (results hypothesis hypothesis 5.4.5). Additionally, lower levels of media bias are associated with a more substantial reduction in one-sided violence under diaspora sponsorship compared to scenarios with higher media bias (results hypothesis 5.4.7). However, it's important to note that the statistical significance of the estimated effect diminishes as the level of media bias increases. The effect sizes are quite similar when we compare cases with multi-ethnic homeland populations to more homogeneous populations. This finding indicates that the information-sharing mechanism might be equally effective in homogeneous settings or multi-ethnic populations where fewer co-ethnics can serve as a crucial source of information for the diaspora. I drew this from the empirical results of hypothesis 5.4.6.

I reject hypothesis 5.4.4 based on the observation that diasporas originating from multiple countries appear to have a lesser impact compared to those from a single origin country, although this difference is not statistically significant as the upper 83% confidence interval includes zero. This surprising outcome warrants further investigation to understand why a diaspora from a single homeland has a more pronounced effect on one-sided violence than a diaspora originating from multiple homelands. One possible explanation for the current result is that the data on news outlets primarily refers to traditional media, such as TV, print, and radio, and does not account for the influence of social media, which could yield different results. Alternatively, it is possible that news outlets are leveraged for propaganda by rebel organizations, which may not align with the diaspora's interests. The next section delves into the findings on ethnic violence against civilians.

8.2 Ethnic violence and diaspora sponsorship

To test my theoretical expectations, as outlined in chapter 5.4, I examine whether ethnically motivated violence against civilians yields more pronounced results if diaspora support exists. Specifically, I empirically evaluate hypothesis 5.4.1.⁷ Therefore, I focus on a subset of the data used for the main analysis in chapter 8.1 concerning violence against civilians. The variation in sample sizes between one-sided violence (N=832)

⁷Hypothesis 5.4.1: Diaspora support to rebel organizations decreases the likelihood of violence against co-ethnic civilians compared to no diaspora support.

and ethnic one-sided violence (N=649) is attributable to the limited availability of data on ethnic violence. Drawing on the data by Fjelde et al. (2021), I differentiate between two types of ethnic-driven violence: ethnic violence and ethnic targeting. Ethnic violence refers to the ethnicity of the victim, while ethnic targeting specifically denotes the intentional ethnic targeting (Fjelde et al., 2021). A third type of ethnic-related violence, termed ethnic one-sided violence, arises when the ethnic tie of the victim aligns with that of the diaspora.⁸ The subsequent section provides a summary of the results for ethnic violence, ethnic targeting and ethnic one-sided violence.

The findings reveal a consistently negative effect of diaspora support on the three types of ethnic-related violence (ethnic violence, ethnic targeting, and ethnic one-sided violence), although this effect is predominantly statistically insignificant. These findings are robust across various model specifications, encompassing logistic and probit models, as well as Poisson and quasi-Poisson models. It is important to note, however, that all Poisson models indicate overdispersion, thus the variance is higher than it is in the theoretical model (cf. Gelman & Hill, 2006, pp. 115–117).⁹ This observation suggests that Poisson models may not be the most appropriate fit for this data. Consequently, I do not elaborate further on those results derived from these Poisson models.¹⁰

Consistent with the hypothesis and theoretical expectations developed in chapter 5.4, the results indicate a more substantial violence reducing effect for ethnic one-sided violence compared to one-sided violence. This inference is drawn by comparing the coefficient sizes and significance levels of diaspora sponsorship on ethnic one-sided violence (table 8.3) and one-sided violence (table E.1 in the appendix). However, caution is necessary in this comparison due to the differing sample sizes utilized in the analyses. Notably, this effect is larger when accounting for rebel group’s recruitment from the same ethnic group. Specifically, the large and negative effect of diaspora

⁸I have coded this variable based on the diaspora support dataset and the ethnic one-sided violence dataset by Fjelde et al. (2021). Chapter 6.2.3 provides summary statistics of the different outcome variables.

⁹I use the R function *check_overdispersion* which is based on the package *performance* by Lüdtke et al. (2021).

¹⁰The comprehensive regression results related to ethnic violence and ethnic targeting are included in the appendix, encompassing all examined model specifications. This demonstrates the methodological rigor of this analysis. The corresponding tables F.1, F.2, F.3 and F.4 in the appendix, provide the results of the overdispersion tests for all conducted Poisson models.

sponsorship on ethnic targeting is negative and statistically significant, when I control for the relevance of ethnicity and ethnic exclusion from power. In contrast, the effect is half in magnitude and statistically insignificant for ethnic violence. This pattern of results lends credence to the pivotal role of diaspora support limiting rebel group's ethnic targeting. Examining the effect of diaspora sponsorship on ethnic one-sided violence, especially when matching the ethnic groups of victims with those of the diaspora, reveals a smaller negative effect. However, this effect only reaches statistical significance if I account for ethnic exclusion, ethnic relevance in the country and ethnic recruitment by the rebel organization (see table 8.3). These findings underscore the substantial role diaspora support can play in ongoing civil wars, particularly where ethnic factors are present. Further robustness for the negative relationship between ethnic one-sided violence and diaspora sponsorship is shown in appendix F (tables F.5, F.6, F.7, F.12, and F.13), in particular robustness across various model estimations, an alternative coding of the outcome variable as detailed in chapter 6.2.3.1.

Table 8.3: Diaspora support and ethnic one-sided violence (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Ethnic one-sided violence (dummy)</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Diaspora support (dummy)	-0.454 (0.425)	-0.452 (0.424)	-0.558 (0.432)	-0.587 (0.435)	-0.704* (0.423)
Lagged EOSV (dummy)	2.098*** (0.401)	2.098*** (0.401)	1.964*** (0.408)	2.026*** (0.418)	1.756*** (0.427)
Population (ln)	-0.078 (0.275)	-0.074 (0.280)	-0.084 (0.304)	-0.037 (0.266)	0.039 (0.307)
GDP (ln)	0.242 (0.198)	0.243 (0.197)	0.318 (0.219)	0.200 (0.194)	0.238 (0.213)
Conflict duration (ln)	-0.426* (0.234)	-0.431* (0.245)	-0.473* (0.282)	-0.405* (0.218)	-0.488* (0.271)
Transborder ethnic kin (dummy)	1.054*** (0.385)	1.061*** (0.387)	1.041** (0.508)	1.142*** (0.381)	1.163** (0.458)
External support	1.045*** (0.277)	1.040*** (0.291)	0.942*** (0.303)	1.006*** (0.288)	0.872** (0.340)
# rebel groups		0.005 (0.043)			0.013 (0.046)
Recruitment			0.541 (0.459)		1.368** (0.550)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)				0.300 (0.455)	0.832* (0.486)
Relevance ethnicity (dummy)				15.137*** (1.125)	15.902*** (1.131)
Constant	-7.611*** (1.828)	-7.705*** (1.827)	-9.731*** (1.858)	-22.531*** (1.960)	-27.259*** (2.373)
Observations	649	649	551	649	551
Log Likelihood	-180.189	-180.182	-157.643	-177.881	-152.502
Akaike Inf. Crit.	376.378	378.363	333.286	375.762	329.004

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The analysis of confounding factors reveals patterns akin to those observed in the context of one-sided violence. The presence of a one-year lag in ethnic violence or ethnic targeting is associated with a statistically significant and positive effect on the respective outcomes shown in appendix F (see tables F.8 to F.11). Furthermore, the existence of transborder ethnic kin increases both ethnic violence and ethnic targeting

in the context of diaspora sponsorship. These findings underscore the relevance to distinguish between transborder ethnic kin and diaspora effects on ethnic violence (as detailed in the appendix table F.8) and ethnic targeting (as detailed in the appendix table F.10). External support from actors other than the diaspora also increases ethnic violence and ethnic targeting in similar sizes than the positive and estimated effect on one-sided violence. This pattern suggests that while diaspora support might reduce violence against civilians, support from other sponsors tends to escalate (ethnic) violence against civilians. This differentiation of sponsors highlights the unique role of diasporas as sponsors. The number of rebel organizations involved in the conflict or the rebel group's recruiting from the diaspora's ethnic group do not exhibit statistically significant effects on ethnic violence and ethnic targeting. These findings lend support to the idea that multi-actor civil wars and rebel recruitment are less relevant for ethnic violence and ethnic targeting. However, further research is needed to investigate the nuanced relations that can occur across those factors.




Figure 8.5: Coefficient plot for models with interaction effect, dependent variable: Ethnic one-sided violence

8.2.1 Results for conditional hypotheses

The examination of conditional hypotheses demonstrates varying effects on ethnic one-sided violence. Figure 8.5 depicts the coefficient plot for the interaction models showing that the results uniformly exhibit negative coefficients. This pattern indicates a general trend towards ethnic violence reduction associated with diaspora support, albeit with nuances. An important observation from chapter 8.1.1 is that the largest violence-reducing effect within the main sample occurs when diaspora support is provided to rebel organizations conditional on the diaspora's ethnic group in the homeland being discriminated (see figures 8.2 and E.1). However, this effect does not reach statistical significance in the context of ethnic one-sided violence, as shown in figure 8.5 and table F.14 in the appendix.

The most pronounced ethnic violence reducing effect occurs in cases where the diaspora originates from multiple homelands, as indicated by figure 8.5. The 95% confidence interval for the interaction effect when the diaspora originates from a single homeland includes zero, indicating it is not a statistically significant effect. Nevertheless, the 83% confidence intervals for single and multiple homeland interaction effects do not overlap (refer to figure 8.5). This highlights a statistically significant difference between diaspora support paired with a diaspora's single country origin compared to multiple homelands on ethnic one-sided violence. On the other hand, the 83% confidence intervals for the interaction effects related to media bias, ethnic discrimination and multi-ethnic population overlap partially. Consequently, these effects present no strong statistically significant differences in their impact on ethnic one-sided violence.¹¹

It is worth noting that the effect of multi-ethnic population is not statistically significant in conjunction with diaspora sponsorship on one-sided violence (dummy) as illustrated in figure E.6 in the appendix. Considering the plotted marginal effect of diaspora support on ethnic one-sided violence subject to the degree of multi-ethnic population follows a similar trend to the observed in one-sided violence. Specifically, the effect is negative and statistically significant for one-sided violence when less than ten active ethnic groups exist in the homeland, as illustrated in figure F.5 in the

¹¹The coefficient plots for interaction effects related to one-sided violence (dummy) are displayed in figures E.1 and E.2 in the appendix.

appendix. Yet, this effect is statistically insignificant for both ethnic one-sided and one-sided violence (figures F.5 and E.6 in the appendix). In summary, these findings highlight the complex relations that can occur in ethnically diverse contexts.




Figure 8.6: Conditional effect for diaspora support on ethnic one-sided violence (95% confidence interval) for different levels of media bias and density distribution of media bias

The analysis of marginal effects concerning various media variables in relation to diaspora sponsorship on ethnic one-sided violence demonstrates interesting results. Figure 8.6 illustrates the marginal effect of diaspora support on ethnic one-sided violence, contingent on the level of media bias. A more biased media demonstrates a negative and statistically significant effect at the 5% level of diaspora support on ethnic one-sided violence. Interestingly, this statistical significance diminishes as the media becomes less biased. This finding drawn from figure 8.6 contradicts the finding displayed in figure 8.4 focusing on one-sided violence. Moreover, the finding on ethnic one-sided violence and media bias paired with diaspora sponsorship, displayed in figure 8.6, contrasts the statistically insignificant finding concerning the dichotomous variable of one-sided violence as depicted by figure E.3 in the appendix. A similar pattern of conditional effect to that of media bias on ethnic one-sided violence occurs for the range of media (figure F.6) and the degree of critical media (figure F.7) with regards to the incumbent government.¹² The findings indicate that the influence of diaspora support on ethnic violence is more pronounced in countries with higher media bias,

¹²Figures E.3 to E.5 in the appendix visualize the marginal effects of diaspora support on one-sided violence in conjunction with media bias, media range and critical media.

but this effect becomes less significant as media impartiality increases. This highlights the importance of further investigating media biases and news outlets in the context of diaspora sponsorship and ethnic violence.




Figure 8.7: Coefficient plot for models with interaction effect

I also examine additional interaction effects related to diaspora characteristics and alternative media restrictions on ethnic one-sided violence which are visualized in figure 8.7. The results are presented in table F.15 in the appendix. A particularly finding emerges in the context of diasporas with a non-voluntary migration background supporting rebel organizations. This interaction reveals a statistically significant and pronounced negative effect on ethnic one-sided violence, supporting hypothesis 5.4.9. Although the interaction effect between voluntary migration and diaspora support is statistically insignificant, as evidenced by the inclusion of zero within the 95% confidence interval (figure 8.7), the 83% confidence intervals do not overlap. This suggests a statistically significant difference in the effect of diaspora support from a diaspora with voluntary migration background compared to such sponsorship from a diaspora with non-voluntary migration background on ethnic one-sided violence. As a result, these finding imply that the reason of migration can affect ethnic-driven civilian killings

when paired with sponsorship. It indicates further inquiry into whether intensified information-sharing between a diaspora originating from non-voluntary background, as opposed to one of voluntary origin, is a mechanism driving this effect in the context of diaspora sponsorship of rebel organizations.

I do not find a statistically significant effect on ethnic one-sided violence for the diaspora's possibility to return to the homeland or not when combined with diaspora sponsorship to rebel organizations, as illustrated in table F.15. Additionally, the 83% confidence intervals overlap, indicating no statistically significant difference between these two interaction effects on ethnic one-sided violence (see figure 8.7). These results contradict hypothesis 5.4.8. While further research is necessary to confirm the robustness of the insignificant result, it is possible that an alternative explanation exists. An alternative explanation for the statistically insignificant yet negative finding is that the diaspora prefers limited ethnic violence, with the overarching aim of changes in the homeland by any means necessary. The diaspora may seek changes in the homeland that benefit the civilian population, particularly co-ethnics, regardless of their own desire to return. On the other hand, the diaspora's interest in returning may be separate from the actual ability to do so, which is measured with the variable *return*. Therefore, a discrepancy between the interest to return and the actual possibility of returning could partly account for the observed results.

The results also underscore the importance of media and thus, possibilities of information-sharing influencing ethnic one-sided violence. Higher media bias, as shown in figure 8.6, smaller range of media, predominantly focusing on the government's perspective (figure F.6), and a few critical media outlets (figure F.7) all exhibit statistically significant negative effects on ethnic one-sided violence. An interesting nuance is observed when considering diasporas that run their own media outlets. The presence of diaspora-run media outlets, does not indicate a statistically significant effect of diaspora support on ethnic one-sided violence. For example, a diaspora running its own radio channel in conjunction with diaspora support to rebel organizations, does not reach statistical significance for results with radio channels as opposed to those without their own radio channel (see figure 8.7). These findings collectively indicate the multifaceted factors that can influence the relationship between diaspora support and

media restrictions and media outlets. Moreover, these findings require further research to analyze the differences between media channels and diaspora-run media channels on ethnic-led civilian killings.

The results for ethnic one-sided violence are robust across different forms of coding of this variable, as detailed in chapter 6.2.3.1. The results derived from the logistic and probit regression analyses, utilizing a conservative approach to coding ethnic one-sided violence, are comprehensively presented in table F.5 and table F.6 in the appendix. Additionally, the results for ethnic violence, ethnic targeting, and ethnic one-sided violence are robust across multiple model specifications, including logistic, probit, and quasi-poisson models. The marginal effect of diaspora support on one-sided violence manifests a negative and statistical significance, indicating a reduction of such violence. Conversely, the most pronounced marginal effect on ethnic one-sided violence occurs in conjunction with a diaspora originating from multiple homelands. Furthermore, various forms of media restrictions in the homeland exhibit negative and statistically significant marginal effects on ethnic one-sided violence. Interestingly, these effects are also significant in relation to the number of one-sided violence related deaths, particularly in contexts where media is less restricted. In summary, while the results indicate a negative effect of diaspora sponsorship on ethnic one-sided violence, the conditions under which those effects are more pronounced differ among ethnic one-sided violence and one-sided violence.

8.3 Rebel governance and diaspora sponsorship

Following my theoretical framework, I extend the analysis to encompass elements of rebel governance as a key outcome of interest, in addition to civilian victimization and ethnic violence. This section presents the findings of an exploratory study, laying the groundwork for subsequent research aimed at unraveling the causal relationships between diaspora sponsorship of rebel organizations and the provision, or lack thereof, of different elements of rebel governance. However, it is important to note that the results presented here do not engage in a comprehensive comparison between violence against civilians and rebel governance, primarily due to the differing sample sizes and

the constraints imposed by the limited data available on rebel governance. I focus on the provision of public goods and services, as outlined in hypothesis 5.5.1 summarized in table 8.4, and on governance elements, including elections, embassies, or a constitution as summarized in hypothesis 5.5.2.

Hypothesis #	Rebel governance hypothesis
Hypothesis 5.5.1	Diaspora support to rebel organizations increases the likelihood of a rebel group providing public goods and service compared to no diaspora support.
Hypothesis 5.5.2	Diaspora support to rebel organizations increases the likelihood of rebel governance, specifically governance elements, compared to no diaspora support.

Table 8.4: Hypotheses developed concerning diaspora sponsorship and rebel governance

I present and explain the results concerning elements of rebel governance which encompasses governance, resources and public goods and services. The findings for rebel governance reveal heterogeneous effects attributable to diaspora support for rebel organizations. I have omitted the outcomes for rebel groups' local government and their attempt to join an international organization due to separation problems in the analysis. Contrary to the hypothesized relationship outlined in hypothesis 5.5.1, I do not find any statistically significant and robust effect of diaspora support on variables measuring public goods and service provision. This includes variables such as education, health services, infrastructure, welfare and aid provided by rebels. Table G.1, table G.2, table G.3 and table G.4 in the appendix show the absence of statistically significant results. One potential explanation for these insignificant results may lie in the time-variant effect of diaspora support, which could manifest on a monthly or daily basis and may not be adequately captured by the current data. Alternatively, the diaspora's preference for limited violence against civilians trumps the emphasis on civilian well-being and quality of life that are typically associated with social service and public goods provision.

In contrast to the dimensions of rebel governance related to the provision of public goods and social services, the factors measuring governance present a more nuanced picture. Diaspora support demonstrates positive and statistically significant effects which are consistent across various model specifications, in aspects such as having a constitution, holding elections and having law over civilian behavior. However, these positive effects are not statistically significant when it comes to the rebels being organized like a government (table G.5), having a justice system (table G.8), and implementing tax-

Table 8.5: Diaspora support and rebel governance (Logit model)

	<i>Dependent variable: Election (dummy)</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Diaspora support (dummy)	2.051*	2.123*	2.112*	2.060*	1.933
	(1.050)	(1.142)	(1.088)	(1.144)	(1.282)
Population (ln)	1.819***	1.870***	1.956***	2.754**	3.102***
	(0.649)	(0.645)	(0.667)	(1.116)	(0.964)
GDP (ln)	-1.055**	-1.156**	-1.139**	-0.684	-0.960*
	(0.474)	(0.468)	(0.471)	(0.621)	(0.554)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	-3.156**	-3.305**	-3.219**	-2.895*	-2.978*
	(1.598)	(1.650)	(1.617)	(1.546)	(1.564)
External support	-0.269	-0.514	-0.224	-0.273	-0.017
	(0.604)	(0.596)	(0.623)	(0.723)	(0.903)
# rebel groups in conflict	0.485***	0.507***	0.507***	0.554***	0.577***
	(0.101)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.143)	(0.157)
Lag OSV	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.0002	-0.0003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Excluded ethnic groups (dummy)					1.276
					(0.986)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)		16.636***			15.910***
		(1.478)			(1.775)
US designated FTO (dummy)			1.665*		4.400***
			(0.950)		(1.601)
Media bias				-1.665***	-1.664***
				(0.469)	(0.529)
Constant	-12.527**	-27.596***	-13.207**	-38.943***	-55.658***
	(5.349)	(5.685)	(5.619)	(9.338)	(9.844)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	551	551	551	551	551
Log Likelihood	-102.001	-97.786	-101.269	-84.126	-74.922
Akaike Inf. Crit.	220.002	213.572	220.538	186.253	173.843

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

ation (table G.9). Table G.6 shows the results from the logistic regression analysis which underscore the positive and statistically significant influence of diaspora support on having a national government by the rebel organization. The estimated coefficient for being organized like a government is positive with a smaller effect size and lacking statistical significance (see table G.5). On the other hand, diaspora support indicates a negative, albeit statistically insignificant, effect on rebels being in power in the center (table G.10). This finding does not display robustness across model specifications, as indicated by the probit regression results, which suggest a positive but statistically insignificant effect of diaspora support on rebels being in power (table G.16).

The results further demonstrate a positive and statistically significant effect of diaspora support on specific elements of governance. This includes rebels writing a constitution (table G.7), having laws over civilian behavior (table 8.6), and holding elections for civilians (table 8.5). Each of these outcome variables indicates robustness across model specifications as shown by the positive and statistically significant effect of diaspora sponsorship on the various elements of rebel governance.¹³ The most pronounced effect size of diaspora support on rebel governance occurs for rebels' armed forces (table 8.7). One potential explanation may be the diaspora's interest in rebels'

¹³In addition to writing a constitution, the other three variables of interest exhibit robust results, including the probit model estimations.

Table 8.6: Diaspora support and rebel governance (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Law (dummy)</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Diaspora support (dummy)	1.299*	1.274	1.332*	1.286*	1.286*
	(0.782)	(0.788)	(0.778)	(0.769)	(0.771)
Population (ln)	0.299	0.347	0.523	0.268	0.484
	(0.535)	(0.528)	(0.541)	(0.517)	(0.499)
GDP (ln)	-0.138	-0.209	-0.301	-0.035	-0.247
	(0.384)	(0.389)	(0.372)	(0.317)	(0.292)
Conflict duration (ln)	-0.839*	-0.860*	-0.972**	-0.775*	-0.881**
	(0.433)	(0.440)	(0.471)	(0.425)	(0.441)
External support	-0.716*	-0.854**	-0.585	-0.750*	-0.700*
	(0.402)	(0.426)	(0.406)	(0.425)	(0.424)
# rebel groups	0.195***	0.209***	0.216**	0.179***	0.200***
	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.086)	(0.067)	(0.072)
lagged OSV	-0.00001	-0.00001	-0.00001	-0.00000	-0.00003
	(0.00004)	(0.00004)	(0.00003)	(0.00003)	(0.00003)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)					0.628
					(0.588)
Relevance of ethnicity (dummy)		2.188***			1.740**
		(0.794)			(0.703)
Designated US FTO			1.966**		2.040**
			(0.882)		(0.925)
Media bias				-0.218	-0.176
				(0.247)	(0.253)
Constant	-4.366	-5.635*	-4.708	-6.128	-7.208
	(3.519)	(3.274)	(3.644)	(4.290)	(4.782)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	516	516	516	516	516
Log Likelihood	-215.966	-212.945	-208.246	-214.269	-200.754
Akaike Inf. Crit.	447.932	443.890	434.493	446.538	425.509

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

victory, thereby influencing conventional and professional military force.

Table 8.7: Diaspora support and rebel governance (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Armed forces (dummy)</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Diaspora support (dummy)	3.661***	3.859***	3.981***
	(1.210)	(1.228)	(1.241)
Population (ln)	0.283	0.031	-0.021
	(0.834)	(0.771)	(0.682)
GDP (ln)	-0.323	0.132	0.114
	(0.592)	(0.460)	(0.420)
External support	-0.772	-0.860	-0.699
	(0.654)	(0.692)	(0.664)
# rebel groups in conflict	-0.216	-0.256	-0.248
	(0.172)	(0.183)	(0.192)
Lag OSV	-0.001	-0.0004	-0.0003
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)			2.366*
			(1.292)
Media bias		-0.719**	-0.473
		(0.291)	(0.421)
Constant	-1.610	-7.807	-8.442
	(4.507)	(5.420)	(5.143)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓
Observations	554	554	554
Log Likelihood	-127.808	-115.475	-101.877
Akaike Inf. Crit.	269.615	246.951	221.754

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The examination of the confounding factors related to elections, constitution and law shows consistent patterns. The estimated coefficient for diaspora support remains positive and statistically significant across various controls, including the duration of conflict, the number of rebel organizations involved in the conflict dyad, population size, GDP, the relevance of ethnicity, the status of the US designation of a rebel group as a foreign terrorist organization, and media bias in the homeland. Considering the rebel governance outcomes concerning law and elections, the number of rebel organi-

zations in a conflict is a relevant factor. Higher numbers of rebel organizations in a conflict dyad are associated with a higher likelihood of elections and establishment of law. While most of the confounding factors are statistically insignificant, conflict duration and relevance of ethnicity maintain their significance across all models and the three outcomes of interest. In line with theoretical expectations, factors such as the population size and the number of rebel groups involved in the conflict are significant for holding elections, as indicated in table 8.5. Interestingly, diaspora support increases the establishment of law, whereas external non-diaspora support appears to have a diminishing effect on this aspect, as evidenced in table 8.6. Contrary to expectations, the status of exclusion does not significantly impact the governance elements of rebel governance. This finding suggests an opportunity for further research to explore the mechanisms and relationship between the status of ethnic group in the homeland and rebel governance in the context of diaspora and state support.

In addition to the aforementioned aspects, I also examine the results on political legitimacy and available resources, which are elements of rebel governance. The results presented in table G.11 show that diaspora support does not exert a statistically significant and meaningful impact on whether a rebel organization is a member of an international organization. In fact, if any, it appears to be a negative effect. Similarly, the estimated coefficients for diaspora support concerning rebel's having embassies abroad indicate an opposite sign (table G.12). Furthermore, the logistic and probit regression results illustrate that diaspora support does not statistically significantly affect variables measuring resources. For example, this includes rebels negotiating rights to extract natural resources (table G.13), rebels engaging in illegal networks (table G.14), and combinations of resources (table G.15). These findings suggest that diaspora support may affect elements of rebel governance related to political legitimacy and availability of resources in complex ways that are not captured in this analysis. The results also uncover more nuanced relationships that warrant further investigation to better understand the relations between diaspora support and various elements of rebel governance.

The findings for social services and public goods, governance, legitimacy and resources demonstrate mixed results. Future research should build upon this exploratory

study's findings, striving to reinforce the robustness of its findings while extending the scope beyond the current analysis of rebel governance elements. Such research should delve into the heterogeneous effects related to the causal linkages between diaspora support and elements of rebel governance. The positive and statistically significant effects of diaspora support on elections for civilians, establishment of law over civilian behavior, writing a constitution and having armed forces lend support for hypothesis 5.5.2. Conversely, the findings for social services and public goods provision, including infrastructure, education and health suggest the rejection of hypothesis 5.5.1. Similarly, the observed effect of diaspora support on having a justice system, taxation, embassies, and rebel's membership in an international organization, though positive, are not statistically significant. This necessitates further research to determine whether these results robustly lead to the rejection of hypothesis 5.5.2, or indicate the presence of more heterogeneous results, thereby calling for the development of additional hypotheses. Furthermore, the results showing that diaspora support increases the likelihood of rebels holding elections and non-diaspora support decreasing it, illustrated by the negative sign, underscore the critical need to differentiate between diaspora and state support. This distinction is vital for a more nuanced understanding of different types of external sponsors and their impact on rebel governance.

8.4 Discussion

I conduct three sets of analyses to empirically examine the consequences of diaspora support on various outcomes: violence against civilians, ethnic violence against civilians, and elements of rebel governance. These analyses employ a time-series cross-sectional approach. The majority of the results demonstrate robustness for the explanatory variable diaspora sponsorship across different model specifications, such as logistic or probit regression analyses, various levels of clustering such as conflict- or dyad-level, and the measurement of variables and confounding factors. A direct comparison between the analyses on civilian victimization, which includes ethnic violence, and rebel governance is not feasible due to the limited data available for ethnic violence and rebel governance, thus constraining the sample sizes. However, the results indicate

more substantial evidence of diaspora sponsorship on one-sided violence, particularly for ethnic one-sided violence, compared to its impact on elements of rebel governance, except for governance-related outcomes.

Table 8.8 offers a comprehensive summary of the hypotheses formulated and the results of the analyses conducted, indicating whether the individual hypotheses are confirmed, rejected, or only partially supported when parentheses are used. Notably, diaspora support reduces one-sided violence by 50%. Furthermore, the violence-reducing effect of diaspora support remains robust across model specifications and in the presence of confounding factors such as the duration of conflict, the relevance of ethnicity, and domestic recruitment. Additionally, the analysis highlights the contrasting effects of non-diaspora support, which positively influences civilian victimization, as opposed to the negative effect of diaspora support. In summary, the results affirm the hypotheses related to violence, while the hypotheses referring to rebel governance receive partial support, specifically for governance related aspects, and are otherwise rejected particularly concerning elements of public goods and social service provision. The results for ethnic one-sided violence support a negative statistically significant effect, though the level of significance varies depending on the confounding factors. Furthermore, the conditional factors indicate partial support for the hypothesized relationships. Intriguingly, the effect of multi-ethnic population remains similar on one-sided violence regardless of the presence of a higher or lower number of ethnic groups in the homeland. The most profound finding for one-sided violence is the strong negative and statistically significant effect of diaspora support combined with discrimination against its ethnic group in the homeland, compared to non-discrimination. Conversely, the most profound interaction effect arises for ethnic one-sided violence involves multiple homelands or non-voluntary migration. However, both single homeland and voluntary migration do not indicate a statistically significant effect for the 95% confidence intervals.

The findings emphasize the necessity to distinguish between state and non-state sponsors, particularly between diaspora and state support. The different causes and subsequent preferences of these sponsors may account for the differing impacts observed on outcomes such as violence against civilians. However, further research inquiries are needed to robustly assess the contrasting effects of diaspora and state sponsorship on

Outcome variable	Hypothesis #	Hypothesis	Confirmed?
Civilian victimization	Hypothesis 5.4.1	Diaspora support to rebel organizations decreases the likelihood of violence against co-ethnic civilians compared to no diaspora support.	(✓)
	Hypothesis 5.4.2	Diaspora support to rebel organizations decreases the likelihood of violence against civilians compared to no diaspora support.	✓
Conditional factor	Hypothesis 5.4.3	Diaspora support to rebel organizations decreases the likelihood of violence against civilians compared to no diaspora support if an alternative sponsor exists.	(✓)
	Hypothesis 5.4.4	The one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is more pronounced if a diaspora originates from multiple countries.	no
	Hypothesis 5.4.5	The one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is more pronounced if diaspora's ethnic group is discriminated in the homeland.	✓
	Hypothesis 5.4.6	The one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is smaller if the population in the homeland is multi-ethnic.	(no)
	Hypothesis 5.4.7	The one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is smaller if the media in the homeland is biased towards the government.	✓
	Hypothesis 5.4.8	The ethnic one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is higher if the diaspora has the possibility to return to the homeland.	no
	Hypothesis 5.4.9	The ethnic one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is higher if the diaspora has a non-voluntary migration background.	✓
Rebel governance	Hypothesis 5.5.1	Diaspora support to rebel organizations increases the likelihood of a rebel group providing public goods and service compared to no diaspora support.	no
	Hypothesis 5.5.2	Diaspora support to rebel organizations increases the likelihood of rebel governance, specifically governance elements, compared to no diaspora support.	(✓)

Table 8.8: Evaluation of hypotheses related to diaspora sponsorship, civilian victimization, and rebel governance

rebel violence during civil wars.

Additionally, the conditional effects of diaspora support on civilian victimization reveal that the hypothesized relationship, involving multiple homelands in conjunction with diaspora sponsorship, does not yield a statistically significant effect. Conversely, diaspora support from a single homeland diaspora demonstrates a violence-reducing effect. This unexpected results needs further investigation and stimulates debate about the backgrounds of diasporas, further supported by the pronounced violence-reducing effect in instances of non-voluntary migration background on ethnic one-sided violence. These findings underscore the need for more nuanced research into the origins of diasporas and their influence on contemporary actions, particularly their involvement in conflict dynamics. Moreover, whether different types of violence against civilians may drive different findings needs further inquiry in future studies.

While the current findings suggest a threshold of ten ethnic groups in a homeland offering partial support to hypothesis 5.4.6, further in-depth investigations are required to ascertain the optimal threshold point for multiple ethnic populations. Such research

should also explore whether and how a lower or higher number of ethnic groups in a homeland may differentially affect various outcomes related to civilian victimization in conjunction with state and non-state sponsorship.

Future research could investigate the different effects of media restrictions such as media bias, range of media outlets, and critical media outlets, on both ethnic violence and civilian victimization more broadly. Such studies would be crucial in probing the mechanisms underlying information-sharing and access to information. It could also enrich the understanding of the stronger results on ethnic targeting, considering the limitations of currently available data. Additionally, future research is needed to explore the possible interaction effect between news outlets and diaspora sponsorship on civilian victimization.

The two sets of analyses distinctly address the outcomes of rebel governance and rebel violence. Once further data becomes available, a combined analysis would reveal results that might speak to co-existence or potential transitions between high violence against civilians, particularly ethnic targeting, and the provision of social services, resources, and elements of governance. Moreover, the intriguing outcomes of the exploratory analysis, where elements of rebel governance do not exhibit statistical significance for variables measuring social services and public goods, and only partial support for governance-related variables, establish a foundation for an in-depth research project. This project would focus on rebel governance and diaspora sponsorship, examining various types and segments of diasporas to gain a more profound understanding of what drives these varying effects, and why some governance elements, such as having a constitution, establishing law, and holding elections demonstrate statistical significance, whereas other elements such as justice system, being in power, organized like a government or implementing taxation do not manifest significant effects. Specifically, the variables measuring political legitimacy, which captures attempts to join an international organization, be a member of an international organization or have embassies abroad, warrants further investigation into the relationship between political support from a diaspora or a state, and rebel organizations decision to engage in elements of legitimacy-seeking rebel governance. Furthermore, the impact of conditional factors, for instance resource and territory related, on different elements of rebel governance

opens further research avenues.

The findings offer crucial empirical evidence regarding the negative effect of diaspora support in conjunction with the discriminated ethnic group of the diaspora in the homeland on one-sided violence. This evidence is not only pivotal but also expected, highlighting the persistent role of ethnic ties in the dynamics of civilian-diaspora relations amidst civil wars. Furthermore, the findings related to biased media in the homeland highlights the importance of debate around media freedom and access to information, especially in the context of external sponsorship in civil wars. These results speak to existing research which examines the effect of social media during civil war (Gohdes & Steinert-Threlkeld, n.d.; McGarty et al., 2014; Moss, 2021). However, it also demonstrates the relevance of media outlets and forms of biases, such as bias towards opposition, media range or level of critical media as well as forms of media outlets encompassing radio, TV and newspapers but also online media and social media. The latter is not analyzed due to the scope of this dissertation and the limited availability of social media data in civil war contexts.

Additionally, the study reveals conditional findings that differentiate between ethnic one-sided violence (EOSV) and one-sided violence (OSV), suggesting that the mechanism of information sharing may operate differently or is driven by distinct causes in the context of ethnically motivated violence, potentially affecting the diaspora in diverse ways. This mechanism is also relevant for future research to investigate whether more co-ethnics or a smaller number of co-ethnics proving more valuable and difficult to access information is more effective for information-sharing. Such research could provide more robust insights or alternative perspectives on the mechanism of information-sharing and its impact on diaspora support and civilian victimization in the context of intrastate conflicts.

In summary, the types of analyses and findings presented underscore the pivotal role of diaspora sponsorship on violence against civilians, ethnically-driven violence, and elements of rebel governance. However, to ensure the robustness of these results, to uncover more nuanced effects, and to gain a deeper understanding of the implications of such sponsorship, further research extending beyond the scope of this dissertation is essential.

Chapter 9

Conclusion

Numerous host countries around the globe accommodate diverse sizes and compositions of diasporas. This dissertation, grounded in the scholarship on diaspora, intrastate conflicts and civilian victimization, highlights the pivotal role diasporas can play, as well as the importance of implementing appropriate policies of diaspora support and monitoring mechanisms. Building upon the limited existing research on diaspora support delineated in chapter 2, I analyzed non-state sponsorship to rebel organizations, with a particular emphasis on diaspora sponsorship during intrastate conflicts.

I conceptualized diasporas as distinct actors, characterized by five features: (1) migration, (2) collective memory, (3) connection, (4) group consciousness, (5) kinship (IOM GMDAC, 2018), as discussed in-depth in chapter 3. Guided by three interrelated research questions, this dissertation has examined both the causes and consequences of diaspora sponsorship of rebel organizations. Specifically, I explored:

1. Why do diaspora groups externally support rebel organizations?
2. Under which conditions is diaspora support more or less likely?
3. How does diaspora sponsorship of rebel organizations impact civilian victimization or rebel governance?

I propose that diaspora and state sponsorship significantly differ regarding logic and means. Building upon existing scholarship in the realm of diaspora politics, which includes exploring the roles of diasporas, as well as the extensive literature on external sponsorship, I investigate why diaspora sponsor rebel organizations (research question 1) and under which conditions such sponsorship is more or less likely (research question 2). Chapter 4 also illustrates material, financial and political diaspora sponsorship.

Within the theoretical framework articulated in chapter 4, I introduced a delegation relationship between a diaspora and a rebel organization in the context of civil wars. At its core, my argument posits that diasporas, driven by kinship ties, aim to support their kin and seek changes within the homeland. The collective preferences of the diaspora are government changes in the homeland and well-being of co-ethnics and civilians, ensuring they receive favorable treatment, as indicated by limited violence or the establishment of rebel governance. The diaspora's decision to support a rebel organization is based on kin support and the alignment of aims between two actors.

This delegation relationship benefits the diaspora in various ways but also exposes it to the risks of agency slack by the rebel organization, acting as the agent. Concurrently, the rebel organization gains access to additional resources while potentially risking a loss of autonomy. Furthermore, I developed theoretical expectations regarding four categories of determinants: conflict, rebel organizations, diaspora, and homeland characteristics, which impact the existence of diaspora sponsorship. Table 9.1 provides a comprehensive overview of all hypotheses developed in relation to the determinants of diaspora sponsorship.

In chapter 5, I explained the principal-agent framework as the theoretical lens through which I examined the consequences of diaspora sponsorship on civilians. Specifically, this chapter delves into the impact of diaspora sponsorship of rebel organizations on civilian victimization or rebel governance (research question 3). Upon presenting the logic of a principal-agent framework, I explained how the diaspora is a unique principal, aiming for limited civilian victimization or rebel governance. Further, I detailed the mechanism of information-sharing between co-ethnics in the homeland and the diaspora residing in the United States.¹ Although the diaspora primarily prefers restraint violence against civilians in general, and co-ethnic civilians in particular, rebel organizations prioritize victory, often at the expense of civilian well-being in conflict zones. Employing violence makes a critical juncture at which preferences diverge. I argue that co-ethnicity is the key reason, surpassing the professionalism and capabilities of the rebel group, for a diaspora to externally support a rebel group. By delegating the task of limited violence against civilians and co-ethnics, the diaspora pursues its preferences on the ground while receiving the benefits of delegation as opposed to direct engagement. However, the convergence of aims between the rebel and diaspora group is also vital. Gaining more support is in the interest of the rebel group, provided its autonomy remains uncompromised. Table 9.1 offers a comprehensive summary of all 17 hypotheses formulated regarding diaspora sponsorship, violence against civilians, ethnic violence against civilians, and aspects of rebel governance.

¹I discuss how this dissertation utilized the fire-alarm developed by McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) in chapter 1 and chapter 5, alongside a discussion how the fire-alarm mechanism differs from the information-filtering mechanism developed by Shesterina (2021).

Type	Hypothesis #	Hypothesis
Conflict determinants	Hypothesis 4.3.1	Diaspora support to rebel organizations is less likely if the number of rebel organizations is high, the duration of conflict long, or violence against civilians was previously conducted.
	Hypothesis 4.3.2	Diaspora support to rebel organizations is less likely if the rebel organization is a designated US foreign terrorist organization, recruits from an ethnic group, or state sponsors exist in the conflict.
Rebel group determinants	Hypothesis 4.3.3	Diaspora support to rebel organizations is more likely if the rebel organization is relative strong compared to the government, claims to fight on behalf of an ethnic group, receives support from the ethnic group in the homeland, multiple sponsors exist, or the rebels provide elements of rebel governance.
	Hypothesis 4.3.4	Diaspora support to rebel organizations is more likely if the diaspora's ethnic group is discriminated or excluded from power, the homeland is economically wealthy or has a large population.
Homeland determinants	Hypothesis 4.3.5	Diaspora support to rebel organizations is less likely if the media in the homeland is biased or restricted.
	Hypothesis 4.3.6	Diaspora support to rebel organizations is more likely if the diaspora originates from a single homeland, has a possibility to return, has a transborder ethnic kin, or a conflict-driven migration background.
Diaspora determinants	Hypothesis 4.3.6	Diaspora support to rebel organizations is more likely if the diaspora originates from a single homeland, has a possibility to return, has a transborder ethnic kin, or a conflict-driven migration background.
	Hypothesis 5.4.1	Diaspora support to rebel organizations decreases the likelihood of violence against co-ethnic civilians compared to no diaspora support.
Civilian victimization	Hypothesis 5.4.2	Diaspora support to rebel organizations decreases the likelihood of violence against civilians compared to no diaspora support.
	Hypothesis 5.4.3	Diaspora support to rebel organizations decreases the likelihood of violence against civilians compared to no diaspora support if an alternative sponsor exists.
Conditional factor	Hypothesis 5.4.4	The one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is more pronounced if a diaspora originates from multiple countries.
	Hypothesis 5.4.5	The one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is more pronounced if diaspora's ethnic group is discriminated in the homeland.
	Hypothesis 5.4.6	The one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is smaller if the population in the homeland is multi-ethnic.
	Hypothesis 5.4.7	The one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is smaller if the media in the homeland is biased towards the government.
	Hypothesis 5.4.8	The ethnic one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is higher if the diaspora has the possibility to return to the homeland.
	Hypothesis 5.4.9	The ethnic one-sided violence reducing effect of diaspora support for rebel organizations is higher if the diaspora has a non-voluntary migration background.
Rebel governance	Hypothesis 5.5.1	Diaspora support to rebel organizations increases the likelihood of a rebel group providing public goods and service compared to no diaspora support.
	Hypothesis 5.5.2	Diaspora support to rebel organizations increases the likelihood of rebel governance, specifically governance elements, compared to no diaspora support.

Table 9.1: Hypotheses developed in chapter 4 and chapter 5

9.1 Key findings and contributions

This dissertation enhances understanding of the international dimensions of civil wars through an analysis of diaspora sponsorship. It highlights the pivotal role of diasporas as transnational actors, emphasizing their impact on rebel governance and the reduction of rebel group's violence against civilians. The interviews conducted offer detailed insights into the processes of information-sharing and consumption of news outlets among first and second-generation diasporans in the United States. These, along with expert interviews, identify diaspora sponsorship as a critical yet under-explored phenomenon that holds relevance not only for intrastate conflicts but also for international relations.

Chapter 7 presents an empirical analysis that, within the defined scope conditions of this study, identifies conflict characteristics as the most robust determinants of diaspora sponsorship, alongside mixed findings for rebel organization characteristics. Notably, homeland characteristics, particularly media biases, do not provide robust findings, thereby suggesting avenues for future research into the relationship between media biases and diaspora sponsorship of rebel organizations. Similarly, with the exception of the presence of transborder ethnic kin, diaspora characteristics do not significantly impact the likelihood of diaspora sponsorship. However, through extreme bounds analysis and subsequent logistic regression analysis, this dissertation confirms that a multifaceted set of factors act as determinants of diaspora sponsorship to rebel organizations.

The analysis presented in Chapter 8 regarding the consequences of diaspora sponsorship reveals that such sponsorship can reduce violence against civilians by 50%. This result is not only statistically significant but also underscores the crucial role diaspora support can play in reducing violence against civilians, potentially having wide-reaching effects on civilian well-being in conflict zones. These results confirm the hypotheses related to violence, while the hypotheses concerning rebel governance find only partial support, especially in aspects of governance, and are largely rejected in relation to public goods and service provision. Nonetheless, the impact on ethnic one-sided violence is predominantly statistically insignificant. Due to the limited number of observations, owing to the scarcity of data, these findings are not directly comparable to the findings from the analysis on one-sided violence. Evaluating the conditional

factors provides additional insights on the effects of diaspora sponsorship on violence against civilians. Diaspora sponsorship, when combined with lower levels of media bias towards the opposition, exhibits a larger effect on reducing violence against civilians. Interestingly, the effect of a multi-ethnic population remains similar irrespective of the presence of a higher or lower number of ethnic groups in the homeland. The most profound finding is the strong, negative and statistically significant effect of diaspora support coupled with discrimination against its ethnic group in the homeland, as opposed to non-discrimination. Considering the conditional factors and their impact on violence against co-ethnics yields similar results. However, a notable difference is the statistically insignificant interaction effect of a multi-ethnic population on ethnic one-sided violence and the statistically significant differences when non-voluntary migration background is included. Meanwhile, the possibility of return to the homeland does not provide significant results.

This dissertation pioneers with the creation of a novel diaspora support dataset, encompassing all UCDP-listed intrastate conflicts in Africa and Asia starting between 1989 and 2014. This unique dataset has enabled the conduct of extensive large-N analyses to systematically examine the phenomenon of diaspora sponsorship to rebel organizations. Consequently, this dissertation not only introduces a new dataset for future research endeavors but also expands the academic discourse on diaspora politics, based in migration studies, and civil wars and external sponsorship literature, which has traditionally concentrated on external state support and the concept of proxy wars.

The dissertation makes significant conceptual, theoretical and empirical contributions to the nuanced comprehension of diasporas as external actors in intrastate conflicts and the ensuing dynamics of such conflicts. By delving into the determinants of diaspora sponsorship to rebel organizations, this dissertation sheds light on a previously under-researched phenomenon: non-state sponsorship to non-state actors. Employing a principal-agent framework to examine diaspora-rebel interactions, it substantially enhances our understanding of how these relationships operate, particularly highlighting the critical role of information exchange among co-ethnics and diasporans. Furthermore, the diaspora support dataset, combined with rigorous statistical analyses, provides empirical evidence on the influence of diaspora support on violence against

civilians, ethnic violence, and rebel governance. This not only addresses an essential gap in empirical research but also offers an invaluable resource for subsequent research in this field.

9.2 Outlook

This dissertation expands the scholarship on diasporas as transitional actors in international relations and contributes to the body of research concerning internationalized civil wars and ethnic conflicts. Furthermore, it speaks to the literature on civilian targeting and offers an instance of the impact of external non-state actors that could influence civilian targeting approaches by armed actors. The three research questions take the aspect of transnational ethnic ties into serious consideration and can be seen as an instance of kinship support, thus engaging with the literature on ethnicity, identity, and migration. Consequently, a prominent avenue for future research is the in-depth exploration of the information exchange mechanism between diasporans and their co-ethnics, especially examining how media biases within the homeland may affect such information-sharing. Additionally, it is crucial to ascertain whether information sharing is more effective when conducted by a few co-ethnics possessing valuable insights or by a larger group, and how the conditional support of the diaspora may influence the restraining of rebel groups. In this context, it is also worthwhile to explore how diaspora-run news outlets play a role in information-sharing and whether social media offers access to trustworthy information or serving as a medium for propaganda by conflicting parties.

Diasporas as diverse actors. An advanced understanding of the diaspora as a crucial actor opens new directions for research. Particularly, the collective actions of the diaspora demonstrates a starting point for studying the variations in organizational structures of diasporas, ranging from loose network to hierarchical organizations. This includes an analysis of how differences in the principal-agent relationship, contingent on the strength of the diaspora, influence such dynamics, whether the cohesiveness of the identity play a role, and other varying factors. By relaxing the unitary actor assumption and examining the impact of diverse organizational degrees among diaspora

groups, new research pathways emerge. In a weak principal-agent relationship, rebel organizations may gain increased leverage over the principal and prefer the support of the diaspora over that of a strong state principal.

While the theoretical framework and analysis treat the diaspora as a unitary actor, the results highlight the importance of recognizing the nuances within diaspora that could be disentangled. Moving beyond the unitary actor assumption, future studies could delve into how different segments of the diaspora interact with respect to civilian victimization and rebel governance, and whether the effects of diaspora sponsorship might counterbalance within the same diaspora. One example of different segments of the diaspora are ethnic versus religious diasporas. These diverse diaspora groups, each with their unique characteristics and connections to their homeland, host country and co-ethnics, are a starting point for further research exploring the complexities in the triadic relationship and the impact on conflict dynamics and sponsorship decisions.

Comparative studies. Building upon the findings of this dissertation concerning civilian victimization, there emerges a spectrum of future research opportunities exploring alternative dimensions of civilian victimization, including torture, sexual violence, rape, and forced displacement. Additionally, comparative studies can analyze and compare both state and diaspora support, examining their varied impacts on the protection of civilians and co-ethnics. Furthermore, diaspora support, alongside other non-state sponsors such as corporations or non-governmental organizations, hold promise for broadening the discourse on external sponsorship.

Extensions of dataset. The dataset on diaspora support that I generated presents numerous avenues for further investigation, including the expansion of its geographical and temporal scope. Refining the coding process to introduce a time-varying variable for diaspora support would offer additional research possibilities. Case studies, such as the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Eritrean government, offer the potential to explore temporal dynamics of diaspora sponsorship and how shifts from voluntary to coerced support, and transitions from non-state actor to state actor sponsorship may occur or are influenced.

Political diaspora support. Political support, as a subtype of external support, provided by the diaspora unveils additional avenues for research. Drawing upon the

findings of this dissertation and existing scholarship on the diplomatic efforts of rebel organizations (e.g. Huang, 2016a; Stanton, 2020), I propose to examine why rebel organizations attract political support from diasporans in a subsequent research project. This investigation should focus on the drivers of external non-state political support for rebel organizations, the influence of conflict-migration background on diaspora's willingness to mobilize for rebel group sponsorship and the characteristics of such support. The gathering of new data on diasporas willingness for political support of armed actors, coupled with experimental research on diaspora's reasons of support promises to illuminate the complexities surrounding political support for militant organizations and its potential policy ramifications for both the homeland and host country.

Diaspora support and terrorism. Another stream of future research could concentrate on the nexus between diaspora support and terrorist activities. This includes examining suicide terrorism and the geographical location of terrorist events, alongside the potential interactions with the diaspora's country of residence. The scholarship by Asal and Ayres (2018), Asal, Phillips, Rethemeyer, et al. (2019), Piazza and LaFree (2019), and Polo and Gleditsch (2016) predominantly focused on terrorist activities and targeting, which diverges the outcome of civilian victimization.

I posit that the designation of foreign terrorist organizations represents one factor that may constrain the diaspora's capacity to support rebel organizations within host nations. Specifically, if a militant organization is a designated US foreign terrorist organization, the diaspora within the United States incurs legal consequences for supporting such groups. Although support may still be funneled through alternative avenues, the associated costs and effort for the sponsor increase. The Global Terrorism Database (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2022) as well as the GTD2EPR (Polo, 2020) present potential starting points for comprehensive, large-N empirical analyses, which could examine the relationship between diaspora and terrorist organization, the implications of designating such organizations, host country-diaspora relationships, and the occurrence or frequency of terrorist events and diaspora sponsorship.

9.3 Policy implications

This dissertation investigates the causes and consequences of diaspora sponsorship of rebel organizations within the framework of intrastate conflicts, providing new insights that contribute to a deeper understanding of the dynamics between sponsors and rebel groups, the interactions between diasporas and civilians, and the impact of diaspora sponsorship on both civilian victimization and, to a lesser extent, rebel governance. Through this exploration, this dissertation, embedded in conflict and migration scholarship, not only enhances the academic discourse but also offers important implications for policy-making.

Actors engaged in conflicts should be held accountable (Salehyan et al., 2014, p. 658). This underscores the necessity for policy recommendations grounded in rigorous research. A nuanced understanding of the reasons and mechanisms underpinning external diaspora sponsorship of rebel groups, along with its effects on civilian-rebel relationships, serves as an essential foundation. This dissertation draws attention to policy strategies that monitor diaspora activities within host countries and the development of counterinsurgency plans that transcend a purely military focus (cf. Salehyan et al., 2011, p. 735; D. E. Cunningham et al., 2009, p. 593; Salehyan et al., 2014, p. 735; Zürcher, 2017; R. M. Wood & Molfino, 2016; Zürcher, 2019). Furthermore, this dissertation aligns with prior research (e.g. Byman et al., 2001, p. 55) in questioning the extent of host countries' responsibilities for the repercussions of diaspora support for rebel organizations. The argument is based on the acquisition possibilities within the host country, the minority rights and voting impacts for host country politicians (Byman et al., 2001, p. 57). Another aspect is the level and role of state capacity, for instance, in monitoring illicit border transactions (Byman et al., 2001, p. 58). Assimilation and integration obstacles can be contributors as well, particularly if diasporas feel more connected to the homeland and excluded within the host country (Chalk, 2008, p. 103). Moreover, studies such as Byman et al. (2001, pp. 55–57) and Chalk (2008, p. 103) explain the beneficial ground for external support activities in Western countries upholding liberal and democratic principles. Consequently, the question occurs whether none interfering of the host country is indirectly supporting the diaspora and hence the rebel group (cf. Byman et al., 2001, p. 58).

Diasporas potential to limit civilian killings. Despite diasporas being pivotal actors in the globalized world (Asal & Ayres, 2018, p. 35), they are frequently viewed as security threats due to the residence in the host country and obtaining their dubious loyalties (Mohamoud, 2005, p. 31; Turner, 2010, p. 98). Additionally, transformative events like the 9/11 attacks have significantly impacted diaspora politics, for instance, “the Tamil diaspora in the USA distanced itself from the Tamil Tigers” (R. Cohen, 2008, p. 170). Nonetheless, this dissertation theoretically and empirically demonstrates that diasporas, unlike states, can significantly mitigate violence against civilians, thereby reducing civilian harm.

As articulated in 2023 by the report from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) during the 53rd session of the Human Rights Council, “Casualty records are not just numbers. They represent human beings whose lives were torn apart by conflicts and violence” (UNHCHR, 2023, p. 79). Consequential, it is crucial to undertake rigorous research on the victimization of civilians, to which this dissertation has made an important contribution. The findings of this dissertation indicate that diaspora sponsorship can indeed limit civilian harm by restraining rebel group’s application of violence when diaspora support exists. Nonetheless, additional research is necessary to delve deeper into the specific conditions that may enhance or mitigate the violence-reducing effect of diaspora sponsorship, as well as to determine whether certain segments of the diaspora might mitigate or escalate conflict dynamics.

Diasporas and the US government. In the interviews conducted, I specifically solicited policy-related recommendations for the US government and administration concerning diasporas within the US. The interview excerpts provided below offer a diverse range of perspectives that serve as further consideration for policymakers. The table 9.2 summarizes the key areas for policy recommendations for the US government and the Biden administration raised by the interviewees. Notably, direct engagement with the diaspora community has been mentioned in different ways. For instance, increasing travel budgets and conduct domestic missions, instead of only going overseas (I3) or direct interactions with the local communities (I9), in contrast to high-level discussions and government exchanges. Another area is brain drain and the loss of human capital in the homeland given diasporan’s residency in the United States. A

member of the Nigerian diaspora and the president of a Nigerian diaspora organization in Washington D.C. highlights the medical sector and the loss of human capital in Nigeria given the immigration to the US by a significant amount of the medical personnel (I11).

Topic area	Interviewee	Policy recommendation
Travel budgets and expert missions	I3	Expansion of travel budgets for the US department of treasure to travel to communities, “reach out, listen to their concern” and foster conversations. Moreover, “sent experts overseas is common but not common to send domestically, in communities. We are missing opportunities”.
Engagement with ordinary people and local level organizations	I9	“I think US government should do really engage with local communities, indigenous community in the county, and, civil society organization activities, what their views on the political situation of Uganda, that would shape foreign policy more efficiently, than only viewing Ugandan as a security or geopolitical ally, Uganda as important geostrategic country in the region, many blind spots of foreign policy [...] listening to ordinary Ugandans more, listening to activities, sexual minorities, empowering them is my wish for the US”.
Diaspora’s human capital	I11	A Nigerian diasporan mentions the problem of medical tourism in Nigeria and states that “folks could put something in way to discourage that [...] Stay home, fix the system than everyone can get good healthcare”.
Political system	I13	“right now in Ethiopia federalist on paper, with lots of states. Addis Ababa is the seat of the federal government. The only problem is that it has never been implemented in the ground. I would like for America to show that a federal system is a good system. We have Afar state in Ethiopia, if at some point federal government disappear, our language will disappear. [...] Make sure [as US] that Ethiopia stays a federal state and understand how federal system must work. America is a federal state”.
Recognition and intersection of identities	I14	A member of the Filipino diaspora wishes for “recognition and diversity in the White House” (I14) and acknowledgment of intersection of identities, including biracial, as “biracial element of identity, is not discussed as commonly but more common than ever and will increase”.
Action, not only words	I12	While the US President Biden issued an executive order in 2022 to establish a <i>President’s Advisory Council on African Diaspora Engagement in the United States</i> (PAC-ADE) (Executive Order 14089, 2022), the interviewee responded in this context that the US administration should “push for this council to come into place, not just words”.

Table 9.2: Policy recommendations for the US government from interviewees

Further areas touched upon during the interviews conducted are the political system of the country of origin, and the role model the United States can play. An Afar diasporan underscores the influence the US government holds in ensuring that other countries adhere to their official government system such as a federal state (I13). Furthermore,

the diasporan stressed the importance of preserving the diversity of languages which is vital for the homeland and its population (I13). Similarly, a Filipino diasporan wishes that the US government recognizes the engagement and achievement of the Filipino diasporans, especially nurses, who played a crucial role during the Covid-19 pandemic in the US (I14). The interviewee also expressed the wish for increased diversity in the White House and the active acknowledgment of intersecting identities, including those of biracial diasporans (I14). Lastly, a strong and direct appeal is formulated by an interviewee to the Biden administration to implement the *President's Advisory Council on African Diaspora Engagement in the United States*, emphasizing that it should go beyond being merely an executive order, thus spoken words without action (I12).

In conclusion, this dissertation illuminated on the role of diasporas as sponsors of rebel organizations, the conditions that make diaspora support more or less likely, and the investigation of diaspora sponsorship as a phenomenon comparable to external state support. I also generated and introduced a novel dataset that laid the ground to examine diaspora sponsorship in intrastate conflicts in Africa and Asia. Additionally, this dissertation provided new avenues for research at the intersection of conflict and migration studies. Specifically, it lays the groundwork for future research on diaspora support to states and its potential varying implications on civilian victimization, ethnic targeting, and rebel governance. Finally, this dissertation offers various starting points for policy-makers to actively assess the role of diasporas during intrastate conflicts, the dynamics between diaspora and civilians in the homeland and host country, and the responsibilities of host countries in monitoring, encouraging, or restraining diaspora support for rebel organizations.

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Appendix A

Interviews

A.1 Overview interviews

Interview Code	Date	Mode	Feature	Type
I1	12/16/2022	virtual platform	Senior economist, US-think tank	expert interview
I2	12/19/2022	virtual platform	Defense analyst, US-think tank	expert interview
I3	01/03/2023	virtual platform	Practice Professor, CT Bureau insights	expert interview
I4	01/07/2023	phone call	Member of the Nigerian diaspora in DMV area	interview with diasporan (first generation)
I5	01/10/2023	virtual platform	Senior research fellow at The Sofan Center & former RAND analyst on ISIS financing, the future of terrorism and transnational crime	expert interview
I6	01/10/2023	virtual platform	Analyst and officer in administration	informal expert chat
I7	01/11/2023	virtual platform	Scientist, US-think tank, former employee intelligence community, deployments in Middle Eastern US base	expert interview
I8	01/13/2023	virtual platform	Member of the Filipino diaspora in DMV area, active engagement in Filipino-American diaspora organization, employee nonpartisan and independent organization	interview with diasporan (second generation) and expert interview (work)
I9	01/20/2023	onsite, UMD Campus College Park	Member diaspora organization at UMD	interview with member of diaspora organization at University
I10	01/30/2022	virtual platform	Associate director & former US-think tank employee, former advisor UN peace operations	expert interview
I11	02/17/2023	virtual platform	President Nigerian diaspora organization, chapter Washington DC	interview with leader diaspora organization
I12	02/17/2023	virtual platform	Senior advisor in administration	informal expert chat
I13	02/22/2023	virtual platform	Member of the Afar-American diaspora	interview with actively involved diasporan (first generation)
I14	02/27/2023	virtual platform	Representative Filipino diaspora organization in DMV area	interview with diaspora NGO representative and diasporan (second generation)

Table A.1: Informational interviews conducted between December 2022 and February 2023

A.2 Interview procedure

I conducted the semi-structured interviews as part of an individual project to explore diaspora-civilian relationships. Project number: 1977139-1, approval by the institutional review board of the University of Maryland, College Park on November 11, 2022. The objective of this project was to gain knowledge about connections between members of a diaspora group and civilians in the homeland or other host countries, with a view to understanding potential mechanisms for information sharing. Additionally, the research aimed to identify motivational factors that drive engagement in diaspora organizations. Furthermore, incorporating perspectives from relevant stakeholders in the host government or agencies allowed to complement the perspective on how members of diaspora might support. I recruited participants via emails, websites, and social media platforms, depending on the online presence of the diaspora community or relevant state agencies' websites. I employed a snowballing technique. Pseudonymization was applied to all interviewees unless explicit consent by the interviewee was obtained for identification by name or organization along with the information shared during the interview. The quotes from interviews included in this dissertation are based on non-verbatim transcription.

Drawing upon the snowballing technique, I reached out to all faculty and researchers within the Department of Government and Politics at University of Maryland, College Park, via email. I also contacted area scholars at the same University who specialize in African and Asian countries; however, these attempts were met with no success, as all propositions for conversations were declined. Similarly, outreach efforts were made to all diaspora-related organizations listed in the University of Maryland, College Park's overview of student organizations, including but not limited to the African Graduate Students Association, Diazporic Dance Team, Ethiopian & Eritrean Students Association, Sikh student organization, Oromo student association and Filipino cultural association. These inquiries either went unanswered or were explicitly declined. Moreover, I contacted various embassies highlighting diaspora in their online presence. Except the Filipino embassy, which provided a list of all registered diaspora organizations, no information was shared. Furthermore, I reached out to diaspora organizations registered in the DMV area with some form of online presence that would mirror diaspora

groups from my diaspora support dataset. I did not receive a response for the majority of messages. Requests for expert interviews, including those directed to affiliated country or diaspora experts at the United States Institute of Peace, scholars residing in Washington D.C. with experience in external support or diaspora issues, and informal inquiries to experts at the at the Federal Bureau of Investigation's headquarter, were frequently declined.

Appendix B

Diaspora sponsorship: Extreme bounds analysis

B.1 Determinants of diaspora sponsorship: Robustness checks




Figure B.1: Robustness check: Cumulative density function with normal distribution for conflict, rebel, homeland and diaspora characteristics with variance inflation factor 10 (Sala-i-Martin's Extreme Bounds Analysis)

B.2 Rebel governance determinants of diaspora sponsorship: Robustness checks




Figure B.2: Robustness check: Cumulative density function with normal distribution for rebel characteristics related to rebel governance with variance inflation factor 5 (Sala-i-Martin's Extreme Bounds Analysis)

Appendix C

Diaspora sponsorship: Logistic regression analysis

C.1 Determinants of diaspora sponsorship: Interaction effects

Table C.1: Homeland determinants (interaction effects) of diaspora sponsorship (Logit model)

	<i>Dependent variable: Diaspora Support (dummy)</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Population (ln)	0.437*	0.336	0.450*	0.447*	0.347	0.346
	(0.243)	(0.246)	(0.247)	(0.247)	(0.251)	(0.255)
GDP (ln)	-0.348*	-0.252	-0.370*	-0.362*	-0.305	-0.298
	(0.191)	(0.203)	(0.195)	(0.197)	(0.194)	(0.202)
discriminated ethnic group (dummy)	0.650	0.266	0.816*	0.695		
	(0.440)	(0.531)	(0.451)	(0.452)		
excluded ethnic group (dummy)		0.582			0.742**	0.741**
		(0.390)			(0.349)	(0.349)
media bias		0.118				
		(0.314)				
critical media		-0.176				
		(0.278)				
discriminated* media bias			0.306			
			(0.259)			
discriminated* critical media				0.118		
				(0.238)		
excluded* media bias					0.033	
					(0.175)	
excluded* critical media						-0.006
						(0.150)
Constant	-0.247	-0.925	0.070	-0.096	0.087	-0.078
	(2.000)	(2.341)	(1.996)	(2.029)	(1.986)	(2.049)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	194	194	194	194	194	194
Log Likelihood	-118.671	-116.938	-117.947	-118.553	-117.429	-117.447
Akaike Inf. Crit.	245.341	247.877	245.894	247.105	244.858	244.893

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.2 Determinants of diaspora sponsorship: Robustness check

Table C.2: Conflict and rebel determinants of diaspora sponsorship (Logit model)

	<i>Dependent variable: Diaspora Support (dummy)</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Population (ln)	0.422* (0.233)	0.433* (0.246)	0.421* (0.235)	0.449* (0.240)	0.386 (0.236)	0.390* (0.234)
GDP (ln)	-0.331* (0.185)	-0.374** (0.183)	-0.351** (0.176)	-0.386** (0.179)	-0.370** (0.178)	-0.327* (0.176)
lagged OSV	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)
# rebel groups in conflict	-0.062** (0.031)	-0.087** (0.035)	-0.084** (0.034)	-0.071** (0.034)	-0.068* (0.035)	-0.084** (0.036)
duration since conflict start (ln)	-0.931*** (0.330)	-1.359*** (0.520)	-1.351*** (0.503)	-1.327*** (0.466)	-1.407*** (0.501)	-1.341*** (0.495)
ethnicity relevant (dummy)	1.316*** (0.285)	-0.066 (0.546)	0.053 (0.580)	0.221 (0.559)	0.183 (0.558)	0.459 (0.719)
claim		0.469* (0.279)	0.477* (0.281)	0.508* (0.285)	0.502* (0.279)	0.507* (0.307)
domestic support		0.362 (0.239)	0.348 (0.235)	0.336 (0.232)	0.405* (0.240)	0.325 (0.234)
external support		0.759* (0.400)				
external state support			0.523 (0.403)			0.458 (0.411)
# external state support				0.111 (0.144)		
# external non-state support					0.232 (0.244)	
recruitment						0.424 (0.491)
Constant	-0.974 (2.154)	0.575 (2.864)	0.334 (2.920)	0.543 (2.972)	1.290 (2.915)	-0.521 (3.076)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	193	151	151	151	151	150
Log Likelihood	-113.636	-81.382	-82.347	-82.941	-82.787	-81.691
Akaike Inf. Crit.	241.271	182.765	184.694	185.881	185.575	185.382

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.3: Rebel governance determinants of diaspora sponsorship (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Diaspora Support (dummy)</i>								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Population (ln)	0.377 (0.390)	0.344 (0.406)	0.377 (0.390)	0.344 (0.406)	-0.018 (0.515)	-0.089 (0.671)	-0.887 (0.890)	-0.673 (0.972)
GDP (ln)	-0.318 (0.321)	-0.310 (0.333)	-0.318 (0.321)	-0.310 (0.333)	-0.062 (0.407)	-0.095 (0.539)	0.545 (0.632)	0.332 (0.686)
In_Power	-1.376 (2.260)	-1.278 (2.280)	-1.376 (2.260)	-1.278 (2.280)	-1.011 (2.470)	-1.782 (2.248)	-1.579 (2.324)	-1.968 (2.362)
Join IO		0.666 (0.758)		0.666 (0.758)				-41.546*** (14.592)
Attempt IO								
Health					-107.379*** (36.992)	-112.654*** (32.853)	-97.687*** (15.769)	-80.467*** (12.798)
Education					106.566*** (36.252)	110.892*** (32.271)	65.640*** (10.550)	58.839*** (10.425)
Infrastructure					-62.990*** (22.190)	-64.945*** (19.680)		
Welfare/Aid					8.394** (3.960)	9.166** (3.609)	4.281 (7.056)	3.735 (7.354)
Media						1.173 (0.935)	1.028 (1.374)	1.164 (1.433)
Election							76.586 (59.380)	374.479*** (144.747)
Organized like government							0.929 (1.479)	1.189 (1.444)
Embassies							-2.152 (2.612)	35.822** (14.187)
Constitution							-5.526 (3.699)	-2.531 (2.556)
Law							18.242** (7.943)	21.307*** (5.830)
Justice system							0.099 (3.631)	-0.255 (3.893)
Taxation							-1.932 (1.771)	-1.788 (1.604)
Armed forces							-77.461 (60.107)	-387.140*** (149.197)
Constant	0.587 (2.751)	0.898 (2.725)	0.587 (2.751)	0.898 (2.725)	1.236 (3.771)	2.991 (3.917)	1.388 (5.059)	2.500 (5.943)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	69	69	69	69	62	54	43	43
Log Likelihood	-46.410	-46.125	-46.410	-46.125	-34.719	-29.301	-20.016	-18.707
Akaike Inf. Crit.	100.819	102.250	100.819	102.250	85.438	76.602	72.032	71.414

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.4: Determinants of diaspora sponsorship (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Diaspora support (dummy)</i>	
Population (ln)	0.409 (0.433)
GDP (ln)	0.074 (0.232)
lagged OSV	-0.001* (0.001)
# rebel groups in conflict	-0.195** (0.090)
duration since conflict start (ln)	-2.246*** (0.537)
relevance ethnicity (dummy)	
claim	0.161 (0.471)
domestic support	0.043 (0.339)
external support (dummy)	0.826 (0.640)
excluded ethnic groups (dummy)	0.383 (0.794)
critical media	0.159 (0.174)
multiple homelands	-1.922** (0.958)
return	0.420 (0.734)
conflict-driven migration	-1.091** (0.464)
transborder ethnic kin (dummy)	1.610** (0.794)
Constant	-8.600 (5.963)
Clustered standard error	✓
Observations	85
Log Likelihood	-40.202
Akaike Inf. Crit.	110.404

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix D

One-sided violence (count) and diaspora sponsorship

D.1 Poisson models and overdispersion test results

Table D.1: Diaspora support and violence against civilians (Poisson model)

<i>Dependent variable: One-sided violence (count)</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Diaspora support	-1.435 (0.892)	-1.334* (0.785)	-1.996* (1.171)	-1.609* (0.908)	-1.747** (0.886)
Lag OSV (ln)	0.202 (0.164)	0.200 (0.175)	0.120 (0.161)	0.185 (0.173)	0.102 (0.159)
Population (ln)	0.976 (0.851)	0.985 (0.871)	1.448* (0.823)	0.969 (0.752)	1.442* (0.815)
GDP (ln)	-0.797 (0.662)	-0.768 (0.639)	-1.164* (0.605)	-0.811 (0.601)	-1.085* (0.567)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	-0.163 (0.274)	-0.190 (0.286)	-0.403 (0.305)	-0.099 (0.238)	-0.394 (0.301)
Transborder ethnic kin (dummy)	1.395 (1.013)	1.373 (0.987)	2.522** (1.208)	1.527 (0.954)	2.446** (1.050)
External support (dummy)	1.037 (0.891)	0.958 (0.779)	1.704 (1.098)	0.994 (0.845)	1.373 (0.882)
# Rebel groups in conflict		0.060 (0.067)			0.093 (0.061)
Recruitment			-1.212* (0.657)		-0.576 (0.681)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)				0.178 (0.431)	0.423 (0.369)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)				2.428*** (0.739)	1.791*** (0.670)
Constant	5.064*** (1.806)	3.986* (2.367)	5.657** (2.351)	3.065* (1.753)	0.961 (3.483)
clustered SE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	832	832	708	832	708
Log Likelihood	-204,362.200	-202,036.300	-146,718.500	-198,412.700	-139,078.100
Akaike Inf. Crit.	408,740.400	404,090.600	293,454.900	396,845.300	278,180.200

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

model	estimate	statistic	p.value	method	alternative
1	3071.82	1.66	0.05	Overdispersion test	greater
2	3091.39	1.63	0.05	Overdispersion test	greater
3	2011.22	2.56	0.01	Overdispersion test	greater
4	2923.06	1.63	0.05	Overdispersion test	greater
5	1403.92	3.29	0.00	Overdispersion test	greater

Table D.2: Dispersion test results

Table D.3: Diaspora support and violence against civilians (Poisson model)

	<i>Dependent variable: One-sided violence (count)</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Diaspora support (dummy)	-1.435 (0.892)				
Lag OSV (ln)	0.202 (0.164)	0.088 (0.151)	0.139 (0.185)	0.203 (0.168)	0.206 (0.166)
Population (ln)	0.976 (0.851)	1.327** (0.673)	1.019 (0.738)	0.928 (0.628)	1.002 (0.842)
GDP (ln)	-0.797 (0.662)	-0.840 (0.520)	-0.836 (0.560)	-0.763 (0.545)	-0.829 (0.699)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	-0.163 (0.274)	-0.224 (0.331)	0.043 (0.207)	-0.209 (0.295)	-0.190 (0.306)
Transborder ethnic kin (dummy)	1.395 (1.013)	1.725** (0.747)	1.218 (0.821)	1.547 (1.224)	1.516 (1.048)
External support (dummy)	1.037 (0.891)	1.069* (0.601)	0.804 (0.616)	1.033 (0.853)	1.029 (0.907)
Multiple homelands (dummy)		-3.783*** (0.931)			
Multiple homelands		0.585 (0.938)			
Single homeland		-2.162** (0.875)			
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)			1.793*** (0.525)		
Discriminated ethnic group (dummy)			1.601** (0.778)		
Discriminated ethnic group			-2.587** (1.199)		
Non-discriminated ethnic group			-0.734 (0.496)		
Ethnic groups in country				0.036 (0.113)	
More ethnic groups in country				-0.821 (0.594)	
Less ethnic groups in country				-0.746 (0.615)	
Media bias					0.125 (0.132)
Higher media bias					-1.627* (0.911)
Lower media bias					-1.414 (0.953)
Constant	5.064*** (1.806)	1.004 (4.240)	3.134 (2.149)	4.711 (4.899)	5.291** (2.405)
clustered SE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	832	575	832	832	832
Log Likelihood	-204,362.200	-149,345.300	-182,369.000	-202,039.000	-203,446.200
Akaike Inf. Crit.	408,740.400	298,710.600	364,760.000	404,098.000	406,912.300

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

model	estimate	statistic	p.value	method	alternative
1	3071.82	1.66	0.05	Overdispersion test	greater
2	2045.35	1.72	0.04	Overdispersion test	greater
3	3117.48	1.41	0.08	Overdispersion test	greater
4	3209.81	1.60	0.06	Overdispersion test	greater
5	2966.77	1.66	0.05	Overdispersion test	greater

Table D.4: Dispersion test results

D.2 Negative binomial models: Interaction effects

Table D.5: Diaspora support and violence against civilians (Negative Binomial model)

<i>Dependent variable: One-sided violence (count)</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Diaspora support (dummy)	-1.132** (0.562)				
Lag OSV (ln)	0.415*** (0.096)	0.448*** (0.087)	0.415*** (0.095)	0.411*** (0.102)	0.369*** (0.078)
Population (ln)	0.344 (0.315)	0.036 (0.219)	0.304 (0.321)	0.349 (0.331)	0.630** (0.292)
GDP (ln)	-0.466* (0.248)	-0.262 (0.190)	-0.452* (0.236)	-0.494* (0.265)	-0.560*** (0.180)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	0.048 (0.152)	0.018 (0.109)	0.063 (0.151)	0.041 (0.153)	0.115 (0.141)
Transborder ethnic kin (dummy)	1.130* (0.594)	0.673* (0.348)	1.144* (0.625)	1.181** (0.587)	1.410*** (0.540)
External support (dummy)	1.041*** (0.395)	0.892*** (0.316)	1.060*** (0.401)	1.092*** (0.399)	0.918*** (0.336)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)		2.152*** (0.602)			
Discriminated ethnic group (dummy)		1.895** (0.879)			
Discriminated ethnic group*DS		-3.349*** (1.087)			
Non-discriminated ethnic group*DS		-0.268 (0.289)			
Ethnic groups in country			0.001 (0.040)		
More ethnic groups in country*DS			-1.222** (0.490)		
Less ethnic groups in country*DS			-1.232** (0.496)		
Media bias				0.136 (0.143)	
Higher media bias*DS				-1.176** (0.529)	
Lower media bias*DS				-1.090* (0.654)	
Multiple homelands (dummy)					-2.565*** (0.766)
Multiple homelands*DS					-0.441 (0.529)
Single homeland*DS					-1.511** (0.600)
Constant	7.763*** (1.612)	5.841*** (1.761)	8.106*** (2.471)	8.233*** (1.963)	5.598** (2.607)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	832	832	832	832	575
Log Likelihood	-2,315.405	-2,311.412	-2,314.184	-2,313.367	-1,581.423
θ	0.069*** (0.005)	0.070*** (0.005)	0.069*** (0.005)	0.070*** (0.005)	0.063*** (0.005)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,646.811	4,644.825	4,648.369	4,646.734	3,182.845

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

D.3 Coefficient plots




Figure D.1: Coefficient plot for baseline model




Figure D.2: Coefficient plot for model, including all control variables

D.4 Marginal effects and density plots




Figure D.3: Conditional effect for diaspora support on one-sided violence (95% confidence interval) for different levels of media range




Figure D.4: Conditional effect for diaspora support on one-sided violence (95% confidence interval) for different levels of critical media

Appendix E

One-sided violence (dummy) and diaspora sponsorship

E.1 Logit model

Table E.1: Diaspora support and one-sided violence (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: One-sided violence (dummy)</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Diaspora support (dummy)	-0.089 (0.240)	-0.118 (0.236)	-0.170 (0.273)	-0.128 (0.260)	-0.254 (0.284)
Lag OSV (dummy)	2.361*** (0.249)	2.351*** (0.252)	2.341*** (0.311)	2.344*** (0.251)	2.317*** (0.313)
Population (ln)	-0.050 (0.165)	-0.077 (0.159)	-0.002 (0.184)	-0.026 (0.162)	0.005 (0.187)
GDP (ln)	0.096 (0.135)	0.103 (0.130)	0.123 (0.144)	0.078 (0.133)	0.100 (0.143)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	0.086 (0.122)	0.098 (0.127)	0.021 (0.144)	0.085 (0.123)	0.038 (0.151)
Transborder ethnic kin (dummy)	0.806** (0.331)	0.797** (0.331)	0.961** (0.376)	0.883** (0.344)	0.967** (0.378)
External support	0.760*** (0.218)	0.793*** (0.216)	0.722*** (0.254)	0.781*** (0.231)	0.731*** (0.264)
# rebel groups in conflict		-0.030 (0.034)			-0.015 (0.039)
Recruitment			0.348 (0.286)		0.522* (0.310)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)				-0.237 (0.286)	-0.067 (0.326)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)				0.745*** (0.246)	1.053*** (0.349)
Constant	-3.958** (1.562)	-3.519** (1.623)	-5.832*** (1.794)	-4.571*** (1.506)	-6.471*** (1.898)
Observations	832	832	708	832	708
Log Likelihood	-389.923	-389.301	-326.919	-388.542	-325.208
Akaike Inf. Crit.	795.847	796.601	671.837	797.083	674.416

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

E.2 Probit model

Table E.2: Diaspora support and one-sided violence (Probit model)

<i>Dependent variable: One-sided violence (dummy)</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Diaspora support (dummy)	-0.061 (0.137)	-0.077 (0.135)	-0.113 (0.156)	-0.087 (0.148)	-0.161 (0.160)
Lag OSV (dummy)	1.418*** (0.145)	1.412*** (0.146)	1.406*** (0.182)	1.408*** (0.147)	1.392*** (0.183)
Population (ln)	-0.039 (0.092)	-0.051 (0.089)	-0.015 (0.102)	-0.025 (0.090)	-0.008 (0.105)
GDP (ln)	0.063 (0.075)	0.065 (0.073)	0.079 (0.080)	0.052 (0.074)	0.065 (0.079)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	0.052 (0.070)	0.058 (0.073)	0.014 (0.083)	0.053 (0.070)	0.022 (0.088)
Transborder ethnic kin (dummy)	0.457** (0.189)	0.452** (0.188)	0.546*** (0.210)	0.502** (0.195)	0.555*** (0.212)
External support	0.436*** (0.121)	0.451*** (0.121)	0.417*** (0.143)	0.451*** (0.129)	0.422*** (0.149)
# rebel groups in conflict		-0.014 (0.019)			-0.006 (0.023)
Recruitment			0.185 (0.171)		0.280 (0.190)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)				-0.138 (0.161)	-0.050 (0.183)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)				0.455*** (0.143)	0.640*** (0.207)
Constant	-2.308** (0.898)	-2.093** (0.931)	-3.321*** (1.015)	-2.676*** (0.860)	-3.755*** (1.091)
Observations	832	832	708	832	708
Log Likelihood	-390.093	-389.669	-327.036	-388.586	-325.284
Akaike Inf. Crit.	796.186	797.337	672.071	797.172	674.568

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

E.3 Coefficient plots




Figure E.1: Coefficient plot for models with interaction effects, dependent variable: One-sided violence (dummy)




Figure E.2: Coefficient plot for models with interaction effects, dependent variable: One-sided violence (dummy)

E.4 Interaction tables

Table E.3: Diaspora support and one-sided violence (Logit model)

	<i>Dependent variable: One-sided violence (dummy)</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Diaspora support (dummy)	-0.089 (0.240)				
Lag OSV (dummy)	2.361*** (0.249)	2.308*** (0.246)	2.357*** (0.246)	2.347*** (0.258)	2.234*** (0.314)
Population (ln)	-0.050 (0.165)	-0.026 (0.159)	-0.015 (0.204)	-0.070 (0.167)	0.077 (0.213)
GDP (ln)	0.096 (0.135)	0.071 (0.130)	0.082 (0.137)	0.118 (0.136)	-0.022 (0.159)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	0.086 (0.122)	0.175 (0.117)	0.088 (0.130)	0.101 (0.123)	0.008 (0.144)
Transborder ethnic kin (dummy)	0.806** (0.331)	0.809*** (0.305)	0.786** (0.331)	0.787** (0.336)	0.851** (0.395)
External support	0.760*** (0.218)	0.770*** (0.210)	0.759*** (0.220)	0.753*** (0.208)	0.503** (0.228)
Discriminated ethnic group (dummy)		1.147*** (0.410)			
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)		0.421 (0.279)			
Discriminated ethnic group*DS		-1.651*** (0.571)			
Non-discriminated ethnic group*DS		0.247 (0.276)			
Ethnic groups in country			-0.017 (0.029)		
More ethnic groups in country*DS			-0.268 (0.353)		
Less ethnic groups in country*DS			-0.291 (0.381)		
Diaspora-run news outlets (dummy)				-0.223 (0.366)	
Diaspora-run news outlets*DS				-0.025 (0.475)	
No diaspora-run news outlets*DS				-0.103 (0.275)	
Multiple homelands (dummy)					-0.682 (0.473)
Multiple homelands*DS					-0.095 (0.977)
Single homeland*DS					-0.379 (0.310)
Constant	-3.958** (1.562)	-4.449*** (1.410)	-4.071** (2.048)	-4.078*** (1.562)	-2.828 (2.103)
clustered SE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	832	832	832	832	575
Log Likelihood	-389.923	-380.888	-389.584	-389.530	-279.710
Akaike Inf. Crit.	795.847	783.776	799.169	799.059	579.421

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table E.4: Diaspora support and one-sided violence (Logit model)

	<i>Dependent variable: One-sided violence (dummy)</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lag OSV (dummy)	2.122*** (0.241)	2.204*** (0.242)	2.287*** (0.335)	2.353*** (0.246)
Population (ln)	-0.037 (0.157)	-0.057 (0.167)	-0.022 (0.197)	-0.041 (0.168)
GDP (ln)	-0.070 (0.135)	-0.040 (0.137)	-0.013 (0.162)	0.087 (0.138)
Duration since conflict strat (ln)	0.097 (0.121)	0.100 (0.119)	-0.012 (0.145)	0.070 (0.131)
Transborder ethnic kin (dummy)	0.812*** (0.310)	0.839** (0.343)	0.791** (0.395)	0.872*** (0.315)
External support	0.890*** (0.218)	0.819*** (0.208)	0.486** (0.243)	0.760*** (0.214)
Media range	0.246** (0.105)			
More media range*DS	0.027 (0.250)			
Lower media range*DS	-0.335 (0.328)			
Critical media		0.214** (0.092)		
More critical media*DS		-0.007 (0.249)		
Less critical media*DS		-0.276 (0.307)		
Voluntary migration (dummy)			0.403 (0.489)	
Voluntary migration*DS			-0.420 (0.396)	
Conflict-driven migration*DS			-0.118 (0.396)	
Return				0.225 (0.463)
Return*DS				-0.078 (0.399)
No return*DS				-0.091 (0.322)
Constant	-0.442 (1.723)	-0.761 (1.646)	-1.556 (2.351)	-4.009*** (1.541)
clustered SE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	832	832	537	832
Log Likelihood	-373.223	-379.108	-263.949	-389.237
Akaike Inf. Crit.	766.446	778.216	547.898	798.474

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

E.5 Marginal effect plots




Figure E.3: Conditional effect for diaspora support on one-sided violence (dummy) (95% confidence interval) for different levels of media bias




Figure E.4: Conditional effect for diaspora support on one-sided violence (dummy) (95% confidence interval) with distribution of media range




Figure E.5: Conditional effect for diaspora support on one-sided violence (dummy) (95% confidence interval) for different levels of critical media




Figure E.6: Conditional effect for diaspora support on one-sided violence (dummy) (95% confidence interval) for different multi-ethnic populations

Appendix F

Ethnic one-sided violence (EOSV) and diaspora sponsorship

F.1 Summary statistics: Outcome variables




Figure F.1: Distribution of observations (N=939) by ethnic violence variable (dyad-year)




Figure F.2: Distribution of observations (N=939) by ethnic targeting variable (dyad-year)




Figure F.3: Distribution of observations (N=939) by ethnic one-sided violence variable (dyad-year)

F.2 Ethnic violence: Poisson models and overdispersion test results

model	estimate	statistic	p.value	method	alternative
1	0.81	-7.29	1.00	Overdispersion test	greater
2	0.81	-7.29	1.00	Overdispersion test	greater
3	0.79	-7.22	1.00	Overdispersion test	greater
4	0.81	-7.31	1.00	Overdispersion test	greater
5	0.79	-7.23	1.00	Overdispersion test	greater

Table F.1: Dispersion test results for ethnic violence as dependent variable

F.3 Ethnic targeting: Poisson models and overdispersion test results

model	estimate	statistic	p.value	method	alternative
1	0.89	-5.16	1.00	Overdispersion test	greater
2	0.89	-5.15	1.00	Overdispersion test	greater
3	0.87	-5.16	1.00	Overdispersion test	greater
4	0.89	-5.18	1.00	Overdispersion test	greater
5	0.87	-5.18	1.00	Overdispersion test	greater

Table F.2: Dispersion test results for ethnic targeting as dependent variable

F.4 EOSV: Poisson models and overdispersion test results

model	estimate	statistic	p.value	method	alternative
1	0.87	-5.69	1.00	Overdispersion test	greater
2	0.87	-5.69	1.00	Overdispersion test	greater
3	0.86	-5.60	1.00	Overdispersion test	greater
4	0.87	-5.70	1.00	Overdispersion test	greater
5	0.86	-5.63	1.00	Overdispersion test	greater

Table F.3: Dispersion test results for ethnic one-sided violence as dependent variable

F.5 Robustness check EOSV coding: Poisson models and overdispersion test results

model	estimate	statistic	p.value	method	alternative
1	0.92	-4.76	1.00	Overdispersion test	greater
2	0.92	-4.75	1.00	Overdispersion test	greater
3	0.91	-4.77	1.00	Overdispersion test	greater
4	0.92	-4.76	1.00	Overdispersion test	greater
5	0.91	-4.78	1.00	Overdispersion test	greater

Table F.4: Dispersion test results for ethnic one-sided violence (conservative coding) as dependent variable

F.6 Robustness check EOSV coding: Logit model

Table F.5: Diaspora support and ethnic one-sided violence (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Ethnic one-sided violence (conservative coded dummy)</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Diaspora support (dummy)	-0.316 (0.611)	-0.291 (0.590)	-0.315 (0.680)	-0.403 (0.601)	-0.346 (0.651)
Lag EOSV (dummy)	2.575*** (0.728)	2.567*** (0.727)	2.529*** (0.712)	2.554*** (0.722)	2.422*** (0.688)
Population (ln)	0.126 (0.382)	0.096 (0.369)	0.146 (0.402)	0.165 (0.375)	0.164 (0.395)
GDP (ln)	0.353 (0.297)	0.338 (0.297)	0.337 (0.314)	0.318 (0.292)	0.280 (0.314)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	-0.405 (0.368)	-0.297 (0.367)	-0.463 (0.411)	-0.376 (0.337)	-0.333 (0.364)
Transborder ethnic kin (dummy)	1.887*** (0.485)	1.823*** (0.495)	1.758*** (0.587)	1.903*** (0.466)	1.609*** (0.575)
External support	0.546* (0.284)	0.611** (0.282)	0.637* (0.342)	0.504* (0.299)	0.628* (0.369)
# rebel groups in conflict		-0.089 (0.097)			-0.126 (0.085)
Recruitment			0.236 (0.533)		0.988 (0.646)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)				0.406 (0.680)	0.536 (0.610)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)				13.608*** (1.158)	13.885*** (1.229)
Constant	-15.183*** (2.316)	-14.047*** (2.696)	-15.299*** (2.380)	-28.817*** (2.318)	-28.780*** (2.720)
clustered SE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	649	649	551	649	551
Log Likelihood	-97.640	-97.157	-91.488	-96.716	-89.537
Akaike Inf. Crit.	211.280	212.313	200.976	213.431	203.075

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

F.7 Robustness check EOSV coding: Probit model

Table F.6: Diaspora support and ethnic one-sided violence (Probit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Ethnic one-sided violence (conservative coded dummy)</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Diaspora support (dummy)	-0.125 (0.288)	-0.128 (0.283)	-0.126 (0.338)	-0.174 (0.285)	-0.135 (0.325)
Lag EOSV (dummy)	1.454*** (0.402)	1.448*** (0.403)	1.438*** (0.405)	1.443*** (0.405)	1.392*** (0.403)
Population (ln)	0.069 (0.191)	0.055 (0.185)	0.083 (0.206)	0.082 (0.184)	0.078 (0.200)
GDP (ln)	0.178 (0.151)	0.169 (0.150)	0.166 (0.162)	0.163 (0.148)	0.143 (0.162)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	-0.219 (0.187)	-0.170 (0.183)	-0.251 (0.213)	-0.211 (0.174)	-0.199 (0.195)
Transborder ethnic kin (dummy)	0.961*** (0.248)	0.934*** (0.251)	0.945*** (0.315)	0.965*** (0.232)	0.871*** (0.300)
External support	0.274* (0.144)	0.306** (0.145)	0.345** (0.166)	0.252* (0.150)	0.368** (0.178)
# rebel groups in conflict		-0.043 (0.043)			-0.055 (0.037)
Recruitment			0.032 (0.254)		0.340 (0.323)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)				0.204 (0.332)	0.237 (0.313)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)				3.529*** (0.336)	3.616*** (0.393)
Constant	-7.870*** (1.227)	-7.288*** (1.326)	-7.861*** (1.221)	-11.342*** (1.178)	-11.108*** (1.365)
clustered SE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	649	649	551	649	551
Log Likelihood	-97.603	-97.088	-91.305	-96.690	-89.596
Akaike Inf. Crit.	211.207	212.177	200.610	213.381	203.193

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

F.8 Robustness checks EOSV coding: Quasi-Poisson model

Table F.7: Diaspora support and ethnic one-sided violence (Quasi-poisson model)

<i>Dependent variable: Ethnic one-sided violence (conservative coded dummy)</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Diaspora support (dummy)	-0.295 (0.647)	-0.259 (0.612)	-0.307 (0.694)	-0.367 (0.652)	-0.337 (0.660)
Lag EOSV (dummy)	1.687*** (0.611)	1.679*** (0.615)	1.605*** (0.546)	1.673*** (0.609)	1.521*** (0.511)
Population (ln)	0.098 (0.317)	0.083 (0.301)	0.105 (0.335)	0.128 (0.319)	0.122 (0.317)
GDP (ln)	0.246 (0.218)	0.232 (0.217)	0.248 (0.230)	0.211 (0.222)	0.185 (0.223)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	-0.193 (0.351)	-0.124 (0.348)	-0.266 (0.384)	-0.181 (0.348)	-0.160 (0.355)
Transborder ethnic kin (dummy)	1.381*** (0.430)	1.323*** (0.442)	1.215** (0.473)	1.438*** (0.453)	1.096** (0.538)
External support	0.246 (0.261)	0.284 (0.258)	0.284 (0.298)	0.230 (0.327)	0.285 (0.370)
# rebel groups in conflict		-0.054 (0.089)			-0.116 (0.084)
Recruitment			0.371 (0.406)		0.897* (0.510)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)				0.066 (0.559)	0.182 (0.490)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)				14.769*** (1.086)	15.010*** (1.162)
Constant	-11.755*** (1.905)	-10.994*** (2.151)	-12.129*** (2.045)	-26.207*** (2.025)	-26.134*** (2.274)
clustered SE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	649	649	551	649	551

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

F.9 Ethnic violence: Logit model

Table F.8: Diaspora support and ethnic violence (Logit model)

	<i>Dependent variable: Ethnic violence</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Diaspora support (dummy)	-0.368 (0.359)	-0.357 (0.356)	-0.516 (0.363)	-0.481 (0.364)	-0.593* (0.359)
Lag ethnic violence	2.455*** (0.302)	2.458*** (0.302)	2.393*** (0.321)	2.405*** (0.307)	2.306*** (0.331)
Population (ln)	-0.009 (0.222)	0.001 (0.228)	-0.013 (0.245)	0.015 (0.219)	0.046 (0.259)
GDP (ln)	0.260 (0.169)	0.261 (0.170)	0.321* (0.174)	0.231 (0.168)	0.283 (0.175)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	-0.451** (0.179)	-0.467** (0.188)	-0.479** (0.205)	-0.436** (0.174)	-0.498** (0.211)
Transborder ethnic kin (dummy)	1.182*** (0.354)	1.197*** (0.361)	1.187*** (0.410)	1.270*** (0.349)	1.292*** (0.419)
External support	0.779*** (0.253)	0.763*** (0.255)	0.667** (0.296)	0.757*** (0.261)	0.613** (0.309)
# rebel groups in conflict		0.016 (0.036)			0.024 (0.042)
Recruitment			0.278 (0.386)		0.623 (0.427)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)				0.170 (0.337)	0.268 (0.417)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)				15.287*** (1.089)	15.794*** (1.104)
Constant	-8.937*** (1.547)	-9.205*** (1.621)	-10.427*** (1.808)	-23.984*** (1.775)	-26.901*** (2.512)
clustered SE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	649	649	551	649	551
Log Likelihood	-203.465	-203.394	-179.297	-201.350	-176.206
Akaike Inf. Crit.	422.930	424.789	376.594	422.700	376.412

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

F.10 Ethnic violence: Probit model

Table F.9: Diaspora support and ethnic violence (Probit model)

	<i>Dependent variable: Ethnic violence</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Diaspora support (dummy)	-0.187 (0.196)	-0.178 (0.194)	-0.251 (0.199)	-0.248 (0.198)	-0.289 (0.198)
Lag ethnic violence	1.434*** (0.166)	1.437*** (0.166)	1.402*** (0.175)	1.407*** (0.169)	1.355*** (0.183)
Population (ln)	-0.026 (0.118)	-0.017 (0.122)	-0.031 (0.132)	-0.014 (0.115)	0.005 (0.141)
GDP (ln)	0.156* (0.088)	0.157* (0.090)	0.193** (0.091)	0.141 (0.087)	0.172* (0.093)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	-0.237** (0.096)	-0.248** (0.100)	-0.253** (0.111)	-0.230** (0.092)	-0.271** (0.114)
Transborder ethnic kin (dummy)	0.608*** (0.194)	0.622*** (0.195)	0.604*** (0.229)	0.656*** (0.192)	0.676*** (0.229)
External support	0.431*** (0.132)	0.421*** (0.135)	0.376** (0.157)	0.421*** (0.135)	0.350** (0.167)
# rebel groups in conflict		0.013 (0.019)			0.017 (0.022)
Recruitment			0.185 (0.209)		0.374* (0.225)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)				0.105 (0.180)	0.158 (0.215)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)				4.173*** (0.296)	4.474*** (0.314)
Constant	-4.906*** (0.814)	-5.132*** (0.845)	-5.796*** (0.943)	-8.949*** (0.801)	-10.738*** (1.207)
clustered SE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	649	649	551	649	551
Log Likelihood	-204.141	-203.966	-179.738	-201.973	-176.353
Akaike Inf. Crit.	424.283	425.932	377.476	423.945	376.705

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

F.11 Ethnic targeting: Logit model

Table F.10: Diaspora support and ethnic targeting (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Ethnic targeting</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Diaspora support (dummy)	-0.712 (0.495)	-0.673 (0.504)	-0.793 (0.501)	-0.939* (0.528)	-0.890* (0.530)
Lag ethnic targeting	2.624*** (0.341)	2.626*** (0.349)	2.573*** (0.326)	2.506*** (0.358)	2.420*** (0.368)
Population (ln)	0.194 (0.310)	0.211 (0.323)	0.219 (0.321)	0.257 (0.298)	0.346 (0.343)
GDP (ln)	0.084 (0.224)	0.107 (0.221)	0.076 (0.230)	0.032 (0.220)	0.025 (0.222)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	-0.554* (0.293)	-0.602* (0.321)	-0.551* (0.297)	-0.537** (0.261)	-0.604** (0.287)
Transborder ethnic kin (dummy)	1.339*** (0.453)	1.408*** (0.458)	1.173** (0.498)	1.437*** (0.479)	1.334*** (0.506)
External support	0.672** (0.321)	0.631* (0.330)	0.586* (0.334)	0.573* (0.339)	0.462 (0.370)
# rebel groups in conflict		0.051 (0.055)			0.056 (0.054)
Recruitment			0.144 (0.483)		0.952 (0.626)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)				0.786* (0.475)	0.931* (0.507)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)				14.640*** (1.212)	15.460*** (1.176)
Constant	-8.671*** (2.118)	-9.754*** (2.319)	-8.804*** (2.199)	-23.526*** (2.262)	-26.935*** (3.214)
clustered SE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	649	649	551	649	551
Log Likelihood	-146.074	-145.599	-138.675	-142.068	-133.726
Akaike Inf. Crit.	308.149	309.197	295.349	304.136	291.452

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

F.12 Ethnic targeting: Probit model

Table F.11: Diaspora support and ethnic targeting (Probit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Ethnic targeting</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Diaspora support (dummy)	-0.363 (0.253)	-0.337 (0.257)	-0.404 (0.259)	-0.481* (0.275)	-0.446 (0.277)
Lag ethnic group	1.501*** (0.184)	1.505*** (0.186)	1.482*** (0.177)	1.425*** (0.199)	1.399*** (0.203)
Population (ln)	0.068 (0.161)	0.081 (0.172)	0.084 (0.171)	0.090 (0.153)	0.144 (0.186)
GDP (ln)	0.074 (0.115)	0.085 (0.116)	0.068 (0.120)	0.054 (0.113)	0.044 (0.120)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	-0.284** (0.145)	-0.307* (0.159)	-0.285* (0.151)	-0.285** (0.131)	-0.321** (0.150)
Transborder ethnic kin (dummy)	0.680*** (0.236)	0.719*** (0.235)	0.599** (0.267)	0.745*** (0.252)	0.692*** (0.262)
External support	0.383** (0.169)	0.363** (0.177)	0.340* (0.179)	0.348* (0.178)	0.296 (0.199)
# rebel groups in conflict		0.029 (0.028)			0.030 (0.027)
Recruitment			0.087 (0.242)		0.486 (0.325)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)				0.421* (0.245)	0.484* (0.256)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)				3.823*** (0.402)	4.234*** (0.394)
Constant	-4.779*** (1.097)	-5.407*** (1.140)	-4.877*** (1.111)	-8.706*** (1.052)	-10.447*** (1.557)
clustered SE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	649	649	551	649	551
Log Likelihood	-145.729	-145.107	-138.457	-141.462	-133.284
Akaike Inf. Crit.	307.458	308.214	294.914	302.924	290.569

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

F.13 EOSV: Probit model

Table F.12: Diaspora support and ethnic one-sided violence (Probit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Ethnic one-sided violence (dummy)</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Diaspora support (dummy)	-0.224 (0.224)	-0.221 (0.223)	-0.264 (0.231)	-0.295 (0.231)	-0.321 (0.228)
Lag EOSV (broad dummy)	1.214*** (0.222)	1.215*** (0.223)	1.146*** (0.232)	1.178*** (0.233)	1.038*** (0.245)
Population (ln)	-0.071 (0.144)	-0.067 (0.148)	-0.082 (0.160)	-0.053 (0.136)	-0.026 (0.162)
GDP (ln)	0.153 (0.102)	0.154 (0.103)	0.198* (0.115)	0.132 (0.099)	0.159 (0.113)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	-0.222* (0.122)	-0.228* (0.127)	-0.246* (0.147)	-0.215* (0.112)	-0.263* (0.145)
Transborder ethnic kin (dummy)	0.529** (0.214)	0.538** (0.212)	0.522* (0.283)	0.573*** (0.212)	0.597** (0.254)
External support	0.545*** (0.134)	0.540*** (0.143)	0.505*** (0.148)	0.527*** (0.138)	0.483*** (0.167)
# rebel groups in conflict		0.007 (0.023)			0.009 (0.024)
Recruitment			0.281 (0.251)		0.686** (0.300)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)				0.196 (0.239)	0.430* (0.243)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)				4.100*** (0.333)	4.512*** (0.361)
Constant	-4.165*** (1.023)	-4.286*** (1.005)	-5.270*** (1.028)	-8.129*** (0.961)	-10.563*** (1.167)
clustered SE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	649	649	551	649	551
Log Likelihood	-181.279	-181.234	-158.780	-178.697	-153.554
Akaike Inf. Crit.	378.558	380.468	335.559	377.393	331.107

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

F.14 EOSV: Quasi-Poisson model

Table F.13: Diaspora support and ethnic one-sided violence (Quasi-poisson model)

<i>Dependent variable: Ethnic one-sided violence (dummy)</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Diaspora support (dummy)	-0.314 (0.369)	-0.320 (0.376)	-0.403 (0.390)	-0.394 (0.370)	-0.542 (0.399)
Lag EOSV (dummy broad)	1.436*** (0.314)	1.439*** (0.314)	1.287*** (0.300)	1.375*** (0.325)	1.098*** (0.301)
Population (ln)	0.023 (0.197)	0.029 (0.201)	0.030 (0.215)	0.055 (0.195)	0.113 (0.218)
GDP (ln)	0.088 (0.135)	0.094 (0.134)	0.138 (0.144)	0.056 (0.133)	0.091 (0.135)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	-0.267 (0.202)	-0.287 (0.214)	-0.316 (0.240)	-0.250 (0.197)	-0.342 (0.237)
Transborder ethnic kin (dummy)	0.670** (0.310)	0.700** (0.315)	0.649 (0.403)	0.741** (0.323)	0.765** (0.383)
External support	0.726*** (0.256)	0.712*** (0.264)	0.623** (0.268)	0.699*** (0.269)	0.543* (0.303)
# rebel groups in conflict		0.018 (0.034)			0.021 (0.039)
Recruitment			0.489* (0.288)		1.027*** (0.387)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)				0.115 (0.378)	0.568 (0.402)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)				14.822*** (1.086)	16.460*** (1.054)
Constant	-5.562*** (1.282)	-5.889*** (1.322)	-7.241*** (1.323)	-20.194*** (1.601)	-24.936*** (1.960)
clustered SE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	649	649	551	649	551

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

F.15 EOSV: Coefficient plot




Figure F.4: Coefficient plot for models with interaction effect, dependent variable: ethnic one-sided violence

F.16 EOSV and multi-ethnic population: Marginal effect plot




Figure F.5: Conditional effect for diaspora support on ethnic one-sided violence (95% confidence interval) for different multi-ethnic populations

F.17 EOSV: Interaction effect models

Table F.14: Diaspora support and ethnic one-sided violence (Logit model)

	<i>Dependent variable: Ethnic one-sided violence (dummy)</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Diaspora support (dummy)	-0.582 (0.491)				
Lag EOSV (dummy broad)	1.953*** (0.407)	1.883*** (0.406)	1.953*** (0.409)	1.958*** (0.411)	1.533*** (0.486)
Population (ln)	-0.269 (0.233)	-0.240 (0.228)	0.006 (0.332)	-0.193 (0.240)	-0.399* (0.240)
GDP (ln)	0.197 (0.199)	0.165 (0.196)	0.104 (0.192)	0.121 (0.196)	0.226 (0.185)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	-0.194 (0.208)	-0.168 (0.222)	-0.250 (0.182)	-0.255 (0.193)	-0.252 (0.281)
Transborder ethnic kin (dummy)	0.517 (0.521)	0.652 (0.569)	0.500 (0.515)	0.593 (0.505)	0.484 (0.645)
External support	1.234*** (0.358)	1.238*** (0.328)	1.264*** (0.365)	1.327*** (0.326)	1.095*** (0.401)
Multiple ethnic violence (dummy)	4.409*** (0.591)	4.381*** (0.589)	4.488*** (0.611)	4.457*** (0.577)	4.602*** (1.056)
Discriminated		0.009 (0.733)			
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)		15.066*** (1.203)			
Discriminated ethnic group*DS		-0.813 (0.787)			
Non-discriminated ethnic group*DS		-0.676 (0.610)			
Ethnic groups in country			-0.053 (0.062)		
More ethnic groups in country*DS			-0.549 (0.561)		
Less ethnic groups in country*DS			-0.542 (0.580)		
Diaspora-run news outlets (dummy)				0.798 (0.560)	
Diaspora-run news outlets*DS				-0.869 (0.668)	
No diaspora-run news outlets*DS				-0.415 (0.579)	
Multiple homelands (dummy)					0.447 (0.790)
Multiple homelands*DS					-17.052*** (0.943)
Single homeland*DS					-0.622 (0.639)
Constant	-3.643* (2.028)	-18.426*** (2.195)	-5.759* (3.456)	-3.531* (2.144)	-1.743 (2.753)
clustered SE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	649	649	649	649	444
Log Likelihood	-135.705	-134.278	-135.085	-134.243	-97.092
Akaike Inf. Crit.	289.409	292.556	292.171	290.487	216.184

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table F.15: Diaspora support and ethnic one-sided violence (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Ethnic one-sided violence (dummy)</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lag EOSV (dummy broad)	1.815*** (0.414)	1.784*** (0.394)	1.328*** (0.405)	1.987*** (0.415)
Population (ln)	-0.251 (0.231)	-0.307 (0.231)	-0.423 (0.287)	-0.266 (0.234)
GDP (ln)	0.154 (0.198)	0.130 (0.189)	0.173 (0.203)	0.192 (0.198)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	-0.129 (0.205)	-0.165 (0.199)	-0.251 (0.269)	-0.227 (0.202)
Transborder ethnic kin (dummy)	0.331 (0.499)	0.466 (0.481)	0.913* (0.510)	0.592 (0.515)
External support	1.262***	1.320***	1.043**	1.255***
Multiple ethnic violence (dummy)	4.367*** (0.568)	4.373*** (0.608)	4.700*** (0.870)	4.461*** (0.579)
Media range	-0.158 (0.103)			
Higher media range*DS	-0.444 (0.475)			
Lower media range*DS	-0.996** (0.481)			
Critical media		-0.013 (0.128)		
More critical media*DS		-0.560 (0.462)		
Less critical media*DS		-1.161** (0.529)		
Voluntary migration (dummy)			-0.005 (0.590)	
Voluntary migration*DS			0.303 (0.777)	
Conflict-driven migration*DS			-1.760*** (0.528)	
Return (dummy)				0.163 (0.626)
Return*DS				-0.353 (0.764)
No return*DS				-0.696 (0.470)
Constant	-2.829 (2.199)	-1.413 (2.343)	-0.004 (2.465)	-3.666* (2.123)
clustered SE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	649	649	428	649
Log Likelihood	-133.418	-132.703	-94.057	-135.255
Akaike Inf. Crit.	288.837	287.406	210.115	292.510

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

F.18 EOSV and Media variables: Marginal effect plots




Figure F.6: Conditional effect for diaspora support on ethnic one-sided violence (95% confidence interval) for different levels of media range




Figure F.7: Conditional effect for diaspora support on ethnic one-sided violence (95% confidence interval) for different levels of critical media

F.19 EOSV and News outlets: Interaction effect models

Table F.16: Diaspora support and ethnic one-sided violence (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Ethnic one-sided violence (dummy)</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lag EOSV (dummy broad)	1.958*** (0.411)	1.939*** (0.404)	1.922*** (0.424)	1.923*** (0.388)
Population (ln)	-0.193 (0.240)	-0.211 (0.243)	-0.117 (0.227)	-0.307 (0.248)
GDP (ln)	0.121 (0.196)	0.133 (0.202)	0.056 (0.190)	0.221 (0.211)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	-0.255 (0.193)	-0.262 (0.195)	-0.285 (0.192)	-0.227 (0.221)
Transborder ethnic kin (dummy)	0.593 (0.505)	0.604 (0.517)	0.643 (0.497)	0.540 (0.547)
External support	1.327*** (0.326)	1.314*** (0.327)	1.414*** (0.327)	1.410*** (0.389)
Multiple ethnic violence (dummy)	4.457*** (0.577)	4.465*** (0.592)	4.444*** (0.586)	4.471*** (0.579)
Diaspora-run news outlets (dummy)	0.798			
Diaspora-run news outlets*DS	-0.869			
No diaspora-run news outlets*DS	-0.415			
Print media (dummy)		0.923 (0.586)		
Print media*DS		-1.113 (0.767)		
No print media*DS		-0.312 (0.554)		
Radio (dummy)			0.972** (0.386)	
Radio*DS			-0.547 (0.721)	
No radio*DS			-0.606 (0.540)	
TV (dummy)				1.891** (0.825)
TV*DS				-1.181 (1.358)
No TV*DS				-0.580 (0.520)
Constant	-3.531* (2.144)	-3.488 (2.165)	-3.247 (2.222)	-3.703* (2.017)
clustered SE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	649	649	649	649
Log Likelihood	-134.243	-133.961	-133.513	-134.321
Akaike Inf. Crit.	290.487	289.923	289.026	290.641

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Appendix G

Rebel governance and diaspora sponsorship: Logit models

G.1 Public goods and social services variables

Table G.1: Diaspora support and rebel governance (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Education (dummy)</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Diaspora support (dummy)	0.534 (0.653)	0.579 (0.665)	0.525 (0.648)	0.600 (0.651)	0.811 (0.798)
Population (ln)	0.287 (0.444)	0.266 (0.454)	0.339 (0.453)	0.246 (0.419)	0.334 (0.372)
GDP (ln)	-0.063 (0.359)	-0.032 (0.371)	-0.104 (0.370)	0.232 (0.342)	0.152 (0.338)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	-0.166 (0.368)	-0.143 (0.372)	-0.185 (0.384)	-0.078 (0.353)	-0.194 (0.442)
External support	0.264 (0.551)	0.323 (0.570)	0.303 (0.548)	0.191 (0.548)	0.506 (0.446)
# rebel groups in conflict	-0.246* (0.129)	-0.273** (0.139)	-0.248* (0.132)	-0.274** (0.126)	-0.307** (0.129)
Lag OSV	0.00001 (0.0001)	0.00002 (0.0001)	0.00001 (0.0001)	0.00001 (0.0001)	-0.00000 (0.0001)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)					1.987* (1.019)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)		-1.489* (0.839)			-3.166** (1.495)
US designated FTO (dummy)			0.523 (1.055)		1.100 (0.876)
Media bias				-0.626** (0.290)	-0.378 (0.280)
Constant	-4.034 (3.982)	-2.907 (3.922)	-3.985 (4.038)	-10.020** (5.007)	-8.067 (6.897)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	531	531	531	531	531
Log Likelihood	-269.882	-268.223	-269.264	-253.138	-221.883
Akaike Inf. Crit.	555.763	554.445	556.528	524.277	467.766

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table G.2: Diaspora support and rebel governance (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Health (dummy)</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Diaspora support (dummy)	-0.500 (0.794)	-0.506 (0.782)	-0.659 (0.756)	-0.728 (0.763)
Population (ln)	0.960*** (0.370)	0.964** (0.377)	0.977*** (0.341)	0.990*** (0.323)
GDP (ln)	-0.844*** (0.288)	-0.849*** (0.299)	-0.461 (0.359)	-0.526 (0.372)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	-0.217 (0.439)	-0.220 (0.445)	-0.015 (0.448)	-0.084 (0.499)
External support	-0.358 (0.528)	-0.368 (0.563)	-0.480 (0.531)	-0.339 (0.463)
# rebel groups in conflict	-0.128 (0.162)	-0.123 (0.177)	-0.141 (0.160)	-0.116 (0.140)
Lag OSV	-0.00003 (0.0001)	-0.00003 (0.0001)	-0.00002 (0.00005)	-0.00004 (0.0001)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)				0.915 (0.879)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)		0.151 (0.903)		-0.213 (1.006)
Media bias			-0.881** (0.342)	-0.773** (0.325)
Constant	2.277 (4.093)	2.178 (4.098)	-6.849 (7.172)	-5.964 (7.754)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	528	528	528	528
Log Likelihood	-197.902	-197.881	-175.088	-170.812
Akaike Inf. Crit.	411.805	413.763	368.175	363.624

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table G.3: Diaspora support and rebel governance (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Aid/Welfare (dummy)</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Diaspora support (dummy)	0.375 (0.765)	0.348 (0.734)	0.456 (0.776)	0.591 (0.775)
Population (ln)	0.007 (0.639)	0.189 (0.673)	-0.081 (0.627)	0.171 (0.578)
GDP (ln)	0.090 (0.549)	-0.046 (0.587)	0.315 (0.556)	0.028 (0.522)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	-0.182 (0.525)	-0.256 (0.601)	-0.166 (0.469)	-0.232 (0.493)
External support	-0.373 (0.531)	-0.243 (0.548)	-0.509 (0.471)	-0.216 (0.430)
# rebel groups in conflict	-0.361** (0.152)	-0.393** (0.158)	-0.373** (0.155)	-0.446** (0.223)
Lag OSV	-0.0001 (0.001)	-0.0001 (0.001)	-0.00004 (0.0005)	-0.00004 (0.0003)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)				2.854** (1.426)
US designated FTO (dummy)		1.625 (1.095)		2.431*** (0.855)
Media bias			-0.379 (0.243)	0.045 (0.290)
Constant	-3.318 (3.426)	-3.344 (3.433)	-6.958 (4.717)	-6.895 (4.795)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	534	534	534	534
Log Likelihood	-148.592	-144.874	-145.204	-119.922
Akaike Inf. Crit.	313.185	307.749	308.408	261.844

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table G.4: Diaspora support and rebel governance (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Infrastructure (dummy)</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Diaspora support (dummy)	0.640 (0.626)	0.619 (0.652)	0.633 (0.617)	0.614 (0.644)
Population (ln)	0.886 (0.772)	0.876 (0.752)	0.851 (0.788)	0.845 (0.783)
GDP (ln)	-0.058 (0.474)	-0.058 (0.487)	-0.099 (0.430)	-0.092 (0.425)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	-0.298 (0.423)	-0.280 (0.367)	-0.319 (0.380)	-0.303 (0.318)
External support	1.400** (0.586)	1.372** (0.642)	1.407** (0.604)	1.386** (0.662)
# rebel groups in conflict	0.137 (0.143)	0.143 (0.159)	0.146 (0.148)	0.151 (0.160)
Lag OSV	0.0002*** (0.00004)	0.0002*** (0.00004)	0.0002*** (0.00004)	0.0002*** (0.00004)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)		-0.280 (1.052)		-0.246 (1.100)
Media bias			0.183 (0.620)	0.159 (0.655)
Constant	-19.289*** (6.172)	-18.974*** (5.327)	-17.829*** (6.096)	-17.764*** (5.771)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	541	541	541	541
Log Likelihood	-98.601	-98.356	-98.375	-98.189
Akaike Inf. Crit.	213.203	214.712	214.751	216.379

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

G.2 Governance variables

Table G.5: Diaspora support and rebel governance (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Organized like government (dummy)</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Diaspora support (dummy)	0.377 (0.611)	0.311 (0.624)	0.383 (0.617)	0.274 (0.630)
Population (ln)	-0.186 (0.459)	-0.134 (0.460)	-0.303 (0.504)	-0.232 (0.484)
GDP (ln)	-0.087 (0.408)	-0.149 (0.423)	0.015 (0.452)	-0.094 (0.446)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	0.019 (0.369)	0.018 (0.371)	0.057 (0.381)	0.092 (0.365)
External support	1.224** (0.512)	1.083** (0.494)	1.108** (0.503)	0.970** (0.462)
# rebel groups in conflict	0.109 (0.071)	0.120* (0.071)	0.101 (0.070)	0.100 (0.077)
Lag OSV	0.0002 (0.0005)	0.0002 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.001)	0.0002 (0.0003)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)				0.718 (0.728)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)		15.339*** (1.189)		16.980*** (1.406)
US desiganted FTO (dummy)			-15.581*** (1.141)	-16.344*** (0.966)
Constant	2.103 (4.007)	-12.556*** (4.000)	1.892 (3.968)	-14.000*** (3.955)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	551	551	551	551
Log Likelihood	-222.309	-218.621	-218.079	-210.463
Akaike Inf. Crit.	460.618	455.241	454.158	442.927

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table G.6: Diaspora support and rebel governance (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: National government (dummy)</i>						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Diaspora support (dummy)	1.150 (0.711)	1.342* (0.737)	1.130 (0.704)	1.160* (0.702)	1.114 (0.694)	1.287* (0.703)
Population (ln)	0.352 (0.518)	0.318 (0.491)	0.492 (0.522)	0.330 (0.497)	0.297 (0.469)	0.455 (0.483)
GDP (ln)	-0.045 (0.377)	0.061 (0.308)	-0.150 (0.378)	0.048 (0.319)	0.084 (0.294)	-0.037 (0.256)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	-0.723** (0.360)	-0.740** (0.360)	-0.773** (0.375)	-0.694** (0.350)	-0.712** (0.359)	-0.765** (0.345)
External support	-0.192 (0.481)	-0.015 (0.459)	-0.092 (0.486)	-0.216 (0.482)	-0.187 (0.481)	0.102 (0.464)
# rebel groups in conflict	-0.092 (0.110)	-0.147 (0.135)	-0.090 (0.116)	-0.101 (0.110)	-0.098 (0.110)	-0.145 (0.139)
Lag OSV	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.0004 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)		1.131 (0.943)				1.130 (0.907)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)		-2.850** (1.248)				-2.917** (1.259)
US designated FTO (dummy)			1.391 (0.887)			1.593* (0.870)
Media bias				-0.182 (0.266)		-0.005 (0.269)
Critical media					-0.148 (0.260)	
Constant	-6.399 (4.806)	-6.239 (5.042)	-6.502 (4.955)	-8.159 (5.431)	-8.422 (5.758)	-6.384 (6.477)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	552	552	552	552	552	552
Log Likelihood	-232.501	-219.825	-228.489	-231.259	-231.241	-215.644
Akaike Inf. Crit.	481.001	459.649	474.978	480.519	480.482	455.287

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table G.7: Diaspora support and rebel governance (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Constitution (dummy)</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Diaspora support (dummy)	2.380*	2.374*	2.421*	2.367*	2.428*
	(1.345)	(1.348)	(1.390)	(1.350)	(1.367)
Population (ln)	1.493	1.493	1.379	1.487	1.410
	(1.010)	(1.008)	(1.053)	(0.992)	(1.018)
GDP (ln)	-0.347	-0.349	-0.252	-0.409	-0.215
	(0.703)	(0.702)	(0.720)	(0.759)	(0.676)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	0.761*	0.760*	0.760*	0.741*	0.912*
	(0.458)	(0.458)	(0.448)	(0.429)	(0.490)
External support	0.408	0.404	0.450	0.388	0.340
	(0.625)	(0.624)	(0.629)	(0.603)	(0.585)
# rebel groups in conflict	0.067	0.068	0.062	0.071	0.068
	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.164)	(0.173)	(0.164)
Lag OSV	0.00003	0.00003	0.00005	0.00003	0.0001
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)					-1.096
					(1.065)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)		11.026***			13.291***
		(1.691)			(2.349)
US designated FTO (dummy)			-15.371***		-16.973***
			(1.011)		(1.059)
Media bias				0.193	-0.015
				(0.474)	(0.441)
Constant	-24.618***	-35.593***	-24.818***	-23.152***	-39.175***
	(6.503)	(5.695)	(6.733)	(6.652)	(6.385)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	554	554	554	554	554
Log Likelihood	-89.985	-89.960	-88.233	-89.701	-85.088
Akaike Inf. Crit.	195.970	197.919	194.467	197.401	194.176

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table G.8: Diaspora support and rebel governance (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Justice (dummy)</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Diaspora support (dummy)	1.110	1.096	1.117	1.099	1.122
	(0.738)	(0.743)	(0.739)	(0.721)	(0.751)
Population (ln)	0.650	0.656	0.714	0.641	0.718
	(0.548)	(0.546)	(0.540)	(0.540)	(0.527)
GDP (ln)	-0.272	-0.283	-0.319	-0.218	-0.289
	(0.360)	(0.367)	(0.352)	(0.305)	(0.300)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	-0.576*	-0.577*	-0.608*	-0.541*	-0.580*
	(0.323)	(0.324)	(0.348)	(0.323)	(0.338)
External support	-0.008	-0.030	0.031	-0.013	0.066
	(0.457)	(0.495)	(0.452)	(0.465)	(0.483)
# rebel groups in conflict	0.187**	0.189***	0.192***	0.179***	0.178**
	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.069)	(0.070)
Lag OSV	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)					0.520
					(0.699)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)		0.330			-0.086
		(0.765)			(0.882)
US designated FTO (dummy)			0.783		0.911
			(1.112)		(1.094)
Media bias				-0.126	-0.066
				(0.250)	(0.252)
Constant	-7.349*	-7.505*	-7.428*	-8.386	-8.372
	(4.461)	(4.210)	(4.512)	(5.134)	(5.321)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	518	518	518	518	518
Log Likelihood	-250.036	-249.928	-249.075	-249.372	-246.010
Akaike Inf. Crit.	516.073	517.857	516.151	516.744	516.020

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table G.9: Diaspora support and rebel governance (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Taxation (dummy)</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Diaspora support (dummy)	0.207 (0.594)	0.220 (0.606)	0.221 (0.584)	0.239 (0.607)
Population (ln)	0.392 (0.391)	0.385 (0.397)	0.391 (0.389)	0.373 (0.377)
GDP (ln)	-0.031 (0.295)	-0.020 (0.305)	0.014 (0.282)	-0.001 (0.264)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	0.048 (0.321)	0.049 (0.323)	0.059 (0.319)	0.073 (0.324)
External support	0.550 (0.459)	0.568 (0.482)	0.534 (0.454)	0.578 (0.453)
# rebel groups in conflict	0.0003 (0.063)	-0.002 (0.066)	-0.004 (0.062)	-0.014 (0.061)
Lag OSV	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)				0.610 (0.580)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)		-0.331 (0.620)		-0.747 (0.682)
Media bias			-0.111 (0.203)	-0.012 (0.207)
Constant	-7.068*** (2.509)	-6.882*** (2.345)	-8.057*** (2.641)	-7.040*** (2.710)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	507	507	507	507
Log Likelihood	-313.062	-312.931	-312.380	-308.110
Akaike Inf. Crit.	642.124	643.862	642.759	638.220

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table G.10: Diaspora support and rebel governance (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: In power (dummy)</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Diaspora support (dummy)	-0.004 (0.806)	-0.256 (1.021)	-0.013 (0.815)	0.158 (0.596)	-0.112 (1.376)
Population (ln)	0.478 (1.043)	0.793 (0.777)	0.442 (1.113)	0.138 (1.412)	1.814 (1.871)
GDP (ln)	-1.812** (0.712)	-2.457*** (0.585)	-1.766** (0.770)	-2.003* (1.176)	-5.202*** (1.778)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	0.168 (0.442)	-0.150 (0.523)	0.167 (0.440)	0.855 (0.881)	1.207 (0.837)
External support	-0.741 (2.085)	-1.266 (1.902)	-0.761 (2.110)	-1.025 (2.878)	-3.062 (2.942)
# rebel groups in conflict	-0.058 (0.305)	0.087 (0.143)	-0.061 (0.307)	-0.143 (0.468)	0.124 (0.197)
Lag OSV	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)					-1.836 (1.419)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)		17.954*** (1.857)			23.349*** (1.820)
US designated FTO (dummy)			-13.432*** (2.354)		-11.630*** (3.140)
Media bias				-0.790 (0.652)	-1.741** (0.689)
Constant	27.477* (14.040)	18.250 (14.209)	27.131** (13.571)	36.541* (21.190)	53.617* (29.906)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	416	416	416	416	416
Log Likelihood	-17.004	-15.574	-16.979	-15.909	-12.191
Akaike Inf. Crit.	50.008	49.148	51.958	49.818	48.382

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table G.11: Diaspora support and rebel governance (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: rebels member of an IO (dummy)</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Diaspora support (dummy)	0.711 (0.864)	0.700 (0.871)	0.805 (0.817)	0.765 (0.826)
Population (ln)	0.281 (0.362)	0.286 (0.361)	0.318 (0.386)	0.283 (0.377)
GDP (ln)	0.139 (0.335)	0.131 (0.339)	0.403 (0.294)	0.450 (0.308)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	-0.672** (0.330)	-0.673** (0.331)	-0.647** (0.297)	-0.602* (0.311)
External support	1.175** (0.523)	1.160** (0.527)	1.105** (0.549)	1.006** (0.504)
# rebel groups in conflict	-0.107 (0.096)	-0.103 (0.097)	-0.114 (0.099)	-0.118 (0.100)
Lag OSV	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)				-0.635 (0.875)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)		13.224*** (1.743)		13.573*** (1.770)
Media bias			-0.560 (0.376)	-0.646 (0.441)
Constant	-10.919* (6.385)	-24.022*** (5.317)	-17.776*** (6.668)	-31.387*** (6.126)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	554	554	554	554
Log Likelihood	-152.166	-151.955	-146.531	-144.391
Akaike Inf. Crit.	320.332	321.910	311.062	310.783
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table G.12: Diaspora support and rebel governance (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Embassy (dummy)</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Diaspora support (dummy)	0.413 (0.855)	0.407 (0.855)	0.548 (0.838)	0.605 (0.900)
Population (ln)	-0.061 (0.501)	-0.049 (0.496)	-0.035 (0.515)	0.045 (0.471)
GDP (ln)	0.229 (0.388)	0.214 (0.387)	0.487 (0.354)	0.404 (0.335)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	-1.928*** (0.608)	-1.932*** (0.612)	-1.872*** (0.590)	-1.912*** (0.592)
External support	0.757 (0.574)	0.731 (0.572)	0.540 (0.557)	0.558 (0.524)
# rebel groups in conflict	-0.170 (0.128)	-0.164 (0.127)	-0.184 (0.122)	-0.173 (0.117)
Lag OSV	0.0001 (0.00005)	0.0001 (0.00005)	0.0001 (0.00004)	0.00004 (0.00004)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)				0.614 (0.898)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)		13.999*** (1.409)		13.844*** (1.465)
Media bias			-0.568* (0.327)	-0.508 (0.391)
Constant	-5.695 (3.975)	-19.529*** (3.720)	-12.033*** (4.572)	-25.715*** (4.619)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	533	533	533	533
Log Likelihood	-171.848	-171.384	-164.365	-161.589
Akaike Inf. Crit.	359.697	360.768	346.731	345.177
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

G.3 Resource variables

Table G.13: Diaspora support and rebel governance (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: negotiate right to extract natural resources (dummy)</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Diaspora support (dummy)	1.096 (1.304)	1.100 (1.288)	1.075 (1.200)	1.029 (1.176)
Population (ln)	0.995*** (0.352)	0.992*** (0.362)	0.886** (0.365)	0.805** (0.326)
GDP (ln)	-1.070*** (0.254)	-1.063*** (0.287)	-0.651*** (0.219)	-0.630*** (0.232)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	-0.986 (0.815)	-0.980 (0.848)	-0.623 (0.721)	-0.664 (0.754)
External support	-0.663 (0.746)	-0.645 (0.845)	-0.752 (0.689)	-0.577 (0.668)
# rebel groups in conflict	0.084 (0.092)	0.081 (0.102)	0.068 (0.101)	0.057 (0.103)
Lag OSV	0.0002* (0.0001)	0.0002* (0.0001)	0.0004 (0.001)	0.0003 (0.001)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)				0.698 (0.876)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)		-0.128 (0.996)		-0.607 (1.033)
Media bias			-0.805*** (0.275)	-0.753*** (0.259)
Constant	4.309 (3.565)	4.308 (3.571)	-3.668 (5.406)	-2.603 (4.672)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	
Observations	554	554	554	554
Log Likelihood	-98.725	-98.713	-89.525	-88.588
Akaike Inf. Crit.	213.449	215.426	197.050	199.176

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table G.14: Diaspora support and rebel governance (Logit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Illegal network (dummy)</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Diaspora support (dummy)	0.108 (0.676)	0.063 (0.683)	0.129 (0.664)	0.097 (0.677)
Population (ln)	-0.659** (0.334)	-0.619* (0.339)	-0.650* (0.337)	-0.602* (0.334)
GDP (ln)	0.578** (0.276)	0.531* (0.287)	0.594** (0.264)	0.533* (0.273)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	0.231 (0.289)	0.229 (0.286)	0.247 (0.282)	0.251 (0.276)
External support	0.439 (0.466)	0.363 (0.479)	0.417 (0.473)	0.320 (0.484)
# rebel groups in conflict	0.026 (0.051)	0.034 (0.050)	0.022 (0.054)	0.027 (0.052)
Lag OSV	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)				0.260 (0.559)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)		15.056*** (1.224)		14.959*** (1.238)
Media bias			-0.069 (0.204)	-0.059 (0.203)
Constant	-3.741 (2.872)	-18.335*** (2.718)	-4.225 (2.888)	-18.639*** (3.017)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	506	506	506	506
Log Likelihood	-280.358	-277.359	-280.138	-276.301
Akaike Inf. Crit.	576.715	572.718	578.276	574.601

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table G.15: Diaspora support and rebel governance (Logit model)

	<i>Dependent variable: Resources combined (dummy)</i>	
	(1)	(2)
Diaspora support (dummy)	0.188 (0.617)	0.406 (0.574)
Population (ln)	0.327 (0.385)	0.813* (0.432)
GDP (ln)	0.031 (0.269)	-0.309 (0.306)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	0.094 (0.334)	0.041 (0.324)
External support	0.620 (0.460)	0.810** (0.407)
# rebel groups in conflict	-0.015 (0.063)	-0.012 (0.061)
Lag OSV	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)	0.593 (0.586)	0.794 (0.652)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)	-0.679 (0.683)	-2.116** (0.952)
Media bias	0.032 (0.227)	0.286 (0.215)
Negotiate Resources	0.802 (0.688)	0.971 (1.597)
Illegal network		3.177*** (0.772)
Constant	-7.120*** (2.744)	-7.550** (3.487)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓
Observations	507	463
Log Likelihood	-306.257	-208.138
Akaike Inf. Crit.	636.515	442.277

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

G.4 Probit models

Table G.16: Diaspora support and rebel governance (Probit model)

<i>Dependent variable: In power (dummy)</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Diaspora support (dummy)	0.017 (0.398)	0.046 (0.363)	0.217 (0.425)
Population (ln)	0.224 (0.458)	0.048 (0.619)	0.199 (0.640)
GDP (ln)	-0.784*** (0.284)	-0.816 (0.513)	-0.865 (0.553)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	0.042 (0.179)	0.296 (0.446)	0.354 (0.485)
External support	-0.186 (0.829)	-0.352 (1.107)	-0.342 (1.076)
# rebel groups in conflict	-0.005 (0.136)	-0.031 (0.193)	-0.081 (0.185)
Lag OSV	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)			-0.630 (0.511)
Media bias		-0.318 (0.345)	-0.325 (0.348)
Constant	11.116 (7.212)	14.488 (9.258)	13.428 (9.613)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓
Observations	416	416	416
Log Likelihood	-16.947	-15.987	-15.626
Akaike Inf. Crit.	49.893	49.975	51.252

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table G.17: Diaspora support and rebel constitution (Probit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Constitution (dummy)</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Diaspora support (dummy)	1.082 (0.723)	1.081 (0.725)	1.097 (0.758)	1.080 (0.720)	1.063 (0.751)
Population (ln)	0.564 (0.444)	0.564 (0.443)	0.499 (0.479)	0.562 (0.440)	0.490 (0.481)
GDP (ln)	-0.043 (0.288)	-0.043 (0.288)	0.011 (0.304)	-0.044 (0.341)	0.058 (0.329)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	0.351 (0.226)	0.351 (0.226)	0.362 (0.222)	0.350 (0.214)	0.410* (0.231)
External support	0.258 (0.326)	0.257 (0.326)	0.265 (0.325)	0.257 (0.322)	0.221 (0.316)
# rebel groups in conflict	0.009 (0.078)	0.010 (0.078)	0.006 (0.077)	0.009 (0.081)	0.005 (0.084)
Lag OSV	0.00002 (0.00004)	0.00002 (0.00004)	0.00002 (0.00003)	0.00002 (0.00004)	0.00003 (0.00003)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)					-0.417 (0.538)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)		2.337*** (0.653)			2.738*** (0.785)
US designated FTO (dummy)			-4.802*** (0.441)		-5.016*** (0.558)
Media bias				0.006 (0.233)	-0.084 (0.206)
Constant	-12.076*** (3.613)	-14.402*** (3.292)	-12.199*** (3.741)	-12.023*** (3.702)	-15.624*** (3.350)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	554	554	554	554	554
Log Likelihood	-92.124	-92.116	-90.162	-92.123	-88.575
Akaike Inf. Crit.	200.247	202.232	198.323	202.245	201.150

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table G.18: Diaspora support and rebel governance (Probit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Law (dummy)</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Diaspora support (dummy)	0.978* (0.560)	0.977* (0.590)	0.989* (0.586)	1.015* (0.600)	0.855 (0.654)
Population (ln)	0.823** (0.393)	0.849** (0.385)	0.901** (0.413)	1.174* (0.604)	1.496*** (0.574)
GDP (ln)	-0.463 (0.289)	-0.513* (0.286)	-0.514* (0.294)	-0.183 (0.361)	-0.386 (0.344)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	-1.239* (0.641)	-1.255* (0.661)	-1.247* (0.653)	-1.283** (0.612)	-1.180** (0.580)
External support	-0.167 (0.339)	-0.279 (0.336)	-0.135 (0.354)	-0.219 (0.406)	-0.064 (0.601)
# rebel groups in conflict	0.231*** (0.064)	0.238*** (0.065)	0.240*** (0.070)	0.255*** (0.080)	0.273*** (0.092)
Lag OSV	-0.0004 (0.0004)	-0.0005 (0.0004)	-0.0005 (0.0005)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0005)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)					0.696 (0.584)
Ethnicity relevant (dummy)		5.379*** (0.722)			4.716*** (0.886)
US designated FTO (dummy)			0.720 (0.471)		1.973** (0.873)
Media bias				-0.874*** (0.216)	-0.939*** (0.295)
Constant	-6.278** (2.582)	-10.858*** (2.728)	-6.566** (2.738)	-19.508*** (4.409)	-25.826*** (5.597)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	551	551	551	551	551
Log Likelihood	-105.682	-102.122	-104.917	-86.995	-77.476
Akaike Inf. Crit.	227.365	222.244	227.835	191.990	178.951

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table G.19: Diaspora support and rebel governance (Probit model)

<i>Dependent variable: Election (dummy)</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Diaspora support (dummy)	0.978* (0.560)	0.989* (0.586)	1.015* (0.600)	0.823 (0.630)
Population (ln)	0.823** (0.393)	0.901** (0.413)	1.174* (0.604)	1.511*** (0.577)
GDP (ln)	-0.463 (0.289)	-0.514* (0.294)	-0.183 (0.361)	-0.379 (0.344)
Duration since conflict start (ln)	-1.239* (0.641)	-1.247* (0.653)	-1.283** (0.612)	-1.159** (0.569)
External support	-0.167 (0.339)	-0.135 (0.354)	-0.219 (0.406)	0.022 (0.548)
# rebel groups in conflict	0.231*** (0.064)	0.240*** (0.070)	0.255*** (0.080)	0.267*** (0.087)
Lag OSV	-0.0004 (0.0004)	-0.0005 (0.0005)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0004)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)				0.813 (0.518)
US designated FTO (dummy)		0.720 (0.471)		2.037** (0.888)
Media bias			-0.874*** (0.216)	-0.940*** (0.296)
Constant	-6.278** (2.582)	-6.566** (2.738)	-19.508*** (4.409)	-21.633*** (5.418)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	551	551	551	551
Log Likelihood	-105.682	-104.917	-86.995	-78.564
Akaike Inf. Crit.	227.365	227.835	191.990	179.128

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table G.20: Diaspora support and rebel governance (Probit model)

	<i>Dependent variable: Armed forces (dummy)</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Diaspora support (dummy)	1.593*** (0.520)	1.850*** (0.575)	2.004*** (0.620)
Population (ln)	0.144 (0.446)	0.023 (0.426)	-0.010 (0.390)
GDP (ln)	-0.175 (0.322)	0.085 (0.252)	0.080 (0.233)
External support	-0.379 (0.369)	-0.428 (0.375)	-0.340 (0.375)
# rebel groups in conflict	-0.130 (0.090)	-0.148 (0.097)	-0.128 (0.091)
Lag OSV	-0.0003 (0.001)	-0.0002 (0.001)	-0.0002 (0.001)
Excluded ethnic group (dummy)			1.192* (0.626)
Media bias		-0.425** (0.168)	-0.330 (0.219)
Constant	-0.390 (2.244)	-4.467 (2.828)	-4.880* (2.747)
Clustered standard errors	✓	✓	✓
Observations	554	554	554
Log Likelihood	-127.430	-114.129	-100.842
Akaike Inf. Crit.	268.860	244.258	219.684

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01