



The Indelible Past

The Effects of Authoritarianism on Political Behaviour

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Summary

This cumulative dissertation investigates when and how experiences with authoritarianism matter for how political attitudes and behaviours are formed by focusing on three dimensions of ideological political behaviour. The first paper (Chapter 2) concentrates on how coming from a (post-) authoritarian regime affects the identification of political stances in the ideological space. Using observational data, I show that immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes are less likely to identify their positions on abstract ideological issues than non-immigrants. At the same time, differences are minor for specific policy issues. Immigrants from established democracies map similarly to non-immigrants, but not concerning party identification. These results have implications for the representation of specific immigrant groups in the host country and their electoral potential for different parties.

The second paper (Chapter 3) then shifts its attention to the effect of authoritarianism on abstract ideological attitudes. I assess how political socialisation in a left- or right-wing authoritarian regime affects party support and left-right self placement in the host country. Based on observational data, I find that immigrants from left-wing authoritarian regimes are more likely to support right of centre parties than their democratic counterparts. Immigrants socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes also express a bias against the political left in their party support, but only if they come from a country with an extended communist past; otherwise, no substantial differences appear. No robust patterns emerge for left-right self placement. These results have implications for how authoritarian regimes can

affect behaviour in a different political context.

Finally, the third paper (Chapter 4) explores the impact of authoritarianism on specific policy attitudes and behaviour. This paper addresses whether negative portrayals of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) can affect redistribution preferences. Employing a novel experimental game, I find that priming participants with negative statements on the GDR does not robustly lower support for redistribution in general. Exploratory analyses show that the prime robustly lowers support for redistribution among those participants who earned fewer points in the games than their opponents. These results highlight that negative depictions of authoritarian regimes can affect support for connected policies, but not necessarily uniformly in a given society.

To my parents.

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Abbreviations

AfD	Alternative für Deutschland
Auth.	Authoritarian
Add.	Additional
CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands
GEM	Coarsened Exact Matching
CSU	Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern
Dem.	Democratic
ESS	European Social Survey
FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei
fka	Formerly known as
GDR	German Democratic Republic
LR	Left-right
LW	Left-wing
SOEP	German Socioeconomic Panel
Imm.	Immigrants
NPD	Die Heimat (<i>fka Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands</i>)
Opp.	Opponents
PAP	Pre-Analysis Plan
PID	Party identification
Red.	Redistribution
RW	Right-wing
SATT	Sample average treatment effect of the treated
sd	standard deviation
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
V-Dem	Varieties of Democracy
WW2	World War II

Chapter 1

Introduction

In the following days, the first opposition party was founded and my parents revealed the truth, their truth. They said that my country had been an open-air prison for almost half a century.

— Lea Ypi (2021, p.129)

Democracy is being challenged around the globe. While the third wave of democratisation led to a steady increase in the number of democracies around the world starting from 1970, this development came to a halt after 2007 (Diamond, 2015). Research remains inconclusive if the world is in the midst of a wave of autocratisation (see Skaaning, 2020, p.1539). Nonetheless, the majority of citizens around the globe does not live in liberal democracies, but in regimes with weakened democratic institutions and often limited political and individual rights (see Figure 1.1 for the state of liberal democracies of 2007 and 2022 based on V-Dem). Especially, for new democracies, sustaining regime stability can be a major challenge (see e.g. Aytaç et al., 2017; Cook and Savun, 2016).

Citizens in authoritarian regimes experience vastly different political environments than those living in democracies. In democracies, debating and also criticising

governmental actions is part of everyday life. On the contrary, doing so under strong authoritarian rule can lead to persecution and citizens often engage in self-censorship to avoid (potential) negative consequences and problems with the authorities (Chang and Manion, 2021; Moore-Gilbert and Abdul-Nabi, 2021; Robinson and Tannenber, 2019). Such repressive experiences do not just vanish from citizens' memories once the regime is overturned, but this shared past can become a deep-rooted part of these societies (Schwartz, 1996).




Figure 1.1: Liberal democracies around the world in 2007 and 2022 based on V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2023a; Coppedge et al., 2023b; Coppedge et al., 2015; Pemstein et al., 2023).

Given these differences in cultural and societal upbringings, the field of authoritarian legacies has, *inter alia*, focused on the question on the effects of exposure to authoritarianism on public opinion. Studies have shown that authoritarianism can indeed affect political attitudes and behaviour (e.g. Avdeenko, 2018; Dinas, 2017; Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2020; Lagos, 1997; Neundorf, 2009; Neundorf and Pop-Eleches, 2020; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2014). Making mostly use of ob-

servational data, this research branch usually studies legacies of the authoritarian rule in attitudes and behaviours after these regimes cease to exist. This field stays, however, relatively silent about individuals who select themselves out of (post-) authoritarian communities and relocate to, for instance, an established democracy. It, therefore, remains unclear how strongly these regimes influence people at the individual level and whether effects persist when they leave the corresponding community. Besides, studying these effects with observational data is no trivial endeavour. Authoritarianism usually does neither emerge exogenously nor at random (for the German case, see Becker et al., 2020), making it difficult to isolate subsequent effects on opinion.

By tackling these two points, this dissertation contributes to this growing field by focusing on the overarching research question of when and how experiences with authoritarianism matter for ideological behaviour and attitude formation. In this dissertation, I argue that socialisation under and exposure to authoritarianism can have a persisting effect on ideological political behaviour, even in substantially different political environments. First, I argue in Chapter 2, that authoritarianism affects the identification of political positions in the ideological space by focusing on immigrants relocating to established democracies. Second, in Chapter 3, I posit that socialisation under ideologically tinted authoritarian regimes matters for stances on abstract political concepts again concentrating on immigrants. Finally, I suggest that exposure to authoritarianism matters for preferences on closely connected policies by employing an experimental study, which focuses on the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and redistribution preferences in Chapter 4.

Throughout this cumulative dissertation, I will show that direct exposure to authoritarianism can impact how ideological attitudes are expressed. However, resulting patterns can also indirectly appear even if the regime no longer exists and people have not been not directly exposed to it. This dissertation combines different literatures and, therefore, multiple fields. First, it contributes to the literature

of authoritarian legacies, socialisation and cultural transmission by focusing on the long-term effects of authoritarianism on public opinion. Second, this dissertation substantially contributes to the immigrant political behaviour literature by concentrating on and differentiating between immigrants from (post-) authoritarian and democratic regimes concerning their host country behaviour. In the past, this research field has often overlooked pre-migration experiences when assessing host country behaviour. Finally, by targeting immigrants relocating to a different political environment and concentrating on Germany in an experimental study, which provides a special case of the communist regime and its legacy, this dissertation puts theories of socialisation and backlash effects of authoritarianism to a more rigorous test.

The remainder of this introductory chapter is structured as follows. First, I will provide insights into the study of authoritarianism, cultural transmission and political socialisation. Second, I will present existing literature on the effects of authoritarianism on political behaviour. Since immigrants are a cornerstone of this dissertation, I will, as a third step, provide evidence as to why this focus is warranted. Finally, I will lay out the theoretical framework and summarise the three analytical chapters of this dissertation before outlining the contribution of this work.

Studying the Effects of Authoritarianism

To study the effects of authoritarianism, it is first necessary to provide a conceptualisation of the term itself. Authoritarianism is a rather abstract concept and as a consequence resulted in the emergence of various definitions and classifications. As Frantz (2018, p.7) summarises, authoritarian regimes express different behaviours nowadays, while early authoritarianism was mostly characterised by a single person - a monarch or chief - in power. In today's authoritarian regimes,

this power can be either found in the hand of one person only, but it can also be distributed among a group of elites. As a result, the definition of authoritarianism has been changing.

Authoritarianism is inherently connected to the notion of democracy. Considering this link on a continuous dimension, authoritarianism would lie on the lower and full democracies on the upper extreme of this scale. My understanding of democracy, and as a result also authoritarianism, relies on the concept of *liberal democracy*, which focuses, on the one hand, on the electoral principle of democracy based on Dahl's (1971) conception of polyarchy (see Coppedge et al., 2023b; Teorell et al., 2019). On the other hand, it also considers, besides electoral, liberal aspects, i.e. the "executive constraint by the legislature and high courts, and rule of law and individual rights" (Boese et al., 2022, p.13). While I acknowledge the difficulty of classifying regimes into authoritarian and democratic given that there is a wide range of regime types within these groups, the aim of this work is to mainly lay out general implications of socialisation and transmission processes resulting from non-democratic regimes. Authoritarian regimes are, therefore, conceptualised as an umbrella term for non-democratic regimes, which are closer to the most authoritarian than to the most democratic end based on the measure of a liberal democracy (see also Lindberg, 2016, p.87).

Culture and the Acquisition of Political Attitudes

The overarching goal of this dissertation is to assess the effects of authoritarianism on the formation of political attitudes and behaviour. How can authoritarianism as a current but also past regime have a lasting impact on a society, particularly concerning opinion formation? According to *the economic theory of cultural transmission*, social norms, preferences and beliefs are subject to *direct vertical* or *oblique* and *horizontal* transmission (Bisin and Verdier, 2001). These transmission processes differ in their agents. While vertical transmission refers to parental sociali-

sation, horizontal and oblique transmission refers to socialisation by peers and society respectively (Bisin and Verdier, 2001, 2023). Vertical transmission processes are likely responsible for prevailing attitudes and ideologies. In contrast, horizontal transmission processes can act as an explanatory factor for heterogeneity across generations (see Giuliano and Tabellini, 2020; Tabellini, 2010; Voigtländer and Voth, 2012, 2015). While the economic theory of cultural transmission puts much focus on the motivations of socialisation efforts of parents, it remains vague on the timings that are of particular importance. By contrast, theories of political socialisation provide more considerations in this regard. Although these two theoretical approaches developed independently, they refer to strongly interrelated concepts.

Political socialisation can be conceptualised as “the gradual development of the individual’s own particular and idiosyncratic views of the political world, the process by which a given society’s norms and behaviour are internalized” (Fillieule, 2013, p.1). Competing models of political socialisation argue for different timings when citizens are most susceptible to change (for a more detailed review, see Sears and Brown, 2013). Early work on political socialisation attributed much importance to *childhood socialisation* for the learning of basic political orientations and attitudes (see Searing et al., 1973). This model of early life learning on the acquisition of political attitudes has, however, received much criticism. Given that these earlier studies often only indicate, but not explicitly test, that these childhood orientations might affect behaviour later on, scholars especially questioned how persistent early political learning is throughout the lifecourse (e.g. Marsh, 1971; Searing et al., 1973, 1976; Sears, 1971).

The field of political socialisation started to shift from a focus on childhood to adults. While the *lifelong openness model* argues that attitudes and opinions can change to the same extent at all ages (see Sears, 1983), Niemi and Sobieszek (1977) made the case that change can occur over the whole life-cycle, but that it

does not happen consistently throughout the adult years. Research indicates that some persistence in attitudes indeed exists. For instance, Sears and Funk (1999) find by focusing on citizens that are 30 years old that although small attitude changes occurred, switches in partisanship were rather unusual. Also, Stoker and Jennings (2008) find evidence for certain levels of persistence. Hence, the literature of political socialisation moved increasingly to the *formative years model* (see Niemi and Hepburn, 1995).

The *formative years* or the *impressionable years model* can nowadays be perceived as a combination of models of persistence and lifelong change. This model views the time between adolescence and early adulthood when attitudes are most susceptible to socialising events and efforts (e.g. Alwin and Krosnick, 1991; Krosnick and Alwin, 1989; Niemi and Hepburn, 1995). Especially defining events experienced throughout the formative years period, such as the occurrence of a war, can lead to a generational effect, where overall issue positions change if there is enough pressure to do so (Sears, 1983, p.81). Hence, while attitudes, views and opinions can change throughout the whole life course, they are most open to change throughout early adolescence and adulthood (see Fillieule, 2013, p.2-3).

In this dissertation, the theoretical considerations in the different chapters draw upon assumptions of both cultural transmission and political socialisation. Especially the negative experiences made with the authoritarian regime are assumed to affect whether political stances are identified (Chapter 2) and how they are subsequently expressed (Chapter 3 and 4). Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 examine vertical transmission processes concerning political socialisation under authoritarianism and its effect on host country politics. Chapter 3 combines the approach of socialisation and vertical transmission by exploring the impact of authoritarianism throughout the formative years between 15 and 25 on ideological behaviour in a different political context. Finally, Chapter 4 assesses different dynamics of transmission processes by exploring, among other things, generational heterogeneity

concerning the effect of authoritarianism on redistribution preferences. By focusing on effects of institutional settings, this dissertation, therefore, provides new tests of processes of political socialisation and transmission of culture.

Authoritarianism on Political Attitudes and Behaviour

How are political attitudes and behaviours shaped as a consequence of (post-) authoritarianism? A growing strand of literature focuses on the effects of authoritarianism on attitudes and political behaviour. Especially early work on new democracies focused on political trust and support for democracy as their outcome of interest. These studies show that citizens in new democracies have overall lower trust levels in political institutions than those in established democracies (e.g. Marien, 2011; van der Meer, 2017). After an initial increase of trust right after democratisation, trust levels sharply decrease once the “post-honeymoon phase” (Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002, p.303) has passed (Catterberg and Moreno, 2005). Nevertheless, democratic principles enjoy not only broad support in established democracies but in regime types around the world (Dalton et al., 2007; Norris, 2011). Support for democracy is, however, not uniform but can also depend on, for instance, the political benefits citizens enjoyed throughout the regime (Neundorf et al., 2020). While these studies make an important contribution by showing that experience with authoritarianism can affect attitudes on democratic institutions, it remains unclear how these experiences extend to ideological preference formation.

The question appears as to how socialisation under authoritarianism affects to what extent political positions are formed and subsequently identified in the ideological space. As Neundorf and Pop-Eleches (2020) summarise, one strategy to oppose the values of the authoritarian system is disengagement from politics. Existing research on new democracies, however, rarely connects the consequences of disengagement from politics to positioning in the ideological space. While studies

show that citizens are less likely to position themselves on the left-right scale and to acquire a partisan identity than those in more established democracies, they usually link this behaviour to the supply side of the new democracies. Besides the lack of elite conflict (Otjes and Rekker, 2021), these patterns are also attributed to particularities of party systems in new democracies (Dalton, 2021; Jou, 2010). In this set-up, it is, however, difficult to isolate whether citizens are distinctively affected by the post-authoritarian experience or if these behaviours appear as a consequence of the properties of the post-authoritarian political environments, which are fundamentally different from established democracies. Additionally, these studies provide limited insights into how these results extend into less abstract political dimensions, such as preferences on immigration or redistribution policies. Chapter 2 addresses these limitations by studying the extent to which immigrants from (post-) authoritarian versus established democratic regimes can position themselves in the ideological space, focusing on abstract concepts but also specific policy issues.

How does authoritarianism affect ideological attitudes and behaviours once they are identified? The ideology promoted by the authoritarian regime can lead to the opposition of these values among the public. Dinas and Northmore-Ball (2020) propose and show in their theoretical and empirical application that after the fall of a right-wing (left-wing) authoritarian regime, citizens of new democracies show a bias against the political right (left). In the case of left-wing authoritarianism, heterogeneity between those born before and after Stalin's rule conceals this bias. The authors connect the appearance of such backlashes to repression, while the level of indoctrination seems to mitigate them. Avdeenko (2018) also shows that in the German case, where scholars even started to use the term nostalgia as *Ostalgie* (e.g. Wicke, 1998), that *Die Linke* - the successor party of the communist regime - are losing votes in the border regions to West Germany. The author attributes these differential behaviours to a higher degree of state repression close to the border in the GDR. By focusing on these effects within post-authoritarian

countries, it remains, however, unclear if ideological backlash effects are confined to these post-authoritarian societies or whether they can be extended to different political contexts. Chapter 3, therefore, explores the appearance of biases against the ideology of the authoritarian regime by assessing party identification and left-right self placement of immigrants from left- and right-wing authoritarian regimes.

Given that backlash effects appear on abstract political behaviour, is support for policies connected to the ideology of the authoritarian regime also affected by authoritarian experiences? While less is known about the right-wing spectrum of authoritarianism, a set of studies focuses on the effects of communism on redistribution preferences. These observational studies argue that due to the lingering presence of communist indoctrination, citizens still attribute the state the responsibility to look after them (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Okulicz-Kozaryn, 2014). Nevertheless, isolating these effects observationally is not trivial, given that authoritarianism is likely not emerging exogenously nor at random (see also Becker et al., 2020). Besides, these mechanisms seem more complex in light of ideological backlash effects, particularly among younger cohorts (Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2020). Also, Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2020) show, among other things, that the gap regarding support for redistribution between younger cohorts in post-communist countries and established democracies is narrowing. Finally, Pfarr et al. (2017) provide a complex picture by demonstrating that East Germans are more supportive of state redistribution but show a similar willingness to West Germans concerning taxation. To assess the link between authoritarianism and support for connected policies to a greater extent, Chapter 4 concentrates on the effects of negative portrayals of the GDR on support for redistribution employing a novel experimental design in Germany.

Taking the Individual Out of the Context

What makes it especially relevant to study the effects of authoritarianism in the case of immigrants? Studies on authoritarian legacies usually focus on the persistence of the authoritarian imprint in the respective post-authoritarian societies while, for instance, concentrating on how these values are passed down to subsequent generations. However, less is known under what conditions legacy effects appear once these individuals are self-selecting out of these communities and migrate to places where, for instance, different social dynamics exist. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this dissertation are, therefore, devoted to exploring these effects on a more individual level. By doing so, this dissertation bridges fields of authoritarianism and migration, contributing substantially to the immigrant political behaviour literature, which, given recent migration developments, becomes increasingly relevant.

European countries have a long migration history, but these movements gradually increased after World War 2. Mol and de Valk (2016, p.32-39) identify three stages of immigration starting in the second half of the 20th century: The first stage is defined by guest workers from geographically close locations arriving to participate in economic reconstruction, migration as a consequence of decolonisation and refugees from the East to the West. The second stage, including the years from the 1973 Oil Crisis to the fall of the Iron Curtain, consisted of immigration which was mainly characterised by family reunification and formation. The third stage, starting after the fall of the Soviet Union and lasting until today, is dominated by intra-European migration and the European Union's increasing control of non-EU inflows. Figure 1.2 depicts absolute and relative migration inflows in the year 2021 for a variety of European countries. It is visible that not all countries receive the same amount of immigrants. Germany and Spain stand out as having received large numbers of migrants in absolute terms, while they also belong to the countries that are on the higher end when concentrating on relative figures.




Figure 1.2: Immigration flows to Europe in absolute numbers and relative to the population size in 2021 based on Eurostat (2023a; 2023b).

With migration numbers rising worldwide, the issue of immigration has become a salient topic on the political agenda over the past years in many established democracies in Western Europe. While immigrants are leaving their home country due to war, political conflicts and persecution, or hoping for an improved economic perspective, populist radical right parties are fostering anti-immigrant sentiments by *othering* migrant groups.¹ As a result, much of the scholarly literature has focused on attitudes of the majority population *towards* immigrants and immigration (for reviews, see Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). However, less is known about how immigrants *themselves* politically behave and how their political attitudes are formed. While pre-migration experiences differ substantially among immigrants depending on the country of origin, they are often overlooked as explanatory factors for behaviour in research. Also in the public discourse, immigrants and their behaviours often get categorised,

¹*Othering* can be defined as “the process whereby an individual or groups of people attribute negative characteristics to other individuals or groups of people that set them apart as representing that which is opposite to them” (Rohleder, 2014, p.1306).

yet there are few systematic discussions of their underlying reasons. Increasing knowledge of these groups by focusing on the underlying mechanisms of their political opinions and behaviour can help counteract discriminatory attitudes and behaviours of the majority population towards these often marginalised groups.

Earlier work on immigrants and political behaviour often operationalised immigrants as one category. Respondents were relatively simply characterised with or without an immigration background (e.g. Bergh and Bjørklund, 2011; Dancygier and Saunders, 2006). While such an approach might have been necessary due to the small number of immigrants in the respective samples, it undermines the heterogeneity within this category. For instance, not all immigrant groups nor generations show the same political participation levels (e.g. Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001; Tam Cho, 1999), even if they originate from the same region (e.g. Bass and Casper, 2001). Different ideological political orientations have also been observed depending on the country or region of origin. Hill and Moreno (1996) show for Cubans in the U.S., for example, that the second generation and those coming to the U.S. before 10 had a lower preference for the Republicans than first-generation immigrants older than 10. Cain et al. (1991) find similar results for Latino and Asian immigrants and their descendants in the U.S.. By contrast, those originating from China, South Korea and Southeast Asia have become increasingly partisans of the Republican Party over the years. Nevertheless, the question of the origins of these behaviours remains. Instead of focusing on country-groups and their shared migration experience to a given context, I build on work of political socialisation and argue that pre-migration experiences are essential to understanding attitudes in the host country.

A set of quantitative research concentrates on pre-migration experiences with different types of institutions, highlighting the promising avenue of such an approach. Some studies focus on the levels of support for democracy as their outcome variable and find, in the case of Australia, that differences between those

socialised in authoritarian and non-authoritarian countries exist (Bilodeau, 2014; Bilodeau et al., 2010; McAllister and Makkai, 1992). Variation between these two groups can also be observed in other areas, such as political participation in protests (for Canada and Australia, see Bilodeau, 2008) and turnout in elections (for Canada and the U.S., see Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001; White, 2017). However, less is known about how socialisation under authoritarianism affects ideological attitudes and behaviours (but see Just, 2019). This dissertation, therefore, extends our knowledge of how ideological political behaviour can be shaped through institutional settings and what patterns appear after relocating to a different political context.

Theoretical Framework and Summary of the Dissertation

This dissertation assesses when and how experiences with authoritarianism matters for how political attitudes and behaviours are formed. Building on research of cultural transmission (Bisin and Verdier, 2001) and political socialisation (e.g. Niemi and Sobieszek, 1977), as well as on literature of authoritarianism and authoritarian legacies (e.g. Chang and Manion, 2021; Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2020; Linz, 2000), I map out a framework that considers the effects of authoritarianism on three levels of political behaviour. As depicted in Figure 1.3, I propose that exposure to and socialisation in authoritarianism affects 1) whether political stances are identified in the ideological space, 2) if citizens identify their opinions and positions, how they express their attitudes on abstract political concepts and 3) how attitudes and behaviours towards specific policies that can be ideologically connected to the authoritarian regime are shaped.

Each of the following chapters assesses one of these propositions. First, the ques-

tion needs to be asked in what way socialisation under authoritarianism matters for identifying political positions in the ideological space. Prior research has shown that citizens in new democracies are less likely to take a position on abstract ideological issues or to form partisan attachments. But is this a mere product of the political supply side? And how does this translate into less abstract issues, such as preferences on redistribution? Chapter 2 explores these questions in detail by comparing immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes and established democracies to the non-immigrant population, respectively. Chapter 3 focuses on those who identify their political stances and investigates how socialisation under authoritarianism can lead to a bias against the ideology of the former regime in abstract ideological items, i.e. party identification and left-right self placement, in a different political context. Finally, Chapter 4 assesses whether negative portrayals of the authoritarian regime can lead to an attitudinal and behavioural backlash against policies that are closely connected to the regime by employing a novel experimental design. The subsequent subsections summarise the dissertation chapters in more detail.




Figure 1.3: Theoretical Framework.

Impact on Positioning in the Ideological Space

Chapter 2, *What is my Opinion? Immigrants, (Post-) Authoritarianism and Ideological Positioning*, focuses on the research question of how socialisation under (post-) authoritarianism versus established democracies affects the degree to which ideological positions are identified after relocating to a democracy. Living under (post-) authoritarianism differs substantially from life in established democracies. Having open discussions and debates about politics might be a regular occurrence and structurally encouraged in democracies but not in authoritarian regimes, particularly not in those with strongly restricted rights. The government might not allow for oppositional views to be spread, which leads citizens to engage in self-censorship due to a fear of repercussions (e.g. Chang and Manion, 2021; Moore-Gilbert and Abdul-Nabi, 2021; Robinson and Tannenbergh, 2019) and, in addition, citizens might disengage from politics as a form of resistance to the regime (Tertychnaya, 2020). Due to these behaviours, immigrants from authoritarian regimes are expected to be less interested in politics and less confident in their political abilities. Consequently, compared to non-immigrants, they should be less likely to identify their position in the ideological space, particularly on abstract political concepts, but not necessarily on specific policy preferences. By contrast, immigrants from established democracies are expected to behave similarly to non-immigrants, given their comparable experiences with democracy.

Leveraging data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and V-Dem, I test this argument by studying first-generation immigrants from (former) authoritarian and established democratic regimes, as well as the non-immigrant population in thirteen European democracies. Focusing on immigrants rather than on citizens in new democracies allows to isolate that these behaviours result from citizens' socialisation in (post-) authoritarian regimes and not due to the lack of ideological politics or the frustration with the (post-) authoritarian nature of the supply side. Employing exact matching as a pre-processing method, I find partial sup-

port for my theoretical argument. Immigrants socialised in (post-) authoritarian regimes are less likely to position themselves in the ideological space than their non-immigrant counterparts. This difference is substantial for abstract ideological concepts but small for specific policy issues. Immigrants from established democracies map, on the other hand, similarly to non-immigrants regarding their ability to position themselves in the ideological space, but not concerning party identification. Nevertheless, being socialised in a democracy instead of an authoritarian regime leads to an advantage also concerning party identification among immigrants. These patterns are driven by lower political confidence and interest due to a (post-) authoritarian socialisation rather than a lack of political efficacy or discontent.

Impact on Abstract Ideological Attitudes

After assessing that socialisation under authoritarianism negatively affects positioning in the ideological space, the question arises for those identifying their stances, how these are shaped as a consequence of the regime. More precisely, the research question addressed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, *Lingering Memories of the Past? The Ideological Behaviour of Immigrants Socialised in Authoritarian Regimes*, focuses on how political socialisation in authoritarian left- and right-wing regimes affects the political behaviour of immigrants in democracies.

Building my expectation on research of authoritarianism and its legacies (Dinas, 2017; Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2020; Linz, 2000), I argue that immigrants socialised in left-wing authoritarian regimes avoid the political left and support right of centre parties. By contrast, immigrants socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes should, on average, not translate their biases against the ideology of the regime into host country politics. The mechanism underlying these distinct behaviours, I theorise, is a consequence of different regime characteristics. Whereas left-wing authoritarian regimes have a developed ideology, right-wing authori-

tarian regimes reflect *mentalities* of their leadership (Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2020; Linz, 2000). Hence, I argue that due to the presence of a developed ideology, only immigrants socialised in left-wing authoritarian regimes will show systematic anti-left biases in host country politics. By contrast, immigrants socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes are not expected to systematically display anti-right sentiments, given that regime mentalities are not as easily transferred to another political environment.

Using the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) and V-Dem while applying Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) (Iacus et al., 2012), I find a bias against the political left for immigrants socialised in left-wing authoritarian regimes compared to their democratic counterparts. Immigrants socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes also express a bias against the political left, but only if the country has a communist past. The legacy of communism seems to be overshadowing the right-wing authoritarian experience. Immigrants socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes with no longer communist past do, on the other hand, not behave substantially differently from their democratic counterparts. These results highlight that systematic biases against the ideological spectrum of the former authoritarian regime are unique to immigrants socialised under left- but not right-wing authoritarian regimes regarding their host country behaviour.

Impact on Specific Policy Attitudes and Behaviour

Given that authoritarianism can lead to biases on an abstract level, the question emerges whether backlash effects can also appear on policies related to the regime. Chapter 4, *Communism and Redistribution Preferences: Evidence from an Experimental Online Game*, addresses this question by focusing on the circumstances under which negative portrayals of communism affect redistribution preferences. Building on literature of authoritarian legacies (Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2020), I suggest that negative depictions of the former authoritarian regime affect pref-

erences on policies that are related to the authoritarian ideology. More precisely, I hypothesise that citizens should be less inclined to support redistribution as a consequence of negative depictions of communism, especially if they are experiencing high levels of income redistribution.

Employing a novel behavioural experiment in Germany programmed in *oTree* (Chen et al., 2016), I assess how priming participants on negative statements on the GDR affects support for redistribution. In the experiment, participants are invited to play three games based on effort and skills. They are each grouped with two computer-simulated opponents who perform better or worse than the participants. Points made within a group get redistributed or are kept individually. In addition, participants are randomly assigned to a prime with negative statements on the GDR before the games.

Unlike hypothesised, negatively depicting the GDR does not have an overall negative effect on redistribution and does not depend on experiencing point redistribution. Exploratory analyses, nevertheless, reveal that being primed with negative statements on the GDR only lowers support for redistribution among participants who are paired with better opponents compared to the control group who did not receive a prime. On the contrary, those who were outperforming their opponents did not report lower (or higher) support for redistribution than the control group. These effects are heightened for younger participants and those performing better in the games. This study shows that exposure to authoritarianism can, under certain conditions, affect support for connected policies while highlighting the heterogeneity of such effects. Additionally, this study provides a novel attitudinal and behavioural approach to measure preferences experimentally.

Contribution and Structure of Dissertation

This dissertation shows that socialisation under and experience with authoritarianism shapes political behaviour, even in different political contexts. Experiences with authoritarianism can be linked to a lower likelihood of identifying stances in the ideological space, to a backlash against its ideological spectrum as expressed in party support, and affect support for closely connected policies under specific conditions. While the political behaviour of different societal groups is not necessarily uniformly shaped by these experiences, authoritarianism can affect people in the long run, even when environments change. This dissertation has both substantial and methodological contributions.

First, this work contributes to the literature connecting authoritarian legacies to political behaviour by providing evidence that resulting behaviours are observable even in different political contexts and can also affect those who only indirectly experienced the authoritarian rule (e.g. Avdeenko, 2018; Dinas, 2017; Dinas et al., 2022; Lagos, 1997; Neundorf, 2009; Neundorf and Pop-Eleches, 2020; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2014). Second, although immigrants constitute a growing part of today's societies, research focuses predominantly on attitudes and behaviour *towards* rather than *of* immigrants. Concentrating on immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes and established democracies in two chapters, this dissertation highlights that pre-migration experiences with institutions are essential for political behaviour in the host country. This dissertation, therefore, substantially contributes to the immigrant political behaviour literature, particularly on the study of pre-migration experiences (e.g. Bilodeau, 2008, 2014; Bilodeau et al., 2010; Just, 2019; McAllister and Makkai, 1992; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001; White, 2017). Third, this dissertation puts theories of political socialisation and cultural transmission to a rigorous test by examining effects in a different political environment and isolating effects of authoritarianism in the experimental study (Bisin and Verdier, 2001; Jennings and Markus, 1984; Niemi and

Hepburn, 1995; Niemi and Sobieszek, 1977).

Besides these substantial contributions, this dissertation also entails methodological ones. Much research concerning immigrant political behaviour is purely correlational. In this dissertation, I take a more causal approach to studying immigrant political behaviour by fully or partially employing matching methods and making immigrant groups more comparable. This approach is particularly important for immigrants, given that socio-economic characteristics can differ substantially across these groups. Additionally, Chapter 4 brings forth a methodological contribution by employing an innovative experiment using the tool *oTree* (Chen et al., 2016). While widely employed in economics, the chapter demonstrates that this tool can also provide opportunities for research questions in political science.

The remainder of this cumulative thesis is structured as follows: The core of this dissertation consists of Chapter 2 to Chapter 4, which were outlined above. These chapters are written as stand-alone research papers and can be treated as such. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation by summarising the three included chapters and outlining their implications, limitations and avenues for future research.

Chapter 2

What is my Opinion? Immigrants, (Post-) Authoritarianism and Ideological Positioning

Abstract

Pre-migration experiences with political regimes differ substantially among immigrants. However, surprisingly little is known about the extent to which these experiences matter in structuring the stance of immigrants. Building on research of new democracies and political socialisation, I argue that (post-) authoritarian as opposed to established democratic socialisation lowers the degree to which positions are identified on abstract ideological issues, but less for specific policy items. Leveraging data from the European Social Survey and V-Dem, I test this argument by studying first-generation immigrants from (former) authoritarian and established democratic regimes, as well as non-immigrants in thirteen European democracies. Employing exact matching as a pre-processing method, I find that immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes are less likely to identify their position on abstract ideological issues than non-immigrants, while differences are substantially small for specific policy items, which seems to be driven by lower political abilities and interest. Immigrants from established democracies map similarly to non-immigrants, but not concerning party identification. This study has important implications for the long-lasting effects of authoritarianism, but also for the representation and electoral potential of specific immigrant groups in the host country.

Keywords: Immigrants, Political Ideology, Political Preferences, (Post-) Authoritarianism

Introduction

Western democracies have experienced increased levels of migration over the past decades. Certain immigrants have been surrounded by democratic institutions their whole lives, but a growing share has experienced authoritarianism with limited political rights. While discussing politics is a regular occurrence in deliberative democracies, politics are usually not part of the table talk in authoritarian regimes. By limiting freedom of speech, the authoritarian government especially restricts criticism of the regime form, which, if known to the authorities, might lead to negative repercussions for them. Due to these circumstances, citizens often engage in (self-) censorship and avoid voicing their true attitudes and opinions as a precaution (e.g. Chang and Manion, 2021; Moore-Gilbert and Abdul-Nabi, 2021; Robinson and Tannenbergh, 2019) or may start disengaging from politics as a form of opposition to the values of the regime (Tertychnaya, 2020).

How does the experience with authoritarianism affect whether political opinions and preferences are identified? Prior studies argue that citizens in new democracies are less likely to take a position on the left-right scale (Jou, 2010; Otjes and Rekker, 2021) and to identify with a political party (Dalton, 2021; Tworzecki, 2008) than those of established democracies. It remains, however, unclear how these patterns translate into the context of immigration and whether similar patterns appear for specific policy preferences on, for example, redistribution or migration inflows, where less political sophistication or democratic experience is needed. Bridging this gap, this paper addresses the question of how socialisation under (post-) authoritarianism versus established democracies affects the degree to which ideological positions are identified after relocating to a democracy. Building on research of socialisation and new democracies, I suggest that immigrants with (post-) authoritarian experience should be less likely to identify their position on abstract ideological issues than non-immigrants. At the same time, this gap should be less pronounced for specific policy preferences. By contrast, immi-

grants from established democracies should map similarly to non-immigrants in the ideological space, given their comparable experience with politics.

To test these assumptions, I rely on the European Social Survey (ESS) for the individual-level data and the V-Dem database to identify the authoritarian past of a country of origin. To proceed in a causal direction and isolate the effect of (post-) authoritarian socialisation of immigrants, I employ exact matching as a pre-processing method before effect estimation. The results support the notion that (post-) authoritarian socialisation leads to a lower identification of stances on abstract concepts compared to non-immigrants; differences are, however, substantially small when moving to specific policy preferences. By contrast, experience with democracy helps for the ideological political positioning when relocating to another democracy, however, a gap to non-immigrants persists in party identification. The effects of the authoritarian socialisation are likely related to lower political abilities and interest of immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes.

This study provides first evidence that coming from a (post-) authoritarian regime leads to a gap in positioning on abstract political concepts, but not substantially on specific policy issues compared to non-immigrants and other immigrants. By systematically studying an item non-response category of immigrants with and without (post-) authoritarian experience for multiple ideological dimensions, this study does not only contribute to the immigrant political behaviour literature but also sheds light on the interplay between authoritarianism and identification of political preferences. Focusing on immigrants relocating to an established democracy demonstrates that these effects do not appear solely because of the characteristics of the supply side of new democracies but that the authoritarian experience lastingly affects its citizens and their positioning in the abstract ideological space. By employing a matching approach, this paper advances the literature in a causal direction. Finally, besides having implications for the (under-)representation of immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes in the host country, the results in-

dicate that immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes might respond more strongly to issue-based appeals than other societal groups. Not only could this help them make better informed electoral decisions, but this immigrant group has, consequently, electoral potential for different parties.

Authoritarianism and Positioning in the Ideological Space

Research on new democracies suggests that citizens in new and established democracies differ in their political participation. Mobilisation rates are, on average, lower in new democracies (Karp and Banducci, 2007) and citizens are less politically involved (Bernhagen and Marsh, 2007). Besides, studies suggest that citizens in new and old democracies differ in the extent to which they indicate their political opinions. While relatively little is known about specific policy issues, evidence shows that citizens in new democracies are less likely to identify their positions in the abstract ideological space. Not only do they have a lower probability to identify with a party (e.g. Dalton, 2021; Tworzecki, 2008), they rank themselves less often on the left-right scale compared to citizens in new democracies (Jou, 2010; McAllister and White, 2007; Otjes and Rekker, 2021). These differences are often attributed to the lack of elite conflict or a lower institutionalisation of party systems in new democracies (see Jou, 2010; Otjes and Rekker, 2021). However, one difficulty that emerges in this set-up is to disentangle if these effects only appear in the political environment of the new democracy or whether the (post-) authoritarian experience substantially lowers the degree to which citizens can identify their positions in political contexts that are ideologically more coherent (see also Mair, 2007).

To address this problem, the focus of this paper lies on immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes and established democracies while comparing them to the non-immigrant population. This allows to isolate effects on the individual level

from effects of the political environment, since variation in the supply side is eliminated. Theories of political socialisation and economic transmission of culture (Bisin and Verdier, 2001, 2023) indicate that immigrants should transfer their political knowledge acquired in the country of origin to the host society. Not only is parental socialisation of importance, also other agents such as schools and peers play a role in the acquisition of political opinions and understandings of political concepts. Particularly throughout the initial political socialisation period, when these attitudes are predominantly formed (Niemi and Hepburn, 1995; Niemi and Sobieszek, 1977), the political environment and how much politics are discussed in the origin country should have a lasting effect on the behaviour in the host country.

A small strand of literature shows that the institutional background matters to predict the political behaviour of immigrants in democratic host countries. Research has shown that immigrants from authoritarian and democratic regimes differ in their political participation, support for democracy and trust (e.g. Bilodeau, 2008; Bilodeau and Nevitte, 2007; McAllister and Makkai, 1992; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001; Superti and Gidron, 2021). Less is, however, known about how coming from a country with authoritarian or democratic institutions matters for the positioning of immigrants in the ideological space (but see Just, 2019, for party identification). Different socialisation experiences should affect the understanding of political concepts and the forming of ideological attitudes and preferences, especially when considering how much political discourse takes place on a daily basis.

In contrast to democracies, freely discussing politics is usually not encouraged in authoritarian regimes. Even in authoritarian regimes with less repression, freedom of speech is normally only present as long as it does not harm the regime (see also Curtis, 1979). Voicing concerns about the current political regime is undermined by the authoritarian government and can often lead to negative repercussions for

the individuals involved. Citizens living under authoritarianism, therefore, often self-censor their political opinions due to risk aversion (e.g. Chang and Manion, 2021; Moore-Gilbert and Abdul-Nabi, 2021; Robinson and Tannenbergh, 2019) or also disengage from politics as a form of opposition to regime values (see e.g. Ter-tychnaya, 2020). Consequently, engaging in political debates, which can help to form and reinforce political opinions and understand political concepts, is limited. The authoritarian experience should, therefore, lower the extent to which immigrants identify their position in the ideological space in the host country due to a decreased political understanding given lower interest and abilities.

An alternative mechanism for why this pattern might emerge is that immigrants from authoritarian regimes tend to be dissatisfied with politics. Experiences in the country of origin might have involved corrupt and/or repressive institutions, which results them to perceive politics not to be efficacious. Prior research has indeed shown that political dissatisfaction can lead to lower political engagement (Hooghe and Marien, 2013), which could be a reason why immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes are comparably less willing to identify their position concerning host country politics than non-immigrants or immigrants from established democracies.

Nevertheless, particularly if a lower political understanding rather than dissatisfaction drives non-positioning in the ideological space, these patterns should be especially pronounced for abstract political concepts but less so for specific policy issues. Not only does research provide evidence that the left-right scale is an abstract concept that is understood very differently in the electorate (Bauer et al., 2017; Dalton, 2006; Neundorf, 2009; Zuell and Scholz, 2019), other studies also show that the acquisition of party identification is related to the degree of political sophistication (Dassonneville et al., 2012; Marthaler, 2008). Positioning on these abstract concepts, therefore, likely requires a higher political understanding. By contrast, questions on specific policy preferences that target, for instance, in-

come redistribution or migration inflows, should be more accessible and easier to interpret even with lower levels of deliberative democratic experiences.

Overall, the differences in the extent to which political ideology and preferences are identified should persist even if the authoritarian system has had a longer democratic period or has recently transformed into a democracy. While citizens might be able to criticise the government without having to fear repercussions, having political conversations should be still less of a norm than in established democracies. As a consequence, expressing their ideological positions should be more rare for both citizens who directly or indirectly experienced authoritarianism due to a lower political engagement in the overall society as opposed to those who are socialised in an established democracy.

Following these considerations, I expect that immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes will be less likely to identify their position in the ideological space than non-immigrants, but that this pattern should be particularly pronounced for abstract political concepts rather than specific policy issues. By contrast, immigrants from established democracies should map similarly to non-immigrants in the host country given their comparable pre-migration experience with politics.

Empirical Strategy

To assess whether certain immigrant groups are more likely to identify their political ideology and preferences, I leverage data from the European Social Survey (ESS). Since immigrants samples are usually rather small in surveys, I employ a cross-national strategy by including immigrants in European host countries that have had a democratic rule since World War II (WW2). I include host countries that participated in the ESS Round 5 to 10 (ESS Round 5, 2010; ESS Round 6, 2012; ESS Round 7, 2014; ESS Round 8, 2016; ESS Round 9, 2018; ESS Round

10, 2020), since the ESS only started to exactly survey immigration year in round 5. The host countries included are the following: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, France, Finland, Great Britain, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.¹ In this analysis, an immigrant constitutes someone with a direct migration background, i.e. a first-generation immigrant. The theoretical considerations make it important that an immigrant spent a considerable amount of time in their host country before relocating. Due to this, I include first-generation immigrants who relocated at 18 or later to the host country and who came of political age after WW2.² To identify whether an immigrant comes from a country with a younger authoritarian past, i.e. authoritarian rule after WW2, I use the categorical liberal democracy index (*e_v2x_libdem_3C*) (Lindberg, 2016) based on V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2023a; Pemstein et al., 2023). Countries were categorised as authoritarian if they do not meet the threshold of being considered *minimally democratic* according to the ordinal transformation of the index after WW2. Certain countries, such as Israel and Japan, took slightly longer to fulfil the *minimally democratic* threshold after the War, but they were, nevertheless, considered as established democracies. Appendix A.1 provides an overview of the considered established democracies, descriptives of the sample sizes of the different groups in the individual host countries, as well as an overview of the largest number of immigrants by country of origin in the respective host country.

Outcome Measures

Abstract Measures: *Left-right self placement* (scale 0-10) and *party identification* (binary scale: yes or no) are included as outcome variables that measure political ideology on an abstract level. **Specific Policy Measures:** To measure specific

¹Due to the communist past of East Germany, Germany as a host country and German migrants are excluded from the analysis.

²In line with other research (see also Andolina et al., 2003; Gomez, 2022), the age of 15 is considered as a start for political socialisation, which is in accordance to considerations of the impressionable years period (see also Niemi and Hepburn, 1995).

policy preferences, I include the variable *EU enlargement* (scale 0-10, item: “European Union: European unification go further or gone too far”), *gay rights* (scale 1-5, “Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish”), *immigration poor countries* (scale 1-4, “Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe”), *immigration economy* (scale 0-10, “Immigration bad or good for country’s economy”) and *redistribution preferences* (scale 1-5, “Government should reduce differences in income levels”).

For all of these variables, binary measures are created, where 1 depicts a respondent who positioned themselves on the scale of the corresponding item and 0 depicts “don’t know”. Following Otjes and Rekker (2021), the other non-response values, “refusal” and “no answer”, were excluded from the analysis to isolate the understanding of these items from an unwillingness to answer or hiding true opinions. For the item party identification, the binary variable is coded differently: 1 represents a respondent that felt closer to a specific party, while 0 depicts respondents who either replied that they do not feel close to a specific party or “don’t know”. This decision was taken due to the consideration that people who are unsure about their party identification are likely to choose this option over the “don’t know”, given the binary nature of the question.

Variables for Mechanisms

For the theorised mechanism of **political ability and interest**, I include the variables *political interest* (scale 1-4, very interested to not at all interested), *confidence in political ability* (“confidence in own ability to participate in politics”, scale 1-5, not at all confident to completely confident), *ability to be active in politics* (“able to take active role in political group”, scale 1-5, not at all able to completely able). The variables on ability were combined into a mean index measuring the perceived political ability of a respondent.

To measure **political satisfaction**, I include measures of political efficacy: *Have a say in politics* (“Political system allows people to have a say in what government does”, scale 1-5, not at all to a great deal) and *influence in politics* (“Political system allows people to have influence on politics”, scale 1-5, not at all to a great deal). To measure trust as another dimension of political satisfaction, I include three dimensions on institutional trust: *trust in the legal system*, *trust in the country’s parliament* and *trust in the police* (all measured 0-10, no trust at all to complete trust). The two variables measuring political efficacy and the three variables on institutional trust were transformed into two mean indices respectively.

Figure A.3 in Appendix A.1 shows an overview of how all individual measures correlate. To allow for a better comparability of the effect sizes, I standardised the variables. Since political interest only had four outcome values, I transformed the variable prior to standardisation into a binary measurement.

Matching

Immigrants from (former) authoritarian regimes and established democracies might differ substantially from the non-immigrant population. As the summary statistics in Table A.2 in Appendix A.1 show, immigrants from established democracies are highly educated, while immigrants from (former) authoritarian regimes often have a lower socio-economic status. To avoid estimating effects that are of compositional nature, I rely on matching as a pre-processing method. Matching ensures that a treatment and a control group are as similar as possible on observed covariates, which reduces bias and model dependence (Ho et al., 2007). To estimate differences between the two immigrant groups and non-immigrants, I use exact matching. The matching process is conducted separately for immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes and immigrants from established democracies to the non-immigrant group in the sample. The large sample size of the non-immigrant population allows to find exact counterfactuals on the observed covariates for each

of the two immigrant groups.

To match the data, I rely on the package `MatchIt` and use the method `exact` in R. Using matching weights, linear probability models are employed to estimate the sample average treatment effect of the treated (SATT).³ The treatment group and the control group are matched separately for each outcome variable to avoid losing observations due to other types of non-response than “don’t know” or a certain question not being asked in a year. Since immigration occurs before data collection, it is important to rely on pre-treatment variables. Since the treatment occurs over a long time-span, I rely on time-invariant matching variables. I match on gender, year of birth, father’s education level and the occupation of the father as a proxy for social status. Additionally, I match the treatment and control group exactly on the host country and the survey year to avoid inducing bias from counterfactuals from different country contexts or time. Given that excellent balance is achieved, covariates are accounted for non-parametrically and not included in the regression models (see also Ho et al., 2007). The respective sections in Appendix A report the origin countries⁴ included in the respective analysis, as well as covariate balances pre- and post-matching.

At this point, this technique does not allow to distinguish differences between immigrant groups. To rule out different pre-existing characteristics of the two immigrant groups as a driver of the results, I compare the two immigrant groups by matching them to each other as an additional analysis. Since the sample size of both immigrant groups is not large enough to use exact matching, I use coarsened exact matching (Iacus et al., 2012). Coarsened exact matching (CEM) is a similar pre-processing approach, but less strict than exact matching. By grouping similar values of covariates and matching for the two groups examined, the pool of potential counterfactuals is larger in CEM. For the estimation process, the coarsening

³Results do not substantially change when using logistic regression models, but are included as robustness checks.

⁴In the case of non-immigrants, this means their country of residence.

gets lifted and the remaining imbalance is accounted for by employing parametric regression models using linear probability models. For this procedure, I also rely on the MatchIt package, but use the method `cem` in R. In addition to the covariates described above, I also include immigration year as a matching variables to ensure that immigrants that are being compared have spent a similar amount of time in the host country.

Results




Figure 2.1: Non-positioning on outcome variables by immigration status. *Depicted proportions of party identification (PID) also include no identification with any party besides “don’t know” (non-matched sample).

How do immigrants from authoritarian regimes position on abstract ideological concepts and specific policy items compared to the non-immigrant population, and how do immigrants from established democracies fare? Figure 2.1 depicts the non-positioning on the included outcome variables for each group examined: immigrants coming from (former) authoritarian regimes, immigrants from established democracies and the non-immigrant population in the democratic host

countries. The graph descriptively supports that immigrants from (former) authoritarian regimes are less likely to identify their ideological position on abstract concepts, such as the left-right scale or party identification in the host country, than immigrants from established democracies and non-immigrants. However, also immigrants from established democracies seem to be less likely to identify with parties than non-immigrants. For the specific policy items, particularly EU enlargement is noteworthy in terms of the proportion of non-positioning of immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes. Differences also exist for the other outcomes but are especially smaller on the immigration items. For the full distribution of the outcome variables, please refer to Table A.4 in Appendix A.1.

Abstract Political Ideology

How does experience with authoritarianism matter concerning the identification of positions on abstract ideological items after migration? Figure 2.2 shows that immigrants from established democracies are not significantly more or less likely to identify their position on the left-right scale, while immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes are around 11% less likely to do so than their non-immigrant counterparts. Although the estimates are not as precise, immigrating from a (post-) authoritarian regimes leads to an approximately 19% lower likelihood of identifying with a party in the host country compared to respondents who have no direct migration background. However, also immigrating from an established democracy does not close this gap: Immigrants from established democracies have a 10% lower likelihood of acquiring a party identity in the host country than their non-immigrant counterparts. Overall, these results highlight that immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes are consistently less likely to position themselves on abstract ideological items than non-immigrants, whereas immigrants from democratic regimes map similarly to the non-immigrant population concerning left-right self placement, but do have lower partisan attachments (see Appendix A.2 for

more details).




Figure 2.2: Effect of authoritarian or established democratic experience on positioning on abstract ideological concepts (left-right scale and party identification). Exactly matched estimations (SATT). Comparison immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes (treatment) vs. non-immigrants (control) - clustered standard errors calculated on country of origin level. Comparison immigrants from established democracies (treatment) vs. non-immigrants (control) - robust standard errors calculated (too few clusters for clustering standard errors).

Policy Preferences

Left-right self placement, but also party identification are rather abstract political concepts, for which a higher degree of political understanding might be needed. By contrast, policy issues are more accessible and should be easier to understand given their specificity. Hence, patterns of non-positioning should be less pronounced for immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes. Figure 2.3 presents results for the positioning on the five different policy dimensions included in the analysis.

As depicted in Figure 2.3, the gap between immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes and non-immigrants is less substantial for policy preferences than the more abstract concepts. The largest gap exists for the EU enlargement item with immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes being 4% less likely to iden-




Figure 2.3: Effect of authoritarian or established democratic experience on positioning on specific policy items. Exactly matched estimations (SATT). Comparison immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes (treatment) vs. non-immigrants (control) - clustered standard errors calculated on country of origin level. Comparison immigrants from established democracies (treatment) vs. non-immigrants (control) - robust standard errors calculated (too few clusters for clustering standard errors).

tify their policy preferences than non-immigrants. This finding might not be as surprising given that a substantial portion of this immigrant group comes from countries outside the EU, where this issue might be less salient. For the other policy items, immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes are approximately 1% to 3% less likely to identify a position than their non-immigrant counterparts. Immigrants from established democracies do, by contrast, not differ much from non-immigrants in their positioning. Immigrants seem to benefit from democratic experiences concerning their positioning on policy items when comparing them to non-immigrants. However, also immigrants without experiences from established democracies do not show large differences compared to non-immigrants (see Appendix A.2 for more details).

Mechanisms




Figure 2.4: Mechanisms: Effect of authoritarian and democratic experience on political ability and interest, efficacy and institutional trust. Exactly matched estimations (SATT) in standard deviation units. Comparison immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes (treatment) vs. non-immigrants (control) - clustered standard errors calculated on country of origin level. Comparison immigrants from established democracies (treatment) vs. non-immigrants (control) - robust standard errors calculated (too few clusters for clustering standard errors).

As postulated in the theoretical section, if political understanding drives these behaviours, then immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes should perceive their political abilities to be lower and be less politically interested than non-immigrants. By contrast, immigrants from established democracies should report similar levels of perceived ability and interest to the non-immigrant population. To assess these mechanisms to a greater extent, Figure 2.4 provides insights into how immigrants from (post-) authoritarian and immigrants from established democracies differ compared to non-immigrants employing again exact matching. Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian perceive their political abilities to be 0.25 standard deviation (sd) units lower than non-immigrants, while immigrants from established democracies perceive their abilities similarly to non-immigrants. A comparable pattern emerges for political interest with a 0.23 sd units difference

for immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes and non-immigrants.

Looking at the two outcomes measuring political satisfaction, the non-response behaviour does not seem to be driven by a lack of political trust in the host country given that immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes have a higher trust in institutions than non-immigrants (0.37 sd units), while immigrants from established democracies report similar trust levels to their non-immigrant counterparts. This result also corroborates findings by McAllister and Makkai (1992) and Superti and Gidron (2021). Concerning political efficacy, the results are not as clear. Immigrants from established democracy report 0.2 sd units lower perceived political efficacy than non-immigrants (significant on a 10% level). Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes also report lower levels of political efficacy, this result is, however, not statistically significant on the conventional levels. Perceived political efficacy could, therefore, at least partly explain the observed differences in party identification between immigrants from established democracies and non-immigrants (see Appendix A.2 for more details).

To ensure the robustness of the results found, I conduct several tests. First, I assess the sensitivity of the estimates by conducting sensitivity analyses (Cinelli et al., 2020; Cinelli and Hazlett, 2020). Results show that the estimations can be interpreted with care (see Appendix A.2.4). Given the binary nature of the outcomes of interest, I additionally re-estimated the analyses with logistic regression models for the main outcomes. Results remain the same (see Appendix A.2.5). As a third step, I allowed for treatment-covariate interactions and calculated the SATT, as suggested by the MatchIt vignette (Greifer, 2023). Results remain the same apart from the effect of political efficacy for immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes compared to non-immigrants, which is now statistically significant (see Appendix A.2.6).

Finally, I re-estimated the models employing propensity score matching as an alternative matching strategy. Differences appear for the policy items redistribu-

tion and immigration from poor countries between immigrants from established democracies and non-immigrants are now statistically significant (the latter on a 10% level). Nevertheless, these differences are with one percentage point relatively minor. In addition, immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes are estimated to trust institutions by 6% more than non-immigrants, which is statistically significant on a 10% level. Otherwise, results do not substantially change (see Appendix A.2.7).

Additional Analyses

Immigrants from (Post-) Authoritarian versus Democratic Regimes

So far, the analyses do not allow to establish whether there really is a difference between immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes and established democracies concerning their positioning in the ideological space. To assess how coming from a (post-) authoritarian versus established democratic regime matters, the analyses are replicated with immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes as the treatment group and immigrants from established democracies as a control group (see Appendix A.3). The analyses support that experience with (post-) authoritarianism before migration decreases the extent to which immigrants take a position in the ideological space. Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes are less likely to place themselves on the left-right scale (7%) and have lower levels of party identification (8%) than immigrants from established democracies. Concerning specific policy dimensions, these differences are much smaller, ranging from approximately 2% to 4% for those statistically different from zero. Employing propensity score matching as an alternative matching strategy yields similar results except for the two immigration policy items, for which the difference is substantially small but significantly different from zero (see Appendix A.3.5).




Figure 2.5: Effect of (post-) authoritarian and established democratic experience of immigrants on positioning on abstract ideological concepts and specific policy items. CEM estimations (SATT). Comparison immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes (treatment) vs. immigrants from established democracies (control) - clustered standard errors calculated on country of origin level.

Figure 2.6 focuses on the underlying mechanisms. The results support that immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes are less politically interested (0.27 sd units), but also perceive their political abilities to be lower than immigrants from established democracies (0.31 sd units). Differences in positioning on ideological positioning between the two groups does not seem to be driven by measures of political satisfaction. There is no difference in perceived political efficacy between the groups and immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes express higher levels of political trust in the host country institutions than immigrants from established democracies, but this is not statistically significant. These results underline that political interest and political abilities seem to be drivers of non-response of




Figure 2.6: Mechanisms: Effect of (post-) authoritarian and established democratic experience of immigrants on political ability and interest, efficacy and institutional trust. CEM estimations (SATT) in standard deviation units. Comparison immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes (treatment) vs. immigrants from established democracies (control) - clustered standard errors calculated on country of origin level.

immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes on the assessed items. These results are robust to a change in matching strategy, except that the difference for trust in institutions is now statistically significant (see again Appendix A.3.5).

New Democracies and Ongoing Authoritarianism

Immigrants from ongoing authoritarian regimes and new democracies have been pooled in the prior analyses. Nevertheless, one could argue that a relatively recent democratic rule in the country of origin might mitigate the effects of authoritarianism on taking a position in the ideological space, given that there should be freedom of expression, more elite conflict and elections. However, socialisation and transmission processes are likely to be slower moving. As a consequence, the observed patterns should at least to a certain degree persist. To assess potential differences, I split the sample of immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes

into countries with and without longer democratic rule from 2000 to 2020 using again the categorical liberal democracy index (Lindberg, 2016). For the sample split, countries were categorised as having a longer democratic rule if they were classified as *minimally democratic* as opposed to *autocratic* or *electoral authoritarian* for at least 11 years. 29 out of the 39 countries in this category were classified as such for all 21 years (see Appendix A.4.1 for more details).




Figure 2.7: Effect of authoritarian experience with or without longer democratic rule on ability to understand and take a position on abstract ideological concepts and specific policy items. Exactly matched estimations (SATT). Comparison immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes with longer democratic rule (treatment) vs. non-immigrants (control) - clustered standard errors calculated on country of origin level. Comparison immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes with no longer democratic rule (treatment) vs. non-immigrants (control) - clustered standard errors calculated on country of origin level.

Figure 2.7 shows that immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes with and without a longer democratic rule do not differ much in whether they identify their

position in the ideological space compared to non-immigrants. Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes with a more stable democratic rule are 9% less likely to take a position on the left-right scale than non-immigrants. At the same time, the effect is 12% for immigrants from countries with no longer democratic rule. In the case of party identification, the negative effect is slightly larger for immigrants from countries with a longer democratic rule (20%) than for those without (17%). This pattern could be correlated with pre-existing party ties in the origin country, since this could make immigrants less open for partisan attachments in the host country (see also Just, 2019). Nevertheless, this difference is small.

Concerning specific policy preferences, coming from a country with a more successful democratisation does not seem to provide much of an advantage apart from the item EU enlargement. Immigrants from countries with no longer and stable democratic rule are 6% less likely to position on the item compared to non-immigrants, while there is no difference between immigrants from a more stable democratic rule and non-immigrants. This result is likely driven by the different shares of EU memberships of the origin countries between the groups. Overall, this additional analysis supports the idea that effects of authoritarianism are a longer-lasting phenomenon and affect positioning in the ideological space. At the same time, it also mirrors conclusions from the main analysis: (Post-) authoritarian socialisation primarily affects the identification of positions on abstract political concepts, while for specific policy issues, differences are not substantial in size (see Appendix A.4).

Discussion & Conclusion

How does exposure to (post-) authoritarianism affect positioning in the ideological political space after relocating to an established democracy? Building on research of new democracies and political socialisation, I argue that authoritarianism dis-

courages people from being involved in politics, which lowers their political interest and ability, which is needed to identify their ideological positions. As a result, immigrants with authoritarian experience are less likely to position particularly on abstract issues than non-immigrants. On the other hand, differences should be substantially small on specific policy items, given that they are more accessible and require a lower level of political sophistication. Immigrants from established democracies, on the other hand, should behave similarly to non-immigrants, given their comparable experience with democracy. This paper contributes to the fields of authoritarian legacies, immigrant political behaviour and, more generally, to the literature on political socialisation and cultural transmission.

Employing exact matching and using the European Social Survey (ESS) round 5-10 for the individual level data and the categorical liberal democracy index (Lindberg, 2016) based on V-Dem to classify the regimes of the origin countries, I find that the results partly support the theoretical considerations made. Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes are substantially less likely to identify their political positions in abstract terms than non-immigrants in the host country. While differences exist for specific policy considerations, they are substantially small. Immigrants from established democracies behave as expected similarly to the non-immigrant population in the host country, except when it comes to party identification, which is lower. Additional analyses directly comparing the two immigrant groups mirror these patterns, ruling out compositional effects of these differences. Assessing mechanisms provides evidence that immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes are less politically interested and ascribe themselves lower political abilities than non-immigrants or immigrants from established democracies.

These findings underline the long-lasting impact direct and indirect exposure to authoritarianism can have on subsequent political behaviour. Given that fertility rates are declining, while migration inflows are rising, the demographic composition in Western democracies is shifting. As an increasing share of the popula-

tion is not allowed to vote or run for office, Western democracies will need to deal with the resulting democratic deficit (see also Blatter et al., 2017). This development might lead these countries to become more politically inclusive. The left-right dimension and party identification are, however, heuristics for electoral behaviour (see e.g. Lachat, 2015). Hence, this study's results could indicate an increased risk of immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes becoming disproportionately underrepresented, especially if elections were opened to non-nationals. On the other hand, the results also highlight that this immigrant group has electoral potential for many parties, given that they might respond more strongly to issue-based appeals rather than basing decisions on abstract labels.

This study has some limitations, which I would like to openly discuss. First, immigrants self-select into migration, which leads to certain compositional biases. However, by employing matching between immigrants and non-immigrants and replicating the analysis with the two immigrant groups in a direct comparison, some of these concerns are addressed. Secondly, while the preferred strategy in this paper is exact matching, which ensures perfect balance on covariates, it discards observations, making the analysis only representative of part of the overall data. Third, this study aimed to assess the overall effect of exposure to authoritarianism on the ability to identify ideological positions. However, authoritarian regimes are heterogeneous in themselves. While authoritarian regimes are often ideologically tinted, some of them attempt to indoctrinate these ideologies more strongly than others (see Neundorf et al., 2023), which might affect how well immigrants from these countries can identify their ideological preferences. Lastly, the legal statuses of immigrants are not considered in this analysis, which could affect especially party identification patterns.

Future research on this topic is highly encouraged. First, heterogeneity within authoritarian regimes is a promising avenue to extend this study. For instance, the level of repression in the country of origin and its interplay with the ideological

indoctrination of its citizens on the ability to identify political preferences could be assessed. On the other hand, variation in the deliberative possibilities in authoritarian regimes could also be exploited. Second, future research could examine how the patterns found matter for second-generation immigrants in the host society. Such a set-up can provide insights into the dynamics of vertical versus horizontal transmission processes in the host society. Third, other studies could also extend this analysis by adapting a temporal perspective, i.e. whether differences between social groups become smaller over time. Lastly, future research could also examine the different legal statuses of immigrants in the host country. For instance, immigrants naturalised in the host country might behave differently than those who are not due to their different levels of political inclusion.

Chapter 3

Lingering Memories of the Past? The Ideological Behaviour of Immigrants Socialised in Authoritarian Regimes

Abstract

How does the political socialisation in authoritarian regimes affect the political behaviour of immigrants in democracies? The political past of immigrants is often overlooked when assessing their behaviour, although experiences with politics can differ substantially. In this paper, I suggest that immigrants socialised in left-wing authoritarian regimes avoid the political left and support right of centre parties, while immigrants socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes do not translate anti-right biases into host country politics. Using the German Socio-Economic Panel and V-Dem while applying Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM), I find a bias against the political left for immigrants socialised in left-wing authoritarian regimes compared to their democratic counterparts. Immigrants socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes also express a bias against the political left, but only if the country has a longer communist past, otherwise no substantial differences appear. These results have important implications for how authoritarianism shapes political behaviour in a different context.

Keywords: Immigration, Political Behaviour, Authoritarianism, Political Socialisation

Introduction

Over the past years, the immigrant population has been growing worldwide. To take an example, compared to 1990, when around 49 million immigrants were living in Europe, the immigrant population increased by more than 1.5 times to around 78 million by 2017 (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2017). Although immigrants constitute an important part of these societies, scholars of political behaviour often focus on attitudes *towards* immigrants and immigration in general (for reviews see e.g. Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014) or on the consequence of the politicisation of migration on party positions and success (see e.g. Abou-Chadi, 2016; van Spanje, 2010). Research on the political behaviour *of* immigrants is, on the other hand, limited and primarily concentrated on political participation (e.g. Andersson et al., 2022; de Rooij, 2011; DeSipio, 1996; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001) and trust (e.g. Maxwell, 2010; McAllister and Makkai, 1992; Rocha et al., 2015). What we lack is a better understanding of political preferences of immigrants.

What drives the political behaviour of immigrants? Empirical evidence finds varying behaviour depending on the country of origin (e.g. Philippov and Knafelman, 2011; Strijbis, 2014; Wüst, 2004), but causes and explanations of such heterogeneity in vote choice and party support patterns remain largely unexplored. Especially, the connection of the political past of immigrants to their ideological behaviour in the host country has often been overlooked. While some immigrants grew up in full-fledged democracies with functioning electoral systems, others spent their youth in left- and right-wing authoritarian regimes often with strongly restricted political rights. This research addresses this gap by focusing on the question: What effect does the regime type and ideology during political socialisation in the origin country have on the political behaviour of immigrants in the host country? Building on research of political socialisation and (post-) authoritar-

ian regimes (Dinas, 2017; Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2020; Linz, 2000), I argue that due to the presence of a developed ideology, immigrants socialised in left-wing authoritarian regimes will show systematic anti-left sentiments concerning host country politics. On the contrary, immigrants socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes are not expected to systematically extend anti-right biases to the democratic host country, since these regimes tend to reflect *mentalities* (Linz, 2000), which cannot be as easily transferred to another political context.

These expectations are tested for first-generation immigrants in Germany relying on the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for individual level data and V-Dem for country level data. By employing Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) (Iacus et al., 2012) on a number of covariates before estimating parametric regression models, I reduce the risk of omitted confounders and model dependency. Results show that immigrants socialised in left-wing authoritarian regimes are indeed more likely to identify with right of centre parties than their democratic counterparts, while no robust differences are found concerning their left-right self placement. Immigrants socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes are also more likely to support right of centre parties than immigrants from established democracies, but only if they come from countries with a longer communist past, such as Russia and Kazakhstan. Those socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes without longer communist past are overall not more or less likely to support right of centre parties or position themselves differently on the left-right scale than their democratic counterparts. These findings underline that pre-migration experiences concerning regime type and ideology matter for the party identification in the host country, particularly in the (post-) communist context.

This paper emphasises that considering institutional settings in the origin country can shed light on party identification patterns of immigrants in the host country, as presented in Figure 3.1, which visualises the aggregate share of right of centre party identification in Germany and the level of democracy by the regime ideology

of the origin country. By doing so, this work provides first evidence that systematic biases against the ideological spectrum of the former authoritarian regime are unique to immigrants socialised under left-, and not right-wing authoritarianism concerning host country politics. While previous studies focused mainly on making claims for the left-wing spectrum of authoritarianism (such as Just, 2019; Strijbis, 2014; Wüst, 2004), this is the first to focus on effects of vertical transmission and political socialisation in both left- and right-wing authoritarian regimes for the case of immigrants. I additionally advance the literature in a more causal direction by applying matching, which makes the results more robust than prior efforts. By focusing on pre-migration exposure to authoritarianism, this study contributes to the immigrant political behaviour literature, but also provides new evidence to the effects of vertical transmission (Bisin and Verdier, 2001) and political socialisation (Niemi and Hepburn, 1995). Demonstrating an asymmetric effect of ideologically tinted authoritarian regimes, this work shows that the theoretical mechanisms by Dinas (2017) and Dinas and Northmore-Ball (2020) do not directly translate to immigrants socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes.

Political Behaviour, Socialisation and Regime Types

Evidence has repeatedly shown that not only natives and immigrants differ in their political behaviour, but that heterogeneity also exists across immigrant groups. Many of these studies provide insights in the U.S. context (e.g. Barreto, 2007; Bass and Casper, 2001; DeSipio, 1996; Hill and Moreno, 1996; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001), however, the topic has also started to attract attention in the European setting (e.g. Goerres et al., 2022; Strijbis, 2014; Wüst, 2004). While a bulk of this literature shows that partisan attachments and vote choice differ by immigrant group depending on the country or region of origin, explanations of the emergence of these patterns often fall short.




Figure 3.1: Aggregate share of right of centre party identification in SOEP and average V-Dem liberal democracy index score during political socialisation period (15-25) in authoritarian origin country by ideology during political socialisation. Due to regime transitions from e.g. left- to right-wing authoritarianism, certain countries, such as Russia, appear as both left- and right-wing authoritarian. LW-Auth. = Left-wing authoritarian regime, RW-Auth. = Right-wing authoritarian regime. Averages depicted of groups with at least 30 respondents.

What is missing is a better understanding of the common denominators that can explain different political preferences of immigrants. One approach to study these behaviours is to focus on effects of vertical transmission of culture (Bisin and Verdier, 2001), which suggests that immigrants intend to preserve their cultural heritage even when adapting to a new socio-political environment with the goal to pass their political values down to their children (Bisin and Verdier, 2011). Previous evidence underlines the importance of exposure to the political culture in the country of origin concerning host country politics: Harles (1997) finds by conducting qualitative interviews of Lao immigrants in Ontario, Canada, that political experiences in the country of origin have an impact on the notion of politics

in general and, for instance, also Luttmer and Singhal (2011) show that redistribution preferences in the host country follow the ones present in the country of origin. That pre-migration experiences with institutions matter is additionally suggested by multiple studies showing that immigrants from authoritarian as opposed to non-authoritarian regimes show different levels of political participation (Bilodeau, 2008; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001; White, 2017) and support for democracy (Bilodeau, 2014; Bilodeau et al., 2010; McAllister and Makkai, 1992). Nevertheless, these studies do not provide insights into ideological political preferences and do not distinguish between ideologies of the previous regime.

While research tends to particularly overlook the effects of exposure to right-wing authoritarianism on political preferences in the host country, experience with communism seems to be connected to a backlash against the political left. Besides correlationally showing that those coming from a non-party autocracy are more likely to acquire a party identification compared to those from a party-based autocracy or democracy, Just's (2019) cross-national study for European countries suggests that those immigrants from an authoritarian communist regime tend to be less likely to identify with left-wing parties in the host country than other immigrants (a result which is pointed to by previous evidence of Philippov and Knafelman, 2011 and Strijbis, 2014). Since the author's comparison group contains both immigrants from authoritarian and non-authoritarian regimes, it remains unclear whether this backlash against the left is a property of communism or part of a broader authoritarian effect. Hence, what is particularly missing in the literature is a stronger empirical claim for immigrants from communist regimes to express biases against the left, and an assessment how immigrants socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes ideologically behave.

In this paper, I focus on the effect of the regime type experienced throughout political socialisation on the political behaviour of immigrants in the host coun-

try. While political attitudes and orientations are subject to change throughout the whole life course, the formative years model of political socialisation theory suggests that events and transitions that can strongly affect these attitudes occur mostly during late adolescence and early adulthood (Fillieule, 2013, p.2). This period of time is of importance, as influential psychological and social changes occur. Additionally, society usually tries to teach young adults how to be active citizens throughout these years (Niemi and Hepburn, 1995, p.9). Although research has not yet agreed on a clear start and finish of the impressionable years period, in this study, I consider in line with other empirical research (e.g. Andolina et al., 2003; Gomez, 2022) the age between 15 to 25 as the formative years period for political socialisation.

How does exposure to a left- or right-wing authoritarian regime throughout political socialisation affect political preferences of immigrants? For new democracies, Dinas (2017) and Dinas and Northmore-Ball (2020) argue and show in their theoretical framework that anti-left or anti-right sentiments succeed the fall of an authoritarian regime among the public depending on its former ideology. As a consequence, citizens in these new democracies position parties associated with the former authoritarian regime more extremely on the political left-right spectrum. While these parties are perceived to be more left- or right-wing, citizens also express an anti-left or anti-right bias when positioning themselves on the left-right scale. Higher levels of state repression lead to a stronger bias against the ideology of the former regime, whereas higher levels of indoctrination mitigate the backlash effect among citizens in new democracies. Following this line of thought, a corresponding symmetric effect could be anticipated for immigrants socialised in an authoritarian left- or right-wing regime concerning their behaviour in host country politics: Given the negative experiences made with the corresponding ideological spectrum in the origin country, immigrants socialised in left-wing authoritarian regimes should support the political right and those socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes should support the political left in the host country. Never-

theless, in this paper, I argue in the case of immigrants for an asymmetric backlash effect to appear as a consequence of socialisation in an ideologically tinted authoritarian regime.

For backlash effects to be translated into another political context, citizens should clearly connect the regime ideology to the repressive authoritarian experience. A certain presence of the ideology and, hence, level of indoctrination should therefore be needed for these biases to be extended. Although research indicates that high levels of indoctrination can lead to regime legitimisation (but see Kang, 2023) and mitigate backlash effects produced by repression (Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2020), immigrants constitute a most likely case for the appearance of biases against the ideology of the regime to appear. By opting out of their prior political system and getting to know a different reality in a democracy, they actively chose to leave the repressive regime and its legacy.

Left- and right-wing authoritarian regimes differ, however, in the extent of how present their ideology is. While left-wing authoritarian regimes have a developed ideology, right-wing authoritarian regimes often reflect *mentalities* of their leadership (see Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2020; Linz, 2000). Having a developed ideology facilitates elites, however, to engage in higher levels of regime indoctrination, which increases the presence of its ideological values. For example, the USSR fully controlled the education system with the goal to legitimise its ideology and regime (Gaworek, 1977), and had access to a wide range of literature simplifying the dissemination of the communist ideology (see Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2020). On the contrary, given their vague mentality, military regimes usually employ lower measures of indoctrination (Linz, 2000; Neundorf et al., 2023), hence, the right-wing ideology is less prominent in the repressive regime.

The coherence and strong presence of the left-wing ideology in left-wing authoritarian regimes should lead citizens to actively associate the ideological tint to their repressive experience. As a result, immigrants socialised under left-wing author-

itarianism should extend their ideological biases to another political context. By contrast, given that the mentality of right-wing authoritarianism is more difficult to diffuse (Linz, 2000), right-wing politics should not get associated to the repressive authoritarian experience strongly enough for biases against it to systematically transfer into another political environment. As a consequence, I expect that immigrants socialised under left-wing authoritarianism should generally avoid the political left in the host country, while socialisation in right-wing authoritarian regimes should generally not result in a systematic bias against the political right in host country politics.

Data and Research Design

I examine the effects of being socialised in an authoritarian left- or right-wing regime on ideological political behaviour in the host country using data on Germany. Germany is a particularly suitable case to study. Around 26% of its population has a migration background of which approximately one third is eligible to vote in the federal elections (Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis), 2020). While Turkey is the origin country with the largest number of immigrants (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2022), Germany has been the destination for immigrants from many different countries, allowing for meaningful comparisons of the effect of ideology and regime type. It is challenging to focus on the immigrant population exclusively since surveys often do not sample many immigrants. The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) (2021; Goebel et al., 2019), which is used for the individual-level data, overcomes this problem by including immigrant oversamples. Information on the regime type, ideology and other country-specific characteristics of the origin country of the respondent is drawn from the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2021a; Pemstein et al., 2021). First-generation immigrants who emigrated as adults (i.e. with at least 18 years of age), who were

politically socialised after World War II, are included in the analysis. This implies that they have spent from three up to eleven years of their political socialisation period (age 15-25) in the country of origin. Outcome variables included are *right of centre party identification*^{1,2} and additionally *left-right self placement* (ranging from 0 = completely left to 10 = completely right).³

Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM)

In purely observational studies, group comparisons are often biased, because survey respondents can be systematically different on observed but also unobserved characteristics across these two groups.⁴ As a consequence, when applying parametric regression models, the estimates of these studies are often model dependent. To overcome this problem, I use a matching approach to pre-process the data. Matching aims to make the control and treatment group balanced on observed covariates by reducing variance between these two groups and approximate a randomised experiment (Ho et al., 2007; Stuart, 2010). While propensity score matching (PSM) is commonly used, there has been a backlash against this method. Although it attempts to recreate a fully randomised experiment, King and Nielsen (2019) argue that it “increases imbalance, inefficiency, model dependence, research discretion, and statistical bias” (King and Nielsen, 2019, p.1) compared to other matching methods that approach a fully blocked randomised experiment,

¹Using the overall ideological party positions of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Jolly et al., 2022), I coded a binary variable, where AfD, FDP, NPD/Republikaner/Die Rechte, CDU/CSU depicts 1 (right of centre) and Buendnis90/Gruene, Die Linke, Piratenpartei, SPD as 0 (not right of centre/left of centre)

²Those not identifying with any party or not specifying the party (answering “other”) were excluded for this outcome.

³Left-right self placement is measured in 2005, 2009, 2014 and 2019 (results are reported into detail in Appendix B) and party identification was included for all waves between 1990-2019. Given missing values on covariates, observations from survey years from 1998 to 2019 were mostly included in the matching process. The SOEP includes a question on voting in the 2013 and 2017 federal elections, but the number of immigrants who answered these questions is too small for the subsequent analysis.

⁴For instance, immigrant groups often differ substantially in their socio-economic characteristics (see e.g. Fibbi et al., 2007).

such as coarsened exact matching (CEM), which will be applied.

CEM follows the logic of grouping values on covariates and finding indistinguishable control and treatment units, i.e. appropriate counterfactuals, across these coarsened groups. For example, years of education could be divided into high school, undergraduate and graduate degree. Variables that are already of categorical nature are not transformed. After the coarsening process, the exact matching algorithm identifies matched control and treatment units. Throughout this identification process, multiple sets of strata are created. Units are located in the same stratum, if they are in the same group of each coarsened matching variable. To balance differing numbers of control and treatment units in each stratum, weights are applied in the following statistical applications. Units are unmatched if there is not at least one treated and one control unit in the same stratum, in which case they will be pruned. Lastly, the coarsening is lifted to return to the original values of the matched units (Iacus et al., 2009; 2012). As matching is only used as a pre-processing method, I apply OLS and linear probability models for the estimation process to account for the remaining imbalance.⁵

Treatment and Control

The theoretical considerations imply two treatment groups: Immigrants fully socialised in a right-wing authoritarian regime and those fully socialised in a left-wing authoritarian regime. An immigrant is defined as having been socialised in an authoritarian regime if 1) the country of origin is classified by the ordinal liberal democracy indicator (*e_v2x_libdem_3C*) (Lindberg, 2016) as either autocratic or electoral authoritarian and 2) this has predominantly been the case for the socialisation period spent in the country of origin. More precisely, this means that

⁵Models include specifications with standard errors that are clustered on country of origin levels. If not enough clusters are present (following Angrist and Pischke, 2009, defined as fewer than 42) robust standard errors are calculated. Robustness checks include standard error clusterings on the respondent and household level.

if over 50% of the political socialisation period in the country of origin was spent under an autocratic or electoral authoritarian rule, the respondent is classified as socialised under authoritarianism. Respondents are excluded if socialisation in the origin country was 50% minimally democratic and 50% authoritarian, as well as those predominantly socialised in new democracies.

To classify the ideological direction of the authoritarian rule, the following procedure is applied: The variable ideological character (*v2exl_legitideolcr*) provided by V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2021b; Tannenbergh et al., 2019) is employed to describe the ideology of legitimacy claims made by the government in a country-year if the regime was classified as autocratic or electoral authoritarian (based on the liberal democracy index). Experts classified the ideologies of the governments in a certain year and country as nationalist, socialist/communist, restorative/conservative, separatist/autonomist and/or religious. Given the possibility of simultaneous classifications and multiple experts, each country-year and ideological classification received a score between 0 (no expert coded this ideology) and 1 (all experts coded this ideology). Right-wing authoritarianism includes country-years that scored highest in the nationalist and/or restorative/conservative category and left-wing authoritarianism those that scored highest in the socialist/communist category. To not falsely assign countries to right-wing authoritarianism that scored highest in nationalist systems but are actually left-wing nationalist (e.g. Nicaragua during the Sandinista Junta), I classified countries as left-wing authoritarian that received from at least half of the experts the classification socialist/communist besides nationalist (if the restorative/conservative category was less dominant). Those country-years that had scored highest in either the ideology separatist/autonomist or religious were classified as “other authoritarian regimes”, since they do not clearly indicate a left- or right-wing ideology.

The socialisation period of immigrants is then classified as left-wing (right-wing) authoritarian if they have spent more than 50% of their socialisation in the country

of origin under left-wing (right-wing) authoritarianism. In the case of a regime change from an authoritarian to a minimally democratic regime, the ideological character was only considered for the socialisation years that were spent under authoritarianism.

The control group consists of immigrants that have been politically socialised in established democratic host countries. Sentiments against the ideology of the former government should not systematically be expressed by immigrants originating from a democratic regime, because they should not have any consistent repressive experiences associated to it, while internalising democratic norms and values.⁶ For details on the regime classifications, see Table B.1 and Section B.1.2 in the Appendix.

Matching

For the matching procedure, the following variables are used: Gender, years of education, year of birth and the social class of the father of the respondent. Matching on these variables should ensure that the experience of political socialisation has not been different due to any of these factors. Additionally, to account for the panel structure of the data, the survey year is used as a matching variable as well to avoid creating counterfactuals that were surveyed in different years. While GDP pc before socialisation (Coppedge et al., 2021b) and the religion of a respondent's father (Christian vs. not Christian religion) are important variables to account for in the models due to the same considerations as the matching variables, including them in the matching procedure would lead to a considerable reduction in matches. Therefore, these variables are excluded from the matching process, but included in the final regression models to account for them parametrically.⁷

⁶Immigrants socialised in new democracies are excluded from the control group to avoid spill-over effects of backlashes emerging from e.g. parental socialisation, which could bias estimations.

⁷GDP pc was imputed using linear interpolation. To ensure having a relatively stable measurement of GDP pc as well as to avoid a dip in a certain year having much influence, a five-year average of GDP pc of the country of origin of a certain respondent between (0-4 years old) was

Appendix B.1 provides descriptives of the sample before matching on covariates and the outcome measures.

Matching is conducted using the `MatchIt` package in R, with the two treatment groups being matched separately to the control group. As the outcome variables are queried in different survey years, I conduct the matching separately for the different outcome variables as well. While the survey year, gender and the social class of the father are exactly matched, the other matching variables are coarsened.⁸ To ensure that the coarsened bins make sense from a conceptual point of view, all coarsening was done on a manual basis. Years of education was coarsened into the categories up to 10 years, over 10 to 13 years and more than 13 years of education. Year of birth was grouped according to generations.⁹ To account for the remaining imbalance on the continuous variables, parametric regression models are applied in the estimations. The countries included in the analyses post-matching and the pre- and post-matching covariate balance are reported for each analysis in the respective sections of Appendix B.

Measuring Repression and Indoctrination

Since the theoretical considerations stipulate that the level of repression and the ideological presence, proxied by indoctrination, plays an instrumental role in the emergence of biases in host country politics, two measures were employed for descriptive purposes. Following Dinas and Northmore-Ball (2020), I used the reversed civil liberties index (`v2x_civlib`, 0 = no repression, 1 = full repression) by V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2021b) to measure repression levels and calculated the indoctrination score (0 = no indoctrination, 4 = full indoctrination) as proposed

employed. To avoid losing observations due to missing data within the five year range, the average was calculated even if certain values of the range were missing.

⁸Due to the exact matching, survey year, gender and the social class of the father are not included in the subsequent regression analysis.

⁹The groups were categorised as followed: < 1966, 1966-1980, 1981-1996, > 1996.

by the authors, which is based on multiple V-Dem indicators (Bernhard et al., 2015; Coppedge et al., 2021b; Pemstein et al., 2021) to measure indoctrination (see Appendix B.2). The constructed indoctrination score is particularly suitable since it follows a broader definition of an indoctrination attempt rather than its success (Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2020, Online Appendix C p.11-12). As repression and indoctrination levels vary over the span of the regime, the socialisation experiences under the same regime differ as well. To account for this variation and depict the accurate levels for the included respondents, I matched the yearly repression and indoctrination score to the corresponding socialisation year spent in the country of origin for each respondent and averaged the scores. In case of a regime change, i.e. a respondent was for example predominantly socialised in a right-wing authoritarian regime, but also spent some time under democratisation or a left-wing authoritarianism in the origin country, only the years under the right-wing authoritarian regime were considered.

Results

Before focusing on the effects of being socialised under a left- or right-wing authoritarian regime, it makes sense to first assess levels of repression and indoctrination in these two regime types compared to established democracies to ensure that they match the theoretical considerations. Figure 3.2, which follows Dinas and Northmore-Ball (2020, p.1974), shows that experienced repression levels are high in both left- and right-wing authoritarian regimes - although there is some heterogeneity present among the included right-wing authoritarian regimes. As outlined above, left-wing authoritarian regimes engage in higher levels of indoctrination than right-wing authoritarian regimes, which show more or less similar levels to established democracies.

How does socialisation under a left- or right-wing authoritarian regime affect right




Figure 3.2: Average repression and indoctrination scores experienced throughout political socialisation in established democratic, left- and right-wing authoritarian country of origin (non-matched sample).

of centre party identification in a democratic host country? Supporting the theoretical considerations, immigrants socialised in left-wing authoritarian regimes are, on average, 48% more likely to identify with a right of centre party than immigrants socialised in democratic regimes as depicted in Figure 3.3. This result is statistically significant on the conventional levels when accounting for the remaining imbalance on matched and additional control variables (see Models 1 to 5 in Table B.5 and Section B.3 in the Appendix). The full, but not naive, model shows differently than expected that immigrants socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes are also more likely to identify themselves with a right of centre party than immigrants from democratic regimes (around 19% difference) (see Models 1 to 5 in Table B.6 and Section B.3 in the Appendix).

Results of the left-right self placement outcome are reported in Appendix B.4, they do, however, not support that immigrants socialised in authoritarian left- or right-wing regimes place themselves robustly more or less towards the political right than their democratic counterparts (see Models 1 to 5 in Table B.10 and Table B.11 in the Appendix).




Figure 3.3: Effect of political socialisation in left-/right-wing authoritarian regime on party identification with right of centre party in Germany. Country of origin level clustered standard errors are calculated. Matching weights are applied.

Conditional Effects

If it is true that the experience of political socialisation under the authoritarian regime has an effect on host country behaviour, then a longer exposure of the regime should reinforce ideological biases due to a longer repressive regime experience.¹⁰ While the number of formative years spent in the country of origin are not conditioning effects on left-right self placement (see Models 6 to 8 in Table B.10 and B.11 in Appendix B.4), the results show a different pattern for the outcome party identification. Figure 3.4 depicts that immigrants socialised in left-wing authoritarian regimes who have spent more of their formative years in the country of origin are more likely to support a right of centre party than those who migrated beforehand in comparison to immigrants socialised in democracies. The anti-left bias starts to emerge, once immigrants spent at least seven years in the country of origin (see also Models 6 to 8 in Table B.5 in Appendix B.3).

¹⁰Due to the limited sample size, treatment and control group were not additionally matched on the number of formative years spent in the country of origin for this analysis.




Figure 3.4: Effect of political socialisation in left-/right-wing authoritarian regime on right of centre party identification in Germany by the number of formative years spent in the origin country. Country of origin level clustered standard errors are calculated. Matching weights are applied.

No conditioning effect of the number of formative years is found for immigrants socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes (see Models 6 to 8 in Table B.6 in Appendix B.3). While longer exposure to the country context reinforces anti-regime sentiments (as expressed in party support) in the case of left-wing authoritarian socialisation, the mechanism is not observed for immigrants socialised in right-wing authoritarian regime. No matter how many of their political socialisation years were spent in the country of origin, their right of centre party support remains the same. So far, the evidence provides mixed insights for immigrants socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes. Unlike hypothesised and although not robustly, they tend to be more likely to identify with a right of centre party, but this effect is not reinforced by a longer exposure to the country of origin during political socialisation.

Dominance of Anti-Left Bias in Post-Communist Right-Wing Regimes?

What could be driving the anti-left bias present for immigrants socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes? The analyses have not yet considered any heterogeneity within the right-wing authoritarian treatment group. Certain immigrants are, however, socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes with a younger communist past. After the fall of communism, some countries, such as Russia and Kazakhstan, have not transformed into democracies, but into right-wing authoritarian regimes.

In the case of socialisation in a right-wing authoritarian post-communist context, an anti-left instead of anti-right bias could exist. These regimes are usually not as repressive as the prior communist rule. Repression is, however, an amplifying factor for backlashes against the regime to appear (see Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2020). Given lower levels of repression and the collective memory of communism, anti-communist sentiments might, therefore, prevent systematic anti-right biases to appear in the origin country. Particularly in countries, where the communist ideology was strongly present, anti-left biases should not disappear once the regime is overturned. Not only can parental or peer socialisation induce these anti-communist sentiments, the communist past is sometimes also further stigmatised by the right-wing authoritarian government in an attempt to legitimise its rule (for Russia, see Sherlock, 2011). Anti-communist sentiments should, therefore, have a fertile ground to continue to exist in right-wing regimes with a long communist past. Given the clear ideology of communism, which citizens in the succeeding right-wing regime learn about, these sentiments should be transferred to host country politics. To get a deeper understanding of these mechanisms, I conduct a sample split analysis of the right-wing authoritarian treatment group that divides countries with a longer communist past and a high presence of the left-wing ideology and those without such a past in the 20th century (see Online Appendix B.5 for details on the sample split).

Again following Dinas and Northmore-Ball (2020, p.1974), Figure 3.5 depicts repression and indoctrination scores for right-wing authoritarian regimes with and without longer communist past. While indoctrination scores are similar across the two regime groups, the repression scores differ. Immigrants socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes with no longer communist past were subject to higher levels of repression throughout their political socialisation, by contrast, these levels were substantially lower for those socialised in post-communist right-wing authoritarian regimes. Given these lower repression levels, it is likely that biases against the political right in the origin country are not developed among immigrants from these post-communist contexts, leaving room for anti-communist sentiments.




Figure 3.5: Average repression and indoctrination scores experienced throughout political socialisation in right-wing authoritarian regimes in origin countries with and without longer communist past (non-matched sample).

Figure 3.6 shows that immigrants who were socialised in a right-wing authoritarian regime of a country with a longer communist past robustly express an anti-left bias in their right of centre party identification compared to immigrants socialised in a democracy. They are 36% more likely to identify with a right of centre party than their democratic counterparts. In contrast, those socialised in a right-wing

authoritarian regime that is not preceded by a longer communist rule do not identify with right of centre parties differently than immigrants socialised in democracies (for details see Appendix B.5.1). This shows that the anti-left bias found in the main analysis is driven by immigrants socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes with a longer communist past. This implies that even if the ideology of the authoritarian regime has switched, an indirect exposure to the left-wing authoritarian regime is a sufficient condition for anti-left biases in party support to appear.¹¹




Figure 3.6: Effect of political socialisation in a right-wing authoritarian regime on right of centre party identification in Germany. Sample split of countries with and without longer communist past. Country of origin level clustered standard errors are calculated for right-wing authoritarian regimes with no longer communist past and robust standard errors for those with longer communist past (too few clusters for country of origin clustered standard errors). Matching weights are applied.

To assess how sensitive these results are regarding omitted confounders, I conduct sensitivity analyses (Cinelli et al., 2020; Cinelli and Hazlett, 2020) for the right of centre party identification models (calculated with robust standard errors), for which I found consistent effects (see Appendix B.3.4 and B.5.1). The results of

¹¹This sample split has been conducted for the outcome left-right self placement as well. No stable differences between immigrants from democracies and the corresponding right-wing regimes have been found (for details see Appendix B.5.2).

the sensitivity analysis show that the effects of having been socialised in a left-wing authoritarian regime and in a right-wing authoritarian regime in a country with a longer communist past on the right of centre party identification can be interpreted with some caution. The results of the sensitivity analyses show that an unobserved confounder would need to account for at least 5.4% (left-wing treatment) and 4.7% (right-wing treatment with communist past) of the residual variance of both the treatment and outcome respectively to find an effect that is no longer statistically significant at the 5% level. Additionally, I re-estimated the analysis for the binary outcome right of centre party identification using logistic regression models and calculated average marginal effects of the full models. The conclusions remain the same (see Appendix B.6). Besides, I used Mahalanobis nearest neighbour matching as an alternative matching strategy (see Appendix B.7). The point estimates are similar, but are smaller in size for the effect of socialisation of left-wing authoritarian socialisation on right of centre party identification (34%). Overall, the main results are, however, robust to a change in matching strategy.

A Russian Effect?

The question remains whether the effect of a left-wing authoritarian political socialisation on right of centre party identification could be driven by a certain origin country. For this reason, I created four subsamples of the four origin countries, which are most represented in the left-wing authoritarian regime treatment group of the analysis (Kazakhstan, Poland, Romania and Russia). In the four sub-analyses either Kazakhstan, Poland, Romania or Russia are the only country of origin represented in the treatment group (see Appendix B.8).

Immigrants socialised in the left-wing authoritarian regime in Kazakhstan, Poland, Romania and Russia are significantly more likely to identify with right of centre parties than immigrants socialised in democracies (Figure 3.7). While being so-




Figure 3.7: Effect of political socialisation in a left-wing authoritarian regime on right of centre party identification in Germany on subsets where the treatment is Kazakhstan, Poland, Romania or Russia. Robust standard errors are calculated (too few clusters for country of origin clustered standard errors). Matching weights are applied.

cialised in left-wing authoritarian Poland, Russia and Kazakhstan as compared to an established democracy is linked to a 45%, 53% and even 62% higher likelihood respectively to identify with a right of centre party in the full models, the probability is even higher for the Romanian subsample (90%). This increased anti-left bias of immigrants socialised in Romania could be related to the brutality of communism and opposition to it from civil society. Given that the communist regime in Romania was the only violently overthrown regime of the Warsaw Pact (see e.g. Anisin, 2020), the memory of communism, and as a result the political left, might be more strongly stigmatised among Romanian immigrants compared to those socialised in other communist countries. While differences between these four origin countries are present, the subsample analysis also highlights that the anti-left bias expressed in right of centre party identification of the main analysis is not solely driven by one of them.

Winners and Losers among Parties

The question remains which parties in the democratic host country are benefiting or losing from the socialisation experiences in authoritarian regimes.¹² Figure 3.8 shows that immigrants socialised in left-wing authoritarian regimes are 32% less likely to identify with the green party (Bündnis90/Grüne), but 49% and 4% more likely to identify with the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the right-wing populist party (AfD) respectively than immigrants socialised in democratic regimes. Immigrants socialised in left-wing authoritarian regimes are also 15% less likely to identify with the Social Democrats (SPD) than their counterparts from democracies on a 10% level. This effect is, however, not robust to all alternative standard error specifications. Although *Die Linke* is the successor of the German communist party, the negative effect is negligible and statistically insignificant (see Appendix B.9.1). This might at least partly stem from the small number of people generally identifying with *Die Linke* in the sample. Immigrants socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes are on average 23% less likely to identify with the green party and 7% more likely to identify with the AfD than those socialised in established democracies. The results also suggest that they are 10% more likely to identify with the CDU/CSU, but this is not robust to other standard error specifications. Otherwise, they do not identify with parties differently than their democratic counterparts (see Appendix B.9.2).

Splitting the right-wing authoritarian treatment group into those origin countries with and without longer communist past results in some differences for party identification (see Figure 3.9). Immigrants from right-wing authoritarian regimes from countries with a longer communist rule show similar patterns as those socialised in left-wing authoritarian regimes with some important differences. The Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) do not significantly benefit from this group when comparing them to their democratic counterparts, while the AfD, however, substantially

¹²As opposed to the main analysis on right of centre PID, this analysis also includes respondents who have indicated “other” as their party identification.




Figure 3.8: Effect of political socialisation in a left- or right-wing authoritarian regime on specific party identification in Germany. Country of origin level clustered standard errors are calculated. Matching weights are applied.

benefits from this immigrant group. Immigrants socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes with a longer communist past are on average 20% more likely to identify with the AfD, while being 25% less likely to identify with the Greens than their democratic counterparts (see Appendix B.9.3). Immigrants socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes with no longer communist past are 21% less likely to identify with the Greens (although this is not robust to different robust standard error specifications), otherwise they show similar party support patterns as their democratic counterparts (see Appendix B.9.4). Overall, it seems that particularly the CDU/CSU and the AfD benefit from immigrants from (post-) communist regimes, while immigrants socialised in an authoritarian regime regardless of ideology tend to be less likely to identify with the greens than immigrants socialised in democracies.




Figure 3.9: Effect of political socialisation in a right-wing authoritarian regime on specific party identification in Germany. Sample split of countries with and without longer communist past. Country of origin clustered standard errors are calculated for subsample with no longer communist past and robust standard errors are calculated for subsample with longer communist past (too few clusters for country of origin clustered standard errors). Matching weights are applied.

Discussion & Conclusion

How do pre-migration experiences during political socialisation affect the political behaviour of immigrants in democratic host countries? This paper argues that the ideological regime experienced throughout the time of political socialisation in the country of origin can affect how immigrants later behave in the host country. Building on research of political socialisation and authoritarianism (Dinas, 2017; Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2020; Linz, 2000), I suggest that immigrants socialised in left-wing authoritarian regimes translate their bias against the ideological spectrum of the party associated with the authoritarian regime in a democratic host country. By contrast, socialisation under right-wing authoritarianism should overall not lead to a systematic anti-right bias in host country politics. These differences are likely to appear due to different regime characteristics. Whereas

left-wing authoritarian regimes have a developed ideology, right-wing authoritarian regimes reflect *mentalities* of their leadership rather than a developed ideology (see Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2020; Linz, 2000), making it difficult to systematically extend biases against the political right to a different political context. The study contributes to the field of the consequences of political socialisation in ideologically tinted authoritarian regimes and their impact on the political behaviour after relocating to a democratic country, while testing the general idea of vertical transmission of culture and political socialisation.

Employing Coarsened Exact Matching and using the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for the individual-level and V-Dem for the country-level data, I find that the empirical evidence partly supports the theoretical considerations. Results for immigrants socialised in left-wing authoritarian systems show that an anti-left bias is present in terms of right of centre party identification in Germany after having spent the majority of their formative years in the country of origin, but not for left-right self placement. Immigrants socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes also express an anti-left bias in their party identification, but only if they come from a post-communist country. No consistent bias against the political left or right can be found in neither left-right self placement nor right of centre party identification when comparing immigrants socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes with no communist past to their democratic counterparts.

The observations made in this paper have three implications. First, a clear ideology with a certain level of indoctrination, besides experiencing repression, seems to be a necessary condition for biases against the ideology of the authoritarian regime to be systematically detectable in host country politics. Second, if the regime employs lower levels of repression and no strong indoctrination of the current ideology, biases from former repressive regimes with more developed ideologies can continue to emerge even among citizens who have not directly experienced this rule. Lastly, while the predominant regime ideology during political socialisation

can matter for the behaviour concerning host country politics, authoritarian effects regardless of ideology can emerge as well, as in this case, a penalty for the German greens in party support.

The analysis of this paper has some limitations. First, while balancing the sample on as many covariates as possible is attempted, certain variables could not be included in the matching process. While matching on, for instance, per capita GDP of the country of origin before political socialisation would have made the treatment and the control groups even more similar, the control group would have needed to consist predominantly of immigrants socialised in new democracies to make this feasible. To have an appropriate control group with as little systematic bias against a political spectrum as possible, it is crucial for the control group to consist of immigrants socialised in established democracies. Second, it could be argued that particular selection effects might be driving the results found. While this cannot be completely ruled out with the present analysis, observable selection effects were counteracted by the matching procedure. Besides, having immigrants socialised in democracies as a comparison group instead of, for instance, the non-immigrant population, accounts for at least certain unobserved selection effects due to migration. Lastly, this study relies on data of immigrants relocating to Germany with a specific sample from certain origin countries and cohorts included. This warrants some caution when inferring conclusions to contexts with origin countries and cohorts that are not included in this analysis.

Future research on the topic is encouraged. First, immigrants socialised in left-wing authoritarian regimes who spent a substantial amount of time in the country of origin during their formative years identify more strongly with right of centre parties compared to immigrants socialised in democratic regimes. How does this translate into actual voting behaviour and does this choice correspond to their attitudes on policy issues? Second, this paper has focused on vertical transmission. Examining how horizontal transmission processes in the host country mitigate or

reinforce these biases is, however, an avenue future research could take. Particularly in the context of Germany and the German reunification, this could be of interest given its own communist past and legacy. Third, the question remains why immigrants from authoritarian regimes tend to avoid the Greens and whether this result is an artefact of Germany or observable in other countries as well. Finally, the intention of this paper was to examine general patterns of host country behaviour as a result of left- and right-wing socialisation prior to migration. Nevertheless, these are broad ideological categories, which might conceal heterogeneous effects within these ideologies, a variation which might be interesting to exploit in the future. All in all, immigrants and their attitudes and behaviour are still understudied, although they constitute a significant part to today's societies, making the importance of assessing their political behaviour to a greater extent evident.

Chapter 4

Communism and Redistribution Preferences: Evidence from an Experimental Online Game

Abstract

Under what circumstances do negative portrayals of communism lead to a backlash against redistribution? Building on literature of authoritarian legacies, I suggest that negatively depicting an authoritarian regime can affect policy preferences that are related to the authoritarian ideology. Hence, I hypothesise that priming participants with negative statements on the German Democratic Republic (GDR) should lower their support for redistribution, particularly if they are subject to redistribution. Employing a novel experimental game in Germany, I find that the negative primes of the GDR do, however, not generally decrease support for redistribution and their effect is also not conditioned on experiencing high levels of redistribution. Exploratory analyses reveal, however, that the effect of the prime was concealed. Priming participants on the GDR lowers support for redistribution only among participants who were outperformed, but not among those who were outperforming their opponents in the games. This study has not only implications for the field of authoritarian legacies and redistribution preferences, but also provides a novel attitudinal and behavioural approach to experimentally measure preferences.

Keywords: Experimental Online Game, Authoritarian Legacies, Redistribution

Introduction

During the 20th century, the Iron Curtain divided the world between communist and capitalist nations. While capitalism promoted private ownership and consumerism, the communist side advocated state ownership, redistribution, as well as values of egalitarianism and classless societies. Nevertheless, communist countries, such as the USSR, did not achieve their egalitarian promise but were systems with high levels of social and economic inequality (Zaslavsky, 1980). But besides the economic dimensions, communist regimes engaged, for instance, in the case of Stalin in the USSR or Hoxha in Albania, in high levels of repression, resulting in citizens having limited freedom.

The political environment of authoritarian regimes is very different to established democracies. A growing strand of research focuses consequently on the legacies of authoritarian regimes and their effect on attitudes and behaviour (e.g. Dinas, 2017; Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2020; Neundorf et al., 2020; Neundorf and Pop-Eleches, 2020; Santana-Pereira et al., 2016). While these studies often focus on support for democracy, left-right self placement or party identification, the question remains how authoritarian legacies affect support for policies that are closely related to the regime. Particularly the communist ideology is interesting in this regard given its close connection to redistribution policies, which are also an important issue on the political agenda of established democracies.

Previous research shows that post-communist societies are generally more favourable of redistribution than others (e.g. Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Okulicz-Kozaryn, 2014). Nevertheless, over the years, this gap seems to have narrowed especially among younger cohorts (Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2020). One potential explanation for this narrowing gap could be that communism becomes increasingly stigmatised and younger people might be consequently less supportive of policies that are connected to this type of regime. Existing research does,

however, not clearly indicate whether negative portrayals of an authoritarian regime can lead to a backlash against closely connected policies. Contributing to this puzzle, this paper addresses the question: How do negative depictions of communism affect support for redistribution? Building on research of authoritarian legacies (Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2020) and the proximity of high redistribution to the communist ideology, I hypothesise that citizens should be less inclined to favour redistribution policies if communism is negatively portrayed, particularly if they are experiencing high levels of redistribution.

To test these expectations, I conduct a behavioural online experiment in Germany with a novel factorial design programmed in *oTree* (Chen et al., 2016). In the experiment, participants are invited to play three games, where they can score points based on effort and skill and are grouped with two computer-simulated opponents who are either better or worse performing than participants themselves. Points made within the group get redistributed equally among the group members in one treatment setting, whereas no redistribution takes place in the control setting. Additionally, participants are randomly assigned to a prime, which includes negative statements on the German Democratic Republic (GDR), i.e. the former communist East Germany, prior to the games. After the games, redistribution preferences are measured using both a behavioural and an attitudinal item.¹

Unlike hypothesised, priming participants with negative statements on the GDR does not generally lower their support for redistribution in a robust manner, and is also not conditioned on experiencing redistribution in the games. Exploratory analyses reveal, however, that being primed with negative statements on the GDR lowers support for redistribution among participants that are paired with better opponents compared to the control group who did not receive the prime. By contrast, participants who are primed, but are paired with worse opponents do

¹The experiment has been pre-registered on OSF, where also the pre-analysis plan and questionnaire are available.

URL: https://osf.io/5e6ht/?view_only=2b331d6877a7468eb2dd9e2cdc28009c

not report different attitudes on redistribution compared to the control group. Priming effects are heightened among younger participants and those that were performing better in the games.

This study provides experimental evidence that negative portrayals of authoritarianism can, but do not necessarily, lower preferences on policies connected to the regime in the case of redistribution and the GDR. The findings, therefore, highlight that backlash effects do not necessarily appear uniformly but only among certain societal subgroups, in this case among those who were outperformed. This result contrasts work by Okulicz-Kozaryn (2014) who shows that winners compared to losers of the transition to capitalism are less favourable of redistribution, which might be a consequence of social network effects. The findings of this paper further corroborate findings by Dinas and Northmore-Ball (2020) by showing that particularly younger, but not necessarily older cohorts, are affected by the negative portrayals of the GDR. Finally, testing these expectations in an experimental setting, allows to causally study negative depictions of a specific regime dimension in an isolated setting, which is a difficult endeavour to do so using purely observational data. The experimental set-up also contributes to the field by providing a novel experimental approach with both attitudinal and behavioural outcome measures.

Authoritarianism, Biases and Redistribution

A vast amount of literature tries to explain redistribution preferences of citizens. In an overview of existing frameworks, Alesina and Giuliano (2011) identify various determinants, some of them relating to income. Early frameworks by Romer (1975) and Meltzer and Richard (1981) mostly focus on the current income of an individual, supporting the notion that the poor should be mainly those in favour of redistribution. This relationship is, however, more complex than just current

income. For instance, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) show that the expected future income determines at least to a certain extent the demand for redistribution. Additionally, Piketty (1995) argues for the importance of social mobility when it comes to redistribution preferences. Experienced wealth through parental income should, therefore, also play a role regarding attitudes towards redistribution. Besides material self-interest, political ideology is, for instance, also an important predictor for preferences and attitudes on redistribution (Jæger, 2008). While this literature provides insights on mechanisms on the micro-level, macro-level effects on redistribution preferences resulting from, for instance regime types, remain less clear.

A small set of studies investigates potential effects of the communism on support for redistribution. Due to the lingering presence of the communist indoctrination, these studies argue that citizens still attribute the state the responsibility to look after them (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2020; Okulicz-Kozaryn, 2014). These mechanisms seem, however, more complex. In past years, the gap between younger cohorts in post-communist and consolidated democracies seems to have narrowed (Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2020). An explanation could be that the former authoritarian regime is becoming more negatively perceived among younger people. Also Pfarr et al. (2017) show that these processes are not clear-cut when focusing on Germany. While East Germans are more in favour of state redistribution, they are not more favourable of taxation than West Germans. Lastly, it is unclear how pre-existing characteristics between post-communist societies and, for instance, established democracies differ, which might lead to a distorted picture. While, for instance, the German reunification is often interpreted as a natural experiment, Becker et al. (2020) show that East and West Germany had already differed in certain characteristics before the communist rule.

Recent research indicates that backlash effects against the former authoritarian

regime can emerge among the public. Given that authoritarian regimes are ideologically tinted, Dinas and Northmore-Ball (2020) suggest that after their fall, citizens develop a bias against the political spectrum associated with the former authoritarian regime and express such in political behaviour. These backlashes against the ideology can appear given that the public is no longer subject to, for instance, propaganda and indoctrination measures. This leaves citizens only with the repressive aspects and negative recollections of the regime. People also no longer have to conceal their oppositional values to the regime given it has ceased to exist. Lastly, support for the prior regime can become stigmatised due to increased social and political pressures (Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2020, p.1962).

As a result, in post-authoritarian regimes, citizens position themselves more towards the opposite ideological spectrum of the past authoritarian regime, while they position the party associated with the former regime more extremely towards the respective end of the scale after the fall of the authoritarian regime (Dinas, 2017). Such patterns can also translate to party support: For instance, citizens socialised in right-wing dictatorships are, on average, less supportive of far-right parties than citizens socialised in other regimes (Frantzeskakis and Sato, 2020). Avdeenko (2018) also provides evidence that backlash effects appear in vote choice in the case of communism by demonstrating that East Germans decreasingly vote for *Die Linke*, the successor of the German communist party, the closer they live to the former West German border. In this area, life under the GDR was particularly difficult. Biases are also visible when focusing on immigrants from left-wing authoritarian regimes, which are more likely to support right of centre parties in the host country (Just, 2019; Lindemann, 2023). Could such an ideological bias also appear in support for policies that are ideologically connected to the prior regime?

To study these dynamics, I focus on the case of communism and support for redistribution. The communist ideology is clearly linked to socialist values. While, for

instance, the Soviet communist rule might not have achieved its Marxist aim (Zaslavsky, 1980), values of egalitarianism and of a classless society were promoted repeatedly through propagandistic means. Redistribution is said to have “reached its most elaborate form in the Soviet-type socialist societies, where almost all resources were subject to allocation by the state” (Zhou and Suhomlinova, 2001, p.164). It is, as a result, a policy field, which is closely linked to socialism on one and capitalism on the other extreme, while being an important issue in today’s democracies. The connection of the communist ideology to highly redistributive measures is, therefore, a suitable case to study how the portrayal of authoritarianism can affect attitudes and behaviours on connected policies.

Given that it is difficult to isolate effects of the authoritarian rule from pre-existing characteristics of a society, this paper takes an experimental approach to study preferences by negatively portraying the GDR and, consequently, measuring redistribution preferences. Given the connection between the policy field and the authoritarian regime as well as the potential biases against ideologies of authoritarian regimes, being exposed to negative statements on communism should affect the evaluation of highly redistributive systems. Especially if statements on the communist regime contain negative presentations of economic aspects of the regime, then the connection between the regime and the redistribution policy should be made more easily. As a consequence, if the communist regime is negatively portrayed, highly redistributive systems should be perceived less beneficial and a stance more towards the opposite side of the ideological spectrum, i.e. the political right, should be adopted by the respondents. Given that socialist policies are part of the content of the left-wing spectrum of politics, I, therefore, expect that a negative presentation of the communist regime lowers support for redistribution (*H1*).

How could pre-existing redistribution policies condition the effects of negatively portraying the GDR on support for redistribution? In the case that high levels of

redistribution are present, the link to socialism is even closer. As a result, experiencing high levels of redistribution should reinforce negative effects of statements on communism. As a result, I hypothesise that if high measures of redistribution are present in a given context, negative depictions of communism should act as a reinforcing factor for decreased support for redistribution (*H2*).²

Experimental Design and Hypotheses

To test whether negative depictions of communism can affect redistribution preferences, I conduct an experimental study in Germany. Employing an experiment allows to isolate effects of negative statements on the GDR on redistribution preferences in an isolated setting, without pre-existing characteristics driving the results. Germany is a particularly interesting case to study this endeavour. With the GDR and the German re-unification, the country has a recent and longer history with communism. While people living in East Germany directly experienced the communist rule and its properties, also in West Germany, communism and the GDR was a politicised matter, with anticommunism being present in everyday life during the cold war (Hoffmann, 2017). Communism is, therefore, historically embedded in Germany, although likely in other ways for people who grew up in the two different parts.

For the experiment, a 2x2x2 factorial design is applied. The experiment itself is derived from the logic of experimental games often applied in economics, but less so in political science. Participants are invited to play three different games, where

²The phrasing of the hypotheses in the pre-registration are geared towards the experimental conditions and phrased as follows:

- Participants exposed to the socialist prime are on average less favourable of redistribution than those who are not exposed to the socialist prime. (*H1*)
- This effect should be larger among those participants actually experiencing the 'redistribution' condition. (*H2*)

Other analyses that were pre-registered are analysed and shortly discussed in Appendix C.5

they can score points based on effort and skill. The experiment is programmed in *oTree* (Chen et al., 2016), which is a module in Python used to program interactive experiments. 2,200 participants (Germans with no migration background, representative by age and gender, as well as approximately 50% East and 50% West Germans) were recruited through the online access panel by Bilendi in November 2022.³ Due to not disclosing to participants that their opponents were computer-simulated throughout the study, participants could withdraw their consent at the end of the study. Additionally, two participants were excluded who played four instead of three games, as well as those who did not attempt any of the games. In total, the sample consists of 1,924 participants, who consented after the debriefing of the study and attempted at least one game.




Figure 4.1: Factorial Design

Figure 4.1 outlines the factorial design of the experiment. After completing a pre-treatment questionnaire, participants are randomly assigned to either receiving or not receiving a prime, which consists of two negative statements on the GDR participants are asked to agree or disagree with. Afterwards participants are

³No additional incentives apart from the standard remuneration from Bilendi were given to the participants due to budgetary constraints and ethical considerations. Ben-Ner et al. (2008) show that behaviours in terms of hypothetical and actual money exchanged are similar in their comparison of dictator games.

grouped with two computer-simulated opponents who are either better or worse performing than the actual participant (participants are at this point unaware that the opponents are not real participants).⁴ The performance of the opponents is dependent on the score of the participant, which should make this as credible as possible. Next, participants are either assigned to the treatment setting, which equally redistributes the total points made in the group among the group members, or the control setting, which does not include any point redistribution. This implies that participants can either gain or lose points if they are in the point redistribution setting. To make participants more engaged with the games, they receive positive encouragements for a good performance. To check whether participants were attentive and received the treatments, three manipulation checks were included in the surveys post-treatment. Participants were asked whether they had previously received questions on the GDR, whether they were paired with better or worse opponents and, lastly, whether they had experienced point redistribution in the games (see Appendix C.1 for more detailed information on the experimental set-up and Appendix C.2 for sample size per treatment and covariate balance).

Outcome Measures

The experiment includes two direct outcome measures. One is of behavioural and the other one of attitudinal nature.⁵ After the third game, participants can cast a vote for the rules applied to a potential fourth game, which would be either full vs. no point redistribution (*voting for redistribution*):

⁴Given that there is no pure control for this factor, participants in the better opponents setting are the baseline, which corresponds to the hypotheses.

⁵Two outcomes on policy attitudes regarding state redistribution and tax increase for redistribution were surveyed as well. Results of the pre-registered main analyses on these outcomes can be found in Appendix C.5.5.

Potentially, a fourth game will follow, which will be the same as one of the first three games. If you are shown this game, how should the distribution of points within your group be arranged? Should the points made within your group be distributed equally so that you and all your opponents receive the same number of points or do you want to remain with the points you have made?

0 = I would like to remain with my own points.

1 = I would like the points to be equally redistributed within the group.

Only two participants, which are excluded from the analysis, play a fourth game with their preferred rule setting. The attitudinal outcome concerns redistribution preferences of the point allocation after the games have been officially completed (*attitudes towards point redistribution*):

Imagine you would have had a say in the rules for distributing points in the games from the beginning: Points can either not be redistributed within the group, so that each player keeps the points they have scored to themselves, or points can be completely redistributed, so that all points that would be made within a group are equally distributed between the players. How strongly would you have been for or against redistributing points if 0 = against redistributing points and 10 = for redistributing points?

Prime

Before the games start, certain participants are shown a subtle prime. The prime consists of two statements concerning labour and the GDR, which intends to negatively portray the GDR and communism. For each of the statements, participants are asked: How strongly do you agree with this statement (don't agree at all, tend to

not agree, tend to agree, completely agree)?

- In the GDR, obstacles were placed in the way of professional and private self-fulfilment.
- Career prospects were limited in the GDR. For example, even if you tried hard and were committed to your job, you were usually paid no more than those who did not go the extra mile.

Games




Figure 4.2: Examples Games 1-3

As part of the experiment, participants are asked to complete three different games (see Figure 4.2). After each game, participants are informed about the points they and their opponents have achieved, as well as about the subtotal in between the three different games. In case they are in the redistribution treatment group, points are already redistributed in the subtotal. To enhance potential treatment effects, they are also shown how much they have lost or benefited from redistribution. To avoid potential feedback effects, participants are asked about their redistribution preference after completing all three games. All of the games are

templates by Chris @ oTree (2021) that are adapted for this research endeavour. Participants are playing each game for 45 seconds, where they can score the more points the more iterations of the puzzles they solve. If they solve one iteration incorrectly, they lose one point. Figure 4.3a shows an example of the redistribution treatment setting and Figure 4.3b of the corresponding control setting (no redistribution) after the first game with better opponents.

Resultate Spiel 1

Die Regeln sehen es vor, dass Sie und Ihre Gegenspieler die jeweils erzielten Punkte für sich selbst behalten. Das bedeutet, dass Sie in diesem Spiel **12 Punkte** erzielt haben.

Momentan haben Sie **12 Punkte**. Ihr erster Gegenspieler hat einen Zwischenstand von **15 Punkten** und Ihr zweiter Gegenspieler von **17 Punkten**.

Punkte in Spiel 1	
	Punkte
Sie:	12 P.
Spieler 1:	15 P.
Spieler 2:	17 P.
Zwischenstand	
	Punkte
Sie:	12 P.
Spieler 1:	15 P.
Spieler 2:	17 P.

Weiter

(a)

Resultate Spiel 1

Die Regeln sehen es vor, dass die Gesamtpunktzahl innerhalb einer Gruppe gleichmäßig verteilt wird. Da Ihre Gegenspieler eine höhere Punktzahl als Sie erzielt haben, kriegen Sie **2,3 Punkte** mehr!

Momentan haben Sie, sowie auch Ihre Gegenspieler, **14,3 Punkte**. Ohne Umverteilung hätten Sie einen Zwischenstand von **12 Punkten**. Ihr erster Gegenspieler hätte **16 Punkte** und Ihr zweiter Gegenspieler **15 Punkte**.

Punkte in Runde 1			
	Erzielt	Umverteilt	Endpunkte
Sie:	12 P.	+2,3 P.	14,3 P.
Spieler 1:	16 P.	-1,7 P.	14,3 P.
Spieler 2:	15 P.	-0,7 P.	14,3 P.
Zwischenstand			
	Erzielt	Umverteilt	Endpunkte
Sie:	12 P.	+2,3 P.	14,3 P.
Spieler 1:	16 P.	-1,7 P.	14,3 P.
Spieler 2:	15 P.	-0,7 P.	14,3 P.

Weiter

(b)

Figure 4.3: (a) Example of 'no redistribution' setting (control) after game 1. (b) Example of 'redistribution' treatment setting after game 1. Both with better opponents.

Models

To test *H1* and *H2*, equation 4.1 and 4.2 are respectively estimated. For the binary outcome measure *voting for redistribution*, a logistic regression and for the attitudinal outcome *attitudes towards point redistribution* an OLS model are employed.

$$RedPref_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * Red_i + \beta_2 * WorseOpp_i + \beta_3 * Prime_i + \epsilon_i \quad (4.1)$$

$$RedPref_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * Red_i + \beta_2 * WorseOpp_i + \beta_3 * Prime_i + \beta_4 * Red_i * Prime_i + \epsilon_i \quad (4.2)$$

Results

Effects of Priming Participants on the GDR




Figure 4.4: Results for outcomes voting for redistribution (in probabilities) and point redistribution preferences (scale 0-10). Average marginal effects of the prime are presented (full sample). Thick lines depict the 90% and thin lines the 95% confidence interval.

Does exposure to negatively portraying the GDR affect support for redistribution? I hypothesised that priming participants with negative statements on the GDR should result in a backlash against redistribution (*H1*). Figure 4.4 shows the re-

sults for whether participants voted for redistribution in a potential fourth game in the left panel and in the right panel, whether the prime moved attitudes towards point redistribution after the games. Unlike hypothesised, priming participants with negative statements on the GDR did not lead to an overall change in support for redistribution. Participants are not more or less likely to vote for redistribution after they have seen the prime, nor do they report lower attitudes towards point redistribution (see Models 1 and 5 in Table C.3 Appendix C.3.1).

Further, I proposed that the effect of the prime should be conditional on whether points are redistributed in the games. More precisely, I hypothesised that the prime should negatively affect support for redistribution particularly if participants experienced redistribution in the games (*H2*). Figure 4.5 shows that this does not seem to be the case. The effect of the prime on support for redistribution is not different if points are redistributed in the games. Priming participants on the GDR does neither make them more nor less likely to vote for redistribution conditional on their points being redistributed, nor do they report lower attitudes on point redistribution than those participants who did not experience redistribution in the games as a consequence of the prime (see Models 3 and 7 in Table C.3 in Appendix C.3.1).

To check the robustness of these findings, the analyses are replicated as pre-registered for those participants only who passed all three included manipulation checks, which ensures that participants have received the treatments. Given this rather strict criterium, 662 participants were excluded. Table C.3 in Appendix C.3.1 reports the results of this analysis. While most results remain substantially the same, attentive participants reported overall 0.29 points lower attitudes towards point redistribution than the control group as a result of the prime, which is statistically significant on a 10% level ($p = 0.099$). As an additional, non pre-registered, robustness test, I included only those participants that at least tended to agree with both priming statements on the GDR. Also in this case, the prime on




Figure 4.5: Results for outcomes voting for redistribution (in probabilities) and point redistribution preferences (scale 0-10) conditioned on redistribution. Average marginal effects of the prime are presented (full sample). Thick lines depict the 90% and thin lines the 95% confidence interval.

the GDR led again to generally lower attitudes towards point redistribution compared to the control group only in the attentive subsample ($\beta = -0.4$, $p = 0.045$) and not in the full sample (see Model 5 and 6 in Table C.4 in Appendix C.3.3).

As described in Appendix C.1.2, imbalance appeared in the performance of the opponents between participants who were paired with better and worse opponents due to a programming decision (but balance is achieved on the treatment variables prime and redistribution). This imbalance led to a weaker treatment intensity for those paired with worse than better opponents, i.e. less (potential) absolute redistribution was taking place among those with worse than better opponents. This imbalance should only lead to an underestimation of the effect of being paired with worse opponents. To check the robustness of the results (not pre-registered), the analyses are replicated by including the absolute (potential) amount of redistribution that is taking place among the participants. As anticipated, the effect of the prime is not substantially affected by this imbalance and conclusions drawn remain the same (for details, see Appendix C.3.4). In conclusion, given that results are not robust, both $H1$ and $H2$ have to be rejected based on the conducted analyses.

Exploratory Analyses

While the main analyses are not supporting the hypotheses, exploratory and sub-sample analyses are conducted to assess whether more robust heterogeneous effects of the prime appear under different conditions. The previous analyses suggest that priming participants with negative statements on the GDR does not robustly affect redistribution preferences. *H1* assumed a uniform negative effect of the prime on the support for redistribution, while *H2* further hypothesised that this negative effect should be stronger among those who experienced point redistribution than those who did not. Both of these hypotheses found no support. The theoretical considerations and hypotheses, however, disregarded that the effect of the prime, which, inter alia, focuses on job performance and remuneration, could be conditioned on the performance of the participants in the games compared to their opponents. While some participants were *outperforming* their opponents, other participants were *outperformed* in the games.




Figure 4.6: Results for outcomes voting for redistribution (in probabilities) and point redistribution preferences (scale 0-10) depending on performance of opponents. Average marginal effects of the prime are presented (full sample). Thick lines depict the 90% and thin lines the 95% confidence interval.

Figure 4.6 shows the effect of the prime conditional on whether participants are paired with better or worse opponents. Focusing on the attitudinal outcome measure in the right panel, priming effects are dependent on being paired with better

or worse opponents. On the one hand, priming participants that are paired with better opponents on the GDR lowers attitudes towards point redistribution by 0.48 points ($p = 0.018$) compared to the baseline that was also paired with better opponents but not primed. However, there is a positive statistically significant interaction effect between the prime and being paired with worse opponents ($\beta = 0.61$, $p = 0.033$). As a result, participants that are primed on the GDR but are paired with worse opponents do not have lower attitudes towards redistribution than the baseline. This result is also robust when excluding participants who did not pass all three manipulation checks as well as when accounting for the (potential) absolute amount of redistribution that was taking place. By contrast, participants are, nevertheless, again not voting for redistribution differently as a result of the prime even if its effect is conditioned by the performance of their opponents (see Appendix C.4.1 for details).

To ensure that these results are not driven by participants who do not agree with the negative statements on the GDR, participants are as an additional robustness check excluded who partly or fully disagreed with the priming statements (see Appendix C.4.2 for details). The conclusions remain the same. In addition, a three-way interaction between all three treatment factors provides further evidence for the stated relationship: The effect of the prime on attitudes towards point redistribution does not necessarily depend on points being redistributed, but whether participants are paired with better or worse opponents (see Appendix C.4.3).⁶

What could be driving these patterns? While theoretically postulated that priming participants with negative statements on the GDR should lead to a backlash against highly redistributive systems, this is only the case for participants that are paired with better opponents. Compared to the baseline, they reported highly redistributive systems to be 0.4 points less beneficial than the baseline ($p = 0.019$).⁷

⁶Please note, however, that in the three-way interaction statistical power is reduced, hence, small effects might not be detected.

⁷Wording: How beneficial do you believe systems with high redistribution to be (0 = not beneficial at all, 10 = very beneficial)?

By contrast, the positive interaction ($\beta = 0.75$, $p = 0.002$) leads participants that are primed on the GDR and paired with worse opponents to report highly redistributive systems to be 0.34 points *more* beneficial than the baseline ($p = 0.047$). These findings indicate that although participants are exposed to negative statements on the GDR, it only affects their evaluations negatively in the case when they have been outperformed by their opponents. This could indicate that participants do not want to strain other people with their comparably worse performance and that they attribute more individual responsibility to their economic well-being as a result of the prime. On the other hand, if participants are outperforming their opponents in the games, the prime on the GDR could have triggered social insurance considerations or increased feelings of altruism (see Appendix C.4.4 for more details).

Younger vs. Older Participants

Dinas and Northmore-Ball (2020) find a bias against the political left predominantly among younger, but not necessarily older cohorts in post-communist societies. The authors explain this finding by higher levels of indoctrination of the communist rule for older citizens. Also in the present case, the exposure to negative statements on the GDR could lead to heterogeneous treatment effects among older and younger citizens, given their different exposure to the GDR and its politicisation. To examine the effect of priming participants with negative statements on the GDR according to age, I split the sample of younger or older participants according to the median age of the sample (48 years). This implies that the oldest participants of the “younger” subsample just came of political age when the Berlin wall fell. While the overall effect of the prime is still statistically but also substantially insignificant among younger and older participants (see Appendix C.4.5), heterogeneous effects appear once the effect is conditioned on either points being redistributed and having worse or better opponents in the games depending on

Table 4.1: Exploratory subsample analysis: Sample split between younger and older participants. Red. = Redistribution and Worse Opp. = Worse Opponents.

	Dependent variable:							
	Voting for Redistribution				Point Redistribution Attitudes			
	logistic		OLS		OLS		OLS	
	Young	Old	Young	Old	Young	Old	Young	Old
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Prime	-0.45**	0.19	-0.06	-0.15	-0.44	-0.13	-0.58**	-0.38
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.27)	(0.30)
Redistribution	0.09	0.61***	0.50***	0.43***	-0.02	0.20	0.25	0.15
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.19)	(0.21)
Worse Opponents	-0.36***	-0.18	-0.41**	-0.31	-0.74***	-0.28	-1.16***	-0.47
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.27)	(0.29)
Prime * Red.	0.82***	-0.37			0.55	-0.09		
	(0.27)	(0.27)			(0.38)	(0.42)		
Prime * Worse Opp.			0.12	0.26			0.83**	0.39
			(0.27)	(0.27)			(0.38)	(0.42)
Constant	-0.24	-0.53***	-0.44***	-0.37**	5.35***	5.20***	5.42***	5.32***
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.24)
Observations	914	893	914	893	959	938	959	938
R ²					0.02	0.003	0.02	0.004
Adjusted R ²					0.02	-0.001	0.02	0.0001
Log Likelihood	-603.24	-602.62	-607.57	-603.05				
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,216.47	1,215.24	1,225.15	1,216.10				

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

the outcome measures (see Table 4.1).

Among younger participants, being primed with negative statements on the GDR leads to an approximately 11% decrease in voting for redistribution when points are not redistributed in the games ($\beta_{logistic} = -0.45$, $p = 0.027$). Differently than initially anticipated, the interaction effect between being primed and points being redistributed is positive ($\beta_{logistic} = 0.82$, $p = 0.003$). This implies that the negative effect of the prime is not stronger, if points are redistributed during the games. This positive interaction effect is making participants 9% more likely to vote for redistribution compared to the baseline. In terms of attitudes, the effect of the prime does again not vary depending on points being redistributed, but is conditional on participants being paired with better or worse opponents. If younger participants are paired with better opponents, the prime on the GDR led to more negative attitudes towards point redistribution compared to the baseline ($\beta = -0.58$, $p = 0.034$). In contrast, the interaction effect of the prime and being paired with worse opponents was again positive and statistically significant ($\beta =$

0.83, $p = 0.03$). As a result, younger participants who were primed with negative statements on the GDR and paired with worse opponents report similar attitudes on point redistribution as the baseline. Although older participants were predominantly politically socialised before the German reunification, negative portrayals of the GDR had no robust effect on redistribution preferences among this group - both when measuring behaviour and attitudes. Results, hence, suggest that the previously found priming effects seem to be at least partly driven by age.

Other Exploratory Analyses

Two more subsample analyses have been conducted to analyse heterogeneous treatment effects of the prime. First, the performance of the participants is exploited and reported in Appendix C.4.6. Some participants scored substantially more points than others in the games. Those who performed well in the games might have been more invested and, hence, also be affected more strongly by negative portrayals of the GDR. To assess heterogeneous treatment effects of the performance of the participants, I conduct the analysis on a subsample of those who performed above or below/equally to the median participant (15 points as the total score) in the games. These subsample analyses show that the interaction effect of the prime and having worse opponents seems to be unique to high performers and emerges on a 10% significance level also for the voting outcome. Hence, the negative effect of being primed on the GDR conditional on being paired with better opponents seems to be a result of high performers. This does not have to contrast the prior analysis on age: Being a high performer also coincides with being younger as depicted in Figure C.6 in Appendix C.4.6.

Heterogeneous treatment effects between East and West Germans are assessed in Appendix C.4.7. Given that East Germany has a direct communist past, those who finished their compulsory education in the East as opposed to West German states might react differently to the prime. Some differences between the two groups

appear. Particularly interesting to see is that the positive interaction effect of the prime and having been paired with worse opponents is far larger among West Germans than East Germans.⁸

Discussion & Conclusion

How does negatively depicting communism affect redistribution preferences? In this paper, I build on research of authoritarian legacies and hypothesise that negative statements of communism should lead to an overall lower support for redistribution observable in both behaviour and attitudes (*H1*). This negative effect should be stronger among those experiencing redistribution (*H2*). I test these expectations using an experimental online game with a factorial design programmed in *oTree* (Chen et al., 2016) and conducted in Germany. Participants are invited to complete three games, which are based on effort and skill and are paired with two computer simulated better or worse performing players than themselves. In the redistribution setting, the points made in the group get redistributed equally among the group members. In the control setting, no redistribution takes place, but participants can still see how well their group members perform. Additionally, participants get randomly assigned to a prime that contains two negative statements on the GDR before the games and are asked to agree or disagree.

The results do not robustly support the two hypotheses. The negative statements on the GDR do not consistently lead to an overall lower support for redistribution, and negative effects of the prime are not stronger among those participants whose points are redistributed in the games. Exploratory analyses, however, reveal that the effect of the prime on attitudes towards point redistribution is conditioned by the performance of the opponents. The effect of receiving negative statements on

⁸Please note, however, that given the reduced sample size due to the subgroup analysis, small effects might not be statistically detected.

the GDR leads only to lower attitudes on point redistribution among participants who are paired with better, but not worse opponents, compared to the baseline. These effects are stronger among younger participants and those who have performed well in the games.

Why could it be that those participants who are paired with better opponents and primed on the GDR with negative statements report lower attitudes on point redistribution than the baseline, but not those who are paired with worse opponents? Participants that are outperformed by their opponents might more strongly attribute individual responsibility for their own economic well-being as a result of the prime. By contrast, being paired with worse opponents and being exposed to the prime might lead participants to express a greater sense of social responsibility and altruism, and a reduction of social rivalry among participants (for more on this, see Corneo and Grüner, 2002) making redistribution seem more favourably.

The results of this study have three main implications. First, the findings highlight that while statements against authoritarian regimes do not necessarily uniformly affect attitudes towards closely connected policies, they can do so for certain societal groups - in this case, those who were outperformed. These results stand in contrast to work by Okulicz-Kozaryn (2014) who finds that winners of the transition to democracy and capitalism are less in favour of redistribution, while losers prefer higher levels of redistribution. This disparity might appear given that social networks often consist of people with similar social standings. As a result, direct comparisons of performance and pay-offs as presented in the games might happen more seldom. Second, particularly younger participants seem to be more affected by the negative statements than older cohorts who were directly exposed to communism and the GDR. This study, therefore, corroborates findings by Dinas and Northmore-Ball (2020) that backlash effects against the former communist rule might work differently for younger than older people. Finally, the experimental set-up of this study highlights that behaviour is less likely to move than attitudes as

a result of experimental manipulation, but, nevertheless, offers a novel approach to study preferences in an attitudinal and behavioural manner.

This study has some limitations, but also provides avenues for future research, which I would like to openly discuss. First, the priming questions employed are rather subtle and target economic dimensions of the GDR. Nevertheless, Dinas and Northmore-Ball (2020), for instance, argue that particularly repression reinforces biases against the former authoritarian regime. If the prime on the GDR, therefore, included elements on the repressive dimension of the GDR, an increased or perhaps also different effect might be found on support for redistribution. Second, a negative portrayal of the GDR might not have been enough to manipulate redistribution preferences in a more consistent manner. Especially if public and social pressures to stigmatise the ideology of the prior authoritarian regime are at play (see Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2020), then elements of social norms should be explicitly included. Third, employing this experiment in Germany might have been a rather hard test to study potential negative responses to the exposure of communism. In other countries, such as Romania, which experienced a comparably higher violent communist rule, a prime against the communist regime might have led to stronger reactions. Fourth, it could have been useful to test baseline attitudes towards the regimes explicitly. For instance, including multiple primes, which target different dimensions of communism, as well as one mentioning the communist regime neutrally would have sufficed to do so. This enables to study, which dimensions of the regime might lead to backlash effects, while studying how the regime is overall perceived among participants. Finally, the results of this study underline differences in younger and older cohorts. Although younger cohorts have not necessarily directly experienced the communist past of Germany, they seem to react differently and more strongly to the primes than older participants. Studying these heterogeneous cohort effects into more detail seems to be a fruitful avenue for future research.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

A large portion of citizens around the globe live or have lived in an authoritarian environment where political and individual rights are limited. Citizens in these regimes experience a vastly different political reality than those living in established democracies. For example, while the possibility to participate in politics and have deliberative political discussions is expected in democracies, citizens in strongly authoritarian regimes live under repression, often fearing negative consequences if they openly criticise the government. Such experiences can become integral to a society's identification, even if the regime is overturned and transformed into a democracy (Schwartz, 1996).

Given the recent democratic backsliding of many new democracies and the occurrence of military coups around the world, investigating the consequences of growing up in a stable democratic regime versus an unstable (post-) authoritarian political environment does not only hold relevance historically speaking but also for future global developments. This dissertation explores when and how experiences with authoritarianism matter for how political attitudes and behaviours are formed. Does growing up under (post-) authoritarianism impede the degree to which citizens identify their position in the ideological political space after relo-

cating to a democracy? Does socialisation under left- or right-wing authoritarianism result in a bias against the ideological spectrum of the authoritarian regime in a different political environment? And are ideological biases of authoritarian regimes unique to political labels and their associated parties, or can they be expressed in support of policies connected to the authoritarian ideology? This dissertation has focused on each of these questions and respectively on a different ideological dimension in a separate chapter. The main message of this dissertation is that socialisation under and exposure to authoritarianism affects how political opinions are formed, even in different political contexts. The results highlight that experiences with political institutions are significant and can be identity-shaping but also that effects are not necessarily uniform across social groups and regime types.

Chapter 2, *What is my Opinion? Immigrants, (Post-) Authoritarianism and Ideological Positioning*, addresses whether socialisation in a (post-) authoritarian environment affects the likelihood of identifying political stances in the ideological space. Citizens in authoritarian regimes often refrain from deliberately debating politics either by engaging in self-censorship to avoid negative consequences (e.g. Chang and Manion, 2021; Moore-Gilbert and Abdul-Nabi, 2021; Robinson and Tannenber, 2019) or disengaging from politics due to opposing the regime (Tertychnaya, 2020). Political debates are, however, a regular occurrence in established democracies. As a result, I posit that socialisation in (post-) authoritarian regimes, as opposed to established democracies, should lead to a lower likelihood of identifying positions in the ideological space driven by lower political ability and interest. Studying first-generation immigrants, I show that immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes are less likely to position themselves on abstract political concepts than non-immigrants or immigrants from established democracies. At the same time, these patterns are less pronounced for specific policy issues. Immigrants from established democracies map similarly to non-immigrants but are less likely to identify with parties in the host country. This chapter shows that

authoritarianism does not impede the identification of political stances on all political concepts to the same extent, but that the level of abstractness of the political items is of importance.

Chapter 3, *Lingering Memories of the Past? The Ideological Behaviour of Immigrants Socialised in Authoritarian Regimes*, contributes to the overarching research question by focusing on immigrants from authoritarian left- or right-wing regimes who express their political orientation in abstract terms. Building on literature of political socialisation and authoritarian legacies (Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2020; Linz, 2000), I suggest that immigrants socialised in left-wing authoritarian regimes should extend biases against the political left into host country politics and support parties towards the political right. By contrast, immigrants socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes are not overall expected to behave differently than their democratic counterparts. Studying first-generation immigrants in Germany, I show that immigrants socialised in left-wing authoritarian regimes are more likely to support right of centre parties than immigrants socialised in established democracies. At the same time, no stable differences are found for left-right self placement. Immigrants socialised in right-wing authoritarian regimes are also more likely to identify with right of centre parties, but only if they come from countries with a longer communist past. Otherwise, they are not more or less likely to express a bias against the left or right-wing spectrum than their democratic counterparts. I attribute these results to different levels of repression and the ideological presence of the regime throughout political socialisation. This chapter provides first insights that systematic biases against the ideological spectrum of the former authoritarian regime are unique to immigrants socialised under left-wing authoritarianism in the host country.

Chapter 4, *Communism and Redistribution Preferences: Evidence from an Experimental Online Game*, as a last step, focuses on whether negative depictions of the ideology of authoritarian regimes can affect preferences of policies that are con-

nected to the former regime. Building on literature of authoritarian legacies (Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2020), I hypothesise that negative portrayals of communism should negatively affect redistribution preferences, especially if someone is subject to high levels of redistribution. I test these expectations by employing a novel experimental game in Germany. In the games, participants could earn points based on effort and skill and were paired with two computer-simulated opponents. Before the games, participants are randomly assigned to a prime with negative statements on the German Democratic Republic (GDR), i.e. the former communist East Germany. Unlike hypothesised, these statements do not generally affect redistribution preferences and their effect is also not conditioned on experiencing high levels of redistribution in the games. Exploratory analyses reveal, however, that priming participants on the GDR only lowers support for redistribution among those who were outperformed by their opponents. These effects are heightened among younger participants and those who scored more points in the games. This chapter highlights the potential of authoritarian backlashes appearing in connected policies, but especially their heterogeneous effects. In addition, it contributes to the literature by providing a behavioural, next to an attitudinal, outcome and offering a behavioural set-up as part of the experimental treatment. This design provides an alternative to more standard vignette experiments in political science to study preferences.

Implications

The research in this dissertation highlights that socialisation under and exposure to (post-) authoritarianism can affect how political opinions are formed and expressed, but not necessarily uniformly across subgroups. By combining multiple literatures, this dissertation bridges research on authoritarian legacies, political sociology, migration and political behaviour and also contributes to the experimental

literature. This dissertation holds implications for research and, more generally, on the consequences of authoritarianism for (new) democracies and democratic countries with migration inflows from (post-) authoritarian regimes.

Overall, the findings of this dissertation underline that experience with authoritarianism can have long-term consequences on how political attitudes and opinions are formed, which in turn has broader implications. This thesis demonstrates, however, that effects resulting from authoritarianism are a complex phenomenon. In specific contexts, backlash effects appear systematically, while they do not necessarily in others. This thesis highlights that differentiating between different types of authoritarianism is necessary while emphasising that more than a one-size-fits-all approach is needed when studying consequences of these regimes, but also when designing policies.

Heterogeneity is also present across cohorts, with particularly younger people, who only indirectly experienced the corresponding authoritarian rule still being influenced by its legacy. These results point to different dynamics of transmission processes that apply to those who directly or only indirectly experienced these regimes. These cohort differences may also partly explain shifts in public opinion in post-authoritarian contexts. Nevertheless, the existence and emergence of these biases can create a fertile ground for more extreme political groupings, which might explain why certain regimes remain authoritarian when the government and its ideology are overturned. In the wake of new democracies experiencing democratic backsliding, strengthening democratic institutions becomes increasingly important.

Particularly, Chapter 2 highlights that socialisation under (post-) authoritarianism affects the likelihood of identifying stances especially in the abstract ideological space. These results have important implications for the state of democracy of the receiving society and representation in the case of immigrants relocating to these democracies. Heuristics, such as party identification, are often used to make

electoral decisions (see e.g. Lachat, 2015). Even if the political arena is to become more politically inclusive, immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes are at risk of being disproportionately underrepresented given their lower understanding of heuristics compared to other groups. Policy-makers should make a conscious effort to include this immigrant group in the political process, especially in polities where non-citizens are allowed to participate.

This thesis also demonstrates the electoral potential of immigrants for a variety of parties. It is often assumed that immigrants generally support the political left, but this thesis highlights that this is not necessarily the case. Besides that immigrants from (post-) communist regimes have a higher likelihood of supporting right of centre parties, especially immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes have electoral potential for different parties. While the terms of the political left and right might mean less and partisan identifications are lower among this group, immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes identify their policy preferences to a not much lower extent than non-immigrants or other immigrants. Hence, issue-based appeals might be a mobilising strategy for this specific group.

Finally, this dissertation also holds implications for the broader debate about immigrants. Pre-migration experiences should be accounted for and explored more broadly in research, while being more strongly included in the popular discourse in general. In the public debate, certain migrant groups become categorised for behaving in a specific way without explanations why. Such categorisations can easily create negative stereotypes of and prejudices against specific immigrant groups. For instance, *Spätaussiedler*, i.e. Ethnic German immigrants, are generally presented as an immigrant group supporting the political right in Germany. This behaviour is, however, rarely linked to their potentially negative experiences with communism. In conclusion, finding mechanisms of behaviours and common denominators can help alleviate discrimination towards minority groups, which is why it is crucial to understand their behaviour to a greater extent.

Limitations and Avenues for Future Research

As with all research, this endeavour has its limitations but also provides avenues for future research. This last section, therefore, maps out different directions future research could take based on the limitations of, but also insights gained in this dissertation.

This dissertation provides evidence that biases as a result of socialisation under authoritarianism can be extended to other political contexts at least in the case of left-wing authoritarianism. More research is, nevertheless, needed to understand the underlying mechanisms to a greater extent. For example, is the fall of an authoritarian regime a necessary condition for the appearance of these ideological biases? A second question concerns switches of the ideology of authoritarian regimes. Part of this dissertation shows that socialisation in post-communist right-wing authoritarian regimes still leads to the expression of anti-left biases after migration. Could this bias against communism at one point turn and citizens in these countries become again more left-wing as a result of the right-wing authoritarian regime, even if it is less repressive than the former communist regime?

One restriction of this work is that although I differentiate between authoritarian regimes with and without recent democratic rule (Chapter 2) and ideologies (Chapter 3), authoritarian regimes are still heterogeneous within these pooled groups. Hence, future research should also focus more closely on the different subgroups. While, for instance, socialisation under right-wing authoritarianism as opposed to in an established democracy might not lead to any systematic behaviours in the host country, specific regime experiences within this group might still lead to differential behaviours. Future research should consider such heterogeneity in greater detail. For instance, the next step might be considering authoritarianism as a more nuanced concept. Future research should also investigate the underlying mechanisms to a greater extent. While this dissertation made some

attempts to do so, future studies should make this a more systematic endeavour.

The question remains as to why there are some seeming disparities between this thesis's observational and experimental findings concerning the appearance of an anti-left bias in political behaviour. While in Chapter 3, an anti-left bias is robustly visible among immigrants socialised in left-wing authoritarian regimes in Germany, when experimentally studying these dynamics with non-immigrants in Chapter 4, an anti-left bias concerning attitudes towards redistribution is only observable for specific subgroups. As already touched upon in the respective chapters, immigrants are a most likely case for these biases to appear. In contrast, the German case in the experimental study is likely not. Not only was life under communism very different in the GDR than, for instance, in Romania, but after the reunification, Germany already had the institutional set-up of a democracy. These and other differences might have made the GDR less negatively connoted than other communist regimes. Future research should investigate these mechanisms to a greater extent.

Another potential avenue for future research is to investigate further what dimensions of the former regime negatively affect public opinion. Such an endeavour could be achieved by implementing a set of online experiments, where participants are primed on multiple political dimensions the regime entailed. For instance, in Chapter 4, the negative portrayals of the GDR were focused on a career and economic dimension only. Another experiment could, however, extend this research by implementing other primes that, for instance, target repression against civil society, freedom of speech or the process of not having free elections. Such an approach would also create insights into the heterogeneity of the emergence of these biases. Besides, it is not yet clear how far-reaching backlash effects against the ideology of the former regime are. Do they appear in rather abstract political concepts, such as party identification and policy dimensions closely connected to the regime or the corresponding ideological spectrum more generally? Investigat-

ing different dimensions on the outcome side could be a promising avenue.

This dissertation has focused on the consequences of authoritarianism on public opinion in a rather general manner. However, there are reasons to believe that subsequent effects and biases emerging from these experiences differ across the spectrum. For instance, authoritarianism might disproportionately affect women when identifying their position in the ideological space, given that politics is often male-dominated. In addition, certain minority groups might have experienced a higher level of repression than the majority groups in their daily lives during authoritarianism, which in turn might affect the extent to which backlash effects are expressed in both the post-authoritarian context and different political environments. For instance, in the case of communism, experiences were likely different for ethnic groups who were actively deported by the regime compared to the majority groups in the respective countries. While data sources might be limiting in this regard, especially if the political behaviour of immigrants is considered, future research could dive more deeply into this (potential) heterogeneity.

Finally, data availability is often a concern when focusing on immigrants as a population. Conducting immigrant-specific studies is often not feasible, especially if the goal is collecting original data in the context of experimental studies or surveys. Also, in existing surveys, migration-related questions are usually limited. These subgroups will, however, play a significant role in the future. Studying not only the majority's opinions and attitudes is crucial to increasing our knowledge of behaviours of our society as a whole. Hence, a greater effort should be made to adequately survey these minority groups to allow for a more comprehensive study of their political behaviour.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Appendix for Chapter 2

A.1 Descriptives

Established democracies (origin country) for analysis: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of America.

A.1.1 Sample Size of Immigrants by Host Country




Figure A.1: Absolute number of immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes and established democracies by host country.




Figure A.2: Proportion of immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes and established democracies and non-immigrant population by host country.

A.1.2 Origin Countries per Host Country

Table A.1: Immigrant groups by host country (five largest origin countries).

Host Country	(Post-) Auth. Or. Countries	N Imm. Auth.	Est. Democracies Or. Countries	N Imm. Dem.
AT	Bosnia & Herzegovina	70	Italy	9
AT	Turkey	54	Netherlands	7
AT	Serbia	43	United Kingdom	6
AT	Croatia	30	Switzerland	5
AT	Romania	29	France	3
BE	Morocco	103	France	89
BE	Romania	39	Netherlands	68
BE	Turkey	34	Italy	22
BE	Poland	33	United Kingdom	5
BE	Portugal	21	Switzerland	4
CH	Portugal	138	Italy	146
CH	Kosovo	67	France	110
CH	Turkey	46	Austria	57
CH	Serbia	44	Netherlands	27
CH	Bosnia & Herzegovina	42	United Kingdom	21
DK	Bosnia & Herzegovina	13	United Kingdom	12
DK	Iran	13	Iceland	10
DK	Poland	12	Sweden	7
DK	Turkey	11	Netherlands	6
DK	Iraq	8	Norway	6
FI	Russia	69	Sweden	11
FI	Estonia	53	Netherlands	4
FI	Thailand	6	United Kingdom	3
FI	China	5	France	2
FI	Nepal	5	Italy	2
FR	Algeria	100	Italy	18
FR	Morocco	88	Belgium	17
FR	Portugal	54	United Kingdom	16
FR	Tunisia	37	Switzerland	7
FR	Côte d'Ivoire	24	United States	5
GB	Poland	117	Ireland	58
GB	India	93	United States	17
GB	Pakistan	45	France	12
GB	Zimbabwe	22	Italy	12
GB	Jamaica	21	Australia	9
IE	Poland	306	United Kingdom	330
IE	India	82	United States	27
IE	Nigeria	52	France	26
IE	Lithuania	44	Italy	14
IE	Latvia	34	Netherlands	14
IS	Poland	25	Denmark	10
IS	Philippines	5	United Kingdom	4
IS	Latvia	3	United States	4
IS	Lithuania	3	France	2
IS	Croatia	2	Norway	2
IT	Romania	94	France	5
IT	Morocco	51	Switzerland	5
IT	Albania	43	United Kingdom	2
IT	India	17	Austria	1
IT	Ukraine	17		
NL	Suriname	39	Belgium	20
NL	Turkey	32	United Kingdom	12
NL	Morocco	29	France	9

Table A.1 (Continued): Immigrant groups by host country (five largest origin countries).

Host Country	(Post-) Auth. Or. Countries	N Imm. Auth.	Est. Democracies Or. Countries	N Imm. Dem.
NL	Poland	26	Italy	6
NL	Indonesia	15	Austria	4
NO	Poland	57	Sweden	60
NO	Russia	15	Denmark	21
NO	Pakistan	14	Netherlands	17
NO	Philippines	14	United Kingdom	16
NO	Lithuania	13	United States	9
SE	Iraq	32	Finland	49
SE	Bosnia & Herzegovina	29	Norway	24
SE	Iran	26	Denmark	19
SE	Serbia	17	United Kingdom	13
SE	Poland	16	Italy	6

A.1.3 Summary Statistics

Variable	Immigrant Status	Min	Mean	Median	Max	SD	N
Education	Imm.: Auth.	0.00	13.32	13.00	40.00	4.65	5380
Education	Imm.: Dem.	0.00	14.64	15.00	40.00	4.54	1782
Education	Non-Imm.	0.00	13.26	13.00	54.00	3.99	101745
Father's Education	Imm.: Auth.	1.00	2.95	2.00	7.00	2.14	4858
Father's Education	Imm.: Dem.	1.00	3.48	3.00	7.00	2.22	1587
Father's Education	Non-Imm.	1.00	2.89	2.00	7.00	1.94	92908
Father: Clerical occupations	Imm.: Auth.	0.00	0.06	0.00	1.00	0.24	4501
Father: Clerical occupations	Imm.: Dem.	0.00	0.07	0.00	1.00	0.25	1593
Father: Clerical occupations	Non-Imm.	0.00	0.07	0.00	1.00	0.25	90924
Father: Farm worker	Imm.: Auth.	0.00	0.14	0.00	1.00	0.35	4501
Father: Farm worker	Imm.: Dem.	0.00	0.08	0.00	1.00	0.27	1593
Father: Farm worker	Non-Imm.	0.00	0.14	0.00	1.00	0.35	90924
Father: Higher administrator occupations	Imm.: Auth.	0.00	0.07	0.00	1.00	0.26	4501
Father: Higher administrator occupations	Imm.: Dem.	0.00	0.11	0.00	1.00	0.31	1593
Father: Higher administrator occupations	Non-Imm.	0.00	0.07	0.00	1.00	0.26	90924
Father: Professional/technical occupations	Imm.: Auth.	0.00	0.13	0.00	1.00	0.34	4501
Father: Professional/technical occupations	Imm.: Dem.	0.00	0.18	0.00	1.00	0.38	1593
Father: Professional/technical occupations	Non-Imm.	0.00	0.10	0.00	1.00	0.31	90924
Father: Sales occupations	Imm.: Auth.	0.00	0.08	0.00	1.00	0.27	4501
Father: Sales occupations	Imm.: Dem.	0.00	0.08	0.00	1.00	0.27	1593
Father: Sales occupations	Non-Imm.	0.00	0.07	0.00	1.00	0.26	90924
Father: Semi-skilled worker	Imm.: Auth.	0.00	0.14	0.00	1.00	0.35	4501
Father: Semi-skilled worker	Imm.: Dem.	0.00	0.13	0.00	1.00	0.34	1593
Father: Semi-skilled worker	Non-Imm.	0.00	0.15	0.00	1.00	0.36	90924
Father: Service occupations	Imm.: Auth.	0.00	0.08	0.00	1.00	0.28	4501
Father: Service occupations	Imm.: Dem.	0.00	0.07	0.00	1.00	0.26	1593
Father: Service occupations	Non-Imm.	0.00	0.07	0.00	1.00	0.26	90924
Father: Unskilled worker	Imm.: Auth.	0.00	0.11	0.00	1.00	0.32	4501
Father: Unskilled worker	Imm.: Dem.	0.00	0.09	0.00	1.00	0.29	1593
Father: Unskilled worker	Non-Imm.	0.00	0.10	0.00	1.00	0.30	90924
Household Income	Imm.: Auth.	1.00	4.48	4.00	10.00	2.59	4497
Household Income	Imm.: Dem.	1.00	5.46	5.00	10.00	2.95	1563
Household Income	Non-Imm.	1.00	5.49	6.00	10.00	2.76	86691
Immigration Age	Imm.: Auth.	18.00	28.04	26.00	75.00	7.91	5470
Immigration Age	Imm.: Dem.	18.00	30.09	27.00	82.00	10.30	1796
Immigration Age	Non-Imm.						
Share Women	Imm.: Auth.	0.00	0.53	1.00	1.00	0.50	5470
Share Women	Imm.: Dem.	0.00	0.52	1.00	1.00	0.50	1796
Share Women	Non-Imm.	0.00	0.51	1.00	1.00	0.50	102484
Year of Birth	Imm.: Auth.	1931.00	1971.13	1973.00	2000.00	13.49	5470
Year of Birth	Imm.: Dem.	1931.00	1962.79	1963.00	2002.00	15.57	1796
Year of Birth	Non-Imm.	1931.00	1966.17	1965.00	2006.00	18.34	102499

Table A.2: Summary statistics by immigrant status (full sample). Imm. = Immigrants.

A.1.4 Correlation Plot Mechanisms




Figure A.3: Correlation plot of measurements of mechanisms in full sample.

A.1.5 Distribution of Outcome Variables by Immigration Status




Figure A.4: Distribution of outcome variables by immigration status (incl. “Don’t Know”, non-matched sample).

A.2 Main Analysis

A.2.1 Matched Countries of Origins (LR Self Placement Only)

Table A.3: (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: (Post-) Authoritarian socialisation of immigrants compared to non-immigrants (for left-right self placement).

Country	Non-Imm.	(Post-) Auth. Regime
Afghanistan	0.00	6.00
Albania	0.00	16.00
Algeria	0.00	26.00
Angola	0.00	1.00
Argentina	0.00	1.00
Armenia	0.00	2.00
Austria	226.21	0.00
Bangladesh	0.00	6.00
Belarus	0.00	5.00
Belgium	205.65	0.00
Benin	0.00	1.00
Bosnia & Herzegovina	0.00	51.00
Brazil	0.00	20.00
Bulgaria	0.00	24.00
Burkina Faso	0.00	1.00
Cambodia	0.00	2.00
Cameroon	0.00	3.00
Cape Verde	0.00	3.00
Chad	0.00	3.00
Chile	0.00	6.00
China	0.00	11.00
Colombia	0.00	3.00
Congo - Brazzaville	0.00	7.00
Congo - Kinshasa	0.00	6.00
Côte d'Ivoire	0.00	9.00
Croatia	0.00	24.00
Cuba	0.00	2.00
Czechia	0.00	14.00
Denmark	63.28	0.00
Dominican Republic	0.00	4.00
Ecuador	0.00	3.00
Egypt	0.00	9.00
El Salvador	0.00	2.00
Eritrea	0.00	2.00
Estonia	0.00	18.00
Ethiopia	0.00	3.00
Finland	79.10	0.00
France	245.20	0.00
Gabon	0.00	3.00
Gambia	0.00	1.00
Georgia	0.00	4.00
Ghana	0.00	6.00
Greece	0.00	9.00
Guinea	0.00	3.00
Haiti	0.00	2.00
Hong Kong SAR China	0.00	3.00
Hungary	0.00	17.00
Iceland	3.16	0.00
India	0.00	47.00
Indonesia	0.00	6.00
Iran	0.00	16.00

Table A.3 (Continued): (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: (Post-) Authoritarian socialisation of immigrants compared to non-immigrants (for left-right self placement).

Country	Non-Imm.	(Post-) Auth. Regime
Iraq	0.00	9.00
Ireland	284.74	0.00
Italy	156.61	0.00
Jamaica	0.00	6.00
Jordan	0.00	1.00
Kenya	0.00	1.00
Kosovo	0.00	11.00
Laos	0.00	3.00
Latvia	0.00	14.00
Lebanon	0.00	5.00
Lesotho	0.00	1.00
Lithuania	0.00	18.00
Madagascar	0.00	1.00
Malawi	0.00	1.00
Malaysia	0.00	4.00
Mali	0.00	2.00
Mauritius	0.00	4.00
Mexico	0.00	3.00
Moldova	0.00	3.00
Montenegro	0.00	1.00
Morocco	0.00	88.00
Mozambique	0.00	1.00
Nepal	0.00	3.00
Netherlands	134.46	0.00
Niger	0.00	1.00
Nigeria	0.00	15.00
North Korea	0.00	1.00
North Macedonia	0.00	11.00
Norway	91.75	0.00
Pakistan	0.00	16.00
Palestinian Territories	0.00	2.00
Panama	0.00	1.00
Peru	0.00	12.00
Philippines	0.00	12.00
Poland	0.00	159.00
Portugal	0.00	54.00
Romania	0.00	75.00
Russia	0.00	43.00
Rwanda	0.00	5.00
Senegal	0.00	11.00
Serbia	0.00	32.00
Seychelles	0.00	1.00
Sierra Leone	0.00	1.00
Singapore	0.00	1.00
Slovakia	0.00	12.00
Slovenia	0.00	4.00
Somalia	0.00	8.00
South Africa	0.00	13.00
South Korea	0.00	1.00
Spain	0.00	13.00
Sri Lanka	0.00	6.00
Sudan	0.00	4.00
Suriname	0.00	10.00
Sweden	82.26	0.00
Switzerland	216.72	0.00
Syria	0.00	6.00
Taiwan	0.00	1.00
Tajikistan	0.00	1.00
Tanzania	0.00	1.00
Thailand	0.00	6.00

Table A.3 (Continued): (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: (Post-) Authoritarian socialisation of immigrants compared to non-immigrants (for left-right self placement).

Country	Non-Imm.	(Post-) Auth. Regime
Togo	0.00	2.00
Trinidad & Tobago	0.00	1.00
Tunisia	0.00	20.00
Turkey	0.00	47.00
Ukraine	0.00	10.00
United Kingdom	151.86	0.00
Uruguay	0.00	1.00
Uzbekistan	0.00	2.00
Venezuela	0.00	4.00
Vietnam	0.00	4.00
Zimbabwe	0.00	6.00

Country	Non-Imm.	Established Dem.
Australia	0.00	4.00
Austria	16.62	17.00
Belgium	73.12	13.00
Canada	0.00	10.00
Denmark	34.90	11.00
Finland	11.63	15.00
France	28.25	55.00
Iceland	1.66	7.00
Ireland	206.06	17.00
Israel	0.00	3.00
Italy	4.99	48.00
Japan	0.00	2.00
Luxembourg	0.00	1.00
Netherlands	24.93	33.00
New Zealand	0.00	2.00
Norway	46.53	7.00
Sweden	63.15	20.00
Switzerland	127.96	6.00
United Kingdom	43.21	124.00
United States	0.00	16.00

Table A.4: (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: Socialisation in established democracies of immigrants compared to non-immigrants (for left-right self placement).

A.2.2 Balance Plots




Figure A.5: Covariate Balance: Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes and non-immigrants. * Standardised mean differences.




Figure A.6: Covariate Balance: Immigrants from established democracies and non-immigrants. * Standardised mean differences.




Figure A.7: Covariate Balance Mechanisms: Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes and non-immigrants. * Standardised mean differences.




Figure A.8: Covariate Balance Mechanisms: Immigrants from established democracies and non-immigrants. * Standardised mean differences.

A.2.3 Regression Tables

Abstract Political Items

Table A.5: Positioning on left-right scale and party identification: Model (1) and (2) immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes (treatment) and non-immigrants (control), model (3) and (4) immigrants from established democracies (treatment) vs. non-immigrants (control) (exactly matched estimations).

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	LR Scale Auth Imm. vs. Non-Imm.	PID	LR Scale Dem. Imm. vs. Non-Imm.	PID
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
SATT	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.19*** (0.04)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.10*** (0.03)
Matched Covariates	✗	✗	✗	✗
Robust SE	✗	✗	✓	✓
Cntry Or. Clust. SE	✓	✓	✗	✗
Observations	3,168	3,297	1,094	1,108
R ²	0.03	0.03	0.002	0.01
Adjusted R ²	0.03	0.03	0.001	0.01

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Policy Items

Table A.6: Positioning on policy items: Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes (treatment) and non-immigrants (control) (exactly matched estimations).

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Redistribution	EU Enlargement	Imm. Economy	Imm. Poor Countries	Gay Rights
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
SATT	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.005)
Matched Covariates	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗
Cntry Or. Clust. SE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	3,327	2,758	3,327	3,307	3,302
R ²	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Adjusted R ²	0.01	0.01	0.005	0.01	0.01

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.7: Positioning on policy items: Immigrants from established democracies (treatment) and non-immigrants (control) (exactly matched estimations).

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Redistribution (1)	EU Enlargement (2)	Imm. Economy (3)	Imm. Poor Countries (4)	Gay Rights (5)
SATT	-0.01 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.004)
Matched Covariates	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗
Robust SE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,116	899	1,110	1,108	1,114
R ²	0.003	0.0000	0.001	0.0001	0.0001
Adjusted R ²	0.002	-0.001	0.0000	-0.001	-0.001

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Mechanisms

Table A.8: Mechanisms: Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes (treatment) and non-immigrants (control) (exactly matched estimations). Standardised outcome variables.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Pol. Interest (1)	Pol. Ability (2)	Pol. Efficacy (3)	Trust Institutions (4)
SATT	-0.23*** (0.08)	-0.25** (0.11)	-0.19 (0.18)	0.37*** (0.11)
Matched Covariates	✗	✗	✗	✗
Cntry Or. Clust. SE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	3,314	1,567	1,527	2,877
R ²	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.03
Adjusted R ²	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.9: Mechanisms: Immigrants from established democracies (treatment) and non-immigrants (control) (exactly matched estimations). Standardised outcomes variables.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Pol. Interest (1)	Pol. Ability (2)	Pol. Efficacy (3)	Trust Institutions (4)
SATT	-0.08 (0.06)	0.01 (0.10)	-0.20* (0.11)	0.01 (0.07)
Matched Covariates	✗	✗	✗	✗
Robust SE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,118	446	426	997
R ²	0.002	0.0000	0.01	0.0000
Adjusted R ²	0.001	-0.002	0.01	-0.001

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

A.2.4 Sensitivity Assessment




Figure A.9: Sensitivity analysis of abstract ideological items. **Panel A:** Outcome: LR scale. Model: Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes vs. non-immigrants. **Panel B:** Outcome: PID. Model: Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes vs. non-immigrants. **Panel C:** Outcome: PID. Model: Immigrants from established democracies vs. non-immigrants.




Figure A.10: Sensitivity analysis of policy items. Models include comparison between immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes vs. non-immigrants. **Panel A:** Outcome: Redistribution. **Panel B:** Outcome: EU enlargement. **Panel C:** Outcome: Immigration economy. **Panel D:** Outcome: Immigration poor countries. **Panel E:** Outcome: Gay rights.




Figure A.11: Sensitivity analysis of mechanisms. Models include comparisons between immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes vs. non-immigrants. **Panel A:** Outcome: Political interest. **Panel B:** Outcome: Political ability. **Panel C:** Outcome: Trust in institutions.

Model	Outcome	Est.	S.E.	t-value	$R^2_{Y \sim D X}$	$RV_{q=1}$	$RV_{q=1, \alpha=0.05}$	df
Imm. (Auth.) - Non-Imm.	LR Scale	-0.11	0.02	-5.18	0.8%	8.8%	5.6%	3166
Imm. (Auth.) - Non-Imm.	PID	-0.19	0.04	-4.22	0.5%	7.1%	3.9%	3295
Imm. (Dem.) - Non-Imm.	PID	-0.10	0.03	-3.09	0.9%	8.9%	3.3%	1106
Imm. (Auth.) - Non-Imm.	Redistribution	-0.03	0.01	-4.05	0.5%	6.8%	3.6%	3325
Imm. (Auth.) - Non-Imm.	EU Enlargement	-0.04	0.01	-3.28	0.4%	6.1%	2.5%	2756
Imm. (Auth.) - Non-Imm.	Imm. Economy	-0.02	0.01	-3.28	0.3%	5.5%	2.3%	3325
Imm. (Auth.) - Non-Imm.	Imm. Poor Countries	-0.02	0.01	-3.79	0.4%	6.4%	3.1%	3305
Imm. (Auth.) - Non-Imm.	Gay Rights	-0.03	0.00	-6.07	1.1%	10%	6.9%	3300
Imm. (Auth.) - Non-Imm.	Political Interest	-0.23	0.08	-2.79	0.2%	4.7%	1.4%	3312
Imm. (Auth.) - Non-Imm.	Pol. Ability	-0.25	0.11	-2.31	0.3%	5.7%	0.9%	1565
Imm. (Auth.) - Non-Imm.	Trust Institutions	0.37	0.11	3.39	0.4%	6.1%	2.6%	2875

Table A.10: Sensitivity statistics: Main analysis.

Table A.10 provides an overview of the calculated sensitivity statistics for those estimates that were statistically significant at the 5% level. A short explanation on how to read this table on the example of the outcome left-right self placement of the model immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes vs. non-immigrants: $RV_{q=1}$: To reduce the point estimate of the treatment to zero, an unobserved confounder would need to account for at least 8.8% of the residual variance in both the treatment and the outcome variable. If it accounts for less of the residual variance of either the treatment or the outcome, then it does not have enough power to do so. $RV_{q=1, \alpha=0.05}$: To make the point estimate statistically insignificant (i.e. a p-value greater than 5%), an unobserved confounder needs to explain at least 5.6% of the residual variance of both treatment and outcome variable. The estimate $R^2_{Y \sim D|X}$ provides us with the scenario of an extreme confounder that explains the complete residual variance of the outcome variable. To completely explain the effects of the analysis, this extreme confounder would need to additionally account for at least 0.8% of the residual variance of the treatment (Cinelli et al., 2020; Cinelli and Hazlett, 2020, p.50-52). The estimates of Table A.10 should therefore be interpreted with care.

A.2.5 Logistic Regression Models (AME's)




Figure A.12: Robustness of abstract ideological items: Average marginal effects based on logistic regressions (SATT). Exact matching for model immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes vs. non-immigrants (country origin clustered standard errors) and immigrants from established democracies vs. non-immigrants (robust standard errors).




Figure A.13: Robustness of policy items: Average marginal effects based on logistic regressions (SATT). Exact matching for model immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes vs. non-immigrants (country origin clustered standard errors) and immigrants from established democracies vs. non-immigrants (robust standard errors).

A.2.6 Treatment - Covariate Interactions




Figure A.14: Robustness of abstract ideological items: Average marginal effects based on treatment-covariate interactions (SATT). Exact matching for model immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes vs. non-immigrants (country origin clustered standard errors) and immigrants from established democracies vs. non-immigrants (robust standard errors).



Figure A.15: Robustness of policy items: Average marginal effects based on treatment-covariate interactions (SATT). Exact matching for model immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes vs. non-immigrants (country origin clustered standard errors) and immigrants from established democracies vs. non-immigrants (robust standard errors).




Figure A.16: Robustness of mechanisms: Average marginal effects based on treatment-covariate interactions (SATT). Exact matching for model immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes vs. non-immigrants (country origin clustered standard errors) and immigrants from established democracies vs. non-immigrants (robust standard errors).

A.2.7 Alternative Matching Strategies: PSM Nearest-Neighbour

Abstract Political Items

Table A.11: Robustness propensity score matching (nearest neighbour): Ability to position on left-right scale and declare acquisition of party identification: Model (1) and (2) immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes (treatment) and non-immigrants (control), model (3) and (4) immigrants from established democracies (treatment) vs. non-immigrants (control). Standard errors clustered on subclass.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	LR Scale Auth Imm. vs. Non-Imm. (1)	PID (2)	LR Scale Dem. Imm. vs. Non-Imm. (3)	PID (4)
ATT	−0.11*** (0.01)	−0.19*** (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.12*** (0.02)
Matched Covariates	✗	✗	✗	✗
Subclass SE	✓	✓	✗	✗
Observations	8,118	8,254	2,894	2,918
R ²	0.06	0.09	0.02	0.05
Adjusted R ²	0.06	0.09	0.02	0.05

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Matched covariates include non-exactly matched covariates:
Father's education level, father's occupation, gender and year of birth
(wave and host country are exactly matched).

Policy Items

Table A.12: Robustness propensity score matching (nearest neighbour): Immigrants from authoritarian regimes (treatment) and non-immigrants (control). Standard errors clustered on subclass.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Redistribution (1)	EU Enlargement (2)	Imm. Economy (3)	Imm. Poor Countries (4)	Gay Rights (5)
ATT	−0.03*** (0.003)	−0.04*** (0.01)	−0.01*** (0.003)	−0.02*** (0.003)	−0.02*** (0.003)
Matched Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Subclass Clust. SE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	8,268	6,882	8,270	8,254	8,214
R ²	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
Adjusted R ²	0.01	0.02	0.004	0.01	0.01

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Matched covariates include non-exactly matched covariates:
Father's education level, father's occupation, gender and year of birth
(wave and host country are exactly matched).

Table A.13: Robustness propensity score matching (nearest neighbour): Immigrants from established democracies (treatment) and non-immigrants (control). Standard errors clustered on subclass.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Redistribution (1)	EU Enlargement (2)	Imm. Economy (3)	Imm. Poor Countries (4)	Gay Rights (5)
ATT	-0.01** (0.003)	0.004 (0.01)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.01* (0.005)	-0.001 (0.002)
Matched Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Subclass Clust. SE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,918	2,400	2,916	2,908	2,916
R ²	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.003	0.003
Adjusted R ²	0.001	0.0003	0.001	-0.001	-0.001

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Matched covariates include non-exactly matched covariates:
Father's education level, father's occupation, gender and year of birth
(wave and host country are exactly matched).

Potential Mechanisms

Table A.14: Robustness propensity score matching (nearest neighbour): Mechanisms. Immigrants from authoritarian regimes (treatment) and non-immigrants (control). Outcome in standard deviation units. Standard errors clustered on subclass.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Pol. Interest (1)	Pol. Ability (2)	Pol. Efficacy (3)	Trust Institutions (4)
ATT	-0.21*** (0.02)	-0.28*** (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.03)	0.32*** (0.02)
Matched Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓
Subclass Clust. SE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	8,264	3,770	3,636	7,190
R ²	0.09	0.11	0.07	0.04
Adjusted R ²	0.09	0.10	0.07	0.04

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Matched covariates include non-exactly matched covariates:
Father's education level, father's occupation, gender and year of birth
(wave and host country are exactly matched).

Table A.15: Robustness propensity score matching (nearest neighbour): Mechanisms. Immigrants from established democracies (treatment) and non-immigrants (control). Outcome in standard deviation units. Standard errors clustered on subclass.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Pol. Interest (1)	Pol. Ability (2)	Pol. Efficacy (3)	Trust Institutions (4)
ATT	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.23*** (0.05)	0.06* (0.04)
Matched Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓
Subclass Clust. SE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,916	1,288	1,242	2,692
R ²	0.05	0.08	0.04	0.04
Adjusted R ²	0.05	0.08	0.03	0.03

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Matched covariates include non-exactly matched covariates:
Father's education level, father's occupation, gender and year of birth
(wave and host country are exactly matched).

A.3 Additional Analysis between Immigrants

A.3.1 Matched Countries of Origins (LR Self Placement Only)

Table A.16: (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: (Post-) Authoritarian socialisation of immigrants compared to immigrants from established democracies (for left-right self placement).

Country	Established Dem.	(Post-) Auth. Regime
Afghanistan	0.00	3.00
Albania	0.00	3.00
Algeria	0.00	9.00
Angola	0.00	3.00
Argentina	0.00	4.00
Armenia	0.00	5.00
Australia	17.84	0.00
Austria	22.30	0.00
Bangladesh	0.00	4.00
Belarus	0.00	3.00
Belgium	16.84	0.00
Bolivia	0.00	3.00
Bosnia & Herzegovina	0.00	29.00
Brazil	0.00	21.00
Bulgaria	0.00	11.00
Cameroon	0.00	3.00
Canada	8.48	0.00
Cape Verde	0.00	2.00
Chad	0.00	1.00
Chile	0.00	3.00
China	0.00	15.00
Colombia	0.00	5.00
Congo - Brazzaville	0.00	6.00
Congo - Kinshasa	0.00	10.00
Côte d'Ivoire	0.00	1.00
Croatia	0.00	11.00
Cuba	0.00	3.00
Czechia	0.00	16.00
Denmark	11.76	0.00
East Timor	0.00	2.00
Ecuador	0.00	2.00
Egypt	0.00	4.00
El Salvador	0.00	1.00
Equatorial Guinea	0.00	1.00
Eritrea	0.00	5.00
Estonia	0.00	3.00
Ethiopia	0.00	2.00
Finland	16.95	0.00
France	98.91	0.00
Gabon	0.00	1.00
Georgia	0.00	2.00
Ghana	0.00	7.00
Greece	0.00	4.00
Guatemala	0.00	1.00
Guyana	0.00	1.00
Hong Kong SAR China	0.00	3.00
Hungary	0.00	16.00
Iceland	4.01	0.00
India	0.00	38.00
Indonesia	0.00	4.00
Iran	0.00	10.00

Table A.16 (Continued): (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: (Post-) Authoritarian socialisation of immigrants compared to immigrants from established democracies (for left-right self placement).

Country	Established Dem.	(Post-) Auth. Regime
Iraq	0.00	11.00
Ireland	17.40	0.00
Israel	2.01	0.00
Italy	129.78	0.00
Jamaica	0.00	5.00
Japan	16.06	0.00
Kazakhstan	0.00	1.00
Kenya	0.00	1.00
Kosovo	0.00	30.00
Kuwait	0.00	1.00
Kyrgyzstan	0.00	1.00
Laos	0.00	2.00
Latvia	0.00	21.00
Lebanon	0.00	2.00
Liberia	0.00	1.00
Lithuania	0.00	22.00
Luxembourg	0.22	0.00
Madagascar	0.00	1.00
Malaysia	0.00	5.00
Maldives	0.00	1.00
Mali	0.00	1.00
Mauritius	0.00	3.00
Mexico	0.00	3.00
Moldova	0.00	2.00
Mongolia	0.00	1.00
Montenegro	0.00	1.00
Morocco	0.00	30.00
Mozambique	0.00	2.00
Nepal	0.00	1.00
Netherlands	48.94	0.00
New Zealand	2.01	0.00
Nicaragua	0.00	1.00
Niger	0.00	1.00
Nigeria	0.00	24.00
North Korea	0.00	1.00
North Macedonia	0.00	10.00
Norway	12.38	0.00
Pakistan	0.00	20.00
Palestinian Territories	0.00	3.00
Panama	0.00	1.00
Peru	0.00	6.00
Philippines	0.00	17.00
Poland	0.00	149.00
Portugal	0.00	63.00
Romania	0.00	34.00
Russia	0.00	23.00
Rwanda	0.00	2.00
Saudi Arabia	0.00	1.00
Senegal	0.00	6.00
Serbia	0.00	23.00
Sierra Leone	0.00	1.00
Singapore	0.00	1.00
Slovakia	0.00	9.00
Slovenia	0.00	6.00
Somalia	0.00	7.00
South Africa	0.00	8.00
South Korea	0.00	1.00
Spain	0.00	18.00
Sri Lanka	0.00	6.00
Sudan	0.00	5.00

Table A.16 (Continued): (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: (Post-) Authoritarian socialisation of immigrants compared to immigrants from established democracies (for left-right self placement).

Country	Established Dem.	(Post-) Auth. Regime
Suriname	0.00	8.00
Sweden	20.91	0.00
Switzerland	9.09	0.00
Syria	0.00	3.00
Tajikistan	0.00	1.00
Tanzania	0.00	1.00
Thailand	0.00	9.00
Togo	0.00	2.00
Trinidad & Tobago	0.00	1.00
Tunisia	0.00	14.00
Turkey	0.00	29.00
Ukraine	0.00	6.00
United Kingdom	152.86	0.00
United States	38.25	0.00
Uruguay	0.00	1.00
Venezuela	0.00	5.00
Vietnam	0.00	6.00
Zimbabwe	0.00	4.00

A.3.2 Balance Plots




Figure A.17: Covariate Balance: Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes vs. immigrants from established democracies. * Standardised Mean differences.




Figure A.18: Covariate Balance Mechanisms: Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes vs. immigrants from established democracies. * Standardised Mean differences.

A.3.3 Regression Tables

Table A.17: Positioning on left-right scale and party identification: Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes (treatment) and immigrants from established democracies (control) (CEM).

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	LR Scale	PID Auth Imm. vs. Dem. Imm.
	(1)	(2)
SATT	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.08** (0.03)
Matched Covariates	✓	✓
Cntry Or. Clust. SE	✓	✓
Observations	1,614	1,630
R ²	0.05	0.08
Adjusted R ²	0.04	0.07

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Matched covariates include non-exactly matched covariates:
Father's education level, father's occupation,
year of birth and immigration year.

Table A.18: Positioning on policy items: Immigrants from authoritarian regimes (treatment) and immigrants from established democracies (control) (CEM).

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Redistribution	EU Enlargement	Imm. Economy	Imm. Poor Countries	Gay Rights
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
SATT	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)
Matched Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cntry Or. Clust. SE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,632	1,302	1,631	1,620	1,620
R ²	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01
Adjusted R ²	0.01	0.02	0.002	-0.0003	0.01

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Matched covariates include non-exactly matched covariates:
Father's education level, father's occupation, year of birth and immigration year.

Table A.19: Mechanisms: Immigrants from authoritarian regimes (treatment) and immigrants from established democracies (control) (CEM). Standardised outcome variables.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Pol. Interest (1)	Pol. Ability (2)	Pol. Efficacy (3)	Trust Institutions (4)
SATT	-0.27*** (0.07)	-0.31*** (0.07)	-0.03 (0.11)	0.22 (0.14)
Matched Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cntry Or. Clust. SE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,627	664	620	1,327
R ²	0.07	0.11	0.03	0.03
Adjusted R ²	0.06	0.09	0.01	0.02

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Matched covariates include non-exactly matched covariates:
Father's education level, father's occupation, year of birth and immigration year.

A.3.4 Sensitivity Assessment




Figure A.19: Sensitivity analysis abstract ideological and policy items. Models all compare immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes and established democracies. **Panel A:** Outcome: LR scale. **Panel B:** Outcome: PID. **Panel C:** Outcome: EU enlargement. **Panel D:** Outcome: Gay rights.




Figure A.20: Sensitivity analysis mechanism. Models all compare immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes and established democracies. **Panel A:** Outcome: Political interest. **Panel B:** Outcome: Political ability.

Outcome	Est.	S.E.	t-value	$R^2_{Y \sim D X}$	$RV_{q=1}$	$RV_{q=1, \alpha=0.05}$	df
LR Scale	-0.07	0.01	-5.07	1.6%	11.9%	7.5%	1601
PID	-0.08	0.03	-2.43	0.2%	4.2%	0.8%	3295
EU Enlargement	-0.04	0.02	-2.03	0.3%	5.5%	0.2%	1289
Gay Rights	-0.02	0.01	-3.46	0.7%	8.3%	3.7%	1607
Political Interest	-0.27	0.07	-4.00	1%	9.5%	5%	1614
Political Ability	-0.31	0.07	-4.29	2.7%	15.4%	8.7%	651

Table A.20: Sensitivity statistics: Additional analysis between immigrants. Models all depict comparisons of immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes and immigrants from established democracies.

A.3.5 Alternative Matching Strategy: PSM Nearest-Neighbour

Table A.21: Robustness propensity score matching (nearest neighbour): Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes (treatment) and established democracies (control). Standard errors clustered on subclass.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	LR Scale (1)	PID (2)
ATT	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.02)
Matched Covariates	✓	✓
Subclass Clust. SE	✓	✓
Observations	2,880	2,912
R ²	0.08	0.10
Adjusted R ²	0.07	0.09

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Matched covariates include non-exactly matched covariates:
Father's education level, father's occupation, gender
year of birth and immigration year
(wave and host country are exactly matched).

Table A.22: Robustness propensity score matching (nearest neighbour): Immigrants from authoritarian regimes (treatment) and established democracies (control). Standard errors clustered on subclass.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Redistribution (1)	EU Enlargement (2)	Imm. Economy (3)	Imm. Poor Countries (4)	Gay Rights (5)
ATT	-0.03*** (0.003)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.01*** (0.004)	-0.02*** (0.005)	-0.03*** (0.002)
Matched Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Subclass Clust. SE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,912	2,394	2,908	2,902	2,908
R ²	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.004	0.02
Adjusted R ²	0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.0004	0.02

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Matched covariates include non-exactly matched covariates:
Father's education level, father's occupation, gender
year of birth and immigration year
(wave and host country are exactly matched).

Table A.23: Robustness propensity score matching (nearest neighbour): Mechanisms. Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes (treatment) and established democracies (control). Outcomes in standard deviation units. Standard errors clustered on subclass.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Pol. Interest (1)	Pol. Abilities (2)	Pol. Efficacy (3)	Trust Institutions (4)
ATT	-0.30*** (0.05)	-0.23*** (0.07)	0.08 (0.07)	0.26*** (0.05)
Matched Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓
Subclass Clust. SE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,910	1,282	1,234	2,684
R ²	0.08	0.09	0.04	0.04
Adjusted R ²	0.08	0.09	0.03	0.03

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Matched covariates include non-exactly matched covariates:
 Father's education level, father's occupation, gender
 year of birth and immigration year
 (wave and host country are exactly matched).

A.4 Additional Analysis: New Democracies and On-going Authoritarianism

A.4.1 Classification of Countries of Origin

Countries	N Years Democratic
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burma/Myanmar, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, North Macedonia, Pakistan, Palestine/Gaza, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of the Congo, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, The Gambia, Togo, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe	0
Lesotho, Timor-Leste	1
Armenia, Burkina Faso	2
Mexico, Paraguay	3
Nepal	4
Georgia, Seychelles, Turkey	5
Bolivia, Liberia, Moldova	6
Colombia, Tunisia	9
Serbia	10
Romania	11
India	14
Hungary	15
Benin, Indonesia	17
Botswana, Mauritius, Peru, Poland, Senegal	20
Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cape Verde, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Ghana, Greece, Jamaica, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Mongolia, Namibia, Panama, Portugal, Sao Tome and Principe, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Suriname, Taiwan, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay	21

Table A.24: Countries of origin and number of years considered as minimally democratic based on the three-categorical ordinal liberal democracy index (Lindberg, 2016) based on V-Dem. Countries with ≥ 11 years of democracy in time span considered as countries with longer lasting democratic rule.

A.4.2 Matched Countries of Origin (LR Self Placement Only)

Table A.25: (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: Immigrants from authoritarian regimes with longer democratic rule compared to non-immigrants (for left-right self placement).

Country	Non-Imm.	(Post-) Auth. Regime (Dem. Rule)
Argentina	0.00	1.00
Austria	110.65	0.00
Belgium	60.36	0.00
Benin	0.00	1.00
Brazil	0.00	20.00
Bulgaria	0.00	24.00
Cape Verde	0.00	3.00
Chile	0.00	6.00
Croatia	0.00	24.00
Czechia	0.00	14.00
Denmark	26.83	0.00
Estonia	0.00	18.00
Finland	36.88	0.00
France	82.15	0.00
Ghana	0.00	6.00
Greece	0.00	9.00
Hungary	0.00	17.00
Iceland	3.35	0.00
India	0.00	47.00
Indonesia	0.00	6.00
Ireland	244.78	0.00
Italy	82.15	0.00
Jamaica	0.00	6.00
Latvia	0.00	14.00
Lithuania	0.00	18.00
Mauritius	0.00	4.00
Netherlands	68.74	0.00
Norway	53.65	0.00
Panama	0.00	1.00
Peru	0.00	12.00
Poland	0.00	159.00
Portugal	0.00	54.00
Romania	0.00	75.00
Senegal	0.00	11.00
Slovakia	0.00	12.00
Slovenia	0.00	4.00
South Africa	0.00	13.00
South Korea	0.00	1.00
Spain	0.00	13.00
Suriname	0.00	10.00
Sweden	25.15	0.00
Switzerland	115.68	0.00
Taiwan	0.00	1.00
Trinidad & Tobago	0.00	1.00
United Kingdom	105.62	0.00
Uruguay	0.00	1.00

Table A.26: (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: Immigrants from authoritarian regimes with no longer democratic rule compared to non-immigrants (for left-right self placement).

Country	Non-Imm.	(Post-) Auth. Regime (No Dem. Rule)
Afghanistan	0.00	6.00
Albania	0.00	16.00
Algeria	0.00	26.00
Angola	0.00	1.00
Armenia	0.00	2.00
Austria	118.91	0.00
Bangladesh	0.00	6.00
Belarus	0.00	5.00
Belgium	145.16	0.00
Bosnia & Herzegovina	0.00	51.00
Burkina Faso	0.00	1.00
Cambodia	0.00	2.00
Cameroon	0.00	3.00
Chad	0.00	3.00
China	0.00	11.00
Colombia	0.00	3.00
Congo - Brazzaville	0.00	7.00
Congo - Kinshasa	0.00	6.00
Côte d'Ivoire	0.00	9.00
Cuba	0.00	2.00
Denmark	37.06	0.00
Dominican Republic	0.00	4.00
Ecuador	0.00	3.00
Egypt	0.00	9.00
El Salvador	0.00	2.00
Eritrea	0.00	2.00
Ethiopia	0.00	3.00
Finland	43.24	0.00
France	163.69	0.00
Gabon	0.00	3.00
Gambia	0.00	1.00
Georgia	0.00	4.00
Guinea	0.00	3.00
Haiti	0.00	2.00
Hong Kong SAR China	0.00	3.00
Iran	0.00	16.00
Iraq	0.00	9.00
Ireland	52.51	0.00
Italy	77.21	0.00
Jordan	0.00	1.00
Kenya	0.00	1.00
Kosovo	0.00	11.00
Laos	0.00	3.00
Lebanon	0.00	5.00
Lesotho	0.00	1.00
Madagascar	0.00	1.00
Malawi	0.00	1.00
Malaysia	0.00	4.00
Mali	0.00	2.00
Mexico	0.00	3.00
Moldova	0.00	3.00
Montenegro	0.00	1.00
Morocco	0.00	88.00
Mozambique	0.00	1.00
Nepal	0.00	3.00
Netherlands	67.95	0.00
Niger	0.00	1.00
Nigeria	0.00	15.00
North Korea	0.00	1.00

Table A.26 (Continued): (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: Immigrants from authoritarian regimes with no longer democratic rule compared to non-immigrants (for left-right self placement).

Country	Non-Imm.	(Post-) Auth. Regime (No Dem. Rule)
North Macedonia	0.00	11.00
Norway	40.15	0.00
Pakistan	0.00	16.00
Palestinian Territories	0.00	2.00
Philippines	0.00	12.00
Russia	0.00	43.00
Rwanda	0.00	5.00
Serbia	0.00	32.00
Seychelles	0.00	1.00
Sierra Leone	0.00	1.00
Singapore	0.00	1.00
Somalia	0.00	8.00
Sri Lanka	0.00	6.00
Sudan	0.00	4.00
Sweden	57.14	0.00
Switzerland	105.01	0.00
Syria	0.00	6.00
Tajikistan	0.00	1.00
Tanzania	0.00	1.00
Thailand	0.00	6.00
Togo	0.00	2.00
Tunisia	0.00	20.00
Turkey	0.00	47.00
Ukraine	0.00	10.00
United Kingdom	50.96	0.00
Uzbekistan	0.00	2.00
Venezuela	0.00	4.00
Vietnam	0.00	4.00
Zimbabwe	0.00	6.00

A.4.3 Balance Plots




Figure A.21: Covariate Balance: Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes with longer democratic rule vs. non-immigrants. * Standardised mean differences.




Figure A.22: Covariate Balance: Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes with no longer democratic rule vs. non-immigrants. * Standardised mean differences.




Figure A.23: Covariate Balance (Mechanisms): Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes with longer democratic rule vs. non-immigrants. * Standardised mean differences.




Figure A.24: Covariate Balance (Mechanisms): Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes with no longer democratic rule vs. non-immigrants. * Standardised mean differences.

A.4.4 Marginal Effects Plot




Figure A.25: Mechanisms: Effect on political ability and interest, efficacy and trust in institutions. Exactly matched estimations (SATT). Comparison immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes with longer democratic rule (treatment) vs. non-immigrants (control) - clustered standard errors calculated on country of origin level. Comparison immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes with no longer democratic rule (treatment) vs. non-immigrants (control) - clustered standard errors calculated on country of origin level.

A.4.5 Regression Tables

Table A.27: Positioning on left-right scale and party identification: Model (1) and (2) immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes (longer democratic rule) (treatment) and non-immigrants (control), model (3) and (4) immigrants from authoritarian regimes (no longer democratic rule) (treatment) vs. non-immigrants (control) (exact matching).

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	LR Scale Auth Imm. (Dem. Rule.) vs. Non-Imm. (1)	PID (2)	LR Scale Auth. Imm (No Dem. Rule.) vs. Non-Imm. (3)	PID (4)
SATT	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.20*** (0.05)	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.17*** (0.04)
Cntry Or. Clust. SE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,622	1,666	1,580	1,670
R ²	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.03
Adjusted R ²	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.03

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.28: Positioning on policy items: Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes (longer democratic rule) (treatment) and non-immigrants (control) (exact matching).

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Redistribution (1)	EU Enlargement (2)	Imm. Economy (3)	Imm. Poor Countries (4)	Gay Rights (5)
SATT	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)
Cntry Or. Clust. SE	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Observations	1,682	1,388	1,686	1,672	1,669
R ²	0.01	0.003	0.01	0.01	0.02
Adjusted R ²	0.01	0.002	0.01	0.01	0.02

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.29: Positioning on policy items: Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes (no longer democratic rule) (treatment) and non-immigrants (control) (exactly matched estimations).

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Redistribution (1)	EU Enlargement (2)	Imm. Economy (3)	Imm. Poor Countries (4)	Gay Rights (5)
SATT	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)
Cntry Or. Clust. SE	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Observations	1,684	1,397	1,680	1,674	1,671
R ²	0.01	0.01	0.005	0.01	0.01
Adjusted R ²	0.01	0.01	0.004	0.004	0.01

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.30: Mechanisms: Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes (democratic transition) (treatment) and non-immigrants (control) (exactly matched estimations).

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Pol. Interest (1)	Pol. Ability (2)	Pol. Efficacy (3)	Trust Institutions (4)
SATT	-0.23** (0.10)	-0.32** (0.13)	-0.31 (0.21)	0.36*** (0.12)
Cntry Or. Clust. SE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,673	758	730	1,422
R ²	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03
Adjusted R ²	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.31: Mechanisms: Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes (no longer democratic rule) (treatment) and non-immigrants (control) (exactly matched estimations).

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Pol. Interest (1)	Pol. Ability (2)	Pol. Efficacy (3)	Trust Institutions (4)
SATT	-0.22** (0.09)	-0.19 (0.12)	-0.09 (0.18)	0.38*** (0.13)
Cntry Or. Clust. SE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,680	832	818	1,490
R ²	0.01	0.01	0.002	0.04
Adjusted R ²	0.01	0.01	0.001	0.03

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

A.4.6 Sensitivity Assessment




Figure A.26: Sensitivity analysis abstract ideological items. **Panel A:** Outcome: LR scale. Model: Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes with longer democratic rule vs. non-immigrants. **Panel B:** Outcome: LR scale. Model: Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes with no longer democratic rule vs. non-immigrants. **Panel C:** Outcome: PID. Model: Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes with longer democratic rule vs. non-immigrants. **Panel D:** Outcome: PID. Model: Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes with no longer democratic rule vs. non-immigrants.




Figure A.27: Sensitivity analysis policy items (I). **Panel A:** Outcome: Redistribution. Model: Immigrants from post-authoritarian regimes with longer democratic rule vs. non-immigrants. **Panel B:** Outcome: Redistribution. Model: Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes with no longer democratic rule vs. non-immigrants. **Panel C:** Outcome: EU Enlargement. Model: Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes with no longer democratic rule vs. non-immigrants. **Panel D:** Outcome: Immigration Economy. Model: Immigrants from post-authoritarian regimes with longer democratic rule vs. non-immigrants. **Panel E:** Outcome: Immigration Economy. Model: Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes with no longer democratic rule vs. non-immigrants.




Figure A.28: Sensitivity analysis policy items (II). **Panel A:** Outcome: Immigration poor countries. Model: Immigrants from post-authoritarian regimes with longer democratic rule vs. non-immigrants. **Panel B:** Outcome: Immigration poor countries. Model: Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes with no longer democratic rule vs. non-immigrants. **Panel C:** Outcome: Gay rights. Model: Immigrants from post-authoritarian regimes with longer democratic rule vs. non-immigrants. **Panel D:** Outcome: Immigration poor countries. Model: Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes with no longer democratic rule vs. non-immigrants.




Figure A.29: Sensitivity analysis of mechanisms. **Panel A:** Outcome: Political interest. Model: Immigrants from post-authoritarian regimes with democratic rule vs. non-immigrants. **Panel B:** Outcome: Political interest Model: Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes with no longer democratic rule vs. non-immigrants. **Panel C:** Outcome: Political ability. Model: Immigrants from post-authoritarian regimes with longer democratic rule vs. non-immigrants. **Panel D:** Outcome: Trust in institutions. Model: Immigrants from post-authoritarian regimes with longer democratic rule vs. non-immigrants. **Panel E:** Outcome: Trust in institutions. Model: Immigrants from (post-) authoritarian regimes with no longer democratic rule vs. non-immigrants.

Model	Outcome	Est.	S.E.	t-value	$R^2_{Y \sim D X}$	$RV_{q=1}$	$RV_{q=1, \alpha=0.05}$	df
Imm. (Auth., Dem. Rule) - Non-Imm.	LR Scale	-0.09	0.03	-3.56	0.8%	8.5%	3.9%	1620
Imm. (Auth., No Dem. Rule) - Non-Imm.	LR Scale	-0.12	0.02	-5.04	1.6%	11.9%	7.5%	1578
Imm. (Auth., Dem. Rule) - Non-Imm.	PID	-0.20	0.05	-3.81	0.9%	8.9%	4.4%	1664
Imm. (Auth., No Dem. Rule) - Non-Imm.	PID	-0.17	0.04	-4.13	1%	9.6%	5.2%	1668
Imm. (Auth., Dem. Rule) - Non-Imm.	Redistribution	-0.03	0.01	-3.11	0.6%	7.3%	2.8%	1680
Imm. (Auth., No Dem. Rule) - Non-Imm.	Redistribution	-0.02	0.01	-2.88	0.5%	6.8%	2.2%	1682
Imm. (Auth., No Dem. Rule) - Non-Imm.	EU Enlargement	-0.06	0.02	-3.52	0.9%	9%	4.1%	1395
Imm. (Auth., Dem. Rule) - Non-Imm.	Immigration Economy	-0.03	0.02	-1.56	0.2%	4.1%	0%	1386
Imm. (Auth., No Dem. Rule) - Non-Imm.	Immigration Economy	-0.02	0.01	-2.25	0.3%	5.4%	0.7%	1678
Imm (Auth., Dem. Rule) - Non-Imm.	Imm. Poor Countries	-0.02	0.01	-2.86	0.5%	6.8%	2.2%	1670
Imm (Auth., No Dem. Rule) - Non-Imm.	Imm. Poor Countries	-0.02	0.01	-2.71	0.4%	6.4%	1.8%	1672
Imm (Auth., Dem. Rule) - Non-Imm.	Gay Rights	-0.03	0.01	-4.81	1.4%	11.1%	6.7%	1667
Imm (Auth., No Dem. Rule) - Non-Imm.	Gay Rights	-0.02	0.01	-3.74	0.8%	8.8%	4.3%	1669
Imm (Auth., Dem. Rule) - Non-Imm.	Political Interest	-0.23	0.10	-2.30	0.3%	5.5%	0.8%	1671
Imm (Auth., No Dem. Rule) - Non-Imm.	Political Interest	-0.22	0.09	-2.54	0.4%	6%	1.4%	1678
Imm (Auth., Dem. Rule) - Non-Imm.	Political Ability	-0.32	0.13	-2.53	0.8%	8.8%	2%	756
Imm (Auth., Dem. Rule) - Non-Imm.	Trust in Institutions	0.36	0.12	3.07	0.7%	7.8%	2.9%	1420
Imm (Auth., No Dem. Rule) - Non-Imm.	Trust in Institutions	0.38	0.13	3.05	0.6%	7.6%	2.8%	1488

Table A.32: Sensitivity statistics: Additional analysis new democracies and ongoing authoritarianism.

Appendix B

Appendix for Chapter 3

B.1 Descriptives

B.1.1 Regime Classification According to V-Dem

Table B.1: Country of origin classification by predominant ideology according to V-Dem.

Country	Democratic	LW Auth.	RW Auth.	Other Auth.	Missing
Afghanistan		1974 - 1992	1946 - 1971, 2002 - 2019	1972 - 1973, 1993 - 2001	
Albania		1946 - 1990, 2017 - 2019	1992 - 2016	1991	
Algeria		1962 - 1987	1946 - 1961, 1988 - 2019		
Angola		1976 - 2017	1946 - 1975, 2018	2019	
Argentina	1984 - 2019	1983	1946 - 1982		
Armenia	2019	1946 - 1989	1990 - 2018		
Australia	1946 - 2019				
Austria	1946 - 2019				
Azerbaijan		1946 - 1990	1991 - 2019		
Bangladesh			1947 - 1949, 1951 - 2019	1950	
Belarus		1946 - 2019			
Belgium	1949 - 2019		1946 - 1948		
Bolivia	1995 - 2005	2006 - 2019	1946 - 1994		
Bosnia & Herzegovina		1946 - 1989	1990 - 2019		
Brazil	1989 - 2019		1946 - 1988		
Bulgaria	1991 - 2019	1946 - 1989	1990		
Burkina Faso	2016 - 2019	1960 - 1965, 1983 - 1987, 2015	1966 - 1982, 1988 - 1989	1947 - 1959, 1990 - 2014	
Cambodia		1975 - 1992	1946 - 1974, 1993 - 2019		
Cameroon		1982 - 1999, 2019	1961 - 1981, 2000 - 2018		
Canada	1946 - 2019				
Chad			1960 - 1989	1946 - 1959, 1990 - 2019	
Chile	1971 - 1972, 1990 - 2019	1965 - 1970, 1973	1946 - 1963, 1974 - 1989	1964	
China		1950 - 2019	1946 - 1949		
Colombia	2011 - 2018		1946 - 2010, 2019		
Congo - Brazzaville		1982 - 1989	1960 - 1962, 1990 - 2019	1946 - 1959, 1963 - 1981	
Costa Rica	1950 - 2019		1946 - 1949		
Côte d'Ivoire		2000 - 2011	1946 - 1999, 2012 - 2019		
Croatia	2000 - 2019	1946 - 1989	1990 - 1999		
Cuba		1959 - 2019	1946 - 1958		
Cyprus	1981 - 2019		1946 - 1949, 1960 - 1980	1950 - 1959	
Czechia	1990 - 2019	1946 - 1989			
Denmark	1946 - 2019				

Table B.1 (Continued): Country of origin classification by predominant ideology according to V-Dem.

Country	Democratic	LW Auth.	RW Auth.	Other Auth.	Missing
Djibouti			1946 - 2019		
Dominican Republic			1946 - 2019		
Ecuador		2008 - 2017	1946 - 2007, 2018 - 2019		
Egypt		1953 - 1976	1946 - 1952, 1977 - 2019		
El Salvador		2010 - 2018	1962 - 2009, 2019	1946 - 1961	
Eritrea		1974 - 2019	1946 - 1969	1970 - 1973	
Estonia	1990 - 1991, 1993 - 2019	1946 - 1989	1992		
Ethiopia		1975 - 1991	1946 - 1974, 2019	1992 - 2018	
Finland	1946 - 2019				
France	1947 - 2019		1946		
Gambia			1946 - 2019		
Georgia	2014 - 2019	1946 - 1989	1990 - 2013		
Ghana	1997 - 2019	1951 - 1966, 1982	1946 - 1950, 1967 - 1981, 1983 - 1996		
Greece	1975 - 2019		1946 - 1974		
Guinea		1958 - 1984	1946 - 1957, 1985 - 2019		
Haiti			1946 - 2019		
Honduras		2008 - 2009	1946 - 2007, 2010 - 2019		
Hong Kong SAR China			1946 - 2019		
Hungary	1990 - 2014	1946 - 1989	2015 - 2019		
India	1953 - 1964, 1966 - 1970, 1978 - 2014	1948 - 1952, 1965, 1971 - 1977	1946 - 1947, 2015 - 2019		
Indonesia	2000 - 2013, 2015 - 2016	1950 - 1965	1946 - 1949, 1966 - 1999, 2014, 2017 - 2019		
Iran			1954 - 1978	1946 - 1953, 1979 - 2019	
Iraq			1946 - 2009	2010 - 2019	
Ireland	1946 - 2019				
Israel	1951 - 1952, 1954 - 2019		1948 - 1950, 1953		
Italy	1947 - 2019		1946		
Jamaica	1996 - 2019		1946 - 1995		
Japan	1952 - 2019		1946 - 1951		
Jordan			1946 - 2019		
Kazakhstan		1946 - 1991	1992 - 2019		
Kenya		1963 - 1999	1960 - 1962, 2000 - 2019	1946 - 1959	
Kosovo		1946 - 1989	1990 - 2019		
Kuwait			1946 - 2019		
Kyrgyzstan		1946 - 1990, 2010 - 2018	1994 - 2009, 2019	1991 - 1993	
Laos		1975 - 2019	1946 - 1974		
Latvia	1991 - 2019	1946 - 1989	1990		
Lebanon			1946 - 2019		
Libya		1970 - 2010	1951 - 1969, 2011	2012 - 2019	
Lithuania	1990 - 2019	1946 - 1989			
Luxembourg	1946 - 2019				

Table B.1 (Continued): Country of origin classification by predominant ideology according to V-Dem.

Country	Democratic	LW Auth.	RW Auth.	Other Auth.	Missing
Madagascar		1960 - 1971, 1974 - 1993	1946 - 1959, 1994 - 2019	1972 - 1973	
Malaysia			1946 - 2019		
Mali		1960 - 1968	1946 - 1959, 1969 - 2019		
Mexico	2004 - 2005		1946 - 2003, 2006 - 2019		
Moldova	2010 - 2014	1946 - 1989, 2001 - 2008	1990 - 2000, 2009, 2015 - 2019		
Montenegro		1946 - 1989	1990 - 2005, 2007 - 2019	2006	
Morocco			1946 - 1999	2000 - 2019	
Mozambique			1946 - 1973, 1994 - 2019		1974 - 1993
Myanmar (Burma)		1948 - 1957, 1963 - 1987	1946 - 1947, 1958 - 1962, 1988 - 2015, 2018 - 2019	2016 - 2017	
Namibia	1995 - 2019		1946 - 1978, 1980 - 1994		1979
Nepal	2015 - 2018	2008 - 2014, 2019	1946 - 1959, 2002 - 2006	1960 - 2001, 2007	
Netherlands	1947 - 2019			1946	
New Zealand	1946 - 2019				
Nicaragua		1980 - 1989, 2007 - 2019	1946 - 1979, 1990 - 2006		
Niger	2013 - 2015	2011 - 2012, 2016 - 2019	1946 - 2010		
Nigeria			1946 - 2004, 2015 - 2019	2005 - 2014	
North Macedonia		1946 - 1989	1990 - 2019		
Norway	1946 - 2019				
Pakistan		1974 - 1976	1946 - 1949, 1951 - 1973, 2000 - 2017, 2019	1950, 1977 - 1999, 2018	
Paraguay	2009 - 2011	2012	1946 - 2008, 2013 - 2019		
Peru	2002 - 2019		1946 - 1984, 1990 - 2001	1985 - 1989	
Philippines			1946 - 2019		
Poland	1991 - 2019	1946 - 1989	1990		
Portugal	1977 - 2019	1975	1946 - 1974	1976	
Romania	2009 - 2017	1946 - 1989	1990 - 2008, 2018 - 2019		
Russia		1946 - 1990	1991 - 2019		
Rwanda		1960 - 1963	1946 - 1959, 1964 - 2019		
Senegal	2000, 2002 - 2019	1960 - 1999	1946 - 1959, 2001		
Serbia	2003 - 2010	1946 - 1989	1990 - 2002, 2011 - 2019		
Sierra Leone		1966 - 1989	1946 - 1965, 1996 - 2019	1990 - 1995	
Slovakia	1990 - 2019	1946 - 1989			
Slovenia	1990 - 2019	1946 - 1989			
Somalia		1970 - 1990	1946 - 1969	1991 - 2019	
South Africa	1995 - 2019		1948 - 1994	1946 - 1947	
South Korea	1989 - 2019		1946 - 1988		
Spain	1979 - 2019		1946 - 1978		
Sri Lanka	1948 - 1955, 1960 - 1969		1946 - 1947, 1956 - 1959, 1977 - 2019	1970 - 1976	
Suriname	1975 - 1979, 1989, 1992 - 2019		1946 - 1974, 1980 - 1988, 1990 - 1991		
Sweden	1946 - 2019				
Switzerland	1946 - 2019				

Table B.1 (Continued): Country of origin classification by predominant ideology according to V-Dem.

Country	Democratic	LW Auth.	RW Auth.	Other Auth.	Missing
Syria		1963 - 1999, 2019	1946 - 1962, 2000 - 2018		
Taiwan	1998 - 2019		1946 - 1997		
Tajikistan		1946 - 1991	1992 - 2019		
Tanzania		1960 - 2019	1946 - 1959		
Thailand			1946 - 2019		
Togo			1960 - 2019	1946 - 1959	
Tunisia	2012 - 2019		1956 - 2011	1946 - 1955	
Turkey	2002 - 2006		1946 - 2001	2007 - 2019	
Turkmenistan		1946 - 1992	1993 - 2019		
Uganda		1966 - 1969	1946 - 1965, 1971 - 2019	1970	
Ukraine		1946 - 1991	1992 - 2019		
United Kingdom	1946 - 2019				
United States	1946 - 2019				
Uzbekistan		1946 - 1991	1992 - 2019		
Venezuela	1960 - 1998	1999 - 2019	1946 - 1959		
Vietnam		1946 - 2019			
Zambia		1964 - 1990	1991 - 2016, 2018	1946 - 1963, 2017, 2019	
Zimbabwe		1980 - 1989	1946 - 1979, 1990 - 2019		

B.1.2 Descriptives of Sample Used for Matching

The following countries of origin were omitted from the democratic control group as they constitute new democracies or authoritarian regimes that experienced a short democratic rule:

Armenia, Argentina, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Latvia, Lithuania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Taiwan, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, India.

Countries of origin considered as established democracies (and included in the analysis) are:

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.

Regime	Variable	Min	Mean	Median	Max	SD	N
Democratic	Share Fath. Christian	0.00	0.84	1.00	1.00	0.36	4094
Democratic	Education	7.00	10.56	10.50	18.00	2.36	9250
Democratic	Share Fath. Farmer	0.00	0.13	0.00	1.00	0.34	4679
Democratic	Year of Birth	1931.00	1956.65	1956.00	1995.00	14.62	9392
Democratic	Share Fath. Non-Skilled Worker	0.00	0.17	0.00	1.00	0.37	4679
Democratic	Share Fath. Petty Bourgeoisie	0.00	0.06	0.00	1.00	0.23	4679
Democratic	Share Women	0.00	0.46	0.00	1.00	0.50	9392
Democratic	Share Fath. Skilled Worker	0.00	0.19	0.00	1.00	0.39	4679
Democratic	GDP pc	2750.00	12054.81	10796.00	38722.50	7004.66	9312
Democratic	Share Fath. White collar Worker	0.00	0.46	0.00	1.00	0.50	4679
Left-Wing Auth.	Share Fath. Christian	0.00	0.66	1.00	1.00	0.48	13664
Left-Wing Auth.	Education	7.00	10.17	10.50	18.00	2.04	34951
Left-Wing Auth.	Share Fath. Farmer	0.00	0.18	0.00	1.00	0.38	13030
Left-Wing Auth.	Year of Birth	1931.00	1959.05	1960.00	1998.00	13.00	36205
Left-Wing Auth.	Share Fath. Non-Skilled Worker	0.00	0.23	0.00	1.00	0.42	13030
Left-Wing Auth.	Share Fath. Petty Bourgeoisie	0.00	0.02	0.00	1.00	0.15	13030
Left-Wing Auth.	Share Women	0.00	0.50	1.00	1.00	0.50	36205
Left-Wing Auth.	Share Fath. Skilled Worker	0.00	0.31	0.00	1.00	0.46	13030
Left-Wing Auth.	GDP pc	508.20	5731.35	5715.50	15039.00	2809.43	27143
Left-Wing Auth.	Share Fath. White collar Worker	0.00	0.26	0.00	1.00	0.44	13030
Right-Wing Auth.	Share Fath. Christian	0.00	0.37	0.00	1.00	0.48	11849
Right-Wing Auth.	Education	7.00	9.48	9.00	18.00	2.00	39303
Right-Wing Auth.	Share Fath. Farmer	0.00	0.19	0.00	1.00	0.39	12067
Right-Wing Auth.	Year of Birth	1931.00	1971.53	1976.00	2000.00	17.95	41929
Right-Wing Auth.	Share Fath. Non-Skilled Worker	0.00	0.23	0.00	1.00	0.42	12067
Right-Wing Auth.	Share Fath. Petty Bourgeoisie	0.00	0.07	0.00	1.00	0.25	12067
Right-Wing Auth.	Share Women	0.00	0.49	0.00	1.00	0.50	41929
Right-Wing Auth.	Share Fath. Skilled Worker	0.00	0.26	0.00	1.00	0.44	12067
Right-Wing Auth.	GDP pc	525.27	6130.51	5505.00	44803.20	3764.39	41795
Right-Wing Auth.	Share Fath. White collar Worker	0.00	0.25	0.00	1.00	0.43	12067

Table B.2: Summary statistics by regime type for first-generation immigrants (non-matched sample without new democracies in democratic group).




Figure B.1: Descriptives: Left-right self placement by predominantly socialised ideological regime type in the country of origin for first-generation immigrants (full sample, but without new democracies in democratic group).




Figure B.2: Descriptives: Right of centre party identification by predominantly socialised ideological regime type in the country of origin for first generation immigrants (full sample, but without new democracies in democratic group).

B.2 Indoctrination Index

Employing the measure by Dinas and Northmore-Ball (2020), the indoctrination index was constructed based on multiple components provided by V-Dem (Bernhard et al., 2015; Coppedge et al., 2021b; Pemstein et al., 2021), measuring dimensions of the *monopolisation of the public discourse* (A), *control of competing organisation* (B), *mass organisation* (C), *mass education* (D), *strong ideology* (E). Instead of the standardised model estimates of the individual index components that the authors used, I used the ordinal scale measures for a more intuitive interpretation of the resulting index scores. Sub-components that consisted of a four instead of five point scale were recoded to ensure equal weight. A mean score was calculated for each dimension based on its components, before the a mean index was created out of the five dimensions. The index was then reversed for it to range from 0 = no indoctrination to 4 = full indoctrination (see Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2020, Online Appendix C p.11-18 for more details).

- **Dimension A:**

- freedom of discussion for men (*v2cldiscm_ord*)
- freedom of discussion for women (*v2cldiscw_ord*)
- government censorship effort (*v2mecenefm_ord*)
- harassment of journalists (*v2meharjrn_ord*)
- media self-censorship (*v2meslfcen_ord*)
- media bias (*v2mebias_ord*)
- print/broadcast media critical (*v2mecrit_ord*)
- print/broadcast media perspectives (*v2merange_ord*)
- freedom of academic and cultural expression *v2clacfree_ord*

- **Dimension B:**

- party ban (*v2psparban_ord*)
- civil society organisation entry and exit (*v2cseeorgs_ord*)
- civil society organisation participatory environment (*v2csprtcpt_ord*)

- **Dimension C**, both reversed: party organisations (*v2psorgs_ord*), party branches (*v2psprbrch_ord*)

- **Dimension D**, reversed: educational equality (*v2peedueq_ord*)

- **Dimension E**, reversed: reasoned justification (*v2dlreason_ord*)

B.3 Right of Centre PID

B.3.1 Origin Countries in Treatment and Control

Table B.3: (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: Left-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants on PID with right of centre party in Germany.

Country	Democratic	LW Authoritarian
Afghanistan	0.00	10.00
Albania	0.00	3.00
Armenia	0.00	8.00
Australia	0.52	0.00
Austria	110.70	0.00
Azerbaijan	0.00	7.00
Belarus	0.00	11.00
Belgium	17.47	0.00
Bosnia & Herzegovina	0.00	22.00
Bulgaria	0.00	17.00
Cameroon	0.00	7.00
China	0.00	28.00
Costa Rica	2.88	0.00
Croatia	0.00	30.00
Denmark	24.30	0.00
Ethiopia	0.00	1.00
Finland	53.90	0.00
France	83.95	0.00
Hungary	0.00	51.00
Indonesia	0.00	1.00
Ireland	10.04	0.00
Italy	124.45	0.00
Japan	1.57	0.00
Kazakhstan	0.00	126.00
Kenya	0.00	8.00
Kosovo	0.00	24.00
Kyrgyzstan	0.00	14.00
Laos	0.00	3.00
Latvia	0.00	7.00
Lithuania	0.00	1.00
Macedonia	0.00	10.00
Moldova	0.00	2.00
Netherlands	118.32	0.00
New Zealand	0.44	0.00
Nicaragua	0.00	2.00
Poland	0.00	329.00
Romania	0.00	179.00
Russia	0.00	232.00
Senegal	0.00	1.00
Serbia	0.00	23.00
Slovakia	0.00	1.00
Slovenia	0.00	1.00
Sweden	0.35	0.00
Switzerland	14.02	0.00
Syria	0.00	7.00
Tajikistan	0.00	9.00
Ukraine	0.00	41.00
United Kingdom	79.22	0.00
United States	17.87	0.00
Uzbekistan	0.00	11.00
Vietnam	0.00	1.00
Yugoslavia	0.00	34.00

Table B.4: (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: Right-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants on PID with right of centre party in Germany.

Country	Democratic	RW Authoritarian
Algeria	0.00	1.00
Argentina	0.00	6.00
Armenia	0.00	3.00
Australia	6.91	0.00
Austria	109.67	0.00
Azerbaijan	0.00	2.00
Bangladesh	0.00	1.00
Belgium	12.62	0.00
Bolivia	0.00	5.00
Bosnia & Herzegovina	0.00	10.00
Brazil	0.00	4.00
Colombia	0.00	10.00
Costa Rica	1.49	0.00
Croatia	0.00	3.00
Denmark	16.30	0.00
Egypt	0.00	6.00
Finland	10.23	0.00
France	36.14	0.00
Georgia	0.00	3.00
Ghana	0.00	3.00
Greece	0.00	12.00
Iran	0.00	30.00
Iraq	0.00	21.00
Ireland	8.62	0.00
Israel	2.98	0.00
Italy	220.89	0.00
Japan	4.87	0.00
Jordan	0.00	6.00
Kazakhstan	0.00	44.00
Kenya	0.00	2.00
Kosovo	0.00	18.00
Kuwait	0.00	1.00
Kyrgyzstan	0.00	2.00
Lebanon	0.00	8.00
Macedonia	0.00	5.00
Malaysia	0.00	1.00
Mexico	0.00	10.00
Montenegro	0.00	1.00
Morocco	0.00	11.00
Netherlands	54.87	0.00
New Zealand	2.40	0.00
Niger	0.00	1.00
Norway	5.47	0.00
Peru	0.00	3.00
Philippines	0.00	24.00
Portugal	0.00	1.00
Romania	0.00	54.00
Russia	0.00	51.00
Serbia	0.00	3.00
South Africa	0.00	5.00
South Korea	0.00	2.00
Spain	0.00	25.00
Sri Lanka	0.00	2.00
Sweden	2.49	0.00
Switzerland	4.41	0.00
Syria	0.00	4.00
Taiwan	0.00	7.00

Table B.4 (Continued): (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: Right-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants on PID with right of centre party in Germany.

Country	Democratic	RW Authoritarian
Tajikistan	0.00	4.00
Thailand	0.00	4.00
Togo	0.00	1.00
Tunisia	0.00	11.00
Turkey	0.00	119.00
Ukraine	0.00	11.00
United Kingdom	24.90	0.00
United States	33.74	0.00
Uzbekistan	0.00	1.00

B.3.2 Matching: Covariate Balance




Figure B.3: Covariate balance of sample before and after matching: Left-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants on right of centre party identification. *Non-standardised mean differences.




Figure B.4: Covariate balance of sample before and after matching: Right-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants on right of centre party identification. *Non-standardised mean differences.

B.3.3 Regression Tables

Table B.5: Impact of socialisation in authoritarian left-wing regime in the origin country on the right of centre party identification in Germany.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Right of Centre Party Identification							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treat: Left-Wing Auth.	0.30*** (0.05)	0.31*** (0.05)	0.48*** (0.11)	0.48*** (0.10)	0.48*** (0.11)	-0.16 (0.28)	-0.16 (0.31)	-0.16 (0.31)
Form. Yrs. (Origin Country)						-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Treat * Form. Yrs (Origin Country)						0.06** (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)
Matched Controls	X	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	X	X	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Origin Country Lvl SE Clust.	✓	✓	✓	X	X	✓	X	X
Respondent Lvl SE Clust.	X	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X
Household Lvl SE Clust.	X	X	X	X	✓	X	X	✓
Observations	1,922	1,922	1,922	1,922	1,922	1,922	1,922	1,922
R ²	0.08	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.12	0.12	0.12
Adjusted R ²	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.12	0.12	0.12

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
Additional Controls:
GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

Table B.6: Impact of socialisation in authoritarian right-wing regime in the origin country on the right of centre party identification in Germany.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Right of Centre Party Identification							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treat: Right-Wing Auth.	0.09 (0.07)	0.09** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.07)	0.19* (0.10)	0.19* (0.10)	0.25* (0.15)	0.25 (0.22)	0.25 (0.22)
Form. Yrs (Origin Country)						0.001 (0.01)	0.001 (0.02)	0.001 (0.02)
Treat * Form. Yrs (Origin Country)						-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Matched Controls	X	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	X	X	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Origin Cntry Lvl SE Clust.	✓	✓	✓	X	X	✓	X	X
Respondent Lvl SE Clust.	X	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X
Household Lvl SE Clust.	X	X	X	X	✓	X	X	✓
Observations	1,121	1,121	1,121	1,121	1,121	1,121	1,121	1,121
R ²	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
Adjusted R ²	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Matched Controls:

Education, Year of Birth

Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

B.3.4 Sensitivity Analysis




Figure B.5: Sensitivity analysis: Left-wing (Panel A) and right-wing (Panel B) authoritarian socialisation of immigrants on right of centre party identification. Full models with clustered standard errors on country of origin level standard errors.

Treatment:	Est.	S.E.	t-value	$R^2_{Y \sim D X}$	$RV_{q=1}$	$RV_{q=1, \alpha=0.05}$	df
<i>LW Auth.</i>	0.475	0.108	4.391	1%	9.5%	5.4%	1916
<i>RW Auth.</i>	0.189	0.071	2.662	0.6%	7.7%	2.1%	1115

Table B.7: Sensitivity statistics: Left-/right-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants on right of centre party identification. Full models with clustered standard errors on country of origin level standard errors.

B.4 LR Self Placement

B.4.1 Origin Countries in Treatment and Control

Table B.8: (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: Left-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants on left-right self placement.

Country	Democratic	LW Authoritarian
Afghanistan	0.00	8.00
Albania	0.00	8.00
Angola	0.00	1.00
Armenia	0.00	5.00
Austria	64.69	0.00
Azerbaijan	0.00	16.00
Belarus	0.00	17.00
Belgium	11.50	0.00
Bosnia & Herzegovina	0.00	30.00
Bulgaria	0.00	26.00
Cameroon	0.00	5.00
Canada	1.83	0.00
Chile	0.00	1.00
China	0.00	21.00
Costa Rica	0.48	0.00
Croatia	0.00	22.00
Cuba	0.00	7.00
Czechia	0.00	1.00
Denmark	6.03	0.00
Egypt	0.00	1.00
Ethiopia	0.00	1.00
Finland	15.88	0.00
France	41.08	0.00
Ghana	0.00	1.00
Hungary	0.00	16.00
Indonesia	0.00	2.00
Ireland	5.70	0.00
Italy	143.77	0.00
Japan	3.08	0.00
Kazakhstan	0.00	175.00
Kenya	0.00	4.00
Kosovo	0.00	42.00
Kyrgyzstan	0.00	10.00
Laos	0.00	2.00
Latvia	0.00	2.00
Lithuania	0.00	3.00
Luxembourg	0.70	0.00
Macedonia	0.00	13.00
Moldova	0.00	6.00
Montenegro	0.00	4.00
Netherlands	53.22	0.00
New Zealand	1.65	0.00
Nicaragua	0.00	2.00
Poland	0.00	234.00
Romania	0.00	120.00
Russia	0.00	228.00
Serbia	0.00	26.00
Slovenia	0.00	2.00
Sweden	4.68	0.00
Switzerland	17.91	0.00
Syria	0.00	16.00
Tajikistan	0.00	3.00
Ukraine	0.00	54.00

Table B.8 (Continued): (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: Left-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants on left-right self placement.

Country	Democratic	LW Authoritarian
United Kingdom	38.00	0.00
United States	31.82	0.00
Uzbekistan	0.00	6.00
Vietnam	0.00	5.00
Yugoslavia	0.00	12.00

Table B.9: (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: Right-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants on left-right self placement.

Country	Democratic	LW Authoritarian
Albania	0.00	1.00
Algeria	0.00	2.00
Argentina	0.00	2.00
Armenia	0.00	1.00
Austria	79.41	0.00
Azerbaijan	0.00	8.00
Bangladesh	0.00	4.00
Belgium	14.05	0.00
Bolivia	0.00	3.00
Bosnia & Herzegovina	0.00	16.00
Brazil	0.00	5.00
Cameroon	0.00	1.00
Canada	0.67	0.00
Colombia	0.00	6.00
Congo - Brazzaville	0.00	2.00
Costa Rica	0.96	0.00
Côte d'Ivoire	0.00	1.00
Croatia	0.00	9.00
Denmark	10.55	0.00
Dominican Republic	0.00	2.00
Ecuador	0.00	1.00
Egypt	0.00	5.00
Finland	3.00	0.00
France	30.62	0.00
Georgia	0.00	6.00
Ghana	0.00	8.00
Greece	0.00	10.00
Guinea	0.00	2.00
Indonesia	0.00	3.00
Iran	0.00	19.00
Iraq	0.00	26.00
Ireland	2.67	0.00
Israel	4.15	0.00
Italy	201.55	0.00
Japan	8.40	0.00
Jordan	0.00	3.00
Kazakhstan	0.00	80.00
Kenya	0.00	1.00
Kosovo	0.00	30.00
Kuwait	0.00	4.00
Kyrgyzstan	0.00	8.00
Lebanon	0.00	17.00
Luxembourg	0.40	0.00

Table B.9 (Continued): (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples:
Right-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants on left-right self placement

Country	Democratic	RW Authoritarian
Macedonia	0.00	15.00
Malaysia	0.00	2.00
Mexico	0.00	9.00
Moldova	0.00	1.00
Montenegro	0.00	2.00
Morocco	0.00	20.00
Netherlands	21.59	0.00
New Zealand	2.57	0.00
Nigeria	0.00	9.00
Norway	1.44	0.00
Pakistan	0.00	2.00
Peru	0.00	5.00
Philippines	0.00	19.00
Portugal	0.00	4.00
Romania	0.00	154.00
Russia	0.00	101.00
Serbia	0.00	12.00
South Africa	0.00	2.00
South Korea	0.00	2.00
Spain	0.00	13.00
Sri Lanka	0.00	5.00
Sweden	10.41	0.00
Switzerland	9.24	0.00
Syria	0.00	4.00
Taiwan	0.00	6.00
Tajikistan	0.00	3.00
Thailand	0.00	15.00
Togo	0.00	1.00
Tunisia	0.00	15.00
Turkey	0.00	217.00
Turkmenistan	0.00	2.00
Ukraine	0.00	32.00
United Kingdom	24.50	0.00
United States	34.80	0.00
Uzbekistan	0.00	2.00
Yugoslavia	0.00	1.00
Zimbabwe	0.00	1.00

B.4.2 Matching: Covariate Balance




Figure B.6: Covariate balance of sample before and after matching: Left-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants on left-right self placement. *Non-standardised mean differences.




Figure B.7: Covariate balance of sample before and after matching: Right-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants on left-right self placement. *Non-standardised mean differences.

B.4.3 Regression Tables

Table B.10: Impact of socialisation in authoritarian left-wing regime in the origin country on left-right self placement.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Left-Right Self Placement							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treat: Left-Wing Auth.	0.11 (0.13)	0.18 (0.12)	0.18 (0.19)	0.18 (0.20)	0.18 (0.22)	0.04 (0.38)	0.04 (0.53)	0.04 (0.54)
Form. Yrs. (Origin Country)						-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Treat * Form. Yrs (Origin Country)						0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)
Matched Controls	X	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	X	X	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Origin Country SE Clust.	✓	✓	✓	X	X	✓	X	X
Respondent Lvl SE Clust.	X	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X
Household Lvl SE Clust.	X	X	X	X	✓	X	X	✓
Observations	1,600	1,600	1,600	1,600	1,600	1,600	1,600	1,600
R ²	0.001	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Adjusted R ²	0.0004	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth

Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

Table B.11: Impact of socialisation in authoritarian right-wing regime in the origin country on left-right self placement.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Left-Right Self Placement							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treat: Right-Wing Auth.	0.18 (0.13)	0.20 (0.14)	0.14 (0.20)	0.14 (0.20)	0.14 (0.20)	-0.06 (0.64)	-0.06 (0.65)	-0.06 (0.65)
Form. Yrs (Origin Country)						-0.04 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)
Treat * Form. Yrs (Origin Country)						0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)
Matched Controls	X	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	X	X	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Origin Country Lvl SE Clust.	✓	✓	✓	X	X	✓	X	X
Respondent Lvl SE Clust.	X	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X
Household Lvl SE Clust.	X	X	X	X	✓	X	X	✓
Observations	1,423	1,423	1,423	1,423	1,423	1,423	1,423	1,423
R ²	0.003	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
Adjusted R ²	0.003	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
 Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

B.5 Dominance of Anti-Left Bias in Post-Communist RW Regimes?

Right-wing authoritarian regimes in countries with longer communist past were considered as follows:

Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia.^{1, 2}

While Syria also had a longer socialist past (although not as long as the other listed countries), indoctrination levels, and, hence, the presence of the ideology, were much lower (see Table B.12), which is why it is not included in the list of countries with a longer communist past.

Country	Indoctrination Score
Armenia	3.20
Georgia	3.20
Russia	3.19
Uzbekistan	3.18
Azerbaijan	3.17
Tajikistan	3.16
Kazakhstan	3.16
Ukraine	3.16
Bulgaria	3.08
Moldova	3.01
Albania	2.98
Kyrgyzstan	2.90
Belarus	2.90
Romania	2.82
Bosnia & Herzegovina	2.74
Croatia	2.74
Kosovo	2.74
Montenegro	2.74
Serbia	2.74
Hungary	2.67
Syria	2.13

Table B.12: Left-wing authoritarian regimes average indoctrination scores by country over left-wing rules based on V-Dem from 1946 to 2019.

¹While Yugoslavia was technically never right-wing authoritarian, certain respondents that were socialised in successor states considered their country of origin Yugoslavia.

²Please note that this split was based on the matched sample, i.e. other countries that are not included in analysis might be considered as countries with a longer communist past and a having a highly present ideology as well.

B.5.1 Right of Centre PID

Origin Countries in Treatment and Control

Country	Democratic	RW Auth. Soc. Past
Armenia	0.00	3.00
Australia	2.64	0.00
Austria	26.12	0.00
Azerbaijan	0.00	2.00
Belgium	2.70	0.00
Bosnia & Herzegovina	0.00	10.00
Croatia	0.00	3.00
Denmark	2.26	0.00
France	5.10	0.00
Georgia	0.00	3.00
Ireland	1.81	0.00
Italy	88.84	0.00
Japan	0.78	0.00
Kazakhstan	0.00	44.00
Kosovo	0.00	18.00
Kyrgyzstan	0.00	2.00
Macedonia	0.00	5.00
Montenegro	0.00	1.00
Netherlands	9.29	0.00
New Zealand	1.00	0.00
Norway	2.76	0.00
Romania	0.00	54.00
Russia	0.00	51.00
Serbia	0.00	3.00
Switzerland	1.21	0.00
Tajikistan	0.00	4.00
Ukraine	0.00	11.00
United Kingdom	2.89	0.00
United States	14.61	0.00
Uzbekistan	0.00	1.00

Table B.13: (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: Right-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants in countries with longer communist past on PID with right of centre party in Germany.

B.5. DOMINANCE OF ANTI-LEFT BIAS IN POST-COMMUNIST RW REGIMES?211

Country	Democratic	RW Auth. Non Soc. Past
Algeria	0.00	1.00
Argentina	0.00	6.00
Australia	4.99	0.00
Austria	109.36	0.00
Bangladesh	0.00	1.00
Belgium	13.16	0.00
Bolivia	0.00	5.00
Brazil	0.00	4.00
Colombia	0.00	10.00
Costa Rica	2.17	0.00
Denmark	19.36	0.00
Egypt	0.00	6.00
Finland	14.88	0.00
France	42.77	0.00
Ghana	0.00	3.00
Greece	0.00	12.00
Iran	0.00	30.00
Iraq	0.00	21.00
Ireland	9.07	0.00
Israel	4.34	0.00
Italy	150.71	0.00
Japan	5.59	0.00
Jordan	0.00	6.00
Kenya	0.00	2.00
Kuwait	0.00	1.00
Lebanon	0.00	8.00
Malaysia	0.00	1.00
Mexico	0.00	10.00
Morocco	0.00	11.00
Netherlands	61.97	0.00
New Zealand	1.57	0.00
Niger	0.00	1.00
Norway	2.65	0.00
Peru	0.00	3.00
Philippines	0.00	24.00
Portugal	0.00	1.00
South Africa	0.00	5.00
South Korea	0.00	2.00
Spain	0.00	25.00
Sri Lanka	0.00	2.00
Sweden	3.62	0.00
Switzerland	4.10	0.00
Syria	0.00	4.00
Taiwan	0.00	7.00
Thailand	0.00	4.00
Togo	0.00	1.00
Tunisia	0.00	11.00
Turkey	0.00	119.00
United Kingdom	30.67	0.00
United States	21.03	0.00

Table B.14: (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: Right-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants in countries with no longer communist past on PID with right of centre party in Germany.

Matching: Covariate Balance




Figure B.8: Covariate balance of sample before and after matching: Right-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants in countries with no longer communist past on right of centre party identification. *Non-standardised mean differences.




Figure B.9: Covariate balance of sample before and after matching: Right-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants in countries with longer communist past on PID with right of centre party. *Non-standardised mean differences.

B.5. DOMINANCE OF ANTI-LEFT BIAS IN POST-COMMUNIST RW REGIMES?213

Regression Tables

Table B.15: Impact of socialisation in authoritarian right-wing regime in origin countries with longer communist past on the right of centre party identification in Germany. Too few clusters for clustered standard errors on country of origin level.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Right of Centre Party Identification				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat: Right-Wing Auth. (Comm. Past)	0.28*** (0.06)	0.29*** (0.06)	0.36*** (0.12)	0.36** (0.16)	0.36** (0.16)
Matched Controls	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Robust SE	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗
Respondent Lvl SE Clust.	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
Household Lvl SE Clust.	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	377	377	377	377	377
R ²	0.08	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.11
Adjusted R ²	0.08	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.10

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

Table B.16: Impact of socialisation in authoritarian right-wing regime in origin countries with no longer communist past on the right of centre party identification in Germany.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Right of Centre Party Identification				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat: Right-Wing Auth. (No Comm. Past)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.07 (0.08)	0.07 (0.12)	0.07 (0.12)
Matched Controls	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Origin Country Lvl SE Clust.	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗
Respondent Lvl SE Clust.	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
Household Lvl SE Clust.	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	849	849	849	849	849
R ²	0.001	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.03
Adjusted R ²	-0.001	0.002	0.02	0.02	0.02

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

Sensitivity Analysis




Figure B.10: Sensitivity analysis: Right-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants in countries with longer communist past on right of centre party identification. Full model with robust standard errors.

Treatment:	Est.	S.E.	t-value	$R^2_{Y \sim D X}$	$RV_{q=1}$	$RV_{q=1, \alpha=0.05}$	df
<i>RW Auth.: Comm. Past</i>	0.356	0.123	2.887	2.2%	13.9%	4.7%	371

Table B.17: Sensitivity statistics: Right-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants in countries with longer communist past on right of centre party identification. Full model with robust standard errors. Too few clusters for clustered standard errors on country of origin level.

B.5.2 LR Self Placement

Origin Countries in Treatment and Control

Country	Democratic	RW Auth. Comm. Past
Albania	0.00	1.00
Armenia	0.00	1.00
Austria	37.03	0.00
Azerbaijan	0.00	8.00
Belgium	8.01	0.00
Bosnia & Herzegovina	0.00	16.00
Croatia	0.00	9.00
Denmark	4.47	0.00
Finland	0.19	0.00
France	13.00	0.00
Georgia	0.00	6.00
Israel	2.41	0.00
Italy	78.31	0.00
Japan	3.36	0.00
Kazakhstan	0.00	80.00
Kosovo	0.00	30.00
Kyrgyzstan	0.00	8.00
Macedonia	0.00	15.00
Moldova	0.00	1.00
Montenegro	0.00	2.00
Netherlands	5.57	0.00
New Zealand	1.17	0.00
Norway	0.19	0.00
Romania	0.00	154.00
Russia	0.00	101.00
Serbia	0.00	12.00
Sweden	4.61	0.00
Switzerland	1.77	0.00
Tajikistan	0.00	3.00
Turkmenistan	0.00	2.00
Ukraine	0.00	32.00
United Kingdom	12.35	0.00
United States	11.55	0.00
Uzbekistan	0.00	2.00
Yugoslavia	0.00	1.00

Table B.18: (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: Right-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants in countries with longer communist past on left-right self placement.

Country	Democratic	RW Auth. No Comm. Past
Algeria	0.00	2.00
Argentina	0.00	2.00
Austria	63.88	0.00
Bangladesh	0.00	4.00
Belgium	7.71	0.00
Bolivia	0.00	3.00
Brazil	0.00	5.00
Cameroon	0.00	1.00
Canada	1.31	0.00
Colombia	0.00	6.00
Congo - Brazzaville	0.00	2.00
Costa Rica	1.87	0.00
Côte d'Ivoire	0.00	1.00
Denmark	9.59	0.00
Dominican Republic	0.00	2.00
Ecuador	0.00	1.00
Egypt	0.00	5.00
Finland	5.39	0.00
France	27.77	0.00
Ghana	0.00	8.00
Greece	0.00	10.00
Guinea	0.00	2.00
Indonesia	0.00	3.00
Iran	0.00	19.00
Iraq	0.00	26.00
Ireland	5.22	0.00
Israel	2.18	0.00
Italy	200.68	0.00
Japan	8.14	0.00
Jordan	0.00	3.00
Kenya	0.00	1.00
Kuwait	0.00	4.00
Lebanon	0.00	17.00
Luxembourg	0.78	0.00
Malaysia	0.00	2.00
Mexico	0.00	9.00
Morocco	0.00	20.00
Netherlands	28.44	0.00
New Zealand	2.13	0.00
Nigeria	0.00	9.00
Norway	2.34	0.00
Pakistan	0.00	2.00
Peru	0.00	5.00
Philippines	0.00	19.00
Portugal	0.00	4.00
South Africa	0.00	2.00
South Korea	0.00	2.00
Spain	0.00	13.00
Sri Lanka	0.00	5.00
Sweden	8.97	0.00
Switzerland	13.68	0.00
Syria	0.00	4.00
Taiwan	0.00	6.00
Thailand	0.00	15.00
Togo	0.00	1.00
Tunisia	0.00	15.00
Turkey	0.00	217.00
United Kingdom	17.45	0.00
United States	39.48	0.00
Zimbabwe	0.00	1.00

Table B.19: (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: Right-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants in countries with no longer communist past on left-right self placement.

Matching: Covariate Balance




Figure B.11: Covariate balance of sample before and after matching: Right-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants in countries with no longer communist past on left-right self placement. *Non-standardised mean differences.




Figure B.12: Covariate balance of sample before and after matching: Right-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants in countries with longer communist past on left-right self placement. *Non-standardised mean differences.

Table B.20: Impact of socialisation in authoritarian right-wing regime in origin countries with longer communist past on left-right self placement. Too few clusters for origin country level standard error clustering.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Left-Right Self Placement				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat: Right-Wing Auth. (Comm. Past)	0.42** (0.18)	0.49*** (0.18)	0.08 (0.29)	0.08 (0.29)	0.08 (0.30)
Matched Controls	X	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	X	X	✓	✓	✓
Robust SE	✓	✓	✓	X	X
Respondent Lvl SE Clust.	X	X	X	✓	X
Household Lvl SE Clust.	X	X	X	X	✓
Observations	668	668	668	668	668
R ²	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04
Adjusted R ²	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
 Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

Table B.21: Impact of socialisation in authoritarian right-wing regime in origin countries with no longer communist past on left-right self placement.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Left-Right Self Placement				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat: Right-Wing Auth. (No Comm. Past)	-0.07 (0.14)	-0.04 (0.14)	-0.09 (0.29)	-0.09 (0.22)	-0.09 (0.22)
Matched Controls	X	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	X	X	✓	✓	✓
Origin Cntry Lvl SE Clust.	✓	✓	✓	X	X
Respondent Lvl SE Clust.	X	X	X	✓	X
Household Lvl SE Clust.	X	X	X	X	✓
Observations	925	925	925	925	925
R ²	0.001	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
Adjusted R ²	-0.001	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
 Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

B.6 Logit Models

Table B.22: Logit model specification: Impact of socialisation in authoritarian left-wing regime in the origin country on the right of centre party identification in Germany.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Right of Centre Party Identification							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treat: Left-Wing Auth.	1.24*** (0.23)	1.31*** (0.21)	2.03*** (0.49)	2.03*** (0.46)	2.03*** (0.49)	-0.68 (1.18)	-0.68 (1.29)	-0.68 (1.29)
Form. Yrs. (Origin Country)						-0.12 (0.10)	-0.12 (0.11)	-0.12 (0.11)
Treat * Form. Yrs (Origin Country)						0.27** (0.11)	0.27** (0.12)	0.27** (0.13)
Matched Controls	X	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	X	X	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country Origin Lvl SE	✓	✓	✓	X	X	✓	X	X
Respondent Lvl SE Clust.	X	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X
Household Lvl SE Clust.	X	X	X	X	✓	X	X	✓
Observations	1,922	1,922	1,922	1,922	1,922	1,922	1,922	1,922
Log Likelihood	-1,293.40	-1,289.98	-1,271.49	-1,271.49	-1,271.49	-1,254.28	-1,254.28	-1,254.28
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,590.79	2,587.95	2,554.97	2,554.97	2,554.97	2,524.56	2,524.56	2,524.56

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
 Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

Table B.23: Logit model specification: Impact of socialisation in authoritarian right-wing regime in the origin country on the right of centre party identification in Germany.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Right of Centre Party Identification							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treat: Right-Wing Auth.	0.40 (0.28)	0.39 (0.28)	0.81*** (0.31)	0.81* (0.45)	0.81* (0.46)	1.09* (0.65)	1.09 (0.99)	1.09 (0.99)
Form. Yrs (Origin Country)						0.004 (0.05)	0.004 (0.09)	0.004 (0.09)
Treat * Form. Yrs (Origin Country)						-0.03 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.10)
Matched Controls	X	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	X	X	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country Origin Lvl SE Clust.	✓	✓	✓	X	X	✓	X	X
Respondent Lvl SE Clust.	X	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X
Household Lvl SE Clust.	X	X	X	X	✓	X	X	✓
Observations	1,121	1,121	1,121	1,121	1,121	1,121	1,121	1,121
Log Likelihood	-685.37	-685.41	-668.70	-668.70	-668.70	-668.42	-668.42	-668.42
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,374.74	1,378.82	1,349.40	1,349.40	1,349.40	1,352.83	1,352.83	1,352.83

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
 Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

Table B.24: Logit model specification: Impact of socialisation in authoritarian right-wing regime in origin countries with no longer communist past the right of centre party identification in Germany.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Right of Centre Party Identification				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat: Right-Wing Auth. (No Comm. Past)	-0.10 (0.29)	-0.09 (0.27)	0.28 (0.36)	0.28 (0.51)	0.28 (0.51)
Matched Controls	X	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	X	X	✓	✓	✓
Country Origin Lvl SE Clust.	✓	✓	✓	X	X
Respondent Lvl SE Clust.	X	X	X	✓	X
Household Lvl SE Clust.	X	X	X	X	✓
Observations	849	849	849	849	849
Log Likelihood	-513.98	-511.59	-501.77	-501.77	-501.77
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,031.96	1,031.18	1,015.54	1,015.54	1,015.54

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
 Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country Religion (Father).

Table B.25: Logit model specification: Impact of socialisation in authoritarian right-wing regime in origin countries with longer communist past on the right of centre party identification in Germany.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Right of Centre Party Identification				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat: Right-Wing Auth.(Comm. Past)	1.19*** (0.17)	1.24*** (0.26)	1.56*** (0.58)	1.56** (0.77)	1.56** (0.77)
Matched Controls	X	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	X	X	✓	✓	✓
Robust SE	✓	✓	✓	X	X
Respondent Lvl SE Clust.	X	X	X	✓	X
Household Lvl SE Clust.	X	X	X	X	✓
Observations	377	377	377	377	377
Log Likelihood	-245.97	-240.71	-238.07	-238.07	-238.07
Akaike Inf. Crit.	495.95	489.42	488.14	488.14	488.14

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
 Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country Religion (Father).

B.6.1 Average Marginal Effects of Full Models

Table B.26: Average marginal effects based on logit model specification: Impact of socialisation in authoritarian left- or right-wing regime in the origin country on the right of centre party identification in Germany.

<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
Right of Centre Party Identification						
	LW			RW		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	0.45*** (0.10)	0.45*** (0.09)	0.45*** (0.10)	0.19*** (0.07)	0.19* (0.10)	0.19* (0.10)
Matched Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country Origin Lvl SE Clust.	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗
Resp. Lvl SE Clust.	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗
Househ. Lvl SE Clust.	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓
Observations	1,922	1,922	1,922	1,121	1,121	1,121
Log Likelihood	-1,271.49	-1,271.49	-1,271.49	-668.70	-668.70	-668.70
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,554.97	2,554.97	2,554.97	1,349.40	1,349.40	1,349.40

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

Table B.27: Average marginal effects based on logit model specification: Impact of socialisation in authoritarian right-wing regime in origin countries with and without longer communist past on the right of centre party identification in Germany.

<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
Right of Centre Party Identification						
	No Communist Past			Communist Past		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treat: RW. Auth.	0.06 (0.08)	0.06 (0.12)	0.06 (0.12)	0.34*** (0.12)	0.34** (0.16)	0.34** (0.16)
Matched Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Robust SE	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗
Resp. Lvl SE Clust.	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗
Househ. Lvl SE Clust.	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓
Observations	849	849	849	377	377	377
Log Likelihood	-501.77	-501.77	-501.77	-238.07	-238.07	-238.07
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,015.54	1,015.54	1,015.54	488.14	488.14	488.14

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

B.7 Alternative Matching Strategy: Mahalanobis Nearest Neighbour Matching

Table B.28: Mahalanobis nearest neighbour matching (with replacement): Impact of socialisation in authoritarian regime on LR self placement and PID with right of centre party in Germany. LW denotes left-wing authoritarian treatment and RW right-wing authoritarian treatment. Standard errors are clustered on country of origin level apart from RW (Comm. Past) due to too few clusters.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	LR Self Placement				PID Right of Centre Party			
	LW	RW	LR Self Placement RW (No Comm. Past)	RW (Comm. Past)	LW	RW	PID Right of Centre Party RW (No Comm. Past)	RW (Comm. Past)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	0.07 (0.14)	0.08 (0.12)	-0.28 (0.25)	0.25 (0.20)	0.34*** (0.07)	0.16** (0.07)	-0.002 (0.08)	0.32*** (0.09)
Matched Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Robust SE	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓
Origin Country SE	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗
Observations	1,592	1,547	862	769	2,300	1,567	1,145	671
R ²	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.09	0.12	0.10	0.09
Adjusted R ²	0.01	0.01	0.005	0.01	0.09	0.11	0.09	0.08

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
 Gender, Social Class (Father)
 GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

B.8 A Russian Effect? Subsamples of Kazakhstan, Poland, Romania and Russia

B.8.1 Origin Countries in Treatment and Control

Country	Democratic	LW Authoritarian
Austria	26.30	0.00
Belgium	3.44	0.00
Costa Rica	1.63	0.00
Denmark	3.03	0.00
Finland	19.66	0.00
France	24.20	0.00
Ireland	1.36	0.00
Italy	67.24	0.00
Kazakhstan	0.00	126.00
Netherlands	25.92	0.00
New Zealand	0.54	0.00
Switzerland	0.54	0.00
United Kingdom	22.20	0.00
United States	8.95	0.00

Table B.29: (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: Left-wing authoritarian socialisation in Kazakhstan on right of centre party identification in Germany.

Country	Democratic	LW Authoritarian
Australia	0.55	0.00
Austria	76.11	0.00
Belgium	16.38	0.00
Costa Rica	2.08	0.00
Denmark	24.79	0.00
Finland	37.31	0.00
France	73.65	0.00
Ireland	14.39	0.00
Italy	55.36	0.00
Netherlands	87.69	0.00
New Zealand	0.23	0.00
Poland	0.00	329.00
Sweden	0.23	0.00
Switzerland	8.09	0.00
United Kingdom	52.33	0.00
United States	6.81	0.00

Table B.30: (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: Left-wing authoritarian socialisation in Poland on right of centre party identification in Germany.

Country	Democratic	LW Authoritarian
Austria	42.56	0.00
Belgium	5.00	0.00
Denmark	5.72	0.00
Finland	39.12	0.00
France	32.31	0.00
Ireland	4.06	0.00
Italy	39.83	0.00
Japan	0.80	0.00
Netherlands	54.35	0.00
Romania	0.00	179.00
Switzerland	21.11	0.00
United Kingdom	32.65	0.00
United States	9.49	0.00

Table B.31: (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: Left-wing authoritarian socialisation in Romania on right of centre party identification in Germany.

Country	Democratic	LW Authoritarian
Austria	53.13	0.00
Belgium	4.22	0.00
Costa Rica	4.02	0.00
Denmark	6.15	0.00
Finland	31.41	0.00
France	39.10	0.00
Ireland	3.33	0.00
Italy	40.28	0.00
Japan	2.01	0.00
Netherlands	72.84	0.00
Russia	0.00	232.00
Switzerland	2.46	0.00
United Kingdom	43.66	0.00
United States	8.38	0.00

Table B.32: (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: Left-wing authoritarian socialisation in Russia on right of centre party identification in Germany.

B.8.2 Matching: Covariate Balance




Figure B.13: Covariate balance of sample before and after matching: Left-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants in Kazakhstan, Poland, Romania and Russia on right of centre party identification. *Non-standardised mean differences.

B.8.3 Regression Tables

Table B.33: Impact of socialisation in authoritarian left-wing regime in Poland, Romania and Russia on the right of centre party identification in Germany. Too few clusters for country origin clustered standard errors.

<i>Dependent variable:</i>												
Right of Centre Party Identification												
	Kazakhstan			Poland			Romania			Russia		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Treatment	0.62*** (0.12)	0.62*** (0.18)	0.62*** (0.18)	0.45*** (0.09)	0.45*** (0.16)	0.45*** (0.17)	0.90*** (0.09)	0.90*** (0.17)	0.90*** (0.17)	0.53*** (0.11)	0.53*** (0.19)	0.53*** (0.19)
Matched Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Robust SE	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗
Resp. Lvl SE Clust.	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗
Househ. Lvl SE Clust.	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓
Observations	331	331	331	785	785	785	466	466	466	543	543	543
R ²	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.13	0.13	0.13
Adjusted R ²	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.12	0.12	0.12

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
 Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

B.8.4 Sensitivity Analysis




Figure B.14: Sensitivity analysis: Socialisation of immigrants in left-wing authoritarian Kazakhstan (Panel A), Poland (Panel B), Romania (Panel C), Russia (Panel C). Full model with robust standard errors.

Treatment:	Est.	S.E.	t-value	$R^2_{Y \sim D X}$	$RV_{q=1}$	$RV_{q=1, \alpha=0.05}$	df
<i>LW Auth.: Kazakhstan</i>	0.616	0.125	4.933	7%	23.9%	15.1%	325
<i>LW Auth.: Poland</i>	0.454	0.088	5.167	3.3%	16.9%	10.8%	779
<i>LW Auth.: Romania</i>	0.898	0.091	9.841	17.4%	36.5%	30.6%	460
<i>LW Auth.: Russia</i>	0.525	0.115	4.583	3.8%	17.9%	10.7%	537

Table B.34: Sensitivity statistics: Kazakhstani, polish, romanian and russian left-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants on PID with right of centre party. Full models with robust standard errors (too few clusters for origin country clustered standard errors).

B.8.5 Logit Models

Table B.35: Logit model specification: Impact of socialisation in authoritarian left-wing regime in Kazakhstan, Poland, Romania and Russian on the right of centre party identification in Germany.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>											
	Right of Centre Party Identification											
	Kazakhstan			Poland			Romania			Russia		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Treat: LW. Auth.	2.71*** (0.61)	2.71*** (0.90)	2.71*** (0.90)	1.92*** (0.40)	1.92** (0.75)	1.92** (0.77)	4.49*** (0.63)	4.49*** (1.15)	4.49*** (1.19)	2.27*** (0.54)	2.27** (0.90)	2.27** (0.90)
Matched Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Robust SE	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗
Resp. Lvl SE Clust.	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗
Househ. Lvl SE Clust.	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓
Observations	331	331	331	785	785	785	466	466	466	543	543	543
Log Likelihood	-214.01	-214.01	-214.01	-477.82	-477.82	-477.82	-269.25	-269.25	-269.25	-315.12	-315.12	-315.12
Akaike Inf. Crit.	440.02	440.02	440.02	967.64	967.64	967.64	550.50	550.50	550.50	642.23	642.23	642.23

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
 Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

B.8.6 Logit Models: Average Marginal Effects

Table B.36: Average marginal effects based on logit model specification: Impact of socialisation in authoritarian left-wing regime in Kazakhstan, Poland, Romania and Russian on the right of centre party identification in Germany.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>											
	Right of Centre Party Identification											
	Kazakhstan			Poland			Romania			Russia		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Treat: LW. Auth.	0.56*** (0.11)	0.56*** (0.15)	0.56*** (0.16)	0.43*** (0.08)	0.43*** (0.15)	0.43*** (0.16)	0.83*** (0.08)	0.83*** (0.14)	0.83*** (0.14)	0.49*** (0.10)	0.49*** (0.17)	0.49*** (0.17)
Matched Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Robust SE	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗
Resp. Lvl SE Clust.	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗
Househ. Lvl SE Clust.	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓
Observations	331	331	331	785	785	785	466	466	466	543	543	543
Log Likelihood	-214.01	-214.01	-214.01	-477.82	-477.82	-477.82	-269.25	-269.25	-269.25	-315.12	-315.12	-315.12
Akaike Inf. Crit.	440.02	440.02	440.02	967.64	967.64	967.64	550.50	550.50	550.50	642.23	642.23	642.23

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth

Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

B.9 Losers and Winners among Parties

B.9.1 LW-Authoritarian Regimes

Origin Countries in Treatment and Control

Table B.37: (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: Left-wing authoritarian socialisation on specific party identification in Germany.

Country	Democratic	LW Authoritarian
Afghanistan	0.00	10.00
Albania	0.00	4.00
Armenia	0.00	8.00
Australia	0.62	0.00
Austria	111.93	0.00
Azerbaijan	0.00	7.00
Belarus	0.00	11.00
Belgium	17.53	0.00
Bosnia & Herzegovina	0.00	23.00
Bulgaria	0.00	18.00
Cameroon	0.00	7.00
China	0.00	29.00
Costa Rica	2.86	0.00
Croatia	0.00	30.00
Denmark	27.65	0.00
Ethiopia	0.00	1.00
Finland	55.24	0.00
France	83.91	0.00
Hungary	0.00	51.00
Indonesia	0.00	1.00
Ireland	10.00	0.00
Italy	127.54	0.00
Japan	1.56	0.00
Kazakhstan	0.00	127.00
Kenya	0.00	8.00
Kosovo	0.00	24.00
Kyrgyzstan	0.00	15.00
Laos	0.00	3.00
Latvia	0.00	7.00
Lithuania	0.00	1.00
Macedonia	0.00	11.00
Moldova	0.00	2.00
Netherlands	118.22	0.00
New Zealand	0.52	0.00
Nicaragua	0.00	2.00
Poland	0.00	342.00
Romania	0.00	185.00
Russia	0.00	236.00
Senegal	0.00	1.00
Serbia	0.00	23.00
Slovakia	0.00	1.00
Slovenia	0.00	1.00
Sweden	0.35	0.00
Switzerland	13.84	0.00
Syria	0.00	10.00
Tajikistan	0.00	9.00
Ukraine	0.00	42.00
United Kingdom	80.37	0.00
United States	22.86	0.00
Uzbekistan	0.00	11.00

Table B.37 (Continued): (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: Left-wing authoritarian socialisation on specific party identification in Germany.

Country	Democratic	RW Authoritarian
Vietnam	0.00	1.00
Yugoslavia	0.00	34.00

Matching: Covariate Balance




Figure B.15: Covariate balance of sample before and after matching: Left-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants on specific party identification. *Non-standardised mean differences.

Regression Tables

Table B.38: Impact of socialisation in left-wing authoritarian regime in the origin country on specific party identification in Germany. Country of origin level clustered standard errors.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Linke (1)	Piraten (2)	Gruene (3)	SPD (4)	FDP (5)	CDU/CSU (6)	AfD (7)	NPD (8)
Treat: LW Auth.	-0.002 (0.06)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.32*** (0.08)	-0.15* (0.09)	-0.05 (0.07)	0.49*** (0.11)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.003 (0.003)
Matched Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971
R ²	0.02	0.003	0.14	0.03	0.04	0.12	0.02	0.003
Adjusted R ²	0.02	0.001	0.14	0.03	0.04	0.12	0.01	0.001

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth

Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

Table B.39: Impact of socialisation in left-wing authoritarian regime in the origin country on specific party identification in Germany. Respondent level clustered standard errors.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Linke (1)	Piraten (2)	Gruene (3)	SPD (4)	FDP (5)	CDU/CSU (6)	AfD (7)	NPD (8)
Treat: LW Auth.	-0.002 (0.05)	0.003 (0.01)	-0.32*** (0.08)	-0.15* (0.09)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.49*** (0.09)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.003 (0.004)
Matched Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971
R ²	0.02	0.003	0.14	0.03	0.04	0.12	0.02	0.003
Adjusted R ²	0.02	0.001	0.14	0.03	0.04	0.12	0.01	0.001

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth

Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

Table B.40: Impact of socialisation in left-wing authoritarian regime in the origin country on specific party identification in Germany. Household level clustered standard errors.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Linke (1)	Piraten (2)	Gruene (3)	SPD (4)	FDP (5)	CDU/CSU (6)	AfD (7)	NPD (8)
Treat: LW Auth.	-0.002 (0.05)	0.003 (0.01)	-0.32*** (0.08)	-0.15 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.49*** (0.10)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.003 (0.004)
Matched Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971
R ²	0.02	0.003	0.14	0.03	0.04	0.12	0.02	0.003
Adjusted R ²	0.02	0.001	0.14	0.03	0.04	0.12	0.01	0.001

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
 Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

Logit Models of Main Standard Error Specification

Table B.41: Logit model specification: Impact of socialisation in left-wing authoritarian regime in the origin country on specific party identification in Germany. Country of origin clustered standard errors.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Linke (1)	Piraten (2)	Gruene (3)	SPD (4)	FDP (5)	CDU/CSU (6)	AfD (7)	NPD (8)
Treat: LW Auth.	-0.07 (1.21)	0.39 (1.23)	-3.08*** (0.51)	-0.81* (0.45)	-0.86 (1.07)	2.17*** (0.58)	2.30*** (0.71)	-2.12 (2.72)
Matched Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971
Log Likelihood	-403.25	-60.70	-682.47	-1,121.48	-434.51	-1,277.80	-187.66	-25.58
Akaike Inf. Crit.	818.49	133.40	1,376.94	2,254.95	881.02	2,567.61	387.32	63.16

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
 Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

Logit Models of Main Standard Error Specification: Average Marginal Effects

Table B.42: Average marginal effects based on logit model specification: Impact of socialisation in left-wing authoritarian regime in the origin country on specific party identification in Germany. Country of origin clustered standard errors.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Linke (1)	Piraten (2)	Gruene (3)	SPD (4)	FDP (5)	CDU/CSU (6)	AfD (7)	NPD (8)
Treat: LW Auth.	-0.003 (0.06)	0.002 (0.01)	-0.30*** (0.06)	-0.14* (0.08)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.47*** (0.11)	0.05** (0.02)	-0.004 (0.01)
Matched Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971
Log Likelihood	-403.25	-60.70	-682.47	-1,121.48	-434.51	-1,277.80	-187.66	-25.58
Akaike Inf. Crit.	818.49	133.40	1,376.94	2,254.95	881.02	2,567.61	387.32	63.16

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
 Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

B.9.2 RW-Authoritarian Regimes

Origin Countries in Treatment and Control

Table B.43: (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: Right-wing authoritarian socialisation on specific centre party identification in Germany.

Country	Democratic	RW Authoritarian
Algeria	0.00	1.00
Argentina	0.00	6.00
Armenia	0.00	4.00
Australia	3.82	0.00
Austria	110.06	0.00
Azerbaijan	0.00	2.00
Bangladesh	0.00	1.00
Belgium	12.28	0.00
Bolivia	0.00	5.00
Bosnia & Herzegovina	0.00	11.00
Brazil	0.00	4.00
Colombia	0.00	10.00
Costa Rica	1.45	0.00
Croatia	0.00	5.00
Denmark	18.81	0.00
Egypt	0.00	7.00
Finland	9.95	0.00
France	34.68	0.00
Georgia	0.00	3.00
Ghana	0.00	3.00
Greece	0.00	12.00
Iran	0.00	30.00
Iraq	0.00	22.00
Ireland	8.39	0.00
Israel	2.90	0.00
Italy	217.85	0.00
Japan	4.74	0.00
Jordan	0.00	7.00
Kazakhstan	0.00	47.00
Kenya	0.00	2.00
Kosovo	0.00	21.00
Kuwait	0.00	1.00
Kyrgyzstan	0.00	2.00
Lebanon	0.00	9.00
Macedonia	0.00	6.00
Malaysia	0.00	1.00
Mexico	0.00	11.00
Montenegro	0.00	1.00
Morocco	0.00	15.00
Netherlands	53.40	0.00
New Zealand	2.34	0.00
Niger	0.00	1.00
Norway	5.32	0.00
Peru	0.00	3.00
Philippines	0.00	24.00
Portugal	0.00	1.00
Romania	0.00	57.00
Russia	0.00	51.00
Serbia	0.00	3.00
South Africa	0.00	5.00
South Korea	0.00	2.00
Spain	0.00	25.00
Sri Lanka	0.00	2.00
Sweden	2.42	0.00

Table B.43 (Continued): (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: Right-wing authoritarian socialisation on specific centre party identification in Germany.

Country	Democratic	RW Authoritarian
Switzerland	4.29	0.00
Syria	0.00	4.00
Taiwan	0.00	7.00
Tajikistan	0.00	4.00
Thailand	0.00	4.00
Togo	0.00	1.00
Tunisia	0.00	11.00
Turkey	0.00	124.00
Ukraine	0.00	13.00
United Kingdom	34.22	0.00
United States	46.07	0.00
Uzbekistan	0.00	1.00

Matching: Covariate Balance




Figure B.16: Covariate balance of sample before and after matching: Right-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants on specific party identification. *Non-standardised mean differences.

Regression Tables

Table B.44: Impact of socialisation in right-wing authoritarian regime in the origin country on specific party identification in Germany. Country of origin level clustered standard errors.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Linke (1)	Piraten (2)	Gruene (3)	SPD (4)	FDP (5)	CDU/CSU (6)	AfD (7)	NPD (8)
Treat: RW Auth.	0.01 (0.04)	-0.0003 (0.01)	-0.23*** (0.06)	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.10* (0.06)	0.07** (0.03)	-0.001 (0.02)
Matched Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,165	1,165	1,165	1,165	1,165	1,165	1,165	1,165
R ²	0.01	0.01	0.06	0.06	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.01
Adjusted R ²	0.01	0.003	0.06	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.002

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth

Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

Table B.45: Impact of socialisation in right-wing authoritarian regime in the origin country on specific party identification in Germany. Respondent level clustered standard errors.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Linke (1)	Piraten (2)	Gruene (3)	SPD (4)	FDP (5)	CDU/CSU (6)	AfD (7)	NPD (8)
Treat: RW Auth.	0.01 (0.04)	-0.0003 (0.01)	-0.23** (0.10)	-0.01 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.10 (0.09)	0.07** (0.03)	-0.001 (0.02)
Matched Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,165	1,165	1,165	1,165	1,165	1,165	1,165	1,165
R ²	0.01	0.01	0.06	0.06	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.01
Adjusted R ²	0.01	0.003	0.06	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.002

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth

Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

Table B.46: Impact of socialisation in left-wing authoritarian regime in the origin country on specific party identification in Germany. Household level clustered standard errors.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Linke (1)	Piraten (2)	Gruene (3)	SPD (4)	FDP (5)	CDU/CSU (6)	AfD (7)	NPD (8)
Treat: RW Auth.	0.01 (0.04)	-0.0003 (0.01)	-0.23** (0.10)	-0.01 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.10 (0.10)	0.07** (0.03)	-0.001 (0.02)
Matched Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,165	1,165	1,165	1,165	1,165	1,165	1,165	1,165
R ²	0.01	0.01	0.06	0.06	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.01
Adjusted R ²	0.01	0.003	0.06	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.002

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth

Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

Logit Models of Main Standard Error Specification

Table B.47: Logit model specification: Impact of socialisation in right-wing authoritarian regime in the origin country on specific party identification in Germany. Country of origin clustered standard errors.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Linke (1)	Piraten (2)	Gruene (3)	SPD (4)	FDP (5)	CDU/CSU (6)	AfD (7)	NPD (8)
Treat: RW Auth.	0.18 (0.80)	-0.43 (1.64)	-1.65*** (0.53)	-0.08 (0.38)	-0.56 (0.71)	0.46 (0.31)	2.40*** (0.82)	-0.21 (2.35)
Matched Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,165	1,165	1,165	1,165	1,165	1,165	1,165	1,165
Log Likelihood	-253.88	-61.02	-497.39	-652.43	-105.89	-649.79	-136.56	-62.85
Akaike Inf. Crit.	519.77	134.04	1,006.77	1,316.86	223.78	1,311.58	285.12	137.70

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth

Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

Logit Models of Main Standard Error Specification: Average Marginal Effects**Table B.48:** Average marginal effects based on logit model specification: Impact of socialisation in right-wing authoritarian regime in the origin country on specific party identification in Germany. Country of origin clustered standard errors.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Linke (1)	Piraten (2)	Gruene (3)	SPD (4)	FDP (5)	CDU/CSU (6)	AfD (7)	NPD (8)
Treat: RW Auth.	0.01 (0.04)	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.24*** (0.07)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.09 (0.06)	0.06** (0.02)	-0.002 (0.02)
Matched Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,165	1,165	1,165	1,165	1,165	1,165	1,165	1,165
Log Likelihood	-253.88	-61.02	-497.39	-652.43	-105.89	-649.79	-136.56	-62.85
Akaike Inf. Crit.	519.77	134.04	1,006.77	1,316.86	223.78	1,311.58	285.12	137.70

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
 Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

B.9.3 RW-Authoritarian Regimes (Longer Communist Past)

Origin Countries in Treatment and Control

Country	Democratic	RW Authoritarian Comm. Past
Armenia	0.00	4.00
Australia	1.45	0.00
Austria	27.15	0.00
Azerbaijan	0.00	2.00
Belgium	2.61	0.00
Bosnia & Herzegovina	0.00	11.00
Croatia	0.00	5.00
Denmark	2.18	0.00
France	4.92	0.00
Georgia	0.00	3.00
Ireland	1.75	0.00
Italy	87.93	0.00
Japan	0.75	0.00
Kazakhstan	0.00	47.00
Kosovo	0.00	21.00
Kyrgyzstan	0.00	2.00
Macedonia	0.00	6.00
Montenegro	0.00	1.00
Netherlands	8.97	0.00
New Zealand	0.97	0.00
Norway	2.67	0.00
Romania	0.00	57.00
Russia	0.00	51.00
Serbia	0.00	3.00
Switzerland	1.16	0.00
Tajikistan	0.00	4.00
Ukraine	0.00	13.00
United Kingdom	7.15	0.00
United States	18.34	0.00
Uzbekistan	0.00	1.00

Table B.49: (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: Right-wing authoritarian socialisation in origin countries with longer communist past on specific party identification in Germany.

Matching: Covariate Balance




Figure B.17: Covariate balance of sample before and after matching: Right-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants in countries with longer communist past on specific party identification. *Non-standardised mean differences.

Regression Tables

Table B.50: Impact of socialisation in right-wing authoritarian regime in origin countries with longer communist past on specific identification in Germany. Robust standard errors (too few clusters for country of origin level clustered standard errors).

	Dependent variable:							
	Linke (1)	Piraten (2)	Gruene (3)	SPD (4)	FDP (5)	CDU/CSU (6)	AfD (7)	NPD (8)
Treat: RW Auth. (Comm. Past)	0.08 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.25*** (0.10)	-0.21* (0.12)	0.03 (0.02)	0.05 (0.11)	0.20*** (0.06)	0.02 (0.05)
Matched Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	399	399	399	399	399	399	399	399
R ²	0.04	0.01	0.10	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.05	0.02
Adjusted R ²	0.03	-0.003	0.08	0.03	0.02	0.07	0.04	0.01

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
 Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

Table B.51: Impact of socialisation in right-wing authoritarian regime in origin countries with longer communist past on specific identification in Germany. Respondent level clustered standard errors.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Linke (1)	Piraten (2)	Gruene (3)	SPD (4)	FDP (5)	CDU/CSU (6)	AfD (7)	NPD (8)
Treat: RW Auth. (Comm. Past)	0.08 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.25* (0.13)	-0.21 (0.20)	0.03 (0.02)	0.05 (0.15)	0.20** (0.08)	0.02 (0.06)
Matched Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	399	399	399	399	399	399	399	399
R ²	0.04	0.01	0.10	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.05	0.02
Adjusted R ²	0.03	-0.003	0.08	0.03	0.02	0.07	0.04	0.01

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
 Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

Table B.52: Impact of socialisation in right-wing authoritarian regime in origin countries with longer communist past on specific identification in Germany. Household level clustered standard errors.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Linke (1)	Piraten (2)	Gruene (3)	SPD (4)	FDP (5)	CDU/CSU (6)	AfD (7)	NPD (8)
Treat: RW Auth. (Comm. Past)	0.08 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.25* (0.13)	-0.21 (0.20)	0.03 (0.02)	0.05 (0.15)	0.20*** (0.08)	0.02 (0.06)
Matched Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	399	399	399	399	399	399	399	399
R ²	0.04	0.01	0.10	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.05	0.02
Adjusted R ²	0.03	-0.003	0.08	0.03	0.02	0.07	0.04	0.01

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
 Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

Logit Models of Main Standard Error Specification

Table B.53: Logit model specification: Impact of socialisation in right-wing authoritarian regime in origin countries with longer communist past on specific party identification in Germany. Robust standard errors (too few clusters for country of origin level clustered standard errors).

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Linke (1)	Piraten (2)	Gruene (3)	SPD (4)	FDP (5)	CDU/CSU (6)	AfD (7)	NPD (8)
Treat: RW Auth. (Comm. Past)	1.20 (1.23)	-0.71 (2.55)	-1.74*** (0.66)	-1.12* (0.66)	1.12 (1.41)	0.26 (0.56)	3.65*** (1.22)	3.98 (2.92)
Matched Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	399	399	399	399	399	399	399	399
Log Likelihood	-100.94	-24.96	-168.72	-207.93	-42.09	-226.23	-84.73	-32.71
Akaike Inf. Crit.	213.88	61.92	349.45	427.85	96.17	464.46	181.46	77.42

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
 Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

Logit Models of Main Standard Error Specification: Average Marginal Effects

Table B.54: Logit model specification: Impact of socialisation in right-wing authoritarian regime in origin countries with longer communist past on specific party identification in Germany. Robust standard errors (too few clusters for country of origin level clustered standard errors).

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Linke (1)	Piraten (2)	Gruene (3)	SPD (4)	FDP (5)	CDU/CSU (6)	AfD (7)	NPD (8)
Treat: RW Auth. (Comm. Past)	0.09** (0.09)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.24*** (0.09)	-0.20* (0.11)	0.03 (0.03)	0.05 (0.11)	0.21*** (0.07)	0.07 (0.05)
Matched Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	399	399	399	399	399	399	399	399
Log Likelihood	-100.94	-24.96	-168.72	-207.93	-42.09	-226.23	-84.73	-32.71
Akaike Inf. Crit.	213.88	61.92	349.45	427.85	96.17	464.46	181.46	77.42

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
 Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

B.9.4 RW-Authoritarian Regimes (No Longer Communist Past)

Origin Countries in Treatment and Control

Table B.55: (Weighted) frequency of origin country in matched samples: Right-wing authoritarian socialisation in origin countries with no longer communist past on specific party identification in Germany.

Country	Democratic	RW Authoritarian No Comm. Past
Algeria	0.00	1.00
Argentina	0.00	6.00
Australia	2.78	0.00
Austria	108.75	0.00
Bangladesh	0.00	1.00
Belgium	12.96	0.00
Bolivia	0.00	5.00
Brazil	0.00	4.00
Colombia	0.00	10.00
Costa Rica	2.14	0.00
Denmark	23.40	0.00
Egypt	0.00	7.00
Finland	14.64	0.00
France	41.39	0.00
Ghana	0.00	3.00
Greece	0.00	12.00
Iran	0.00	30.00
Iraq	0.00	22.00
Ireland	8.92	0.00
Israel	4.27	0.00
Italy	148.33	0.00
Japan	5.51	0.00
Jordan	0.00	7.00
Kenya	0.00	2.00
Kuwait	0.00	1.00
Lebanon	0.00	9.00
Malaysia	0.00	1.00
Mexico	0.00	11.00
Morocco	0.00	15.00
Netherlands	60.99	0.00
New Zealand	1.54	0.00
Niger	0.00	1.00
Norway	2.61	0.00
Peru	0.00	3.00
Philippines	0.00	24.00
Portugal	0.00	1.00
South Africa	0.00	5.00
South Korea	0.00	2.00
Spain	0.00	25.00
Sri Lanka	0.00	2.00
Sweden	3.56	0.00
Switzerland	4.03	0.00
Syria	0.00	4.00
Taiwan	0.00	7.00
Thailand	0.00	4.00
Togo	0.00	1.00
Tunisia	0.00	11.00
Turkey	0.00	124.00
United Kingdom	36.33	0.00
United States	31.87	0.00

Matching: Covariate Balance




Figure B.18: Covariate balance of sample before and after matching: Right-wing authoritarian socialisation of immigrants in countries with no longer communist past on specific party identification. *Non-standardised mean differences.

Regression Tables

Table B.56: Impact of socialisation in right-wing authoritarian regime in origin countries with no longer communist past on specific party identification in Germany. Country of origin level clustered standard errors.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Linke (1)	Piraten (2)	Gruene (3)	SPD (4)	FDP (5)	CDU/CSU (6)	AfD (7)	NPD (8)
Treat: RW Auth. (No Comm. Past)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.004 (0.01)	-0.21** (0.09)	0.11 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.09 (0.08)	0.001 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)
Matched Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	875	875	875	875	875	875	875	875
R ²	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02
Adjusted R ²	0.005	0.01	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.01

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
 Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

Table B.57: Impact of socialisation in right-wing authoritarian regime in origin countries with no longer communist past on specific party identification in Germany. Respondent level clustered standard errors.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Linke (1)	Piraten (2)	Gruene (3)	SPD (4)	FDP (5)	CDU/CSU (6)	AfD (7)	NPD (8)
Treat: RW Auth. (No Comm. Past)	-0.02 (0.08)	0.004 (0.04)	-0.21 (0.13)	0.11 (0.20)	-0.04 (0.02)	0.09 (0.15)	0.001 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.06)
Matched Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	875	875	875	875	875	875	875	875
R ²	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02
Adjusted R ²	0.005	0.01	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.01

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
 Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

Table B.58: Impact of socialisation in right-wing authoritarian regime in origin countries with no longer communist past on specific party identification in Germany. Household level clustered standard errors.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Linke (1)	Piraten (2)	Gruene (3)	SPD (4)	FDP (5)	CDU/CSU (6)	AfD (7)	NPD (8)
Treat: RW Auth. (No Comm. Past)	-0.02 (0.08)	0.004 (0.04)	-0.21 (0.13)	0.11 (0.20)	-0.04 (0.02)	0.09 (0.15)	0.001 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.06)
Matched Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	875	875	875	875	875	875	875	875
R ²	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02
Adjusted R ²	0.005	0.01	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.01

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
 Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

Logit Models of Main Standard Error Specification

Table B.59: Logit model specification: Impact of socialisation in right-wing authoritarian regime in origin countries with no longer communist past on specific party identification in Germany. Country of origin clustered standard errors.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Linke (1)	Piraten (2)	Gruene (3)	SPD (4)	FDP (5)	CDU/CSU (6)	AfD (7)	NPD (8)
Treat: RW Auth. (No Comm. Past)	-0.68 (1.21)	0.80 (2.22)	-1.63** (0.77)	0.46 (0.49)	-1.19 (0.84)	0.41 (0.37)	-0.48 (1.17)	-3.68 (2.65)
Matched Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	875	875	875	875	875	875	875	875
Log Likelihood	-148.94	-21.06	-384.53	-482.81	-89.85	-488.60	-38.23	-17.42
Akaike Inf. Crit.	309.88	54.13	781.07	977.62	191.70	989.20	88.45	46.83

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
 Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

Logit Models of Main Standard Error Specification: Average Marginal Effects

Table B.60: Average marginal effects based on logit model specification: Impact of socialisation in right-wing authoritarian regime in origin countries with no longer communist past on specific party identification in Germany. Country of origin clustered standard errors.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Linke (1)	Piraten (2)	Gruene (3)	SPD (4)	FDP (5)	CDU/CSU (6)	AfD (7)	NPD (8)
Treat: RW Auth. (No Comm. Past)	-0.03 (0.05)	0.004 (0.01)	-0.25** (0.11)	0.10 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.09 (0.08)	-0.005 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)
Matched Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	875	875	875	875	875	875	875	875
Log Likelihood	-148.94	-21.06	-384.53	-482.81	-89.85	-488.60	-38.23	-17.42
Akaike Inf. Crit.	309.88	54.13	781.07	977.62	191.70	989.20	88.45	46.83

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Matched Controls: Education, Year of Birth
 Additional Controls: GDP pc before Soc. Origin Country, Religion (Father).

Appendix C

Appendix for Chapter 4

C.1 Experimental Set Up

C.1.1 Ethics & Pre-Registration

This project received ethical approval from the Hertie School's Research Ethics Committee on the 20th of September 2022 and was pre-registered on the 1st of November 2022 on OSF.

C.1.2 Additional Information on Performance of Opponents

The opponents of a participant can be either better or worse performing than the participant. How much better or worse performing an opponent is depends on the result of the participant, which in turn also influences the amount redistributed if they are in the 'redistribution' setting. To make this part as credible as possible - but still being able to detect effects of redistribution, the points made by the opponents depend on the points made of the participant:

- 0 to (-)1 P.: 1 or 2 points better or worse performance by each opponent
- (-)2 to (-)6 P.: approx. 40, 50 or 60% better or worse performance by each opponent
- (-)7 to (-)9 P.: approx. 30, 40 or 50% better or worse performance by each opponent

- (-)10 to (-)12 P.: approx. 20, 30 or 40% better or worse performance by each opponent
- (-)13+ P.: approx. 10, 20 or 30% better or worse performance by each opponent

Note: The exact percentage of how much an opponent is better or worse performing is randomly allocated. If this resulted in points with decimals for a certain opponent (e.g. 2.3 P.), the points are rounded up to the next integer (in this case to 3 P.). This programming decision led, however, to imbalance between the treatment intensity of those being paired with worse or better opponents, due to negative points being also rounded up to the next integer (-2.3 P. to -2 P.). Those who are paired with better opponents (potentially) experience on average 1 point more redistribution than those being paired with worse opponents. Given that those being paired with better opponents are the baseline, the effect of being paired with worse opponents is being underestimated. This variable is, however, balanced on the other treatment conditions, making the effects of the prime and redistribution unbiased.

C.1.3 Deviations from Pre-Analysis Plan

In the pre-analysis plan (PAP), more hypotheses and two indirect outcomes were specified than discussed in the main text. These hypotheses are not mentioned in the main text, but are analysed and discussed in Appendix C.5. As touched upon in the previous section, a programming decision led to an imbalance between the amount of points that were distributed among two treatments (being paired with better or worse opponents). The PAP specified that the variance of the amount of points that are distributed will be exploited as an exploratory analysis, but given the imbalance, this exploratory analysis is disregarded in the final analysis. Additionally, two minor points have changed as well in regards to the PAP: Only participants who played four games as well as those who removed consent in the end, were to be excluded from the analysis. However, some people did not attempt to play any of the games. These participants were excluded for analysis as well. Finally, instead of Fachhochschulreife for the fourth category on highest educational degree variable, Fachhochschulabschluss was written in the questionnaire, which overlaps with another category. As a consequence, only two instead of three categories were created out of this variable (low and high education).

C.2 Descriptives

Prime	Opponents	Redistribution	
		Yes	No
Yes	Better	233	230
	Worse	256	237
No	Better	264	218
	Worse	262	224

Table C.1: Participants by Treatment Group.

Table C.2: Balance Table Covariates. Mean Values on each Covariate by Treatment Group.

Variable	Bett. Opp.	Worse Opp.	Red.-Bett Opp.	Red.-Worse Opp.	Prime-Bett Opp.	Prime-Worse Opp.	Prime-Red-Bett Opp.	Prime-Red-Worse Opp.
Age	45.34	46.65	47.59	45.71	45.44	46.54	46.42	45.43
Edu. East Ger.	0.47	0.51	0.50	0.50	0.48	0.51	0.48	0.45
Living East Ger.	0.51	0.54	0.49	0.51	0.51	0.50	0.48	0.50
Education High	0.56	0.50	0.51	0.55	0.55	0.49	0.59	0.55
Ethnic Minority	0.06	0.05	0.07	0.03	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.06
Female	0.49	0.47	0.51	0.48	0.50	0.52	0.42	0.45
Income	5.29	5.18	5.58	5.30	5.14	5.08	5.41	5.43
Rural Living	0.29	0.31	0.31	0.28	0.31	0.31	0.27	0.28
Urban Living	0.40	0.42	0.44	0.43	0.40	0.44	0.42	0.41
Between Urban/Rural	0.31	0.27	0.25	0.29	0.29	0.25	0.31	0.30
LR Pos.	4.72	4.72	4.71	4.90	4.80	4.59	4.83	4.80
AfD Party ID.	0.11	0.14	0.11	0.11	0.14	0.13	0.12	0.14
Die Linke Party ID.	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.12	0.12	0.11
Lower Class	0.40	0.38	0.33	0.40	0.43	0.41	0.39	0.39
Middle Class	0.50	0.52	0.55	0.50	0.49	0.50	0.50	0.50
Upper Class	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.10	0.07	0.08	0.10	0.11
Trust	4.15	3.97	3.92	3.90	3.91	3.90	4.00	3.93

C.3 Main Analysis

C.3.1 Regression Tables

Table C.3: Regression results for vote for redistribution and attitude towards point redistribution. Full denotes results for full sample and att. check. denotes results for those who passed all attention checks.

	Dependent variable:							
	Vote for Redistribution <i>logistic</i>				Point Redistribution <i>OLS</i>			
	Full (1)	Att. Check (2)	Full (3)	Att. Check (4)	Full (5)	Att. Check (6)	Full (7)	Att. Check (8)
Prime	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.11 (0.12)	-0.14 (0.14)	-0.27 (0.17)	-0.17 (0.14)	-0.29* (0.18)	-0.29 (0.21)	-0.51** (0.26)
Redistribution	0.47*** (0.10)	0.73*** (0.12)	0.35*** (0.14)	0.59*** (0.16)	0.20 (0.14)	0.30* (0.18)	0.08 (0.20)	0.10 (0.25)
Worse Opponents	-0.26*** (0.10)	-0.21* (0.12)	-0.26*** (0.10)	-0.22* (0.12)	-0.51*** (0.14)	-0.63*** (0.18)	-0.51*** (0.14)	-0.64*** (0.18)
Prime * Red.			0.23 (0.19)	0.28 (0.24)			0.23 (0.29)	0.42 (0.36)
Constant	-0.45*** (0.10)	-0.51*** (0.12)	-0.39*** (0.11)	-0.44*** (0.14)	5.22*** (0.15)	5.08*** (0.18)	5.28*** (0.17)	5.19*** (0.20)
Observations	1,807	1,233	1,807	1,233	1,897	1,254	1,897	1,254
R ²					0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
Adjusted R ²					0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Log Likelihood	-1,211.98	-820.36	-1,211.30	-819.67				
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,431.96	1,648.72	2,432.60	1,649.34				

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

C.3.2 Marginal Effects (Attention Checks)




Figure C.1: Results for outcomes voting for redistribution (in probabilities) and point redistribution preferences (scale 0-10). Average marginal effects are presented of those who passed all three attention checks.

C.3.3 Participants Agree with Prime

Table C.4: Results of voting for redistribution and attitudes on point redistribution: Subsample where participants at least partly agree with both priming statements.

	Dependent variable:							
	Voting for Redistribution <i>logistic</i>				Point Redistribution <i>OLS</i>			
	Full (1)	Att. Checks (2)	Full (3)	Att. Checks (4)	Full (5)	Att. Checks (6)	Full (7)	Att. Checks (8)
Prime	0.004 (0.11)	-0.22 (0.13)	-0.17 (0.16)	-0.40** (0.20)	-0.12 (0.16)	-0.40** (0.20)	-0.29 (0.23)	-0.68** (0.29)
Redistribution	0.48*** (0.11)	0.72*** (0.13)	0.35*** (0.14)	0.59*** (0.16)	0.21 (0.16)	0.31 (0.19)	0.08 (0.20)	0.10 (0.25)
Worse Opponents	-0.24** (0.11)	-0.21* (0.13)	-0.25*** (0.11)	-0.22* (0.13)	-0.48*** (0.16)	-0.64*** (0.19)	-0.49*** (0.16)	-0.65*** (0.19)
Prime*Red.			0.31 (0.22)	0.33 (0.27)			0.33 (0.32)	0.54 (0.40)
Constant	-0.47*** (0.10)	-0.51*** (0.12)	-0.39*** (0.12)	-0.43*** (0.14)	5.19*** (0.15)	5.08*** (0.19)	5.27*** (0.17)	5.20*** (0.21)
Observations	1,509	1,040	1,509	1,040	1,577	1,058	1,577	1,058
R ²					0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02
Adjusted R ²					0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Log Likelihood	-1,013.58	-690.32	-1,012.56	-689.54				
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,035.17	1,388.65	2,035.13	1,389.08				

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

C.3.4 Accounting for Redistribution Amount




Figure C.2: (Potential) Absolute redistribution of points in games by treatment.

Table C.5: Regression results for vote for redistribution accounting for (potential) absolute redistribution amount. Full denotes results for full sample and att. check. denotes results for those who passed all attention checks.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Vote for Redistribution <i>logistic</i>				Point Redistribution <i>OLS</i>			
	Full (1)	Att. Check (2)	Full (3)	Att. Check (4)	Full (5)	Att. Check (6)	Full (7)	Att. Check (8)
Prime	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.12 (0.12)	-0.13 (0.14)	-0.27 (0.17)	-0.20 (0.14)	-0.31* (0.18)	-0.30 (0.21)	-0.50* (0.26)
Redistribution	0.47*** (0.10)	0.73*** (0.12)	0.35*** (0.14)	0.60*** (0.16)	0.18 (0.14)	0.32* (0.18)	0.09 (0.20)	0.14 (0.25)
Worse Opponents	-0.25** (0.11)	-0.28** (0.14)	-0.25** (0.11)	-0.28** (0.14)	-0.92*** (0.16)	-0.93*** (0.21)	-0.92*** (0.16)	-0.93*** (0.21)
Prime * Red.			0.23 (0.19)	0.27 (0.24)			0.20 (0.28)	0.38 (0.36)
Constant	-0.49* (0.25)	-0.25 (0.33)	-0.43* (0.26)	-0.19 (0.34)	6.90*** (0.36)	6.31*** (0.50)	6.95*** (0.37)	6.39*** (0.50)
Red. Amount Included	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,807	1,233	1,807	1,233	1,897	1,254	1,897	1,254
R ²					0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Adjusted R ²					0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Log Likelihood	-1,211.97	-820.02	-1,211.28	-819.35				
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,433.94	1,650.03	2,434.56	1,650.71				

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.4 Exploratory Analysis

C.4.1 Prime Conditional on Performance of Opponents

Regression Table

Table C.6: Exploratory analysis: Interaction prime and being paired with worse opponents. Estimations for full sample, subsample that passed all three attention checks, full sample + accounting for (potential) absolute redistribution amount.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Vote for Redistribution			Point Redistribution		
	Full Sample	<i>logistic</i> Att. Checks	Full Sample	Full Sample	<i>OLS</i> Att. Checks	Full Sample
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Prime	-0.10 (0.14)	-0.22 (0.17)	-0.10 (0.14)	-0.48** (0.20)	-0.62** (0.26)	-0.50** (0.20)
Redistribution	0.46*** (0.10)	0.72*** (0.12)	0.46*** (0.10)	0.19 (0.14)	0.29 (0.18)	0.18 (0.14)
Worse Opp	-0.35*** (0.14)	-0.31* (0.16)	-0.34** (0.15)	-0.81*** (0.20)	-0.94*** (0.25)	-1.21*** (0.21)
Prime * Worse Opp.	0.19 (0.19)	0.20 (0.23)	0.19 (0.19)	0.61** (0.28)	0.63* (0.36)	0.60** (0.28)
Constant	-0.40*** (0.11)	-0.46*** (0.13)	-0.44* (0.26)	5.37*** (0.16)	5.25*** (0.20)	7.05*** (0.37)
Red. Amount Included	X	X	✓	X	X	✓
Observations	1,807	1,233	1,807	1,897	1,254	1,897
R ²				0.01	0.02	0.02
Adjusted R ²				0.01	0.01	0.02
Log Likelihood	-1,211.51	-819.99	-1,211.49			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,433.02	1,649.98	2,434.99			

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Marginal Effects (Passed Attention Checks)




Figure C.3: Results for outcomes voting for redistribution (in probabilities) and point redistribution preferences (scale 0-10). Average marginal effects are presented of those who passed the attention checks.

C.4.2 Participants Agree with Prime

Table C.7: Results of voting for redistribution and attitudes on point redistribution: Subsample where participants at least partly agree with both priming statements.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Voting for Redistribution		Point Redistribution	
	Full <i>logistic</i> (1)	Att. Checks (2)	Full <i>OLS</i> (3)	Att. Checks (4)
Prime	-0.14 (0.15)	-0.34* (0.19)	-0.53** (0.23)	-0.79*** (0.28)
Worse Opponents	-0.35*** (0.14)	-0.31* (0.16)	-0.81*** (0.20)	-0.94*** (0.25)
Redistribution	0.47*** (0.11)	0.71*** (0.13)	0.20 (0.16)	0.29 (0.19)
Prime*Worse Opp.	0.28 (0.22)	0.25 (0.26)	0.83*** (0.32)	0.77* (0.40)
Constant	-0.41*** (0.11)	-0.46*** (0.14)	5.36*** (0.17)	5.25*** (0.20)
Observations	1,509	1,040	1,577	1,058
R ²			0.01	0.02
Adjusted R ²			0.01	0.02
Log Likelihood	-1,012.72	-689.86		
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,035.44	1,389.73		

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.4.3 Three-Way Interaction

Table C.8: Three-way interaction voting for redistribution and attitudes towards point redistribution. Full denotes results for full sample and att. check. denotes results for those who passed all attention checks.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Vote for Redistribution			Point Redistribution		
	Full	<i>logistic</i> Att. Check	Full	Full	<i>OLS</i> Att. Check	Full
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Prime	-0.30 (0.20)	-0.42* (0.24)	-0.30 (0.20)	-0.65** (0.29)	-0.74** (0.36)	-0.66** (0.29)
Redistribution	0.31 (0.19)	0.53** (0.23)	0.31 (0.19)	0.43 (0.29)	0.43 (0.36)	0.42 (0.28)
Worse Opponents	-0.41** (0.21)	-0.37 (0.24)	-0.40* (0.21)	-0.43 (0.30)	-0.60* (0.36)	-0.85*** (0.31)
Prime * Red.	0.37 (0.27)	0.40 (0.34)	0.37 (0.27)	0.36 (0.41)	0.28 (0.51)	0.34 (0.40)
Prime * Worse Opp.	0.34 (0.29)	0.32 (0.35)	0.34 (0.29)	0.71* (0.41)	0.49 (0.51)	0.71* (0.41)
Red * Worse Opp.	0.10 (0.27)	0.12 (0.33)	0.09 (0.27)	-0.69* (0.40)	-0.63 (0.50)	-0.67* (0.40)
Prime * Red. * Worse Opp.	-0.28 (0.39)	-0.26 (0.47)	-0.28 (0.39)	-0.24 (0.57)	0.19 (0.71)	-0.27 (0.57)
Constant	-0.31** (0.14)	-0.36** (0.17)	-0.36 (0.28)	5.24*** (0.21)	5.17*** (0.26)	6.91*** (0.39)
Red. Amount Included	X	X	✓	X	X	✓
Observations	1,807	1,233	1,807	1,897	1,254	1,897
R ²				0.02	0.02	0.03
Adjusted R ²				0.01	0.01	0.02
Log Likelihood	-1,210.55	-819.21	-1,210.53			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,437.10	1,654.43	2,439.07			

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.4.4 Mechanism

Table C.9: Potential mechanism: High redistribution systems are beneficial.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	High Redistribution Systems are Beneficial							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Prime	-0.03 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.12)	-0.08 (0.18)	-0.09 (0.18)	-0.41** (0.17)	-0.42** (0.17)	-0.42 (0.25)	-0.42* (0.25)
Redistribution	0.05 (0.12)	0.05 (0.12)	-0.0004 (0.17)	0.002 (0.17)	0.05 (0.12)	0.04 (0.12)	0.38 (0.25)	0.38 (0.24)
Worse Opp.	-0.31** (0.12)	-0.50*** (0.14)	-0.32** (0.12)	-0.50*** (0.14)	-0.69*** (0.17)	-0.87*** (0.19)	-0.27 (0.25)	-0.45* (0.26)
Prime*Red.			0.11 (0.25)	0.09 (0.25)			0.04 (0.35)	0.03 (0.35)
Prime * Worse Opp.					0.75*** (0.25)	0.75*** (0.24)	0.65* (0.36)	0.65* (0.36)
Red. * Worse Opp.							-0.78** (0.35)	-0.77** (0.35)
Prime * Red. * Worse Opp.							0.16 (0.49)	0.15 (0.49)
Constant	5.43*** (0.13)	6.18*** (0.32)	5.46*** (0.14)	6.20*** (0.32)	5.62*** (0.14)	6.36*** (0.32)	5.43*** (0.18)	6.16*** (0.34)
Red. Amount Included	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓
Observations	1,902	1,902	1,902	1,902	1,902	1,902	1,902	1,902
R ²	0.004	0.01	0.004	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
Adjusted R ²	0.002	0.005	0.002	0.005	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; *** p<0.01

C.4.5 Heterogeneity: Younger and Older Participants

Regression Tables

Table C.10: Exploratory subsample analysis: Sample split between younger and older participants.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	<i>Vote for Redistribution</i>				<i>Point Redistribution</i>			
	<i>logistic</i>				<i>OLS</i>			
	Young	Young	Old	Old	Young	Young	Old	Old
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Prime	-0.004 (0.14)	-0.001 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.14)	-0.16 (0.19)	-0.19 (0.19)	-0.18 (0.21)	-0.20 (0.21)
Redistribution	0.50*** (0.14)	0.50*** (0.14)	0.44*** (0.14)	0.44*** (0.14)	0.26 (0.19)	0.26 (0.19)	0.15 (0.21)	0.13 (0.21)
Worse Opponents	-0.35** (0.14)	-0.30* (0.16)	-0.18 (0.14)	-0.17 (0.16)	-0.74*** (0.19)	-1.20*** (0.22)	-0.28 (0.21)	-0.63** (0.25)
Constant	-0.47*** (0.14)	-0.67* (0.40)	-0.43*** (0.14)	-0.49 (0.36)	5.19*** (0.20)	7.27*** (0.53)	5.23*** (0.22)	6.58*** (0.55)
Red. Amount Included	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓
Observations	914	914	893	893	959	959	938	938
R ²					0.02	0.04	0.003	0.01
Adjusted R ²					0.01	0.03	0.0002	0.01
Log Likelihood	-607.67	-607.53	-603.50	-603.49				
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,223.34	1,225.05	1,215.01	1,216.98				

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.11: Robustness check of exploratory subsample analysis: Sample split between younger and older participants. Accounts for absolute (potential) redistribution amount in the games.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Vote for Redistribution				Point Redistribution			
	<i>logistic</i>				<i>OLS</i>			
Young	Old	Young	Old	Young	Old	Young	Old	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
Prime	-0.45** (0.20)	0.19 (0.20)	-0.06 (0.19)	-0.15 (0.20)	-0.45* (0.28)	-0.15 (0.31)	-0.61** (0.27)	-0.41 (0.30)
Redistribution	0.09 (0.19)	0.61*** (0.19)	0.50*** (0.14)	0.44*** (0.14)	0.01 (0.27)	0.18 (0.29)	0.25 (0.19)	0.13 (0.21)
Worse Opponent	-0.30* (0.16)	-0.17 (0.16)	-0.36* (0.21)	-0.29 (0.21)	-1.20*** (0.22)	-0.64** (0.25)	-1.61*** (0.29)	-0.84*** (0.32)
Prime * Red.	0.82*** (0.28)	-0.36 (0.27)			0.50 (0.38)	-0.11 (0.42)		
Prime * Worse Opp.			0.12 (0.27)	0.26 (0.27)			0.81** (0.38)	0.41 (0.42)
Constant	-0.47 (0.40)	-0.59 (0.37)	-0.64 (0.40)	-0.42 (0.37)	7.39*** (0.54)	6.55*** (0.56)	7.47*** (0.54)	6.69*** (0.56)
Red. Amount Included	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	914	893	914	893	959	938	959	938
R ²					0.04	0.01	0.04	0.01
Adjusted R ²					0.03	0.01	0.03	0.01
Log Likelihood	-603.04	-602.61	-607.43	-603.04				
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,218.08	1,217.21	1,226.85	1,218.07				

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Marginal Effects




Figure C.4: Exploratory subsample analysis: Sample split between younger and older participants based on median (age 48). Average marginal effects presented (conditions of the other factors in parentheses).

C.4.6 Heterogeneity: High versus Low Performance




Figure C.5: Distribution of total score by treatment group. Differences in means between all groups are not statistically significant.




Figure C.6: Distribution of age by high and low performers.

Table C.12: Subsample of high performing participants for voting for redistribution and point redistribution outcome based on median (score total is more than 15 points).

	Dependent variable:					
	Vote for Redistribution			Point Redistribution		
	<i>logistic</i>			<i>OLS</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prime	0.04 (0.13)	-0.18 (0.20)	-0.22 (0.19)	-0.37* (0.20)	-0.58** (0.30)	-1.08*** (0.29)
Redistribution	0.73*** (0.14)	0.54*** (0.19)	0.73*** (0.14)	0.19 (0.20)	-0.01 (0.29)	0.18 (0.20)
Worse Opponents	-0.21 (0.13)	-0.22 (0.13)	-0.47** (0.19)	-0.80*** (0.20)	-0.81*** (0.20)	-1.50*** (0.28)
Prime * Red.		0.39 (0.27)			0.40 (0.41)	
Prime * Worse Opp.			0.52* (0.27)			1.40*** (0.40)
Constant	-0.65*** (0.14)	-0.54*** (0.16)	-0.52*** (0.15)	5.02*** (0.21)	5.13*** (0.24)	5.38*** (0.23)
Observations	943	943	943	944	944	944
R ²				0.02	0.02	0.03
Adjusted R ²				0.02	0.02	0.03
Log Likelihood	-624.16	-623.11	-622.30			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,256.32	1,256.22	1,254.60			

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.13: Subsample of low performing participants for voting for redistribution and point redistribution outcome based on median (score total is 15 points and less).

	Dependent variable:					
	Vote for Redistribution			Point Redistribution		
	<i>logistic</i>			<i>OLS</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prime	-0.07 (0.14)	-0.10 (0.21)	0.01 (0.20)	0.03 (0.20)	-0.004 (0.29)	0.13 (0.28)
Red.	0.18 (0.14)	0.15 (0.20)	0.18 (0.14)	0.20 (0.20)	0.16 (0.28)	0.20 (0.20)
Worse Opp.	-0.32** (0.14)	-0.32** (0.14)	-0.24 (0.19)	-0.23 (0.20)	-0.23 (0.20)	-0.13 (0.27)
Prime * Red.		0.05 (0.28)			0.06 (0.39)	
Prime * Worse Opp.			-0.16 (0.28)			-0.20 (0.39)
Constant	-0.23 (0.14)	-0.22 (0.16)	-0.27* (0.16)	5.42*** (0.20)	5.43*** (0.23)	5.37*** (0.22)
Observations	864	864	864	953	953	953
R ²				0.003	0.003	0.003
Adjusted R ²				-0.001	-0.002	-0.001
Log Likelihood	-583.49	-583.47	-583.31			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,174.98	1,176.94	1,176.63			

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.14: Robustness Check: Subsample of high performing participants for voting for redistribution and point redistribution outcome based on median (score total is more than 15 points). Accountig for absolute (potential) redistribution amount.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Vote for Redistribution			Point Redistribution		
	(1)	<i>logistic</i> (2)	(3)	(4)	<i>OLS</i> (5)	(6)
Prime	0.04 (0.13)	-0.18 (0.20)	-0.22 (0.19)	-0.39* (0.20)	-0.59** (0.30)	-1.09*** (0.29)
Redistribution	0.73*** (0.14)	0.54*** (0.19)	0.73*** (0.14)	0.18 (0.20)	-0.005 (0.29)	0.17 (0.20)
Worse Opponents	-0.26 (0.18)	-0.26 (0.18)	-0.51** (0.23)	-0.99*** (0.28)	-0.98*** (0.28)	-1.66*** (0.34)
Prime * Red.		0.39 (0.27)			0.38 (0.41)	
Prime * Worse Opp.			0.52* (0.27)			1.39*** (0.40)
Constant	-0.42 (0.58)	-0.36 (0.58)	-0.34 (0.58)	5.86*** (0.88)	5.91*** (0.88)	6.12*** (0.88)
Red. Amount Included	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	943	943	943	944	944	944
R ²				0.02	0.02	0.03
Adjusted R ²				0.02	0.02	0.03
Log Likelihood	-624.08	-623.06	-622.24			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,258.16	1,258.12	1,256.49			

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.15: Robustness Check: Subsample of low performing participants for voting for redistribution and point redistribution outcome based on median (score total is 15 points and less). Accountig for absolute (potential) redistribution amount.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Vote for Redistribution			Point Redistribution		
	(1)	<i>logistic</i> (2)	(3)	(4)	<i>OLS</i> (5)	(6)
Prime	-0.07 (0.14)	-0.10 (0.21)	0.02 (0.20)	0.03 (0.20)	-0.01 (0.29)	0.13 (0.28)
Redistribution	0.18 (0.14)	0.15 (0.20)	0.18 (0.14)	0.20 (0.20)	0.16 (0.28)	0.20 (0.20)
Worse Opponents	-0.22 (0.17)	-0.22 (0.17)	-0.13 (0.22)	-0.28 (0.24)	-0.28 (0.24)	-0.18 (0.31)
Prime * Red.		0.05 (0.28)			0.06 (0.39)	
Prime * Worse Opp.			-0.18 (0.28)			-0.19 (0.39)
Constant	-0.59 (0.41)	-0.57 (0.41)	-0.64 (0.42)	5.61*** (0.57)	5.62*** (0.58)	5.55*** (0.58)
Red. Amount Included	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	864	864	864	953	953	953
R ²				0.003	0.003	0.003
Adjusted R ²				-0.002	-0.003	-0.002
Log Likelihood	-583.05	-583.03	-582.85			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,176.10	1,178.06	1,177.70			

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.4.7 Heterogeneity: Education in East or West Germany

Table C.16: Subsample of finished education in East Germany for voting for redistribution and point redistribution outcome (without Berlin).

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Vote for Redistribution			Point Redistribution		
		<i>logistic</i>		<i>OLS</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prime	-0.20 (0.14)	-0.19 (0.20)	-0.25 (0.20)	-0.30 (0.20)	-0.50* (0.30)	-0.47 (0.29)
Red.	0.46*** (0.14)	0.46** (0.19)	0.46*** (0.14)	0.22 (0.20)	0.04 (0.29)	0.22 (0.20)
Worse Opp.	-0.40*** (0.14)	-0.40*** (0.14)	-0.44** (0.19)	-0.44** (0.20)	-0.44** (0.20)	-0.60** (0.28)
Prime * Red.		-0.01 (0.28)			0.37 (0.41)	
Prime * Worse Opp.			0.10 (0.28)			0.33 (0.41)
Constant	-0.31** (0.14)	-0.31* (0.16)	-0.29* (0.16)	5.16*** (0.21)	5.26*** (0.24)	5.25*** (0.23)
Observations	883	883	883	925	925	925
R ²				0.01	0.01	0.01
Adjusted R ²				0.01	0.01	0.01
Log Likelihood	-586.61	-586.61	-586.54			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,181.21	1,183.21	1,183.08			

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.17: Subsample of finished education in West Germany for voting for redistribution and point redistribution outcome (with Berlin).

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Vote for Redistribution			Point Redistribution		
		<i>logistic</i>		<i>OLS</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prime	0.16 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.20)	0.03 (0.19)	-0.04 (0.20)	-0.09 (0.29)	-0.49* (0.28)
Red.	0.46*** (0.14)	0.24 (0.19)	0.46*** (0.14)	0.17 (0.20)	0.13 (0.28)	0.16 (0.20)
Worse Opp.	-0.14 (0.13)	-0.14 (0.13)	-0.27 (0.19)	-0.57*** (0.20)	-0.58*** (0.20)	-1.02*** (0.28)
Prime * Red.		0.43 (0.27)			0.08 (0.40)	
Prime * Worse Opp.			0.26 (0.27)			0.88** (0.40)
Constant	-0.57*** (0.14)	-0.44*** (0.16)	-0.51*** (0.15)	5.27*** (0.20)	5.29*** (0.23)	5.49*** (0.23)
Observations	924	924	924	972	972	972
R ²				0.01	0.01	0.01
Adjusted R ²				0.01	0.01	0.01
Log Likelihood	-622.71	-621.44	-622.26			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,253.42	1,252.88	1,254.51			

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.18: Robustness Check: Subsample of finished education in East Germany for voting for redistribution and point redistribution outcome (without Berlin). Accountig for absolute (potential) redistribution amount.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Vote for Redistribution			Point Redistribution		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		<i>logistic</i>			<i>OLS</i>	
Prime	-0.20 (0.14)	-0.20 (0.20)	-0.25 (0.20)	-0.30 (0.20)	-0.49* (0.30)	-0.47 (0.29)
Redistribution	0.46*** (0.14)	0.46** (0.19)	0.46*** (0.14)	0.22 (0.20)	0.04 (0.29)	0.22 (0.20)
Worse Opponents	-0.32** (0.16)	-0.32** (0.16)	-0.37* (0.21)	-0.48** (0.23)	-0.48** (0.23)	-0.65** (0.31)
Prime * Red.		0.0004 (0.28)			0.36 (0.41)	
Prime * Worse Opp.			0.10 (0.28)			0.33 (0.41)
Constant	-0.63* (0.37)	-0.63* (0.37)	-0.60 (0.37)	5.34*** (0.52)	5.43*** (0.53)	5.43*** (0.53)
Red. Amount Included	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	883	883	883	925	925	925
R ²				0.01	0.01	0.01
Adjusted R ²				0.005	0.005	0.005
Log Likelihood	-586.16	-586.16	-586.10			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,182.32	1,184.32	1,184.19			

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.19: Robustness Check: Subsample of finished education in West Germany for voting for redistribution and point redistribution outcome (with Berlin). Accountig for absolute (potential) redistribution amount.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Vote for Redistribution			Point Redistribution		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		<i>logistic</i>			<i>OLS</i>	
Prime	0.15 (0.13)	-0.09 (0.20)	0.02 (0.19)	-0.13 (0.20)	-0.16 (0.29)	-0.57** (0.28)
Red.	0.46*** (0.14)	0.24 (0.19)	0.46*** (0.14)	0.15 (0.20)	0.12 (0.28)	0.14 (0.20)
Worse Opp.	-0.19 (0.16)	-0.19 (0.16)	-0.32 (0.21)	-1.33*** (0.22)	-1.33*** (0.22)	-1.76*** (0.30)
Prime * Red.		0.43 (0.27)			0.06 (0.39)	
Prime * Worse Opp.			0.25 (0.27)			0.86** (0.39)
Constant	-0.38 (0.36)	-0.25 (0.37)	-0.32 (0.36)	8.41*** (0.51)	8.42*** (0.52)	8.62*** (0.51)
Red. Amount Included	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	924	924	924	972	972	972
R ²				0.05	0.05	0.06
Adjusted R ²				0.05	0.05	0.05
Log Likelihood	-622.54	-621.27	-622.09			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,255.07	1,254.55	1,256.18			

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.5 Additional Pre-Registered Analyses

C.5.1 Additional Pre-Registered Hypotheses

- H3: Participants in any of the ‘redistribution’ conditions are less favourable of redistribution than participants in any of the ‘no redistribution’ conditions.
- H4: Participants are on average less favourable of high redistribution if they make or would make losses than benefit from it.
 - H5: This effect should be larger among those participants actually experiencing the ‘redistribution’ condition.
- H6: The [negative] effect of the socialist prime should not only be larger among those participants actually experiencing the ‘redistribution’ condition, but additionally among those who lose because of the redistribution that is taking place.

Table C.20: Regression results for voting for redistribution. Full denotes results for full sample and att. check. denotes results for those who passed all attention checks.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
			Vote for Redistribution			
	Full	Att. Check	Full	Att. Check	Full	Att. Check
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prime	−0.01 (0.10)	−0.11 (0.12)	−0.01 (0.10)	−0.11 (0.12)	−0.30 (0.20)	−0.42* (0.24)
Redistribution	0.47*** (0.10)	0.73*** (0.12)	0.49*** (0.14)	0.73*** (0.17)	0.31 (0.19)	0.53** (0.23)
Worse Opponents	−0.26*** (0.10)	−0.21* (0.12)	−0.24 (0.14)	−0.21 (0.17)	−0.41** (0.21)	−0.37 (0.24)
Red. * Worse Opp.			−0.05 (0.19)	−0.01 (0.24)	0.10 (0.27)	0.12 (0.33)
Prime * Red.					0.37 (0.27)	0.40 (0.34)
Prime * Worse Opp.					0.34 (0.29)	0.32 (0.35)
Prime * Red. * Worse Opp.					−0.28 (0.39)	−0.26 (0.47)
Constant	−0.45*** (0.10)	−0.51*** (0.12)	−0.46*** (0.11)	−0.51*** (0.14)	−0.31** (0.14)	−0.36** (0.17)
Observations	1,807	1,233	1,807	1,233	1,807	1,233
Log Likelihood	−1,211.98	−820.36	−1,211.95	−820.36	−1,210.55	−819.21
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,431.96	1,648.72	2,433.90	1,650.72	2,437.10	1,654.43

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.21: Regression results for vote for redistribution and attitude towards point redistribution. Full denotes results for full sample and att. check. denotes results for those who passed all attention checks.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
			Point Redistribution			
	Full (1)	Att. Check (2)	Full (3)	Att. Check (4)	Full (5)	Att. Check (6)
Prime	-0.17 (0.14)	-0.29* (0.18)	-0.16 (0.14)	-0.29 (0.18)	-0.65** (0.29)	-0.74** (0.36)
Redistribution	0.20 (0.14)	0.30* (0.18)	0.62*** (0.20)	0.59** (0.26)	0.43 (0.29)	0.43 (0.36)
Worse Opponents	-0.51*** (0.14)	-0.63*** (0.18)	-0.07 (0.21)	-0.35 (0.26)	-0.43 (0.30)	-0.60* (0.36)
Red. * Worse Opp.			-0.83*** (0.28)	-0.55 (0.36)	-0.69* (0.40)	-0.63 (0.50)
Prime * Red.					0.36 (0.41)	0.28 (0.51)
Prime * Worse Opp.					0.71* (0.41)	0.49 (0.51)
Prime * Red. * Worse Opp.					-0.24 (0.57)	0.19 (0.71)
Constant	5.22*** (0.15)	5.08*** (0.18)	4.99*** (0.16)	4.94*** (0.20)	5.24*** (0.21)	5.17*** (0.26)
Observations	1,897	1,254	1,897	1,254	1,897	1,254
R ²	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
Adjusted R ²	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01




Figure C.7: Three-Way Interaction: Results for outcomes voting for redistribution (probabilities) and point redistribution attitudes (scale 0-10). Results are shown for the full sample and those participants who passed all three attention checks. Average marginal effects are presented (in parentheses are the conditions of the other factors).

C.5.2 Accounting for Redistribution Amount

Table C.22: Regression results for voting for redistribution accounting for (potential) absolute redistribution amount. Full denotes results for full sample and att. check. denotes results for those who passed all attention checks.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
			Vote for Redistribution			
	Full (1)	Att. Check (2)	Full (3)	Att. Check (4)	Full (5)	Att. Check (6)
Prime	−0.01 (0.10)	−0.12 (0.12)	−0.01 (0.10)	−0.12 (0.12)	−0.30 (0.20)	−0.42* (0.24)
Redistribution	0.47*** (0.10)	0.73*** (0.12)	0.49*** (0.14)	0.74*** (0.17)	0.31 (0.19)	0.54** (0.23)
Worse Opponents	−0.25** (0.11)	−0.28** (0.14)	−0.23 (0.15)	−0.27 (0.19)	−0.40* (0.21)	−0.43* (0.25)
Prime * Red.					0.37 (0.27)	0.39 (0.34)
Prime * Worse Opp.					0.34 (0.29)	0.32 (0.35)
Red. * Worse Opp.			−0.05 (0.19)	−0.02 (0.24)	0.09 (0.27)	0.12 (0.33)
Prime * Red. * Worse Opp.					−0.28 (0.39)	−0.26 (0.47)
Constant	−0.49* (0.25)	−0.25 (0.33)	−0.50* (0.26)	−0.26 (0.34)	−0.36 (0.28)	−0.12 (0.35)
Red. Amount Included	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,807	1,233	1,807	1,233	1,807	1,233
Log Likelihood	−1,211.97	−820.02	−1,211.94	−820.02	−1,210.53	−818.91
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,433.94	1,650.03	2,435.88	1,652.03	2,439.07	1,655.82

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.23: Regression results for point redistribution outcome accounting for (potential) absolute redistribution amount. Full denotes results for full sample and att. check. denotes results for those who passed all attention checks.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
			Point Redistribution			
	Full (1)	Att. Check (2)	Full (3)	Att. Check (4)	Full (5)	Att. Check (6)
Prime	-0.20 (0.14)	-0.31* (0.18)	-0.19 (0.14)	-0.30* (0.18)	-0.66** (0.29)	-0.71** (0.36)
Redistribution	0.18 (0.14)	0.32* (0.18)	0.60*** (0.20)	0.63** (0.26)	0.42 (0.28)	0.49 (0.36)
Worse Opponents	-0.92*** (0.16)	-0.93*** (0.21)	-0.48** (0.22)	-0.63** (0.28)	-0.85*** (0.31)	-0.85** (0.37)
Prime * Red.					0.34 (0.40)	0.25 (0.51)
Prime * Worse Opp.					0.71* (0.41)	0.45 (0.51)
Red. * Worse Opp.			-0.82*** (0.28)	-0.59* (0.36)	-0.67* (0.40)	-0.67 (0.50)
Prime * Red. * Worse Opp.					-0.27 (0.57)	0.20 (0.71)
Constant	6.90*** (0.36)	6.31*** (0.50)	6.67*** (0.37)	6.19*** (0.50)	6.91*** (0.39)	6.36*** (0.52)
Red. Amount Included	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,897	1,254	1,897	1,254	1,897	1,254
R ²	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02
Adjusted R ²	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.5.3 Mechanisms (Exploratory)

Table C.24: Potential mechanism: Game fairness.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Game Fairness					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prime	-0.11 (0.12)	-0.09 (0.12)	-0.10 (0.12)	-0.09 (0.12)	-0.47* (0.25)	-0.47* (0.25)
Redistribution	-0.99*** (0.12)	-0.98*** (0.12)	-0.37** (0.17)	-0.36** (0.17)	-0.45* (0.24)	-0.44* (0.24)
Worse Opp.	0.22* (0.12)	0.52*** (0.14)	0.85*** (0.18)	1.16*** (0.19)	0.54** (0.25)	0.85*** (0.26)
Prime*Red.					0.13 (0.35)	0.14 (0.35)
Red. * Worse Opp.			-1.21*** (0.24)	-1.21*** (0.24)	-1.18*** (0.34)	-1.19*** (0.34)
Prime * Worse Opp.					0.60* (0.35)	0.61* (0.35)
Prime * Red. * Worse Opp.					-0.02 (0.49)	-0.01 (0.48)
Constant	7.20*** (0.12)	5.96*** (0.31)	6.87*** (0.14)	5.63*** (0.32)	7.06*** (0.18)	5.81*** (0.34)
Red. Amount Included	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓
Observations	1,891	1,891	1,891	1,891	1,891	1,891
R ²	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.06
Adjusted R ²	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.5.4 Discussion

While hypothesised that experiencing high redistribution as opposed to no redistribution should negatively impact redistribution preferences due to lower fairness perceptions, the analyses suggest that this is not the case. On the contrary, experiencing redistribution has a positive impact on voting for redistribution (see Model 1 and 2 in Table C.20) although the games are perceived less fair (see also Table C.24).¹ While the overall effect is not statistically significant for attitudes towards point redistribution, the point estimate is also positive (see Model 1 and 2 in Table C.21). Therefore, *H3* is rejected.

Being paired with worse as opposed to better opponents leads to a more negative evaluation of redistribution expressed both in voting for redistribution in a potential fourth game and attitudes towards point redistribution (see Model 1 and 2 in Table C.20 and Table C.21). Hence, *H4* finds support for both direct outcomes measured, also when the the absolute (potential) amount of redistribution is accounted for (see Model 1 and 2 in Table C.22 and C.23).

The effect of being paired with worse opponents is not statistically significantly stronger among those where points are actually redistributed in the voting outcome (see Model 3 and 4 in Table C.20). The interaction effect is, however, statistically significant concerning attitudes towards point redistribution for the full model. But, the point estimate is high also for the attentive subsample (see Model 3 and 4 in Table C.21). The interaction is also statistically significant when accounting for point redistribution (see Table C.23 Model 3 and 4). *H5* finds, therefore, partial support for the two direct outcomes.

Finally, the three-way interaction effect for the prime was not discussed in greater detail in the main text due to reduced statistical power, which was already mentioned in the PAP. The effect of the prime does not seem to be substantially more negative among those actually experiencing redistribution in addition to being paired with worse as opposed to better opponents (see Model 5 and 6 in Table C.20 and Table C.21 and also the marginal effects in Figure C.7). Hence, *H6* is not supported.

¹Wording of the question: “How fair did you find the games (0 = not fair at all, 10 = very fair)?”

C.5.5 Analysis of Additional Pre-Registered Outcomes

Wording of Additional Outcomes

Two indirect outcomes have been pre-registered as well. These indirect items measure survey policy preferences regarding redistribution more explicitly, which appeared in random order after the two direct outcome measures in the survey. As visible in the following subsections, the treatments did not robustly alter preferences on these two attitudinal outcomes.

- The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.
- Taxes should be increased to reduce differences in income levels.

Regression Tables

Table C.25: Regression results for state redistribution. Full denotes full sample and Att. Check the subsample that passed all attention checks.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	State Redistribution							
	Full	Att. Check	Full	Att. Check	Full	Att. Check	Full	Att. Check
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Prime	-0.04 (0.13)	-0.04 (0.16)	-0.04 (0.13)	-0.05 (0.16)	0.04 (0.19)	-0.11 (0.24)	-0.16 (0.28)	-0.27 (0.33)
Redistribution	-0.09 (0.13)	-0.19 (0.16)	-0.22 (0.19)	-0.34 (0.24)	-0.01 (0.19)	-0.25 (0.23)	-0.38 (0.27)	-0.64* (0.33)
Worse Opponents	0.04 (0.13)	0.13 (0.16)	-0.10 (0.19)	-0.02 (0.24)	0.04 (0.13)	0.13 (0.16)	-0.31 (0.28)	-0.18 (0.33)
Red. * Worse Opp.			0.26 (0.27)	0.30 (0.33)			0.74** (0.38)	0.75 (0.46)
Prime * Red.					-0.15 (0.27)	0.13 (0.33)	0.34 (0.38)	0.63 (0.47)
Prime * Worse Opp.							0.40 (0.39)	0.31 (0.47)
Prime * Red. * Worse Opp.							-0.97* (0.53)	-0.94 (0.66)
Constant	6.67*** (0.14)	6.65*** (0.16)	6.73*** (0.15)	6.73*** (0.19)	6.62*** (0.15)	6.68*** (0.19)	6.80*** (0.20)	6.84*** (0.24)
Observations	1,909	1,255	1,909	1,255	1,909	1,255	1,909	1,255
R ²	0.0003	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.0005	0.002	0.003	0.004
Adjusted R ²	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.26: Regression results for tax redistribution outcome. Full denotes full sample and Att. Check the subsample that passed all attention checks.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Tax Redistribution							
	Full	Att. Check	Full	Att. Check	Full	Att. Check	Full	Att. Check
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Prime	-0.01 (0.14)	-0.17 (0.18)	-0.01 (0.14)	-0.17 (0.18)	0.03 (0.21)	-0.18 (0.25)	-0.29 (0.29)	-0.47 (0.35)
Redistribution	0.12 (0.14)	0.35** (0.18)	0.16 (0.20)	0.43* (0.25)	0.16 (0.20)	0.34 (0.24)	0.10 (0.28)	0.29 (0.35)
Worse Opponents	0.03 (0.14)	-0.08 (0.18)	0.07 (0.21)	0.003 (0.25)	0.03 (0.14)	-0.08 (0.18)	-0.26 (0.30)	-0.30 (0.36)
Red. * Worse Opp.			-0.09 (0.28)	-0.16 (0.35)			0.12 (0.40)	0.09 (0.49)
Prime * Red.					-0.08 (0.28)	0.02 (0.35)	0.11 (0.41)	0.26 (0.51)
Prime * Worse Opp.							0.64 (0.41)	0.59 (0.50)
Prime * Red. * Worse Opp.							-0.38 (0.57)	-0.50 (0.70)
Constant	4.52*** (0.14)	4.47*** (0.18)	4.49*** (0.16)	4.43*** (0.20)	4.49*** (0.16)	4.47*** (0.20)	4.64*** (0.21)	4.58*** (0.25)
Observations	1,905	1,254	1,905	1,254	1,905	1,254	1,905	1,254
R ²	0.0004	0.004	0.0004	0.004	0.0004	0.004	0.002	0.01
Adjusted R ²	-0.001	0.002	-0.002	0.001	-0.002	0.001	-0.002	-0.0002

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Marginal Effects




Figure C.8: Three-way interaction: Results for outcomes state and tax redistribution (both scale 0-10). Average marginal effects are presented of full sample and subsample that includes those who passed all attention checks (in parentheses are the conditions of the other factors).

C.5.6 Accounting for Redistribution Amount

Table C.27: Regression results for state redistribution and accounting for absolute (potential) redistribution. Full denotes full sample and Att. Check the subsample that passed all attention checks.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	State Redistribution				State Redistribution			
	Full (1)	Att. Check (2)	Full (3)	Att. Check (4)	Full (5)	Att. Check (6)	Full (7)	Att. Check (8)
Prime	-0.05 (0.13)	-0.05 (0.16)	-0.05 (0.13)	-0.05 (0.16)	0.04 (0.19)	-0.11 (0.24)	-0.16 (0.28)	-0.25 (0.33)
Redistribution	-0.09 (0.13)	-0.17 (0.16)	-0.23 (0.19)	-0.31 (0.24)	-0.01 (0.19)	-0.23 (0.23)	-0.39 (0.27)	-0.60* (0.33)
Worse Opponents	-0.13 (0.15)	-0.08 (0.19)	-0.26 (0.21)	-0.22 (0.25)	-0.13 (0.15)	-0.08 (0.19)	-0.47 (0.29)	-0.36 (0.34)
Red. * Worse Opp.			0.26 (0.27)	0.27 (0.33)			0.75** (0.38)	0.72 (0.46)
Prime * Red.					-0.17 (0.27)	0.11 (0.33)	0.33 (0.38)	0.60 (0.47)
Prime * Worse Opp.							0.40 (0.39)	0.28 (0.47)
Prime * Red. * Worse Opp.							-0.98* (0.53)	-0.94 (0.66)
Constant	7.33*** (0.34)	7.54*** (0.46)	7.40*** (0.35)	7.59*** (0.46)	7.29*** (0.35)	7.56*** (0.46)	7.47*** (0.37)	7.69*** (0.48)
Red. Amount Included	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,909	1,255	1,909	1,255	1,909	1,255	1,909	1,255
R ²	0.003	0.005	0.003	0.01	0.003	0.01	0.01	0.01
Adjusted R ²	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.0002	0.001	0.001	0.001

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.28: Regression results for tax redistribution outcome accounting for absolute (potential) redistribution.. Full denotes full sample and Att. Check the subsample that passed all attention checks.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Tax Redistribution							
	Full (1)	Att. Check (2)	Full (3)	Att. Check (4)	Full (5)	Att. Check (6)	Full (7)	Att. Check (8)
Prime	-0.01 (0.14)	-0.16 (0.18)	-0.01 (0.14)	-0.16 (0.18)	0.03 (0.21)	-0.18 (0.25)	-0.29 (0.29)	-0.48 (0.35)
Redistribution	0.12 (0.14)	0.34* (0.18)	0.16 (0.20)	0.41 (0.25)	0.16 (0.20)	0.32 (0.24)	0.10 (0.29)	0.27 (0.35)
Worse Opponents	0.03 (0.16)	0.06 (0.21)	0.07 (0.22)	0.13 (0.27)	0.03 (0.16)	0.06 (0.21)	-0.26 (0.31)	-0.17 (0.37)
Red. * Worse Opp.			-0.09 (0.28)	-0.14 (0.35)			0.12 (0.40)	0.11 (0.49)
Prime * Red.					-0.08 (0.28)	0.04 (0.35)	0.11 (0.41)	0.28 (0.51)
Prime * Worse Opp.							0.64 (0.41)	0.61 (0.50)
Prime * Red. * Worse Opp.							-0.38 (0.57)	-0.50 (0.70)
Constant	4.51*** (0.37)	3.89*** (0.49)	4.48*** (0.37)	3.86*** (0.50)	4.49*** (0.37)	3.90*** (0.50)	4.63*** (0.40)	4.01*** (0.51)
Red. Amount Included	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,905	1,254	1,905	1,254	1,905	1,254	1,905	1,254
R ²	0.0004	0.01	0.0004	0.01	0.0004	0.01	0.002	0.01
Adjusted R ²	-0.002	0.002	-0.002	0.002	-0.002	0.001	-0.002	0.0003

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

List of Papers

Chapter 2: What is my Opinion? Immigrants, (Post-) Authoritarianism and Ideological Positioning

single-authored

Chapter 3 (Preprint): Lindemann, K. O. (2023, August 18). Lingering Memories of the Past? The Ideological Behaviour of Immigrants Socialised in Authoritarian Regimes. <https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/vyfcm>

single-authored (under review)

Chapter 4: Communism and Redistribution Preferences: Evidence from an Experimental Online Game

single-authored