



Patterns towards Effective Policy Implementation in Patrimonialist Bureaucracies

Berlin, August 2022

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Dissertation submitted to the Hertie School
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

in the

Doctoral Programme in Governance

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Summary

This thesis seeks to respond to the central question of how successful public policies could be obtained in countries whose bureaucracies are predominantly considered as 'patrimonialist'. To respond to this guiding question, and by departing from existing public administration on bureaucratic professionalism and policy effectiveness, I formulate that the different conjunction of institutional incentives, motivations and abilities of policy actors might structure varied patterns of effective policy delivery in patrimonialist contexts.

Drawing on this framework, three arguments are advanced in this dissertation. First, I sustain that in patrimonialist bureaucracies, politicians have powered access to shape the inclusion and promotion of bureaucrats therefore being central for policy delivery. Second, I sustain that because politicians are central for policy delivery, I suggest that 'reputation building' underlies the production of effective policy outputs in patrimonialist bureaucracies. Yet, I also stress that this finding comes with the nuance that in patrimonialist settings politicians not only 'deliver', but also reconcile good performance in office with rent extraction. Finally, I also document how 'politicians' who acquire 'expert knowledge' of the administrative functions of their bureaucracies are endowed with unprecedented access to utilise their resources –hence strategically distributing them to aides and supporters, while sabotaging office when they know they will lose the ballots. Overall, my thesis also finds that tenure (prior office experience) mediates performance in office generally rendering seasoned politicians to be more strategic when it comes to extracting and distributing public goods –meaning that they are more careful in selecting and appointing loyal knowledgeable aides in key positions, manoeuvring key aspects of the bureaucracy especially those related to budgeting.

Together, these findings configure three important patterns leading to successful policy delivery in contexts plagued with patronage dynamics: (i) that politicians' positive perspectives of winning office underlie sound policy delivery, (ii) that older politicians tend to deliver better policies, but also are more detrimental to their country's bureaucratic capacity, and (iii) that politicians' who acquire 'expert knowledge' deliver better policies, but also extract more rents. Such patterns towards leading to implementation also have important repercussions to public administration and political science scholarship. My contributions are therefore threefold: (i) my thesis advances the comprehension of politicians' careers and their effects on policy success; (ii) it also formulates novel theoretical frameworks to comprehend the role impact of patronage on policy success, and my thesis (iii) advances 'expert knowledge utilisation' theory by documenting the long-ignored functions and utilisation of 'expert knowledge' by incumbents in office, and how such usage, is mediated by their tenure.

Acknowledgments

As a younger bureaucrat of the Peruvian government, I was bewildered with my first job. It was at a complex political organisation at an enormous intimidating brutalist building behind the financial centre of the country in the Javier Prado Avenue. The Ministry of Education was perhaps the largest, oldest, more problematic ministry of the country. It is the institution hiring more than two hundred thousand teachers working for the Peruvian state. This institution was –and still is– special for me and my family composed of rural indigenous teachers from whom I have learned first-hand the disconnection from what was designed by central bureaucrats and what was implemented at the local level in my rural area. After my enrolment at the ministry, I was thus eager to unfold how this institution works while promising myself that I will do my best to learn how to manoeuvre the engines of the ministry so I could make it work better. Or so I thought.

What I have become acquainted with, however, more than useful technical knowledge, was instead a compound of politico-administrative practices to survive and progress my career. I learned how public hirings were done in the ministry; I observed public selection processes, where the private information of applicants flew across offices or where ‘lost in the process’, hence facilitating the appointment of patronage aides in good positions –in detriment of other good candidates. At the ministry, I was taught to use bureaucratic regulations to protect my post and/or to weaponise them in case needed. In such contexts, I observed, ‘Law was neutral’ indeed, but it also depended on who uses it.

Arguably, the lessons of my undergraduate years did not prepare me for such politicised environment, but I was a good student. I learned and made it to the upper echelons of the Ministry –soon I was included as part of the National Centre of Strategic Planning (CEPLAN) and found myself doing national policy. After some time, however, the ‘system’ closed itself. It was electoral times and as patrons in office change so do the entire echelons of the public administration –as it is customary in those settings. Some of my colleagues found ways to prevail under the new government, often resorting to the carefully built bureaucratic cadres they cultivated over the years. For me, it was time to move on.

I write this because the present thesis is based on my positionality of the first-hand lived experience of doing policy in a country plagued with patronage practices. This means that this thesis is impinged by a very personal account on how policymaking operates in other settings, with other actors, values, different type of bureaucratic ‘ethos’ and peoples. It feels, for the author, a very personal enterprise to document the challenges that policymakers face to manoeuvre the enormous machineries of patrimonialist bureaucracies towards producing

effective public policies. In fact, during my graduate studies I struggled to find scholarship that could speak to the ‘lived’ experience of making the state machinery work in such difficult highly politicised contexts. To some extent, I felt that public administration was missing a Global South perspective: there is missing documentation about the incentives, motivations, and abilities of the policymakers in such particular arrangement of institutional rules and learned careers paths. So, I embarked in a doctoral project trying to document such aspects of my country’ bureaucratic life.

Yet of course, the development of an investigation of such calibre could not be possible without the support of researchers, policymakers, and academics who have believed in this present project. I am specially indebted to my supervisor, Luciana Cingolani, for her academic, professional, and emotional support. Without your kindness and comprehension, it would have not been possible to finalise this doctoral project –thanks for the many calls, your kindness and human approach to my project. I am also highly indebted to my other supervisors Pedro Pineda and Gabriela Lotta for their kind, organised, and hard-working approach to my academic work. Thanks for your professionalism and timely feedback. You all make me believe that another academia is possible.

As well, I am thankful to the group of friends who have introduced me to the world of policy making over these years. I am especially grateful to Renzo Sotomayor, Isy Faingold, Carmen Osorio, Victor Vargas, Roger Merino, Nelly Huamani, Elohim Monard, Anthony Medina, Luis Melendez, Moises Rojas, Elvis Mori, Jorge Vega, Pablo Paz, Zoraida Sarmiento, Carlos Alza, Julio Corcuera, and most especially to the trio of ‘techno-idealists’: Carlos Ramos, Rudy Bezir, and Christian Herencia. Keep on trying to change Peru, guys!

To the Hertie School friends and colleagues, I am also thankful for your support and company which has made Berlin more bearable place over these years: Dominic Hüller, Felix Lil, Till Schöfer, Till Hartman, Felix Sieker, Lukas Jerg, Ronan Riordan, Simona Stockreiter, Haytham Mones, Paulina Garcia-Corral, Anna Hundehage, Jessica Breugh, Eduardo Campbell Bethancourt, and Luis Mejia.

To embark on this project has also demanded from me an enormous academic, economic, and personal effort which involved relocating from the safety network of family, friends, and relatives from Lima to Berlin. I hence want to make special mention to the *Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst* (DAAD) which has founded this doctoral project, and to Patricia Guzman and Geraldine Carreon. I am tremendously indebted with you all who have safeguarded me from experiencing academic abuse and stood by my side in difficult times.

Finally, I could not finish without stressing that I am enormously indebted to my wife Sandra Tagle, and my kids Diego Sandro, and Agnes Victoria. You have been the emotional pillar sustaining my work over these years. *Gracias mi Sandrita*, for believing in this academic and immigration project. It is time to move on, to a better chapter in life.

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–Chapter 1–

Conceptualising the Patrimonialist Bureaucracy and its Role on Policy Success

1.1. Motivation and research puzzle

In 2013, a journalistic investigation revealed that, Manuel Burga, President of the Peruvian Football Federation (FPF), had carefully ‘made arrangements’ and allocated his aides in key financial positions of the FPF to win the favours of subnational clubs and voters which benefited him in two re-elections that kept him for a total of 12 years in power (La Republica 2014). In further investigations, fiscal evidence started mounting, and it was revealed that Mr Burga had not only managed to allocate loyal functionaries in key positions of the Federation, but also that he had carefully and quietly built a machinery to extract resources from the allocation of TV football licenses (RPP 2016). If TV channels wanted to air football matches, they needed to pay bribes to Mr Burga regional aides, and when such transactions did not happen, regional bosses tended to withhold the participation of local football stars in matches with the consequence of having low TV audience ratings because football fans were disappointed watching that their local starts were not playing (TvPeru 2019).

In observing Mr Burga scandal, several media outlets and journalists started questioning on whether the performance of the national football team was related to the poor administration of the FPF’s resources, the lack of accountability, and the appointment of aides at every level –situation that facilitated, observers mention, the opportunities for corrupt acts (RPP 2016). Indeed, over the 12 years Mr Burga stayed in office, Peru ranked at the bottom of the South American football leagues, often failing to qualify for international competitions such as the World Cup. It was not only until Mr Burga and his aides were extradited to the US under corruption allegations that a new President of the FPF was elected, and he subsequently appointed, ‘talented’ and ‘knowledgeable’ regional football leaders, finally luring the famous Argentinian DT, Ricardo Gareca (*‘El Tigre’*) to manage the Peruvian national team. In only 5 years, results started to be visible: the Peruvian national team have ended up among the three more competitive teams in the latest Copa America (2021, 2016, 2015), and the team classified to the World Cup in Russia after 36 years (12 of which, Mr Burga governed the federation) (Deport 2022).

The success of *‘El Tigre’* not only has deeply impinged its mark in the country’s morale and sportsmanship, but also serves as reference to Peru’s politicians that want their image associated to the FPF’s ‘managerial practices’. One of the most salient experiences was that of Mr Huancahuari, a former mayor of a district in South Central Peru, who has

managed to be ranked among top performers in health indicators and transparency (Int. 20 of Chapter 4). He often stressed that like *'El Tigre'*, he had learned that 'management was central' for his performance and hence for his re-election in office. He mentioned that like *'El Tigre'*, he has sought to congregate 'a right' and 'knowledgeable team' –meaning experts on budgetary and administrative process– that have aided him to 'deliver' while 'building up his own political party' (Int. 20 of Chapter 4). In his view, like the famous Argentinian DT, he suggested that his 'strategic vision' and the 'selection of seasoned bureaucrats' (local *tecnicos*) were central to his 'history of success'. In practice, he happily mentioned that even the Pan-American Health Organisation (OPS in Spanish) recognised his governmental experience, 'pointing out that unlike other districts in the area, he managed to curb the number of children stunted through the implementation of a pre-natal stimulation programme in his district's schools by developing informational campaigns on nourishment and hygienic practices' (Int. 20 of Chapter 4).

Mr Huancahuari, who entered into politics after serving 15 years as a physician and after occupying the position of director in a regional hospital, further mentioned that because of his performance, he started gaining recognition from colleagues, local NGOs, and other regional politicians congratulating him for his policy outputs, and that various established regional and national political parties invited him to run in their files for the next election, yet this time for a governor position (Int. 20 of Chapter 4). He stressed also in our interview that 'either in football or in politics, a good result could be achieved with the 'combination of a vision and by [inviting] the right people to be part of your team' (Int. 20 of Chapter 4).

The experiences of *'El Tigre'* Gareca and Mr Huancahuari pose relevant questions on how institutions that have been underperforming for many years, could eventually obtain effective policy outputs (McConnell 2010). Elements such as 'experience', 'strategic vision', the search for 'an adequate team', and the appointment of aides in key positions seem, in the abovementioned examples, to suggest a pattern leading to effective results (Marsh and McConnell 2010). But there is also another side of these stories referring to how incumbents' experience, 'expert knowledge' and reputations play a central role in facilitating their management of complex bureaucratic systems plagued with stakeholders, competing interests –all of them situated in a predominantly weak institutional environment (Brinks, Levitsky, and Murillo 2020; Brierley 2021).

To add more complexity to the abovementioned elements, we also must take into consideration that obtaining policy success either for Gareca or Huancahuari is a process unabashedly connected to an eminently weak institutional environment (Laguna 2011), whereby the Weberian 'ethos' sustaining the political contract between politicians (McDonnell 2017), bureaucrats and citizens is often unchecked and dependent on willingness of those

occupying office roles (Oliveros 2016). Scholars suggest that those institutional contexts are highly volatile, marked by eminently patrimonialist relationships where incumbents have unchecked access to promote, withhold and/or advance the careers of bureaucrats in office, and that the delivery of policy results remains a matter of alignment between incumbents' interests and their career progression (Benton 2007; Oliveros 2021; Panizza, Peters, and Larraburu 2019; Bach, Hammerschmid, and Löffler 2020). Where these alignments did not occur, scholars mention, politicians might turn onto utilising their offices for personal purposes, powering their influence by appointing 'knowledgeable aides' in key positions (Brierley 2021), no longer with the objective of distributing rents, gaining audiences, or delivering policy, but in order to enrich themselves personally hence shifting the state machinery into one that commits to corrupt acts (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017) –such as the case of the Mr Burga's FPF.

Of course, this does not mean that politicians are not equipped with the experience, expertise, and networks to simultaneously extract rents, engage into corrupt acts, and still produce positive welfare outputs (Brierley 2021). However, studies documenting such process, and how successful policy delivery could occur in patrimonialist contexts –where politics are volatile, accountability mechanisms are non-existent, bureaucracies are largely deemed inefficient or regarded mere extensions of politicians in office– have remained to public administration scholarship still pending of further scrutiny (Grindle 2012; Allison and Halperin 1972). Therefore, this dissertation seeks to responds to such fundamental questions: **How are successful policy outputs obtained in bureaucracies where politicians have powered access and control over bureaucrats? Are they identifiable patterns to obtaining policy success in such patrimonialist bureaucracies?**

So far, scholars, especially those studying Global North bureaucracies argue that Weberian bureaucracies, characterised by the clear separation of political and administrative careers, produce more effective policy outputs (Bach, Hammerschmid, and Löffler 2020; Bawn 1995; Allison and Halperin 1972; Evans and Rauch 1999). Presumably, the 'separation of careers' between politicians and bureaucracies might lead to a 'good government' (Suzuki and Demircioglu 2017). This because politicians and bureaucrats are subject to different incentives thereby structuring an effective system of checks and balances. Other scholars have also sustained that countries 'exhibiting clear career separation of political and civil service careers' tend to be more innovative, often resilient to external political shocks, being thus more adaptable to new situations, and to implement 'wide-ranging reforms' (Clausen, Demircioglu, and Alsos 2020; Meyer et al. 2014; Evans and Rauch 1999; Dahlström and Lapuente 2017). On the contrary, bureaucracies where political and civil service careers are

linked tend to associate with poorer government effectiveness' (Dahlstrom and Lapuente 2017, 134).

While orientation to institutional goals, depersonalised public administration, and civil servants' long-term horizons, have been thought to conduce the bureaucracy towards a 'good government' (Suzuki and Demircioglu 2017; Dahlström and Lapuente 2012), other scholars have started to question such assumption and rather re-formulated it as a matter of an empirical question (Brierley 2021; Grindle 2017). For instance, Bawn (1995) mentions, drawing on principal-agent theory, that rather politicians' (principals) political control over demotivated bureaucrats (agents) might rather facilitate that voted mandates are implemented –other scholars also second such claim (Bach, Hammerschmid, and Löffler 2020; Eichbaum and Shaw 2007; Walton 2005). For these scholars, bureaucracies inevitably shift towards incrementalism, expanding their power and safeguarding the status quo. Advocates of this approach are of the opinion that politicians micromanaging the administration do not necessarily harm the production of welfare outputs, and that in some circumstances, policy goals are effectively attained –even at a faster and more efficient pace compared to traditional *Rechstaat* bureaucracies.

Following this call for a more 'empirical assessment' of policy reform and/or policy success, Grindle (2017), for instance, argues that bureaucracies which are at the caprice of those occupying office positions are not inherently sought to corruption and incompetence, but rather might facilitate the implementation of reforms avoiding reluctant politicised bureaucrats who could sabotage incumbents' policies. Recent calls for a serious scrutiny of the effects of patrimonialist arrangements on effective policy outputs suggest that depending on a combination of factors, good results could be attained (Grindle 2017; Oliveros 2021; Kappe and Schuster 2021). For instance, Kappe and Schuster (2021) suggest that appointees of past incumbents can damage the delivery of public services due to politicisation. For these authors, principled bureaucrats, and their ideologies, when not aligned, damage the implementation of incumbents' voted mandates, overall limiting the production of positive welfare outputs (Benton 2007). Similarly, Cingolani (2019), in analysing the cases of Argentina and Brazil, observes that bureaucracies could better construe state capacities by trading off 'pro-adaptability' –meaning strong principals– while at the same time building 'predictable' civil service systems that introduce constraints to principals' power and structure an autonomous bureaucracy. She suggests that favouring 'pro-adaptability' capacities in government might create more opportunities for the consolidation of neo-patrimonialist practices which, on the one hand facilitate 'fast-changing governance' while, on the other, could also enable rent extraction and corruption.

Drawing on this and other emerging examples, this thesis attempts to contribute to the comprehension of the circumstances under which patrimonialist bureaucracies deliver. Rather than taking a normative stance or assuming patrimonialism as an inherently 'ill practice', I seek to respond the empirical question on identifying the motivations and circumstances –the patterns– that all-together lead to politicians and bureaucrats, engaged in patrimonial relationship, to produce sound policy outputs. Yet, before evaluating this thesis central puzzle and arguments, it is worth revisiting the centrality of patrimonialism as an 'organising force' in developing countries, and in Latin America, in particular.

1.2. The persistence of the 'patrimonialist ethos'

In his analysis of the modern capitalist forms of organisation of state and citizen relationships, Max Weber defines bureaucracies as 'legal and impersonal set of norms and institutions where civil servants are thought to transcend personal commitments in order to focus exclusively on delivering common goals' (Weber 2002, 800). Weber noted that the 'modern bureaucracy' was an institution governed by a 'myriad of implicit and explicit rules' duly performed by public servants who accommodate their behaviours and identify themselves with the rational, impersonal, and technical development of work (Weber 2002, 801–20). Moreover, Weber also proposed his 'ideal bureaucratic form' as an analytical tool that permitted him to categorise emerging modern bureaucracies based on three interrelated central features: (i) a hierarchical structure with 'graded levels of authority' dividing the public function among specific roles and functions, (ii) its 'dehumanised' procedural organisation which served as a counterweight to 'traditional forms of organisation' based on charisma, and its (iii) personnel who, in his ideal type, must be recruited following objective classifications or 'meritocratic criteria' (see Weber 2002; Alvensson and Thompson 2004; Walton 2005; Dahlström and Lapuente 2017).

In Weber's definition, the idea of a bureaucratic hierarchical structure needed to support an objective division of roles and functions that could facilitate civil servants the specialisation over their administrative functions while guaranteeing supervision from higher to lower offices (Alvensson and Thompson 2004). In relation to the procedures, Weber's ideal formulation was unabashedly connected to capitalism and democracy, and hence to the preservation of the 'rule of law' –citizens' equality and the presence of 'calculable rules', 'codes of practice', and 'regulations' should guide the working of a bureaucracy (Constas 1958). Finally, Weber (2002) also suggested that civil servants, in his 'modern conception of bureaucracy' were the 'quintessential' characteristic of modern bureaucracies.

In short, his formulation of what 'modern bureaucracy' should be, advocated for the premise that 'whoever gets the job' must access to the civil service through meritocratic means, on a long-term basis, 'protected from interference' and exclusively devoted to the civil services career (Walton 2005). *He understood for 'meritocratic recruitment', as Evans and Rauch (1999, 2) indicate, to the existence of competitive formal examinations, the presence of civil service procedures for hiring and firing, and the filling of internal hierarchies through promotions (Evans and Rauch 1999, 2).* Due to the presence of such 'meritocratic recruitment processes', Weber suggested, public officials might construe a type of '*esprit de corps*', which might render them towards 'thinking, deciding, perceiving, and acting in ways driven by the orientation to achieving organisational goals' (McDonnell 2017, 38). They were to be guided by a type of public 'ethos' that makes them to profoundly identify with the objectives of the workplace, whereby their social attachments alluded to the impersonality of the rules, serving in their jobs with a sense of 'ethical commitment' and 'duty' (Møller, Pedersen, and Pors 2022).

Weber made these remarks at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century while focusing on analysing advanced economies such as the US and Europe (Sager and Rosser 2021). He thus concluded that the emergence of a hierarchical, objective, impersonal, efficient, and specialised bureaucratic system was no other than the hallmark of the modern state and a 'precondition for the emergence of the modern capitalist system' (Grindle, 2012, 10). He also suggested that modern bureaucracies' more salient features (the impartial and meritocratic recruitment of personnel) might lead to economic development, growth, and as other authors such as Evan and Rauch (1991) and Henderson et al. (2007) suggested, to poverty reduction.

Drawing on this characterisation, public administration scholars, principally those coming from Anglo-Saxon tradition, and more generally from the Global North, have proclaimed the triumph of the 'modern bureaucracy' by highlighting its technical superiority over other types of organisations' (de la Riva Agüero 2022). Presumably, the 'modern bureaucracy', they sustain, might reduce the vices and inefficiencies of the material and personal costs of producing organisational outputs (Dahlström and Lapuente 2012), it might reduce the volatility of the decision embedded in the apparatus of the state, and it might have finally conjured a form of organisation that 'depoliticise' and 'de-personalise' the distribution of goods in the public sector (Suzuki and Demircioglu 2017). Such type of organisation, observed by Weber and many others (Alvesson and Thompson 2004; Henderson et al. 2007; Constatas 1958), represent no other than the solution to the limiting factors preventing countries to transit into modern forms of capitalist organisation. The modern bureaucracy, in sum, was thought to be the 'tonic for corruption, nepotism, favouritism, partisanship, spoils,

incompetence, lack of professionalism, inequity capture, particularism, mediocrity, malfeasance and electoral fraud and violence' (Grindle 2012, 31).

However, in contexts other where Weber's observation of the 'nascent modern bureaucracy', another type of public ethos was still in place (McDonnell 2017). One where public work was embedded in a contract putting less value on individual achievements, abstract rules, and impersonal universalism (Oliveros 2021). This 'other ethos' conceives bureaucratic relationships as of cut through by the moral obligation to nurture relationships by rendering some of the 'otherwise' impersonal public goods/resources at the particular and personalistic disposal of those occupying a powerful position (Pereira 2016). This 'other ethos' demands public servants to construe their daily bureaucratic interactions based on a set of purposes and ideals cementing a type of social contract marked by eminently dyadic, personal, and transactional relationships (Martz 2017). Scholars, either coming from the public administration, political science, and anthropology, have labelled this 'ensemble of purposes and ideals' in which public servants interact as 'patrimonial' (Stokes et al. 2013; S. N. Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980; 1981; Roniger 1994). Important to mention is that public administration scholars have been creative in labelling such type of 'anti-Weberian' ideal as 'state clientelism' (Martz 2017), 'patronage bureaucracies' (Dahlström and Lapuente 2012), 'bureaucratic clientelism' (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980) and/or 'patronage systems' (Oliveros 2021). And despite they present different types of nominations, they commonly agree that such type of bureaucracy is characterised by the presence of a 'dyadic', personalistic, and transactional 'ethos' (Stokes et al. 2013).

Different from the Weberian concept of bureaucratic rationality, which advocates for the separation of the personal and the professional spheres, publicness of the utilisation of common goods, transparency, and effective goal achievement (Henderson et al. 2007; Dahlström and Lapuente 2012; Grindle 2017), the patrimonialist 'ethos' conjures a cultural practice built in 'thousands of small behaviours' and 'sprawling' concatenations that enact personalistic *quip-pro-quo* relationships (Stokes et al. 2013; McDonnell 2017, 49). Patrimonialist practice, in this sense, involves a form of 'habitus' among public servants who gradually cluster distinctive mechanisms of circumstantial interactions structuring a bureaucratic culture (Gay 1998). A 'culture' where the construction of the 'public service work' depends on the discretionarily and calculation of the patron or incumbent in office concerning the distribution of goods that might benefit the advancement of their own goals (Oliveros 2016). In this 'patrimonialist ethos' insulation is given to officials to advance their interests turning their inner particular motivations into a new type of rationality governing the application of the law based an overly discretionary, personal, and transactional utilisation of governmental resources.

While Weber's observation of the nascent modern bureaucracy clearly pointed towards a superior (and ideal) form of rational power distribution, which does not obey the sole 'willingness' of an incumbent; in other parts of the world –those places where the quarrels of state building in independent nations were still coped with the rationale of colonial domination– the contracts bidding citizens and states were still based on relationships of 'kinship' and closedness configuring patrimonialist relationships (Roniger 1994). Along the 19th and 20th centuries, such type of patrimonialist relationships proved to be widespread, accepted and commonplace (Kettering 1988), in part because they use to organise a political order following a hierarchical and unequal fashion. They classify peoples in classes according to their degree of hierarchy and power: *Patrons* are endowed with power, access to resources and control over their distribution; *clients*, in turn, owe *patrons* loyalty and provide them with services.

Accordingly, such patron-client relationships have persisted in part because of the actors' 'expectations' of material benefit, perceived fair 'reciprocity' (Stokes et al. 2013). On the one hand, expectations of material redistribution sustain 'clients' loyalties with their 'patrons', while on the other hand, reciprocity, and the accomplishments of the material distribution of goods perpetuates the relationship between them (Oliveros 2021).

Of course, as several scholars have also recognised, over the years, with the upcoming of modernisation waves, and democratisation forces, that 'patrimonialist' contracts in settings such as Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia have mutated and coupled with novel institutional incentives (Brierley 2021). In some cases, they have adapted to the shape of electoral democracies by adopting competitive forms (Driscoll 2018), but also, in others, they have enabled authoritarian regimes to exercise control over the bureaucracy and the citizenry often receiving largesse and loyalty (Benton 2007). Other authors also regard that the persistent patrimonialist ethos somehow facilitate the implementation of public policy reforms, 'breaking through' bureaucracy resistance and ensuring that bureaucrats conform and avoid shirking (Grindle 2017; Brierley 2020).

Arguably, the 'patrimonialist ethos' embodies the 'anti-Weberian' bureaucratic ideal and it is integral part of developing countries' bureaucracies. Some scholars have emphasised that doing research in Global South settings where historical legacies of 'patrimonialist' relationships have evolved alongside 'modern forms' of organisation undoubtedly require a disclosure comprehending that dyadic, *quip pro quo* relationships are no other than structural characteristics –the very social contract– sustaining the relationship between politicians, bureaucrats, and citizens in developing contexts –as I explain next.

1.3. The predominance of patrimonialist bureaucracies in developing contexts

In the early 1960s scholars struggled to identify the type of political system dominating nascent Latin American, African and South Asian democracies (Pereira 2016). While some scholars suggested that the utilisation of the Weberian 'patronage' typology might fully encompass the emerging form in which authority was exerted by rulers in those countries, others suggested that new mediating mechanisms between patrons and clients, and emerging novel types of instruments involved in the distribution of state goods in competitive settings, were more complex than Weber's ideal conceptualisation of 'patrimonialism' (Pereira 2016; Martz 2017; S. Mainwaring 2018). Said scholars hence largely debated the inclusion of a new terminology, which Eisenstadt (1973) finally settled by adding the 'neo' prefix, in the spirit of capturing the novelty and complex form that patrimonialism adopted in the nascent Global South democracies. For Eisenstadt, 'neopatrimonialism' refers to the process through which traditional forms of power distribution, cemented in hierarchical and unequal relationships, influence the administrative organisation of the state.

In using the term neopatrimonialism (Eisenstadt 1973; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980; 1981), scholars strove to comprehend the waves of state modernisation and democratisation that traditional societies have experienced along the 20th century. However, despite Eisenstadt's (1973) terminological accuracy, more recent studies have resorted to the 'old fashioned' term 'patrimonialism' to refer to both old and new forms of charismatic domination, loyalty and resource distribution. In practice, novel empirical studies contend that the idea of patrimonialism is a subcategory of the broader sociological notion of 'clientelism' – understood as the *quid-pro-quo* exchange of goods and favour for political support– (Stokes et al. 2013; Driscoll 2018; Oliveros 2021). *These new waves of scholars understand 'patrimonialism' (or neopatrimonialism for the case) as the utilisation of various types of state positions (jobs) that are redistributed discretionally by an incumbent with the purpose of surviving in office or advancing their careers.* Generally, they consider that until today there is not a clear-cut distinction between clientelism and patrimonialism, and other types of personalistic distribution of state resources.

There have been some efforts to create an exclusive corpus of research around the idea of 'patrimonialism' by analysing how it is employed by political parties to redistribute goods (S. Mainwaring 2018; Martz 2017). Scholars such as Stokes et al. (2013), for instance, have attempted to isolate this concept based on how more or less programmatic is the distribution of public resources. They differentiate state goods redistribution by observing how personal they are: those forms of allocating governmental resources to particular aides or supporters in the expectation that they will provide some types of political services are

labelled as 'patrimonialist' distributions. This in clear contrast with more partisan forms of distribution to specific constituencies (pork-barrelling) and/or with those programmatic based on specific welfare distributions or universal redistributive policies.

Overall, whether conceptualised as an ideal form of domination (Eisenstadt 1973), a new 'neo' type of bureaucratic and state organisation (Bach, Hammerschmid, and Löffler 2020; Cingolani 2019), and/or centrally as a form of non-programmatic distribution of goods (Brierley 2020; Oliveros 2021), patrimonialism still remains central in old and new studies covering its effects and functions in developing democracies. In part, scholarship focused on the developing world suggests that 'patrimonialism' is rather a structural characteristic embedded in the bureaucracies of developing states (Brierley 2021; Haque 2007), in part due to waves of truncated modernisation processes promoted in them, e.g: international pressures to developing countries coming from lending organisations such as the World Bank and the FMI that sought to construe their 'professional and meritocratic civil services', the introduction of competitive elections, and the incorporation of oversight and autonomous bureaucratic organisations (Bertelli et al. 2020). Together these 'modernisation efforts' have partly transformed the 'traditional' legacies in developing countries' bureaucracies –and of course also have slowly changed the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats–.

Some scholars suggest that such modernisation attempts have diversified developing countries' bureaucratic 'ethos' into coexisting hybrids where we can observe at least two sections¹: (i) one section of developing countries' bureaucracies adopting predominantly meritocratic recruitment of public servants, with high independence from political power, and which have been colonised by 'technocrats' of all kinds; and (ii) a second section of developing countries' bureaucracies mostly focused on social policies where 'patrimonialist' distributive logics are still thriving (McDonnell 2017; Roll 2014).

These hybrid structure coexists in developing states, where 'pockets –or isles– of efficiency' are in constant interaction with patrimonialist institutions as two available spaces that politicians can resort to in order to maximise their gains (Brierley 2020). But perhaps most notably, is that these two coexisting and contradictory bureaucratic structures have also conjured a new type of 'rationality' of government. One where the 'persistent' patrimonialist ethos is also combined with 'meritocratic appointments' hence having both of the two worlds (Brierley 2021): the possibility of overcoming the preoccupations related to bureaucratic shirking accompanied by the loyalty of the 'experts of government'.

¹ There are other scholars who suggest that this initial fragmentation has also been intermeshed with various types of institutional incentives and arrangements thereby generating bureaucratic hybrids of various types and kinds. In practice a more nuanced debate can be found in the next chapter 2, where different types of coexisting bureaucratic structures produce different types of civil servants.

There are other various studies documenting developing countries' hybrid bureaucracies. For instance, Rasul, Rogger, and Williams (2021) in their study of the implementation process of the Ghanaian bureaucracy note that the proper combination of incentives and autonomy granted by politicians to bureaucrats in the country were conducive to more efficient outcomes in public project co-financed by international organisations. In a more recent study, Brierley (2021), for instance, indicates that Ghanaian incumbents have learned to deliver by best combining the capabilities of 'technical bureaucrats' with those 'low-skilled' through appointing the former in highly ranked positions and the later in lower ones. In other words, politicians well understand the functioning of the logics of patrimonialism and those of 'meritocratic' recruitment being overall effective in bringing them together.

More qualitative approaches also seem to confirm this trend although by pointing out that rather than combining both strategies, politicians 'transpose' patrimonialist schemes to seemingly 'meritocratic' hirings. This is the case of McDonnell (2017) in his book *Patchwork Leviathan* where the author suggests that in Global South bureaucracies, more concretely, in the focus of her study, the Ghanaian bureaucracy, there is a case of 'analogous transposition of neo-patrimonialist' schemes' whereby jobs allocations –even in those pockets of efficiency or 'high' performing institutions– emulate practices of 'interpersonal relationship maintenance', 'an orientation of pleasing the patron' which are bend towards 'proto-meritocratic' hirings (McDonnell 2017, 51). This way, the author suggests, even those sectors thought as 'modernised' or influenced by meritocratic selection processes happen to be 'transposed' by the patrimonialist ethos –just that in this scheme job allocation occurs to a cadre of more qualified personnel.

There are several other studies from African and South-East-Asian countries documenting the bureaucratic experience in the geopolitical sector of the world recognised as 'Global South'. Notably, Haque (2007) for instance, suggests that Southeast Asian countries exhibit a wide variety of public administration models which are still largely influenced by post-colonialist Western traditions or 'developmental schemes'. These 'public administration models', Haque (2007) indicates, have arguably replicated foreign administrative models which have only been absorbed by the predominant hierarchical and patrimonialist culture of these countries. The same author, in another paper (Haque 1998) narrates the experience of Malaysia and its adoption of developmental policies enforced by the UN which permitted the countries to construe a relatively solid bureaucracy, which however has turned out to be influenced by the role of religion, the introduction of novel managerial techniques cemented in the NPM, and the still underlying and transformative presence of patrimonial practices. Similar experiences have been also documented in

countries like India where Auerbach and Thachil (2018) have found out that despite multiple reform attempts, in the country, citizens still largely expect to obtain state goods and benefits via forging close connections with party brokers who have capacity and power to make claims to the state. The authors report that while at the federal level, the countries have developed a sound bureaucracy, at the subnational level 'political brokers' have adopted a central role in securing recourses for clients in India's subnational politics.

Arguably, the above documented research demonstrate that patrimonialism is still situated at the stake of the bureaucratic functioning of developing countries bureaucracies. In spite of the multiple reforms implemented, and the construction of the so-called 'pockets of efficiency' (Roll 2014), patrimonialist logics are prevalent, permanent, transposing its ways of functioning and operations all over the state: closeness, kinship, ideological or political affinity become central aspects when judging civil servants' entrance to the public service force –in spite of 'clear cut' presumably, 'meritocratic reforms'. The Latin American region has not been exempt of these dynamics –as I revise next.

1.4. Patrimonialist bureaucracies in Latin America

There is no other region in the world where patrimonialism has been more studied as in Latin America (Martz 2017). The region is one of the most diverse in terms of innovation of patrimonialist strategies which led to the construction of a proper 'genealogy' regarding the evolution of patrimonialist practice (Stokes et al. 2013). Currently, scholars suggest that it is difficult to differentiate the origins of the study of patrimonialism itself, and patrimonialist practice as an organising rationale of the state, yet many still regard the text of Schwartzman in 1975 as one of the founding ones in providing a comprehensive definition of the Latin American state foundations and operation as eminently patrimonial.

For Schwartzman (1975) the Latin American bureaucracy comes as the by-product of its colonial past, and the resilience to international efforts to 'modernise it' –a case in which patrimonialist practice just does not 'wither away' from the regions' different states. In practice, the author, and other classics in the study of patrimonialism suggest that patrimonialism in the region constitute a 'rationality' of government (Martz 2017; Laguna 2011) –in reference that it supports the functioning of the government of subjects ultimately influencing the 'ethos' of the regions' bureaucracies.

The centrality of 'patrimonialism' as a practice of organising and distributing power in the Latin American region, however, scholars mention responds to a variety of concomitant processes based on the historical trajectory of the region (Pereira 2016; Schwartzman 1975; S. Mainwaring 2018; Oliveros 2021). Arguably, as Martz (2017) mentions, one of the central

processes underlying the emergence of patrimonialist practice is the presence of the Spanish/Portuguese 'colonial inheritance', which instituted a type of monarchic authority that operated via the sell-off of public office positions in exchange for loyalty.

In practice, Painter and Peters (2010) sustain, the colonial legacies in Latin America have forged a comprehension and utilisation of the Law in a patrimonialist fashion: granting benefits and accesses to colonial goods to aides and supporters while enforcing it against the opposition. As Martz (2017) further argues, the predominance of such patrimonialist logics of government did not simply disappear when Latin American countries became independent, but rather mutated into new forms of political action as liberal ideas spread across the continent. Colom (2020) exemplifies this process by noting that after Latin American countries' independence, a combination of patrimonialist rule and liberalism forged the image of 'caudillos' who dominated the political life of their countries. Yet, these 'caudillos' rather than instituting a different political rule –or a democratic one, for the case– opted for reproducing the learned patterns of political action of the regime they helped to dismantle. In the words of Weiss (2018), 'caudillos' in the region contributed to the articulation of 'bureaucratic despotism' which employs public offices for favours' retribution – just that at the time elements of hierarchy, domination and discipline turned out as central parts of public jobs distribution (C. R. Nureña and Helfgott 2019; C. R. Nureña 2021).

Furthermore, democratic transitions in the region, after 'caudillismo' did not suppose a transformation of the 'patrimonialist bureaucratic state', but rather the confirmation that accesses to state resources and benefits were (have been) marked by the will of 'caudillos in office' (Weiss 2018). Subsequently, other scholars also mention that other changes have also been minimal with the upcoming and conformation of political parties during the late 19th century. These parties, in the view of Martz (2017), were elitist and resorted to a distribution and control of 'the masses' (because civil society as such and concept was still incipient) via the bequeathing of privileges from supporters.

As shown, to comprehend the centrality adopted by patrimonialist practices in current Latin America, it is important to overview past historical legacies. Scholarship only shows that colonial legacies have rendered 'patrimonialism' as a *raison d'état* in the countries' states further cementing a differentiation of social groups and societies based on bonds of proximity, kinship and ideological affinity (Nureña 2020). It has been precisely, Zabludovsky (2019) who claimed that such dualisation provoked by patrimonialism, its arbitrary application based on political allegiances, its daily interpretation based on dis-likings of the incumbent in office, is what precisely has built different ranks, social groups, and hierarchies in the region. Arguably, in the traditional vein of Latin American history, patrimonialism hence has been associated with forging inequality, cementing political resentment among excluded groups

which later, when windows of opportunity opened, fuelled radical and overnight changes in the structure of government (Nureña 2020).

But also, subsequent studies, especially those coming after the first democratisation process of the early 1960s, have further investigated how patrimonialism was at the centre of strategies utilised by military governments in enforcing their authoritarian rule (Weiss 2018; S. Eisenstadt 1973; Gay 1998; Zabludovsky 2019; Schwartzman 1975; Loxton and Mainwaring 2018). For these authors, patrimonialist practices in Latin America adopted a new face: it was not only the spine sustaining state inequality, but also the pinnacle of authoritarian regimes. In this way, patrimonialism enabled autocrats the construction of networks of trust to rule government –of course invisible to the accountability of ‘civil society’–, utilising public services with a ‘weak sense of public consciousness’ triggering a colonisation of the public service with relatives, and friends.

More recent studies counting the last 20 years have labelled patrimonialism in Latin America as fundamental when discussing power distribution in the continent. For many, Scott Mainwaring (1999) is the author who has best summarised the situation in the region when identifying the central goals of rulers when they took office: *treating the public office as if ‘it was their own property’, distributing public money as ‘coming from personal bank accounts’, ‘requiring public servants to work on their personal projects’, ‘hiring relatives and friends at will, totally ignoring the idea of res publica.*

Other authors further expanded Mainwaring’s (1999) claims by observing that upon the second and third wave of democratisation during the 1990s and 2000s, patrimonialist practices adopted more complex forms –mostly in part due to the inclusion of elections– (Stokes et al. 2013; Benton 2007; Driscoll 2018). Patrimonialism changed. It was no longer about the private distribution of favours, but such distribution required a machinery bounded by interests and sometimes ideologies that could channel support for an incumbent in office (Holland and Freeman 2021; Muñoz 2019). The growing complexity of Latin American state and democracies have also pressured politicians to come up with new forms and ways to avoid raising red flags to extract public resources with the purpose of financing their party machines (Stokes et al. 2013). The utilisation of the Law for rent extraction in this new form of patrimonialism hence requires more fine-grained abilities, the concurrence of loyalists and experts willing to put their knowledge at the service of the politician while also advancing their own administrative and political goals (Grindle 2017).

The complexity of Latin American patrimonialism has also been subject of further analysis by regional scholars. In its current ‘democratic form’, comprehending the functioning of patronage in the region requires more complex techniques which could also help us to identify new actors coming in between the patron-client relationships: brokers. According to

Auyero (2011), many patron-client relationships in the Latin American region require more complex work and specialised personnel who can bridge demands between politicians and the electorate. Hence the role of the 'broker', as he investigated in Argentina, is the more characteristic feature of current patronage practices in the Latin American region.

Auyero has been one of the most prominent authors researching on the effects and persistence of patrimonialism. In his oeuvre, he casted light on the dimension of the 'reciprocity' and 'access to governmental' resources in competitive electoral systems. In one of the most notable books on patrimonialism, '*The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina*', Auyero studies the functioning of patrimonialist logics in the '*cono-urbano boanerense*' –the metropolitan area around the Argentinian capital. He then discovers that political power and state resources were distributed via experienced *peronista* political brokers. In this textbook, Auyero casts lights on what he considers the epitome of the functioning of the patrimonialist system which is the 'expectation of receiving public goods/benefits' –a fundamental relationship of trust that has replaced the expectations of the citizens of receiving public value via sound bureaucracies and rather turned them onto relying on brokers. In his book, Auyero suggests that the role of political brokers is central in modern Argentina as they enable politicians to collect crucial information about the 'political climate' while also facilitating them to hold their grips on the electorate.

More recent studies have also echoed Auyero's preoccupation for comprehending the mechanism that renders patrimonialism as a persistent and ubiquitous force in organising modern Latin American political life. Sánchez-Carretero and Jiménez-Esquinas (2016), for instance, suggest that intermeshing patrimonialism alongside neo-liberal reforms and New Public Management practices (adopted in many countries of the region) have only reified the role of the patrimonialist connections as a surrogate function of social security networks for poor populations. Where the construction of social security networks tends to be colonised by brokers and it is cemented in 'patrimonialist trust networks', the authors suggest, citizens also start learning how to resort to 'brokers' and to use patronage strategies to advance their claims –ultimately being educated in the arts of resource acquisition and distribution via patronage.

There are several others notable examples of the study of clientelism in the modern Latin America, perhaps being one the most recognised examples the text '*Jobs for the Boys*' of Merilee Grindle (2012). In it, in comprehending the centrality of patrimonialism for the region, and its ubiquitous presence, the author recognises it as the central mechanism for staffing the public service and widely functional to diverse political parties that come into government. In her study, she notices that while the persistence of a patronage system has facilitated a considerable variety of corruption, incompetence, and violence in Latin American

states, she also suggests that it has enabled the accumulation of technical expertise, conjunctural responsiveness, focused organisational performance, and political instability. For the author, it has been long visible that 'patrimonialist practices' have exerted a mixed role in the 'modernisation' of Latin American bureaucracies, yet the question on how they affect bureaucracies was rather empirical than merely normative. In practice, the author suggests that reform implementation in patrimonialist bureaucracies might be facilitated through loyalty mechanisms enforced via patrimonialist appointments, especially in times of crisis, or when civil society pressures incumbents for delivering policies.

Another prized example studying the persistence of patrimonialist strategies in Latin American governments is the book of Virigina Oliveros (2021), '*Patronage at Work*' which studies the persistence of patrimonialist ties between politicians and civil servants even though the author believes there is no obligation of the former to comply with mutual exchange of goods in a patrimonialist arrangement. The author develops an advanced approach to comprehend modern patrimonialism in the region by illustrating the patronage bounds are forged when civil servants and politicians see their career tracks are intermeshed and interdependent. Her research constitutes one of the most advanced understandings of patrimonialist practices in the workplace by casting light to unseen aspects of the diversity of political services that bureaucrats provide to politicians in patrimonialist bureaucracies.

In sum, either in developing countries, more generally, or in Latin America in particular, the persistence, relevance, constant mutations of patrimonialist practices for distributing goods to citizens have been at the stake of the academic research. Scholars have historically focused on studying it as of linked to colonial legacies confirming it as a type of tradition proper of the Latin American region –either as a mechanism facilitating the institution of autocratic rules, or as a form of fostering networks of social support and resource distribution. In any case, the centrality of patrimonialism to understand politics in the region is undeniable. Despite these extensive efforts, a more careful analysis of role of patrimonialist bureaucracies on the production of welfare policies is still pending of scrutiny. While Grindle's '*Jobs for the Boys*', somehow casted light on this dimension, and more recently, Dahlstrom and Lapuente (2017), have pointed out the diversity of (anti) Weberian bureaucracies and their impacts on policy success, *little still is known on how in patrimonialist bureaucracies' effective policy results could be obtained*. This is the puzzle (also mentioned above) that this thesis tries to answer.

1.5. The puzzle: Patrimonialist bureaucracies and their effects on policy success

Modern Weberian bureaucracies have been assumed for a long time to automatically produce policy success. Under this scheme, if functioning correctly, politicians might win elections following their programmatic objectives and shape them by formulating policy programmes (Evans and Rauch 1999). These programmes, in theory, will then be implemented without shirking by diligent public officers who, in identifying themselves with their work, will follow the most efficient and cost/effective form of responding to politicians' pressure to deliver (Bawn 1995; Sager and Rosser 2021). Whether this could work in theory, in reality, in many countries around the world policy success –*meaning the situation where achievement of the goals that its proponents set out to achieve without attracting too much criticism*– is a rare if not unique situation (McConnell 2010). Policy success is even more surprising in bureaucracies which are characterised as traditionally weak, inefficient, colluded, and/or cut through traditional patrimonial practices. **This is precisely the object of this dissertation: to unfold the link between patrimonial bureaucracies and how they are conducive to successful policy implementation.**

While there has been extant research on policy failure, and mounting evidence about the limitation of institutional designs to allocate public goals and promote development (Hudson, Hunter, and Peckham 2019), in current public administration scholarship little is known about how policy success could be obtained in bureaucracies that scape from the ideal Weberian bureaucracy (cemented in Global North administrative traditions). This is to say, as de la Riva Agüero (2022) indicates, that evidence documenting the experience of Global South/developing countries bureaucracies in effectively implementing reforms is still scarce.

Recent scholarship in this regard suggests that some developing democracies could 'effectively deliver'. For instance, Bersch (2016), in her research of Brazil and Argentina, recognises that 'incremental and gradual policy reforms' produce more sound results than 'big bang approaches' as they permit to overcome the radical opposition from diverse stakeholders and hence facilitates building new policies. Like her study, Dahlström and Lapuente (2012), in their book 'Organising Leviathan' suggests that 'good government' might not necessarily be correlated with the presence of traditional *Rechtsstaat* Weberian bureaucracies, but rather this could be a matter of 'flexibility' in the process of hiring and promotion of civil servants who could be incentivised to deliver. Both old and new studies have discussed, although some tangentially, others directly, that policy success could effectively be achieved in bureaucracies other than those deemed highly professional and autonomous.

Typically, the above-mentioned studies suggest that policy goal attainment is indeed achievable through the positive conjunction of three important domains (Marsh and McConnell 2010; McConnell 2010): sound institutional rules and incentives (Dahlström and Lapuente 2012), highly motivated policy actors (especially politicians and bureaucrats) (Gibbs 2020), and the active utilisation of ‘expertise’ and ‘expert knowledge’ to inform policymaking (Boswell 2009). Yet, of course, while these three domains might gracefully coexist in ‘Weberian’ bureaucratic structures –thereby producing positive policy outputs–; in other settings, they diverge in accordance with the ‘bureaucratic ethos’, the particular institutional arrangements, expectations of the policy actors, and political patterns of behaviour they have learnt to follow. In the following, I revise the main ‘connections’ between institutional incentives, motivations and abilities on producing good policy results yet by situating them in the entrenchment of ‘patrimonialist bureaucracies’.

1.5.1. The incentives structured by the quality of civil services and their impact on policy success

The first ‘domain’ affecting policy success is that of institutional incentives, which presumably, might be conducive to the production of better policy outputs. Although there is a variety of scholarship documenting the particular features and the incentives they articulate for bureaucratic actors including politicians (such as broader divisions concerning power differentiations, accountability systems, and the presence of sub-or-supranational organisations such as the EU or federal articulations), this thesis’ first domain, in following Dählstrom and Lapuente (2012) suggestion that ‘incentives are central’ for the obtention of ‘good government’, focuses on the set of behavioural incentives, constraints and opportunities offered by the institutional context of patrimonialist bureaucracies.

In this way, as Besley (2006) and later Pressman (2016) mention, the obtention of sound policies and its positive ‘welfare consequences’, rely on the set of institutional opportunities shaping the behaviour of public functionaries and politicians’ relationships. For Dählstrom and Lapuente (2012) –as for other theorists of public choice themselves (Besley 2006; Williams 2021)– if bureaucracies are more ‘professional’ and exhibit more ‘independence’ from political power in doing policy, they could contribute to construe different types of civil servant profiles making them more or less responsive to implement voted policy mandates (Besley 2006; Pressman 2013). Presumably, the mechanism sustaining bureaucratic effectiveness in this more ‘professional bureaucratic context’ could render public servants –as argued before in section 1.2– to lean towards strongly identifying with their bureaucracies’ organisational objectives and thereby striving for delivering them at the lowest possible cost for taxpayers. In theory, this is feasible because, authors mention (Bach,

Hammerschmid, and Löffler 2020) that bureaucracies are protected from waves of political storms that could affect the implementation of mandated goals. In that sense, bureaucracies that are more *autonomous* –not subject to the will of incumbents in power– might have more wriggle room to deliver.

While this is of course the case for ‘Weberian bureaucracies’, the set of incentives structured in patrimonialist contexts is rather different (Weiss 2018). In those settings, as discussed above –which are the focus of this dissertation– politicians are known for having predominance over their bureaucracies. In short, this means that they have ample power over shifting ‘the rules of game’ for public servants in office who see their careers’ time horizons in the hands of politicians (Oliveros 2016). In this way, because their access, salary and promotion are subject to the quality of political services they might provide to politicians, bureaucrats see their fate to some extent tied to those of the incumbents.

The central idea here is that because bureaucrats, as Oliveros (2016) highlight, owe their posts to politicians and hence they might strive to provide them with a diverse range of political services (e.g. political work, rent extraction, campaigning, hiding administrative mistakes, allocating monies to aides and supporters, among others) rather than delivering policy directly. In the Latin American region, this case is commonplace, although with varied degrees of professionalism that considers some legal criteria for the selection and promotion of public services (Gibbs 2020). While countries in the region have thick regulations concerning the public service (e.g. in Peru only there are 15 labour regimes including those for public servants), the maintenance of the patronage system is still guaranteed by the ‘simple failure to observe laws and regulations’ (Oliveros 2016, 167). This has been achieved across the years, by delaying the implementation of reforms and through the intensive use of temporary contracts.

In practice, while Latin American countries commonly present various types of ‘long term employment contracts’, politicians have found special ways to contravene civil service laws, by appointing aides via ‘short term’ consultancy contracts. In this form, politicians try to avoid the ‘tenure system’ and hence dealing with potentially unresponsive civil servants (Laguna 2011).

To finally illustrate my claim about the centrality of incentives shaping the functioning of the regions’ civil service, it is worth mentioning that in Latin America, according to the IDB there is ample evidence of political hiring and firing of bureaucrats (Iacovello 2015). Oliveros (2021) mentions that Latin American bureaucracies are ‘too politicised’ that it would be empirically spurious to do research about the region without considering the widespread distribution of patrimonialism in their civil services. Perhaps the most notable example of the widespread utilisation of temporary hirings, as Oliveros reports drawing on the IDB (Iacovello

2015) is the Dominican Republic where 70% of hires are made based on political influence; in Peru, Balcázar (2018) sustains that nearly 40% of all public servants are on temporary political contracts; in Panama, only 18% of the civil service force is considered to be officially part of the public force (Iacovello 2015). Other numbers are shocking, especially in bureaucracies thought to be 'well advanced' such as in Brazil, where nearly 41% of all hires in the public sector at the municipal level are thought to be political appointments of mayors winning office (Oliveros 2021). The central history here is that such widespread politicisation of hiring and promotion serve as a central incentive whereby each 'new incumbent' trigger waves of new 'more loyal' hirings. While more public servants are fired, incentives are set for instituting a high turnover rate in each administration. These new hires while more responsive to politicians, significantly damage the stability and perspectives of 'tenured' employees. This fragments the public service thereby creating parallel bureaucracies: one official, with public servants tenured but unresponsive public servants; and a second one, with patronage appointments, only responsive to incumbent in office (Brierley 2021).

Arguably, the incentives articulated by the patronage system shape the preferences of bureaucrats and motivations/intensions of politicians in office. Be their objective to tempt re-election or to move to higher offices (and for bureaucrats to attain job-stability or progress to leading roles), politicians must become familiar with the institutional rules and myths where they are operating (Borchert 2011). In this context, the production of positive welfare outputs, could be linked to be a matter of 'motivations' and 'interests' alignment' between politicians and bureaucrats rather than a normative assumption as presumed by advocates of the Weberian bureaucracy and its direct relationship with policy success.

1.5.2 The reputational motivations of politicians and bureaucrats and their impact on policy success.

Another important aspect informing policy success in public administration scholarship has to do with the role of motivations (Meyer et al. 2014). Political science scholarship typically considers politicians and bureaucrats as having distinctive motivations in their relationship with the production of welfare outputs (Henderson et al. 2007). While politicians are conceived as of being 'self-centred' and ambitious in fostering their careers thereby being, in theory, more focused on gaining electoral advantage and advancing their own agendas; bureaucrats are thought to be more worried in preserving the status quo rather than endeavouring complex policy reforms (Borchert 2011; Askim, Karlsen, and Kolltveit 2020). Consequently, scholars suggest, that the central question on this 'politico-bureaucratic' relationship is one of tension and control (Bach, Hammerschmid, and Löffler 2020). In this theoretical scheme –known also as principal and agent theory–, politicians are

thus endowed with electoral mandates that they will strive to implement via policy, and in doing so, they need to ensure control of their bureaucracies to prevent shirking. In this context, the decision to mingle in carefully drafting regulations and/or in micromanaging the bureaucracy is rather an indication that the politician in question is willing to keep his/her promises (Bawn 1995, 7).

Other scholars rather disagree with the 'principal-agent' framework above exposed (Kappe and Schuster 2021). They rather suggest that politicians only interests are keeping or accumulating offices and are rather less preoccupied in delivering policy (Bawn 1995). They argue that agencies could rather strive to deliver successful policies because this could enhance their reputations of 'efficiency' and 'highly technical' institutions –of course with the final aim of preventing politicians' intervention (Carpenter and Krause 2012). Authors of this theoretical stream hence are of the opinion that the underlying motivation pressuring bureaucracies towards responsiveness is one of 'reputation'. Arguably, an agency whose reputation is under question by being constantly criticised –making negative headlines– is thus more likely to be dismantled, their public functionaries sacked, and/or in the worst cases the entire agency body to be reformed/closed (Verhoest et al. n.d.). Agencies striving for keeping their 'technical' reputations and preventing political intervention are thus advancing their collective interests in a context where public attention and budgets are limited assets (Carpenter and Krause 2012).

In patrimonialist contexts, however, the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats and their diverse motivations to produce successful policies do not belong to separate dimensions (Oliveros 2016). As old and new research has demonstrated, in a patrimonialist context, the fates of politicians and bureaucrats are rather tied. As Oliveros (2021) demonstrates, where politicians have ample leverage over the careers of bureaucrats –either by appointing, promoting, or influencing their working environment– bureaucrats engage voluntarily in 'self-reinforcing' patronage relationships thus acting as politicians' personal staff and providing them with a diversified range of political services. Under these conditions, bureaucratic shirking is less than a preoccupation for politicians since they have the power to hire and dismiss those who are not loyal or want to sabotage the implementation of their preferences (Bawn 1995; Brierley 2020). Notably, in these patrimonialist settings, the principal normative and empirical question is rather one of identifying the 'underlying motivations' that leads politicians and bureaucrats to perform well in such institutional environment –where also citizens have shifted their expectations towards evaluating the quality of those in office rather than 'trusting' in their bureaucratic institutions (Breaugh, Ritz, and Alfes 2018).

Recent empirical studies addressing the ‘motivations’ of policy delivery in Global South settings, have started to claim that there is a more complex picture than existing Global North preoccupations for ‘policy shirking and control’ or ‘agency reputation’ (Brierley 2021). In practice, in developing democracies, politicians reconcile policy delivery and career progression (Brierley 2021). Depending on the circumstances and other pre-established career pathways, politicians effectively reconcile producing welfare outputs with rent extraction from their bureaucracies. Given the leverage that politicians have over their bureaucracies, they have ample wriggle room to implement the policies of their preferences while also constructing their own reputations to either temp higher offices or climb the ladder of their own political parties.

Unlike current theoretical claims, I sustain, in line with Oliveros (2021), that politicians and bureaucrats’ interests are entangled by various mechanisms of self-enforcing discipline or by public servants’ dependency on incumbency. Either way, such co-dependency shifts the theoretical attention towards unfolding what the ‘actual’ motivations of politicians is for delivering rather than only extracting rents or incurring into collusion. As above sustained, in many developing democracies, politicians have ‘the best of the two worlds’ (lack of bureaucratic shirking and extensive control over public servants) to further implement their programmes (Brierley 2021). In these contexts, as Munoz (2014) and later Brierley demonstrate, citizens tend to conceive public institutions as colluded, dependent on the incumbent in office, shifting their scrutiny towards finding ‘sings’ or ‘indications’ –overall information– that could signal politicians’ electoral viability and capacities in office. In other words, citizens start caring for the abilities, experience, tenure, and other related questions of politicians² tempting office, as I explain next.

1.5.3 The abilities of politicians and bureaucrats and their impacts on policy success

A third dimension commonly explored to understand successful policy outputs is that of policymakers’ ‘knowledge’ (Boswell 2009). Current scholarship sustains that role division between politicians and bureaucrats equip them with different types of knowledge according to their position and function in the bureaucracies (Boräng et al. 2018; Boswell 2009). While politicians are more acquainted with the political dimension of policymaking hence considered being more knowledgeable of negotiation, distribution and allocation techniques which overall summarise their political experience; bureaucrats in turn, are thought to be connoisseurs of the administrative cogs and wheels of the state (Aberbach, Putnam, and

² Please note that throughout this dissertation ‘tenure’ has multiple meanings. When it comes to defining politicians, it refers concretely to their acquired experience in office. When it is used for civil servants, I imply that they hold a long-term position and of course that they also have ‘experience’ in the bureaucracy.

Rockman 1981). Drawing on such division, scholars conceive bureaucrats as the actors who are better equipped to transform 'expert knowledge' into effective policy delivery (Boswell 2009). After all, they sustain, managing an increasingly complex modern state requires more from highly specialised bureaucrats in areas that traditional politicians have hardly any control over (Christensen 2021). Some scholars started speaking about 'über-bureaucrats' and/or 'technobureaucrats' in clear reference to a growing public servant profile in the public administration who are more focused on IT and Data Science (Abu-Shanab 2020; Dunleavy et al. 2006). Arguably, in more advanced democracies, the presence of these type of public servants supposes an important opportunity to transform traditional 'paperwork' into digital public services –being them an example of what Evans and Rauch (1999) sustains as bureaucrats and expert knowledge having a direct relationship with the production of better policy outputs.

That public servants better use 'expert knowledge' to substantiate the formulation of policies and/or lead state reforms remains out of question for some scholars. But of course, such 'positive' utilisation of knowledge is linked to the set of motivations, incentives, and independence of policy actors (Dahlström and Lapuente 2012). In most 'Weberian bureaucracies' the division of roles between politicians and bureaucrats facilitate different degree of specialisms, knowledge acquisition and utilisation, meanwhile in patrimonialist bureaucracies the interdependence of politicians and bureaucrats' careers enables them to acquire knowledge to survive an environment marked by the trade of loyalties (Brierley 2020; Roniger 1994). On the one hand, politicians became not only acquainted with the political dynamics and external incentives, but also because they have ample power over the bureaucracy, they learn how to manouvre key administrative processes of the state –most significantly budgeting and personnel hiring regulations, which are central for the establishment of patronage relationships. On the other hand, Dahlström and Lapuente (2012) stress, bureaucrats also acquire specialist political knowledge, learning how to navigate the 'triangles of loyalties' structured by patrimonialist practices (Grindle 2017). They learn the intricacies of loyalties trades which are central to patrimonialist systems; they develop strategies to deal with the system marked by volatile politics and high-end uncertainties; they learn to approach, gain power, and climb the ladder of their 'patrons' trust mechanisms to secure their positions. Bureaucrats hence became knowledgeable in identifying politicians' needs for expert help in office, and hence seek to specialise in these areas, such as: administrative law, state contracts, and budgeting (Nureña 2020).

Accordingly, emerging research and working papers have started to show that the degree of specialisation to extract rents from governments has been substantially growing over the years. In Colombia, Holland and Freeman (2021) suggest that politicians and

bureaucrats have utilised the administrative and regulatory blinds-pots to actively allocate funds to aides via 'contract clientelism'. Contractors hence feel compelled to contribute with political services to the re-election of the incumbent in office. Similarly, de la O (2021) finds out that in Mexico, despite its widespread control of subnational spending, local mayors still find ways to engage with loyalist bureaucrats enabling them to incur into collusion practices.

In sum, the lesson here is that politicians and bureaucrats acquire 'expert knowledge' in managing the state and utilise it in accordance with the set of incentives and motivations of the political system. Whether the conjunction of these three commonly underlying factors of— in a context marked by the predominance of the 'patrimonialist ethos'— produce effective policy outputs remains an empirical question that this thesis has addressed in its chapters below.

1.6. Methodology

In order to respond this thesis central puzzle concerning the study of identifiable patterns towards policy success in patrimonialist bureaucracies, I resort to a pragmatic research approach (Hesse-Biber 2010). The complexity of identifying patrimonialist behaviours and how they lead to policy success requires from the intensive utilisation of both quantitative and qualitative methods.

The pragmatic approach undertaken by this dissertation has also been largely discussed among public administration scholars as 'the best form of comprehending the complexity involved in transformation of mandated electoral voted into policy programmes' (Saetren 2005). As Saetren (2005) signals, the concurrence of stakeholders, politicians, bureaucrats, and their interplay in complex institutional scenarios requires a 'total approach' to make sense of their actions and how conducive they are towards producing 'successful policy outputs'. Drawing on the consideration that a pragmatic approach is needed to respond my research puzzle, I have divided my methodological approach in three subsequential, yet interrelated steps.

First, I develop a comprehensive map of the set of the institutional entrenchment shaping the roles and functions of the actors involved in the policy arena in Latin American countries (Rowan and Meyer 1977). In this step, I develop a thick and narrative approach to comprehend the institutional entrenchment, regulations, and characterisation of the civil services in the region (Sandelowski 1991). The objective is to become familiar with the perils and functioning of bureaucracies in their current praxis. While in previous subsections of this chapter, I have already developed a 'genealogy' of the 'ethos' and 'predominance' (McDonnell 2017) of the patronage forms in Latin American civils services, in this initial step I thus characterise, situate, and identify the dynamics of bureaucrats and politicians in doing

their daily tasks. Evidently, conducting this revision demands the intensive use of 'documentary and archival approaches' (Mogalakwe 2006) which I have organised in the form of time-sequences or timelines permitting me to articulate a story. Of course, in this stage, I pay special attention to official documents, reports, and memos documenting 'patronage' events –hires and fires– although focused on selected civil services of the Latin American region.

A second step, and further to the institutional-legal identification of the incentives and motives of policy actors involved in policymaking process, I proceed by collecting administrative data that could facilitate me to disentangle the central puzzle involving my thesis research question (Mogalakwe 2006). In this second step, I hence 'zoom in' into particular policy domains (education and health) whereby I will attempt to scrutinise the production of 'successful policies'. For the purposes of this thesis and drawing on the particular positionality of the author (me), I have resorted to the education and health sectors as two key areas marked, as above exposed, by the predominance of patrimonialist practices –unlike other types of more 'technocratic' agencies (e.g. Ministry of Finance, Central Banks, etc) (Rose 1997). Another reason underlying the selection of such policy domains is that the author has worked as a high-profile functionary of the Peruvian government at different levels for many years. Said positions that have facilitated him (me) the acquisition of first-hand information in sectors such as education, health and economy and planning. As Rose (1997) suggests, my positionality undoubtedly has cemented my desire for comprehending how policies in the circumstances of my previous environment (as public servant) could be effectively delivered. While bureaucracies, and more concretely, the domains of health and education are the centre this dissertation, my approach to them follows a pragmatic stance to test the theoretical formulations sustaining this dissertation.

As third step, to understand how patrimonialist bureaucracies can effectively deliver, and more specifically to comprehend how politicians and bureaucrats interact in such scenarios, I have constructed specific database for each of my papers (specially those of chapter 3 and 4) where I have intensively collected data concerning politicians' tenure, age, electoral viability, and other important confounding variables that inform my thesis. Access to those datasets can be consulted in the appendixes to the specific chapters. Based on those datasets, I have searched for specific correlations that could inform me about the relationship between politicians', bureaucratic characteristics, and policy success (specifically in the education and health arena chosen for this dissertation). Drawing on the correlations discovered, I have further contacted key actors (local politicians) and high-level civil servants that could illustrate me about the intricacies and hidden dynamics underlying the significant correlations encountered. The list of interviews conducted for the papers composing my

research can also be found in the appendix of the paper's chapters composing this dissertation.

As well, important to mention is that the data collected has been interpreted following an 'abductive' approach (Richardson and Kramer 2006). This means that I have intensively iterated my theoretical approach with the dataset encountered with the objective of best triangulating the information by creating a 'thick' narrative about this thesis puzzle. In doing so, I have drafted and re-drafted my findings even challenging my initial theoretical formulations and/or finding best ways of presenting them to the readership.

1.6.1. Generalisability

While this thesis offers a conceptualisation of patrimonialist bureaucracies and their effects on policy success, the application of the empirical chapters composing this dissertation expands to countries that showcase similar historical traits and patterns of politicians' behaviour and are largely marked by the legal predominance of politicians over the careers of bureaucrats at the regional and local levels (e.g. Latin American countries).

This is possible because, in line with Basedau and Köllner (2007), my thesis more than generating 'global theory' attempts at 'modifying, creating, and specifying' a 'middle-range theory' which is undoubtedly context sensitive (geographically bounded area). Hence, the reader must acknowledge, when extrapolating my findings and theories to other settings, the particular institutional arrangements from which I have conceived my propositions –as unabashedly connected to the political dynamics of Peru and Bolivia and yet belonging to the grander colonial traditions, state trajectories, and bureaucratic dynamics of the Latin American area, more generally.

For this reason, it is advisable for the reader, as in any research endeavour, to navigate the tension between *parochialism* and *generalisability*. as Lijphart (1971) suggests, all theories are context-based and reflect the particular intricacies of the institutional settings, actors, and values where the researcher has developed his investigations; on the other hand, patterns, mechanisms, and common lessons can also travel across different institutional settings (Becker 2012). They could be applied in other 'geographies', by carefully fine-tuning them to the particularities of the new contexts' values and incentives. As Sartori (1991) mentioned: 'in understanding other countries' contexts, we are also understanding ours'. The central lesson here is that my research design aids to disentangle common paths leading to policy implementation in the complex patrimonialist bureaucratic scenarios of Bolivia and Peru and yet could serve as theoretical glasses to observe other similar processes in Latin America.

Arguably, non-comparativists (rigorous econometricians) might find it difficult to extrapolate results without ‘counterfactuals’, or similar types of controls. Yet this is an old-fashioned and largely debated idea, especially in public administration and political science scholarship (please see King, Keohane and Verba 2021), where methodological sophistication also includes the incorporation of comparative and area-studies methodologies (Basedau and Köllner 2014). In fact: when it comes to comparing different political systems, countries can hardly align to the conditions of ‘natural experiments’ to test for the ‘average treatment effect’ of theories under observation (Brady and Collier 2010). Instead, in most cases, scholars tend to resort ‘most different case scenarios’ as intensive, pragmatic, and theory-oriented comparative process to unfold how different contexts lead to similar outcomes. Hence, this dissertation is aligned with the idea of following such intra-regional ‘comparative area study’, with the objective of developing new theoretical claims on how countries where politicians are predominant over bureaucrats (namely patrimonialist ones), under certain conditions, produce welfare outputs. In sum, the account here presented is ‘contextually situated’, ‘middle-ranged’, and area focused on Latin America (Basedau and Köllner 2014; Becker 2012) –with the pretention of situating ‘more global theories concerning bureaucracy and policy success’ to a context marked by ‘powered’, ‘unchecked’, eminently patrimonial and ‘reckless’ politico-administrative relationships.

1.7. Thesis outline

This is a cumulative dissertation, and the thesis is organised as follows. In line with theoretical formulation and puzzle of this thesis suggesting that the conjunction of institutional incentives, policy actors’ motivations and their expert knowledge might configure different patterns of policy success, I have hence divided my thesis in 3 theoretically guided chapters. **Chapter 2**, in this light, provides a detailed overview of the Latin American civil services. It focuses on describing the institutional entrenchments that cements patrimonial relationships while also providing a categorisation of the types of variety of bureaucrats encountered in the region: loyalists, technocrats, careerist, and patronage appointees. The paper sustains that Latin American civil service systems although different in degree of capacities and autonomy, present hybrid configurations situating themselves in a continuum between more ‘professional and meritocratic’ vs ‘more patrimonialist’. The central idea of this chapter is to situate the reader in the institutional context where civil service systems operate by discussing its ‘hybrid configurations’, and how diverse profiles of bureaucrats still coexist under the same roof shaping the Latin American bureaucratic administrative tradition.

Following the identification of the institutional contexts where this thesis takes place, **chapter 3** analyses the ‘motivations’ that politicians might have to deliver policies. In this

paper, by comparatively assessing educational policies in Peruvian and Bolivia, I formulate that the mechanism sustaining policy success in the educational sector in these countries is cemented in politician's distinctive construction of their reputations. While I find out that politicians in both countries strive to deliver quickly, especially small impactful projects to boost and construct their reputations, tenured one are more strategic, often more focused on 'gathering support' from 'technical of experts of government' striving to display a capacity of deliverers and connoisseurs of the bureaucracy.

The third paper, to be found in **chapter 4**, in turn, further zooms in the third condition formulated at the beginning of this chapter: expertise or expert knowledge. In it, I research on how expert knowledge of running government –typically associated with bureaucrats– in patrimonialist contexts can be differently employed to deliver successful policy outputs. The paper suggests that given the predominance of politicians over bureaucrats, in order to extract rents to advance their careers, they learn how to control the administrative processes of the state. However, they also must balance rent extraction with policy delivery because even in patrimonialist bureaucracies, citizens care for policy delivery. In doing so, politicians acquire 'expert knowledge' about the cogs and wheels of the bureaucracy, yet this posits and important methodological limitation to isolate the effects of politicians' experience from the knowledge they possess. This paper utilises an external treatment to overcome this limitation: a programme to fight stunting among Peruvian children that taught politicians about their administrative functions. The results of this paper confirm in part my theoretical claims that indeed 'expertise matters' to policy delivery, but it is moderated by tenure: newcomer politicians tend to deliver less and make more mistakes, while tenured politicians in turn, are strategical at delivering policy outputs, employing their knowledge of the administration strategically also by sabotaging competitors –turning themselves into mercantilist of knowledge utilisation.

Finally, the last **chapter 5** readdresses the research question and central puzzle of this dissertation further discussing its contributions to public administration scholarship. This chapters begins by listing the 'patterns' towards effective policy implementation discovered in this thesis, and further summarises its contributions: (i) the advancement in the comprehension of politicians' career literatures and their impact on policy success, (ii) the formulation of a new theoretical framework for public administration scholarship, to comprehend the role of patronage and policy success, and (iii) the advancement of 'expert knowledge' utilisation by understanding how politicians utilise knowledge to produce outcomes. The chapter concludes offering some reflections on the limitations encountered in doing this thesis.

–Chapter 2–

A Typology of the Latin American Civil Servant: Patronage Appointee, Technocrat, Loyalist or Careerist

This chapter can be accessed in the following link in the Hertie School repository.

Salazar-Morales, D.A., Lauriano, L.A. (2021). A Typology of the Latin American Civil Servant: Patronage Appointee, Technocrat, Loyalist, or Careerist. In: Sullivan, H., Dickinson, H., Henderson, H. (eds) *The Palgrave Handbook of the Public Servant*. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29980-4_71

The abovementioned article covers pages 29 to 49 of this dissertation

–Chapter 3–

The Reputational Basis of Policy Success in Comparative Perspective. Evidence from the Education Sector in Peru and Bolivia

3.1. Introduction

In 2014, Martin Vizcarra, a *novel* subnational governor of Peru, attracted national attention. Despite his inexperience in office, his region obtained the highest score in the National Quality Education Examination (ECE in Spanish) (*America TV*, 2014). Vizcarra claimed that he succeeded because he ‘allocated the necessary resources’ to obtain successful educative results while permanently overseeing the implementation process afterwards (Congress Peru 2015). In 2016, he received the *Magisterial Palms* – the highest distinction awarded by the Peruvian government – for his contributions to ‘education improvement’ in the country. Later, in 2017, a national party invited Vizcarra to join its electoral team, thus jumping from regional to national politics; he has then served as interim Peruvian president until 2020.

In an opposite case, a *three-times re-elected* Bolivian governor, Rubén Costas (2006-2020), chose to oppose the implementation of the Education Law, ‘Avelardo Siñani’. Costas did not only constitutionally challenge the implementation of the educative reform in his region, but also attained administrative control of most educative functions (La Razon 2013). Despite his large control over the educative policy in his region, he mediocly delivered: enrolment rates in his region barely improved in primary grades (+4% since 2000), and virtually did not among secondary students (+1%) (Gob. Santa Cruz 2020).

Thus, the question must be asked, why did an inexperienced politician obtain better policy results than a tenured one? Most importantly, what role did those politicians’ tenure play in their decisions of delivering policies or not? How is their tenure relatable to policy success? The role of politicians in policy delivery, and how they reclaim success when it happens, is an old concern that for a long time has been obscured by the Weberian distinction between politicians, who merely articulate ‘broad and diffuse interests’, and bureaucrats, who ‘implement them’ (Aberbach 1981, 44). Such division has led scholars to ignore the variety of individual characteristics and motivations of politicians when they took office (e.g. motivations, abilities, and, most importantly, tenure) and how these characteristics might be relatable to ‘policy success’. In practice, public

policy and public administration literatures have conferred politicians to the role of ‘actors who use politics to make politics’ (Aberbach 1981, 41) without paying attention to the Global (South) concern about their capacities to manage bureaucracies (Albala 2016; Diez 2013).

Despite theoretical attempts to situate politicians as fundamental part of the policymaking process (e.g. ‘the politics of policymaking’ literature during the 1990s), scholars still regard them as tangential when it comes to evaluating their involvement in producing effective ‘policy outcomes’ (Sharkansky 2002, p.27). This is in part due to their consideration of politicians’ role as conferred only to ‘interest aggregation’ (Stein and Tomassi 2006, 397), ‘constituency building’, and ‘agenda setting’ (Sharkansky 2002; Zittoun 2014 12).

However, cases such as Peru and Bolivia illustrate that politicians’ ‘doing politics’ is not the only aspect which is relevant to policy delivery; indeed, importance is also attached to politicians tenure (or experience) in allocating resources, request resources from the central government, coordinate along with bureaucrats, and oversee the functioning of their government. In practice there is an abundance of literature linking bureaucrats’ tenure and capacities to deliver ‘successful policies’, yet evidence from politicians’ ‘involvement’ in managing the modern state is still scarce (Spiller et al., 2008; Jager, 2019; Peters, 2014). This article aims to fill the abovementioned gap by documenting the effects of politicians’ tenure on policy delivery.

To achieve this I propose, drawing in organisational reputation theory (Carpenter 2010; Carpenter et.al 2012), that politicians would choose to intervene in managing their bureaucracies depending on how this activity aids them to build their political reputations. Thus, newcomer politicians might choose to ‘strategically’ deliver well visible or measurable policies (e.g. educational ones) to build a *vitae* for subsequent electoral times. Conversely, more tenured politicians would shield their already won reputations either by delivering policies shortly before Election Day (if re-election is expected) or by administratively sabotaging their successors (if re-election is not expected). Evidence combining fixed effects panel analysis, fieldwork, and in-depth interviews with regional politicians and higher civil servants (n=20), largely corroborate my theoretical claims –although with country specific differences in each Peru and Bolivia.

The remainder of this article is organised as follows. I provide a theoretical overview of how reputation building might sustain politicians’ motivation for effective policy delivery. In this section, I also propose four testable hypotheses coming from my theoretical revision. The paper then moves on to explaining the research strategy adopted in three steps: case selection,

quantitative stage, and qualitative stage. Then I present my findings, and conclude discussing the theoretical implications of my study.

3.2. Scholarship linking politicians to policy success

'Politicians make policies', whereas 'civil servants administer'; 'politicians make decisions', and 'civil servants implement them' (Aberbach et al., 1981). This sharp distinction between these actors' roles has been predominant for scholars seeking to unravel the degree of politicians participation in the policymaking process. This question has prompted several studies concerned with two type of dynamics: (A) the relationships between politicians and civil servants, and concomitantly, (B) civil servants and the quality of the policy outputs they produce. Yet there are few studies linking politicians to the policy outputs they deliver (C) (Zittoun, 2014, p.3).

Scholarship of types A and B consider that politicians channel electoral preferences into policy plans and goals, while civil servants of various types are called to disentangle them, and select the policy instruments to address these goals, only to implement and manoeuvre them afterwards (Zittoun, 2014; also see Peters, 2014; Stein and Tommasi, 2006). There is a vast amount of research sustaining these claims; indeed, Aberbach et al. (1981), and later Zittoun (2014), group said research in three categories.

A first group of scholars regard politicians as dilettantes to the administrative realm, whose knowledge circumvents only their 'passionate search for power' (Scartascini et al. 2010, 7). In this group, authors consider that politicians' influence over bureaucracy, and/or the politicisation of bureaucrats, has detrimental effects for a 'good government' (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017, 41), and might led to collusion and corruption (Coviello and Gagliarduci 2010). A second group of scholars consider politicians as 'goals setters' and highlight their 'oversight' role in policy delivery because they might exert pressure on the bureaucratic apparatuses to obtain policy success (Zittoun 2014, 44). In this scheme, some scholars propose that politicians' leadership and motivation are crucial when it comes to operating the bureaucratic machinery (Brewer 2000, 260; Kellough et al. 2010, 400). The third group of scholars, in turn, emphasise the 'policy effort' and 'energy' of politicians through which they might influence the bureaucratic equilibrium (Aberbach et al. 1981, 48). In this scheme, politicians seek to negotiate the scope of their influence and functions with bureaucrats, therefore permanently redefining the boundaries of their labour divisions (Hood and Lodge 2006, 31).

Notably, the majority of these studies are mostly cemented in European (Napoleonic and Germanic) and Anglo-American administrative traditions, where bureaucracies have enough capacity and autonomy to deliver sound policies following political decisions (Painter and Peter 2010, 19). However, as Dahlström and Lapuente (2017, 43) state, in Latin America there is neither a clear separation between political and administrative roles, nor a 'closed' well developed Weberian bureaucracy. The LA region instead is known by its tradition of patrimonial appointments, personal loyalties, and its generalised use of public resources as 'politicians' private property' (Dussauge-Laguna 2011). This has been confirmed by various studies showing that LA politicians opt for patrimonial strategies and short-term calculations as means of exerting control over their countries' bureaucracies, ultimately ensuring their own political survival (Flom 2020; Salazar-Morales et.al. 2020). Notably, politicians in LA have fewer incentives to build strong meritocratic and autonomic bureaucracies. It is therefore no surprise that institutional mistrust in the region, and in our cases in particular, Peru and Bolivia, has reached 72% and 87% respectively, leaving little or no chance neither for bureaucratic reputation building nor capacity construction (Latinobarometro 2018, 55).

In this context, the case for studying the determinants of policy success (type C) under the LA administrative tradition should take into consideration that bureaucracies operate as extensions of politicians in office. Thus citizens tend to place important weight on the capabilities of politicians as 'managers' (Flom, 2020: 640), meaning that politicians' 'experience and expertise' which can be 'brought' to government has become a subject of concern in electoral times as indicators of their ability to successfully deliver (Dargent et.al. 2018). Ultimately, said situation has provoked innovative attempts to bring together political roles and bureaucratic expertise leading the emergence of various types of hybrids (technocrats, technopoles, or *tecnicos*) who resort to their 'expert knowledge' in running government as their principal asset for their political activity (Dargent, 2015; Lundin et al., 2014). But also, in other cases, politicians have built a network of support of 'saleable' technocrats akin to their ideological orientations, so they can showcase 'readiness for office' (Salazar-Morales et.al., 2020).

3.3. Theory: The reputational dynamics of policy success

Considering the abovementioned premises and drawing on Carpenter et.al. (2011), I propose that reputation building underlie politicians' decisions to effectively deliver policies. Reputation refers to the compound of beliefs about a politician's 'mission, capabilities, and history' in the political and bureaucratic arena. It refers to a generalised perception of a politician's ability to 'create solutions' and provide 'moral support' that 'no one else in the polity can provide'. To build reputations, politicians then resort to various 'audiences' (individual or collective) who, through their judgement, might help them construe an 'image' of 'status' and 'legitimacy' around their government. These audiences can bestow politicians with 'power' and 'authority' by assigning them 'technical expertise' and 'competence' to ease their work; or alternatively, audiences can deflate politicians' credibility by casting doubts on their capacities, and by repelling supporters with technical skills and experience from their government, ultimately complicating their work (Carpenter 2010, 33-34).

In contexts of bureaucratic weakness, and generalised mistrust, a good reputation is therefore valuable asset. It permits a politician to negotiate with different audiences (Wæraas et al., 2015), analyse the costs of his/her actions (or inactions), present as 'technically irreversible' some of his/her decisions, 'attract talented technocrats' to government (Dargent, 2015), and engage in contingent actions (Carpenter et al., 2012, 27-29). Arguably, politicians actively seek to construct –or preserve –a reputation not only for advancing their political careers, but also for ensuring their political survival, by being active providers of policy alternatives, which only 'they are capable of implementing' (Carpenter et.al. 2012).

Drawing on this framework, Table 3.1 summarises the different tracks in which politicians seek to build and/or preserve their reputations and how they are relatable to successful 'policy delivery'—understood as 'the effective attainment of promised policy goals, while attracting no significant criticism'¹ (see McConnell 2010, 351)—. Table 3.1 first axis, based on existing literature about 'politicians' careers' (see Carreras 2012), considers that politicians can be either *outsiders*, when they attain no previous political experience as candidates or in elected positions; or *insiders*, if otherwise. As well in line with Carreras (2012), regarding the differing incentives politicians

¹ As per McConnell (2010) policy success in practice, and intuitively, is difficult to attain. For this reason, the author suggests it is more related to success in degree so long two elements are conflated: one is the more rational dimension suggesting that a 'policy is successful insofar it achieves the goals it set out to achieve', and a secondly, given that 'success' has political connotation, the idea is that 'success' is perceived in this way or either attract less political attention leading for a more-or-less universal support.

face, I consider politicians respond differently to building their reputations either as candidates or *in office*.

The proposed mechanism underlying Table 3.1 is that politicians, by instrumentalising their tenure, would opt for delivering certain policies so they build/preserve their reputations –with differing political gains– depending upon the incentives of their circumstances (elections or in office). From this premise, four scenarios, with an equal number of testable hypotheses, can be inferred.

Table 3.1. Relationship between reputation building and policy success based on politicians' tenure and position

	In office	Elections
Non-tenured (outsiders)	H1: Novel elected politicians seek to build a good reputation by actively delivering policies.	H2: Novel politicians resort to 'appointed or extra political experiences' for building their reputations.
Tenured (insiders)	H3: Risky behaviour is to be avoided; instead, politicians seek to preserve already gained reputations, compromising policy delivery.	H4: Tenured politicians actively resort to past 'successful experiences' as <i>vitae</i> for office.

A first group of hypotheses engages with old debates between Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) claiming that shorter terms in office incentivise politicians' hard work, while contradicting Dal Bo and Rossi's (2011) argument that longer terms in office are relatable to better policy outputs. Concretely, H1 posits that *outsiders* in office, because of their relative short *vitae* to promote, would actively seek to accumulate successful experiences with significant and positive impacts for policy delivery. On the contrary, H3 suggests that politicians serving longer terms might be more experienced, but given that policy implementation supposes a risky bet, they would rarely embark on complex policy delivery enterprises. In turn, a more conservative attitude seeking to preserve their already gained reputations is expected.

The second group of hypotheses addresses politicians' reputation construction and its utilisation in electoral times. Current research contends that voters' attempts to select competent politicians incentivise reputation building (Schwabe 2010). Thus, in electoral times, politicians might instrumentalise their 'tenure' by speaking to multiple audiences through informational shortcuts about their potential 'efficiency' and 'integrity' (Carpenter et.al. 2012). For this paper, H2 expects novel politicians to rely on extra-political and/or previous appointed experiences to showcase their fit for office. Existing research has largely documented the informational strategies

politicians employ to create expectations about their candidacies, either as technical deliverers (by congregating ‘experts’) (Dargent 2015), and/or by signalling their electoral viability (Munoz, 2014). H4, in turn, expects politicians to intensively employ ‘policy successes’ achieved during their office time as *vitae*— even more in policy areas that count with strong statistical capacities – or are visible and tangible e.g. education or infrastructure (Dargent et.al 2018).

3.4. Research strategy

Drawing on the tradition of mix methods (MM) research, I resort to a pragmatic and sequential (QUAN-QUAL) strategy that integrates fixed effects panel data analysis (N=587) and in-depth interviews (N=20) with regional politicians, as well as other important high policy officers involved in the provision of educative services in both countries. I have employed a sequential strategy because both the interviews conducted, and the data collected, have interacted during my fieldwork between June and September of 2018 (Johnson et al. 2007). While panel data analysis reveals the associations between politicians’ tenure and educative policy outcomes in their area, the interviews, explain the rationalities and strategies corroborating (or revealing) unseen tendencies potentially hidden in the fixed effects, or the regressive noise of my panel analysis (Johnson et al., 2007, p.112; Yin, 2006). In the following, I explain in detail my research design.

3.5. Case selection

Case selection criteria responds to the *most-different with similar outcomes (MSDO)* design which makes it possible to test for common variables/hypotheses in systems that differ the most from each other (de Meur and Berg-Schlosser 1994). Accordingly, Peru and Bolivia present marked differences in terms of regime characteristics, decentralisation incentives and party dynamics, yet share commonalities concerning how educative policy is measured, and the roles of regional politicians in administering it (MIPLAN, 2009). These elements make these countries suitable cases for comparative scrutiny.

Table 3.2 further clarifies the cases similarities and differences. It shows that in both countries regional governors can legally allocate funding on educative infrastructure, materials, and appoint regional educative authorities (DRE Piura 2014; MEB2016). Similarly, in both

countries, the central government has set leading indicators that are annually released, and generally accepted –by contenders and advocates, including social organisations– as reliable sources of measuring policy attainment (MEB 2016; UMC 2020). An exception is that Bolivian authorities have rejected measuring students’ performance based on standardised evaluations, because of students persistent low scores (de la Vega 2013).

In relation to the countries’ differences, Table 3.2 reports that despite both countries underwent decentralisation processes almost simultaneously in the early 2000s; regional politicians experience differing system incentives. Observers contend that while in Bolivia, decentralisation has pressured regional governors to be more responsive and oriented towards social spending (Faguet, 2000); in Peru, politicians have engaged in rent-seeking behaviour and corruption, consequently exhibiting a greater distance and disconnection from their electoral circumscriptions (Dargent et.al. 2016).

Those differences, some authors contend, might also respond to differing societal and party dynamics. In Bolivia, scholars argue that society’s ideological and territorial cleavages underlie the consolidation of a relatively stable party system with nationwide party identities (Vergara 2011). Moreover, societal organisations in Bolivia actively invigilate local and national politicians hence pressuring them to be more responsive (Faguet 2000). Conversely, in Peru, the virtual absence of political and ideological confrontation has pressured regional politicians to care more for their own political gains. In practice, scholars mention that party dynamics in the country are predominantly ‘candidate-centred’, and national parties are unable to neither win spots in regions nor overseeing regional incumbents’ compliance (Levitsky and Cameron 2009). Yet, recently, observers have started to point out that Peru is experiencing a gradual party consolidation process coming from the *fujimorista* party, *Fuerza Popular* (Melendez 2014, 188).

Finally, another aspect considered for case selection is the countries’ institutional context. Current literature has characterised both countries as institutional unstable, with some important particularities leading to continuity and/or change depending on each country own party dynamics and territorial divisions. For instance, despite its fragmented party dynamics, Peru’s democratic regime is considered ‘surprisingly’ continuous because it has avoided major constitutional changes, and divisive ideological debates (Vergara et.al 2016). Differently, Bolivia, in part because of its large ideological and territorial cleavages, has experienced deep politicisation and conflict, involving referendums (2006, 2008, and 2009), large voting polls (2004) and

constitutional reforms (between 2007 and 2009) (Vergara 2011, 81), leading the country to a recent regime change in 2019.

Table 3.2: Comparable categories considered for case selection

Category	Peru	Bolivia
Education administration	Governors manage, allocate funding, and appoint regional education directors	Governors manage and allocate funding (with emphasis on infrastructure, and educative materials).
Policy attainment measurement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Standardised tests inform about learning outcomes Students enrolment and completion rates 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Students enrolment and completion rates
Decentralisation incentives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Created electoral incentives for rent-seeking behaviour 25 “governors” elected by popular vote 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased party responsiveness and improved social spending 9 “governors” elected by popular vote
Party dynamics	Generally fragmented party system without subnational articulation	Party system with some degree of subnational interest articulation
Democratic regime	Polarised with institutional instability, but regime “persistence”	Polarised with institutional instability, but regime “change”

In sum, both Peru and Bolivia are comparable cases in terms of educative bureaucratic structure and the roles that regional governors have in administering it. Besides, both countries measure similar indicators in relation to education attainment. But most importantly, their party system structure, and regime characteristics, provide room for *variance* and *nuance* for testing my hypotheses. In the following, I present my research strategy and how I control for the comparable elements of my cases, with the final aim of responding how regional politicians relate to successful educative policy delivery while building their reputations.

3.5.1. Quantitative stage

To test this paper’s hypotheses, I employ a fixed effects panel data analysis to assess each country’s educative policy outcome by region; the analysis is based on official sources between 2002 and 2018 (for Bolivia between 2010 and 2018), as follows:

$$PolicyOut_{j,i,t} = \alpha + PolicyOut_{j,i,t-1} + \beta_1 PolExp_{j,i,t-1} + \beta_2 X'_{j,i,t-1} + \theta + \varepsilon_{j,i,t}$$

The first key dependent variable (*PolicyOut*) is the set of leading educative indicators measured both in Peru and Bolivia as part of their National Education Plans. They are the general, primary and secondary enrolment rates, and the students' performance in the ECE. These indicators are relevant because of their widespread acceptance and recognition along the media and regional governors. A similar procedure has been applied to Bolivia, except for the students' 'performance' indicator (which the country does not report) (see Table 3.2). These variables measure the yearly policy attainment obtained per region.

To test whether tenure influences policy outcomes, I have constructed a novel dataset. The variable of concern, *PolExp*, codes the years of experience in public office as declared by the candidates in their vitae. In both countries, the National Jury of Election (Peru) and the Plurinational Electoral Organism (Bolivia) collect information concerning candidates' prior office experience. The variable codes the total number of years of experience which a regional governor in both countries has accumulated during his/her political career (in municipal, regional, and/or local positions).

Furthermore, X' is a vector containing regional level variables to isolate the effect of tenure. Accordingly, I consider confounding variables those likely to correlate with the eventual 'policy success' in a region. Following concerns that the political context might impact the delivery of policy (May et al. 2007), I construct a variable of political polarisation based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman (HEE) index. It measures the party concentration relative to the number of seats in a region's parliament (in Bolivia) or council (in Peru). For interpretation purposes, I consider the inverse HEE index (1-HEE) as the variable of our model, which means that the closer to 1, the higher the polarisation. Moreover, I expect said variable to control the differing ranges of party conflict dynamics embedded in Peru and Bolivia. Presumably, less political polarisation in a given region might help a governor to pass legislation (and increase the budget), thus leading to policy success. Linked to this concern, various studies highlight the role of budget availability in ensuring better educative outcomes in developing countries (see Heckman et al. 2018). Therefore, I also include in my model the GDP invested in education per region as a percentage of their regional budget. This measure works as a 'revealed preference' of governors to obtain educative outcomes. A substantial budget allocated to the education sector would reveal interest in the area.

In addition, drawing on research arguing that pre-existing school conditions shape policy success (Beltran and Seinfeld 2013; Reiling 2016), I consider the ration of students per teacher as a control of structural quality of educative service in the regions. Education scholars have

pointed out that, in LA, this indicator operates as a measure of educative attainment, and even school enrolment (see Beltran and Seinfeld 2013).

Moreover, I have included the lagged versions ($t-1$) of explanatory variables because of concerns about reverse causality. I also have other reasons to lag variables; for instance, I expect that the previous year's educative outcomes, due to structural and incremental patterns, would be positively correlated with the following year. Similarly, I also expect occurrences related to budgetary allocation and political decisions (polarisation in our case) which usually affect policy choices made for implementation in the forthcoming years (Guragain and Lim 2019). Therefore, it is vital to lag said occurrences. Finally, in my model, the variable θ is a fixed effect per region, while $\varepsilon_{j,i,t}$ is the error term.

In total, the dataset is composed of $N=587$ observations divided into 425 for Peru and 162 for Bolivia. For Bolivia, difficulties in accessing data from governmental sources means an unbalanced panel. To overcome this limitation, I use the *Alicia* software (King et al., 2001). It employs the Multiple Imputation by Chained Equations (MICE) to input values into missing cells by considering them as dependent variables and regressing them based on all other observables (Azur et al., 2015). Moreover, in doing so I opt for the Expectation-Maximisation (EM) algorithm because it not only inputs values but resamples the entire dataset through an iterative simulation beneficial for small samples. These outcomes are later employed in a balanced fixed effects regression (King et al. 2001, 56). Table 3.3 presents a close overview of the data employed.

Table 3.3. Data summary

Outcome variables	Peru				Bolivia²			
	Min	Max	Mean	Std.dev	Min	Max	Mean	Std.dev
Enrolment (total %)	43.75	99.45	84.77	8.23	70.8	96.27	83.44	6.53
Enrolment (primary %)	79.9	100	93.49	3.18	70.63	98.3	88.73	6.96
Enrolment (secondary %)	44.7	98.9	77.18	11.59	64.4	94.25	80.18	7.42
Performance (score)	421	684	533.30	48.66	-	-	-	-
Independent								
Political experience (tenure in years in office)	0	43	13.11	9.75	0	30	9.4	6.85
Polarisation (1-HEE)	.60	.89	.80	.061	.27	.59	.40	.07
Regional GDP invested in education (%)	1.2	19	5.32	3.1	.266	.59	4.05	.07
Ratio alumni/ teachers (total)	7	25.5	15.6	3.85	.2	35.15	14.33	9.14
(Primary)	8	32	17.96	5.22	.2	28.2	12.87	7.94
(Secondary)	6	23	13.22	2.95	.2	49.4	15.79	11.3

Sources: Peru: Ministry of Education of Peru (SICRECE), National Jury of Elections of Peru, Ministry of Finance of Peru; Bolivia: Ministry of Education of Bolivia, Plurinational Electoral Organism of Bolivia, National Statistics Institute of Bolivia

3.5.2. Qualitative stage

Results obtained from the panel analysis have later been corroborated through in-depth interviews with regional governors, electoral candidates and high policy officers interacting with them. These interviews have been carried out during fieldwork between June and September 2018 in Peru. Interviews with Bolivian actors in turn have been conducted via telephone. In total, N=20 actors have agreed to be interviewed. Data coming from this process has been recorded,

² Prior MICE-EM resampling.

translated, and analysed following an abductive logic. Abduction means the identification of 'meanings and interpretations, motives and intentions' of the actors interviewed (Dubois and Gadde 2002). The aim of this subsection is to complement the quantitative findings by casting light on how politicians, candidates and policymakers see their roles from the 'inside', how they 'consider' they relate to successful policies and, concomitantly, how they think they build reputations from 'successful experiences'.

The results from both the quantitative and qualitative sections have been analysed following the mixed method paradigm.

3.6. Results

3.6.1. Quantitative findings

Table 3.4 shows the fixed effects results both for Peru and Bolivia where, in most of the models, the interest variable correlates negatively with policy outcomes in these two countries (model 1, model 2, model 4, model 5 and model 7). This result confirms my first group of hypotheses (H1 and H3) contending that tenured politicians are associated with worse performance, meaning an inefficient delivery of educative policies in their regions. Conversely, less tenured politicians associate with better educative results.

These effects also vary per model and country. On average, general impacts on alumni enrolment at the total and primary levels are approximately .097 (in model 1) and .092³ (model 2) percentage points less per additional year which a politician stays in office (all other variables controlled). There are also important impacts in relation to educative performance, where one year more tenure relates to .87 less points in standardised performance tests.

Notably, the impacts of tenure in Bolivia are even larger. As model 5 and model 7 show, all things equal, a politician who stays one year more in office would negatively impact total students' enrolment by 1.14 percentage points, and specifically secondary enrolment by 2.35 points.

³ Please note that these are natural logged values, and thus coefficients in Table 3.4 are the expected change in outcome variables multiplied by $e=2.72$.

Table 3.4. Fixed effects models estimation

Peru					Bolivia (MICE-EM)		
Variables	Enrolment (total)	Enrolment (primary)	Enrolment (secondary)	Performance	Enrolment (total)	Enrolment (primary)	Enrolment (secondary)
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Dep-1	.54** (.074)	-1.3** (.06)	.84** (.18)	.84** (0.52)	.52** (.088)	.71** (.04)	.61** (.046)
Log of Tenure (lag)	-.036** (.016)	-.037** (.017)	.002 (.0006)	-.32** (.15)	-.42** (.12)	-.06 (.23)	-.866** (.24)
Polarisation (lag)	2.37 (3.47)	-3.8 (4.06)	.78 (1.59)	-.78 (37.84)	.60 (1.51)	-.14 (1.5)	2.05 (2.25)
Log of the Monies invested in public education as percentage of the GDP (lag)	3.31** (1.5)	1.25 (1.15)	-1.82** (.44)	21.43** (8.8)	-.44 (.55)	-1.03 (.61)	-.031 (.98)
Ratio of professor per alumni(lag)	-11.62** (1.6)	-.188 (.047)	-1.99 (2.7)	-65.59** (14.24)	.194 (.122)	.012 (.077)	.134 (.15)
Constant	62** (0.0)	110.89** (7.48)	8.91** (4.7)	228.0** (64)	42.54** (7.87)	28.27** (3.9)	33.1** (5.33)
R-square (within)	.54**	.11**	.65**	.8**	.36**	.5**	.47**
Observations	360	360	336	200	153	153	153

Furthermore, drawing on my theoretical framework summarised in Table 3.1 (Carreras 2012), I separately analyse effects size of politicians' tenure on educative policy attainment. Accordingly, I have divided politicians in *outsiders* (those with one – or less than – one period in office) and *insiders* (those presenting more than one period) in office. Office periods in Peru and Bolivia are restricted to 4 and 5 years, respectively.

Results in Table 3.5 demonstrate that 'insider' politicians tend to perform worse at delivering effective educative results than less tenured 'outsiders' in both countries. All other variables controlled, 'insiders' in Peru would deliver around 1% less both in general education and secondary education enrolment rates, and almost 5.14 score points less in ECE performance tests. In Bolivia, effects are even larger, *insider* politicians (compared to outsiders) show negative

impacts on the general educative enrolment rates (-1.42%), as well as on secondary education enrolment (-2.89%).

Table 3.5. Tenure dummies, fixed effects estimation

Dummy	Peru				Bolivia (MICE-EM)		
	Enrolment (total)	Enrolment (primary)	Enrolment (secondary)	Performance	Enrolment (total)	Enrolment (primary)	Enrolment (secondary)
	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14
Tenure							
Outsiders	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Insiders	-0.812** (.40)	-0.54 (.35)	-1.01* (.56)	-5.145** (2.98)	-1.47** (.56)	.307 (.64)	-2.89** (.73)
Constant	96.07** (10.14)	116.48** (8.12)	95.53** (11.87)	318.23** (70.5)	67.45** (12.84)	87.8** (13.09)	59.02** (11.32)
Observation	199	360	360	199	153	153	153

There are other important results. Despite the theoretical relevance granted to regional politics, and the role of negotiations within departmental assemblies (in Bolivia) and councils (in Peru), they do not exhibit a significant effect on policy attainment. Presumably, this might be a response to large understandings and agreements in relation to the promotion of educative policies in these two countries, in contrast with more polemic ones e.g. extractive policies (see Dargent 2011). Such situation might also leave ample wriggle room for politicians' initiative and 'policy effort'.

Another variable with important results concerns the regional monies invested in the education sector. As explained, regional governors can use their budget to leverage the policies of their preferences – or where they see most electoral returns in terms of 'reputation building'; in other words, the better they deliver, the more reputed they become, and so they can attempt re-election or seek another office. However, the results regarding these variables are disputed. In the case of Peru, while monies invested in education are associated with positive returns in the overall enrolment figures (model 1) and learning performance (model 4), said results are contested at the secondary enrolment level where returns seem negative (model 3). This might be a response to the fact that the central government has started a large infrastructure project for secondary education in partnership with regional counterparts, which might take time to unfold (Correo 2019), and thus it might be distorting – temporarily – the effects of investment and enrolment. In the case of Bolivia, in turn, I found no significative associations.

Another important indicator is the ration of teachers per alumni, also known as class size, which has been largely researched as a key factor for school achievement. The logic is that a larger class size would be associated with poorer student achievements (Reiling 2016). The models explored confirm this trend in Peru, most notably in model 1 and model 4 where: the larger a class, the fewer enrolled students (approximately 11.62% less in the overall period) – also meaning almost 66 points less in standardised tests. Yet the same effect could not be confirmed in Bolivia. Finally, all models show that, in every case, policy outcomes follow an incremental pattern expressed in lagged versions of their coefficients (t-1).

Robustness

To test the strength of the models presented, I perform a two-step assessment process. First, I conduct an Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test (Cheung and Lai 1998) for all variables to analyse potential random walks in my data. The null hypothesis is that the panels contain a unit root, while the alternative is that they are stationary. The results Table A-1 (see this chapter appendix) indicate that, in all cases, no variables present 'random walks' and thus are suited for further analysis.

Secondly, and most important, I conduct a complementary analysis by resorting to the One-Step (System) Generalised Methods Moments (GMM), as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and later by Blundell and Bond (1998) (*xtabond2* in Stata). This estimation method aids me in obtaining more efficient estimators in relatively small samples. It also helps me overcoming endogeneity issues derived from the usage of lagged variables in panel datasets, thus preventing my models from containing downward bias (Roodman 2009, 87). Moreover, GMM also employs instruments for specification under the condition that they must be strictly exogenous to the error term (Bellamare et al. 2017, 950). To ensure this condition, I test for residuals correlated at the second order –AR (2)–. This is important because, as clarified in the research strategy, I expect some of the variables to have an incremental effect on my outcomes. Finally, I test for my instruments' autocorrelation (the lagged versions of my independent variables) through the Sargan-Hansen (Hansen-J) test under the null hypothesis that they are exogenous.

The results in Table A-2 in the appendix of this chapter show that neither the models' residuals nor their instruments are serially correlated with the error term, meaning that our GMM specification and the instruments it uses are robust. But most importantly, Table A-2, as predicted, suggests a better fit between the interest variable and educative policy outcomes. In all cases, *there is a significant association between longer tenures and poorer policy results.*

3.6.2. Qualitative findings

3.6.2.1 Reputation building and policy delivery

Results obtained from fieldwork and interviews further confirm the outcomes from the statistical section and reveal how reputation building dynamics underlie successful policy delivery. Table 3.6 comparatively summarises my qualitative findings in both countries in line with this paper theoretical framework. Main findings are noted as *R#* per quadrant.

Table 3.6. Summary of qualitative findings of Peru and Bolivia

	In office	Elections
Non-tenured (outsiders)	In both countries, politicians seek to deliver policies effectively to avoid the ‘ <i>exhaustion</i> ’ effect (R.1)	Politicians either use extra political or appointed experience (Peru) to build reputations, and/or seek endorsement from social movements/national parties (Bolivia) (R.2)
Tenured (insiders)	In both countries, politicians strategically chose to deliver policies depending upon their time in office, and re-election potential. (R.3)	In both countries, politicians consider previous “successful” experiences important but “insufficient” for leveraging their reputations for electoral purposes. (R.4)

R.1 informs that *outsiders* ensure better (educative) policies to avoid being overcome by the expectations they created during electoral campaigns. My findings show that in both countries, new incumbents’ in office experience a surge in support immediate after their election. This represents, for less tenured politicians, an opportunity to create an image of policy ‘deliverers’, with the final aim of avoiding partisans and supporters’ ‘disenchantment’. Respondents in Bolivia, for instance, point out that they (politicians) seek to deliver ‘strategically’ to couple with higher pressures and demands from the population:

‘... When you are new ...the level of *exhaustion* and *satisfaction* is a matter of time. The possibilities of making decisions in a secure way are reduced over time.... People want to see things done. This is the point, as time goes and you do not do, your popularity reduces, and your image deteriorates, then conflicts arise...’ (Int. 4).

In Peru, in turn, *outsiders* resort to policy delivery by considering political calculations. On the one hand, they create an image of ineffectiveness around their predecessors; on the other,

they simultaneously capitalise predecessors' existing projects or policies. In the words of a former regional governor (regarding his first term):

'...I received the office in disaster. We found questionable processes in personnel hiring, projects observed by the ministry [of finance], and cooperation projects observed, and poorly managed finances. So, the first thing I do is an audit, and then I select the viable [projects] and those which are urgent for the people [his constituents]. *I tell my [...the managers] to prioritise them*' (Int. 12).

Most of my interviewees consider said behaviour commonplace. Outsiders in office portray predecessors as 'inefficient' by exploiting their administrative mistakes. Said process usually serves them as 'protective shield' (Carpenter et.al. 2012, 26) against their own early mistakes in office, while cultivating 'an image of efficiency' (Int.12) –of course in case they attain successful (educative) policy delivery.

Arguably, under these circumstances newcomer politicians would make the effort to show concrete, successfully implemented policies (most notably small, but impactful ones) to avoid people's 'exhaustion' effect. But what would more tenured politicians do?

Unsurprisingly, R.3 shows that *insiders*, following reputational dynamics, opt for policy delivery close to electoral periods, looking to construct a credible image of 'efficiency'. In doing so, they speak to various audiences (core voters, disaffected supporters, enemies, etc) by making careful use of their administrative advantage (e.g. being in office) and tenure in the political arena (Carpenter et.al. 2012). For instance, a former Peruvian candidate, interviewed regarding *insider* politicians, stresses:

'I lost because ... you know who is running [for office] and so as he goes for re-election... he will do all the works he has not done before. [Luis] Castañeda inaugurated public parks, gardens, and his last year he created a scholarship for young voters. He presented all this as results. That is a problem...do not you think? ...Because if he does not re-elect, the new one will not show any result quickly, because all works have been inaugurated by him' (Int.14).

High policy officers of the MED Peru also second my interviewees' statements. They notice that 'tenured' regional governors capitalise public works by engaging with other local authorities. One top officer argues: 'it's remarkable that they wait until the last minute to *execute their budget* for educative materials' transport to schools...and when they do, they politically profit from it: they ...take pictures, call the media, they form a reception group [*a comitiva*] of representatives of various organisations to hand in materials' (Int. 5).

Complementary to my findings in Peru, interviewees from Bolivia highlight that when politicians know that they will not be re-elected, they usually ‘...embezzle the monies of the regional government’ or, in any case, he continues, ‘they tie everything to silly projects so we have no budget for one or two years’ (Int. 11). Politicians aim is to hinder successors’ possibilities of constructing an image of ‘efficiency’, while creating conditions for a second chance to fight back their reputations of ‘experienced deliverers’ with certain audiences (the media or hard core supporters) in the political arena. Important to mention is that this finding coincides with previous scholarship documenting politicians’ policy sabotage (including freezing wages, massive personnel redundancies, and administrative gridlocks) when they lose office (Lazar 2004, 230).

3.6.2.2. Reputation building and elections

Another important aspect which this paper researches is the relationship between reputation and its usage during electoral times. Following the second group of hypotheses formulated in Table 3.1 (H2 and H4), results confirm only in part my expectations. In practice, I have found that while politicians commonly resort to ‘previous policy experiences’, they also use it differently due to the nature of each country’s party system.

For instance, R.2 informs about a complex political dynamic in which Bolivian *outsider* politicians partially build reputations by political endorsements (*aval político*) from national party leaders, and regional societal organisations. One of my interviewees argues ‘...the first thing we do is to connect with the social movement (*las bases*); they are the spine. We must talk with them; it is a negotiation, and each sector wants to solve their problems. [Education organisations], for instance, demand not to touch the *escalafón*⁴, their autonomy, but also we must work with them’ (Int. 18). Notably, associations with social organisations help the newcomer politician to politically connect with central government agendas, especially in rural areas where most indigenous young people live (see Pape 2009). For less tenured politicians, establishing links with national party leaders is important, because they might secure funding in case they win office. An example of said dynamic comes from a public ceremony– during the inauguration of a local school in Sacaba, Cochabamba, where a politician argued: ‘We built this school with the resources of the UPRE⁵, [But most importantly] ... this would not be possible without the help of

⁴ Teachers’ scale that determines their payment, access, and progression in their careers.

⁵ Special Projects Unit (UPRE): a unit inside the Ministry of the Presidency of Bolivia that allocates funding to regional and local governments for special projects in education and health.

leaders (*dirigentes*) of *Labra*, but neither with the support of Alvaro Garcia Linera [Bolivian Vice-President and MAS national leader], Because of their collaboration, we can now attend at full capacity for our children' (Gestion y Gobierno 2018). Garcia Linera personally attended to a public ceremony where a school was hand in to Sacaba citizens in 2018, Cochabamba is one of regions with strong officialism support (52%) (El Deber 2019).

Different from Bolivia, R.2 evidences that in Peru, in part due to its fragmented party system, newcomer politicians build their reputations by actively resorting to extra-political (or appointed) experience. For instance, a former candidate interviewed mentions: '...the Peruvian elector is oral and in politics you must show your work. I have worked in the very visible [Ministry of Transport]; the other candidates have nothing to show (Int. 17)'. This candidate largely associates his image with his 'policy success' during his time as minister of government. He mentions that, as he '...concluded an entire train line in 18 months, thus he would solve many other problems, including education infrastructure issues'. During campaign time, then, he instrumentalised his experience to make the elector sure he is 'capable' of obtaining policy success. He points out that:

'I have elaborated with my team a strategy to showcase my experience, with the slogan 'full machine' ('*a todo tren!*'). My slogan rapidly struck a chord with people, and even the polls suggested that if the campaign lasted one week more I would have won' (Int. 17).

While less tenured politicians face differing incentives to build reputations from each country party system, R.4. documents both commonalities and differences between Peru and Bolivia. Common features are that in both countries, insider politicians consider that 'demonstrable achievements' seem to operate as a reputational shortcut for the electorate, because they have 'informational value' (Munoz 2014) for a network of multiple audiences. Accordingly, those 'policy successes' inform about politicians' electoral viability hence dissipating doubts –or construing beliefs– about their technical capacities, 'maturity', 'knowledge', and 'managerial abilities' (Int. 15). Hence, for politicians, strengthening their reputation involves 'generating the sensation [for the public] that you know what you are doing' (Int. 15).

But also tenured politicians (*insiders*) consider that showcasing previous 'office successes' is 'insufficient for re-election purposes' (Int.19), so they resort to alternative strategies which vary depending upon each country party system. For instance, my Bolivian respondents consider key their *embeddedness* in multiple audiences. They highlight the need to cultivate a 'mutually beneficial' association with 'national leaders', 'social organisations', and/or 'people who

are in the daily struggle, such as the presidents of associations and others...' (Int. 16). Differently, in Peru, due to the country's widespread party disenchantment and fragmentation, regional politicians prefer candidate centred strategies (Levitsky and Cameron, 2009) thus creating reputations involving moral ('we are the less dangerous alternative') and technical dimensions ('no one else in the polity can do this') (Carpenter 2012, 27). In doing so, *insiders* seek to project 'security' by showing that they are not alone but supported by a network of *connoisseurs* of the bureaucracy. My interviewee contends:

'When I decided to run, the first thing I did was to construct my team...One of the things I learned while working in my previous job [the Ombudsmann] was to show 'a team' (*mostrar equipo*). When I was in a meeting and specialised questions arose, I let my team speak. I said, 'here is the expert in education', 'here is another on security'; this gives the idea that you are not alone and that you know what to do – what you came to do' (Int. 13).

In sum, R.4. documents that *insiders'* final aim is to ensure the electorate that '... you are neither coming to learn, nor to see what happens', but '...you can do it [deliver successfully], because I [you] have already done it before...' (Int. 13).

3.7. Conclusion

The present paper's findings have illustrated that reputational dynamics link politicians and policy success in Peru and Bolivia. Politicians tend to associate with better educative outcomes due to strategic considerations to construct a reputation – a *vitae* – of successful experiences which they instrumentalise in electoral times to display 'expertise' in bureaucratic procedures. Overall, I consider these results present two important theoretical implications for public policy and administration scholarships.

First, the results contradict the assumption that politicians are passive when it comes to policy implementation. Current scholarly literature has conferred politicians to 'goal setters', or 'interest aggregators' roles. They are usually placed at the beginning of the policy process – without further involvement in implementation – as if they were alien to the outcomes of their own policies. In practice, this paper shows that politicians' involvement matters. The logic is that tenured politicians (*insiders*) need to showcase their 'technical expertise' in running a government during electoral time, and therefore demonstrate that they are better than unexperienced rivals. Newcomers (*outsiders*) in office, in turn, chose to deliver quickly, in part pressured by the expectations of their own constituents.

A second important implication of this article relates to reputation theory in developing contexts. Advocates of the reputational approach are of the opinion that agencies choose to negotiate and sustain their technical capacities against criticism. With 'technical capacity' being their principal asset for bureaucratic survival, agencies thus negotiate with audiences, take preventive measures and project an image of competence. While this might be true in countries with strong bureaucracies, in developing contexts characterised by weak or inexistent civil service schemes, citizens tend to worry more about the 'technical competences' (Peru), and social embeddedness (Bolivia) of those in office – their knowledge about the state, their bureaucratic procedures, and their performative capacities. Politicians know this, and therefore they actively seek to display capacity either by instrumentalising prior experiences (in business or government), by constructing a 'team of experts' that supplements their lack of demonstrable expertise for their candidacy (Peru), and/or actively mingling with social organisations, seeking support of national party leaders (Bolivia).

The present study also opens a new research avenue exploring the timing and budgeting conducted by politicians in office. This paper suggests that newcomer politicians' effort to deliver policy programmes is countercyclical to elections, whereas for insiders, it is procyclical. While reputation theory provides framework to said finding, a further research agenda might benefit from re-testing it considering the discretionarily and types of benefits (whether public goods or individual transfers) of social programmes (Diaz-Cayeros 2016, 7). As well, it would be necessary to test this paper theoretical claims in countries (e.g. Mexico) in which Federal (or centralised) social programmes include clauses forbidding spending close to electoral years (e.g. Progresas/Oportunidades), hence limiting the incentives to Old and New politicians to boost their reputation shortly before re-elections, and immediately after being elected. Finally, further attention to other politicians' background is still needed. Factors such as gender, personal trajectories, and capacities, are still pending for serious scrutiny.

–Chapter 4–

A Mercantile Theory of Expert Knowledge Utilisation in Patrimonialist Bureaucracies: Evidence from the Health Sector in Peru

This chapter can be accessed in the following link in the Hertie School repository.

Salazar-Morales, D. A. (2022). A Mercantile Theory of Expert Knowledge Utilization in Patrimonialist Bureaucracies: Evidence from the Health Sector in Peru. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*.<https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muac033>

The abovementioned article covers pages 71 to 109 of this dissertation

–Chapter 5 –

Conclusion: The Patterns towards effective policy implementation in patrimonialist bureaucracies

5.1. Introduction

This thesis aimed to respond to the puzzle on identifying the circumstances under which patrimonialist bureaucracies predominant in Latin American countries can attain successful policy outputs. To respond to this thesis guiding question, I have resorted to a threefold theoretical framework materialised in three chapters (2, 3 and 4) –each of them independently respond to this thesis central guiding questions.

More generally, in this dissertation, I have shown, drawing on existing scholarship on public administration, that policy success in contexts where bureaucracies are marked by the predominance of politicians over bureaucrats and overall guided by *quid-pro-quo* relationships, could be the result of the conjunction of institutional incentives, career motivations and expert knowledge. Of course, each of these elements, interact in a particular form guided by the myths and rules of the political, historical, and administrative contexts as well as the types of organisations where they coexist.

This is an undoubtedly complex task that my individual chapters strove to respond in a more independent form. Hence, in this concluding chapter, I start by re-addressing this thesis guiding research question and provide an answer to it. In doing so, based on my findings, I propose that there are overall three patterns leading towards policy success. After discussing each patterns discovered, I proceed with outlining the more general contributions that my dissertation has made to public administration scholarship, and finally point out some limitations.

5.2. Readdressing this thesis puzzle

This thesis aimed at responding to the following two questions formulated in chapter 1:

- How are successful policy outputs obtained in bureaucracies where politicians have powered access and control over bureaucrats? Are they

identifiable patterns to obtaining policy success in such patrimonialist bureaucracies?

Throughout this thesis' chapters I have responded to the above questions by initially disentangling the concept of 'patrimonialist bureaucracy' and its persistence over the years in multiple developing countries. In practice, in chapter 1, I have provided an in-depth discussion of the concept 'patrimonialism' by identifying it as the gradual evolution of traditional patron-client forms of dominations that most 'traditional societies' (Martz 2017) from developing countries have sought to reform via importing more 'modern' and 'professional' types of bureaucratic organisation as of observed by Weber (Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell 2012). This chapter have situated the debate of patrimonialism in developing contexts by recognising that more than a form of 'goods distribution' it invokes a learned pattern of social interaction that has been also influenced by the particular political developments of developing countries, including the Latin American region, whereby colonial legacies and authoritarianism have cemented a particular form of comprehending patrimonialism as a preferred strategy to manouvre the bureaucracy (Pereira 2016). Yet this chapter has also theoretically formulated, by resorting to old and new public administration scholarship (Eisenstadt 1973; Roniger 1994; Oliveros 2016; Brierley 2020a) that in patrimonialist bureucrancies, the positive conjunction of incentives, motivations and abilities of policy actors might lead to important and varied patterns of successful policy implementation.

While chapter 1 presented the theoretical foundations of this thesis, the following chapter were specifically focused on disentangling the institutional incentives, motives and abilities leading to policy success in developing countries. Chapter 2, for instance, has provided a detailed revision of the 'institutional incentives' –the first of the three conditions– and how Latin American countries have constructed a distinctive hybrid form of bureaucracy whereby various types of civil servants coexist. The chapter offered close overview of the bureucrancies in the region and suggested that they are populated by four types of bureaucrats: Patronage Appointee, Technocrats, Loyalists, and Careerist. While each of them owes their positions to different forms of incorporation to the civil service corpus –hence are responsive to political power in different forms (degree of autonomy)– they also are in possession of different types of 'expert knowledge (capacities)' that could inform their administrative work (Gibbs 2020; Grindle 2012).

Having identified the set of institutional incentives and diverse types of bureaucrats' (with their different ranges of autonomy from political interferences and capacities), chapter 3 then explored the role of 'motivations' (Benton 2007) and how they can be conducive towards producing effective policy outputs. Drawing on a successful common trajectory of Peruvian and Bolivian education reforms which started in the early 2000s seeking to increase the enrolment of students at the primary and secondary level –and by acknowledging both countries' bureaucracies are eminently patrimonial–, the paper has shown that politicians build their reputations via demonstrating effectiveness in government. In practice, this article provided evidence that even in countries which are comparatively different in terms of overall party strength and structure (although similar in terms of bureaucratic administration of the education), politicians actively seek to build a reputation of deliverers to generate a positive image in the electorate. The paper also suggested, by combining interviews and Arellano-Bond Generalised Methods of Moments estimations (Arellano and Bond 1991), that politicians' tenure in both countries crucially play a role in their quest for delivery. While tenured politicians do well, their decisions to deliver are strategic, often close to elections and depending on if they will stay in office; newcomer politicians, in turn, the paper highlighted, strive to deliver, pressured to build up their own reputations –in Peru, for instance, they strive to construe their own particularistic political brands; in Bolivia, to gather support from other social leaders and established members of the MAS. Arguably, this chapter has responded to some extent to this thesis motivation question by informing that indeed reputation building could constitute a pattern towards policy delivery that if utilised carefully, might produce effective results.

In the subsequent chapter 4, I have addressed the third element composing this thesis theoretical framework, generally coined as 'abilities'¹. This chapter zooms in the Peruvian bureaucratic system, classifies it as overwhelmingly patrimonialist, and analyses the interplay of politicians and bureaucrats. The chapter has formulated a novel theory of 'expert knowledge' utilisation in patrimonialist bureaucracies (with politicians having more power to shape the careers of bureaucrats) where politicians acquire 'knowledge' about key administrative functions of their bureaucracies thereby colonising them with appointees that can retribute them with political work (J. A. Weiss

¹ Both in chapter 2 and chapter 4 –and throughout this thesis, I refer to abilities as the acquisition of knowledge and technical capacities in manoeuvring the cogs and wheels of the bureaucracy. These abilities cover a distinctive form of educational, experience and networking capacities of policy actors in government (politicians and bureaucrats).

and Gruber 1984). Different from the previous chapter, this one has resorted to an exceptional programme developed by the Peruvian government alongside the World Bank that taught subnational politicians and their bureaucrats to manage key state budgetary functions (MEF 2017). This programme enabled them to have unprecedented access to the ‘cogs and wheels’ of Peruvian state budget, hiring and procurement processes.

The particular design of this programme facilitated me to isolate the entrenched relationship between experience and tenure, hence being able to identify the actual effect of ‘expert knowledge’ –transferred in this case– on the production of policy outputs. More concretely, chapter 4 helped me to respond to this thesis motivating question in relation to policy delivery by finding out that politicians’ acquisition of expert knowledge and outcome production comes at the expense of building autonomous and competent bureaucracies, because they resort to learned patterns of advancing their careers involving extracting rents and utilising them to win or accumulate offices. Chapter 4 hence has found out that it is indeed tenured politicians, similar to the previous chapter, those who deliver better, but also those who do more harm when they know they will lose office –contrary to newcomer politicians.

Overall chapters, 2,3 and 4 illustrate that together politicians have the power to structure the incentives for bureaucrats to perform (or not to do so) in office, pressuring them to deliver if they will, or to sabotage competitors. But also, these chapters demonstrate that not only ‘incentives’ play a key role in policy delivery but that also they interplay with other factors such as ‘reputation building’ (underlying politicians’ motivation to deliver) and the degree of knowledge/familiarity with their bureaucracies. Previous chapters, and the evidence presented my thesis, have so far unveiled three important patterns leading towards policy implementation in patrimonialist bureaucracies that I explain next.

5.3. Pattern 1: In patrimonialist bureaucracies, politicians’ motivation to deliver better depends on their perspectives of winning or holding office

One of the key lessons stemming from the empirical chapters of this dissertation is that it critiques traditional scholarship claiming that the principal (and perhaps) sole motivation of politicians is to win or accumulate offices *being irrespective or detached*

from the positive welfarist outputs they might produce (J. A. Weiss and Gruber 1984; 1984; Bawn 1995; Schlesinger 1966; Docherty 1997). In part, and aligned with growing scholarship researching the Global South (Brierley 2020a; 2021; Oliveros 2016; Schuster 2016), my thesis also finds out that politicians strive to reconcile rent extraction, delivery, and winning office. In practice, chapter 3 and 4 of this dissertation have illustrated via interviews that indeed politicians intend to deliver, sometimes ‘quickly’ small and impactful projects to boost their reputations –of course with the purpose of winning office. But also, these chapters further illustrated how politicians articulate their motivations (reputation building) and carefully fit them in accordance with the institutional infrastructure of their countries. This is notable is Peru, for instance, whereby in an ‘uncontrolled’ context in chapter 3, politicians know that the electorate distrust bureaucracies because they are perceived as corrupt and colluded, hence they articulate an institutional substitute by presenting themselves as ‘deliverers’ and ‘technopols’ (Dargent 2015) often surrounded by knowledgeable *tecnicos* that guarantee to the electorate that they will indeed comply with their promises. Differently, in Bolivia, chapter 3 has reported that politicians also strive to deliver, yet they do so to climb up the ladder of the intraparty politics. In doing so, they surround themselves by civil organisations, and/or regional leaders that grants them with a sense of ‘political and electoral weight’ and viability –turning themselves relevant to higher instances of their political party.

As well, a common pattern unveiled in this dissertation is that while politicians intend to deliver policies in order to secure office, they also are conscious of their possibilities of re-election or advancing to other offices. Where they find out that they will not retain office, their quest for delivering policy turns into one sabotaging competitors. As Oliveros (2016), Brierley (2020), Schuster (2016) argue, the powered mechanisms of politicians over bureaucrats vanishes institutional resistance to politicisation. Patronage logics employed by politicians are thus used for multiple purposes: if they initially helped them to deliver, in other circumstances, they can contribute to dismantle the entire bureaucratic infrastructure.

This is particularly visible in the cases studied in this thesis. Unlike other countries like Argentina, in Peru and Bolivia, Iacovello (2015) signal that bureaucratic hirings and firings are flexible and do not entail any long-term tenure –especially at the subnational level. Given that bureaucrats’ fate is tied to politicians’ (Oliveros 2016),

both have no incentive to shift from each other ending up in a lower resistance cost to dismantle office if they lose the ballot. Chapter 3 and 4 have largely exemplified how bureaucrats appointed to strengthen policy production can then turn into executioners of 'state capacity' purportedly harming, colluding procurement processes, embezzling monies –sabotaging incoming incumbents overall (De La O 2021).

5.4. Pattern 2: In patrimonialist bureaucracies, tenured politicians strive to produce more positive policy outputs than newcomer politicians

A second important pattern identified leading towards successful policy delivery is that politicians' tenure plays a key role in successful policy delivery. While their motivations could be aligned with the delivery of successful policies, how they do so, is conditioned on their experience in office. This thesis, in following claims that recognise politicians as central to policy formulation and implementation (McDonnell 2017; Brierley 2021; E. Weiss 2018; Oliveros 2016; Auyero 2013), has sought to identify the effects of tenure on delivery. An initial hunch guiding this dissertation suggested that politician's age in government might have an important impact on delivery –in part because their incentives and motivations differ relative to their position in office.

In general, chapter 3 and chapter 4 have largely illustrated on this mechanism, although with some important differences. Chapter 3, for instance, in dividing politician's incentives on whether they are in office or during electoral times, suggested that tenure have different functions. For newcomer politicians, it is more relevant to construe their reputations (if in office) and or associate themselves with 'knowledgeable bureaucrats', 'experts' or 'organisations' (Zavaleta 2014; Levitsky 2018) whose image could guarantee to the electorate that they will be/are indeed successful in office. As for tenured ones, chapter 3 showed that they have already a stablished network of 'loyalists bureaucrats' aides, supporters, businesses willing to invest in their candidacy, and they are 'in the know' as to when redistribute goods to those supporters (Crabtree 2010).

This is further confirmed in chapter 4 where the effects of tenure have been also analysed yet in the health arena. In this chapter, it is found out that 'tenured politicians' have an important advantage over 'newcomers': the longer the stayed in office, the

more chances they have had to build their own networks, to acquire knowledge about the functioning of the state. They have the instruments to navigate better their political and administrative turbulences –and also are better equipped to utilise office to their advantage. As Boas, Hidalgo, and Richardson (2014) sustain, holding office offers an enormous possibility for incumbents seeking re-election. Those with experience could employ their mandates to power their careers and construe their images –especially in contexts of hyper-personalistic policies such as in Peru.

Despite this clearly identified pattern, chapter 3 and 4 presented other important differences. While in the former chapter, ‘newcomer politicians’ correlate with more positive results mostly because they are pressured to build their own political brands, in chapter 4, in turn, my results showed that it is tenured politicians best produce welfare outputs. This distinction comes due to nuanced contexts of these two papers. While in the case of chapter 3, the comparative analysis included Peruvian and Bolivian regional governors in the context of educative policies, in the second case (chapter 4) which studied the case of health policies, it focused on subnational mayors in a semiexperimental controlled scenario. For chapter 4, newcomer politicians are subject to other powered incentives including the constant oversight of high-profile officers of the ministry of finance hence being less able to re-direct resources for reconciling rapid policy delivery or using it for contract clientelism –thereby paying off to their electoral creditors and aides. This is why they also, as I state in said chapter, ‘withdraw from the programme at the minimum opportunity’ (when MEF officials leave).

In sum, this thesis has shown that a second pattern leading towards effective policy implementation is tenure. It offers, however, a more nuanced overview to the circumstances and contexts that politicians face ahead the implementation of their preferred policies.

5.5. Pattern 3: In patrimonialist bureaucracies, politicians who are more knowledgeable of their administrative processes deliver better but also damage more their bureaucratic capacities

The third and final pattern leading to policy success identified in this thesis has to do with the abilities of policy actors involved in the policymaking process. Concretely, as discussed in chapter 1, this thesis has observed that in patrimonialist bureaucracies

the acquisition of expert knowledge of key functions of the state –especially those related to goods distributions– is relevant for politicians. While acquiring expert knowledge in more professional bureaucracies is traditionally thought to endow bureaucrats to enhance policy outputs (Boswell 2009; Brierley 2020a; Bjurstrøm 2020; J. A. Weiss and Gruber 1984), in patrimonialist settings, ‘knowledge’ utilisation endows politicians with unprecedented access to their bureaucracies ‘cogs and wheels’, allowing them to manoeuvre in detail previously unknown state functions, better allocating resources to aides, hiring patronage appointees, and delivering better their promised policies. In that sense, chapter 4 extensively explored the ‘uses of knowledge’ among experienced and unexperienced politicians. I have thus shown that expert knowledge in that sense enables –especially “old politicians” to build their reputations, gather information and utilise the state to articulate a network of supporters for further electoral raids.

This dissertation hence has sustained that knowledge all-together with experience contributes to produce better policies. The ‘mechanism’ under which politicians do so, in contexts where there is lack of accountability and control, is ‘contract clientelism’ (Holland and Freeman 2021; De La O 2021). To demonstrate this chapter 4 resorted to a MEF (2016) programme that transferred subnational Peruvian politicians ‘expert knowledge’ to bolster their administrative and managerial capacities. Politicians, my thesis showed, were not impressed neither by programme nor its objectives –but rather saw it as an opportunity to power their reputations via ‘delivering better’, articulating civil society organisations and/or appealing to contractors that helped them to win office. That is why chapter 4 is central in demonstrating that older politicians deliver better, but they also do close to elections –so they can prolong their time in office or temp higher ones.

Notwithstanding, older politicians doing better in office is a partial story. Because they resort to ‘contract clientelism’ to allocate state goods (De La O 2021), the (un)expected consequence of this process is that they employ their knowledge to engage in illicit acts. In practice, although chapter 4 did not directly document ‘corruption cases’ it found out suggestions made by high-officials and other politicians’ interviewed, that ‘knowledgeable politicians’ did engage into collusion in part because they have better training in navigating the complex budgetary laws of the country by avoiding raising red flags. Newcomer politicians, in turn, my research showed, struggle

with the ‘thick’ laws and regulations –making more mistakes that damage their reputations. Hence, it is older politicians those who in acquiring ‘expert knowledge’ were more capable to utilise it against competitors by administratively sabotaging them e.g., interviewees in chapter 4 indicated that they tie budgets to expensive projects or delete technical profiles of existing infrastructure projects with the aim of delaying their competitors.

In sum, this thesis has so far shown that unlike scholarly claims that patrimonialist bureaucracies are ill-equipped to deliver, I have empirically shown that there are circumstances under which politicians (who are central in this type of institutions) can align their motivations, experience, and knowledge to produce positive welfare outputs. Of course, this depends on whether said outputs are of their benefit. Yet, I have also demonstrated that the patterns identified in this thesis leading politicians to deliver could also damage the already weakened capacities of their bureaucracies. In the following, I briefly present the most important contributions of my thesis to public administration scholarship and discuss its limitations and future research directions.

5.6. Summary of general contributions

Drawing on the inputs stemming from the three papers composing this dissertation, and complementing the contributions already made in each investigation, I further propose three important theoretical advancements that this dissertation has made to political science and public administration scholarship more generally. I hence consider that my thesis:

- (i) Advances the comprehension of politicians’ career literature and their impacts on policy success;
- (ii) Formulates a new theoretical framework for public administration scholarship to understand the role of patronage on policy success, and
- (iii) Advances ‘expert knowledge’ utilisation theory by analysing how politicians utilise knowledge to produce policy outcomes.

On the first point abovementioned, I have noted in previous chapters (especially in chapters 1 and 4) that traditional scholarship researching politicians’ careers tend to

conceive them as exclusively focused on career progression and electoral raids (Schlesinger 1966; Askim, Karlsen, and Kolltveit 2020; Docherty 1997; Samuels 2003; Borchert 2011; Black 1972). As if politicians were alien to the policy effects of their own office period. As well, these scholars tend to oversee that the electorate is aware on whether their elected representatives implement their promised platforms (Brierley 2021) –or rather employ office as gateway for their own careers (Lazar 2004). In practice, old and new scholarship, often stemming from ‘more professional Weberian bureaucracies’, consider politicians and bureaucracies as two separate entities with clearly delimited roles and functions (Meyer et al. 2014; Dahlström and Lapuente 2017; Evans and Rauch 1999; Weber 2002; J. A. Weiss and Gruber 1984). In this way, politicians are thus abstracted away from the very task of intervening in administrative matters, often thought at the ‘top’ of the policy production line (Meyer et al. 2014). Even, very recent scholarship insists on differentiating the making of policy affairs by dividing the entire process in a ‘policy super-structure’ colonised by politicians and high-stake policy actors, and the ‘engine’ in reference to the more technical work developed by ‘bureaucrats’ in transforming voted mandated into policy programmes (Hassel and Wegrich 2022).

This thesis, in turn, has shown that politicians mingling into administrative work to exert direct control on the production and delivery of policy outputs is rather commonplace. In practice, my thesis coincides with emerging research sustaining that in developing countries politicians do strive for balancing policy delivery with rent extraction (Grindle 2012; 2017; Brierley 2021; 2020b; Oliveros 2016; Schuster 2016; Holland and Freeman 2021; De La O 2021). In fact, chapters 3 and 4 have largely demonstrated that politicians do care for the outputs they produce because they can campaign them to temp higher offices. But also, I stress that this respond to the particular set of incentives conjured in a patrimonialist setting where the electorate holds accountable politicians’ experience, teams, and overall reputations because bureaucracies are considered colluded and highly dependent of those in office (Muñoz 2014). Of course, there has been attempts to conceptualise the relationship of politicians and bureaucrats by casting light on their ‘bargaining’ roles and functions—under the ‘executive politics’ scholarship yet by focusing a mechanism proper of Westminster systems (Lodge 2010; Lodge and Wegrich 2012)—, yet said bargains are unlikely to occur in one-sided powered bureaucracies such as the Latin American ones. In sum, I consider that identifying the centrality of politicians in policymaking is one of

the key contributions of this thesis, because it calls for a more nuanced empirical scrutiny of policymaking in contexts other than Europe and Anglo-Saxon countries, rather than merely assuming that politicians and bureaucrats belong to different domains.

The second relevant contribution this thesis makes is formulating a novel theoretical and empirical framework to comprehend the relationship between patrimonialist bureaucracies and policy success. Traditionally, public administration scholarship and political science scholarship studying patronage have concentrated on exploring the strength and permanence of the link between politicians (patron) and bureaucrats (clients) (Eisenstadt 1973; Roniger 1994; Stokes et al. 2013; Auyero 2001; 2013). Concretely, over the years, academic literature has focused on the question of how this unequal relationship between two policy actors persist despite ‘modernisation’ processes, including: democratisation, incorporation of accountability mechanisms, participatory democracy, among others (Stokes et al. 2013; Pereira 2016; Mainwaring 2018; McDonnell 2017; Crabtree 2010). Scholars have been surprised about the persistence of patron-client relationships and have conducted extensive research on how this ‘informal’ reciprocity agreement could hold in changing societies (Stokes et al. 2013; Oliveros 2016; Schuster 2016). They have also identified that new actors came into play as Latin American countries underwent ‘modernisations’ waves: brokers –a type of intermediary between politicians and civil society facilitating goods allocation (Mainwaring 2018; Auerbach and Thachil 2018). Likewise, scholars coming from the political science arena have been worried on the effects of patron-client relationships for ‘goods allocation’, vote buying, party building and the quality of democracy more generally (Muñoz 2014; Lazar 2004; Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004; Shchukin and Arbatli 2022; Nichter 2014).

Despite such heightened attention on patronage as a prevalent institution in Latin America, little is still known on the actual empirical effects of patronage on policy success. Rather than considering it a ‘normative question’, my thesis in line with Grindle (2012; 2017) and Brierley (2020, 2021), hence has documented and has identified three patterns (above discussed) through which patronage leads to effective policy outputs. I have generally argued that the differential conjunction of incentives (short time horizons and powered politicians), motivations (office hunting via reputational building) and abilities (knowledge of the administrative intricacies of the

state), enable politicians in patrimonialist settings to produce sound policy outputs. While this is a general framework sustaining the contribution of this dissertation, more detailed empirical evidence provided in chapters 3 and 4 have illustrated how politicians' motivations and abilities are mediated by their tenure in combining their quest for rent extraction and policy delivery.

Finally, the third contribution of this thesis is that it extensively casts light on previously understudied arena in public administration: the utilisation of expert knowledge by incumbents in office. So far, scholars have theorised how agencies employ their technical advantage over policy formulation to construe their reputations (Bjurstrøm 2020; Gailmard 2009; Waterman and Meier 1998; Boswell 2009; Meyer et al. 2014). For instance, the study of Carpenter (2014) about the Federal Food and Drugs Administration of the US, and other regulatory bodies, have casted light on how these agencies use their technical advantage over politicians' protecting themselves from underfunding and cuts –also controlling policy implementation. Other studies in the European and Latin American contexts have also followed this example by analysing the application of agencies' control over environmental metrics in extractive industries (Lee 2020; Martinez-Gallardo and Murillo 2011; Prado 2012; González and Peci n.d.) and how this 'expert knowledge control' endowed them with 'important advantage' in expanding their budgetary status and preserving their independence from political intervention (Dubash and Morgan 2012).

As well, other studies, especially Boswell (2009) have further summarised the scholarship involving knowledge utilisation in government. She argues that knowledge has overall three functions: (i) directly illustrating bureaucrats technical work hence positively affecting policy implementation, (ii) providing justificatory framework sustaining the election of a particular course of action, and (iii) enabling its political utilisation to deflate alternative policy options, hence substantiating certain ideological political choices. In her summary of knowledge employment, similar to other scholars (Christensen 2021; Boräng et al. 2018; Evers and Menkhoff 2010), 'knowledge' serves 'politicians' as an 'instrumental utilisation' whose function is to substantiate policy debate, whereas for bureaucrats, 'knowledge' rather enlightens them to best carry out their tasks (Fincham et al. 2008). This general conception of the role and place of 'expert knowledge' as of informing policy –a general tendency to 'data-based policy making', 'scientifically informed policy making' among others (Nutley, Walter, and

Davies 2009; Sanderson 2002)– hence placing it exclusively in the domain of ‘bureaucrats’, ‘expert agencies’, technical ‘policymakers’, ‘technocrats’ (Nutley, Walter, and Davies 2009) is challenged in my thesis.

In turn, I suggest that in patrimonialist bureaucracies politicians also learn. They indeed use the knowledge either coming from their experience in office (chapter 3) or by other technical means, transferred (chapter 4), and employ it to better deliver policymaking. Contrary to what most scholarship on ‘knowledge utilisation’ sustains (Boswell 2009; Nutley, Walter, and Davies 2009), my thesis shows that politicians often strive to acquire knowledge of their administrative functions of the state –rather, it is their motivation, and the purposes of such knowledge utilisation what differs. On the one hand, my thesis shows that politicians use ‘expert knowledge’ to produce welfare outputs, as this of their benefit, but also, on the other hand, they use said ‘expert knowledge’ to extract rents, to embezzle and sabotage competitors. In practice, chapter 4 has extensively shown that politicians employ knowledge as ‘mercantilists’ only to their own benefit and in detriment of their bureaucratic capacities. Such is one of the key contributions of this dissertation to public administration scholarship –as it expands previous research to the unexplored field of ‘expert knowledge’ and how it is acquired, appropriated, and used by politicians in office.

In sum, the reader must acknowledge that in the patrimonialist bureaucracies here discussed, the role of politicians is central to policy delivery, and whether they opt for creating welfare outputs for their polities strongly depend on their incentives. Yet of course, in line with several authors (Lazar 2004; Oliveros 2016; Brierley 2020b), such production of outputs might also come at the expense of institutions. Creating welfare in these settings turns out to be a personalistic process, often associated with patrons in office giving brands to their political movements which are to some extent reflected in the Spanish/Portuguese labels: *Peronismo*, *Fujimorismo*, *Bolsonarismo*, *Masismo*, *Uribismo* –among many others. They are only symptoms of an underlying ‘ethos’ governing the usage of the ‘*res publica*’ in patrimonialist ways in Latin American countries (McDonnell 2017).

5.7. Limitations

This thesis offers only an initial step towards analysing the patterns underlying successful policy delivery in patrimonialist bureaucracies. To do so, it has offered an overview of Latin American bureaucracies, and scrutinised the interaction of policy actors in the education and health policy sectors. Arguably, the findings presented in this thesis only briefly scratch the surface of many other potential patterns explaining policy success embedded in the complexity of the Latin American region. This endeavour, hence, has left some important limitations at the theoretical, methodological, and empirical level that future research might well address.

Theoretically, while the investigations conforming this dissertation, have coined two joined theoretical formulations leading to the production of successful policy outputs (chapter 3 suggests that ‘reputation building’ is central for policy delivery; while chapter 4, coins a ‘mercantile theory of knowledge utilisation), there are still other patterns pending of further scrutiny. For instance, Bersch (2016), has developed an interesting approach to comprehending the circumstances, interactions and intricacies involved in the construction of sound bureaucracies by analysing if ‘big bang’ reforms work better than ‘incremental ones’ in Latin America. Like Bersch (2016), Brierley (2021) has also evaluated the patterns under which Ghanaian politicians reconcile rent extraction and policy delivery. Similarly, McDonnell (2017) sociologically observed how ‘pockets of efficiency’ emerge in developing countries plagued with patronage practices. This thesis contributes to this growing literature, but also, I recognise that novel theoretical approach to respond how ‘patronage bureaucracies’ currently are able to ‘innovate’ and better digitalise its public services is still pending of scrutiny. Overall, the question on policy success has been taken rather as a ‘surprise factor’ in patrimonialist bureaucracies (see Bersch 2016), yet in recent years, such bureaucracies have been able to innovate, create, transform, and produce welfare outputs even at a faster pace than traditional *Rechtsstaat* bureaucracies.

Linked to still underdeveloped theoretical perspective to comprehend the link between patrimonialism and policy success, there are also other important methodological limitations concerning the public administration scholarship more generally, and this thesis in particular. On the former, the long-documented limitation in comparative public administration studies renders difficult to understand the presence of particular mechanisms leading to policy success in different bureaucratic

traditions (Saetren 2005). This could be due to the idea inserted by developmentalist studies—and by the own Weberian (1978) framework— suggesting that ‘more professional bureaucracies’ are automatically correlated with better policy outputs (Suzuki and Demircioglu 2017). Recently, scholars such as Dahlström and Lapuente (2017), and others, have started to cast light on the multiple dimensions of Weberianness. They suggest that countries worldwide show different preferences for the construction of recruitment processes, access, and training of their bureaucratic forces. These countries, they suggest, articulate varied types of incentives including marked roles between politicians and bureaucrats –and of course, different ‘art and forms’ of policy production, implementation, and delivery. In light with this study, this thesis hence contributes to cast light at regional comparative level on the challenges and opportunities leading to policy delivery in patrimonialist bureaucracies of Latin America. Yet, in doing so, this thesis also presents an important limitation of generalisability. The reader must note that the patterns towards policy success here identified are unabashedly connected to the conjunction of institutional incentives, policy actors’ motivations, and their abilities to do policy. Together they articulate the patrimonialist setting in which this thesis took place, and hence must be taken into consideration when trying to extrapolate my theoretical claims to other settings. Moreover, other important factors also constitute the ‘context’ whereby my theoretical and empirical claims stem from: countries under my analysis are full ‘procedural democracies’ (Mainwaring 2018)—in such contexts, patronage relationships hence work differently as in authoritarian settings. In sum, if the reader attempts to make generalisations in other countries of Latin American and beyond it, he/she should accommodate my theoretical claims and contributions by considering the countries of their preference particular historic-political trajectories, and institutional arrangements.

Finally, an important empirical limitation of this thesis is that my claims are connected to economic and funding limitations. For the adequate development of a thesis of this calibre, further exploration of other countries in Latin American that could help to contrast my findings is still needed. Hence, other researchers might well test the functioning of patrimonialist bureaucracies in federal countries like Mexico, Argentina and Brazil whereby subnational policy actors are subject to an additional layer of scrutiny at the ‘state’ and ‘federal’ levels (De La O 2021; Oliveros 2016), unlike the cases of this thesis (Peru and Bolivia) which are unitary states. As well, there are relevant limitations coming from the lack of information on politicians’ trajectories

(education, studies, electoral participations, among others), and agencies' concrete measurement of their policy goals/objectives. In that sense, Peru, Bolivia, Mexico, and Brazil remain exceptions in Latin America presenting well documented data about politicians in office, candidates, and the performance of agencies in office –further claims for data transparency might also facilitate comparative work in other countries.

6. References

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7. Appendix to Chapter 3

Data availability

Statistical data employed in this article can be found in the following link: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/8OQL2N>. Interviews carried out for this article have followed the ethical guidelines of the Hertie School. Every interviewee has been informed in advance about the objectives of my research and the utilization of their data. Interviewees granted their consent to use their data for this article either in a written or an oral form in line with the *Bundesdatenschutzgesetz*. Interviews have been conducted following a snowballing technique (in which one interviewee refers the researcher to another potential source). All interviews have been anonymized. A sample of the consent form is provided in the appendix.

Alternative tables

Table A-1. Augmented Dickey Fuller test (χ^2)

Outcome	Peru	Bolivia
Enrolment (total)	137.1**	36.61**
Enrolment (primary)	241.5**	46.50**
Enrolment (secondary)	117.02**	60.41**
Performance	107.18**	-
Independent variables		
Log of Tenure (lag)	134.09**	57.6**
Polarisation (lag)	121.525**	29.60**
Log of the Monies invested in public education as percentage of the GDP (lag)	141.91**	111.26**
Ratio of professor per alumni(lag)	115.11**	75.56**
Total	141.91**	111.26**
Primary	159.41**	84.29**
Secondary		

** for $p < .05$; and * $p < .1$

Table A-2. One-Step System Generalised Moments Method (GMM) results

Variables	Peru				Bolivia (MICE-EM)		
	Enrolment (total)	Enrolment (primary)	Enrolment (secondary)	Performance	Enrolment (total)	Enrolment (primary)	Enrolment (secondary)
	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20	Model 21
Dep-1	.33* (.17)	.02 (.091)	.56** (.17)	.102 (.19)	.55** (.11)	.70** (.04)	.79** (.14)
Log of Political experience (lag)	-.33** (1.62)	-.33** (.15)	-.44** (.21)	-.0011** (.0003)	-.43** (.15)	-.33** (.13)	-1.95* (1.0)
Polarisation(lag)	-5.81 (9.71)	-.32* (.15)	46.27 (99.78)	.017 (.063)	-.13 (2.26)	-2.86** (.89)	7.14 (5.6)
Log of the Monies invested in public education as percentage of the GDP (lag)	-.83 (3.88)	-6.8 (4.08)	.575 (6.64)	.054 (.04)	-.29 (.52)	-.83 (.57)	1.25 (1.96)
Ratio of professor per alumni(lag)	-9.71 (5.71)	-.75 (4.2)	-10.99 (8.55)	-.50** (1.1)	.14 (.14)	-.13 (.113)	-.20 (.34)
Instruments	18	18	18	11	16	21	21
Groups	24	24	24	24	9	9	9
Observations	312	312	312	151	144	144	135
Hansen-J test Reject H ₀ ?	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
AR (2) errors autocorrelation Reject H ₀ ?	No	No	No	No	No	No	No

** for p<.05; and * p<.1

Interview List for Chapter 3

Interviewee number	Position	Medium
Interview 1	Former Director of the Secondary Education -MED	Personal
Interview 2	Former Director of the Coordinator Office (a)	Personal
Interview 2	Former Minister of MED	Personal
Interview 3	Former Director of the Office of Regional Coordination (b)	Personal
Interview 4	Former governor of the Ayacucho region	Personal
Interview 5	Former Advisor MED Planning office (a)	Personal
Interview 6	Former specialist of procurement office MED	Personal
Interview 7	Current candidate of the Ayacucho region (a)	Personal
Interview 8	Current candidate of the Ayacucho region (b)	Personal
Interview 9	Current candidate of the Ayacucho region (c)	Personal
Interview 10	Current candidate of the Cusco region (a)	Mobile
Interview 11	Current candidate of the Cusco region (b)	Mobile
Interview 12	Political advisor of candidate of the Ayacucho region	Mobile
Interview 13	Former candidate to Lima region (a)	Personal
Interview 14	Former candidate to Lima region (b) – district	Personal
Interview 15	Former candidate to Lima region (c) – regional	Personal
Interview 16	Advisor of former regional governor region Lima	Mobile
Interview 17	Former Minister of Transport (Peru)	Mobile
Interview 18	Former governor – Cochabamba	Mobile
Interview 19	Former higher officer of MEB - currently World Bank	Mobile
Interview 20	Former higher officer of MEB	Mobile

8. Appendix to Chapter 4

This appendix of this chapter can be accessed in the following link in the Hertie School repository.

Salazar-Morales, D. A. (2022). A Mercantile Theory of Expert Knowledge Utilization in Patrimonialist Bureaucracies: Evidence from the Health Sector in Peru. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muac033>

The appendix covers pages 148-161 of this dissertation

9. List of individual papers and publications

This cumulative dissertation consists of an envelope conformed by chapters 1 and 5. Chapter 2, 3 and 4 are standalone research papers which have been published as follows:

Chapter 2 has been co-authored with Prof. Dr. Lucas Lauriano (IESEG, France) and has been published as follows:

- Salazar-Morales D.A., Lauriano L.A. (2021) A Typology of the Latin American Civil Servant: Patronage Appointee, Technocrat, Loyalist, or Careerist. In: Sullivan H., Dickinson H., Henderson H. (eds) *The Palgrave Handbook of the Public Servant*. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29980-4_71

Chapter 3 is single authored and published as follows:

- Salazar-Morales, D. A. (2022). The reputational basis of policy success in comparative perspective: Evidence from the education sector in Peru and Bolivia. *Governance*, 35(1), 143-165.

Chapter 4 is single authored and published as follows

- Salazar-Morales, D. A. (2022). A Mercantile Theory of Expert Knowledge Utilisation in Patrimonialist Bureaucracies: Evidence from the Health Sector in Peru. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*.