

**Urban Governance Processes in the Making:
The Unfolding of Cycling Policies in London and Berlin**

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Summary

With the growing variety of stakeholders involved and different interests that need to be reconciled, policymaking in the city can be sometimes slow or even run into deadlock. This dissertation addresses this complexity of urban governance with a process view. It strives to investigate how complex urban governance processes unfold and what might enable or impede joint action throughout. Accordingly, it surveys the field of urban transport, which provides a prime example of the struggle of cities to move complex policies forward. This becomes particularly apparent in the redesign of urban streets, which requires careful retrofitting of existing infrastructures and an alignment of previous plans with new political priorities. This struggle has recently been reignited by the renaissance of the bicycle in cities and the related rollout of new cycling infrastructure. The promotion of cycling has moved up the urban political agenda almost universally and become a cross-sectoral priority of transport, public health, and environmental policies. Yet, the creation of space for the safety of cyclists, for instance in the form of separate cycle lanes, has initiated fierce debates with strong supporters and opponents in nearly all major cities. This dissertation explores how, in spite of this controversy, urban stakeholders move ambitious cycling programs forward based on the comparative analysis of cycling policies in London (2012-2016) and Berlin (2016-2021). With a methodological and theoretical approach rooted in network research, this dissertation explores the evolution of the actor-networks and the policy debate of these case studies over time. The analysis draws on a qualitative database that was created for this dissertation and consists of interview data and documents. The findings suggest that next to structural and cultural properties, stylistic features should be taken into account to fully comprehend how complex urban governance processes unfold and, thus, deserve a more prominent position in the urban governance field.

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List of Abbreviations

- ADAC – German Automobile Club (*Allgemeiner Deutscher Automobil-Club*)
- ADFC – German Cyclists Association (*Allgemeiner Deutscher Fahrrad-Club*)
- BID – Business Improvement District
- BSR – Berlin Waste Management (*Berliner Stadtreinigung*)
- BUND – German Federation for the Environment and Nature Conservation (*Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland*)
- BVG – Berlin Transport Company (*Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe*)
- BWB – *Berliner Wasserbetriebe* (water utilities)
- CDU – Christian Democratic Union (*Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands*)
- CO₂ – Carbon dioxide
- DfT – Department for Transport
- GDP – Gross domestic product
- GDR – German Democratic Republic (*Deutsche Demokratische Republik*)
- GLA – Greater London Authority
- GLC – Greater London Council
- LCC – London Cycling Campaign
- LIP – Local Implementation Plan
- QSA – Qualitative Structural Analysis
- SenUVK – Senate Department for the Environment, Transport, and Climate Protection (*Senatsverwaltung für Umwelt, Verkehr und Klimaschutz*)
- SNA – Social Network Analysis
- SPD – Social Democratic Party (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*)
- TFL – Transport for London
- VCD – Association for sustainable mobility (*Verkehrsclub Deutschland*)
- VeF/CC – Berlin Bicycle Referendum/Changing Cities (*Volksentscheid Fahrrad/Changing Cities*)

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Urban governance and the case of cycling

The city as a research context and the complexity of urban governance

Housing more than half of the world's population since the turn of the millennium, cities are increasingly regarded as both sources of, and solutions to, the global challenges of the 21st century. Whilst occupying only 2% of landmasses, cities contribute about 80% of GDP but also account for around 70% of CO2 emissions and 60% of resource use globally (UN-Habitat, 2019; World Bank, 2020). They are the localities where some of society's greatest challenges such as climate change, social exclusion, and migration become conspicuously visible but they are also epicenters of productivity and innovation as well as places that develop, probe, and scale political solutions to tackle these challenges (da Cruz et al., 2019; Gerometta et al., 2005, p. 2008; Rapoport et al., 2019). The ability of cities to bring these political solutions forward depends on a multitude of factors including the financial backing and devolution of powers from higher tiers of government, politico-administrative structures, and institutional and socio-economic trajectories (da Cruz et al., 2019; Pierre, 1999). Besides exploring these macro- and meso-level conditions, research is increasingly directed towards the issue of urban governance itself, which has become one of the key areas of interest in the field of urban studies over the course of the last three decades (MacLeod, 2011; McCann, 2017). Gaining a profound understanding of the functioning of urban governance is critical because it often falls within the remit of cities, and regional governments more generally, to implement policies designed at higher levels of government (Katz & Nowak, 2018). Yet, it is usually during the implementation phase when policymaking becomes most complex. As the urban planning and design professor Jerold S. Kaydon (2014) has put it: "To design is human, to implement, divine." (para. 1)

In its broadest sense, the concept of urban governance refers to the ways in which urban policymaking increasingly transcends the sphere of the state and thus to the blurring of lines between the public, private, and non-profit sector (Einig et al., 2005; Pierre, 2005; Rhodes, 2007). Through this variety of stakeholders, a close proximity to citizens, and the character

of public goods within many urban policy fields, policymaking in the city is characterized by high complexity and interdependency of actors. At the core of urban governance therefore lie collective processes of various kinds such as issue formation, decision-making, as well as policy implementation (Lelong et al., 2017). This dissertation is based on the belief that in order to fully grasp how cities can perform better in the face of global challenges, research needs to further unpack the complexity of these governance processes, their enablers and constraints, and the ways in which urban stakeholders maneuver through them despite socio-economic, cultural, and technical challenges (Lelong et al., 2017).

The problem of moving forward in urban governance

More than on higher levels of government, urban governance takes place in a physically close and socio-spatial setting, which increases the potential for conflict in processes of collective action (Heinelt & Vetter, 2008; Lelong, 2015). Particularly in policy fields that require changes to the built environment and directly affect the everyday life of urban dwellers, such as urban and regional development projects or housing and transport policies, policy initiatives are often controversially discussed (Legacy, 2016; Nagel & Satoh, 2019). Furthermore, urban governance is confined in territorial terms while being embedded in multiple functional interdependencies (Brenner, 2003; Einig et al., 2005). Cities are “dense bundles of social relations and power-infused interactions” (Hart, 2002, p. 297), which require internal coordination. But cities also form important elements of regional and global systems and processes, which, in turn, require external coordination (Ward, 2010). The capability of city leaders to effectively organize governance processes in this context, let alone steer them smoothly towards desired policy outputs and outcomes, is therefore limited (Häußermann et al., 2008; Ibert & Lelong, 2010; Lelong, 2015; Lelong et al., 2017). It is not surprising that urban governance processes can sometimes be slow or even run into deadlock, particularly in democratic cities that value public participation and the involvement of non-state actors.¹ We can observe a growing number of cases exemplifying

¹ Cities with more concentrated state authority or those that are situated in political systems that are more technocratic or authoritarian are generally purported to create policy outputs in shorter time spans through top-down and non-participatory planning (Gilley, 2012; Han, 2017; Sowers, 2007). In this dissertation, I will take a neutral stance in this broader systemic debate but rather explore the differences that exist even between cities in Western Europe.

this challenge, such as the highly disputed transport mega-project “Stuttgart 21” (Nagel & Satoh, 2019), the delayed construction of the Berlin-Brandenburg airport (Arnold et al., 2016, p. 351), or the politicized railway project “CrossRail” in London (Glaister & Travers, 2001; Mboumoua, 2017). While there are several, often idiosyncratic, reasons for the delays in each case, research has started to systematically investigate sources of conflict or of non-action in urban governance processes such as opposing discourse coalitions (Hajer, 1995; Lelong et al., 2017; Nagel & Satoh, 2019) or the constraining effects of specific power and actor constellations (Lelong et al., 2017). With this dissertation, I strive to enrich this work further, but wish to place a stronger emphasis on action (instead of non-action) as well as on temporality by posing the following question: how do complex urban governance processes unfold? Can we learn more about the overcoming of difficulties and the enablers of joint action by zooming into the governance process, disentangling its components, and, thereby, carefully trace how it moves from one phase to the next? This research goal needs to be narrowed down further due to the variety of different factors that might shape the unfolding of governance processes. There are, at least, five aspects that should be mentioned in this regard: (1) laws, regulation, and administrative structures (see, e.g., the work of Rode (2019) on administrative structures and policy integration in cities); (2) the availability of resources and skills (in a survey by LSE Cities, UN-Habitat, and UCLG (2016), city representatives rank budgetary insufficiencies as their top challenge (da Cruz et al., 2019, p. 5)); (3) the occurrence of external shocks (see, e.g., the work of Rinscheid et al. (2020) on the different policy outcomes of the Fukushima accident); (4) relational aspects (see, e.g., Lelong, 2015; Lelong et al., 2017; Lelong & Nagel, 2017; Rode & da Cruz, 2018); as well as (5) ideational aspects (see, e.g., Imbert, 2017; Lelong et al., 2017; Nagel & Satoh, 2019). This dissertation will mostly focus on, and thus only attempt to wield, explanatory power over the last two aspects.

Empirical focus: Governing bicycle use to move the urban mobility transition forward

The transition away from the combustion engine towards a more sustainable transport system provides a prime example for the struggle of cities to move complex and controversial urban policies forward. Transport, a key urban policy field, is one of the main

sources of greenhouse gas emissions² but vital to the functioning of the city. Political pressure (e.g., stricter emission targets), legal proceedings (e.g., driving bans in European cities) as well as a change in public discourse (e.g., election victories of “green” transport policies) are increasingly urging city governments of the developed world to reverse the 20th century’s trend of high emission transport (Rode et al., 2015). This relatively recent push for sustainability coincides with more long-term trends such as a return to mixed-use and dense urban planning, the rise of digital technologies as well as changing lifestyle patterns regarding, for instance, car ownership and travel behavior (Rode et al., 2015, p. 2). Governing this transition constitutes a multifaceted challenge for city governments and their administration. First, they have to balance between the divergent needs and expectations of different transport users and, at the same time, effectively deliver a coherent policy. Second, they have to weigh political approaches that expand existing urban infrastructures and more restrictive measures on motorized transport. Third, they have to align their policies with existing law and coordinate with higher and sometimes lower tiers of government and neighboring jurisdictions.³ A careful examination of how cities are performing this balancing act might provide insights into the complexity of urban governance in a domain that features a high degree of institutionalization and where change is slow, expensive, and faced by opposition.⁴

This balancing act becomes particularly apparent in the redesign of urban streets, which requires careful retrofitting of existing infrastructures and an alignment of previous plans

² In the European Union, which is around 70% urbanized, the transport sector accounts for 28% of total greenhouse gas emissions and 22% if international aviation and maritime emissions are excluded. The biggest chunk of these emissions comes from road traffic (71.1%). In order to meet EU emission reduction targets, the greenhouse gas emissions from transport would need to be reduced by two-thirds by 2050 (European Environment Agency, 2017b, 2017a).

³ According to Wegrich and Hammerschmid (2017), trade-offs in infrastructure governance include a temporal dimension (e.g., immediate costs vs. future benefits); a regional dimension (e.g., geographical distribution of investments); and a sectoral dimension (e.g., tensions with other sectors or between subsectors of infrastructure) (pp. 22–23).

⁴ Wegrich et al. state that “providing high-quality infrastructure at an appropriate level and at the same time avoiding project delays, cost overruns, poor quality, and spending on bridges to nowhere is a difficult job.” (2017, p. 1)

with new political priorities. Above all, an upgrade of the street implies a reallocation of scarce public space and therefore a clash of interests from a diverse set of street users and affected stakeholders. The functional image of the urban street as “physical movement channel” (Marshall, 2016, p. 771) has only changed during recent decades, and transportation experts and academics increasingly view the urban street as a multifunctional space that requires an interdisciplinary management (Marshall, 2016, pp. 771–772). As New York’s former Transport Commissioner Sadik-Khan (2017) puts it, “Streets are the social, political, and commercial arteries of cities [...] they are the motor that holds most of the world’s population together. They must be designed to encourage street life, economy, culture.” (p. 3) However, cities are struggling to leave the trajectory of more traditional and efficiency-driven street planning, which carries strong support for retaining the status quo.

The struggle over the street as public space has recently been reignited by the renaissance of the bicycle in cities and the related roll-out of new cycling infrastructure (Rode et al., 2015). The considerable growth in urban cycling manifests itself differently, even among European cities, from a cycling modal share of over 30 per cent in Copenhagen to almost zero in Madrid (CIVITAS, 2016, p. 5).⁵ Despite these differences, the promotion of cycling has moved up the urban political agenda almost universally and become a cross-sectoral priority of transport, public health, and environmental policies (Aldred, 2012). The benefits of urban cycling, inter alia reductions in congestion and emissions as well as economic and social benefits, such as a greater affordability and rise in inner-city retail sales, are increasingly known and measurable (CIVITAS, 2016; Lawlor, 2014; We Made That & LSE Cities, 2017). Particularly for larger cities with favorable topographical conditions, cycling has become an increasingly important transport mode (Agora Verkehrswende, 2020). Based on calculations by the German Federal Environment Agency (Umweltbundesamt, 2021), cycling could replace up to 30% of car journeys in major conurbations given that between 40 and 50% of car journeys do not exceed five kilometers in length. Yet, the creation of space for the safety of cyclists, for instance in the form of separate cycle lanes, has initiated fierce debates with strong supporters and opponents in nearly all major cities. When London’s former Mayor

⁵ Combined data from 2010 – 2013 (for additional modal split data see European Cyclists’ Federation, 2018).

Boris Johnson introduced new cycle lanes on major routes from 2012 onwards, a member of the House of Lords publicly criticized that they “were doing more damage to London than almost anything since the Blitz.” (Moore, 2016, para. 1) In 2010, a newly installed protected bike lane in Brooklyn, New York, made headlines as “the most controversial slab of cement outside of the Gaza Strip” (Sadik-Khan & Solomonow, 2017, p. 8).

This dissertation explores how, in spite of this controversy, urban stakeholders progress in moving ambitious cycling programs forward based on the comparative analysis of two particularly embattled cases: **“London’s Cycling Revolution” from 2012-2016** and the **“Berlin Mobility Act” from 2016 – 2020**. These case studies, which can broadly be defined as most-similar cases, are chosen because they constitute a major turning point in the cycling policies of two European capitals, were initiated by an active civil society, and further developed with a variety of stakeholders. They both represent cases where a city government decided to take a step forward and enter into the heated debate about the reorganization of its streets. Even though both cases share an almost identical beginning, they subsequently start to diverge in terms of pace of joint negotiations and policy implementation. They are thus well-suited to uncover underlying mechanisms and causes of action or non-action throughout the governance process. I will discuss the case study design in more detail in chapter 3.

1.2. A network perspective on urban governance – and possible alternatives

This dissertation addresses the unfolding of the governance process with a network-theoretical perspective. This intention might be surprising at first. It almost goes without saying that the concept of governance and the notion of networks bear a certain resemblance (Torfing, 2005, p. 305). Network approaches have been heavily applied in governance studies and in political science more generally – as a metaphor and methodology up to the classification of networks as specific forms of governance (for overviews see e.g., Börzel, 1998; Kenis & Schneider, 1991; Rhodes, 2007; Schneider, 2017). Yet, network approaches have traditionally been criticized for their lack of theoretical grounding (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Granovetter, 1979) and their inability to embrace dynamism and change (Hollstein, 2014; Jansen, 2006; Lelong, 2015). However, next to basic graph theoretical

conceptualizations of networks (Wasserman & Faust, 1994), the network idea has been theoretically refined in disciplines such as neoinstitutional and organizational sociology that view networks as institutionalized coordination and governance arrangements (Powell, 1990). Building on these developments, more recent research in urban governance has, for instance, identified hybrid models of urban governance that combine networks with hierarchy (Rode, 2019). Furthermore and following the call to integrate institutional (normative) dimensions more strongly into the study of urban governance (Pierre, 1999, 2005), scholars have made great strides in using more interpretive strands of network theory as a dynamic perspective on urban governance (Bradford, 2016; Lelong, 2015; Lelong et al., 2017; Lelong & Nagel, 2017; Nagel & Satoh, 2019). With this dissertation, I wish to strengthen this link and further demonstrate the usefulness of network theory for the study of contemporary urban governance.

At this point, it is important to consider possible alternatives to the network approach by mentioning other theoretical lenses and bodies of literature that would be fruitful for the study of urban governance processes. There are, at least, five other perspectives (or rather groups of perspectives) that would have been promising but, after careful consideration, were rejected. The variety of promising theories also reflects the interdisciplinary nature of the study of urban politics, which draws the attention of political scientists, sociologists, and human geographers alike (Lelong, 2015, p. 15). Even though these alternatives, which are briefly outlined in the following, do not form the main theoretical basis of this dissertation, they are regarded as an additional source of inspiration that might provide complementary insights to the network perspective.

- (1) The first are theories of policy change, i.e., the frameworks on advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 1988), multiple streams (Kingdon, 1984), policy entrepreneurship (Mintrom & Norman, 2009) or punctuated equilibrium (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). These political science theories excel at explaining recurrent changes in public policy development and emphasize key aspects such as coalition building, changes in belief systems, or the role of particularly engaged individuals or “policy brokers” in the public sector. Even though these theories would be fruitful to deductively explain changes in

urban policymaking overall, they are less suited to uncover the more fine-grained dynamics on a lower level of how individual governance processes move forward or not – and this is what I intend to do in this dissertation.

(2) A second possibility would be to examine action (or non-action) in urban governance processes through the lens of social action theory (Coleman, 1986; Parsons, 1937; Weber, 1978) or, more specifically, collective action theory (Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990). While these sociological and organizational perspectives would undoubtedly help to better understand particular actions or the overcoming of collective action dilemmas, this dissertation has chosen to adopt a structural perspective. Structural approaches stand in contrast with action theory because they view individual action as embedded in, and impacted by, broader structures. Yet, even for structural approaches such as network theory, making sense of action does play a central role; at least because social networks themselves can be seen as opportunities or constraints for individual action or result from it (Burt, 1982; Granovetter, 1973). Chapter 3, which elucidates the network theoretical approach, therefore also elaborates on the challenge of making sense of action and, thus, agency from a network perspective.

(3) A third valuable approach would be to draw on stakeholder theory from management and organizational scholarship (Freeman, 1984; Friedman & Miles, 2002; Parmar et al., 2010; Weiss, 1994) in order to capture the functioning of multi-stakeholder governance processes. With a focus on issue-driven and multi-stakeholder networks (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Kell & Levin, 2003; Roloff, 2008), this perspective adduced valuable insights such as the importance of careful inclusion or exclusion of stakeholders in the early phase of network initiation, the reduction of conflict through open and honest communication during first stakeholder acquaintances, and the difficulty of keeping stakeholders engaged when moving from deliberation to implementation (Roloff, 2008). However, these approaches come with a strong “how to” nature, remain centered around business organizations, and are thus not seamlessly transferable to the urban governance context where different power relations and conditions for legitimacy and decision-making apply.

(4) Fourth, a promising but rather different body of literature is the burgeoning research in geography on policy mobility that traces how policy templates or master paradigms, such as the smart city paradigm (Wiig, 2015), travel through global networks of inter alia policy advice, advocacy, and activism (Cochrane & Ward, 2012; Peck, 2011; Peck & Theodore, 2010). Building on policy transfer research in political science (Peck, 2011), this literature has specifically addressed the transfer of urban policies (see e.g., Clarke, 2012; Temenos & McCann, 2012). While it is certainly true that cycling policies are currently on the move due to inter-city adaptation, learning, and competition, this dissertation is more focused on policy formation that takes place within the city. Nevertheless, I will keep this transnational perspective in mind when examining how cycling policies are debated and legitimized by actors in the political arena.

(5) A fifth alternative are theories that specifically address power relations and politics in cities. Despite the lack of any uniform theory of urban politics in the face of the institutional differences that exist even among industrial countries (Häußermann et al., 2008; Lelong, 2015, p. 18; Mossberger & Stoker, 2001, p. 195), certain frameworks gained prominence, most notably the urban growth machine approach (Logan & Molotch, 1987; Molotch, 1976) and urban regime theory (Mossberger & Stoker, 2001; Stone, 1889, 2015). Whereas the urban growth machine framework centers around urban land as a market commodity for local elites that compete with each other in a race for economic growth (Molotch, 1976), urban regime theory addresses “the collective action problems that have to be overcome for effective urban governance to emerge” (Mossberger & Stoker, 2001, p. 195). It is urban regime theory in particular that would offer a promising perspective because it identifies the capacity to act of city governments as a key component of successful urban governance and theorizes on the engagement with non-state actors (Mossberger & Stoker, 2001; Stone, 1889). Yet, both theories were set aside because they emerged from the study of American cities and share a bias towards the influence of the private sector (Häußermann et al., 2008, p. 355; Lelong, 2015, pp. 25–27; Pierre, 2014, p. 865). This fits neither with the European focus

of this dissertation, nor with the significant influence of civil society organizations in the case studies covered here.

This dissertation takes on a network theoretical perspective because it occupies a higher level of abstraction and offers a certain conceptual openness and, thus, prospect to generate new insights into the micro-processes of urban governance. Moreover, this work is based on the belief that a network approach does not merely serve as a “paradigm” (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994, p. 1414) or an “analytical toolbox” (Kenis & Schneider, 1991, p. 25), but that considerable theoretical progress has been made since the 1990s that can enrich our understanding of urban governance. The research process proceeded abductively in order to draw on the richness of existing network concepts and previous findings and simultaneously explore emerging possibilities for conceptual development. The main source of inspiration for this dissertation is the so-called relational sociology school that complement a structural perspective with a cultural one (Fuhse, 2015; Mische, 2011; Mützel, 2009; White, 2008). This network theoretical school, sometimes also referred to as the New York School, is described as particularly suited to dynamic and temporary research contexts (Grabher, 2006, pp. 108–109). Taking this perspective, this dissertation rests on the assumption that both structure and culture can enable and constrain urban stakeholders in their attempt to navigate through complex governance processes. What sets this dissertation apart from other governance studies applying this perspective is that, besides paying careful attention to both structure and culture, it brings another network theoretical concept to the fore that has received less scholarly attention so far – the notion of styles – and demonstrates its usefulness for the study of urban governance.

1.3. Civil society in the urban governance literature

This section provides a more thorough introduction to the study of urban governance. Despite its heightened attention, different understandings of urban governance circulate the scholarly debate. First, urban governance is used as a “terminus technicus” (Einig et al., 2005, p. I) for different forms of coordination of collective action in cities, which are often conceptualized as functioning through either hierarchy, markets, or networks. Second, it refers to historical development towards more cooperative models of governance in cities since the end of the 1970s (Einig et al., 2005, p. I; McCann, 2003, p. 159). In this dissertation,

I have used urban governance in the latter sense, and, accordingly, wish to explore how the actual interaction between state and non-state actors in this increasingly cooperative setting evolves in two concrete governance processes.

The constitution of this cooperative setting also determines the capacity of city governments to act, which is of central interest for this dissertation. As Stone (1889) famously stated with regards to urban politics “What is at issue is not so much domination and subordination as a capacity to act and accomplish goals. The power struggle concerns, not control and resistance, but gaining and fusing a capacity to act – power to and not power over” (p. 229). The role of non-state actors for the realization of this “power to” is further highlighted in the literature on public innovation and collaborative governance, which also draws on insights from organizational and institutional theory (Ansell & Gash, 2018; Ansell & Torfing, 2015; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011). In the field of urban studies, these developments were thoroughly researched as well but with a certain bias. Since the early days of urban governance research, a large body of scholarly work has emerged that critically reflects on the neoliberal manifestation of urban politics and the rising influence of corporate elites in times of globalization and inter-city competition (Brenner et al., 2010; Jessop, 2002; MacLeod, 2011). At least since Harvey’s (1989) influential work on “the entrepreneurial turn in urban governance” (p. 14) scholarly attention was directed towards linking public resistance in cities to democratic deficits and limited opportunities for public participation (Legacy, 2016) and at uncovering practices in urban governance that are depoliticized, technicized, and directed toward economic competitiveness (MacLeod, 2011; McCann, 2017, p. 316; Swyngedouw, 2009). The salient role of business and the clout of an economic logic in urban politics was further examined in the case of public-private partnerships in cities (Peters, 1998; Pierre, 1998). Where the “corporatization of city governance” (Kitchin, 2014, p. 1) is reported to be particularly pronounced is the field of transport and infrastructure (Cruz & da Cruz, 2017; Wegrich et al., 2017) as demonstrated by research on infrastructure megaprojects in cities (Moulaert et al., 2001) or on smart cities (Cardullo & Kitchin, 2019; Kitchin et al., 2015; Vanolo, 2014; Wiig, 2015).

However, this tendency to explore urban governance with a private sector focus no longer seem to hold. In more recent urban governance research, issues such as citizen participation and civil society involvement have come to the fore (da Cruz et al., 2019). This broadening of perspectives is also observable in the study of smart cities, where models such as “triple helix” (Leydesdorff & Deakin, 2011) and “quadruple helix” (Carayannis & Rakhmatullin, 2014) have started to explore the links between different actor groups, such as universities, industry, governments, and civil society. Yet, the influence of corporate actors through more traditional top-down channels still resonates in scholarly debate about smart cities. Another perspective is presented by the notion of platform urbanism that offers a more heterarchical model of governance characterized by multiple platforms such as Uber and Airbnb and their data ecologies (see e.g., Barns, 2020; Bauriedl & Strüver, 2020; Lee et al., 2020; Leszczynski, 2020). Despite these differentiated views and a stronger focus on civil society, systematic investigations into the involvement of civil society organizations⁶ *throughout* urban governance processes are rare. Rather, the urban civil society is embedded in discussions about citizen participation and democracy (da Cruz et al., 2019, p. 3), or its supplementary function to the welfare state (Gerometta et al., 2005; Healey, 2015). Yet, particularly in policy fields that are currently undergoing profound changes, such as urban transport, the “ground is in motion”, which opens up windows of opportunity for civil society organizations to play a more formative role. Moreover, these developments are not limited to classical non-profit organizations. Alternative and hybrid forms of organizing – e.g., in

⁶ Following Anheier, this dissertation regards civil society as an umbrella concept. From this perspective, the non-profit sector or philanthropy are sub-parts of civil society. With regard to the urban context, civil society organizations have been, for instance, defined as organizations that are distinct from state and market organizations and hold legitimate claims (Healey, 2015), while other definitions focus on their ability to foster social inclusion (Gerometta et al., 2005). Rose (2021) has recently proposed a differentiation between socially and economically-oriented civil society stakeholders in the smart city discourse. This dissertation follows the general definition by Anheier (2004) who sees civil society organizations as self-organized groups characterized by “voluntary participation (which would exclude compulsory membership organizations), relative autonomy from family, market, and state; and a capacity for collective action to advance common interests.” (p. 23). In line with the temporal focus of this dissertation, another distinction is made between organized civil society, that is traditional and membership-based associations, and more emergent initiatives, which rather resemble social movements (Daniel & Neubert, 2019; Della Porta, 2020).

the form of social enterprises or sharing economy firms (Mair & Rathert, 2019) – increasingly manifest themselves in cities, and their representatives are making their voices heard in the political arena. With this dissertation, I therefore wish to accentuate the role of civil society organizations in urban governance, not as an extended arm of the state but as vocal organizations that drive policy change and shape governance processes in a specific way.

1.4. Operationalization and research goals

This dissertation sets out to explore the unfolding of complex governance processes in the field of urban cycling with the help of a network theoretical perspective. In order to do justice to the temporal dimension of the governance process as well as to compensate for the rather static nature of the network approach, a processual research strategy is deployed (Langley, 1999; Langley et al., 2013; Pettigrew, 1997). According to Langley (1999), “Process research is concerned with understanding how things evolve over time and why they evolve this way” (p. 692; see also Van de Ven & Huber, 1990). This research strategy can yield either a strong or a moderate view on the process (Fortwengel et al., 2017). Whereas strong process scholars see “the world as in flux, in perpetual motion, as continually in the process of becoming” (Langley & Tsoukas, 2010, p. 1; as cited in Fortwengel et al., 2017), a moderate process view pays attention to dynamics of change as well as to the stabilization of processes and, thus, to both agency and structure (Fortwengel et al., 2017). This dissertation adopts the moderate process view. What distinguishes process studies is their effort to take time seriously, produce a granular understanding of processes at the micro level, and identify tensions and contradictions in driving patterns of change (Langley et al., 2013). In this dissertation, one component of this strategy is to resolve the governance process into different components (Langley, 1999). For that, the term “urban governance process” requires further concretization. Following the model of the policy cycle (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995; Jann & Wegrich, 2007), this dissertation divides the governance process

into three stages to enable comparisons and a structured analysis.⁷ Each governance process is divided into a first phase of *formation within civil society* where the topic of cycling becomes salient with the formation of new actors in civil society; a second phase of *formal policymaking* during which new cycling policies are formulated, negotiated, and decided; and a third phase of *policy implementation* where an alternation of infrastructure construction and consultation processes takes place. Another component of this strategy is to identify and focus on specific moments in time where the continuation of the governance process is at risk and can potentially culminate in either deadlock or breakthrough. Inspired by my own interview data, these particularly challenging moments are hereafter called “crunch points” (TfL04-02, interview, January 28, 2020). Apart from focusing on those moments when the governance process gets “crunched”, this dissertation also aims at exploring the wider forces that alter and shape the process throughout.

This study offers a threefold contribution. First, it accentuates two aspects of urban governance that call for more scientific scrutiny: its evolution over time and the performative role of civil society organizations therein. Second, it further strengthens and extends the application of network theory in the field of urban governance. Existing research has produced initial comprehensive network studies of urban transport systems, such as the study by Rode & da Cruz (2018). While this study offers valuable insights into the governance of urban accessibility in different cities, it uses networks primarily as an analytical and visual tool to reconstruct governance networks at one specific timepoint. Meanwhile, approaches that go one step further and undergird the analysis with network theory by paying attention to structure and culture (Lelong, 2015; Lelong et al., 2017; Nagel & Satoh, 2019) examine large and prestigious urban development projects and therefore a different context. This dissertation extends this work empirically by turning to the field of urban cycling that is

⁷ The policy cycle framework conventionally consists of the five stages *agenda-setting*, *policy formulation*, *decision-making*, *implementation*, and *evaluation*, but was frequently criticized for its idealized description of a linear process (Jann & Wegrich, 2007). In this thesis, this is reduced to three phases due to the following considerations. First, to reduce complexity and, second, to align the division of phases to different actor formations and formal procedures of the case studies at hand, such as legislative processes. The evaluation phase is excluded because the Berlin Mobility Act was studied in real time and had only reached the phase of policy implementation when this dissertation was written in 2020/2021.

currently undergoing profound changes, which enables more bottom-up engagement than usual. Furthermore, this dissertation offers a theoretical extension. It aims at illuminating the space between structure and culture by introducing styles as a dynamic concept to make sense of how urban governance processes unfold. Finally, this dissertation is guided by a methodological motivation. In line with the more interpretive strands of network theory, this dissertation is rooted in qualitative research. The centerpiece of the methodological approach, which is explained in full detail in chapter 3, is a qualitative network analysis (Hollstein, 2014). Yet, instead of drawing on more established techniques for the collection of relational data, such as name generators, a modified version of a Qualitative Structural Analysis (QSA) (Herz et al., 2015) is performed on the basis of qualitative interviews as well as document analysis. QSA is a relatively recent technique that works with network maps during qualitative interviews and aims at combining “the analytical perspective of structural analysis and analytical standards taken from qualitative social research” (Herz et al., 2015, p. 1). The QSA procedure was initially developed for the study of ego-centric networks that originate from the point of view of one specific actor. With this dissertation, I also wish to showcase how a QSA can be performed for the study of whole networks in a dynamic setting.

1.5. Dissertation outline

This dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 will discuss the network theoretical perspective and derive three analytical dimensions, namely, structure, policy, and styles. This will be followed by a methods section (Chapter 3), which presents the procedures adopted for data collection and analysis; provides an overview of the data sources; and addresses methodological challenges and validity concerns. Chapter 4 describes the analysis – the centerpiece of this dissertation. It contains a sub-chapter on contextual background (4.1.), the London case study (4.2.), the Berlin case study (4.3.), and a comparative analysis (4.4.), which re-connects with theory. Finally, chapter 5 summarizes the main findings of this dissertation, situates them within the wider theoretical debate around networks, and outlines possibilities for future research.

Chapter 2: Theory

Any changes must originate from countering the inertia endemic in social organization,
that is, change comes from fresh action curing blockage.
Action is fresh when it overcomes the inherent lethargy of social life.
(White & Godart, 2007, p. 13)

This dissertation adopts a network perspective inspired by the theoretical advances that developed in relational sociology. It is based on the belief that a network approach does not merely serve as a “paradigm” (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994, p. 1414) or an “analytical toolbox” (Kenis & Schneider, 1991, p. 25), but that considerable theoretical strides have been made by relational sociologists since the 1990s (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Fuhse, 2015; Mische, 2011). In order to demonstrate how these theoretical developments might enrich the study of urban governance processes, this chapter proceeds as follows. First, a general introduction into the study of social networks is presented, which cumulates in the rise of more interpretive strands of network research. Second, several network concepts are discussed in more detail. These are presented according to three analytical dimensions: (1) structure, (2) policy, and (3) styles. Emphasis is placed on the third dimension of styles, which emerged and whose conceptual value first appreciated during the data analysis and thus at an advanced stage of the research process. Even though styles are used by some relational sociologists – albeit less prominently – it is a relatively abstract concept and studied across disciplines. It thus requires a more thorough introduction and positioning within the scholarly debate.

2.1. Introduction to social networks

The rise of network research in the social sciences and beyond epitomizes a remarkable success story (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Grabher, 2006). In its most basic sense and going back to graph theory, social networks can be thought of as patterns of relations (edges) between a set of actors (nodes) (Fuhse, 2015). Originating from sociology, psychology, and anthropology, the study of social networks has spread through various social science disciplines, including political science, economics, and human geography (Grabher, 2006;

Kenis & Schneider, 1991; Lelong, 2015; Powell & Smith-Dor, 2003; Scott, 2013). These interdisciplinary ramifications have, however, prohibited the development of a “unitary theory” (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994, p. 1414) of networks. Rather, network research has long been seen as a broad strategy to investigate social structure, as “a loose federation of approaches” (Burt, 1980, p. 79). Even within individual disciplines, network-inspired research struggled to reach conceptual clarity – a challenge that Börzel (1998) felicitously compared with “Organizing Babylon” in the case of political science and public administration research (p. 253).

But what are the theoretical underpinnings that unite the different strands of network research? According to Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994), the common denominator is what they term “anticategorical imperative” (p. 1414). This imperative “rejects all attempts to explain human behavior or social processes solely in terms of the categorical attributes of actors, whether individual or collective.” (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994, p. 1414) Following this line of reasoning, network researchers share a healthy skepticism towards categories, such as age, gender, or class, that people might use to describe their social situation. Instead, explanations are based on relations or patterns of relations, and social embeddedness is not taken for granted but studied (Burt, 1986; Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994). This approach goes back to the formalistic sociology of Georg Simmel (1950), who – among other sociologists such as Emil Durkheim – is considered as one of the main precursors of network theory. Network research therefore departs from the sociological tradition that gained prominence since the 1940s and primarily examines individual behavior through quantitative empirical research, for instance with statistical surveys, but bypasses the respective social group or community (Borgatti et al., 2009, p. 894; Coleman, 1986; Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994). In contrast, network approaches afford a certain ontological flexibility by acknowledging the intersection between the individual and the group. Thanks to this “duality of persons and groups” (Breiger, 1974, p. 181; Simmel, 1955), network approaches are praised for bridging the micro-macro divide and being well-suited for meso-level research (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994). From this vantage point of relationality and context-sensitivity, network research has generated a substantial conceptual and methodological repertoire. The next

section will sketch out the main conceptual developments in formal social network research and, subsequently, highlight the theoretical work in relational sociology.

2.2. Conceptual advancements in social network research and the relational sociology around Harrison C. White


Network research has been applied to a diverse set of social phenomena, ranging from individual creativity to corporate profitability (Borgatti et al., 2009). A key period in the development of social network research spanned from the 1960s to the end of the 1970s (Schmitt & Fuhse, 2015, pp. 12–17). Together with his graduate students at Harvard University, Harrison C. White – a sociologist also trained in physics – developed two major innovations: the concept of *structural equivalence* and the method of *blockmodel analysis* (Lorrain & White, 1971; White et al., 1976; as cited in Fuhse, 2015, p. 17). The concept of structural equivalence, which I will fully introduce below (p. 25), broadly corresponds to the similarity in relationship patterns between positions. Blockmodelling, meanwhile, is a method to identify structurally equivalent positions in a network with the help of an algorithm (Fuhse, 2015). The underlying argument is that structurally equivalent individuals are expected to develop similar behaviors due to the similarity of their social environments (Borgatti et al., 2009; Burt, 1987). These conceptual and methodological strides have greatly leveraged social network research within the social sciences, and were thus called the “Harvard Breakthrough” (Scott, 2000, p. 33). Granovetter’s (1973) idea of *weak ties* and Burt’s (1992) concept of *structural holes* further substantiated this approach; they drew attention away from coherent networks with strong ties and directed it to absent or non-redundant ties (Grabher, 2006). Both concepts will be explained in more detail in the next section. Another theoretical milestone in the 1980s, when social network analysis had become more established in the social sciences (Borgatti et al., 2009), was the introduction of Granovetter’s (1985) concept of *embeddedness*. By moving the focus from structure and positions to the institutional context, network approaches became fruitful for the study of (regional) economics and extended their methodological toolbox to qualitative and case study research (Grabher, 2006). More recent work in social network analysis has turned to the study of *small worlds* (Watts, 2003; Watts & Strogatz, 1998). Small world research

examines average path lengths between individuals as well as structural properties of small world networks (Singh et al., 2010).

These conceptual developments coming from quantitative social network analysis still resonate strongly in, *inter alia*, organizational and management science and have also come to the fore in political science (Baumgarten & Lahusen, 2006). What this dissertation is mostly inspired by, however, are the more interpretive strands of network research that grew out of these formal approaches and are mainly centered around the work of Harrison C. White. Despite first investigations into the cultural dimensions of networks in older manuscripts of White, his early work was largely characterized by advances in formal network analysis (Schmitt & Fuhse, 2015, p. 15). This started to change since the 1980s, which marked the beginning of the so-called “cultural turn” in network research. In the context of a cultural turn in the social sciences more generally, for instance through the influence of Pierre Bourdieu’s work on the role of culture in social structures and a (re-) focusing on institutions in economics and sociology (DiMaggio, 2011; Fuhse, 2015), a group of network scholars with White at its center began to argue for studying networks in conjunction with culture and not as detached from it (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Pachucki & Breiger, 2010; White, 1992; as cited in Fuhse, 2015, p. 15). During the 1990s, this endeavor to examine the nature of relations and therefore undergird them with meaning was mainly pursued at Columbia University (where White was based) and the neighboring New School of Social Science in New York (Schmitt & Fuhse, 2015). This school of thought, which included Harrison C. White, Charles Tilly and their colleagues and students, such as Mustafa Emirbayer, Ronald Breiger, and Ann Mische, was termed “relational sociology”⁸ or the “New York School” of relational sociology (Mische, 2011, p. 80). See a network depiction of this circle of scholars in figure 1 below.

⁸ In 1997, Mustafa Emirbayer published an acclaimed article entitled “Manifesto for relational sociology”, which draws heavily on the ideas of White (Emirbayer, 1997).

Figure 1: Network of acknowledgements among relational sociology authors created by Fuhse (2015, p. 22)



It is in this context that White turned these questions into the first edition of his magnum opus “Identity and Control” in 1992, which presents his theory of the social. A revised version was published in 2008.⁹ White’s theory builds on a social context, in which interactions are driven by uncertainty. In the face of this uncertainty, identities try to establish a footing and gain control. He sees social networks as temporary patterns emerging from these control attempts in a particular context; they are composed of stories that link identities (Fuhse, 2015, p. 18; White, 1992, pp. 3–4). For White “A social network is a network of meanings” (White, 1992, p. 67). The ideas of White and his colleagues spurred or at least influenced research in different empirical fields, such as social movements and politics (Mische, 2009a; Tilly & Tarrow, 2015) and historical sociology (Bearman, 1993; Ikegami, 2005; McLean, 2007; Padgett & Ansell, 1993) to name but a few.

Situating this line of research within the wider network literature, Emirbayer and Goodwin differentiate between three “models” with varying perceptions on the relationship between social structure and culture (1994, p. 1425). The first, which they term “structural determinism”, omits the potential influence of cultural formations, such as the beliefs, values, and normative commitment of actors in the analysis of social networks. The second,

⁹ A detailed consideration of Identity and Control lies outside the focus of this dissertation.

“structuralist instrumentalism”, accepts the important role of social actors but conceptualizes them in rather utility-maximizing ways (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994, p. 1425). The proponents of “structural constructionism”, finally, devote full attention to the “potentially transformative impact of cultural idioms and normative commitments on social action” (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994, p. 1426). Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994) thus argue that only a research strategy that synthesizes both (1) *social structural* as well as (2) *cultural analysis* can adequately explain the “formation, reproduction, and transformation of networks” (p. 1411). Along similar lines, another helpful differentiation of the network literature is offered by Tasselli et al. (2015): they distinguish between an “individual agency perspective”, which suggests that individual characteristics and cognitions can shape networks, and a “network patterning perspective”, which broadly assumes that network configurations shape individuals (p. 1361). According to Borgatti et al. (2009), network research in the social science has focused more extensively on the consequences of networks than on its antecedents. For the future, Tasselli et al. (2015) expect more work from an “co-evolutionary perspective” that explores both top-down and bottom-up processes between individual agency and structure (p. 1361). This dissertation thus wishes to pay close attention to this nexus of structure, culture, and agency.

2.3. Theoretical building blocks

How can this network perspective, that takes both structure and culture into account, support this dissertation’s objective, which is to make sense of the unfolding of complex governance processes? An indication that White and his co-authors qualify as a source of inspiration for this endeavor can already be found in the subtitle of the first edition of White’s principal work “Identity and Control: A Structural Theory of *Social Action* [emphasis added]” (1992). White (2008) introduces his theory as follows:

Social organization has two faces: blockage and allowance of fresh action. The blockage can come from the intermeshing of identities despite some latitude, some decoupling. The other face cuts open the Sargasso Sea of social obligation and context to achieve openness sufficient for getting fresh action. Each of us has experienced how hard it is to push even the smallest social organization in a given direction. By what means, and when, does it

become possible to break through rigidity in social organization to get fresh action at large scale and small? (pp. 3–4)

Before turning to how rigidity can be turned into (fresh) action, it is helpful to mention what White refers to as “getting action”. In an interview he gave shortly before obtaining emeritus status, he elaborated:

Switchings can be one form of “getting action”, in a very small, very compressed sense. But getting action goes so much further, because it always implies a break with the likely course of things, with how things should normally take place. When I talk about getting action, I mean a context, in which it is attempted to do things differently. A context that makes this possible. (Schmitt & Fuhse, 2015, p. 183; own translation from the German)

Yet, explaining how this “break with the likely course of things” comes to pass is not necessarily straightforward from a network perspective and requires some a priori explanation. White’s dedication to explaining the creation of fresh action makes the dynamic character of his theory apparent, but directly touches upon the tense relationship between structuralism on the one side and the notion of action on the other, which rather resembles a homo economicus or rational choice theory (Mützel & Fuhse, 2010; Stegbauer, 2010). This relates to the difficulty of making sense of agency from a network perspective (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998) and of novelty or change in general (Padgett & Powell, 2012). Despite this balancing act, network research provides a wealth of theoretical ingredients that indeed helps to conceptualize the enabling of action in governance processes. White’s ideas in particular are well-suited to analyze dynamic and temporary contexts (Grabher, 2006). However, it should be noted up front that White’s idiosyncratic and ambiguous language constitutes a barrier to his ideas and to assembly of a meaningful whole (Grabher, 2006; Mützel & Fuhse, 2010). Nor does it help that interpreting White has become something like an IQ test for sociologists (Azarian, 2005). What gives hope is that this is a generally accepted problem and his theory perceived as “better at triggering innovative research than at internal coherence and consistency” (Fuhse, 2015, p.

28). This might allow for a more spirited approach that focuses on particularly fruitful aspects from his theory and combines them with other network concepts.

We already know that relational sociologists unite behind bringing culture back into the equation, but that their views on the relation between structure and culture differ. White goes furthest in this regard and meshes the two dimensions completely by theorizing networks as informal and temporary patterns of order that are composed of stories that link identities. For White, networks are structures of meaning, which emerge from control attempts in the face of uncertainty (Fuhse, 2015; White, 1992, pp. 65). According to Mützel (2009), this approach of treating structure and culture as inseparable can be described as a distinctive feature of relational sociology. This dissertation, however, follows Emirbayer and Goodwin at this critical point, who state that instead of treating structure and culture as inseparable, cultural formations should be treated as analytically distinct in order to uncover their internal logic and organization. Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994) justify this analytical distinction as follows:

Why is it so important, then, to think of symbolic formations as if they were analytically autonomous cultural structures? We propose that these cultural formations are significant because they both constrain and enable historical actors, in much the same way as do network structures themselves. (p. 1440)

This mirrors the argument of Hays (1994) that systems of relations and systems of meaning (which are two aspects of social structure) should be analytically distinct to fully understand how patterns shape the behavior of any group or individual. Systems of meaning can be, for instance, discourses, narratives, or frames (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994, p. 1438; Lelong et al., 2017, p. 135). This dissertation concurs with this justification and takes it as an analytical point of departure. Both structure and culture can constrain or enable actors and their actions throughout a multistakeholder process in specific ways. Whereas structure emerges from the relations between actors as well as their specific positions within a network (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994), cultural formations – which can be regarded as crucial for the analysis of political matters where different interests clash – comprises the actors' views, perceptions,

or goals (for similar interpretations of the structural and cultural context see the recent applications by Lelong, 2015; Lelong et al., 2017). For both aspects, the repertoire of network research exhibits several concepts that hold explanatory potential and serve as a source of inspiration for this study.

2.3.1. Structure¹⁰

Where, in the social structural fabric, can we find features that enable or constrain action? A meaningful procedure is to (1) start examining the overall structure of a social network, then (2) study specific network positions, and, lastly, (3) look more closely at the ties between them.¹¹

(1) The overall network structure can be analyzed by characteristics such as size and density (Burt, 1992) and by paying attention to more cohesive segments of the network, such as cliques, or recognizable gaps, such as structural holes. The size of a network can range from a triad of three actors to infinity (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). The bigger the network size, the more complex its structure, which can make coordinated action in urban governance processes more difficult (Lelong, 2015, p. 49). Related to this is the concept of density, which can be defined as the ratio of actual ties among a set of actors in a network and the maximum possible number of ties so that a density of one means that all actors are tied to one another (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Powell & Smith-Dor, 2003). The opposite, the absence of ties among actors or groups of actors, is included within the concept of structural holes (Burt, 1992).

Network research has found several effects of these overall structural features, notably the contrasting benefits of either dense or sparse networks, which are sometimes also referred to as closed or open networks (Obstfeld et al., 2014; Obstfeld, 2017). Whereas sparse networks rich in structural holes have a good “opportunity structure” (Obstfeld, 2005, p. 101) for the development of new ideas, they simultaneously come with an “action problem”,

¹⁰ For consistency, this dissertation will henceforth relate to “structure” even though “structure and “social structure” are often used interchangeably.

¹¹ This three-step approach is inspired by the four-step approach by Lelong (2015).

the problem of consecutively implementing these ideas (Burt, 1992; Burt, 2004). Conversely, dense networks possess favorable structural conditions for the initiation and realization of coordinated action but hinder the generation of new ideas (Obstfeld, 2005). This “idea problem” of dense networks also occurs or can be reinforced due to the so-called lock-in effect: cohesive networks tend to seal themselves off from their environment and, despite a smooth diffusion of information through their multiple ties, this information runs risk of being redundant (Grabher, 1993; Lelong, 2015). In the context of urban governance, sparse structures might therefore enable the generation of new ideas but complicate their subsequent execution. This also applies to sub-segments of the network, such as cliques, where (nearly) all actors are directly and strongly linked (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994, p. 1447). Lastly, the concept of structural equivalence (Burt, 1987; Lorrain & White, 1971) might hold answers. In its original sense, structural equivalence is the sharing of equivalent relations to a third actor by a set of two or more actors who are not necessarily linked themselves (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994, p. 1449). Structurally equivalent actors can thus be subject to similar structural possibilities or constraints without being tied or even close to one another. For the case of urban governance, where actors with potentially competing views come together, structural equivalence can be a source of competition or even some kind of mimetic (imitative) pressure for specifically positioned actors.

(2) This leads to the positional analysis, where the first concept that easily comes to mind in the context of governance is that of brokerage. In his foundational work on tertius positions, Simmel (1950) prominently argued that the introduction of a third party fundamentally changes the dynamics of dyadic ties (Obstfeld, 2005, p. 102). One particular tertius position introduced by Simmel (1950) is the *tertius gaudens*, or “the third who laughs” (pp. 154–162). The image of the powerful *tertius gaudens*, who gains by keeping actors apart, plays a pivotal role in the previously introduced concept of structural holes. Structural hole theory suggests that unique ties can provide individuals with superior access to information and greater opportunities to exercise control (Burt, 1992). For the purpose of this dissertation and its epistemological standpoint, however, this rather deterministic perspective is alone insufficient to effectively explain brokerage in an urban governance context. Therefore, the *tertius gaudens* will be complemented with the alternative concept of the *tertius iungens*, or “the third who joins” (Obstfeld, 2005). According to Obstfeld (2005), the *tertius iungens*

connects people “by either introducing disconnected individuals or facilitating new coordination between connected individuals” (p. 100) and rather constitutes a strategic and behavioral orientation towards action. These tertius positions can create autonomy and open up room for maneuver and strategic games (Grabher, 2006), which Padgett and Ansell labelled “robust action” (1993). Actors holding these positions in urban governance processes might use this autonomy to either initiate or facilitate action of a certain kind, for instance by establishing or leveraging connections, or to prohibit change by upholding the structural status quo. Another useful concept is that of *structural folds* developed by Vedres and Stark (2010). Structural folds are intercohesive positions that unfold at the intersection of different network groups so that actors positioned at structural folds can be regarded as multiple insiders. In their study of Hungarian enterprises, Vedres and Stark (2010) found that structural folds qualify as key network locations for entrepreneurial recombinations and thus as a source of innovation (p. 1183) – a structural observation, which might be transferable to the urban governance context. And lastly and most metaphorically perhaps, Simmel’s notion of the *stranger* offers a fruitful perspective on brokerage in urban governance processes. For Simmel (1908), the stranger is not a rambler passing by, but someone who “comes today and stays tomorrow” (p. 509). By entering a group without fully arriving, the stranger can bring new qualities or experiences. By epitomizing both closeness and remoteness, the stranger exhibits a certain objectivity, which Simmel (1908) interpreted as freedom: “he [the stranger] is not tied down in his action by habit, piety, and precedent.” (p. 511)

(3) Network relations can be analyzed with regards to their content, intensity, and direction (Jansen, 2006; Lelong, 2015; Mitchell, 1969). Most significant for the context of this dissertation is the feature of intensity, which comes with the conceptual distinction between strong and weak ties that also informs the overall structural features mentioned above. Granovetter (1973) defines the strength of a tie as a combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy, and the reciprocity which characterize the tie (p. 1361). Generally, strong ties can facilitate coordination and, hence, joint action:

Strong embedded ties provide higher levels of trust, richer transfers of information, and greater problem-solving capabilities when compared with arm's-length ties. Thus, strong ties are more trusted sources of advice and may be more influential in uncertain or conflicting situations. (Brass & Krackhardt, 2012, p. 361)

However, strong ties come with a higher obligation and require a constant investment of time and effort to remain strong. Moreover, as Granovetter (1973) demonstrated in “The Strength of Weak Ties”, strong ties tend to produce redundancy and, according to Grabher (1993), might fail to adapt to a changing environment, which might prevent necessary action to take place. A qualitative and processual research design further allows exploration of what constitutes ties in a governance network and their evolution over time, i.e., how they emerge or dissolve, whether they ameliorate or deteriorate. I will elaborate on this in the chapter on methods (3.).

2.3.2. Policy

As stated by Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994), cultural formations can influence actors in several ways, for instance “by ordering their understandings of the social world and of themselves, by constructing their identities, goals, and aspirations, and by rendering certain issues significant or salient and others not.” (p. 1441) They can also prevent certain arguments from being expressed in public discourse or, once articulated, from being interpreted by others as intended or even understood (Swidler, 1987). Thus, culture can facilitate or block certain courses of action in the same way as structure (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994).

Yet, the impact of cultural formations on collective action has been studied in diverse ways. White, for instance, conceptualizes these formations as *domains*, which he and Mische (1998) define as “the perceived array of [...] signals – including story sets, symbols, idioms, registers, grammatical patternings, and accompanying corporeal markers – that characterize a particular specialized field of interaction.” (p. 702) The idea of network domains thus represents different interpretative patterns of the issue at hand and addresses both structural and cultural dimensions of networks (Lelong, 2015; Mische & White, 1998). Much of the

work inspired by White has focused on stories in networks and thus on flows or events of communication (Fontdevila et al., 2011; Fuhse, 2015; Mützel, 2009). It is argued here, however, that the political context requires a slightly different approach. Like politics in general, urban politics constitutes a competitive setting and process for different policy interests to be debated and decided upon. In order to explore the impact of cultural, that is ideational or discursive patterns on collective action in the political arena, it is important to, as a first step, distill the different policy interests on the issue at hand; their reconciliation is what a governance process is all about. As a second step, it is worthwhile to understand the broader structures of this exchange of interests – or to say it in the words of Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994) – to uncover its “internal logic and organization” (p. 1438). For that, this dissertation follows the approach of Lelong et al. (2017) and draws on the notion of *frames*. According to Goffman (1974), whom White referred to himself (Santoro, 2008, pp. 8–9), frames are schemata of interpretation that construct meaning and may cause actors to follow certain courses of action (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Hays, 1994; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). In policy research, frames were found to serve at least two functions: to help actors understand proposed policy solutions and form preferences among alternative solutions (Lau & Schlesinger, 2005). This dissertation thus aims at identifying broader policy frames that might guide the policy debate.¹² Instead of using the generic term of “culture”, which can be conceptualized in many different ways, this dissertation will label this dimension as “policy”.

2.3.3. Styles

After covering enabling (and constraining) effects of structure and culture on joint action, it is worthwhile to delve into White’s ideas about getting action. Key concepts of his theory to capture these dynamics are *switchings* and *publics*. For White, the source of fresh action is “fresh meaning”, which can expand the sense-making repertoire of the actors involved. Fresh meaning emerges from what he calls switchings between network domains, which are moves from one meaning structure to another (Mische & White, 1998; White & Godart, 2007).

¹² It is important to be aware that a frame might contain a range of positions on a political issue, meaning that actors might share a frame while articulating different policy interests (Steensland, 2008).

These switchings between domains, in turn, are facilitated through publics, which Mische and White (1998) define as “interstitial social spaces characterized by short-term copresences, as well as intersections between multiple network domains.” (p. 705) Publics can thus be seen as special moments or spaces of social opening (Grabher, 2006, p. 103) that ease the transition between domains “by positing minimally recognizable identities, maximally decontextualized from the complex array of relations and story sets that each actor brings to the occasion.” (Mische & White, 1998, p. 705)

In the field of urban studies, White’s concepts of switchings and publics (Lelong, 2015; Sheller, 2004) as well as the interplay between structure and culture more generally (Lelong, 2015; Lelong et al., 2017) have already received scholarly attention. This dissertation wishes to accentuate another, less prominent concept of White that, hitherto, has not been applied to the urban governance context: the notion of styles.¹³ White’s writings on styles often serve as a reference point for style-related work in sociology and relational sociology more specifically but can be criticized on the grounds of ambiguity and inaccessibility. The following section will therefore attempt to complement the work of White with other sociological readings (both the work that influenced him and the work that was influenced by him) and selected empirical investigations. After a general introduction to styles, these varying conceptualizations will be presented, and an own definition derived for the subsequent analysis. In doing so, this dissertation will introduce styles as a third dimension to make sense of the enfolding of urban governance processes and situate it at the nexus of structure, culture, and agency.

Etymologically, style goes back to the Latin word “stilus” (a sharp stick used to write on clay tablets) signifying its original meaning as a specific tool or way of writing (Oxford English Dictionary, 2012, p. 725). This indicates that style refers to a certain way of doing something. More specific or generally accepted definitions in pertinent literatures are rare.

¹³ What I mean here is that the sociological ideas from the style tradition around Harrison White have not yet found their way to urban governance research. The word style itself or similar concepts have, naturally, been used before. See, for instance, the recent work by Kornberger et al. (Kornberger et al., 2021), which will be introduced later on (p. 38).

The word style is often used more casually and inconsistently without being properly defined – despite its wide usage in social science (Godart, 2018). Looking across the literature, the following general properties can be derived. Style describes a way of acting (Hegmon, 1992), that is recognizable and observable (Boorman, 2011; Cattani et al., 2020; White, 2008), and can form durable patterns (Godart, 2018): all relatively abstract. In order to conceptualize styles for the context of this dissertation, different views on styles will be presented around two foci. The first focus point is White himself (1), whose work will be compared with Bourdieu’s concept of “habitus” (2), two exemplars of which can be subsumed under the term “styles of interaction” (3), as well as more specific research in the creative industries on styles in art and fashion (4). The second focus point relates to the empirical setting of this dissertation, which is urban politics. Here, the concept of “policy styles” (5) will be introduced as well as the work on “thought styles” and “intrinsic logics” of cities (6).¹⁴ By looking at these different understandings of styles, two conceptual dualisms become apparent. The first one concerns the durability of the concept as being something rather long-lasting or ephemeral. How easily do styles emerge and change? Are they, in fact, durable and consistent or more of a volatile nature? Second, style seems to display a certain ontological fuzziness, which Simmel (1991) described as the “struggle between individuality and generality” (p. 63) in his 1908 essay “The Problem of Style”.¹⁵ Are styles observable on the individual level or rather as a property of a group? In other words, are they recognizable in a specific context as typical behavior or as a break with the typical? These conceptual dualisms will guide the subsequent comparison.

¹⁴ It is important to be aware that the views on style included here are hardly comparable in terms of theoretical scope. While, for instance, Bourdieu’s “habitus” constitutes a well-known sociological term, other conceptualizations are bound to specific empirical contexts (e.g., politics and art) and thus situated at a lower theoretical level. Furthermore, styles have been studied in various other fields, such as literary scholarship (e.g., Burke, 1945), anthropology (e.g., Hegmon, 1992), or in sub-cultural studies (e.g., Hebdige, 1979). Concepts were selected based on their closeness to relational sociology (e.g., Mische, Godart, McLean) or their usefulness for the urban context (e.g., policy styles and thought styles).

¹⁵ An English translation was published in 1991.

(1) Styles – Harrison C. White

Let us first explore the concept of styles in the work of White. The secondary literature on White portrays styles as a relatively stable cultural feature of networks in his theory (Fuhse, 2015). This interpretation is in line with White's remarks that styles help to explain what is stable and can reproduce itself (Schmitt & Fuhse, 2015, p. 184) by "elaborate[ing] and sustain[ing] meaning through reenactments" (White & Godart, 2007, p. 13). At first glance, it seems that for White styles are a blockage to fresh action. Yet, when delving deeper into his theorization of styles, which is mainly presented in chapter four of *Identity and Control* (2008)¹⁶, it becomes evident that his perspective on styles is more ambiguous. In this chapter, he characterizes styles as a "flexible and subtle concept", which is stochastic and more ephemeral than, for instance, institutions¹⁷ (pp. 114–116). He further elaborates that styles possess a processual character and can be thought of as the "rhythm" of social life (p. 116). Overall, however, White presents a rather inert concept of styles by emphasizing that "a style does not come easily" (p. 160) and does not change easily either (p. 141). What does White (2008) mean with styles? Without giving a clear definition, he refers to styles as a certain profile of "perceptions, appreciations, and actions" (p. 141). Unlike the other cultural building blocks of his theory¹⁸, these profiles do not refer to content but rather resemble a "distinctive texture in social process" (p. 112). He further elaborates that styles come with a certain signaling function, meaning that they can be sensed by those involved in the social process (p. 112). He then provides numerous examples of styles, ranging from styles in fashion and music to styles of warfare and whole centuries of commercial trade, underlying the scale-invariance of the concept (p. 113).

What are (to remain in White's language) the links between styles and getting action? As mentioned above, styles are not necessarily one of White's key concepts to explain fresh action, such as switchings through publics. According to the view expressed by White and Godart (2007) above, styles can even constitute an obstacle to action (p. 13). This is just one

¹⁶ In the 1992 edition of *Identity and Control*, styles are included in chapter five.

¹⁷ When, following DiMaggio and Powell, institutions are thought of as rules that govern the relations between actors in organizational fields (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

¹⁸ Such as his conceptualizations of "stories" that constitute ties (White, 1992, p. 67) and "rhetorics" that characterize institutions (White, 2008, p. 171).

side of the story, however. The other, hitherto somewhat neglected, is that for White (2008) style “is in itself a source of innovation and change” (p. 114) – a statement he has hidden in a footnote. Even though styles do not change easily, they offer options for getting action. These options should be understood as “leaks and cracks, which open opportunities for fresh control and thereby beget action” (p. 116). For White, styles have the potential to couple and decouple between network populations (p. 291). Changes in styles themselves, however, can only occur in conjunction with other styles because “styles mate to change” (p. 163), which can have far-reaching structural and cultural repercussions: “No change in style can take place without change in organization of networks and values [...]” (p. 141). Even though this overview is not exhaustive, it becomes clear that White’s concept of styles is more versatile than originally expected and almost of a dialectical character: styles can both enable and constrain fresh action.

(2) Habitus – Pierre Bourdieu

White calls the work of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu as a source of inspiration for his concept of styles. Whereas at the micro end, style should be analogous to Bourdieu’s “habitus”, the manifestation of a broad style at the macro end should, at least in some aspects, be comparable to Bourdieu’s idea of a “field” (White, 2008, p. 114). As the resemblance indicates, Bourdieu also shares a structural and relational view of the social world. Habitus (from where the idea of a “matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions” originates) is composed of socially ingrained dispositions. These dispositions are durable and transposable orientations toward action (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53), which one accumulates and internalizes throughout life. According to Bourdieu, the link between habitus and field becomes noticeable when there is a mismatch between the two; when “you feel or anticipate feeling awkward, out of your element, like a <<fish out of water>>” (Maton, 2012, p. 57), indicating that the structures of the habitus and social context are out of alignment in that particular social situation. How does the concept of habitus relate to durability? As mentioned above, Bourdieu describes these dispositions as durable; they are both “structured and structuring”, meaning that they form a certain path-dependency. Indeed, when referring to styles, Bourdieu (1977) makes the following statement: “Personal style [...] is never more than a deviation in relation to the style of a period or class so that it relates back to the common

style not only by its conformity [...] but also by the difference” (p. 86). In Bourdieu’s theory, therefore, the “common style” is the norm, which leaves little room for uniqueness.

This immediately leads to the relationship between habitus and action. It becomes clear that Bourdieu’s concept rather helps us to make sense of our barriers to action and not of how to overcome them. McLean (2007) formulates this as follows: “This sense of place [habitus] is clearly not only (or typically) a sense of entitlement, but a sense of constraint: a sense of difficulty of pursuing certain courses of action [...]” (p. 18). From this perspective, the bulk of social action should lead to the reproduction of the status quo and draws our attention to the difficulty of breaking free from taken-for-granted schemes of action (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 95; McLean, 2007, p. 18).

(3) Styles of Interaction

Another area of style research revolves around what can be summarized as “styles of interaction”.¹⁹ Two sociological studies are highlighted at this point: first, the work by Mische on styles of political communication among Brazilian youth activists and, second, the examination of patronage letter-writing in Renaissance Florence by McLean. Both approaches are rooted in network research and inspired by White.

According to Mische (2009), a style is a “distinguishable set of practices” that one could think of as “network-based patterns of social interaction that are considered appropriate or valuable within a given relational context” (p. 38). She grounds styles in institutions, which she defines as “clusters of self-producing practices and relationships sustained by particular <<logics>> of interaction that distinguish them from the environment around them and give them sustainability over time.” (p. 38) These institutional logics then give birth to particular discursive practices that form recognizable styles of interaction, which she specifies as styles of communication (p. 40). Mische studied these communication styles among Brazilian

¹⁹ Naturally, every style requires some level of interaction to be “sensed”; styles only “exist” and evolve in social space. I emphasize the works of Mische and McLean here because they theorize on interaction styles more generally, without narrowing it down to a specific field, such as politics or fashion.

youth activists by accompanying several of their leaders over time and, interestingly, puts styles in relation to skill. For Mische, activists “learn” several styles of communication as they progress through different organizations or institutional sectors (very much like acquiring a habitus) but she focuses on individuals that are positioned at the intersection of multiple organizations or sectors and can therefore draw on a repertoire of different communicative styles in a given situation (p. 19). She endows these individuals with a considerable degree of agency by arguing that they can actively combine, segment, and move between different modes of communication – an ability that Mische, following Fligstein, calls social skill (Fligstein, 2001; Mische, 2009a, pp. 40, 41). Mische views individuals with high degrees of social skills as crucial for bridging cross-sectoral or -institutional divides to enable progress.

In his analysis of patronage in Renaissance Florence, McLean (2007) treats patronage letters as a corpus of patterned discourse that forms a “style composed of <<everyday interactional routines>>” (p. 35). According to McLean, these everyday styles of interaction were of a distinct character in fifteenth-century Florence and influenced how writers could express themselves in order to win the favor of powerful Florentines (p. 35). For instance, they had to pay attention to the concept of honor and their own relations to the Florentine elite. McLean sees this style not only as a cultural practice or some sort of “patronage language” dominating during that period but also as a strategic act of networking to enhance one’s position, as a cultural tool for individuals to achieve upward mobility through social ties (p. 194). Like Mische, he links styles with agency and even goes so far as to interpreting patronage letter-writing as a means of self-presentation and -perception because “[...] in interaction one must present and represent a culturally relevant and recognizable <<authentic>> self.” (p. 196)

These studies offer a valuable perspective because they examine styles in interactional settings where different styles might come into conflict. They also demonstrate the temporal bandwidth of styles, from interactional patterns persisting whole centuries to a behavior being picked in a particular situation. Both studies further stress that styles of interaction, to some degree, reflect what is considered “appropriate” or “good” in a certain period or

situation – thereby highlighting the cultural and even moral grounding of styles. Even though this brings styles very close to routinized behavior, these routines can be challenged. Despite the ontological fuzziness of styles, Mische (2009) draws our attention back to the individual actor: “[...] we need to return to the individual: it is people who practice styles, which they learn through their experiences in different kinds of institutional milieus [...]” (p. 40). From this perspective, actors acquire styles through the institutional environment but can (and this is where Mische and McLean offer a new perspective) consciously and strategically use it. This sense of agency also creates an interesting link to action. According to Mische, specifically positioned and socially skilled actors are able to actively “carve out spaces”²⁰ (p. 21) that facilitate communication in interactional and fractious fields (pp. 20–21) and therefore pave the way for fresh action. It is also Mische who goes furthest in exploring the impact that styles can have on each other. She ascribes to styles of communication a “performative” and “productive” potential (p. 185) that can lead to contrasting tendencies. They can either help to provide dynamism and creativity to a given field or generate tensions and disputes within it. She further elaborates, “Sometimes these styles fuse easily, or allow for smooth transitions between interactions. But other times they come into conflict.” (p. 40) They might contribute to communicative breakdown, particularly if certain styles of communication are used “unskillfully” (pp. 334–337).

(4) Styles in creative industries

Another area of research inspired by White examines the role of styles in specific fields. Frédéric Godart, a co-author of White, conducted sociological studies of the fashion industry where the concept of style takes center stage. He defines style as “a durable, recognizable pattern of aesthetic choices” (Godart, 2018, p. 103). This extends our understanding of style as a specific way of acting to involving a choice among alternatives. Looking at actors, Godart (2012) elaborates that styles represent “a <<cultural repertoire>> from which creators can draw their inspiration, and are generally recognized by consumers.” (p. 67) Styles are thus culturally grounded but evolve in an interactional field: “A style does not belong solely to its author, as it emerges in interaction and negotiation with the audience to

²⁰ Mische refers to the concept of publics that she worked on together with White (Mische & White, 1998).

which it is addressed” (Cattani et al., 2020, p. 4). Godart (2012) further addresses the difficulty of capturing the durability of a fashion style because “it is difficult to pinpoint the exact origin of a style” (p. 67) as well as its subsequent dissemination. A stylistic movement can serve as a “reference style” for designers and consumers; a recombination of these references can form a “specific style”, e.g. of a particular brand. The specific style, again, can turn into a reference style, such as Chanel’s little black dress (p. 68). Despite this cyclical character, Godart conceptualizes styles as more persistent than, for instance, trends or fashion itself – especially for the individual designer. While fashion trends fade, the style of a designer is his or her expression of identity (Godart, 2018, pp. 104, 107).

Another area tailored to the study of styles is the art world, which was examined by White himself (White, 1993; White & White, 1965). According to Bergesen (1984) “Styles of art represent cultural communities where the use or non-use of the style defines membership and group boundaries” (p. 188) – a definition that highlights the collective character of styles. From this perspective “styles are the property of the group, not the individual, as they are only what all members share, not what is unique to each artist” (p. 188). Simmel (1991), on the other hand, reflects on styles in art, “The distinction between the individual style of the very great and the general style of the lesser expresses that broad practical norm: <<and if you cannot become a unity yourself, then join a unity as a serving partner>>” (p. 70). According to Simmel, the “individual genius” or “master” (p. 64) embodies a style as “the mysterious, absolute unity of the artistic personality” but this style then gets acquired by others. “Michelangelo [...] is this style himself, it is identical to Michelangelo’s own being [...]” (p. 64). Intriguingly and in contrast to the work on fashion styles, it was argued that stylistic inconsistencies are rewarded rather than penalized for high status artists (Sgourev & Althuizen, 2014). What is similar to fashion styles, however, is the cyclical understanding of artistic styles. With the growing popularity and acceptance of a style, its “artistic code” tends to become so “in-group”, which might cut artists off from the larger artistic community (Bergesen, 1984, p. 218). “From this perspective the very success of an art movement plants the seeds of its later failure.” (Bergesen, 1984, p. 218)

These examples, again, underline the ontological tension of styles between the individual and the group. They also underscore that while style is often seen as a cultural feature, it is also relationally grounded and involves agency. The next section departs from the work around Harrison White and moves on to the topic of urban politics.²¹

(5) Policy styles, thought styles and intrinsic logics of cities

Closer to the empirical setting of this dissertation is the work on policy styles, which constitutes the manner in which policy deliberations take place. The interest in policy styles comes from comparative politics and policymaking studies as it relates to decision-making processes within specific politico-administrative contexts (Howlett & Tosun, 2018). Richardson (1982) defines a policy style as the interaction between: (1) a government's approach to problem-solving; and (2) the relationship between government and societal actors in the policy process (p. 12). Research on policy styles combine structural with behavioral dimensions by emphasizing the role of institutional arrangements in shaping and constraining the way policy styles are exercised by policy agents (Howlett & Tosun, 2018, pp. 5, 8, 9). Considering durability, policy styles are “relatively long-lasting, quasi-permanent arrangements establishing a trajectory of activity which are difficult to change [...]” (Howlett & Tosun, 2018, p. 10). It is a concept used to capture the relatively enduring nature of many policy arrangements (Howlett & Tosun, 2018, p. 4). With regards to its ontological status, policy styles are usually conceptualized as broader patterns of sectoral or national scope, which are, however, comprised of individual actions that follow schemes which are institutionally and psychologically rooted (Howlett & Tosun, 2018, p. 10).

²¹ A third area that would contribute to a more profound understanding of styles – but was left out in the main text for conciseness – is research in the field of strategy, management, and leadership. Cattani et al., for instance, challenge the view that strategy constitutes the opposite of style as it unfolds through purposeful action towards an objective. Rather, strategy involves aesthetic and thus stylistic choices (2020). Research on leadership has found that leadership styles emerge as a dual manifestation of meaning-making and network-making, underlying the cultural and structural grounding of styles (Basov et al., 2020; Helmich & Erzen, 1975). What is interesting about this line of research is that it attempts to derive different ideal types of leadership style and explore their effects in specific settings (Basov et al., 2020). Structural but also agentic elements of styles have been further highlighted by research on the networking style of entrepreneurs (Vissa, 2012; Vissa & Bhagavatula, 2012).

Therefore, policy styles relate to routinized behavior that is typical for a specific context, e.g., for a policy sector or a whole country.

Looking at the city level, Kornberger et al. propose an intriguing connection between urban strategies and style (Kornberger et al., 2021; Meyer et al., 2020). Drawing on the work of the microbiologist and epistemologist Ludwik Fleck, they argue that the effectiveness of urban strategies is not limited to the formulation and achievement of goals; strategies can also give rise to new “thought styles” and “thought collectives”. According to Fleck (1980), a thought style directs the way of perceiving and processing within a group, a thought collective (p. 130).²² Kornberger et al. (2021) theorize that urban strategies can, in the long-term, shape the city as an institution, its socio-cognitive infrastructure for collective action, its way of thinking (p. 16). This recalls the sociological work of Löw (2018), who argues that cities possess an “intrinsic logic”, a cultural order that is historically grown and established through processes of “habitualization, institutionalization, and materialization” (p. 132). This intrinsic logic should be thought of as a hidden structure within the city that characterizes processes of collective sense-making but also its physical environment (Löw, 2013, p. 894). While not referring to styles directly, Löw draws on research that investigates how this historical profile of a city gives rise to new policies and policy styles, for instance in city-marketing (Heinelt, 1991; Keil, 1998; as cited in Löw, 2013, p. 895).

It becomes clear that style-related research in politics and urban politics more specifically has, hitherto, located style rather at the higher end. Styles are used to describe political activities of a whole city or even country. They are conceptualized with reference to cognition and institutions and, thus, as cultural and relatively stable features. It is worthwhile, therefore, to connect them to the ideas of the style-tradition around Harrison White in order to render intelligible the study of urban governance processes in the current contexts, which are temporary and dynamic, and require attention to activities at the micro-end.

²² For Fleck (1980), who examined the categorisation and treatment of syphilis, defining scientific problems, choosing appropriate methods, and even considering what is true or not is bound by a thought collective (p. 131).

Table 1: Overview and classification of different style concepts

Style concept	Definition	Durability	Ontology
Styles <i>White (1992, 2008)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Profile of “perceptions, appreciations, and actions” (2008, p. 141) - “Distinctive texture in social process” (2008, p. 112) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Difficult to emerge and change but more ephemeral than institutions - “Style is stochastic” (2008, p. 116) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Scale-invariant concept - Styles can be typical for a network (e.g., painters observe and imitate each other) or for specific positions (i.e., via structural equivalence)
Habitus <i>Bourdieu (1990)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Durable and transposable orientations toward action” (p. 53) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Difficult to change 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Describes an individual orientation that is, however, formed by belonging to a group such as a social class
Styles of Communication <i>Mische (2009)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Distinguishable set of practices”, which one could think of as “network-based patterns of social interaction that are considered appropriate or valuable within a given relational context” (p. 38) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Emerge out of institutional logics and give them sustainability over time but can be exercised situationally 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Individual level but rooted in institutions
Style of patronage letter writing <i>McLean (2007)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Style composed of everyday interactional routines” (p. 35) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Standard operating procedures unchallenged for over a century 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cultural tool for individuals to reach upward mobility
Fashion styles <i>Godart (2012, 2018)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Durable, recognizable pattern of aesthetic choices” (2018, p. 103) - “Cultural repertoire from which creators can draw their inspiration, and are generally recognized by consumers” (2012, p. 67) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stable sartorial choices 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Scale-invariant concept: refers to aesthetic choices of an individual, group, or fashion house - Circular relationship between reference and specific styles
Art styles <i>Bergesen (1984)</i> <i>Simmel (1991)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Cultural communities where the use or non-use of the style defines membership and group boundaries” (Bergesen, 1984, p. 188) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cyclical: success of a style automatically leads to its later failure - Consistency is generally rewarded (but not for high-level artists) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Property of the group, not the individual” (Bergesen, 1984, p. 188)

<i>Sgourev & Althuizen (2014)</i>			- Different for great artists that embody a distinct style
Policy styles <i>Richardson (1982)</i>	- “Interaction between a government’s approach to problem-solving and the relationship between government and societal actors” (p. 12)	- Difficult to change: routinized behavior in the policy process	- Sectoral or national level (but exercised by individuals)
Thought styles <i>Fleck (1980)</i> ²³	- Directs perception and processing in a thought collective	- Tendency to persist, which prohibits contradictions or fundamental changes in thinking	- Thinking not an individual processes but bound by a thought collective
Intrinsic logic of cities <i>Löw (2013, 2018)</i>	- Hidden sense-making structure of a city - “Horizon of meaning” (and action) (2013, p. 904)	- Solidifies over time through “habitualization, institutionalization, and materialization” (2013, p. 904)	- Shared meaning and experiences within a city

Styles in urban governance processes

Extending the discussion about styles beyond the understanding of White and juxtaposing it with other perspectives helped to make the very abstract idea of styles more tangible. We learned about the dialectical if not circular character of styles in in terms of durability and ontology. Table 1 provides a summary of these dimensions for the concepts covered above. How can we pin this down for the context of this dissertation? This dissertation examines urban governance processes, such as the formation of political interests in civil society, policymaking processes, and implementation processes. Certainly, one might observe overarching styles of how these processes usually unfold in a particular city; think of confrontational civil movements and legalistic policymaking in Berlin compared to the more competitive and business-conscious approach in London. However, this work zooms into these processes and is interested in how different actors and styles intermingle throughout. Drawing primarily on the approach of Mische, this dissertation conceptualizes styles in processes of urban governance as follows:

²³ As interpreted by Kornberger et al. (2021)

Styles link structure, policy, and agency. A style is the property of actors involved in urban governance manifesting as a behavioral pattern. These patterns are both interactional (i.e., how ties are enacted in the political arena) and argumentative (i.e., how political interests are articulated). Actors who exercise styles can be individuals or organizations. I agree with Mische (and to some degree with Bourdieu) that actors “acquire” styles through the institutional environments in which they operate and through which they travel. I further agree with Mische and McLean that actors are, to a certain degree, able to use these imprinted styles deliberately in a given situation. Exercising styles involves choice and, thus, agency.

Styles are not idiosyncratic. While style is the property of actors, it is a central feature of styles (as stressed for instance by White and the work on styles in the creative industries) to be shared by multiple actors simultaneously. Styles are thus not individualistic but become recognizable as broader behavioral patterns in the governance process. Neither are particular styles peculiar to any specific political context but can emerge in many contexts.

Styles are dynamic. In an urban governance process, different styles are at play with some being more durable and dominant and others more ephemeral. They can rise and disappear with actors or actor groups entering and leaving the process. The style of actors can also change throughout the process, particularly through the influence of other styles.

Based on this understanding, different styles will be identified in the case study analysis in chapter 4. How will this be achieved? For the different phases of the governance process, the analysis will trace how actors interact and bring forward demands and whether this interactional and argumentative behavior forms a certain pattern during this phase. Following the example of the research on leadership styles, different types of style will be derived, such as a confrontational style and a consensual style. By tracing the development of, and the interactions between, these styles over the course of the governance process and by comparing them across cases, it will be discussed how styles in general might shape or alter the governance process.

Chapter 3: Methods

In line with the relational perspective and interpretive paradigm, this dissertation is rooted in qualitative network research. This chapter first explains the overall research design, which combines a comparative case study with process research. It then provides a general introduction to network analysis, followed by a more focused discussion about qualitative network approaches and their application in a political setting. This is followed by a detailed description of the individual steps of the research process including data collection and analysis, and a presentation of the data sources. To conclude, methodological challenges that occurred during the research process are laid out.

3.1. Case study design

A case study strategy was chosen for this dissertation because, first, it investigates a contemporary phenomenon, which is the current struggle over the street as public space in the face of rising demands for a better cycling infrastructure; and, second, because the boundaries between this phenomenon and its urban context are not clearly apparent (Yin, 2003, pp. 13–14). Case studies are an established methodological technique in urban studies and urban governance research, more specifically. According to Pierre (2005), this interdisciplinary field is dominated by single-case studies with urbanists typically adopting a holistic and context-embracing research strategy but would benefit from more comparative approaches: “Understanding urban governance more broadly, that is, to investigate to what extent different social, political, and economic forces tend to produce different models of urban governance, requires a comparative approach. The absence of comparative work is arguably the main obstacle to theoretical development in this field.” (p. 453) Taking this critique seriously and acknowledging the advantages of multiple case studies, such as the clarification that emergent findings are not restricted to a single case (Eisenhardt, 1991; Yin, 2003), while attempting to allow for contextual richness, this dissertation compares two case studies: “London’s Cycling Revolution” and “The Berlin Mobility Act”. Overall, the case study design can be described as an embedded and multiple-case design (Yin, 2003, p. 40) with two governance processes as cases that are embedded in Berlin and London as their

respective contexts. The purposeful selection (Maxwell, 2009, p. 235; Patton, 1990, p. 169) of these governance processes followed two considerations.

First, they constitute almost identical political projects (a major shift in urban cycling policy) and therefore represent most similar cases. Pierre (2005) appraises the most similar system as a promising strategy to conduct urban governance research because it “allows the researcher to control for a larger number of contextual factors while at the same time conducting empirical study in close proximity to theory” (p. 455). Both cases are embedded in Western European capitals, which are broadly comparable in socio-economic terms and, crucially, share the administrative complexity of an intermingling of national, city, and district governments. With regards to transport, they further share a division of the responsibilities in road management between the city and individual districts. Despite variances with regards to their cycling policy history and current cycling modal share (more on that in chapter 4), London and Berlin broadly share similar transport challenges and agendas as well as climatic and topographical conditions (Hazael, 2017; Nobis, 2019). Naturally, the most similar system, like other case study designs, are to some extent idealized models of comparative inquiry (Pierre, 2005, p. 455) and profound differences between Berlin and London exist: e.g., regarding size and population, party-political systems and legal traditions, and, closer to the empirical field, in their respective requirements and capacities of their public transport organization and Mayoral control.²⁴ Keeping these contextual variations in mind, London’s Cycling Revolution was recommended as a suitable

²⁴ Taking data from 2019, London exceeds Berlin both in terms of area size (Greater London: 1.569 km² vs. Berlin: 892.00 km²), population size (Greater London: 8.961,989 vs Berlin: 3.669,491) as well as population density (Greater London: 5.701 people per km² vs. Berlin: 4.118 people km²) (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg, 2019; Office for National Statistics, 2020). Whereas Berlin is constituted as a parliamentary representative system, the Greater London Authority (GLA) is run by the Governing Mayor and his team, usually representing one political party. The Mayor of London directly oversees the public transport provider Transport for London (TfL), which is an integrated organization that also covers cycling. Transport is therefore a key responsibility of the Mayor of London. Berlin, on the other hand, has a senator for transport who heads a separate Senate Department. The public transport provider BVG is responsible for public transport only (Rode, 2016; Travers, 2002). More contextual information on both cities is provided in chapter 4.

comparison to the Berlin Mobility Act independently by three transport researchers located in London. Furthermore, London and Berlin have already been compared with regards to their transport system (Rode et al., 2015; Rode, 2019) and this dissertation can, therefore, legitimately attempt to build on this prior research foundation.

The second consideration was of a practical nature. The Berlin Mobility Act was chosen because parts could be studied in real time, particularly its later phase from 2019-2021. This was highly valuable when conducting the first case study because it: (1) allowed for a prolonged observation of, and involvement in, an unfamiliar field; (2) enabled building interactional expertise; and (3) provided access to events and practices – all of these steps being essential for the study of processes (A. Langley et al., 2013, p. 6). Subsequently, London was chosen as a second research context because the data collection could be combined with a research stay at the London School of Economics during 2019. This position was crucial to gain access to the respective transport scene. Even though London's Cycling Revolution constitutes an historical case and could not be accompanied in real time, nearly all major stakeholders were reached and missing observational data compensated by extensive minutes and video recordings of key events.

This study is further a process study because it is concerned with understanding how these governance processes emerge and why they evolve in a certain way (Huber & Van de Ven, 1990; Langley, 1999, p. 692). Following Langley et al. (2013) "Process studies take time seriously, illuminate the role of tensions and contradictions in driving patterns of change, and show how interactions across levels contribute to change. They may also reveal the dynamic activity underlying the maintenance and reproduction of stability." (p. 1) One way to take time seriously is to partition the governance processes into different phases, which offers not only descriptive utility but also opportunities for structuring process analysis and sensemaking (Langley, 1999, p. 703). This is done by dividing both processes into three phases that are inspired by the policy cycle framework (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995; Jann & Wegrich, 2007). This reduces complexity while increasing comparability. After clarifying

the design features of this dissertation, the next section illustrates how the case studies are conducted with the help of a qualitative network analysis.²⁵

3.2. Qualitative network analysis

In recent decades, network analysis as a method has grown in popularity across various disciplines to become an established approach in several sociological sub-fields including urban and community studies, migration and family research, science and technology studies as well as organizational and political sociology (Hollstein, 2006, p. 11). Substantially, network analysis has been developed for the study of relations (and not attributes) meaning that network studies offer explanations by uncovering relational patterns and positional properties (Franke & Wald, 2006). Whereas the quantitative and formal variants of network analysis, classically known as social network analysis or SNA, are standard in empirical social research, the use of qualitative methods in network research is less widespread (Franke & Wald, 2006). Since the 1990s, however, the criticism of the domination of a structurally deterministic view in network research was increasingly expressed, which “neglects altogether the potential causal role of actors' beliefs, values, and normative commitments – or, more generally, of the significance of cultural and political discourses in history. It neglects as well those historical configurations of action that shape and transform pre-given social structures in the first place” (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994, p. 1425). This claim for incorporating culture into network research was also a call for more interpretive approaches that are sensitive to context and subjective meaning – and, thus, for qualitative methods.

Since this “cultural turn” in network research (for discussions about the cultural turn see the chapter on theory (2.) or Diaz-Bone, 2007; Fuhse & Mützel, 2010; Pachucki & Breiger, 2010), qualitative approaches as well as their combination with quantitative methods have grown significantly; the first comprehensive overview over qualitative network methods

²⁵ It is important to note that this processual research strategy is not, in the strict sense, an application of the process tracing methodology common in political science (see, e.g., Beach, 2016; Bennett & Checkel, 2014; Bennett & George, 1997; Collier, 2011) because it is not aimed at examining the outcomes of specific policy interventions or at unpacking all possible causal mechanisms. Rather, it focuses on the evolution of the governance processes at hand in structural, ideational, and stylistic terms.

being published in German in 2006 (Hollstein & Straus, 2006).²⁶ Yet, the usage of qualitative methods comes with specific challenges as well opportunities for network research. The most central challenge, perhaps, lies in the very nature of network studies. How can qualitative methods be compatible with a network analysis that presupposes a certain formalistic view? This contradiction even gave rise to the question if a purely qualitative network analysis can exist at all (Diaz-Bone, 2007). Despite these legitimate doubts, qualitative approaches have proven to be a powerful tool for primarily six areas of network research: the “exploration of networks, network practices, network orientations and assessments, network effects, network dynamics, and the validation of network data” (Hollstein, 2014, p. 406). Through their relative openness for both data collection and analysis, qualitative methods can specifically address several shortcomings of the classical SNA such as its inability to sufficiently explain the problem of agency as well as questions relating to the dynamic processes that shape and alter networks from emergence to dissolution (Hollstein, 2014, p. 404). It is for these reasons that a qualitative network approach was chosen for this dissertation.

3.3. Political network studies

When designing a network study to compare processes of urban governance, attention needs to be paid to the special features of the political setting. Network studies in political science (as well as in neighboring fields, namely public administration and policy studies) have grown to a sheer “Babylonian variety” (Börzel, 1998, p. 253) of concepts and applications. The increasing popularity of network approaches in this field stems from their suitability to systematically explore negotiations and interactions between different actors and their interests, which lie at the core of politics (Baumgarten & Lahusen, 2006; Leifeld, 2019).²⁷

²⁶ It should be noted that the first network studies, mostly in the field of cultural anthropology, made use of qualitative methods (see e.g., Barnes, 1954; Bott, 1957; Mitchell, 1969).

²⁷ It is important to clarify that the governance processes under investigation are not viewed as exemplars of new or superior forms of “network governance” that stand in contrast to hierarchical or market-oriented models. I rather draw on networks both as a method and theoretical perspective in order to examine urban governance processes that showcase the complexity and cross-sectorial character of many urban governance processes of today – but can very well evolve in the “shadow of hierarchy” or develop market-like properties.

So far, political network studies have, for the greater part, made use of quantitative methods (Ward et al., 2011). For examples see the work on political decision processes by Pappi et al. (1995) or Laumann et al. (1978). These studies largely follow a rational choice paradigm: actors in the political arena are viewed as behaving in a rational and utility-maximizing fashion to pursue their political interests (Lang & Leifeld, 2008). Aspects such as resources and power are highlighted and political networks conceptualized as exchange relationships (Baumgarten & Lahusen, 2006; Schindler, 2006). However, the cultural turn in network research also influenced political network studies and coincided with the so-called “interpretive turn” in political science (Checkel, 1998; Maier, 2003; Nullmeier, 1997). The role of shared ideas and values in shaping political processes came increasingly into focus (Janning et al., 2009) and was incorporated into theoretical frameworks such as policy-communities (Richardson & Jordan, 1979) or advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 1988). From this perspective, cooperation in the political sphere cannot be traced back to pareto maximisers alone but also to the power of “new knowledge and policy ideas” (Richardson, 1996, p. 16). This gave rise to more qualitative approaches in political network research that provide means for understanding different interpretations and orientations of actors with regards to potentially multidimensional relations as well as networks as a whole (Hollstein, 2014; Lang & Leifeld, 2008). While political network research could, in principle, draw on the whole repertoire of qualitative methods (Baumgarten & Lahusen, 2006, p. 193), the following intricacies should be considered.

First and concerning both research design and data collection, whether the exploration of whole networks or egocentric networks are best suited for the research endeavor demand clarification. In political network studies, the dominant strategy has been the analysis of whole networks (Baumgarten & Lahusen, 2006).²⁸ The collection of network data for whole networks, however, requires a nearly complete survey and thus considerable prior knowledge about the constitution of the network, its actors, and relations (Franke & Wald, 2006; Ward et al., 2011). This can be particularly challenging for quantitative approaches. This dissertation also explores whole networks but reconstructs them qualitatively. This is

²⁸ For the study of social influence, political network studies have also largely drawn on ego-centric data (Lazer, 2011).

done by collecting data from the ego-centric perspective of key actors who are also questioned about the constitution of the wider network and its evolution over time. This is undoubtedly a challenging and time-consuming approach and requires continuation until saturation is reached. According to Baumgarten and Lahusen (2006), networks can be reconstructed from the perspectives of individual actors because it is reasonable to assume that network members possess practical knowledge about the wider structure of their field and can position themselves within it (p. 190). A second distinction is whether the “political actors” in question are organizations or individual persons. So far, the analysis of inter-organizational networks has prevailed in political network studies (Raab & Kenis, 2007). In the case of the two governance processes examined in this dissertation, different organizational representatives came together and are thus conceptualized as embodying their respective organization. Yet, particular individuals, such as “the Mayor” or “the Cycling Commissioner”, stand out and are treated individually. Finally, and despite the openness of a qualitative approach towards the nature of relations, it is necessary to broadly determine what type of relations are being investigated (Franke & Wald, 2006; Pappi, 1993). This dissertation focuses on working relations that are mutually perceived as important for the joint realization of the respective governance process.

A second challenge in relation to the overall research strategy but specifically to the data analysis is striking the right balance between deduction and induction. This also corresponds to the aforementioned tension between formalistic approaches (which are anticipated by a network analysis to a certain degree) and the more open and qualitative side of the spectrum. Purely deductive procedures face the challenge of requiring extensive prior knowledge about the nature of interactions, e.g., on their content, extent, or regularity. As soon as a diverse set of actors is concerned (which is self-evident for the political sphere where stakeholders as heterogeneous as ministries, associations, or business can come together) this approach becomes analytically less sharp. At the same time, inductive approaches that do justice to grounded theory are equally limited by the large amount of material as well as possible perspectives and multidimensional relations. They are further restricted by the structural presuppositions inherent to network analysis (Baumgarten & Lahusen, 2006; Herz et al., 2015). This dissertation therefore follows the advice by Baumgarten and Lahusen (2006) to

intertwine data collection, preparation, as well as analysis (p. 183). It chooses an abductive approach that starts off with theoretical assumptions taken from network theory but simultaneously attempts to remain open for emergent ideas.

A third but related problem concerning data analysis is that, in contrast to their well-established formal counterparts, qualitative network studies face the challenge that the techniques for performing a purely qualitative analysis of relational data are still under development. Even though the different data collection strategies, for instance the combination of qualitative interviews and network maps, have undergone considerable progress (Kronenwett & Schönhuth, 2014; Schönhuth et al., 2013), established procedures for data analysis are rare. To achieve rigor in qualitative analysis, however, the individual steps of getting from data to results need to be comprehensible as well as transparent (Grodal et al., 2020). Qualitative network studies further face the dual criticism that while data is often collected by qualitative means, the analysis part still follows standardized procedures (Diaz-Bone, 2007; Herz et al., 2015). On the other hand, purely qualitative interpretations are criticized “for putting a disproportionate emphasis on the actors’ ability to shape the network“ (Herz et al., 2015, p. 2), which, according to Diaz-Bone (2007), contradicts the assumptions of social network analysis. Therefore, this study partly applies a “Qualitative Structural Analysis” (hereafter “QSA”) – a methodology developed at the University of Hildesheim, Germany, by Herz, Peters, and Truschkat with the goal of overcoming these shortcomings. QSA combines “the analytical perspective of structural analysis and analytical standards taken from qualitative social research” (Herz et al., 2015, p. 1). The next section will outline the individual steps of the research process including data collection and analysis, and a presentation of the data sources.

3.4. Research process

Instead of following a linear order, the empirical research of this dissertation can be described as a “reflexive process” (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995, p. 24) where “the activities of collecting and analyzing data, developing and modifying theory, elaborating or refocusing the research questions, and identifying and dealing with validity threats are usually going on more or less simultaneously, each influencing all the others” (Maxwell,

2009, p. 215). The data collection and analysis for the Berlin Mobility Act were completed first and emergent findings presented at an academic conference in 2019. This feedback was incorporated into the first round of data collection for London's Cycling Revolution at the end of 2019. Following a review of the data collected so far, a second field trip to London was conducted at the beginning of 2020. This was followed by a phase of in-depth analysis of both case studies with occasional member-check interviews. Despite this parallel progression of steps, the data collection and analysis for both case studies broadly followed the subsequent scheme.

3.4.1. Data Collection

This dissertation mainly draws on two data sources: semi-structured interviews with members of organizations that participated in the governance processes and documents, which mainly consist of legal text, official statements, strategies, protocols, and press articles. As a complementary but less significant data source in terms of data analysis, observation at theme-specific events was also carried out. The data collection for each case study proceeded in three phases (Corley & Gioia, 2004). (1) In an *exploratory phase*, which constitutes an important first step in a network analysis (Hollstein, 2006, p. 21), preliminary interviews (seven in Berlin and six in London) with individuals that are engaged in the field of urban development and transport and close to my personal network were conducted in order to gain a better understanding of the respective context and detect possible themes. During this phase, the Berlin Mobility Act and London's Cycling Revolution were selected as case studies. (2) This was followed by a *consolidation phase*, during which actors were identified through desk research, interviews, as well as observation and networking at events. Setting the boundaries of a network constitutes a crucial but challenging step in a network analysis due to the fact that a clear and finite number of its members is usually not given (Baumgarten & Lahusen, 2006, p. 189; Franke & Wald, 2006, p. 156; Pappi, 1993, p. 87). Actors were selected according to two principles. First, they had to play an active part in the governance processes under study. For Berlin, this included first and foremost all organizations that participated in the so-called *Raddialog* (dialogue on cycling), which negotiated and designed large parts of the cycling module of the Berlin Mobility Act. (See Appendix 3.6.1. on p. 62 for a list of the Raddialog participants.) This task was slightly more

difficult in London because the formats in which actors came together for the joint creation of London's Cycling Revolution were less transparent. Second, the criterion of mutual relevance was applied, meaning that organizations were included when perceived as relevant by other network members for the joint realization of the project (Janning et al., 2009, p. 66; Laumann & Knoke, 1989, p. 24; Lelong, 2015, p. 53). Particular emphasis was given to the nominations and referrals of key stakeholders (e.g., the Deputy Mayor for Transport in London or a high-level civil servant in Berlin) because it can be assumed that central actors possess considerable knowledge about the constitution of the network and about the role that other actors play within it (Hollstein, 2014, p. 411; Krackhardt, 1990). This technique was continued until no new relevant organizations were added and, thus, a certain level of saturation reached. Ultimately, the demarcation of a network has to be subject to research-practical considerations (Baumgarten & Lahusen, 2006, p. 189) as network boundaries can be fluid at the periphery and across time. It had to be weighted, for instance, when the involvement of actors varied over the course of the process or when organizations were not formally involved in joint negotiations but influenced them from a peripheral position, e.g., by shaping the discourse. Thus, the reconstruction of actor-networks can always be an approximation only, which calls for careful interpretations (Baumgarten & Lahusen, 2006, p. 190). With some temporal overlaps, the consolidation phase was followed by a more focused (3) *data collection period*:

Interviews: Interviews rank among the prime data collection strategies for qualitative network studies (Hollstein, 2014, p. 411) and constitute the main data source for this dissertation. To do justice to qualitative research, they are usually designed in an open-ended fashion in combination with techniques to obtain information about actors and relations (Hollstein, 2014, p. 411). For this dissertation, ego-centric networks of the interviewed actors were collected with the help of network maps based on the hierarchical mapping technique

(Kahn & Antonucci, 1980).²⁹ Unlike less structured and standardized uses of network maps, the hierarchical mapping technique produces highly comparable data (Ahrens, 2018). The aims of collecting the actors' ego-centric networks were first, to gather different perspectives on the relevance of actors and their joint work and, second, to get a better understanding of the actors' wider networks in the context of the respective governance project. (See Appendix 3.6.5. on p. 67 for exemplary network maps.) In order to carve out the micro-activities of governing and find out who was engaged when, timelines were used as another technique to trigger a narrative about the governance process. These timelines were filled in by the interviewees especially during the first interviews. They were further asked about difficulties that arose during the process and how they were overcome. Lastly, interviewees were asked about their personal opinion about Berlin's and London's transport policies and the Berlin Mobility Act or London's Cycling Revolution in particular. In Berlin, 16 interviews (13 in-depth semi-structured, one informal, and two member-check interviews) were conducted during this phase. Besides the Senate Chancellery, which did not play an active part in the negotiations, these interviews cover all organizations of the *Raddialog*. (See Appendix 3.6.1. on p. 62). One challenge was personnel turnover during the negotiations, especially at the Senate Department for the Environment, Transport and Climate (SenUVK). For that, I spoke to the former department representative, the successor as well as to a representative focused on bicycle traffic who joined midway through the process. To challenge the "insider-perspective" of the members of the *Raddialog*, one interview with the main opposition party CDU (Christian Democratic Union) and two interviews with organizations that were involved at different stages of the Berlin Mobility Act were conducted: the Fuss e.V. (association for pedestrians) and the public transport provider BVG. One representative of the Senate Department was interviewed for a second time in the form of a member-check interview. In London, 21 interviews (19 in-depth semi-

²⁹ The organization of the interviewee was placed at the center of the map, which was pre-structured into three concentric circles and the sections "politics/public administration", "civil society/non-profit sector", "private sector", and "academia". The interviewees were asked to place organizations (or individuals) onto the map which they considered as important for their joint work on the respective policy. It was further explained that the closer an actor is placed to the home organization, the more important it should be for the joint work. During the process of filling out the map, interviewees sometimes drew relations or added other sections to the map such as "media".

structured, one via e-mail, and one member-check interview) were conducted. This number is higher than in Berlin because for several organizations, multiple representatives were involved in different working groups and phases of the process. Furthermore, London's Cycling Revolution was equally affected by personnel turnover. Thus, four representatives from different organizational levels of Transport for London (TfL) and two representatives of the London Cycling Campaign (LCC) were interviewed. One high-level representative from TfL was interviewed three times because of the deep insights that person had gained during the process. In the same way as in Berlin, the "insider-perspective" of the core group of organizations was challenged by also interviewing on the borough level and across sectors: one inner London borough (Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea) and two outer London boroughs (Enfield and Waltham Forest) were interviewed as well as business representatives, researchers, one transport journalist, and several representatives of civil society organizations. The interviews were recorded and lasted between 15 minutes and two hours and twenty minutes, with the majority of interviews lasting one hour. Together with the graphical data produced during the interview (network maps, drawings, and timelines) the recordings were safely stored on an external hard drive. (See Appendix 3.6.2. on pp. 63-64 for a list of the interviewed organizations.)

Documents: For triangulation, a more focused collection of documents related to the Berlin Mobility Act and London's Cycling Revolution was accomplished. Besides strategy and law text, official statements, protocols as well as press articles, these documents include political speeches and debates that are publicly available on www.youtube.com/ and material from previous meetings that were either publicly available or provided by my interviewees. Particularly for the London case study, an extensive coverage of the period of interest on specialized blogs provided a valuable data source. (See Appendix 3.6.3. on p. 65 for a document overview.)

Observation: Observation at events constitute a complementing data source. It is important to mention that these observational elements were analytically less relevant than the interviews and documents. In Berlin, I attended 13 events between August 2018 and November 2020 at both the city level, such as official meetings of the transport committee

at the city parliament, and the district level, such as civil engagement workshops. During the Corona crises, events could be attended online. In London, I attended seven events between September and November 2019, including summits, board meetings, and smaller expert workshops. (See Appendix 3.6.4. on p. 66 for a list of the attended events.) Especially the first events were crucial to gain access to the field and better comprehend the dynamics in the respective transport polity on a general level. Observations were recorded with a focus on actors and their interactions in field notes (Gibbert et al., 2008), and ordered into a descriptive and a reflective part (Emerson et al., 2011). These notes were used to carefully formulate first assumptions, for instance about the closeness between business and civil society interests in the field of cycling in London or about the interests of different political parties in Berlin. Events at a later stage, particularly those that were attended online during the Corona crises in Berlin, were analytically more important as they included statements by key actors. They were thus partially transcribed and included into the document analysis.

3.4.2. Data Analysis

This section outlines the multi-step procedure that was developed for this dissertation. Due to the lack of a blueprint for conducting a qualitative network analysis, it combines different analytical strategies, which are guided by the three theoretical dimensions derived in chapter two: structure, policy, and styles.

Data preparation

As a first step, the interviews were transcribed, and their complexity reduced by extracting all text passages that contain “relational information”³⁰ into a separate document for each interview. Reducing the interview data to those parts that are of actual relevance for the research endeavor is a step recommended by Baumgarten and Lahusen (2006, p. 194). Then, all data sources (such as interview extracts, network maps, timelines, official statements, statements in the press, and political speeches) that contain information on or statements by one of the organizations of interest were grouped. A first careful temporal clustering was

³⁰ With “relational information” I refer to information on relations between the interviewed actors (ego) and other actors (alters) as well as between alters, on how these relations and alters are perceived as well as information on self-perception.

conducted by ordering organizations into those phases during which they were engaged in the governance process.³¹


Structure

For the analysis of the structural context, QSA was performed, first and if available, of the network map of one organization, followed by that of the corresponding document containing extracts of relational information taken from the interview. QSA of the network map proceeds as follows. The network map is analyzed by working out *structure-focused*, *actor-focused*³² and *tie-focused* descriptions. A structural approach is used as a sensitizing concept for these descriptions, meaning that they draw on concepts from formal network analysis, such as structural equivalence or structural holes. (For a list of possible structure-, actor-, and tie-focused questions see Herz et al., 2015.) The descriptions are written down in memos. Furthermore, nuanced propositions about the structure of the map are formulated. These preliminary interpretations are also written down. Subsequently, the interpretations of the network map are tested by performing QSA of the respective document. Again, *structure-focused*, *actor-focused*, and *tie-focused* questions, which are sensitized by formal network concepts, guide the analysis. This is further enriched by insights taken from other data sources, such as statements or protocols. Results and new assumptions are, again, noted in memos.

³¹ Naturally, timing and duration of engagement differed: whereas some organizations, particularly central ones, were engaged throughout longer periods of the process, the engagement of others was limited to particular phases.

³² For actor-focused descriptions, I focused primarily on positional features on the network map and in the respective documents.

Figure 2: Procedure of Qualitative Structural Analysis (Herz et al., 2015, p. 17)



For this dissertation, QSA of the network map and that of the respective documents form one interpretation round of the network of a single organization. The first interpretation round for the Berlin case study was accomplished with a group of young scholars that are familiar with network research in order to allow for different readings and interpretations early on. One of the developers of the QSA-method also participated in this interpretation round. All participants agreed to treat these interpretation sessions confidentially. After this procedure has been successively performed for all organizations, the network maps and written interpretations were compared across organizations. The results of these comparisons were, again, recorded.

It is important to mention that network maps provide a static depiction of the network from the perspective of its members. Their analysis was useful to detect general features of the overall network, such as cliques, broker positions or rivalries. For understanding the evolution of the network over time, however, the analysis of the interview as well as additional data sources was essential. Only by going through these data on multiple occasions, could a visual representation of the actor-network at different points in the process be carefully reconstructed. In the analysis chapter (4.), these network graphs will introduce the different phases of the governance processes.

Policy

Frame analyses are increasingly applied in qualitative network research (Hollstein, 2014, p. 412; Lelong, 2015; McLean, 1998). For the analysis of this dissertation, frames were identified in an inductive manner. For each organization, the analysis started by coding the whole interview text with a focus on political interests regarding the Berlin Mobility Act or London's Cycling Revolution with the program MAXQDA. This was then extended by coding the other data sources allocated to that organization. This was an important step to distil which policy interests were brought forward and by whom. By comparing coding schemes across organizations, these interests were, ultimately, grouped into larger frames.

After the identification of frames was complete, a second round of analysis was accomplished with a stronger focus on temporality. Taking the evolution of the actor network as a point of reference, it was noted in detail which policy interests were primarily expressed during the different phases and how these priorities changed over time – also by organizations entering or leaving the process. This was a challenging task because it required an extensive listing of when interests were brought forward and by whom. To make this manageable, policy interests per phase and organization were limited to seven, which proved to be a reasonable number to capture the majority of objectives expressed. The evolution of frames was also tested in member check interviews. For a visual representation, a network consisting of the main policy interests was created for each of the three phases. The individual steps for creating these networks are outlined in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Procedure for creation of network depictions of policy interests and policy frames for each phase of the governance process

Step 1: List of organizations and their main policy interests were transferred into a matrix-format in Excel

Step 2: Excel file was imported into the network visualization software Visone as a two-mode network (organizations & policy interests)

Step 3: This two-mode network was transformed into a one-mode network (policy interests only) in Visone

Step 4: The network visualization was enhanced with algorithms available in Visone and different colors

Styles

Styles originally emerged as a concept during the QSA and were found salient for both case studies. After an extensive study of the literature on styles, they were added as a third analytical dimension. Focusing on both interactional patterns (how actors enact their ties to other actors) and argumentative patterns (how actors advance their interests) in the process, different types of styles were derived in a qualitative fashion. This classification was guided by questions such as: does this way of interacting and of bringing forward demands reveal a certain pattern? How can this pattern be described? In which way does this differ from other behaviors in the process? Are there changes over time? Valuable data sources for this step were interview transcripts, protocols, videos of debates, statements as well as observational data.

A certain emphasis was placed on the style of key actors (e.g., the Deputy Mayor for Transport in London) because of the richness of accounts available about them in interview transcripts or media reports and the possibility to observe them at (recorded) events. On reflection, this emphasis was deemed valid considering the influence that key actors can exert on the course of the governance process.

3.5. Methodological challenges

This section recounts the methodological challenges that arose during the research process, which accrue from conducting qualitative research in general and network analysis more specifically, and how they were addressed.

A first challenge was gaining access to the two governance networks. After the consolidation phase and first interviews during data collection, I felt I had gained an adequate overview over the organizations (and their representatives) involved but was still dependent on their willingness to be interviewed. This challenge was further aggravated by the sensitivity of network information, which pose a problem for qualitative approaches in particular because they attempt to dig deeper into the knowledge base and opinions of network members (Baumgarten & Lahusen, 2006). To overcome this challenge, an extended involvement in the field was required (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Maxwell, 2009) by investing considerable time in networking and trust-building. Regarding dependability and authenticity (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), I communicated transparently prior to the interview that I was interested in the relations and joint work during the Berlin Mobility Act or London's Cycling Revolution as well as in the interviewees' personal opinions. During the interview, I offered confidentiality by withholding informants' identities while revealing their affiliations. Even though the majority of interviewees agreed to be named personally, I decided to remain at the level of affiliation for consistency. Yet, for certain individuals such as political office holders, anonymity is impossible to uphold. This is why the names of prominent positions (e.g., of the Deputy Mayor for Transport) are revealed.

A second and related challenge concerns the database. Even though the majority of stakeholders were reached, not everyone agreed to talk or to fill out a network map during the interview, a task sometimes also impeded by time constraints. Moreover, the network maps were filled out to varying degrees of detail. Incomplete or varying quality of data was mitigated by the multi-source approach of this dissertation (Hollstein, 2014, p. 410). This was primarily achieved in two ways. The most important data for the analysis were the actors' recollection of the network as well as their policy interests. When an actor could not

be interviewed personally, particular effort was dedicated to gaining insights from the actor's closest alters and to collect as much other data sources as possible (e.g., videos, official statements, protocols) to gather sufficient information on that actor's role, position, and interests. Second, it was not always straightforward to determine the position and political standing of larger organizations, such as political parties, civil society organizations, or transport organizations. In order to counterbalance the view of particular individuals in an organization, I aimed at interviewing multiple members (e.g., four from TfL, three from the SenUVK in Berlin). While data triangulation comes with the advantage of addressing these data gaps and varying data qualities, synthesis from diverse data sources can also be challenging. This was especially true for the graphical data collected that produces static snapshots and textual data that, to a large degree, contains narrative. While network maps were used to formulate first assumptions about the constitution of the network, its interpretation and temporal evolution required a thorough analysis of the textual data at hand. Furthermore, interviews yield rather personalized accounts, while many documents (e.g., press articles) and observational notes are colored by their authors' own perceptions. Regarding this tension, I strived to remain close to my interviewees' accounts and validate assumptions early on during interviews as well as at a later stage in the form of member-check interviews (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

The absence of established techniques to perform a qualitative network analysis, which go hand in hand with the general openness of qualitative approaches, constituted a third challenge. This was addressed by working out a bespoke analytical procedure by triangulating two different methodological approaches. First, a QSA, which is a relatively recent technique that allows for structural interpretations of interview data (also visual data) in accordance to the standards of qualitative analysis. Second, a qualitative analysis of policy interests and policy frames, which was inspired by the political network studies of Lelong (2015) and Lelong et al. (2017) as well as developments in discourse network analysis (Janning et al., 2009; for applications see e.g. Leifeld & Haunss, 2012; Nagel & Satoh, 2019). These approaches were applied to reconstruct structural but also more cultural features of the governance processes over time. This analytical procedure, which was tailored to the

specific research context and refined throughout the research process, turned out to be relatively granular and time-consuming, which might limit its transferability.

Lastly, the problem of retrospectivity, which is inherent to network research, had to be faced. Reconstructing networks based on the multiple accounts of its members can be subject to uncertainty as the views expressed might be vague or even contradict each other (Hollstein, 2006, p. 26; Manger, 2006, pp. 228–230). Against this backdrop, special attention had to be paid while conducting the case study in London, which (when compared to that in Berlin) constitutes an historical case and is therefore associated with a higher risk that informants' recollections have deteriorated over time. To ensure the credibility of findings, the data collection for the London case was more extensive in terms of interviews (different government levels, members of the succeeding administration, and the press) as well as by including a detailed coverage of the period of interest on specialized blogs. In the case of contradictory statements, special attention was given to the remarks of key actors due to their profound overview over the respective governance project compared to more peripheral actors.

3.6. Appendix to chapter 3

3.6.1.: List of organizations of the *Raddialog*

Sector	Organization	Information
Administration	Senate Department for the Environment, Transport and Climate (SenUVK)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Department responsible for transport ▪ Since 2016 elections ruled by senator who belongs to the Green party ▪ Chair of <i>Raddialog</i>: in charge of overall organization and inviting participants
Administration	Senate Chancellery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Administration of the ruling Mayor of Berlin
Civil Society	Changing Cities e.V. - formerly „Volksentscheid Fahrrad“ (VeF/CC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Civil society initiative based in Berlin that formed around the cycling referendum
Civil Society	ADFC Berlin e.V. – The German Cyclists Association	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Berlin branch of the national cyclists association that traditionally represent interests of everyday cyclists ▪ Around 15.000 members in Berlin
Civil Society	BUND Berlin e.V. – Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Berlin branch of the biggest environmental association in Germany ▪ Around 15.000 members in Berlin
Politics	Bündnis 90/DIE GRÜNEN Berlin – Green Party	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Joined city government in 2016 for the first time in many years: previous government participation between 2001 and 2002 ▪ 27 seats in parliament (in 2021)
Politics	SPD Berlin – Social Democratic Party	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ruling party of Berlin since 2001 (with multiple previous government participations) ▪ 38 seats in parliament (in 2021)
Politics	DIE LINKE. Berlin – Left Party	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Joined city government for the second time: previous government participation between 2002 and 2011 ▪ 27 seats in parliament (in 2021)

3.6.2.: Interviewed organizations

BERLIN

LONDON

	Date	Organization	Interview Type		Date	Organization	Interview Type
1	5/3/2018	Innovationszentrum für Mobilität und gesellschaftlichen Wandel (InnoZ)	Preliminary (face to face)	1	10/10/2019	London Car Free Day	Preliminary (face to face)
2	5/7/2018	Senate Department for Economics, Energy and Enterprises	Preliminary (face to face)	2	10/10/2019	University College London	Preliminary (face to face)
3	5/17/2018	Tegel Projekt GmbH*	Preliminary (face to face)	3	10/15/2019	New Economics Foundation	Preliminary (face to face)
4	5/30/2018	Urban Standards GmbH	Preliminary (phone)	4	11/7/2019	University College London & University of Cambridge	Preliminary (face to face)
5	6/7/2018	Neue Mobilität Berlin - BMW Group*	Preliminary (face to face)	5	Several meetings in autumn 2019	LSE Cities, London School of Economics	Preliminary (face to face)
6	6/18/2018	Berlin Agency for Electromobility (eMO)*	Preliminary (face to face)	6	11/13/2019	University of Westminster	Preliminary (face to face)
7	7/10/2018	Deezer nextbike*	Preliminary (face to face)	7	11/8/2019	Sustrans*	Expert (face to face)
8	1/25/2019	Volksentscheid Fahrrad/Changing Cities (VeF/CC)*	Expert (face to face)	8	11/11/2019	Royal Borough of Kensington Chelsea	Expert (face to face)
9	2/8/2019	Fuss e.V.*	Expert (face to face)	9	11/21/2019	London Bike Kitchen*	Expert (face to face)
10	2/19/2019	Senate Department for the Environment, Transport and Climate (SenUVK01)*	Expert (face to face)	10	11/22/2019	Enfield Council*	Expert (face to face)
11	2/20/2019	Christian Democratic Union (CDU Berlin)	Expert (face to face)	11	11/26/2019	Transport for London, Active Travel and Health Team (TfL01)*	Expert (face to face)
12	2/22/2019	German Cyclist Association (ADFC Berlin)*	Expert (face to face)	12	11/28/2019	Transport for London, former Director (TfL02)*	Expert (face to face)

13	2/25/2019	BUND Berlin*	Expert (face to face)	13	11/29/2019	Transport for London, former advisor (TfL03)*	Expert (face to face)
14	3/10/2019	KCW (transport consultancy)	Informal (phone)	14	12/2/2019	London Cycling Campaign, infrastructure campaigns (LCC01)*	Expert (face to face)
15	3/13/2019	Senate Department for the Environment, Transport and Climate (SenUVK02-01)*	Expert (face to face)	15	12/2/2019	London Cycling Campaign, former chair (LCC02)*	Expert (face to face)
16	3/21/2019	Senate Department for the Environment, Transport and Climate (SenUVK03)	Expert (face to face)	16	12/3/2019	Transport for London, Surface Transport 01, (TfL04-01)	Expert (face to face)
17	4/25/2019	BVG (Public Transport Provider)	Expert (face to face)	17	12/5/2019	London Assembly, Transport Committee	Expert (e-mail)
18	6/12/2019	Social Democratic Party (SPD Berlin)	Expert (face to face)	18	12/5/2019	Former Deputy Mayor for Transport01*	Expert (face to face)
19	6/13/2019	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Green Party Berlin)	Expert (face to face)	19	1/28/2020	Transport for London, Surface Transport 02 (TfL04-02)	Expert (face to face)
20	6/26/2019	DIE LINKE (Left Party Berlin)	Expert (face to face)	20	1/29/2020	Individual campaigner (both Londoners on Bikes & LCC)*	Expert (face to face)
21	5/25/2020	Senate Department for the Environment, Transport and Climate (SenUVK02-02)	Member Check (phone)	21	1/30/2020	Former Deputy Mayor for Transport02	Expert (face to face)
22	5/29/2020	Former State Secretary, Senate Department for the Environment, Transport and Climate	Expert (face to face)	22	2/3/2020	Waltham Forest Council*	Expert (face to face)
23	2/23/2021	Volksentscheid Fahrrad/Changing Cities (VeF/CC)	Member Check (phone)	23	2/5/2020	“Cycling Works” Campaign	Expert (face to face)
				24	3/9/2020	London Evening Standard	Expert (face to face)
				25	3/10/2020	Business Improvement District (BID) - Team London Bridge*	Expert (face to face)
				26	3/11/2020	Individual campaigner (both LCC and blogging)*	Expert (face to face)
				27	4/15/2021	Transport for London, Surface Transport 03 (TfL04-03)	Member Check (phone)

*network maps used during interview

3.6.3.: Document overview

BERLIN	LONDON
Official and legal documents	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Berlin Mobility Act (2018) + previous drafts ▪ Berlin urban development plan for transport (2003 - 2011) and progress reports ▪ Berlin Energy- and Climate Protection Program (2016) ▪ Berlin Strategy for Bicycle Traffic (2004 & 2013) ▪ Berlin Strategy for Pedestrian Traffic (2011) ▪ Straßenverkehrsordnung StVO (2017) ▪ Coalition Agreement (2016) ▪ Parts of the Berlin Constitution (1995) <p><i>Appr. 780 pages of material</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Mayor`s Vision for Cycling in London. An Olympic Legacy for all Londoners (2013) ▪ TfL Business Plans (2011/12 – 2014/15) and TfL Budget Plans (2013/14 – 2015/16) ▪ Mayor`s Transport Strategy (2010) ▪ The London Plan – Transport Chapter (2011 & 2016) ▪ Road Task Force report: The vision and direction for London`s streets and roads <p><i>Appr. 782 pages of material</i></p>
Protocols and statements	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Protocols: meetings of transport committee at parliament ▪ Protocols of political speeches in parliament (also on youtube.com) ▪ Protocols: "FahRat"-meetings ▪ Information material from stakeholders and interviewees ▪ Presentations and statements ▪ Press releases by Senate Department for the Environment, Transport and Climate <p><i>Appr. 805 pages of material</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Minutes: TfL Board Papers (2012 – 2016) and videos of board debates (youtube.com) ▪ Minutes: LCC Annual General Meeting (2013 – 2017) ▪ TfL press releases ▪ TfL consultation documents about cycling schemes & consultation responses ▪ Official answers to parliamentary questions (e.g. at the Mayor`s Question Time) ▪ Speeches and statements by e.g. the Cycling Commissioner and panel discussions (youtube.com) ▪ GLA: "Gearing Up" report, evidence provided experts and TfL <p><i>Appr. 1529 pages of material</i></p>
Press and blog articles	
<p>Articles mainly by</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Der Tagesspiegel ▪ Berliner Zeitung ▪ Berliner Morgenpost <p><i>Appr. 120 pages of material</i></p>	<p>Articles mainly by</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Guardian ▪ Financial Times ▪ London Evening Standard ▪ BCC <p><i>Appr. 99 pages of material</i></p> <p>Blog entries on "Cyclists in the City", "ibikelondon", "Vole O'Speed", "Crap Cycling & Walking in Waltham Forest", the LCC blog or on specialized websites such as "Mayorwatch"</p> <p><i>Appr. 311 pages of material</i></p>

3.6.4.: List of attended events

BERLIN		LONDON	
Date	Event	Date	Event
10/17/2018	“Mit dem Rad zur Verkehrswende” (Berlin Social Science Center)	9/19/2019	International Car Free Day (London Car Free Day)
7/11/2018	“Datenbasierte Mobilitäts-Innovationen: Neue Beteiligungsformate” (InnoZ)	9/20/2019	London Summit (UCL Bartlett School)
11/12/2018	“Wie soll der urbane Verkehr der Zukunft aussehen?” (Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation)	10/9/2019	Meeting of Transport Committee (London Assembly)
11/22/2018	28th meeting of transport committee (Berlin Parliament)	11/5/2019	The London Conference (Centre for London)
12/6/2018	“Neue Wege für Berlin. Internationale Mobilitätskonferenz 2018” (Senate Department)	11/11/2019	Workshop with the New Economics Foundation and Sustrans on inclusive cycling
12/6/2018	29th meeting of transport committee (Berlin Parliament)	11/14/2019	Workshop: “Making Connection for Climate Action: Urban transport and renewable energy” (LSE Cities and Urban Transport Group)
12/12/2018	“Zukunft der Mobilität” with federal minister of transport (Telefónica Basecamp)	11/20/2019	Transport for London, Board Meeting
2/26/2019	“Streitfall Parken” (Agora Verkehrswende)		
3/9/2019	Civil engagement workshop “Ideenwerkstatt zum Tempelhofer Damm”		
4/11/2019	Civil engagement workshop: “Berlin soll schöner werden: Workshop der Visionäre”		
6/15/2019	“digital macht stadt – City to Go” (Alexander von Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society)		
4/29/2020	“Krisenfestes Radfahren: Die Corona-Pop-Up-Radwege in Berlin” (Online event by the German Institute for Urban Affairs Difu)		
10/11/2020	“14. Fahrradkommunalkonferenz” (Online event by the German Institute for Urban Affairs Difu)		

Chapter 4: Analysis

4.1. Contextual background

This chapter presents the analysis and empirical findings of this dissertation. Before turning to the individual case studies of the Berlin Mobility Act and London's Cycling Revolution, which form a sub-chapter each, it is crucial to embed both governance processes in their respective contexts. At least three contextual dimensions are important for understanding the subsequent analysis: (1) key similarities and differences in the politico-administrative systems of London and Berlin; (2) the ways in which actors from the private sector and civil society traditionally engage in those systems; and (3) the role of cycling in the transport policy history of London and Berlin.


4.1.1. The politico-administrative systems of London and Berlin

This dissertation examines two metropolises in Western Europe, whose politico-administrative systems underwent considerable changes in their recent past. In London, the most profound shift has been the re-instatement of a city government in 2000 following 15 years without a London-wide government. In Berlin, a momentous change has been the merging of East and West Berlin resulting from Germany's reunification in 1990 (Rode, 2019; Travers, 2008). In their current state, London and Berlin function through a two-tier administration and are both the largest and most populated city as well as the political capital of their home countries. As such, they undergo both centralization and decentralization tendencies, which is a characteristic feature of large cities (Röber & Schröter, 2002; Rode, 2019).

Interestingly, we can observe a certain convergence of London and Berlin on the spectrum of centralization and decentralization during the last two to three decades. Whereas in London, the autonomy of the individual boroughs was never questioned and peaked in the complete abolition of any higher-tier government, Berlin looks back at a centennial history as a single municipality (Röber, 2002; Röber et al., 2002). Yet, both politico-administrative systems have converged since London has become more centralized by establishing the

position of a directly elected Mayor in 2000, while reforms in Berlin have striven at strengthening the individual districts; a development which also led to the reduction from 23 to 12 districts in 2001 (Röber et al., 2002; Rode, 2019). London and Berlin thus offer a relatively high comparability regarding the governance challenges arising from a two-tier administrative structure, particularly in contrast to other European city models that are traditionally more centralized, such as Paris (Röber & Schröter, 2002).

Figure 3: Institutional development of European Metropolis (Röber & Schröter, 2002, p. 329; slightly modified version with own translations from German to English)



Besides their recent convergence, London and Berlin have developed distinct administrative structures, which accrue from the path dependencies of their unique histories (Röber et al., 2002; Rode, 2019). Furthermore, they are embedded in different national systems with the UK being a unitary state with strong centralization at the national level and Germany a federal state with considerable constitutional powers delegated to state and municipal levels (Rode, 2019). The next section will therefore briefly walk through the most important administrative reforms of both cities, highlighting administrative features that still characterize their governance systems today.

The politico-administrative history of London

London has experienced several administrative changes over the centuries that created complex institutional arrangements during certain periods, which gave London the reputation of an “ungovernable city” (Travers, 2003, p. 182). What has persisted throughout these alterations is the autonomy of the individual boroughs, which gained municipal status during the 19th century and exist in their current form since 1965 (Schröter, 2002).³³ After initial attempts of an area-wide coordination (particularly of public infrastructures), the London County Council was established in 1888, which covered the area of what is known today as Inner London. During the London County Council era (1888-1965), which constituted a relatively stable period in the politico-administrative history of London, the two-tier structure of an elected London County and the individual boroughs (28 at that time) emerged (Schröter, 2002).

The London Government Act in 1963 then marked a profound administrative reform with the creation of the Greater London Council (GLC) in 1965: through the extension of Outer London, the GLC was the first administrative body responsible for the whole area of Greater London. However, the GLC was exposed to several tensions since its formation. First, the GLC’s government capacities were limited by the relative power of the individual boroughs,

³³ One constant among the boroughs has been the City of London, the medieval city center, which enjoys a special administrative status up until today (Thornley, 2003).

which were re-arranged into 32 and the City of London (Schröter, 2002). Second, conflicts of interest arose between Inner and Outer London with Inner London being part and parcel of the social, economic, and administrative center of London (and traditionally Labor-run) and the more affluent and conservative Outer London (Travers, 2002). Third, the GLC was marked by party political rivalries between the city and national levels, particularly between Ken Livingstone (a central figure of the GLC and a Labor politician) and the conservative government under Margaret Thatcher. These tensions are still present today. Thus, only two years after the Thatcher government had gained power, the GLC was abolished in 1985, which left behind a polycentric administrative structure at the borough level with some responsibilities delegated to central government (Schröter, 2002).

Even though several new partnerships and organizations (such as borough committees and public-private partnerships) partly filled the void in the 15 years of “interregnum” (Travers, 2002, p. 117), it became widely accepted that London had become a “headless horror” (Schröter, 2002, p. 25) – particularly with regards to land use and transport planning. The election of a Labor government at the end of the 1990s then gave birth to London’s latest politico-administrative reform: the creation of the Greater London Authority (GLA). The main innovation of the GLA was the introduction of Britain’s first directly elected executive Mayor, which brought an American system of government to London (Schröter, 2002; Travers, 2008). The Mayor of London was given considerable competences, including budgetary powers, the appointment key administrative figures, and the strategic planning of key policy fields, notably urban development and transport (Schröter, 2002). Next to the Mayor, the London Assembly, a lean city parliament with 25 members, was created with the role of overseeing the Mayor’s policies.³⁴ The London Assembly has been assessed as relatively weak compared to the Mayor, who is the central political and administrative figure of the GLA (Travers, 2008). Even through the GLA is still relatively young and several reform demands have been expressed (e.g., improving the Mayor’s accountability,

³⁴ The London Assembly is composed of 14 constituency members and 11 London-wide members elected via lists. This “additional Member” voting system was chosen to allow for a multi-party assembly. The Mayor of London is elected using the “supplementary” vote system (The Electoral Commission, 2020).

strengthening the assembly and the city government as a whole), its formation is generally seen as a successful administrative re-structuring (Travers, 2008).

The politico-administrative history of Berlin

The cornerstone in the politico-administrative history of Berlin was the creation of a single but decentralized municipality through the *Groß-Berlin-Gesetz* in 1920. This law brought together eight urban municipalities, 59 rural municipalities, and 27 former estates into one municipality, which already covered an area with four million inhabitants. Before the law was passed, Berlin had been administered by a union (*Zweckverband*) for around a decade that aimed at coordinating transport, construction, and green area management (Musil & Kirchner, 2012; Röber, 2002). The *Groß-Berlin-Gesetz* thus marked a turning point and created an administrative structure that, broadly, persists until today: a two-tier system of the main administration at the city-level (*Hauptverwaltung*) and the district administration at the lower level (*Bezirksverwaltung*), with individual districts not being legal entities (Musil & Kirchner, 2012). One of the main organizational challenges of Berlin's administration, the unclear division of responsibilities between the city and district level, is thus a century old (Röber, 2002).

Another decisive period has been the division of the city into East and West Berlin between 1949 and 1989. Both parts of the city developed in very different ways, with East Berlin gradually becoming the capital of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) and West Berlin, surrounded by the GDR, struggling to remain part of West Germany and redefine its role within it. This division impacted the metropolitan development as suburbanization was frozen at 1939 levels due to the spatial limitations of West Berlin and the centralized and controlled land use and housing policies in East Berlin; a development which explains today's rather sharp distinction between Berlin and its surrounding areas (Häussermann, 2003). Another administrative change that fell into this period was the transformation of Berlin into a city-state and, thus, into one of the German *Länder* (Musil & Kirchner, 2012). Berlin has ever since fulfilled a double role: it is both a municipality and a German state (Musil & Kirchner, 2012). This implies that the city government assumes state level responsibilities, such as education, policing, and culture, as well as municipal powers

typically including infrastructure provision, waste management, and local planning (Rode, 2019).

In the wake of Germany's reunification, the city-state of Berlin then assumed its present form. The administration of West Berlin with 12 districts were joined by the 11 districts of East Berlin (Rode, 2019). These 23 districts were later reduced to 12. The decision of the German parliament in 1991 to move large parts of the central government to Berlin added yet another administrative layer. Efforts to merge the state of Berlin with the surrounding state of Brandenburg failed in a 1996 referendum. However, both states have entered into a number of agreements and created joint institutions in order to improve regional development (Häussermann, 2003; Musil & Kirchner, 2012).

Based on Berlin's constitution, the main administration consists of the Berlin Senate, which holds executive power. The Senate functions as a collegiate body and is comprised of the Governing Mayor of Berlin and up to eight senators who spearhead different thematic departments. Berlin is generally ruled by a coalition and thus a multi-party government, but minority governments are possible. Unlike the dominant figure of the Mayor of London, the Governing Mayor of Berlin is appointed by the relatively powerful House of Representatives (city parliament) and acts more like a *primus inter pares*. Compared to the other prime ministers of the German states, the position of Berlin's Mayor has been frequently criticized as weak even though it has been strengthened by several constitutional reforms (Musil & Kirchner, 2012). The district administrations are comprised of a district office, which is led by a district Mayor, and a district assembly. While the districts should act according to the principles of self-government, they are constrained by their legal status, and all matters of citywide relevance are administered at the city level.

This historical review demonstrates that despite certain analogies between London and Berlin, both cities follow distinct politico-administrative models. London, where administrative reforms usually proceeded bottom-up (Travers, 2002), is governed by a directly elected Mayor who is scrutinized by a relatively weak Assembly. In Berlin, where the emphasis has been placed on the city as a whole for over a century, the Governing Mayor,

whose competencies do not equal his London counterpart, is confronted by a powerful city parliament.

4.1.2. The role of business and civil society

To grasp fully how the two governance processes of this dissertation evolved in a multi-stakeholder context, it is important to understand the ways in which other stakeholders (such as businesses, civil society organizations or simply the electorate) can articulate their interests in these politico-administrative systems and engage within them.

Since the 1990s, politics in London have traditionally followed a “world city” agenda, which highlights the economic competitiveness of the city as a financial powerhouse that ranks only second to New York (Long Finance, 2021; Rode, 2016; Thornley, 2003). Unsurprisingly, London’s business sector is well organized and of considerable political relevance. During the 15 years of interregnum between the GLC and GLA, public-private partnerships as well as new private interest groups were formed (such as the influential “London First” group) that gained privileged access to central government, which was in charge of London’s strategic policy guidance at that time (Gordon, 1999; Newman & Thornley, 1997; Thornley et al., 2005). Business upheld its privileged position throughout the administrative changes that created the GLA, which was first governed by the Labor politician Ken Livingstone. It quickly adapted to the new governance structure by shifting attention away from central government towards the GLA and the Mayor in particular. Through, inter alia, informal networks and confidential meetings, business interests were fed into the development of the first London Plan, London’s main policy planning guideline (Thornley et al., 2005; Travers, 2003). Another channel for the business sector to shape London politics are so-called Business Improvement Districts (BIDs), which are business-led organizations that represent the businesses of a geographical area and assume quasi-public tasks such as security, regeneration, and place promotion. London is home to several influential BIDs that mediate between businesses and public bodies such as local councils, TfL, and the police; a development which, according Häußermann et al. (2008), can be seen as a form of privatization of city politics (pp. 293–294). Berlin, meanwhile, does not hold the same position as the lead economic or financial center due to the more decentralized

economic structure in the federal state of Germany. Following turbulent years as a divided and politically contested city, Berlin experienced an exodus of corporate headquarters (Krätke, 2000). The restructuring of the eastern part was accompanied by rising unemployment, an agglomeration in public debt, and an economy which underperformed the national average (Gornig et al., 2013; Senatsverwaltung für Finanzen Berlin, n.d., "*Schulden des Landes Berlin*"). Even though the economic performance (particularly of the service industries) and public finances have improved considerably since 2005 (Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Berlin, n.d., "*Wirtschaftsentwicklung und -struktur*"; Gornig et al., 2013; Senatsverwaltung für Finanzen Berlin, n.d., "*Schulden des Landes Berlin*"), the economic pressures on urban politics are comparatively lower than in London. However, business associations, such as the Berlin branch of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce or the Business Association of Berlin Brandenburg as well as the public private partnership "Berlin Partner" are integral members of Berlin's political system.

Yet, Berlin is home to vibrant civil societies (Keane, 2007), which increasingly demonstrate their capacity for collective action to advance their interests in the political sphere.³⁵ As petitions about water utilities, the electricity network or Tegel airport indicate, the engagement of Berlin's civil society increasingly intersects with the field of urban development and public infrastructures. Since its latest revision in 1995, public petitions and referenda have been incorporated into Berlin's constitution while debates about strengthening direct democracy date back to the end of the Second World War (Wollmann, 2002). Even though Berlin lags behind the rest of the country with regard to direct democracy measures at the district level, legislative process at the city level can now be initiated not only by the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also by the general public (Röber et al., 2002). Apart from legislation, public participation is mandatory for several construction and planning processes, including large infrastructure projects (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Wohnen Berlin, n.d.,

³⁵ It is important to be aware that London's and Berlin's civil society and business sector are diverse and consist of very different actor groups with varying constituencies and agendas (for an overview of Berlin's social entrepreneurship and crowdfunding scene, see e.g., Langley et al., 2020).

"*Bebauungsplanverfahren in Berlin*"). Next to these constitutional requirements, urban governance in Berlin now increasingly incorporates project-based work through boards and advisory committees that also draw on the expertise of the organized civil society (Rode & da Cruz, 2018). In London, public participation is also built into policymaking processes, for instance through consultation processes, public hearings, and question times. However, the debate in the UK mainly centers on revitalizing local democracy through measures such as neighborhood government or community planning (Röber et al., 2002).

This rough overview demonstrates that the stakeholder setting, in which the two governance processes are situated, differs. Whereas London is characterized by an influential private sector that still builds on the unusual coalitions developed during the 1990s, urban politics in Berlin increasingly allow for direct democracy as well as civil society participation through committees and advisory boards.

4.1.3. Transport governance and policies in London and Berlin

As highlighted earlier, a functioning transport system has been high on the agenda in London and Berlin for centuries with transport challenges often serving as a driver for politico-administrative reforms. This section introduces the present-day transport governance as well as the transport policy mix of both cities and the role that cycling plays within them.

In London, transport has traditionally been a one of the most important policy fields. According to Rode (2016), this rests on the shortcomings of the city's transport system as well as the dependence of the business sector on a functioning transport network. When powers were re-allocated to a citywide government and the first directly-elected Mayor took office in 2000, the development of a comprehensive transport strategy was prioritized over all other strategies (pp. 121–122). Yet, even before the formation of the GLA, transport has been at the center of politico-administrative debates. The predecessor of the GLA, the GLC, held extensive competences in transport (Busetti, 2015; Golbuff & Aldred, 2011). A dispute over public transport fees between the GLC and the borough of Bromley turned into a 20-year court battle, which contributed to the removal of the GLC (Burnham, 2006; Busetti, 2015). During the years of interregnum, the governance structure of London's transport

system became more complex with new organizations and positions being created such as “London Regional Transport” or the “Minister for Transport in London” (Busetti, 2015). Calls for a new transport authority soon re-emerged and greater coordination and directly elected control was demanded (Busetti, 2015; Travers et al., 1991). The formation of the GLA then created the present-day governance structure that centers around the Mayor of London as the main figure in transport. The Mayor is obliged to draft a transport strategy that covers all transport modes. Funds are allocated to the individual boroughs based on Local Implementation Plans (LIPs), which detail how the boroughs intend to meet the objectives of the Mayor’s Transport Strategy. The Mayor is granted the right to approve or amend each borough’s LIP (Busetti, 2015). The creation of the GLA also gave birth to Transport for London (TfL), which is seen as one of the most progressive organizational arrangements for a transport authority to date because it integrates the planning and operation of all transport modes in the city, including walking and cycling (Burnham, 2006; Rode, 2019).³⁶ The Mayor chairs the TfL board and appoints the other board members as well as the Transport Commissioner, who runs TfL.

Cycling policies in England are guided and overseen by the Department for Transport (DfT), while much of the responsibility lies at the local level (Golbuff & Aldred, 2011). In London, cycling policies are broadly set by the Mayor and then substantiated and implemented by TfL. In so doing, TfL depends on the willingness of the individual boroughs who own and manage around 95% of London’s road network (London Councils, n.d., "About boroughs"). TfL has further entered into strategic partnerships, primarily with the active travel charity and consultancy Sustrans that manages the delivery of cycle lanes on borough roads (Sustrans, 2019).

³⁶ TfL was established alongside three other agencies, which are the Metropolitan Police Authority, the London Development Agency, and the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (Busetti, 2015). TfL is a comparatively large transport organization with around 28.000 employees in 2019 (compared to around 14.600 employees of Berlin’s transport organization BVG in the same year) and finances itself primarily through fares (Transport for London, n.d., "How we are funded").

The governance of transport in Berlin has been heavily impacted by the city's division and subsequent reunification, which necessitated the merger of two different transport systems. During the 28 years of division, Berlin's public transport organization BVG was split in two. While transport planning in West Berlin followed the example of other western European capitals such as London and Paris, that in East Berlin was oriented towards the cityscape of Moscow (Van Den Hövel, 2019). Today, the future development of Berlin's transport system is the political responsibility of one of the senators and the respective senate department. Due to possible thematic rearrangements, transport has been handled by different senate departments. After being part of the former Senate Department for Urban Development and the Environment until 2016, it is now administered by the newly established Senate Department for the Environment, Transport, and Climate Protection (SenUVK). Even though transport takes a more prominent stance in the current institutional setup, its thematic separation from urban development has been subject to criticism. Unlike TfL, the now reunified BVG is only responsible for the operation of the public transport system, which makes the governance of cycling a more complex matter in Berlin.

While the planning and coordination of cycling policies falls under the responsibility of the respective senate department, their implementation depends on the twelve districts who oversee construction on the majority of the roads (Senatsverwaltung für Umwelt, n.d.-a, "*Akteure und Gremien*"). As for any transport policy, cycling policies are subject to parliamentary debate and scrutinized by the transport committee of the city parliament. Furthermore, Berlin traditionally plans and coordinates cycling policies through committee work with the organized civil society, for instance in the so-called *FahrRat* (Senatsverwaltung für Umwelt, n.d.-c; "*FahrRat*"). During the current legislative period (2016-2021), administrative capacities for cycling were expanded and processes streamlined: the SenUVK created a permanent coordination unit for cycling and integrated the formerly subordinate traffic control unit (*Verkehrslenkung Berlin*) into the organization (Senatsverwaltung für Umwelt, 2019b). Moreover, funds were allocated for the creation of additional administrative positions for cycling in the individual districts. The indirect effect of national politics should not be overlooked as well, as it sets national strategies to promote cycling (which have been institutionalized in 2002), oversees road traffic regulations, and

supports lower-level administrative units (VCD Verkehrsclub, 2009).

How have cycling policies evolved within the broader transport policy mix of both cities? European cities are historically denser and more compact than those in, for instance, the US or Australia, which is associated with a higher public transport usage and lower per capita energy consumption (Banister, 1995, pp. 67–68). London and Berlin are no exception and, together with Paris, have developed some of the most elaborate urban rail systems worldwide. Unsurprisingly, the development of a vast public transport network has traditionally taken center stage in the cities' transport agendas. Following the destruction of large parts of Berlin's railway during the Second World War and a divergence in public transport strategies while the city was divided, the reconstruction and expansion of Berlin's railway system was a challenging task. From the early 1990s onwards, the so-called "mushroom concept" (*Pilzkonzept*) was applied, which was designed to increase rail capacity within and through Berlin while upholding the city's polycentric structure (Rode et al., 2015; Rode, 2016). In this context, transport policies such as the re-establishment of the pre-war *S-Bahn*, the upgrade and extension of the light train system in the former eastern part of the city, and investments in the underground were of high political relevance (Rode, 2016). London equally builds on a strong public transport legacy and is home to the oldest underground system, which opened its first line in 1863 (Transport for London, n.d.-b, "London Underground"). Since the 1990s, when the world city agenda gained traction, investments in public transport (including an improved access to the city's airports) were increasingly aimed at maintaining the city's economic competitiveness in the face of continuing population growth (Rode, 2016; Thornley, 1999). Providing a dense and reliable public transport network, which also relies heavily on bus services, has thus been a political priority across parties for many years and, according to Rode (2016), remains by far the most pertinent transport policy objective in London to date (p. 122). Recent developments are concentrated in East London, which is experiencing substantial population growth and inner-city densification (Rode et al., 2015).

Despite their generously sized public transport systems, the concept of the car-friendly city took root in both cities and translated into car-oriented policies such as road expansion and

the construction of urban motorways. Even though the concept dates back to the 1920s, the facilitation of private motorized traffic started to move up both cities' policy agendas during the 1960s (in Berlin primarily in the former western part) when economic upswing led to a surge in car-ownership (Golbuff & Aldred, 2011). However, the unintended consequences of “predict and provide” road building (notably growing motorization, congestion, and pollution) soon became evident among city and transport planners (Banister, 1995; Dudley & Richardson, 2000; Golbuff & Aldred, 2011). In Berlin, a rethinking started during 1990s when commuter volumes grew and integrated transport concepts for a reunited Berlin were put in place. Since then, transport policies in Berlin have shifted and now predominantly aim at disincentivizing private motorized traffic, for instance through speed limits or by the introduction of an environmental zone in 2008 – the extension of the urban motorway A100 being the only exception (Rode, 2016). Today, the majority of Berlin households do not own a car (51%), which is why it is considered one of the least car-friendly cities in Germany (Follmer & Gruschwitz, 2019; Rode, 2016). London was equally challenged by the rise of private motorized traffic as Central London maintained parts of its historic street grid with a more random alignment of narrow lanes. Limited road capacities are one of the reasons why London suffers severely from congestion. Thus, urban motorway plans faced local opposition already since the late 1960s, also by some of the key boroughs (Rode, 2016). London's most prominent policy to ease congestion has been the Congestion Charge in 2003, which, according to TfL, has reduced traffic considerably within the charging area (Transport for London, 2006, 2008). Traffic was further disincentivized with similar road charging policies, such as the “Low Emission Zone” since 2008 and the “Ultra Low Emission Zone” since 2019.

It is in this context of increased efforts to achieve modal shift away from private motorized traffic that cycling was re-established as an important transport mode in both cities. There are, however, notable differences between London and Berlin. First, actual cycling levels vary considerably. (See Figure 4 on p. 81). The UK witnessed a sharp decline in cycling levels during the post-war era up to the point that a 1989 European Commission survey placed “Britain alongside Belgium as the worst nation” to cycle (Cyclists' Touring Club, 1993, p. 10; as cited in Golbuff & Aldred, 2011, p. 9). In London, the trip-based mode-share

of cycling grew slightly from one to two per cent in 2005 and remained there ever since. (See Table 3 on p. 81). In Germany, on the other hand, cycling is traditionally more widespread, which is reflected in a cycling mode share of around 11% on a national level (Nobis, 2019, data from 2017). Berlin exceeds this average with a cycling mode share of 18% (see Figure 5 on p. 82, data from 2018).

Figure 4: Cycling share in European countries in 2011 (Netherlands = 100 %)³⁷





Table 3: Trip-based mode shares in London 1997-2017³⁸

Year	Percentage of trips			
	Public transport	Private transport	Cycle	Walk
1997	26%	48%	1%	24%
1998	27%	48%	1%	24%
1999	27%	48%	1%	24%
2000	28%	47%	1%	24%
2001	28%	46%	1%	24%
2002	29%	46%	1%	24%
2003	30%	44%	1%	24%
2004	31%	43%	1%	24%
2005	31%	43%	2%	25%
2006	31%	43%	2%	24%
2007	32%	43%	2%	23%
2008	34%	40%	2%	24%
2009	34%	40%	2%	24%
2010	34%	39%	2%	24%
2011	36%	38%	2%	24%
2012	36%	37%	2%	24%
2013	37%	37%	2%	24%
2014	37%	37%	2%	24%
2015	37%	36%	2%	24%
2016	37%	36%	2%	25%
2017	37%	36%	2%	25%

³⁷ Slightly modified representation by the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Affairs (today Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure), displayed in the *Nationaler Radverkehrsplan 2020* (National Cycling Strategy 2020) based on European Commission data (Bundesministerium für Verkehr Bau und Stadtentwicklung, 2012, p. 7).

³⁸ Slightly modified representation: Strategic Analysis, TfL City Planning (as cited in Transport for London, 2018)

Figure 5: Modal split in Berlin³⁹



Second, the city’s political approaches towards cycling differed.⁴⁰ In London and the UK overall, cycling has traditionally been devolved from classical transport policy and framed as an individual choice rather than a state responsibility (Aldred, 2012). This is also reflected in the idea of “vehicular cycling”, which shaped the discourse in the political sphere but also among cycling interest groups (Golbuff & Aldred, 2011). The term vehicular cycling expresses the view that cyclists should have equal rights to other road users and, thus, free access to the road (Longhurst, 2015). This contrasts with the approach of planning and providing segregated space for cyclists, which has been more prominent in Central Europe. When London’s first bike path opened in 1934, cycling campaigners voiced concerns over their “rightful use of the roadway” (Golbuff & Aldred, 2011, p. 5). Even though priorities have shifted towards segregation, the debate over segregation versus vehicular traffic remains important in the UK to this day (Golbuff & Aldred, 2011). Since the 1990s, plans

³⁹ Modal choice measured in terms of all journeys made by Berlin residents (not only inner-city trips), volume figures in percentages (sums can deviate from 100 per cent due to rounding errors), data taken from the study *Mobilität in Städten* (Mobility in Cities) SrV 2013 and SrV 2018 by the Technical University of Dresden (Gerike et al., 2019)

⁴⁰ It is important to note that apart from infrastructural measures, there are several policy options available to support cycling, which also include “softer” measures such as cycle training, awareness campaigns as well as co-benefits from other transport policies such as emission zones or traffic calming.

to realize a network of cycle routes across the London boroughs were developed and partly implemented under the term “London Cycle Network”, which was later rebranded as “London Cycle Network Plus” (Golbuff & Aldred, 2011, p. 31). Yet, the project, which was planned to reach almost 3,000 km of new cycling infrastructure and received approximately £100 million worth of investments, was terminated prior to completion in 2012 having failed to meet its quantitative and qualitative targets (Deegan, 2016). Already in 2010, the then Mayor Boris Johnson had promised a “Cycling Revolution” (Transport for London, 2010b) but was criticized for not delivering on this promise.⁴¹ This shows that until that point, cycling has been a challenging – if not neglected – area of transport policy in London and change proved to be difficult to achieve.

To a lesser degree, the segregation-vehicular traffic debate also reverberated in Berlin. This did not prevent, however, that the city became home to over 1,000 km of cycling infrastructure (Beikler, 2020b). Until recently, the main guideline for Berlin’s urban transport policy has been the so-called *Stadtentwicklungsplan Verkehr* (urban development plan for transport), which is a non-binding strategy document first developed in a multi-stakeholder dialogue in 2003 (and renewed in 2011 and 2016) and which also relates to cycling. More focused strategies for cycling and walking have existed since 2004 and 2011, respectively. However, despite widespread approval of these guidelines across stakeholder groups, implementation was lagging, which caused mounting dissatisfaction, particularly amongst civil society organizations. The following analysis will examine and showcase how this stalemate was overcome in both cities by a step change in cycling policy.⁴² It will reveal how – besides the broader developments outlined in this section – change was brought about by the actions of, and the interplay between, a group of stakeholders through a chain of events.

⁴¹ Even though the announcement of the “Cycling Revolution” dates back to Johnson’s first mayoralty, this dissertation uses the term to describe his second mayoralty, during which the Cycling Revolution actually happened.

⁴² At the point of writing in 2020/2021, the more long-term results of the case study in Berlin are still uncertain.

Chapter 4.2. Analysis London – The Cycling Revolution

Phase 1: Formation within civil society (2010-2012)


Major crunch point: Making prospective Mayor Boris Johnson pledge in response to the demands of civil society

Background: During his first mayoralty (2008 – 2012), Mayor Boris Johnson was criticized for not doing enough for cycling despite his promises to significantly promote it. He had rolled out London's much heralded bike hire scheme and realized a first generation of Cycle Superhighways, which were recognizable by their blue color. Both projects were inherited from his predecessor Ken Livingstone (TfL04-01, December 12, 2019). Dissatisfaction started to mount within London's main cycling association, the London Cycling Campaign (LCC). Certain individuals within the association (both at the city and borough levels) started to promote segregation instead of vehicular cycling (LCC02, December 2, 2019). The public debate on cycling then suddenly gained momentum because of a planned redesign of the junction on top of Blackfriars Bridge by TfL, which was viewed as worsening conditions for cyclists. Around the same time, several cycling fatalities on Blackfriars Bridge and on the first Cycle Superhighways occurred and reported by the local press. Several cycling bloggers, whose voices became increasingly influential, engaged stridently in the debate over Blackfriars Bridge and started to create pressure by lobbying members of the London Assembly. The LCC, meanwhile, carried out a membership ballot to persuade its members to vote for a single-issue campaign for the upcoming mayoral elections. The members decided on a campaign for segregated and protected cycling infrastructure, which was later labelled "Love London Go Dutch". A number of cycling fatalities at Bow roundabout (in East London, close to the Olympic Park) were widely discussed in the media and heated up the debate still further (Deputy Mayor for Transport01, December 5, 2019). Two *route de dangers* were organized by the group of bloggers and these cycling tours around dangerous junctions in London, again, attracted media attention. These events also gave birth to the campaign "Londoners on Bikes", a short-term and relatively straightforward campaign aiming at mobilizing a "bike vote" for the upcoming mayoral elections, which was also strongly connected to the bloggers (Aldred, 2013, p. 195). The LCC, which had not

organized demonstrations for several years, then initiated “flash rides” on Blackfriars Bridge with strong media presence, which were also attended by some politicians. After all mayoral candidates had pledged to the demands of the Love London Go Dutch campaign and some back and forth between the LCC and his campaign team, Mayor Johnson fully endorsed the campaign – just before his re-election (LCC02, December 2, 2019).

STRUCTURE

Figure 6: Graphic representation of actor-network in phase 1⁴³



London’s Cycling Revolution found its beginning in a relatively small network outside of politics. The switch from the logic of vehicular to segregated cycling emerged through an opinion forming process within civil society. Through the series of events outlined above, a triad of the LCC, bloggers, and the local press materialized, which jointly pushed for a

⁴³ These network depictions are used throughout the analysis to visualize key actors and their working ties during different phases of the process. They are not based on quantitative network data but reconstructed in a qualitative fashion. This was done with the help of the network visualization software Visone. The positioning of actors (e.g., at the center, at the top or at the bottom of the network) as well as the distance of their ties are arbitrary. The working ties represented in these graphs are those that were found important for the development of the policy at hand. Naturally, other ties between the actors might exist outside the scope of the respective governance process (e.g., between the press and the Mayor). In this graph, the bloggers and Londoners on Bikes are jointly represented as “Bloggers” and “GLA” stands for Members of the London Assembly.

change in cycling policies.⁴⁴ Interestingly, the group of bloggers, who were also engaged in the campaign Londoners on Bikes (and some of whom were also active in the LCC network) were considered structurally equivalent to the long-established LCC by the majority of interviewees from the administrative and political sphere – if not as even more influential (TfL04-02, January 28, 2020 & Deputy Mayor for Transport01, December 5, 2019). This can be partly explained by the fact that the LCC, as a membership-based and relatively large organization existing since the 1970s, did not only have to overcome internal struggles (mainly between members who wanted to promote segregation and activists who preferred to uphold the vehicular cycling paradigm) but also to carefully manage their long-established ties in London’s transport polity, for instance with TfL (LCC02, December 2, 2019). As one interviewee, who was active in the LCC network but also ran a cycling blog, recalled about the relations between the former chief executive of the LCC and TfL: “[...] his view was that we should keep talking, we should keep trying to improve them. We should keep trying to negotiate.” (Individual campaigner, March 11, 2020) The bloggers, however, were detached from these existing structures and, as individuals, freer to publicly accuse, lobby, and mobilize. They contributed to winning Assembly members from all major parties for their cause, which created additional pressure for Mayor Johnson and TfL and attracted media attention. The LCC, meanwhile, managed to amalgamate all demands into the relatively concise Love London Go Dutch campaign and was well-positioned to convince Johnson’s campaign team to sign up to their claims. One senior leader at TfL summarized this phase as follows:

What we actually saw was huge momentum added into this by social media, by the bloggers. It became apparent that social media commentators made an informal alliance

⁴⁴ This does not mean that the idea of segregation was not increasingly articulated or even practically worked on elsewhere, for instance in some of the London boroughs (TfL03, November 29, 2019). However, it was mainly the triad of the LCC, the local press, and the bloggers that was perceived as central in placing the issue on the agenda. It is also important to be aware that several of the measures around cycling that Mayor Johnson started to implement (e.g., the concept of cycle superhighways) and was criticized on due to their lack of coherence and quality were first developed under his predecessor Ken Livingstone (TfL04-03, April 15, 2021).

at that time. Individual people were blogging but they started then to connect via Twitter and via the internet. They then started to meet informally, and you could just tell by a lot of the social media that was going on that there was an informal network that coalesced. LCC was seen to be slightly outside of this because I think they were seen to be a little old school and not necessarily that successful at directly lobbying the Mayor and TfL. The bloggers were the new kids on the block. They were very tech savvy in terms of how to use social media and how to campaign and they started to really pile on the pressure. But LCC were then eventually central in bringing all of that together in 2012, and that's where everybody really joined behind the Go Dutch thing. (TfL04-02, January 28, 2020)

With regards to relations, it would be misleading to surmise a close working relationship or even a strategic division of tasks between the LCC and the bloggers, between old and new campaigners so to speak. Both sides viewed each other critically. The “new wave of cycling blogs” (Aldred, 2013, p. 196) also arose as a form of criticism of traditional campaign work and intentionally distanced itself with distinct online and offline activities. An interview with a former LCC representative further revealed that the LCC struggled to convince Johnson's campaign team to endorse Love London Go Dutch because they did not agree with the more radical campaign techniques of Londoners on Bikes:

So there was [...] I think it was called Londoners on Bikes. Many of them were LCC activists but they were going a little bit further in terms of being [...] political [...] Okay very different from us [...] And they had, on a TV debate, one of the spokespersons had asked a very aggressive [...] they asked a very difficult question to Boris [...] But Lynton [Lynton Crosby, Johnson's election manager] then was chewing my head off and said So what are you playing at? We are trying to [find] an agreement here and you're having someone [...] you know trashing us on TV? (LCC02, December 2, 2019)

What is more, the other organized civil society associations from the field of active travel in London, such as Living Streets (association for pedestrians) and the charity and consultancy Sustrans, did not back LCC's Love London Go Dutch campaign at the beginning. Notwithstanding such lack of cohesion at this point, the varying engagements of the LCC

and the bloggers were viewed as somewhat reinforcing. The ties between the bloggers and the local press were equally seen as mutually supportive. The bloggers made intensive use of social media or gave detailed accounts of events on their respective blogs. Journalists quickly picked up their stories and made them available to a wider London audience (Deputy Mayor for Transport01, December 5, 2019).

STYLE

What became discernible during this phase was the rather confrontational style of the new cycling campaigners (bloggers and Londoners on Bikes), which differentiated them from the traditional campaigners centered around the LCC. They applied new communication tactics (blogging, data sharing, video recordings to comment upon driver behavior or infrastructure) (Aldred, 2013, p. 200), employed a more strident rhetoric against TfL and the Mayor, and spontaneously mobilized for protest (*tour de danger*). The bloggers were well positioned for these novel practices of communicating and interacting because they were relatively detached from existing ties with decision-makers and, as day job holders, perceived differently as paid representatives of cycling organizations (Aldred, 2013, p. 200). In an email to an Assembly member, one of the bloggers wrote, “I should stress that I don’t regard myself as a transport campaigner. I am someone who works and lives in London and happens to cycle to work” (Cyclist in the City, 2011a). With this approach, they also reached occasional cyclists who were not involved in long-term campaigning (Aldred, 2013, p. 198). Interestingly, throughout 2011, the LCC started to partly adopt this confrontational style by publicly speaking out against TfL’s infrastructural plans (calling TfL’s road management strategy a “nightmare”) and becoming more proactive (protesting outside of TfL’s buildings, organizing “flash rides” through the city) (London Cycling Campaign, 2011a, 2011b). In a 2011 blogpost entitled “London Cycle Campaign finally gets angry: Proposes Blackfriars flash-ride Friday morning” one of the bloggers wrote:


I think this is the first time ALL people who cycle and walk in London agree that the way Transport for London plans our streets has to change. The London Cycling Campaign has come out fighting and plans to leaflet people tomorrow morning at Blackfriars Bridge

about how TfL simply ignores Londoners if they don't want to drive everywhere all the time. (Cyclist in the City, 2011c)

According to Aldred, the legacy of the new campaign groups such as Londoners on Bikes and the bloggers thus included their contribution to “radicalizing the existing campaigning scene” (Aldred, 2013, p. 200). As a result, the previously “comfortable” relationship between the LCC and TfL became strained over the course of this period. Moreover, the press took on an unusually proactive position. In addition to reporting, the national newspaper “The Times” launched their own cycling campaign, entitled “Cities fit for cycling”, after one of their journalists had been seriously injured while cycling close to their office building (British Cycling, n.d., "British Cycling and The Times Cities fit for Cycling Campaign"). Already in 2007, “The Evening Standard” newspaper had initiated a “Safer Cycling” campaign, which promoted a charter for cyclists including a cycle network across London with proper segregation (Golbuff & Aldred, 2011, p. 30).

POLICY

Figure 7: Policy network at the beginning of phase 1




KEY

- Nodes = Policy interests articulated by key actors during this phase
- Size of nodes = High / low amount of nominations by actors
- Links btw. nodes = Policy interests shared by actors
- Width of ties = Amount of concurrent nominations by actors
- Colors = Framing of policy interests [light green: safety; light blue: vehicular cycling]
- Layout: Computed with the visualization algorithm “stress minimization” in the software Visone, a multi-dimensional scaling technique arranging distances (i.e., shortest path lengths) as adequate as possible (*Visone Manual*, n.d.); the positioning of nodes (e.g., at the top or at the center of the network) and the length of ties are arbitrary

Initially, the frame of “vehicular cycling” (light blue) still reverberated within London’s cycling community and was observable through policy interests about enabling individual cyclists to ride confidently in traffic, such as cycle training or a reduction in traffic speed. This frame had, according to Aldred (2013), traditionally resisted the “dangerization” of cycling and stressed instead that cycling on roads is a healthy and safe activity (p. 199). Throughout phase one, which was marked by several cycling fatalities, the frame of “safety” (light green) gained traction. Policy interests about upgrades of dangerous junctions, provision of dedicated cycle infrastructure on busy roads, and, most importantly, the overall improvement of the quality of cycle infrastructure partly replaced the former “skepticism towards segregation” (Aldred, 2013, p. 194). One of the key principles of LCC’s Love London Go Dutch campaign was “safety first: Londoners young or old, occasional cyclists or experienced ones, will be safe, and feel safe cycling on main roads” (London Cycling Campaign, 2012). According to Aldred (2013), this “frame shift” can be traced back to the new wave of cycling advocacy (bloggers and Londoners on Bikes), striving “to re-introduce danger into the debate, politicizing rather than individualizing it” (p. 199). Overall, the discourse during this phase was highly emotionalized and exclusively focused on cycling (TfL04-03, April 15, 2021). This also resulted from the articulation of relatively concrete objectives by members of the new cycling advocacy on the issues of safety and danger while avoiding cross-links to other themes such as livability or environmentalism (Aldred, 2013, p. 199).

Figure 8: Policy network later in phase 1



KEY

- Nodes = Policy interests articulated by key actors actors during this phase
- Size of nodes = High / low amount of nominations by actors
- Links btw. nodes = Policy interests shared by actors
- Width of ties = Amount of concurrent nominations by actors
- Colors = Framing of policy interests [light green: safety; light blue: vehicular cycling; grey: feasibility & efficiency; yellow: cycling as mass transport]
- Layout: Computed with the visualization algorithm “stress minimization” in the software Visone, a multi-dimensional scaling technique arranging distances (i.e., shortest path lengths) as adequate as possible (*Visone Manual*, n.d.); the positioning of nodes (e.g., at the top or at the center of the network) and the length of ties are arbitrary

As the actor network grew and new ties to politics materialized, a number of new frames became apparent, such as the call for a broader and more inclusive approach to cycling (yellow), and the view that infrastructural interventions should be implemented cautiously in order to minimize the impact on other road users (grey). It is the latter frame in particular that builds on the transport policies of Johnson’s first tenure, which (with high congestion and the mega event of the Olympics in 2012) largely followed an agenda of “smoothing the traffic flow” (TfL02, November 11, 2019). A focus on congestion as a major transport policy problem brings cycling into a double-edged position: on the one hand, it is seen as an alternative transport mode that should be strengthened in order to ease congestion – more so in light of the failure of “predict and provide” road building. On the other hand, it requires a reallocation of road space that, at least temporarily, can disrupt traffic flow (Golbuff & Aldred, 2011, p. 11). This shows that as soon as the actor network expanded into the sphere

of political decision-makers, a more problem-focused perspective on the realization of new cycling infrastructure gained priority.

CONCLUSION

The analysis of the first phase has shown that the interplay of different factors mitigated the main crunch point, which was the promise of prospective Mayor Boris Johnson to implement the demands of civil society and the press. Although the upcoming mayoral elections presented a window of opportunity in themselves, it is important to remember that fulfillment of Johnson's pledge in this case was by no means guaranteed. First, because of the transport legacy of his first mayoralty, which had been differently prioritized albeit with a stronger focus on cycling. Moreover, an interviewee from the LCC involved in the negotiations with Johnson's campaign team recalled that, at first, Johnson's team had issued an official statement, which only partly committed to the demands of Love London Go Dutch and was considered as "weak" (LCC02, December 2, 2019). Only after continued lobbying and negotiations, did he endorse it fully.

Change came about when the rise of a new cycling advocacy altered the structural landscape of London's cycling campaign scene. New actors, such as a group of bloggers and campaigners, became influential and brought a novel style of campaigning to the fore – one distinctively more confrontational. Almost through a mimetic pressure to adjust, the organized civil society, namely the LCC, followed suit, which gave the call for a drastic change in cycling policy further momentum. Together with a surprisingly proactive press, these campaign efforts made cycling – and especially cycle safety – one of the key political issues in the run-up to the 2012 mayoral elections. A combination of this external pressure and the established ties between the LCC and London's political leadership resulted in Johnson's commitment to make cycling a top priority of his second term in office.

Phase 2: Formal policymaking process (2012-2015)


Major crunch point: Winning the approval of the TfL Board to proceed with cycling project

Background: Now that Johnson had won the mayoral elections and pledged according to the demands of civil society, his promises had to be translated into policy. Johnson had already appointed Isabel Dedring, his former environment advisor who also used to be head of staff at TfL as his Deputy Mayor for Transport. Dedring started to engage with the group of bloggers, was regularly in touch with the LCC, and founded the “Roads Task Force” – a group of experts and representatives of different road users that published a strategy to re-shape and re-prioritize London’s road network. She had appointed one of the bloggers to join this task force (Deputy Mayor for Transport01, December 5, 2019). This also triggered the cycling team within TfL in cooperation with representatives from civil society to work out a draft for a comprehensive cycling strategy. Johnson further appointed journalist Andrew Gilligan as London’s first Cycling Commissioner who oversaw the cycling program and reported to Dedring. This appointment was slightly controversial because Gilligan was a former colleague of Johnson and continued his work as a journalist next to his government post (TfL03, November 29, 2019). Shortly after, Gilligan re-wrote and published the cycling strategy, which was entitled “The Mayor’s Vision for Cycling in London. An Olympic Legacy for all Londoners”.⁴⁵ This new policy guideline was received with enthusiasm by the cycling community (hitherto highly skeptical of Johnson’s plans to deliver on his promises) and its ambitious agenda praised (LCC02, December 2, 2019). Meanwhile, Deputy Mayor Dedring managed to procure a £1bn budget for the cycling program (Deputy Mayor for Transport01, December 5, 2019). An intense working period kicked off during which, mainly within TfL, detailed infrastructural plans for the different components of the cycling strategy were developed. Because 95% of London’s road network belong to the boroughs,

⁴⁵ The cycling strategy consisted mainly of three components: a number of fully- or semi-segregated “Cycle Superhighways” through the city (radial commuter routes), a grid of cycle ways on back routes called “Quietways”, and a more focused promotion of cycling infrastructure in three outer London boroughs, which were called “Mini Hollands”. A denser network of cycle routes in Central London was further planned under the headline “Central London Grid” (Greater London Authority, 2013). (See Figure 9 on p. 94 for a graphical representation.)


TfL cooperated with them, particularly for the Quietway program and the Mini-Hollands (TfL02, November 29, 2020). Public consultation processes for major routes were conducted, and in 2014 the Mini-Holland program kicked off in the outer boroughs of Waltham Forest, Kingston, and Enfield. These work streams culminated in a meeting of the TfL board at the beginning of 2015 whose approval is required for infrastructure projects of a certain budget size. This mainly concerned the construction of two “flagship routes”, the East-West Cycle Superhighway and the North-South Cycle Superhighway. This TfL board meeting, during which the project was approved, was identified as a critical moment by multiple interviewees, including the Deputy Mayor and four representatives of TfL (Deputy Mayor for Transport01, December 5, 2019; TfL01, November 26, 2019; TfL02, November 28; TfL03, November 29; TfL04-01, December 3).

Figure 9: Graphical representation of individual parts of the Mayor’s Vision for Cycling (Transport for London, 2016, p. 3)



STRUCTURE

Figure 10: Graphic representation of actor-network in phase 2⁴⁶



Following adoption of the cycling project by official government bodies, the actor-network further expanded into the sphere of government and the administration. The addition of these actors – particularly of the transport organization TfL, which had ultimately to deliver the cycling infrastructure – created tensions within the network because a bigger and more heterogeneous group now had to engage with the cycling agenda. Interestingly, the main work happened underneath the official surface of what was publicly visible. As several cliques on the network maps indicate, an “informal alliance” (TfL04-02, January 28, 2020 & Deputy Mayor for Transport01, December 5, 2019) of supporters was formed that promoted the cycling program across sectors, organizations, and organizational hierarchies. This informal alliance consisted of individuals from City Hall, TfL staff members, sympathetic Assembly members, the local press, civil society representatives, and – as we will see later – private sector actors:

⁴⁶ As previously mentioned, the positioning of actors and the length of their working ties are arbitrary in these network depictions. A visualization algorithm in the software Visone was used to optimize readability with the help of a circular layout (*Visone Manual*, n.d.). In this graph, the LCC and the bloggers are now graphically merged to one actor (“LCC/Bloggers”) as their distinction is less relevant during this phase. The Londoners on Bikes campaign, which some of the bloggers were also engaged in, did not outlast the mayoral elections.

[...] so it was a really interesting like of drawing together across this whole landscape like a group of people who actually just wanted to do the right thing. Despite wherever they had their [...] or whatever part of the organization they sat in. (Deputy Mayor for Transport01, December 5, 2019)

Besides Mayor Johnson himself, the most important actors at this stage were Deputy Mayor Dedring and Cycling Commissioner Gilligan, both of whom held important positions within the wider network to push the cycling vision forward. Special attention must be given to Cycling Commissioner Gilligan who, as a London-based journalist, leveraged his exclusive press connections in order to plant stories at auspicious occasions or publish opinion pieces himself (London Evening Standard, March 9, 2020). Because he was still working as a journalist next to his post at City Hall, he held an intercohesive position. He also engaged deeply with the cycling campaigners. He did that more or less informally and “under the radar”, which made him – according to a campaigner who was both blogging and active in the LCC – “something like a double agent” (Individual campaigner, March 11, 2020). Another important position was held by Deputy Mayor Dedring who, due to her previous career at TfL, was familiar with the different camps within the transport organization and knew key staff members well. From this position, she managed to “calm the waters” when tensions arose, mainly between Cycling Commissioner Gilligan and the senior leadership at TfL:

Isabel [Dedring], although she was much more in the background in terms of the cycling agenda, I think she played a critical role in that interface between the senior leadership in TfL and Andrew [Gilligan]. So, while it was all going well, she stepped back and let it carry on. When there were points of conflict, she very helpfully stepped in and smoothed the waters. (TfL04-02, January 28, 2020)

She can thus be seen as a *tertius iungens* who profited by bringing people together. She had already proven this “strategic orientation” by forming (nearly amicable) relationships with a number of bloggers and by making representatives from all road users work constructively together in the Roads Task Force. She even regularly exchanged views with Assembly

Members from the political opposition who were sympathetic with the cycling project and continually addressed the issue in the Assembly and the Assembly's transport committee (Deputy Mayor for Transport01, December 5, 2019). The Mayor himself was less involved in the details and internal politics at TfL, but, apparently, stepped in at crucial points, e.g., at the TfL board meeting, which he chaired. One interviewee from TfL recalled about the Mayor's role in the board meeting:

The Mayor had to be relatively impartial as chair of the meeting, but he gave a very eloquent backing of the cycle superhighway and it was voted through. While there were certain conditions, it felt like the culmination of two years' worth of hard work had come down to that huge set-piece point. If we hadn't got agreement at that meeting it would have been very, very difficult. I think it was really a crunch point for the Mayor's Vision for Cycling. (TfL04-02, January 28, 2020)

Furthermore, Mayor Johnson stood up against external criticism, which started to mount as the infrastructure plans became more concrete. The main external critics were not only of a political nature⁴⁷ but also came from the private sector, such as the Canary Wharf Group, London First, and from businesses and taxi associations – all of whom lobbied extensively against the building of new cycling infrastructure. Hence, he was mainly managing the “macro-politics” around the cycling project (TfL04-02, January 28, 2020). The transport agency TfL, meanwhile, experienced internal struggles between different groups during this phase. Initially, the staff members working on the bus network and several senior leaders were skeptical of this sudden change of priorities and first had to adapt, i.e., by building up internal capacity and expertise (TfL02, November 28). Even though TfL eventually implemented the ambitious cycling agenda, these internal struggles were seen as thwarting the project. As an interviewee from Sustrans recalled:

⁴⁷ Johnson's cycling program was regularly criticized by members of his own party from different levels of government. Former chancellor Lord Lawson famously commented in the House of Lords that Johnson's cycle lanes “were doing more damage to London than almost anything since the Blitz” (Moore, 2016, para. 1).

It's funny because even in organizations such as TfL, there are a lot of people there that get in the way of cycling infrastructure ... Yeah, definitely. [...] I think there is a lot of [4] people that haven't quite [...] with the narrative or the agenda and are still stuck in operating in a way that is retaining the status quo. (Sustrans, August 11, 2019)

From the many relations that formed during phase two, I will highlight two that were crucial for gaining the approval of the TfL board in 2015. First, the ties between Deputy Mayor Dedring and the bloggers. According to Dedring, these ties had more of an ad hoc and informal character – but were highly valuable nevertheless. During the board meeting, criticism about the planned cycling infrastructure was raised by a board member heading a UK-based coach operator. The meeting was broadcast live and according to Dedring, she had been texting one of the bloggers who informed her that a cyclist had just been injured by one of the buses of that very operator. Dedring passed that information on to counter the critique (Deputy Mayor for Transport01, December 5, 2019). Second, the relationship between Cycling Commissioner Gilligan and the cycling campaigners. The majority of interviewees stressed that criticism from the private sector of the two flagship Cycle Superhighways through central London had become so severe at one point that the argument that cycling is bad for business was gaining traction⁴⁸ (Sustrans, November 8, 2019; TfL01, November 26, 2019; TfL02, November 28, 2019; LCC01, December 2, 2019; TfL04-01, December 3, 2019; TfL04-02, January 28, 2020; Former Deputy Mayor for Transport02, January 30, 2020; Cycling Works, February 5, 2020). The Cycling Commissioner exchanged views with cycling campaigners about this and shortly after a pro-business campaign, called “Cycling Works”, emerged that in only a couple of months managed to get the CEO’s of 180 London-based business (including Deloitte, Unilever, Orange, and the Financial Times) to publicly back the Mayor’s cycling schemes (Individual campaigner, January 29, 2020). This campaign was deliberately kept separate from the traditional cycling campaigns and was crucial to convince the Mayor to proceed with the project and turn around the debate

⁴⁸ The Licensed Taxi Drivers' Association, one of London’s taxi associations, even went so far to file judicial review of the East-West Cycle Superhighway (BBC, 2016). According to several interviewees from TfL, the Canary Wharf group engaged in high-level lobbying against the schemes (TfL02, November 28, 2019; TfL04-02, January 28, 2020).

(Cycling Works, February 5, 2020).

STYLE

What is remarkable and deserves center stage in the analysis of this phase is the style with which Cycling Commissioner Gilligan managed relations and the cycling project overall. He was generally described as forceful, confrontational, deeply committed, and left a strong impression with everyone I interviewed. People felt either fascinated by his approach or alienated. As one interviewee from the LCC put it:

Now Gilligan is a hugely what we would call Marmite figure⁴⁹, you love him or hate him. And you know he was very very divisive but incredibly forceful [...] So I got to know him and you know in essence you did not get in his way. You know he was very forceful and aggressive assertive opponent or depending on on which side of life you were on [...] And I have various you know stories of his reign that I've heard all of which were terrifying you know essentially involve a [...] kind of [...] aggression being unleashed upon people who stood in the way. So he is quite the street battler. (LCC01, December 2, 2019)

Next to this conflictual style of engaging with other stakeholders, he was determined to push his agenda forward rather than seeking compromise:

[...] his approach was I know more than you, I win [...] no one could say no to him because they don't know that level of detail [...] it was a BRILLIANT technique [...] his method of like knowing more and getting stuff done and not taking no for an answer was amazing to me. (TfL03, November 29, 2019)

This was opposed to a rather pragmatic style then current at TfL, which resulted in tensions between some senior TfL representatives and Gilligan:

⁴⁹ Marmite is a British yeast extract spread that, reputedly, people either love or hate.

So there was a lot of tension there in that relationship between myself and him [...] And Andrew was only interested in cycling. Cycling, cycling, cycling, he wouldn't hear of anything else [...] he was very forceful about cycling; my job was trying to balance that off with the rest. (TfL02, November 29, 2020)

Despite the antagonism this might have caused, nearly all actors involved highlighted that this unusual style accelerated the project as a whole; gave it “momentum” or “impetus”: “and I think if in that period of time if it hadn't been for that hard approach, if it would have been compromised all the time, we would still be talking about it now.” (TfL02, November 29, 2020) The Cycling Commissioner's way of engaging and of putting forward demands thus followed a confrontational style that, interestingly, almost resembled the behavior of the new cycling campaigners during phase one. He publicly accused critics, put forward absolute demands, strategically leveraged external ties (e.g., with the press or cycling campaigners), and acted without necessarily coordinating with the wider network (e.g., by publishing his own version of the cycling strategy).

Deputy Mayor Dedring, on the other hand, displayed a very different style, which was equally unusual but more uniting than dividing. She was perceived as a powerful figure with high social skills; almost like a puppet master who created synergies between distant groups. She was widely respected (also from actors outside of government and the administration) but perceived as “publicity shy” (Individual campaigner, January 29, 2020):

Isabel [Dedring] is a natural communicator and she didn't necessarily go through hierarchies or formal meetings. When she first became deputy, I used to suddenly get a phone call, which was quite unheard of. She used to do that with everybody. She had a fantastic network and used to do a huge amount of behind the scenes information gathering, networking and assisting with problem solving. (TfL04-01, December 3, 2019)

Through this style of engaging with other stakeholders, which I would describe as

conspirational⁵⁰, she managed to align disparate approaches:


He [Andrew Gilligan] is very very driven and focused; he doesn't mind upsetting people. But we were a good team because he was gonna go and be like No, not good enough. And he also was really into the detail detail of the design [...] but he couldn't get TfL to do what he wanted. So I would sort of like go and say I think what he means is this and maybe we can do that and like Maybe we can bring those people in. (Deputy Mayor for Transport01, December 5, 2019)

Interviewees often portrayed Cycling Commissioner Gilligan and Deputy Mayor Deding as a “duo” that complemented each other; as the “good cop and bad cop” (Deputy Mayor for Transport01, December 5, 2019) driving the cycling agenda forward. Furthermore, interviewees, who favored or applied a more confrontational style themselves, gave Cycling Commissioner Gilligan the main credit for the success of the program and positioned themselves closer to him (TfL03, November 29, 2019) – and vice versa for a more collaborative style and Deputy Mayor Deding (Individual campaigner, January 29, 2020). This gives rise to the tentative assumption that any resemblance or divergence in style might also impact how actors perceive closeness or distance to one another in joint governance processes.

⁵⁰ Conspirational in the sense of orchestrating a joint effort toward a particular end with a certain level of concealment and not in the sense of conspiracy theory.

POLICY

Figure 11: Policy network during phase 2



KEY

- Nodes = Policy interests articulated by key actors during this phase
- Size of nodes = High / low amount of nominations by actors
- Links btw. nodes = Policy interests shared by actors
- Width of ties = Amount of concurrent nominations by actors
- Colors = Framing of policy interests [light green: safety; blue: business; grey: feasibility & efficiency; yellow: cycling as mass transport; salmon pink: wider benefits of cycling]
- Layout: Computed with the visualization algorithm “stress minimization” in the software Visone, a multi-dimensional scaling technique arranging distances (i.e., shortest path lengths) as adequate as possible (*Visone Manual*, n.d.); the positioning of nodes (e.g., at the top or at the center of the network) and the length of ties are arbitrary

During phase two, the policy interests expressed by the main actors had become more diverse. We can also observe a certain division of frames. Whereas the initial debate between vehicular and segregated cycling had somewhat subsided, the main rift now lay between the frame that views the preferences of cyclists critically and draws on technical feasibility (grey) and a more general pro-cycling perspective on the other side (yellow, salmon pink, green). Even though safety was still high on the agenda, supporters now seemed to stress the wider benefits of cycling beyond individual safety in order to counter mounting criticism. Several interviewees highlighted the tradition of transport modelling in the UK, which was

also rooted in TfL's approach to transport planning but not seamlessly applicable to cycling infrastructure. A number of supporters of the cycling project viewed this trajectory of modelling for efficiency and smooth traffic flows as a major obstacle:

But there is still an expectation that whenever you propose a cycle route you need to build a transport model that looks at the impact of that on journey time of all modes and it looks at the potential disruption that it may cause if queues are longer, if people are redirected onto other streets and time and time again that results in schemes that are [?] unacceptable or being watered down, being of maybe lower quality. And that is internal to TfL. That is TfL that [?], that is the main thing to retain. Things like bus journey times or busses are a huge obstacle for [?] high quality [?] cycling infrastructure ... And that happens time and time again [...] I would say it's the SINGLE biggest obstacle to implementation. (Sustrans, August 11, 2019)

On the other hand, interviewees from TfL stressed that the detailed and extensive preparation of infrastructure plans and transport models for the cycling program were vital for winning the approval of the TfL board (TfL04-03, April 15, 2020; TfL02, November 29, 2020).

We can see a further divide between the policy objective that rejects any prioritization of cycling in what interviewees called a "road user hierarchy" (Deputy Mayor for Transport02, January 30, 2020) in transport planning and others that, on the contrary, wanted to push cycling up that very hierarchy. This relates to the trade-offs inherent to reallocating road space: "The problem with the road network is that it seems so zero-sum, right? [...] you create instantly this sort of like black and white sort of tension" (Deputy Mayor for Transport01, December 5, 2019). This tension was at least partly eased through parallel investment programs for other transport modes, which was an achievement of Deputy Mayor Deding:

So the idea was to package up like a much more significant cycling program ALONG side other things. So it's like everybody gets something and everybody wins, which was very effective because then you don't get the Why are you giving money to them not us

and all that kind of thing. (Deputy Mayor for Transport01, December 5, 2019).

Another interesting development was the gradual change in tone of the cycling campaigners (both from the LCC and the bloggers) towards Mayor Johnson as it became increasingly clear that he was indeed trying to live up to his promises. Taking the example of one of the main cycling blogs, the rhetoric changed from “Boris Johnson – doing nothing for London’s transport. Doing even less for cycling.” in 2011 (Cyclist in the City, 2011b, headline) to “[...] I feel he is starting to get serious about putting cycling at the heart of his decision-making [...]” in 2012 (Cyclist in the City, 2012, headline) up to “[...] I never thought I would say this but I am really going to miss Boris Johnson” in 2016 (Cyclist in the City, 2016, para. 1). Another policy objective that now came to the fore and formed a certain “bridge” between the two sides was the issue of health. As an interviewee from Sustrans recalled about the cycling discourse:

And then another big shift happened when, you know, the whole idea of health came into it. I think that was THE single game changer in the narrative and recognizing, you know, we are not only doing cycling for cyclists sake but we are doing cycling for the health benefits to wider society [...]. (Sustrans, August 11, 2019)

The power of health-related arguments in conjunction with cycling can be related to the obesity and inactivity crisis in the UK that has become increasingly severe since the 1990s and for which cycling is considered at least a partial remedy (Golbuff & Aldred, 2011, p. 11). It is in this context that cycling was redefined alongside walking as “active travel” in the 2000s (Golbuff & Aldred, 2011, p. 32). Remarkable during this phase was the rise of an economic frame, which reflects the importance of business interests in London politics. It is almost a case in point to observe how the business community started to engage in this policy debate as well but instead of speaking with one voice, they expressed almost detrimental objectives (from portraying cycling as a risk for the local economy to a source of economic growth). The important role of economic considerations also led to the preparation of a comprehensive business plan of the cycling program for the TfL board meeting.

CONCLUSION

This analysis has shown that in various events leading to the TfL board meeting in 2015, it was the interplay between the central actors of the Cycling Commissioner and the Deputy Mayor for Transport in particular that shaped and drove the cycling project forward. While the Cycling Commissioner substantiated and accelerated the project, the Deputy Mayor enabled its continuation. The present analysis further revealed a certain link between the different analytical dimensions, primarily those of structure and style: Coming from the field of journalism, where Gilligan was known for scrutinizing the policies of the previous Mayor Ken Livingstone, he remained in an intercohesive position and executed his government post with more of a *tertius gaudens* orientation. He further pursued the cycling project with a confrontational style, which, in turn, injected new dynamics into established relations and procedures. The rather conspirational style of Deputy Mayor Deding, exercised only thanks to her prominent position, her pre-existing network, and the level of respect entrusted to her, initiated and sustained the informal alliances of the cycling project. To an extent this relieved certain lines of conflict, e.g., between the cycling campaigners, the Mayor of London and his transport agency TfL, as well as between the latter and the Cycling Commissioner. These observations tentatively imply a certain interrelationship between specific broker orientations and the interactive and argumentative style of these brokers. Furthermore, the execution of specific styles seems to have structural implications in turn. These putative links will be explored further below.

Another remarkable development during this phase was the evolution of the policy debate, which diversified with the expansion of the actor-network becoming more divided with mounting criticism from a technical and economic standpoint. The pro-business campaign Cycling Works that managed to at least counterbalance this criticism with the view that betterment of cycling infrastructure constitutes not a liability but rather a business asset (and thus links to London's world city agenda) can therefore be regarded as crucial for winning the final approval of the TfL board.


Phase 3: Between consultation and delivery (2015-2016)

Major crunch point: Finish implementation until end of tenure despite continued criticism

Background: After the TfL board had given its approval, the different components of the cycling program had to be further rolled out. For the individual project streams, this brought together different groups of actors. After several public consultations, which were the largest consultations organized by TfL hitherto in terms of submissions, plans had to be partly redesigned (TfL04-02, January 28, 2020; Individual campaigner, March 11, 2020). For some stakeholders, this was the first time they were able to see the plans, which is why some parts of the routes required more detailed consultations. In general, however, the proposed routes, especially the Cycle Superhighways, were largely supported by the public (between 60 – 80% approval) (Transport for London, 2015a, 2015b). It is important to note that the delivery of the different components did not start simultaneously. The Mini-Holland and Quietway program had already kicked off, while construction of the Cycle Superhighways only began after the board's approval and then progressed expeditiously. Mayor Johnson officially opened the Cycle Superhighway network on his last day in office in early 2016.

STRUCTURE

Figure 12: Graphic representation of actor-network in phase 3⁵¹



⁵¹ The following organizations were less relevant during the implementation phase and thus removed from the actor-network: GLA, Cycling Works, and the Canary Wharf Group.

During the consultation and delivery phases, the actor network extended to “impacted” stakeholder groups. In the case of the Quietways, that were primarily installed on borough roads, this included local businesses as well as residents. Consultations for the Quietway program were managed by TfL’s delivery partner, Sustrans. Generally, the individual boroughs as well as other city actors, such as business districts or property developers, became more important at this stage. Because the proposed route of the East-West Cycle Superhighway crossed several parks, Parliament Square, and along the Victoria Embankment passing world heritage sites, stakeholders such as Westminster Council, The City of London or the organization “Royal Parks” were consulted, which resulted in protracted and difficult negotiations. Despite this difficulty, a TfL representative stressed that all of these “micro-conversations” were crucial to mitigate opposition, bring these stakeholders on board, and make them “champions” of the new schemes (TfL04-03, April 15, 2021). By this time, TfL and the Cycling Commissioner seemed to be working together more closely and their agendas more aligned. According to a senior TfL representative, the transport agency had overcome its internal struggles by that time and was prepared for the actual infrastructure implementation:

We had an internal organization that was set up for delivery. We had sponsors, designers, traffic modelers and project managers. So we already had an internal machine, but we massively upped our game in this period, We improved hugely in terms of the quality of what we were able to deliver. The substance was there. (TfL04-02, January 28, 2020)

By and large, TfL and the Cycling Commissioner followed the strategy to only fund those boroughs that came up with or agreed to TfL’s infrastructure proposals that met strict design standards, which TfL had developed in the meantime. This top-down approach antagonized several of the London boroughs and put them under a certain pressure to align rather than realizing their own schemes. The Mini-Holland program, which provided nearly £100 million worth of investments, was equally designed as a competitive process between the outer London boroughs instead of distributing funds evenly amongst them.

With regards to positions, Cycling Commissioner Gilligan again took on a central role and acted with a *tertius gaudens* orientation by making use of his exclusive connections to pressure groups such as the press or local campaigners in order to exercise control over the individual boroughs. As a journalist from the Evening Standard recalled:

But I think it's fair to [...] assume that he knew how to get the right kind of stories in the press that if he felt there was a particular council was being difficult or that council was objecting to something in the [bringing?] scheme in jeopardy. That word would get out to journalists who he felt were sympathetic and once again [...] So he was able to use his contacts in the media, shall we see, to see, by the way, and Westminster Council is being really awkward about this scheme in Regent's Park. Did you know that? Perhaps you'd like to write about it? (London Evening Standard, March 9, 2020)

This strained the relationship between TfL and the Cycling Commissioner on the one side and some of the boroughs on the other, who “felt railroaded” (TfL02, November 28, 2019) by this sudden pressure coming both from the top (TfL, Cycling Commissioner) and from the bottom (local cycling campaign groups, criticism in the press or by residents and businesses). One TfL representative specified how the working relationship between TfL and the boroughs grew increasingly discordant:

I think most of the boroughs really liked the idea of getting investment from us because we paid for the Quietways. But then they weren't necessarily bold enough, as bold as we've been with the Cycle Superhighways, to take out parking, to have the necessary interventions. We ended up with quite a long-drawn-out discussion as to where Quietways would go. Then we ended up with quite a long-drawn-out discussion about what the design for individual sections of Quietways would look like. Then we ended up with a very long-drawn-out decision-making process, because many of the boroughs had an extended decision making-process. (TfL04-02, January 28, 2020)


STYLE

The confrontational style, which Cycling Commissioner Gilligan had introduced in the previous period, also became apparent at this stage and further exacerbated the tensions between the city- and borough level. According to one interviewee from TfL, who worked closely with Gilligan, the Cycling Commissioner acted on the basis of a clear “friend-enemy” dichotomy of the boroughs and publicly blamed those that showed reluctance to deliver or live up to his expectations (TfL03, November 29, 2019). This also goes in line with his continued efforts to strategically mobilize campaigners and inform the press. What was interesting to observe was that this confrontational style of rushing ahead regardless of criticism now seemed to be laid at the door not of the Cycling Commissioner alone but of larger parts of the team that oversaw implementation. In particular, the construction of the Cycle Superhighways situated on the TfL road network, were (despite the political turmoil they have created) described as a fast and “epic delivery” during which everyone involved “went completely nuts” (TfL03, November 29, 2019). Valerie Shawcross, who was a member of the political opposition at this time and became Deputy Mayor for Transport in the administration succeeding Boris Johnson, described this approach as follows:

They were in what I would call kick-the-door-down mode. Which on the one hand opened up, made the issue easier than to come in and manage properly. On the other hand, I think they created a lot more objections than needed to. (Deputy Mayor for Transport02, January 30, 2020)

This demonstrates that particular styles can gain traction in a governance network at certain times, which underlines their ability to form larger patterns.

Figure 13: Policy network during phase 3



KEY

- Nodes = Policy interests articulated by key actors during this phase
- Size of nodes = High / low amount of nominations by actors
- Links btw. nodes = Policy interests shared by actors
- Width of ties = Amount of concurrent nominations by actors
- Colors = Framing of policy interests [light green: safety; blue: business; grey: feasibility & efficiency; yellow: cycling as mass transport; salmon pink: wider benefits of cycling; turquoise: democracy]
- Layout: Computed with the visualization algorithm “stress minimization” in the software Visone, a multi-dimensional scaling technique arranging distances (i.e., shortest path lengths) as adequate as possible (*Visone Manual*, n.d.); the positioning of nodes (e.g., at the top or at the center of the network) and the length of ties are arbitrary

During the last phase and with mounting time pressure to finish at least the main Cycle Superhighways, we can see a concentration of pro-cycling frames which, besides constantly underlining the wider benefits of cycling (salmon pink), demanded a faster infrastructure delivery and an evidence-based and data-driven approach in order to falsify criticism and offer reassurance to impacted stakeholders (yellow). An advantage at this stage was that initial successes, especially from the Mini-Holland schemes in Waltham Forest, could be

used as best-practice demonstrations (TfL03, November 29, 2019; TfL04-01, December 3, 2021). Now that the views of impacted stakeholders had gained in importance, a new frame became apparent that addressed the democratic dimensions of the program (turquoise). This comprised policy interests aiming at a thorough community engagement or extensive consultations to “reach the silent majority” (TfL04-02, January 28, 2020). However, this also included a call for less disruption but more context-sensitivity in infrastructure delivery – a contrast to the “all or nothing” perspective, which was adopted by several key stakeholders (Royal Borough of Kensington Chelsea, November 11, 2019). The severity of the backlash from local residents and businesses felt by some boroughs during implementation can be neatly illustrated by the example of the opening ceremony of the first scheme of the Mini Holland program in Waltham Forest in 2015, which was accompanied by large demonstrations where residents bore a coffin down the street symbolizing the death of the village due to road closures for cyclists (Davis, 2015). (See Table 4 on p. 115 for a list of all policy interests and policy frames in this case study.)

CONCLUSION

For the final sprint of Johnson’s Cycling Revolution, it was again the confrontational style that dominated and steamrolled the project through ongoing resistance coming either from individual boroughs (e.g., Westminster and the City of London) or other impacted stakeholders, such as the Royal Parks, or local businesses and residents within the boroughs. Even though such persistent confrontations succeeded in the sense that Johnson could officially open the Cycle Superhighways before leaving office, it strained several relations to such an extent that the succeeding administration under the Labor politician Sadiq Khan had to spend considerable time and effort “repairing the bridges” (TfL03, November 29, 2019) and “rebuilding trust” (Deputy Mayor for Transport02, January 30, 2020). According to then appointed Deputy Mayor for Transport Shawcross, this process took about 18 months (Deputy Mayor for Transport02, January 30, 2020). A new Walking and Cycling Commissioner was appointed (and integrated more strongly into TfL), and the top-down approach gradually replaced by a more collaborative procedure of working together with the boroughs (TfL03, November 29, 2019; TfL04-03, April 15, 2021). A senior TfL

representative recounted, however, that this new approach slowed down progress of infrastructure delivery:

And they, Will Norman [the new Walking and Cycling Commissioner] was coming in, very much trying to rebuild the bridges, relationships that has been broken and be more collaborative about the way they [moved things?] forward. But the trouble with collaboration is it's slow [S laughs]. So that has slowed the [...] slowed the progress down [...] (TfL02, November 28, 2020)

This change of course also ended the informal alliance that had carried the cycling project through this mayoralty. According to Shawcross, the cycling campaigners were skeptical of this new sense of collaboration: “But the cycling lobby have got a bit used to kick the door down mode. And they were somewhat suspicious of a bit more technical, granular, negotiated approach.” (Deputy Mayor for Transport02, January 30, 2020) The majority of bloggers had stopped posting by 2016, while several positions were re-staffed. According to Shawcross, cycling policies were treated as “normal business” – and not a battle – under the new administration (Deputy Mayor for Transport02, January 30, 2020).

So what have we learnt about the unfolding of urban governance processes through analysis of London's Cycling Revolution? Looking at the process as a whole, it has provided us with a more fine-grained understanding of cycling policies in an urban governance setting by demonstrating how an informal and intersectoral alliance had formed and blurred several lines of conflict and possible sources of blockage. First and despite being politically contested, it would be an oversimplification to interpret cycling policies in London along party-political lines. Naturally, the push for sustainable transport modes are articulated by certain parties in particular and, accordingly, the contextual overview has outlined how cycling in the UK has gained significance under Labor rule. Yet, London's Cycling Revolution provided a completely different setting: a conservative Mayor introducing a new era of cycling policies for which he was both praised and criticized by Tory and Labor politicians alike at the national, city, and borough levels. We further saw fruitful forms of interaction between a Conservative city government and Labor-run borough councils, such

as in the case of the Mini-Holland program in Waltham Forest. Another classical line of conflict with regards to cycling, which was temporarily overcome, is that between civil society on the one hand and the administration on the other (Lelong et al., 2017). Here, the analysis revealed the complexities within civil society itself – even between the cycling campaign scene – and demonstrated how a close cooperation between members of civil society (both from established organizations but also individual campaigners) and the political leadership formed at least since phase two. Lastly, the oft-proclaimed divide between business and civil society interests on cycling (Aldred, 2016) did not hold true for London. Even though the cycling project did receive major backlashes from private sector conglomerates as well as local businesses, we could also observe a counter movement of companies actively supporting the agenda.⁵²

Looking more closely at the processual development over time, two main questions arise. What enabled this profound policy change in the first place? And how, after the initial spark, did the informal alliance manage to penetrate stiff resistance during policy formulation and implementation? Regarding the initial period, the analysis has revealed how, when the window of opportunity of the upcoming elections emerged, alterations in London's cycling scene created a pressured environment for London's political leadership to commit to change. At the same time, established ties between members of London's transport polity conveyed these demands into the heart of political decision-making. Taking a closer look at the three analytical dimensions, it took new actors entering the scene who (from their relatively detached position) exercised a new style, which created further structural repercussions. Interestingly, this pattern repeated itself in the public sphere during the second phase with the appointment of London's first Cycling Commissioner. (See Table 5 on p. 116 for an overview of all styles in this case study.) This leads to the second question of how the supporter network emerging at this stage managed to proceed despite ongoing resistance.

⁵² The relations and overlaps between cycling campaigners and the business sector also became evident at a number of attended events. In a panel discussion at the "International Car Free Day" in August 2019, for example, the chief executive of the LCC (who had also organized the Love London Go Dutch campaign) stressed the synergies between the different sectors in working for a common cause: "We are civil society actors, we are business people, we are academics" (International Car Free Day, notes, September 19, 2019).

What we saw was that the style exercised from the central positions of the Cycling Commissioner and the Deputy Mayor for Transport permeated the wider actor network and created a certain pattern of interactive and argumentative behavior. First and as already indicated by its name, the informal alliance had a conspirational note to it, which enabled the establishment of rather informal ties between sectors, organizations, and organizational hierarchies and, interestingly, had a stabilizing effect on the network. Towards the second half of the process, the cycling project was characterized by a confrontational approach against all forms of reluctance and critique, which accelerated the process in certain dimensions (e.g., implementation) whilst straining established ties within the wider network. One interviewee from TfL compared this (in parts parallel) progression of different approaches with classical models of team development⁵³, which call for a different form of leadership at different stages of a team project (TfL04-03, April 15, 2021). Considering the remarkable speed of London's Cycling Revolution, could it be that the successful enfolding of complex urban governance processes benefits from or requires specific styles of key actors at specific points in time? This question will be further explored in connection with the next case study, the Berlin Mobility Act.

⁵³ A notable example is the work of the US psychologist Bruce Tuckman, who argued that groups go through the stages of forming, storming, norming, performing (and adjourning) (Tuckman, 1965; Tuckman & Jensen, 1977).

Appendix to chapter 4.2.

Table 4: List of policy interests and policy frames – London

Vehicular cycling	Safety	Feasibility & efficiency	Cycling as priority and mass transport	Benefits beyond cycling	Democracy	Business
- Reduce speed	- Provide segregation on busy roads	- Improve conditions for all road users	- Make cycling accessible for all	- Protect environment	- Perform thorough community engagement	- Unlock economic benefits of cycling
- Provide cycle training	- Improve quality cycling infrastructure	- Reduce congestion	- Make cycling mainstream	- Strengthen social cohesion	- Find solutions appropriate to local context	- Minimize risk for local economy
	- Improve safety features of HGVs and lorries	- Apply transport modelling and impact assessment	- Use evidence against criticism	- Improve health	- Reach silent majority	- Enable employee safety
	- Stop cycling fatalities	- Protect bus network	- Accelerate pace of infrastructure delivery	- Improve air quality		- Create attractive business districts
	- Upgrade cycling facilities at dangerous junctions	- Focus on what is technically feasible	- Keep fighting to realize improvements	- Tackle inequality		
		- Reduce disruption of new cycling infrastructure		- Free up space through cycling		

Table 5: Overview of styles – London

Styles	Confrontational style	Consensual style	Conspirational style
Interactive behavior	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- (Public) accusing & blaming of opponents- Acting without coordinating with others- External network mobilizing	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Thwarting most demanding actors- Bringing everyone onto the same page	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Informal networking and influencing (e.g. through direct communication channels that cut through formal organizational boundaries and hierarchies)
Argumentative behavior	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Putting forward absolute demands	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Focusing on feasible solutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Aligning demands between actors

Chapter 4.3. Analysis Berlin – The Berlin Mobility Act

Phase 1: Formation within civil society (2015-2016)

Major crunch point: Making the newly elected city government adopt the aims of the cycling referendum

Background: After mounting dissatisfaction with Berlin's previous cycling strategies, individual cycling campaigners and representatives of cycling associations started to meet and exchange ideas on how to put forward more binding demands at the end of 2015. This gave birth to the idea of a local referendum on cycling (Volksentscheid Fahrrad, n.d.-b, "*Chronik des Volksentscheids Fahrrad*"). The central figure pushing for the referendum was Heinrich Strößenreuther, a dedicated campaigner who had previously promoted harsher measures against illegal parking. During a workshop (to which both Strößenreuther and the Berlin branch of the more traditional cycling association "ADFC Berlin" had invited around 30 to 40 participants), ten goals were agreed upon, which were first mentioned in the local press and chained to a golden bicycle in front of City Hall in December 2015 (Volksentscheid Fahrrad, n.d.-a, "*10 Ziele – weil Berlin sich dreht!*"). This marked the official beginning of the *Volksentscheid Fahrrad* (later "Changing Cities e.V.", hereafter "VeF/CC"), which can be seen as one of the most professional societal campaigns in Berlin to date. After an inaugural meeting with around 100 supporters in Berlin-Neukölln at the beginning of 2016, a civil hackathon was held over a weekend, during which the ten goals were translated into a first version of the cycling law (*Berliner Radgesetz*). In April 2016, the law was officially submitted for cost estimation, which constitutes an official step in the referendum process. Between mid-May and mid-June 2016, 105,425 signatures (of 20,000 required) were collected and officially handed in (Volksentscheid Fahrrad, n.d.-b, "*Chronik des Volksentscheids Fahrrad*"). The signature collection was accompanied by media-effective activities such as silent vigils and a considerable number of signatures came together at mass ride events such as "Critical Mass" or the *Sternfahrt* (ADFC Berlin, February 22, 2019). The topic of cycling became increasingly salient in the run-up to the elections of the city parliament and initial meetings between the cycling campaigners and representatives of the former city government, consisting of the Christian Democratic Union


(CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), took place (VeF/CC, January 25, 2019). In September 2016, a new city government (consisting of the SPD, the Green Party, and the Left Party) was elected, which one interviewee described as the “best possible coalition” for the demands of the cycling community (ADFC Berlin, February 22, 2019 – own translation). After two months of coalition talks, the newly elected government committed itself to take up the demands of the referendum but integrate it into an encompassing law, which should be jointly negotiated with representatives of civil society organizations and regulate other modes of urban transport as well. At this point, the referendum was officially terminated and transformed into a legislative proposal by the Berlin Senate: The Berlin Mobility Act. The referendum was also stopped because parts of the initial referendum were deemed non-complaint with existing law (VeF/CC, January 25, 2019).

Table 6: 10 key goals of the local referendum on cycling (Volksentscheid Fahrrad, n.d.-c, "*Volksentscheid Fahrrad in Englisch*")

Goal 1	Cycle streets which are safe for everyone, including children and seniors
Goal 2	Safe cycling infrastructure for every main road
Goal 3	Safer junctions and crossroads
Goal 4	Safer and more comfortable cycling – as chosen by the people (transparent, quick, and effective repair of cycling infrastructure)
Goal 5	More and safer cycle parking
Goal 6	Giving cycling the green light (at traffic signals)
Goal 7	Fast cycle ways for cycle commuters
Goal 8	Enforcing safer and more conscientious transportation (action against illegal parking, speed violations, dangerous driving)
Goal 9	More representatives in council positions
Goal 10	Prepare Berlin for an increase in cycling (e.g. PR and public reports)

STRUCTURE

Figure 14: Graphic representation of actor-network during phase 1



The idea of a cycling referendum, which later turned into the Berlin Mobility Act, emerged in a relatively small network within civil society around the VeF/CC with the support of the ADFC Berlin. Interestingly, the newly founded campaign group VeF/CC was quickly considered as a structurally equivalent stakeholder to the traditional ADFC Berlin, which is around 40 years old (SenUVK01, February 19, 2019). In the run-up to the elections, we could observe the formation of a triad consisting of the VeF/CC, the ADFC Berlin, and the local press (that had reported critically on previous cycling strategies over the past years) jointly pushing for more binding measures (SenUVK02-02, May 25, 2020). Next to their advocacy in the public sphere, the cycling campaigners also started to reach out directly into politics and met with members of the previous administration, most notably with the former Senator for Urban Development and Housing (who was also responsible for transport) and his State Secretary, as well as with other party representatives (Volksentscheid Fahrrad, n.d.-b, "*Chronik des Volksentscheids Fahrrad*"). Cycling became a political campaign theme with representatives of the Green and Left Party (and parts of the SPD) publicly demanding and promising a change in cycling policy (VeF/CC, January 25, 2019).

Besides holding a central position as the main idea generator and pressure group, the demands of the VeF/CC gained prominence because of their ability to quickly professionalize and mobilize by forming supporter networks at the district level. These local networks, named “cosmos of VeF/CC” by one representative of the Senate Department (SenUVK02-01, March 13, 2019 – own translation) and described as “local political players”

by the VeF/CC itself (VeF/CC, January 25, 2019 – own translation), carried the interests of the initiative into the individual districts, where cycling policies had to be ultimately implemented. Regarding professionalization, a VeF/CC representative remembered:

We were a team of 50 or 60 people that were very active and we divided responsibilities so there were people that worked on the law, there were people that prepared the signature collection and there were people who did public relations, social media, graphs and everything that needs to be done [...] it was very professional, we basically built a startup. (VeF/CC, January 25, 2019 – own translation)

The other main civil society organization, the ADFC Berlin, struggled slightly to find its positioning because there was still uncertainty within the organization whether to back the referendum fully. Disagreement mainly concerned the issue of protected bike lanes. According to an ADFC representative, this initial hesitancy also stemmed from the internal structures of the ADFC Berlin:

In my role at the ADFC, I experienced what the possibilities of a classical association are [...] and how they, in my view, differ from those of an initiative in terms of speed and flexibility. We at the ADFC are like a large tanker that is incredibly difficult to move [...] And of course an initiative with less democratic structures has a completely different leeway here. It can be faster; it can be more purposive. (ADFC Berlin, February 22, 2019 – own translation).

As a former member of the VeF/CC recounted about the ADFC Berlin: “The ADFC was, let’s say [...] it actually wasn’t that easy to win their support because there are conflicting forces within the ADFC. Cycle initiatives in other cities are making the same experience by the way.” (VeF/CC, January 25, 2019 – own translation) In a two-thirds vote, the ADFC members finally decided to support the referendum, for instance with communication and signature collections (ADFC Berlin, February 22, 2019). Since then, the VeF/CC and the ADFC Berlin acted more or less in concert.

The relations that played a role in making the newly elected coalition commit to more binding measures were, first, the ties that formed between the VeF/CC and the local press. From its inception, the VeF/CC pro-actively approached the press and VeF/CC-representatives emphasized the crucial role of local reporting for their work (VeF/CC, January 25, 2019). The VeF/CC designed its campaign in a media-savvy way by producing high-quality photos and organizing attention-grabbing activities. Furthermore, they made intensive use of social media (e.g., Twitter) and, at a later stage, even formed their own expert database for media requests and organized a task force of volunteers that engaged in online debates (e.g., in comments columns) (VeF/CC, January 25, 2019). According to the former State Secretary of the Transport Department (who was appointed after the elections), the public figure behind the VeF/CC, Heinrich Stößenreuther, had become the “darling of journalists” during this time (Former State Secretary, May 29, 2020 – own translation); and the BUND Berlin even went so far as to say that the Berlin newspaper *Der Tagesspiegel* practically supported the VeF/CC (BUND Berlin, February 25, 2019). Even though there were also critical voices in the press, the former State Secretary for Transport recounted, “The cycling community served the needs of the media in a way that overwhelmed politics and the administration because they couldn’t even react that quickly, everything was in the press at once.” (Former State Secretary, interview, May 29, 2020 – own translation).

This leads us on to the second important relationship, that between the cycling campaigners and the former administration. While the ADFC Berlin had previously been in a “cozy relationship” with the Senate but felt increasingly “fooled” by broken promises (ADFC Berlin, February 22, 2019 – own translation), the relations between politics and campaigners became strained during this phase. In particular, interactions between the VeF/CC and the former Senator for Urban Development and Housing (and Transport) were marked by antagonism and mistrust. From the perspective of the cycling campaigners, this open conflict did not impede the referendum because it had provided them with a public target for their criticism and created a “David vs Goliath-like situation” (ADFC Berlin, February 22, 2019 – own translation). A more compliant approach from the political side might have “stolen their thunder” at this early stage (SenUVK02-02, May 25, 2020 – own translation).

STYLE

It becomes apparent that the VeF/CC introduced a new style of campaigning, which was distinctively more confrontational than that of previous cycling campaigns. The VeF/CC described their way of engaging as follows:

We are currently also trying to build a national campaign network. With the methods that come along with bicycle initiatives, which are highly action-based and with direct interventions instead of sitting at desks and in committees. It means getting to the points where it becomes uncomfortable and, if necessary, resolve conflicts in public. This is our method, a less cooperative but more controversial approach. This is how we try to get things moving. (VeF/CC, January 25, 2019 – own translation)

This confrontational style was also reflected in their network map. In the civil society section, the network of VeF/CC includes neighboring “radical” organizations, such as “Extinction Rebellion”, “Climate Friday” or initiatives against coal mining. One practice through which this style also became apparent was public denunciation of political decision-makers. As one representative of the administration recalled:

Maybe I’m a little bit biased because, partially, I found their methods and approach not okay; this way of attacking certain actors, also personally and sometimes based on half-truths but always very professionally communicated. But apparently this received a high acceptance in public and in the media. It’s always popular to criticize the Senate. (SenUVK01, February 19, 2019 – own translation)


Even members of the cycling community stated that, in their view, the personal attacks by the VeF/CC had at least once crossed the line (ADFC Berlin, February 22, 2019). Next to this relatively harsh approach of “interacting” with opponents, we could further observe strong external network mobilizing (e.g., for signature collections or rides through the city) as well as extensive communication through traditional press channels or social media platforms (VeF/CC, January 25, 2019). Yet another practice was the formulation of concrete and absolute demands: first in the form of ten points, then as fully fledged cycling law. It

was interesting to observe how the more traditional ADFC Berlin, which had considered itself as “almost politically dead” (ADFC Berlin, February 22, 2019 – own translation) before the referendum-phase, joined the VeF/CC caravan, which sharpened their stylistic profile as well (SenUVK01, February 19, 2019). The VeF/CC described this alignment as follows:

Many civil society organizations regard themselves as experts [...] but I think what is happening because of CC and the referendum, and I see this very strongly in Berlin, especially for the ADFC but for the other organizations as well. They try to become more active and think more in this direction. So basically a small radical player appeared and whirled them up in their incremental way of working. (VeF/CC, January 25, 2019 – own translation)

POLICY

Figure 15: Policy network later in phase 1



KEY

- Nodes = Policy interests articulated by key actors during this phase
- Size of nodes = High / low amount of nominations by actors
- Links btw. nodes = Policy interests shared by actors
- Width of ties = Amount of concurrent nominations by actors
- Colors = Framing of policy interests [light green: safety; pink: equity]
- Layout: Computed with the visualization algorithm “stress minimization” in the software Visone, a multi-dimensional scaling technique arranging distances (i.e., shortest path lengths) as adequate as possible (*Visone Manual*, n.d.); the positioning of nodes (e.g., at the top or at the center of the network) and the length of ties are arbitrary

The policy interests articulated at this early stage mainly concerned traffic safety, particularly via the introduction of safe cycling infrastructure on main roads, back routes as well as through cycle highways. Two lines of argument were frequently advanced in this context. First, that despite the steady growth in cycling in Berlin over recent years, infrastructural improvements failed to keep in step with increasing road use (SenUVK02-02, May 25, 2020; Former State Secretary, interview, May 29, 2020). The second line of argument concerned perceptions of safety, which constitute one of the main barriers for people to cycle and thus for future growth in cycling rates. According to the former State Secretary for Transport, who played a central role in the further development of the Mobility Law, the focus on subjective dimensions of safety resulted from a gradual shift from handling traffic safety mainly in technical terms towards more psychological perceptions (Former State Secretary, May 29, 2020). Another frame that characterized this early debate (albeit to a lesser degree) were demands for a more equitable re-distribution of the public space of the street. The term *Flächengerechtigkeit* (spatial justice) gained traction and was articulated by the VeF/CC in particular (VeF/CC, January 25, 2019; ADFC Berlin, February 22, 2019).

CONCLUSION

We can see that the Berlin Mobility Act emerged in a fashion similar to London's Cycling Revolution. In the *mélange* of upcoming elections and growing dissatisfaction with previous policies, a new player entered the scene and "activated" the cycling community with its confrontational style. During the period from the initiative's kick-off to the submission of signatures, in particular, the project was also driven forward by hard work and the smart division of tasks:

From my personal view I would say that this was actually the most intense period of my life. It was basically half a year with extremely high levels of adrenalin, lots of working hours of voluntary work next to my paid work, so 70 hours per week were completely normal. (VeF/CC, January 25, 2019 – own translation)

Again, a combination of external pressure and more direct ties to political representatives

enabled a change in cycling policy. Needless to say that the election outcome, which was favorable for the demands of the cycling community, also played a role. According to the former State Secretary for Transport, the inclusion of the Mobility Act into the coalition agreement was already celebrated as a triumph and everyone involved was “almost intoxicated” (Former State Secretary, May 29, 2020 – own translation).

However, we can also observe certain differences. Unlike in London, old and new campaigners had joined forces early on and acted in concert ever since. We can thus see a stronger coordination amongst Berlin’s civil society organizations in the field of active and sustainable transport. Second, the initiative of the VeF/CC was not only a campaign targeted at a specific election but also embodied a direct democratic instrument, which strengthened its legal obligations (even though the referendum was officially terminated at the end of this phase). It is no surprise, therefore, that the strength of any legal obligation lay at the center of dispute throughout the whole process. As the former State Secretary for Transport summarized: “This was about citizens organizing themselves and playing the keyboard of direct democracy, where, in this case, their performance was masterly.” (Former State Secretary, May 29, 2020 – own translation)

Phase 2: Formal policymaking process (2016-2018)

Major crunch point: Keeping the SPD on board in order to bring the Berlin Mobility Act through the legislative process

Background: For the Berlin Mobility Act as a whole, a module-based negotiation process was set up. Whereas the first part of the law should regulate the general relationship between mobility participants, cycling as well as public transport, the subsequent parts should relate to walking, commercial transport as well as “new mobility”. (See Figure 16 on p. 127 for a graphical representation of the Berlin Mobility Act). For some of these thematic modules, different societal actors were involved in joint negotiations, which raised civic participation in policymaking to a new level in Berlin. These negotiation rounds were accompanied by meetings of larger advisory bodies, such as the newly established *Mobilitätsbeirat* (mobility committee), which consists of representatives of mobility and transport associations, the administrations at the city and district level as well as political parties (SPD, June 6, 2020). This analysis places a particular emphasis on the theme of cycling, which was the first module jointly developed with a group of civil society organizations and the most controversially debated part of the Berlin Mobility Act. These negotiations, labeled as *Raddialog* (cycling dialogue), kicked off in February 2017 (Volksentscheid Fahrrad, n.d.-b, "*Chronik des Volksentscheids Fahrrad*"). It is important to mention that around this time, the VeF/CC had further professionalized and managed to set up an office and hire staff through a fundraising campaign (VeF/CC, January 25, 2019). The subsequent negotiations of the *Raddialog*, which lasted approximately two to three months, were described as intense and difficult (VeF/CC, January 25, 2019; SPD Berlin, June 12, 2020). Tensions rose so high around mid-May 2017 that VeF/CC published a preliminary draft bill without consulting the other parties, which brought the *Raddialog* to a temporary standstill (Volksentscheid Fahrrad, n.d.-b; "*Chronik des Volksentscheids Fahrrad*"). After the negotiations, the results of the *Raddialog* were presented to the wider audience of the *Mobilitätsbeirat*, whose members were given the opportunity to hand in amendments. The participation of associations (*Verbändebeteiligung*) constitutes a standard procedure in Berlin. The incorporation of these amendments (approx. 900 remarks) was processed internally by the


administration with the help of a consultancy (Former State Secretary, May 29, 2020). The final draft bill of the Mobility Act was then publicly defended on a broad basis in parliament in order to receive the required political support to push it through the legislative process. After the Mobility Act passed its first and second readings by the Berlin Senate, the situation became strained again, mainly because the coalition partner SPD became concerned that the Berlin Mobility Act omitted car traffic. This caused another delay. On June 28, 2018, the first part of the Mobility Act was passed at second reading in Parliament (Volksentscheid Fahrrad, n.d.-b; "*Chronik des Volksentscheids Fahrrad*").

Figure 16: Graphical representation of the different modules of the Berlin Mobility Act (dark blue = passed by Parliament / light blue = not passed yet at the point of writing in May 2021) (Senatsverwaltung für Umwelt, n.d.-b; "*Berliner Mobilitätsgesetz*")



STRUCTURE

Figure 17: Graphic representation of actor-network during phase 2



The VeF/CC and ADFC Berlin now formerly joined the *Raddialog*, which constituted the core group of actors that officially designed the cycling part of the Mobility Act. We thus have a relatively dense actor-network at the beginning of this phase, which met multiple times in intense working sessions.⁵⁴

Even though the members of the *Raddialog* had entered the negotiations on equal terms, the qualitative analysis revealed that it was the extent to which an organization could actively coordinate and quickly galvanize its external and internal network that determined its negotiating power. Concerning external network coordination, the duo of the VeF/CC and ADFC Berlin exchanged views with other civil society organizations from the field of active and sustainable travel, such as the *Fuss e.V.* (association for pedestrians) and the *Verkehrsclub Deutschland* (association for sustainable mobility “VCD”), who provided their mandate for the negotiations (VeF/CC, January 25, 2019; ADFC Berlin, February 22, 2019). This equipped VeF/CC and the ADFC Berlin with additional legitimacy in the process. The interview with the ADFC Berlin also brought to the fore that, besides external coordination, the internal coordination of an organization’s own structure mattered equally. Surprisingly, the civil society organizations, which usually rely on voluntary work, entered the negotiations with a more sophisticated internal coordination and manpower:

The state secretary was there with his personal assistant and a couple of other people. He said This is the capacity that we can put into this from our side. We thought this can’t be true. Only these people? It took us quite some time to realize that he didn’t have other people doing his groundwork. We, on the other hand, within the structure of our associations, had already built new structures that supported us in the negotiations. This means we had many people operating in the background. (ADFC Berlin, February 22, 2019 – own translation)

One example of how this “operating in the background” took place was that during negotiations, when the group worked on specific documents, digital communication

⁵⁴ According the former State Secretary for Transport, some of these working sessions were thematically split and lasted late into the night (Former State Secretary, May 29, 2020).

platforms were used by some of the civil society organizations, which were accessed by external supporters who commented and provided guidance in real time (ADFC Berlin, February 22, 2019)

The committees consulted after the draft bill had been finalized – mainly the newly constituted *Mobilitätsbeirat* – further opened the network to a plethora of other city actors, which, for instance, also included the German automobile association ADAC (SenUVK, March 21, 2019). Yet, these actors were only allowed to hand in amendments and were thus less relevant. This is why they are graphically represented as one organization in the second actor-network above. As the bill went through the legislative process, the governing parties as well as the political opposition became more engaged – for instance in the Transport Committee of the Parliament or during parliamentary debates.

During the negotiations, a broker position was occupied by the BUND Berlin. VeF/CC and the ADFC Berlin stated that, initially, they were surprised that the BUND had been invited to the *Raddialog* (ADFC Berlin, February 22, 2019; SenUVK02-01, March 13, 2019). However, the BUND holds unique relations to other traditional environmental associations in Germany. Seemingly, the BUND was well aware of this advantageous position and tried to maintain it, which strongly suggests a *tertius gaudens* orientation. This became clear in an interview with one representative of the Senate Department:

That was a strategic consideration from the administration that the BUND is the major association here and you don't want to do these things without the BUND. Strategically, this turned out to be a good decision in the end even though it was not well communicated. The BUND really enjoyed playing this moderating role [...] We needed the BUND as a supporter because then you get the support by all the other associations. If you have the BUND on board, you have the *Grüne Liga* on board, you have the *Naturschutzverbund* on board and so on. All of them didn't want to cooperate at first. The BUND is not the first player in transport policy that you would think off, their profile is less clear. They approve of cycling but also of trees and landscape conservation and so one and so forth

so the BUND had to moderate a lot and enjoyed this moderating role. (SenUVK02-01, March 13, 2019 – own translation).

Another broker position was held by the VeF/CC, which was well equipped not only to coordinate but also spontaneously to galvanize its external network and mobilize a wider supporter base. When the SPD caused another delay, a demonstration with around 500 people was organized within twelve hours and criticism placed in the local press (ADFC Berlin, February 22, 2019). This created sufficient public pressure for the process to continue.

Another actor that took center stage during the *Raddialog* was Berlin's former State Secretary for Transport, who represented the administration. This experienced and charismatic transport politician was often described as highly committed to the Berlin Mobility Act and, yet, his role was seen as somewhat ambivalent by the participating cycling organizations. Though assuming a moderating role during the negotiations, he was also an active participant (ADFC Berlin, February 22, 2019). Nevertheless, he was viewed as someone who managed to hold the strings together and push the project forward. When, at a later stage, the State Secretary had to step down from his position due to illness, participants (particularly those of the subsequent negotiation rounds) stressed that it was difficult to continue without him, which slowed down the process (Fuss e.V., February 8, 2019). Therefore, he can be seen as a *tertius iungens* who held a stabilizing position. One interviewee from the Left Party described the role of the State Secretary as follows:

I would say that the former State Secretary, by impersonating the Senate Department, had the most important function in this round which was to hold all the strings together [...] To have an intuition for this, also to bring everyone back in [...] to not only let things happen but see that everyone is on board, to keep us in check, to keep civil society in check, to make sure things don't escalate when bad things are said because this can actually happen a lot [...] to prevent that people just leave the room or leave early, these things are key. (Left Party, June 26, 2019 – own translation)

The relationships that played a role in keeping the SPD on board were, yet again, the close ties between the VeF/CC and the local press and its supporters to quickly boost public pressure for the process to continue. However, the interview with the ADFC Berlin further revealed that much persuasion had been already accomplished. Representatives of the cycling community had joined the transport spokesperson of the SPD in visiting all district chapters of the SPD in Berlin with the goal of winning the approval of their party base for the Mobility Act (ADFC Berlin, February 22, 2019; SPD, June 12, 2020).

STYLE


It was mostly the divergent styles that clashed during the negotiations. Whereas VeF/CC and, to a lesser degree, the ADFC Berlin carried their confrontational style into the *Raddialog*, the BUND Berlin and in particular certain representatives of the administration pursued a more consensual style (SenUVK01, February 19, 2019). These styles were observable through the following interactive and argumentative behavior: before entering the negotiations, the VeF/CC prepared extensively and assigned different negotiating roles (SenUVK02-01, March 13, 2019). During the negotiations, they put forward absolute demands and did not shrink from creating conflict. When the process slowed down, they published a preliminary draft to maintain public pressure. One participant called this approach a “confrontational war”. The administration, on the other hand, argued for realistic and more balanced measures and tried to remain in control by emphasizing that the *Raddialog* was a voluntary dialogue and by starting the discussion from scratch – even though the cycling organizations had already created a fully-fledged cycling law (SenUVK03, March 21, 2019). This was later perceived as an “embrace strategy” by the cycling organizations (VeF/CC, January 25, 2019). A former representative of the administration recounted about the *Raddialog*:

The organizations in the dialogue different at lot, so the VeF/CC wanted everything at once. The ADFC also moved more in this direction [...] The BUND was more pragmatic and then we had the coalition parties and the administration. So maybe the Green Party and the Left Party wanted to make progress but the SPD was a bit more cautious. But there was no one that didn't want to progress at all or blocked the whole thing [...] the

question was more how realistically or pragmatically do you approach this? This was the spectrum. (SenUVK01, February 2, 2019 – own translation)

POLICY

Figure 18: Policy network at the beginning of phase 2




KEY

- Nodes = Policy interests articulated by key actors during this phase
- Size of nodes = High / low amount of nominations by actors
- Links btw. nodes = Policy interests shared by actors
- Width of ties = Amount of concurrent nominations by actors
- Colors = Framing of policy interests [light green: safety; pink: equity, grey: feasibility & efficiency; salmon pink: wider benefits of cycling; purple: implementation]
- Layout: Computed with the visualization algorithm “stress minimization” in the software Visone, a multi-dimensional scaling technique arranging distances (i.e., shortest path lengths) as adequate as possible (*Visone Manual*, n.d.); the positioning of nodes (e.g., at the top or at the center of the network) and the length of ties are arbitrary

The initial frames, which addressed safety (light green) and a just transport system (pink), remained important throughout the negotiation phase but were joined by a number of other frames that focused on feasibility (light grey), for example, or the wider benefits of cycling (salmon pink). Interestingly, the graphs show that these frames were widely shared across participants with none of the frames dominating the debate or creating a clear divide.

Naturally, different transport priorities existed among the participating organizations. Whereas the SPD, for instance, usually prioritizes railway and the underground (SPD, June 19, 2020), BUND Berlin demands an expansion of the light train system (BUND, February 25, 2019) while the ADFC Berlin wishes to improve the conditions for cyclists (ADFC Berlin, February 22, 2019). We can also see that individual frames included various and sometimes contradictory policy interests. Taking the frame of a just transport system as an example, organizations expressed policy priorities as different as “Terminate the privilege of cars” and “People should be able to continue using their car” from a logic of equity. Despite these differences, interviewees stressed that in the context of the *Raddialog* all participating organizations united behind the primary goal of creating a better and safer cycling infrastructure for Berlin (SPD, June 12, 2019; Former State Secretary, May 29, 2020). What made the negotiations tense to such a degree that interviewees lamented a “crisis of confidence” (SenUVK03, March 21, 2019 – own translation) was not so much the “what” as the “how” – a finding, which directly links to the “clash of styles” described above. Conflict revolved primarily around two issues: the legal force of measures and their timing. The State Secretary, who moderated the dialogue, remembered, “Reliability, this is what we talked about all the time; this was the main issue of conflict. On thematic guidelines, we agreed but not on quantitative ones. The common thread in this was bindingness.” (Former State Secretary, May 29, 2020 – own translation) Whereas the VeF/CC and the ADFC Berlin strove to become as concrete as possible in terms of quantitative targets (e.g., number of re-designed junctions per year) and legally binding measures (e.g., actions against illegal parking), the administration aimed for a more general draft bill. Equally opposed views existed on time frames. The VeF/CC and ADFC Berlin insisted on sticking to agreed-upon time frames for the negotiations and subsequent steps and accused the administration of “paralyzing” and “thwarting” the process (VeF/CC, January 25, 2019; SenUVK02-01, March 13, 2019). On the other side of the time spectrum was the Senate Department that felt overwhelmed because of its responsibility to implement the Berlin Mobility Act in the end (SenUVK03, March 21, 2019). The former State Secretary summarized thus: “Looking back at this from today, I would say that the time frame was totally mad, it was just impossible to achieve. This was organized frustration, for all of us.” (Former State Secretary, May 29, 2020 – own translation)

Figure 19: Policy network later in phase 2



KEY

- Nodes = Policy interests articulated by key actors during this phase
- Size of nodes = High / low amount of nominations by actors
- Links btw. nodes = Policy interests shared by actors
- Width of ties = Amount of concurrent nominations by actors
- Colors = Framing of policy interests [light green: safety; pink: equity, grey: feasibility & efficiency; salmon pink: wider benefits of cycling; purple: implementation]
- Layout: Computed with the visualization algorithm “stress minimization” in the software Visone, a multi-dimensional scaling technique arranging distances (i.e., shortest path lengths) as adequate as possible (*Visone Manual*, n.d.); the positioning of nodes (e.g., at the top or at the center of the network) and the length of ties are arbitrary

At a later point in phase two, when the process opened up to the members of the *Mobilitätsbeirat* and entered into the legislative process, the debate became slightly more polarized. Here, it is important to mention that the discussion now evolved around the Mobility Act as a whole, which, at this point, also encompassed both a general part and one concerning public transport. The former State Secretary, who coordinated the incorporation of written amendments, and also held a series of bilateral consultations with representatives of interest groups, was amazed by the vast number of remarks and the level of participation (Former State Secretary, May 29, 2020). Criticism was primarily levelled by the opposition parties as well as certain associations, such as the automobile club ADAC and taxi

associations. Key points of criticism concerned a privileged focus of cycling, the inner-city districts as well as the exclusion of motorized and commercial traffic (Beikler & Wittlich, 2018). Even though this constitutes a rather fundamental critique, it is important to be aware that it was up to the administration to incorporate amendments and that the political opposition could always be outvoted by the governing coalition. By and large, the subsequent debates in parliament or its transport committee were a repetition of previously debated points (Former State Secretary, May 29, 2020). Only when at an advanced stage of the legislative process, the coalition parties suddenly started to renegotiate the law, the dispute reignited. The SPD expressed its unease with the fact that the law omitted car traffic, but was ultimately convinced to drop this concern. In return, the right for associations to take legal actions upon infringements (*Verbandsklagerecht*) as demanded by some of the civil society organizations and the Green Party was excluded from the law.

CONCLUSION

In contrast to the London case, it was not an “informal alliance” that carried the proposal through the policymaking process. Rather, a formalized procedure was set up, which bore a stronger legalistic and transparent dimension: legalistic in the sense that the referendum became an encompassing law, which moved through the different stages of a legislative process involving decisions by official bodies such as the Senate, the Council of Mayors, and Parliament; and transparent in the sense that a plethora of stakeholders were informed about or involved in the process, and debates were partially carried out in public. According to the former State Secretary, the Mobility Act was considered one of the most participatory and thoroughly communicated laws of Berlin – a view even shared by the political opposition (Former State Secretary, May 29, 2020; CDU, February 2, 2019).

However, the analysis also revealed several structural and stylistic similarities to the London case. One actor in particular (VeF/CC), with a *tertius gaudens* orientation, exercised a confrontational style of engaging with other participants and of putting forward demands. This accelerated the process but strained relationships. Even though a government official did not hold this position in this case, the VeF/CC had to a certain degree joined “the official system” by entering the *Raddialog* and, in this position, was expected to not only put forward

demands but also constructively to work on a draft bill with majority appeal. On the other side, we have a high-level administrative figure (former State Secretary) who, with a *tertius iungens* orientation, pursued a rather consensual style, which aimed at stabilizing the network and enabling its continuation. This also highlights the crucial role of leadership in governance processes that is capable of orchestrating and harmonizing participants. Concerning the main crunch point of this phase, which was caused by last-minute hesitation by the coalition partner SPD, it was, again, a combination of external pressure created by mobilization and confrontation as well as internal trust building and lobbying through direct ties that enabled continuation of the process.

The analysis further revealed that it was not necessarily competing frames that had a “structuring effect” on the network of organizations involved (i.e., how they perceived closeness or distance to one another or whether relations were seen as harmonious or conflict-laden) but rather competing styles and approaches to reliability and time that constituted a source of conflict during this phase. Even though this line of conflict was particularly visible between civil society organizations and the administration (reminiscent of the “classical” tension between the two sectors), the analysis yielded a more complex picture: instead of a divide between sectors, we could observe cross-sectoral cliques and disagreement among civil society itself.

Phase 3: Between re-negotiations and first deliveries (2018 - 2020)

Major crunch point: Kick-off the actual infrastructure delivery

Background: Interestingly, the negotiations did not stop at this point. While the cycling part of the Mobility Act should serve as a legal framework, concrete targets and infrastructural plans (which are difficult to integrate into law text) were outsourced into subsequent documents: the *Radverkehrsplan* (cycling plan) and the *Radverkehrsnetz* (cycling network). For the *Radverkehrsplan*, the participants of the *Raddialog* resumed their negotiations at the end of 2018. These negotiations were again, described as deadlocked, which made the VeF/CC and ADFC Berlin withdraw from the negotiation table in March 2019 (VeF/CC, January 25, 2019; SenUVK03, March 21, 2019). It is important to remember that only after the Mobility Law had been officially passed by Parliament, work started inside the administration to realize the primary requirements of the law (SenUVK03, March 21, 2019). This involved new budgeting and a restructuring process: Berlin hired (or, rather, is still in the process of hiring at the time of writing) two full-time positions for cycling for each of the twelve districts and installed a new coordination unit for cycling at the SenUVK. The city-owned company “infraVelo”, which was founded in 2017 for organizing and overseeing the delivery of the new cycling infrastructure, was further expanded. Furthermore, the formerly subordinate traffic control unit (*Verkehrslenkung Berlin*) was integrated into the SenUVK (Senatsverwaltung für Umwelt, 2019b). Despite the opening of first protected cycle lanes (e.g., on *Holzmarktstraße* in Berlin-Mitte), the progress of infrastructure delivery was perceived as extremely slow if not as non-existent at this point (VeF/CC, January 25, 2019; ADFC Berlin, February 22, 2019; SenUVK02-02, May 25, 2020). According to one interviewee, this was mainly due to an “organized non-responsibility” (ADFC Berlin, February 22, 2020 – own translation) in Berlin’s administration, showing itself most clearly between the city-level and the individual districts, which are responsible for delivering the infrastructure on the majority of streets. Another committee, the *Bündnis für Radverkehr* (alliance for cycling), was constituted in the summer of 2019 to accelerate infrastructure delivery. This alliance brought together administrative bodies and city-owned companies that need to be consulted for infrastructural changes to the road network, such as the BVG


(public transport), BWB (water management), and BSR (waste management) (Senatsverwaltung für Umwelt, 2019a). Yet, the period of stasis continued, and it increasingly became clear that the development of detailed infrastructure plans and their implementation would take much more time than expected. A representative of the SenUVK stressed:

Turning all of these demands into infrastructure, actually to create a passable bike lane based on the Mobility Law, this is the responsibility of the Executive. And right now we have to say that this is the most challenging and the least successful part. (SenUVK02-02, May 25, 2020 – own translation).

The sudden onset of the Corona pandemic, which reached in Germany in early 2020, then gave this glacial process new impetus. Bike lanes were created, starting in the district of *Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg*, albeit temporary with less physical intervention and a much simpler administrative procedure in order to provide a “pandemic-resilient” infrastructure (SenUVK02-02, May 25, 2020). These “pop-up bike lanes”, which already surpass 20 km at the time of writing, have attracted considerable attention – also internationally (Beikler, 2020a). Criticism quickly followed, and the pop-up bike lanes became a legal dispute before the *Oberverwaltungsgericht Berlin-Brandenburg* (higher administrative court of Berlin-Brandenburg) (Fröhlich, 2021).

STRUCTURE

Figure 20: Graphic representation of actor-network later in phase 3



Despite the temporary revival of the *Raddialog* for the development of the *Radverkehrsplan*, the main work was now concentrated within the administration, which reduced the network size. Interestingly, the different civil society organizations (BUND Berlin, ADFC Berlin, VCD Nordost, and VeF/CC) that had major disagreements during the previous phase, now joined forces in publishing their own version of the *Radverkehrsnetz* to pressurize the administration from outside (ADFC Berlin, 2019). The *Bündnis für Radverkehr*, established to smoothen infrastructure delivery, was also perceived as less relevant by a representative of the SenUVK (SenUVK02-02, May 25, 2020) and thus excluded from the network depiction above. Only when the COVID-19 crisis broke out almost two years after the Mobility Act took effect, structures began to change again. Starting in *Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg*, a triad of the administration at the district-level, at the city-level, and the Traffic Management unit at the SenUVK emerged that carried out the delivery of pop-up bike lanes (Field notes, difu dialogue, April 29, 2020).⁵⁵

During this later phase, the individual districts gained a more prominent position. Interestingly, the initiative for pop-up bike lanes emerged from within the district of *Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg*, which had political backing from its district Mayor (SenUVK02-02, May 25, 2020). This is remarkable because for the first time in the whole process this actor group, which had not been involved in the initial development of the cycling part of the Mobility Act, started to reach out and form its own network. This illustrates the bottom-up nature of this case study. Their main partner at the city-level was the department *Verkehrsmanagement Berlin* (Berlin traffic management, formerly Berlin traffic control unit), under new management in the context of its integration into the SenUVK.

Apropos relations, it was interesting to observe that even though the civil society organizations from the cycling community were less involved at this stage, their relations to the sphere of politics and the administration remained tense. In light of the slow delivery, they continued to act reproachfully and critically, for instance through media postings (ADFC Berlin, 2020b; Präßer, 2020). A high-level representative of the SenUVK lamented

⁵⁵ This triad had already formed internally before the Corona crisis to work on procedures to accelerate the infrastructure delivery but was now triggered to act.

that the administration did not manage to switch into an active communication itself and continued to feel pressured and pushed (SenUVK, March 21, 2019). Another crucial relation at this point was that between the two layers of Berlin's administrative system, which was often named as one of the main barriers for a successful implementation of the Mobility Act (ADFC Berlin, February 22, 2019, Left Party, June 26, 2019; Former State Secretary, May 29, 2020). This also revealed itself in mutual accusations between representatives from both levels. Yet, it is important to note that the relations between city-officials and the individual districts varied. However, in the times of crisis, this rather complicated relationship gained new flexibility. The idea to create pop-up bike lanes originated rather spontaneously during a phone call between a district representative and the new head of the *Verkehrsmanagement Berlin* and was picked up by other districts after first successful implementations (Field notes, difu dialogue, April 29, 2020).


STYLE

During the time of stalemate, the styles brought forward by the main stakeholders did not change much, which also meant that intervening "fronts" remained frozen. With rising anxiety of not seeing significant changes "on the street", the civil society organizations VeF/CC and the ADFC Berlin continued to pursue a confrontational style by public accusations, withdrawal from negotiations, and organization of protests or silent vigils after fatal accidents. A new style that became visible at the end of this phase was the rather spontaneous approach at the district level to break free from existing structures and prolonged processes of route planning. This style showed itself in actions, such as spontaneous phone calls and meetings on the street with other stakeholders (infrastructure companies and the police), the search for new legal footings for flexible solutions, and therefore a departure from the perfectionism that dominated most of the Mobility Act's genesis (Field notes, difu dialogue, April 29, 2020). While the future of the pop-up bike lanes remains uncertain at this point, this erupting style of certain stakeholders, triggered by the pandemic, introduced a new dynamic into gridlocked structures and the governance process overall. The erupting style can be described as a hybrid form of the consensual and confrontational stage; it is consensual in the sense of searching for workable solutions and forming new coalitions and confrontational in the sense of breaking free of existing

structures as well as ways of thinking and talking.⁵⁶ (See Table 8 on p. 147 for an overview of all styles in this case study.)

POLICY

Figure 21: Policy network later in phase 3



KEY

- Nodes = Policy interests articulated by key actors during this phase
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- Colors = Framing of policy interests [light green: safety; pink: equity; grey: feasibility & efficiency; purple: implementation]
- Layout: Computed with the visualization algorithm “stress minimization” in the software Visone, a multi-dimensional scaling technique arranging distances (i.e., shortest path lengths) as adequate as possible (*Visone Manual*, n.d.); the positioning of nodes (e.g., at the top or at the center of the network) and the length of ties are arbitrary

After the Mobility Act came into force, the frames about its further development remained more or less the same – at least at first. The civil society organizations insisted on a more binding commitment, quantitative targets, and an acceleration of the infrastructure delivery. The administration, on the other hand, tried to balance off this criticism (which was also increasingly expressed by the local press) and demanded more time to roll out the required processes properly. A high-level representative of the SenUVK stated:

⁵⁶ According to Godart, “styles are prone to hybridization” (Godart, 2018, p. 115); a view also in line with White’s observation that “styles must mate to change” (White, 2008, p. 163).

Right now with the ADFC and Changing Cities [VeF/CC] withdrawing from the dialogue process for the *Radverkehrsplan*, we can see that they demand a higher level of commitment. But we also have to say, objectively and with all goodwill and efforts, that it's not possible to implement it in this form [...] Some people have a strong interest to implement certain things, but we can't just waive requirements for planning procedures or participation processes. We can't just say We are the good ones and the good ones decide what needs to be done. We have to be careful here. (SenUVK03, March 21, 2019 – own translation)

Only through a new sense of urgency after the Covid 19 outbreak, the discourse started to change again. The policy interests of the key actors at this stage are depicted in the graphic above. The pressing need for social distancing fortified certain objectives such as the call for more traffic safety, which remained high on the agenda during this phase. Pop-up bike lanes were communicated as a means to provide safety from motorized traffic and other cyclists in the face of growing cycling rates in times of lockdown. The focus on distance also reignited debate about a fair distribution of the public street space and the special protection needed for its weakest users. Pop-up bike lanes were further framed in efficiency terms: by reducing the dependency on cars and relieving public transport, they were viewed as a possibility to ensure the functioning of the overall transport system during the crisis (SenUVK02-02, May 25, 2020; Field notes, difu dialogue, April 29, 2020; Stein & Klein, 2020). Besides, stakeholders primarily stressed the following two objectives: first, to accelerate the infrastructure delivery. A representative from the district level expressed this as follows:

For the administration, it is unfortunate, at least in my understanding, to have a law in place, which we don't manage to implement for years. And realizing that we have planning procedures that takes years, probably two to 10 years for a cycle lane. And not to do justice to the Mobility Act which should improve safety for cyclists [...] Through the crisis we just, metaphorically speaking, stopped with the red tape [*den Amtsschimmel in den Stall stellen*] and got out the racing bike. This situation got us thinking; now we really have to kick-off. (Field notes, difu dialogue, April 29, 2020 – own translation).

A procedure was established, which aimed at constructing a pop-up bike lane at comparably low costs and within two weeks, which, according to the ADFC Berlin, was 550 times faster than previously (ADFC Berlin, 2020a). The second objective was to realize flexible solutions that would allow for re-adjustments and improvements before being permanently fixed:

This is about not thinking everything from a planning perspective, not to excessively and endlessly plan everything from this logic of engineering and planning into the very last detail. But to take a pragmatic approach to street space, which we all know because we use it all the time, we know what we are talking about, this is no rocket science. But planners often make rocket science out of this and then we have these endless coordination loops about every single shop access, its special conditions for delivery, what this means and so one and so forth and you can make a lot of mistakes here. So this is a completely new approach that disempowers the engineering perspective and this is a powerful one. (SenUVK02-02, May 25, 2020 – own translation)

It is no surprise that these objectives were largely shared by the civil society organizations from the cycling community but criticized by the political opposition, which demanded a sufficient justification for each bike lane and cautioned against problems for car and commercial traffic. Paradoxically, the administration, which had been criticized for overly complex and prolonged planning procedures for years, was now criticized for the exact opposite. (See Table 7 on p. 146 for a list of all policy interests and policy frames for this case study.)

CONCLUSION

After the first and second milestone of the referendum and the passing of the Mobility Law were rapidly achieved (despite some delays), we could observe how the governance process now entered into gridlock. It turned out that it would take the administration considerably more time than expected to fulfill the primary requirements of the law of creating administrative capacities and planning guidelines, let alone steer the transition from planning

to infrastructure delivery. At this stage of the process, the challenges of a two-tier administrative structure for the implementation of citywide transport policies became particularly acute, which in the case of London, were somehow flattened through top-down pressure and the creation of a competitive environment amongst the boroughs. In Berlin, meanwhile, structures, styles, and policy interests remained more or less unchanged. Only after the external “shock” of the Corona crisis, did structural reconfiguration in the form of a new triad become visible. This (to a certain degree) bridged the gap between the administrative layers accompanied by an erupting style of spontaneous interactions and the search for flexible solutions.

What has the analysis of the Berlin Mobility Act brought to the fore about the unfolding of complex urban governance processes? First, it provided us with a case where a considerable leap in cycling policies was achieved through a highly participatory format, which was more transparent and legalistic than London’s Cycling Revolution. The inclusion of a number of civil society organizations was not one of agenda-setting and consultation alone but of joint and almost equal decision-making in the *Raddialog*. In contrast to London, the private sector influence was negligible with almost all network maps being sparsely filled out in this area, small wonder against the backdrop of how societal actors traditionally engage in the governance systems of the two cities (see sub-chapter 4.1.).⁵⁷ The Berlin Mobility Act thus constitutes a case that demonstrates both possibilities and challenges for making progress in urban governance when opting for a high level of civil society participation. On the one side, this approach ensures a certain level of legitimacy because it requires a more thorough communication both internally between stakeholders (among whom critical debates can already take place before the projects moves into the legislative process) and externally as participants are likely to engage with their wider networks and make use of communication channels to the public. This analysis also revealed that without the continuous efforts of certain civil society organizations to exert pressure, progress would have been slower (particularly at crunch points), if not non-existent. On the other hand, the analysis showed

⁵⁷ It should be mentioned that the impact of private sector associations is likely to gain significance in the design of the subsequent modules of the Mobility Act on commercial traffic and new mobility.

the difficult balancing act for the administration to reconcile different demands while simultaneously keeping feasibility in sight. After the Mobility Law had been passed, the administration was almost paralyzed by the weight of expectations raised:

What we currently realize in the administration is that we are not adequately prepared, that we can't handle this enormous wave, this tsunami. [...] Ultimately, we created high expectations with the Berlin Mobility Act and we can't, to the same extent, build the required resources and make the necessary changes. [...] We are in a huge dilemma right now. In theory, we want to support this much more but we realize that we need time for that, time that no one gives us. (SenUVK03, March 21, 2019 – own translation)

Next to these general observations and focusing more on the theoretical underpinnings of this dissertation, the analysis of the Mobility Act also substantiated several observations of the London case. Regarding structure, a number of *tertius*-positions were identified from which actors could not only mould the governance project in their favor but also accelerate it. Similar to London, it was an actor “alien” to the system – a stranger in Simmel’s terms – that created pressure with a confrontational style, i.e., by leveraging its exclusive ties to external supporters and the local press. The difference was that in London, this position was occupied by a government official who exerted top-down pressure, while in Berlin the pressure proceeded bottom-up from a civil society organization; but the end effect was the same. Another commonality was the crucial role of a centrally positioned *tertius iungens* to enable the continuation of the process by strategically bringing stakeholders together with a unifying, almost calming effect on the wider network. While this happened more “behind the scenes” in London, Berlin’s former State Secretary was one of the public figures of the Mobility Act. These findings provide additional evidence supporting the inference of an interrelationship between specific broker orientations and the interactive and argumentative style of these brokers, which in turn can have structural repercussions in the wider governance network. In the following sub-chapter, I will further elaborate on these comparative aspects and emphasize laying out what we have learnt about the role of style in the governance process.

Appendix to chapter 4.3.

Table 7: List of policy interests and policy frames – Berlin

Safety	Equity	Feasibility & efficiency	Benefits beyond cycling	Implementation
- Build safe cycling infrastructure	- Fair re-distribution of public space	- Focus on what is technically and physically feasible	- Improve quality of spaces	- Determine quantitative and legally binding targets
- Upgrade cycling facilities at dangerous junctions	- Terminate privilege of cars	- Improve fluidity of traffic and reduce conflict	- Upgrade whole street scene	- Introduce stricter legal measures (e.g. for illegal parking, street damages, and accident sites)
- Stop cycling fatalities	- Improve conditions for the weakest	- Identify priority projects and not everything at one	- Reduce noise and pollution	- Stick to time plan
- Improve subjective feeling of safety	- Improve conditions for all road users	- Consider costs	- Improve quality of life	- Gain political backing for schemes
- Provide traffic education	- Take realities of life and traffic needs into account	- Avoid problems for commercial traffic	- Improve health	- Accelerate planning procedures
- Ensure traffic safety during crisis	- Include traffic needs in the periphery	- Maintain functioning of transport system	- Achieve climate goals	- Realize flexible solutions that allow for re-adjustments
	- People should be able to continue using their car		- Improve attractiveness to boost tourism and retail	
	- Create more space for those that really need to drive by car			
	- Include part on motorized traffic as well			

Table 8: Overview of styles – Berlin

Styles	Confrontational style	Consensual style	Erupting style
Interactive behavior	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- (Public) accusing & blaming of opponents- Acting without coordinating with others- External network mobilizing	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Thwarting most demanding actors- Bringing everyone onto the same page	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Breaking free of existing structures- Establishing new ties between established players, therefore creating new networks
Argumentative behavior	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Putting forward absolute demands	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Focusing on feasible solutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Putting forward flexible solutions

Chapter 4.4. Comparative Analysis

The analysis revealed that both cases shared strong similarities initially. It is striking how the two governance processes developed almost identically during the first phase, the formation within civil society, regarding structure, styles, and policy interests. However, they subsequently started to diverge. Before turning to a more detailed comparison of the three analytical dimensions and reconnecting them to the theoretical underpinnings of this dissertation, three more general disparities between the cases revealed by the analysis should be highlighted.

First, the Berlin case proved to be of a stronger bottom-up nature. Especially since the second phase, the constant push to move forward came from civil society organizations, who were involved as nearly equal decision-making partners in the design of the cycling part of the Mobility Act. During the gridlocked delivery in phase three, the impetus originated from one of the twelve districts. London, meanwhile, proceeded more top down; both in anchoring the cycling agenda inside of TfL during phase two and in delivering the infrastructure despite resistance during phase three. This might come as a surprise given the relatively more centralized nature of Berlin's politico-administrative system and the power normally held by the London boroughs. This, again, demonstrates how the two cases stand out from previous governance arrangements in their respective cities. Second, the analysis of London's Cycling Revolution uncovered an "informal alliance" of supporters across sectors, organizations, and organizational hierarchies that carried the cycling projects through the different stages of the governance process, i.e., "underneath the surface" of the respective organizations. In Berlin, on the other hand, the cross-sectoral work took place in a more transparent and legalistic format with civil society organizations positioned as formal negotiation partners. Third, the analysis revealed a divergence in pace. Even though both cases constitute a remarkable leap in cycling policies, London managed to achieve a smoother transition from policymaking to implementation, whereas in Berlin a more holistic approach was negotiated, which struggled to materialize on the street – at least until the Covid 19 outbreak in early 2020. Let us now move to a comparison of the three theoretical dimensions for a better understanding of these disparities. In order to give the discussion on

style more space, the order hitherto has been modified to start with structure, proceed with policy, and conclude with styles.

4.4.1. Structure

Structural analysis

At the beginning of the second phase, the actual network size did not vary significantly between the cases. However, the qualitative analysis revealed that in London, fewer actors external to the politico-administrative sphere were allowed inside the inner core of actors with decision-making power.⁵⁸ Despite internal resistance at TfL and lobbying efforts directed against the schemes, this made the cycling program easier to handle at this stage but might have resulted in a less comprehensive approach compared to Berlin, where plans quickly expanded to other modes of transport as well. Particularly during the implementation phase in London, it became clear that a homogenous and rather small group of synchronized actors (for the Cycle Superhighways on TfL's road network) excelled in infrastructure delivery, whereas a larger and more heterogeneous network (for the Quietways on borough roads) proceeded more slowly. In Berlin, even though the number of participating organizations in the *Raddialog* were kept to a minimum, the network grew and became more heterogeneous towards the end of the second and the beginning of the third phase. During first attempts at delivery, the number of participating actors remained high through multiple advisory bodies (e.g., *Bündnis für Radverkehr*, *Mobilitätsbeirat*, *Raddialog*, *FahrRat*), at the expense of coordinated action. Only when a small group of actors "broke free" in face of the Corona crisis, could progress be made. This supports the presumption that size does indeed matter in urban governance networks but that the question is not merely a numerical one but also one of the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the actors involved. This also relates to the concept of density. A dense network alone, e.g., due to the existence of cliques, did not say much about the ability of actors to push the governance project forward jointly. Taking the example of the *Raddialog*, which constituted a dense but heterogeneous sub-group in a

⁵⁸ Even though the demands from civil society and the press were included and jointly discussed, the actual strategy document (the "Mayor's Vision for Cycling") was mostly developed within TfL as well as finalized and published by the Cycling Commissioner himself.

roundtable format, we could observe severe tensions and coordination challenges. The study of the *Raddialog* also provided insights into what heterogeneity means in this context: similarity or difference showed itself not primarily along sector or party-political lines – not even along policy interests – but mostly in terms of style. I will further elaborate on this in the part on styles below. The impact of structural equivalence, meanwhile, seemed to vary. In Berlin, structural equivalence amongst the civil society organizations in the *Raddialog* created a competitive setting, which rather led to disagreement and temporary blockage. In London, structural equivalence between the outer boroughs in relation to TfL (which was also financially incentivized) created a certain willingness to adapt and to put forward bold plans. In both cases, it was possible to observe how an established cycling association became “radicalized” or “activated” by a newcomer, to whom these were suddenly deemed structurally equivalent. This supports the tentative assumption that in an urban governance context, structural equivalence can be a source of competition between stakeholders and result, for instance, in either “mimetic pressure” to keep up or to differentiate oneself. The analysis of both cases also confirmed that the existence of structural holes, thought of as the absence of ties to important stakeholders in the wider transport polity (e.g., the press, local campaign groups or environmental organizations), does indeed provide an opportunity-structure for actors being in a position to bridge these gaps, which brings us to the positional analysis.

Positional analysis

In both cases, a driving force could be identified albeit differently positioned. In London the driving force was mainly the Cycling Commissioner himself, who joined the administration as a stranger but then took on an intercohesive position in relation to the local press (and the cycling campaigners to some degree), which he then occupied with a *tertius gaudens* orientation: he exploited his exclusive relations to drive the project forward from within. Another impactful position was occupied by the Deputy Mayor for Transport, who acted as a *tertius iungens* to, first, gather input from outsiders (which also had a mitigating effect on outside criticism) and then to “smooth the waters” in times of tension, thereby ensuring the continuation of the project. In Berlin, the main driving force was the VeF/CC (and to some degree the ADFC Berlin) who proceeded as a *tertius gaudens* to increase both pressure and

speed. Despite being appointed a formal negotiation partner, the VeF/CC could not exercise the same political clout as a government official and had to resume its role as an outside critic during the implementation phase. Moreover, other *tertius* positions were occupied by the BUND Berlin, for example, which was able to counter the views of the VeF/CC. The analysis further revealed that even though the project had more of a formalized governance structure, the loss of one central actor, the former State Secretary who acted as a *tertius iungens*, had a destabilizing effect on the network. Identifying these positional features in both cities gives rise to the hypothesis that in order to push controversial policies through a multi-stakeholder format (particularly through the formal policymaking process in phase two), the joint existence of a *tertius gaudens* and *iungens* orientation might prove beneficial; with one aiming at speed and the other at stability. This naturally depends on who is occupying these positions, but in both cities we saw that a high-level political or administrative figure acted with a *tertius iungens* orientation. This also highlights the importance of a particular kind of leadership in multi-stakeholder governance processes that manages to uphold stability and keep the overall picture of the project in sight during the crucial phase of policymaking. Thinking about political leadership, it is worthwhile to reflect on the role of the Mayor. This was not covered in detail in the analysis of the individual governance processes, but looking at both cases in comparison it becomes evident that the Mayor of London was personally more engaged in the cycling project than the Governing Mayor of Berlin. While this is scarcely surprising given the prominent role of the Mayor of London in urban transport and London's political system in general, it draws our attention to the powerful effect of a Mayor publicly backing a political program or even impersonating it to a certain degree. Other recent examples of this effect are, for instance, the efforts of the Mayor of Paris, Anne Hidalgo, in the field of sustainable transport and mixed-use planning (O'Sullivan, 2020) or the engagement of Barcelona's Mayor, Ada Colau, in housing policies (Hancox, 2016).

Relational analysis

Even though the data presented here do not suffice to capture all dimensions to differentiate clearly between strong and weak ties, the analysis brought some interesting findings to light. First, both case studies highlight those ties that fulfilled a certain bridging function –

particularly: (1) between actors that were closely involved in the governance process and more distanced actor groups in the political arena; as well as (2) between administrative layers. Especially the former ones proved to be valuable for the creation of public pressure (London: relations between Cycling Commissioner and the press as well as cycling campaigners & Berlin: relations between VeF/CC and the press and local campaign groups), which was a key ingredient for overcoming several crunch points. The analysis further revealed that it was usually a combination of this external pressure, internal lobbying and trust building through direct ties that piloted the governance process through critical periods. Second, and comparing both cases more broadly, we could see that time intensity, i.e., the amount of time spent in joint work, did not necessarily translate into emotional intensity in terms of mutual trust or respect. Even a rather informal and irregular contact (e.g., between London's Deputy Mayor for Transport and the bloggers) that, however, came with mutual trust, was more fruitful for enabling joint action than a dense group of actors that worked regularly and formally together on a common project (as in the case of the *Raddialog* in Berlin). This highlights the importance of establishing a certain level of trust among participating organizations in order to progress in a political and multi-stakeholder context. The former State Secretary for Transport in Berlin confirmed this by stating that, when looking back at the process, he would first ensure that participants get to know each other and develop a certain level of trust (Former State Secretary, interview, May 29, 2020). Third, the analysis uncovered how relations changed over time, which also had an effect on the process. Whereas the views of the civil society organizations from the cycling scene on the political leadership in London improved considerably from the first to the second phase (particularly since the announcement of the Mayor's Vision for Cycling), these ties remained tense in Berlin, almost until the very end. We could see an equally sharp deterioration of relations between the city and borough level in London from phases two to three. This shows that a relatively sharp and rapid policy change can impede existing relations but can equally form or ameliorate others along the way; a development that only a qualitative and processual analysis can truly reveal.

4.4.2. Policy

What commonalities or differences did the analysis of the policy debate bring to the fore? First, we observed a similar development during the first phase, which was dominated by a frame around safety. The call for more safety thus proved to be a powerful frame to initiate change in cycling policies; it is spurred on by the tragedy of cycle accidents and fatalities that emotionalize and increase the urgency to act. As one SenUVK representative affirmed, “Nothing mobilizes more than a fatal accident.” (SenUVK02-02, May 25, 2020 – own translation) The call for more safety also gave rise to the political *leitmotif* of “Vision Zero” in both cities, which aims at reducing traffic deaths to zero. Interestingly, White himself used accidents as exemplars of switchings, which can suddenly change one’s identity and perspective – an observation that might hold some truth for a city as a whole. However, London’s former Deputy Mayor for Transport, who then sized this momentum to expand the cycling program significantly, was still amazed by the sudden rise of the cycle agenda:

[...] what I’m really interested in is how like politics and policymaking moves in a very uneven way. So you know you can work on something for decades and nothing happens and suddenly there is like this moment and you are like Oh this is the time to do the thing! And you hock the thing onto the moment and then suddenly you can do things super-fast. So sometimes things move SO slowly or don’t move at all and then suddenly things can move SO quickly. (Deputy Mayor for Transport01, December 4, 2019)

Official statistics show no clear peak in cycling accidents or fatalities right at the beginning of both governance processes (even though cycling fatalities in London rose from ten in 2010 to 16 in 2012) but, instead, that fatalities and especially total accident numbers were alarmingly high in the preceding and following years. (See Table 9 on p. 154 for accident statistics.). This brings us to the interesting question of how to make sense of a rapid rethinking in policy fields not necessarily triggered by (external) events, such as the Fukushima catastrophe in the field of nuclear energy. Consideration of the case studies presented in this dissertation would suggest that such rethinking requires, *inter alia*, both preexistence of a breeding ground on which debates can flourish (in both cases, the local

press had criticized previous cycling policies for years and the upcoming elections provided a window of opportunity), and the emergence of dedicated actors who persistently push the agenda forward to ensure a vocal advocacy. We could observe similar conditions in the *Stop de Kindermoord* protests of the 1970s that initiated a turn in cycling policies in the Netherlands (van der Zee, 2015) and, perhaps, even in the more recent climate change discourse with the rise of “Fridays for Future” (de Moor et al., 2020).

Table 9: Cycling accident statistics of London and Berlin

London⁵⁹

2009	2010	2011	2012
3.669 cycling accidents 13 cycling fatalities	4.007 cycling accidents 10 cycling fatalities	4.497 cycling accidents 16 cycling fatalities	4.613 cycling accidents 14 cycling fatalities

Berlin⁶⁰

2013	2014	2015	2016
6.952 cycling accidents 9 cycling fatalities	7.699 cycling accidents 12 cycling fatalities	7.724 cycling accidents 10 Cycling fatalities	7.496 cycling accidents 19 cycling fatalities

The analysis further revealed how, in both cases, frames diversified during the second phase of policymaking and demands for more cycle safety now had to “compete” against a frame that revolved around feasibility and the consideration of other transport users. (See Figure 22 and 23 on p. 155). This backlash is of little surprise given the paradigms of efficiency and a smooth traffic flow rooted in urban road planning and transport planning more generally. Pro-cycling frames also diversified in a similar fashion in both cases by going beyond the individual safety of cyclists and highlighting wider societal benefits, most notably on health, climate, and quality of life in cities more generally – thereby demonstrating the embeddedness of cycling in several urban policy fields. The plausible assumption that an increase of frames can complicate or even hamper joint action in urban governance processes thus proved to be only partly true. The question should be more whether the frames in question are indeed opposed to one another or, rather, complementary.

⁵⁹ (Transport for London, 2010a, 2011, 2012, 2013)

⁶⁰ (Der Polizeipräsident in Berlin, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016)

Figure 22: Evolution of policy frames in London





Figure 23: Evolution of policy frames in Berlin



- KEY**
- Nodes = Policy frames (aggregation of policy interests)
 - Size of nodes = High / low amount of nominations by actors
 - Links btw. nodes = Frames shared by actors
 - Width of ties = Amount of concurrent nominations (sum of concurrent nominations of policy interests)
 - Layout: Computed with the visualization algorithm “centrality layout” in the software Visone that arranges nodes on concentric circles based on some attribute value of nodes while reducing link crossings (*Visone Manual*, n.d.). In the graphs above, the position of a node on these concentric circles as well as its size correspond to the number of nominations of the frame in question (the closer to the center and the bigger the node, the higher the number of nominations). The positioning at the top, bottom, left or right of the radial layout is arbitrary.

In this context, the analysis also uncovered several differences between the cities. First, we could identify slightly more frames in an alternating fashion in London whilst the framing of the Berlin Mobility Act remained rather stable with safety being high on the agenda throughout. Looking more closely at the individual frames, the analysis showed the rise of an economic frame in London, whereas in Berlin the debate was strongly characterized by policy interests in equity and a fair distribution of public space. When the view had gained traction that the new cycling infrastructure would harm London's business community, the governance process indeed ran into danger of blockage. The subsequent rise of a pro-business and pro-cycling frame certainly played a part in avoiding this blockage to set in. Besides exemplifying how the wider policy-agendas of cities (a sensitivity for business-related issues in London and debates around equality in Berlin) also resonate in governance processes on cycling, we can take away from this that cultural formations, for instance in the form of frames, can indeed hamper or facilitate certain courses of political action. Another difference was that frames seemed to polarize more in London since the second phase, without necessarily jeopardizing the continuation of the process. By comparing this to Berlin, where we could see severe coordination problems despite mutual consent on policy interests in the same phase, it becomes evident that it is not only the "what" in terms of thematic arguments that matters in multi-stakeholder governance processes but also the "how". Overall, these findings support the tentative assumption that any stringency or stability of frames is not a necessary precondition for the successful continuation of an urban governance process. A safety-centered debate mutated in different ways and extents in both cases without bringing the process in complete jeopardy. For urban decision-makers this would imply that a change of frames over the course of a governance process is not worrisome compared to the high importance of maintaining relations and paying attention to different styles.

4.4.3. Styles

What has the analysis uncovered about the role of styles in the governance process? First, a number of styles could be identified in both cases. Interestingly, these stylistic patterns were broadly similar in both cities (London: confrontational, consensual, conspirational & Berlin:

confrontational, consensual, erupting). (See Table 10 on pp. 158-160 for an overview of all styles with data extracts.)⁶¹ However, the evolution of these styles over the course of the process varied: in London, confrontational during the first phase; a blend of confrontational, conspirational, and consensual during phase two; and a return to a confrontational style in phase three. In Berlin, we also observed a confrontational style at the beginning, and a mix of confrontational and consensual styles during the second phase. This constellation only changed when a new style, the erupting style, emerged at a later point in phase three. This stylistic evolution over the course of the governance processes supports the following inferences: confrontation can serve as an impetus during the formation phase of a new governance process. During the actual policy negotiation, however, this confrontation requires complementation with a more collaborative style in order to reach consensus and acceptance for a new policy. Policy implementation, meanwhile, requires a certain level of flexibility in interactive and argumentative behavior and, at best, a close alignment of all key stakeholders.

⁶¹ It is important to note that these four styles should be regarded as different variants or even ideal types of patterned behavior that were observable in the cases studied here. This means that they sometimes blended and could not always be clearly allocated to specific actors. This was most pronounced in the case of the erupting style, which was identified as a hybrid form of the confrontational and consensual style. It is further crucial to note that both governance processes examined in this dissertation constitute cases in which all actors involved were, more or less, interested in the successful realization of the cycling policy at hand – despite remarkable differences on how to get there. We would probably find a different mix of styles in a context where this is not the case, or where the influence of civil society organizations is less pronounced.

Table 10: Overview of styles with data extracts

Style	Confrontational Style	Erupting Style	Consensual Style	Conspirational Style
<p>Data extracts or examples from case studies for interactive behavior</p>	<p>(Public) accusing and blaming of opponents</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Berlin: “Maybe I’m a little bit biased because, partially, I found their methods and approach not okay; this way of attacking certain actors, also personally and sometimes based on half-truths but always very professionally communicated. But apparently this reached a high acceptance in public and in the media. It’s always popular to criticize the Senate.” (Interview SenUVK01, own translation) - London: “So I got to know him and you know in essence you did not get in his way. You know he was VERY forceful and aggressive assertive opponent or [?] depending on which side of life you were on. And so I think you know I think and I’ve spoken to a lot of TfL people and a lot people at City Hall and I think all [?] you know and even people at boroughs said They feel that he’s a rival.” (Interview LCC02) <p>Acting without coordinating with others</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Berlin: Group of civil society actors published preliminary draft without consulting others to speed things up - London: “[...] And just appointed him. That’s the guy, that’s the new Walking and Cycling Commissioner. Which which was exciting times 	<p>Breaking free of existing structures</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Berlin: Circumvention of committees and planning procedures that were put in place <p>Establishing new ties between actors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Berlin: Direct call from district employee to new head of department at SenUVK, then meetings with a few stakeholders on the street and implementation of first pop-up bike lanes within a few weeks 	<p>Thwarting most demanding actors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - London: “So he was, he was very forceful about cycling, my job was trying to balance that off with the rest of [?]. So yes we had some very tense internal meetings but also some very tense stakeholder meetings.” (Interview TfL02) <p>Trying to bring everyone onto the same page</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Berlin: “Conflicts between different expectations or special interest associations have to be resolved together. You can’t just lean back, point at the administration, and say Go ahead. The participants need to do this themselves, among each other. This is not an easy process and requires a lot of moderation” (Interview SenUVK03, own translation)) 	<p>Influencing & lobbying of actors involved and beyond</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - London: “[...] so behind the scenes I would just be like Okay you know with like the political opposition you need to accept like that’s their job, it’s their job to be the opposition, they never gonna get them to go away, get them to stop criticizing the mayor, no that’s why they’re there. But what you can do is sort of point them in the right direction like you know sort of like Well you know this is what we are trying to do but actually we try to fight against this layer here, there are other parts of the GLA that don’t want to do things, we are fighting against the boroughs. So actually you can help me like We both want the same thing which is a big step change in what we are doing on cycling so you know you can help me by fighting against our common enemy.” (Interview Deputy Mayor01) <p>Informal networking</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - London: “And I do think that in that period of time, if you hadn’t have had a Deputy Mayor who was so adapt as Isabel. Isabel [Dedring] is a natural communicator and she didn’t necessarily go through hierarchies or formal meetings. When she first became deputy, I used to suddenly get a phone call, which was

	<p><i>and then he had a strategy, a cycling strategy ready at TfL and he just rewrote the whole thing the day before and then just send it out so This is our cycling strategy.” (Interview TfL03)</i></p> <p>External network mobilizing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Berlin: “[...] at the end, they [SPD] came with their part on cars. And [...] then we had 500 people on the street within 12 hours, so the VeF did this [...]” (Interview ADFC) - London: “But I think it’s fair to [...] assume that he knew how to get the right kind of stories in the press that if he felt there was a particular council was being difficult or that council was objecting to something in the [bringing]? scheme in jeopardy.” (Interview Evening Standard) 			<p><i>quite unheard of. She used to do that with everybody. She had a fantastic network and used to do a huge amount of behind the scenes information gathering, networking and assisting with problem solving.” (Interview TfL04-01)</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - London: “So it was a real team effort and I’m still in touch with all those guys [...] what was great about it was they helped to raise the standard of what we were doing but it also took the politics up [...] so it was a really interesting like of drawing together across this whole landscape like a group of people who actually just wanted to do the right thing. Despite wherever they had their [...] or whatever part of the organization they sat in.” (Interview Deputy Mayor01)
<p>Data extracts or examples from case studies for argumentative behavior</p>	<p>Putting forward absolute demands</p> <p><i>London: “This was very difficult. And [the Cycling Commissioner] was VERY very ONLY interested in cycling. Cycling, cycling, cycling, he wouldn’t hear of anything else. And you needed, it actually needed a personality like that to drive this through, otherwise I don’t think it would not have happened” (Interview TfL02)</i></p>	<p>Putting forward flexible solutions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Berlin: <i>The building of pop-up bike lanes during the Corona crises flipped the planning process (trial and error instead of perfectionist planning followed by implementation)</i> 	<p>Focusing on feasible solutions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Berlin: <i>“We can see this right now with the ADFC and the VeF/CC leaving the dialogue process for the Radverkehrsplan because they expect a higher level of commitment. But here we have to say objectively, and with all good will and effort, that we can’t implement it just like this. Even if some people have a strong interest in implementing certain things, we can’t simply annul requirements for planning procedures, for participation processes because we are the good ones, right?” (Interview SenUVK03)</i> 	<p>Aligning demands between actors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - London: <i>“He is very very driven and focused, he doesn’t mind upsetting people. But we were a good team because he was gonna go and be like No, not good enough. And he also was really into the detail detail of the design [...] but he couldn’t get TfL to do what he wanted. So I would sort of like go and say I think what he means is this and maybe we can do that and like Maybe we can bring those people in. So I was like the good cop and Andrew is the bad cop” (Interview Deputy Mayor01)</i> London: <i>“So the idea was to package up like a much</i>

			<p>- London: “The first problem was that the [Cycling Commissioner] had a very clear vision of what he wanted to achieve but he was not a technical person. So we had a lot of, we had a lot of interesting conversations about how we square the way what he wanted to achieve with what was physically and technically achievable.” (Interview TfL04)</p>	<p>more significant cycling program ALONG side other things. So it’s like everybody gets something and everybody wins, which was very effective because then you don’t get the Why are you giving money to them not us and all that kind of thing.” (Interview Deputy Mayor01)</p>
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Given these observations, let me elaborate on the relationships between styles and the governance process more generally. In research hitherto, style has mainly been referred to as a cultural feature of networks, and also in relational sociology (Boorman, 2011; Fuhse, 2015). This dissertation, however, further underlines its interrelationships with structure. The first question is how structure shapes style. Scholars from the field of relational sociology have already provided meaningful answers to this question. Based on the work of White, Fuhse highlights two primary mechanisms. First, styles can develop in densely knit networks where actors influence one another in direct relationships (Boorman, 2011; Fuhse, 2015). An example for this mechanism would be how artists are influenced by the artistic style of their closest peers. Similarly, we observed how the confrontational style gradually spread across civil society organizations in the field of sustainable transport in Berlin through mutual observation and copying, thereby leading to a concentration of a particular mode of behavior (i.e., of interacting and of putting forward demands) in this context. A second possible mechanism builds on structural equivalence. Actors who are occupying similar positions might exhibit a common style because of the similarity of their relationships (Fuhse, 2015). An example put forward by White are processes of professionalization resulting in distinct professions with a typical style (Schmitt & Fuhse, 2015, p. 124). The analysis also detected this mechanism in the context of urban governance processes. In the London case, we observed how the structural equivalence between the LCC and the bloggers in relation to political decision-makers made their styles converge despite their efforts to

maintain individuality. These mechanisms are reminiscent of the work on social contagion by Ronald Burt, who analyzed how social contagion (in his example the diffusion of technological innovation) can either occur through cohesion (that is strong socialization between actors) or through structural equivalence (that is competition between actors due to similar relationship patterns) (Burt, 1987). This dissertation gives rise to another notion about the positional preconditions of style. Particularly with regards to the strategic orientations at specific broker positions (i.e., that of the *tertius gaudens* or *tertius iungens*), a certain interrelationship with styles could be detected. In both cases, a *tertius gaudens* orientation could be associated with a confrontational style – irrespective of sector affiliation. Similarly, a *tertius iungens* orientation seemed to coincide with more collaborative style-variants in both cases, i.e., the conspirational or consensual style. Even though this might sound like an obvious consideration, it demonstrates the usefulness of the notion of styles to capture how ties are enacted from different brokerage positions, which can then segue into more patterned forms of behavior in the wider network.

This leads us to the second and inverse question of how styles might, in turn, shape or alter the governance process, the question that this dissertation was trying mostly to illuminate. For that, let us have a closer look at each of the individual styles identified in the analysis.

(1) The confrontational style, which turned out to be relatively dominant in both case studies, proved to be a stimulus of new governance processes in the first place. We also found that a confrontational style could play a role at critical moments when the governance process crunched to a halt (Berlin: spontaneous protest mobilization when the SPD was unsure whether to stay on board). Yet, I found that it could also have the opposite effect of creating too much tension so that the process struggles to continue (Berlin: temporary halt of negotiations during phase two and three).

(2) The erupting style, meanwhile, was broadly classified as a hybrid form of the confrontational and consensual style with a focus on flexible solutions. In the Berlin case, it showed itself as a combination of a relatively unorthodox behavior in the face of deadlock. We can therefore carefully assume that it can be a source of dynamism in phases of stalemate

in a multi-stakeholder governance setting (Berlin: bottom-up realization of pop-up bike lanes).

(3) The consensual style, on the other hand, through its rather cautious nature, was found to be more of a decelerator of the governance process. However, it proved to be crucial for the success of the two governance processes as a whole (particularly during the policymaking phase) because, first, it presented a counterweight to the confrontational style in the search for policy solutions with majority appeal that will successfully pass through parliament or board meetings. Second, it came with a rather critical and technical orientation that kept feasibility in sight.

(4) The conspirational style proved to be a powerful one when it comes to the successful continuation of the governance process. It was identified in the London case, where it unfolded its potential rather internally (that is underneath official organizational surfaces) and was found to have a stabilizing effect on the wider network by building and maintaining bridges, “smoothing the waters” in times of tension, and empowering stakeholders to act.


Based on these observations on the styles identified in this dissertation, can we carefully formulate ideas on how style in general shapes the governance process? Without claiming to be exhaustive, the analysis revealed at least two ways of how this shaping can occur: one regarding relations and the other one regarding the network as a whole. First and thinking more broadly about structure, certain styles seemed to have the potential to “shake up” (VeF/CC, January 25, 2019) actor-networks during the governance process or, to use White’s words, “styles can couple and decouple between network populations that exist in physical space” (White, 2008, p. 114). In this context, we should think of coupling and decoupling not in the sense of a detachment of e.g., organizational elements but as the materialization of new ties and the de-materialization of previous ones. In both case studies, for example, the emergence of a confrontational style made other actors follow suit, which impacted their already existing relations. Another example from the London case was that the confrontational style of the Cycling Commissioner, which was alien to TfL, created new

cliques but also fronts within the organization. We could also observe how the exertion of the confrontational style strained relations between the borough- and city-level in London. Thinking more about the process, I also found that this effect could play a role at crunch points. We already saw that individual styles have this potential, but they can also do so in combination. Following Mische, who researched styles of interaction, “Sometimes these styles fuse easily [...] But other times they come into conflict, either between contending actors (who battle over appropriate styles for a given situation), or within individuals themselves, who have to reconcile two or more possible ways of responding to a given situation.” (Mische, 2009a, p. 40) I would even go one step further and carefully propose that styles cannot only fuse but that their joint appearance might, in some cases, create synergies, meaning that they shape the process more strongly when combined. As, perhaps, best illustrated by the interplay between the confrontational and conspirational style in the policymaking phase in London, these two styles proved to be complementary when exercised by key actors working towards the same goal: their practices appealed to a diverse set of actors, which created a broader basis for legitimacy and helped to surmount critical periods. On the other hand, as Mische also pointed out, styles can come into conflict, which might jeopardize the continuation of the process. An example here would be how the confrontational style of the civil society organizations in Berlin clashed with the consensual style of certain members of the administration. A confrontational style exercised by two opposing “sides” at once would inevitably result in a clash. The second effect that could be observed was that certain styles have the potential to gain traction and temporarily characterize whole phases of the process – thus becoming more like a “group style” (Eliasoph & Lichterman, 2003). Depending on which style is brought to the fore, this can, for instance, accelerate the process (e.g., in case of the “kick-the-door-down-mode” during the implementation phase in London). (See Figure 24 on p. 164 for a graphical representation of the dynamics between structure and style.)

The mechanism underlying these possible impacts is a key feature of styles, which is their disseminating nature that can create patterned forms of behavior. As the analysis demonstrated, styles have the potential to attract or repel actors, they can be adopted or actors can try to differentiate themselves from them. This dissertation advances the proposal that

this almost magnetic effect of styles might play out on the policy side (when the diffusion of specific styles emphasizes certain policy interests more than others) as it certainly does on positions (how close or distant actors position themselves to one another) and relations (if ties are viewed as harmonious or conflict-laden). This structuring effect is reminiscent of the work on homophily, which describes processes of social similarity (Powell et al., 2005, p. 1139) and the phenomenon of “like attracts like” (Pachucki & Breiger, 2010, p. 214). Yet, styles depart from this concept because they do not necessarily relate to shared objectives but rather to the ways in which these are pursued. This structuring effect would substantiate the statement of White that a style “is in itself a source of innovation and change” (2008, p. 114) and pin it down in the context of governance. In this context, styles are indeed a dynamic force that – next to potentially other factors – can set working ties, through which policies are negotiated, into motion. Therefore, they can be seen as a concept to carefully make sense of the enactment of ties from specific broker positions in the governance network and thus of agency at the interface of structure and policy. They are, as stated by White, context-specific and more ephemeral than, for instance, institutions.

Figure 24: Dynamic interplay between structure and style in the context of urban governance



Concerning the empirical context of this dissertation, the analysis demonstrated the inadequacy of viewing urban governance processes only in terms of different sectors or interests that need to be reconciled, but rather that the style of the actors involved constitutes another structuring component and deserves more attention in the study of how urban governance processes unfold. It became clear that it is particularly the confrontational style that seems to counter “the inertia endemic in social organization” (White & Godart, 2007, p. 13). This encourages the proposal that this style embodies a key ingredient of progress in urban policymaking for complex and politically contested issues, such as the urban mobility transition. But as one senior representative from Transport for London recounted:

Some people might look at that and say, “Well, that's clearly what a city needs then forever”. My personal opinion is that the mayoral election in 2016 came around about the right time for the cycling agenda in London. I think that intensity, that kind of blitzkrieg effect, particularly what Andrew Gilligan brought to it, was hugely valuable in the moment but was running out of steam by 2016 in terms of breaking new ground. I think by that period, more enemies were being made than friends. (TfL04-02, January 28, 2020)

This illustrates that confrontation might spark urban policy change or temporally drive it forward but that it can also create negative repercussions, i.e., a destabilization of key relationships within the urban polity. “Move fast and break things” (Mark Zuckerberg, CEO of Facebook, as cited in Taneja, 2019, para. 1) has been a propagated mantra of Silicon Valley tech companies. Even though this originally relates to an error culture in engineering and coding, it also holds some truth for the political sphere. Without balancing, moving fast in urban policymaking can literally “break” political relationships. This dissertation therefore underlines the indispensability of a consensual style next to a confrontational style in order to make urban policy change in cities sustainable. In the closing chapter, I will discuss these findings and situate them within the wider theoretical debate around networks. Second, I will consider key limitations of this study and what its findings imply for future research.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

5.1. Discussion

This dissertation set out with the aim of addressing the difficulty in urban policymaking to move complex governance processes forward, which is the difficulty to break through the inertia or deadlock that we so often observe in the city (Lelong et al., 2017). Prior research has already highlighted macro- and meso-level conditions that limit cities in their capacity to govern, such as a lack of municipal autonomy, insufficient public budgets, and administrative or territorial complexities (da Cruz et al., 2019; Einig et al., 2005). While this dissertation touches upon these aspects, it primarily draws on another stream of research that has started to dig deeper into the micro-foundations of urban governance itself, its functioning and dynamics, to reach a better understanding of how action is enabled or constrained from within. This stream draws extensively from a relational perspective, which has a certain tradition in the study of urban politics (see e.g., Laumann & Pappi, 1976). The approaches that I found most fruitful in this regard are those that combine structural with cultural dimensions by not only paying attention to specific actor- and power constellations but also exploring the impact of ideational or discursive patterns and dynamics on collective action in the political arena (Bossner & Nagel, 2020; Bradford, 2016; Ingold & Leifeld, 2016; Lelong, 2015; Lelong et al., 2017; Lelong & Nagel, 2017; Nagel & Satoh, 2019). Building on this research, this dissertation approached the complexity of urban policymaking with a process view (Fortwengel et al., 2017; A. Langley, 1999; A. Langley et al., 2013; Pettigrew, 1997) in order to further unpack it while maintaining both granularity and chronology. For that, two governance processes were analyzed: first, in terms of structure, that is the positions of the actors involved and the working relations between them; and second, in terms of culture, conceptualized as the actors' policy interests and policy frames. In the following, I will discuss the empirical findings and then situate my theoretical observations within the wider debate around networks.

Looking at actors first, a key goal guiding the case selection and analysis of this dissertation was to gain insights into the role of civil society organizations in today's urban governance arrangements. What does it mean for the unfolding of urban governance processes when the

involvement of civil society goes beyond mere consultation at the beginning or its support to the welfare state ensuing a governance process (Gerometta et al., 2005; Healey, 2015; Swyngedouw, 2005), but becomes much more formative throughout? In order to explore that, urban cycling was chosen as a contested transport policy field with vocal civil society organizations. The analysis of the Berlin Mobility Act and London's Cycling Revolution has shown that civil society organizations can not only successfully trigger these governance processes in the first place, but also actively shape and drive them forward. With regard to the initial impetus for a new policy, the comparative analysis revealed a nuanced picture of the dynamics within civil society itself. In both cases, the organized civil society consisting of traditional membership-based cycling associations was "radicalized" by the emergence of a newcomer that rather resembled an initiative or movement. Next to favorable conditions such as upcoming elections, it was primarily this combination of approaches, of the organized and organizing civil society, of old and young so to speak, that pushed cycling to the top of the political agenda. The analysis further revealed that despite the different forms that the subsequent involvement of civil society organizations into the governance process can take, they mainly acted as pressure groups. The Berlin Mobility Act exemplifies an extreme case in this regard because civil society organizations were exclusively involved as almost equal negotiating partners during crucial periods of the policymaking process. As such, they exerted pressure for the process to continue and to produce concrete results at the negotiation table but also mobilized their wider networks to create external pressure on the street. Interestingly, this forced the administration into a thwarting role from which it tried to counterbalance the more demanding civil society organizations. In London, meanwhile, certain members of the administration and political office holders strategically leveraged their ties to civil society organizations to, inter alia, incorporate their expertise and increase external pressure in the face of mounting criticism. As stated earlier (chapter 1), the capacity of city governments to act accrues from (but is certainly not limited to) their ability to cooperate with non-state actors (Mossberger & Stoker, 2001; Stone, 1889). Extant research has generated considerable knowledge about the involvement of the private sector that rests on the complementarity of state authority on the one hand and economic resources in cities, such as capital that generates jobs, tax revenues, and financing, on the other (Mossberger & Stoker, 2001). The relatively strong involvement of civil society organizations in urban

governance processes can hardly be conceptualized as an exchange relationship only. While it has the potential to boost the efficiency, legitimacy, and transparency of urban politics (Postigo, 2011), it also creates novel coordination challenges. My observations suggest that, in particular, city officials will need to take into consideration and adapt to the increased publicness due to civil society involvement.

Looking beyond civil society, it was especially the analysis of London's Cycling Revolution that yielded the most unexpected results. First, the political debate around cycling in London did not run along party-political lines during that time. Instead, the cycling agenda flourished under Conservative rule and in Labor-run boroughs alike. A second classical line of conflict in urban governance runs between civil society and the administration (Lelong et al., 2017, p. 133). While clearly observable in Berlin, this line of conflict was temporarily mitigated in London by informal but relatively trust-based relationships between civil society organizations and the political leadership. Lastly, the oft-proclaimed divide between business and civil society interests on cycling (Aldred, 2016) did not hold true for London. Even though the cycling project did receive backlash from private sector conglomerates as well as local businesses, we could also observe a counter movement of companies actively supporting the agenda. Considering that the beginnings of London's Cycling Revolution date back almost a decade at the time of writing, we can conclude that the issue of cycling has outgrown niche or special interest-debates and established itself firmly in the transport agenda of many cities.

Going to a higher level of abstraction and thinking about the process, this dissertation also illuminated several dialectics in driving patterns of change. Even though both governance processes constitute cases of fundamental and rapid policy change, they experienced critical moments where the process ran into risk of failure (conceptualized as "crunch points") as well as phases of stalemate. A pattern detected in both cases was that crunch points were usually overcome by simultaneous trust building and lobbying through direct ties and the creation of public pressure through external network mobilization. This twofold approach could be detected for supporters of the cycling agenda regardless of their sector affiliation. In Berlin, mostly civil society representatives urged continuation of the process, a role played

instead by high-level public officials in London. Another underlying pattern was the concurrence of disparate styles. It is a central argument of this dissertation that the unfolding of the governance process cannot be explained by structural developments and the wider policy debate alone. Drawing on the notion of styles from (relational) sociology and different empirical fields, it is here proposed that the style of actors can be another structuring component during the governance process. In other words, it is not only important who is involved and what is being negotiated but also how actors interact and bring forward demands. For both case studies, the analysis uncovered an interplay between a confrontational and a consensual style. Whereas the confrontational style was found to be both a trigger of change and an accelerator of the governance process, the consensual style brought a stabilizing effect. Without the latter, the negative repercussions of confrontation on existing relationships would certainly have been more pronounced.

I will now step out of the empirical context and situate these observations in the wider theoretical debate around networks. The theoretical perspective of this dissertation was inspired by network theory, and relational sociology more specifically (Fuhse, 2015; Mische, 2011). Even for more culture-sensitive approaches, the challenge remains of how to adequately make sense of change or emergence from a network perspective (Padgett & Powell, 2012). This relates to the age-old sociological debate on how to grasp action from a structural perspective and thus on the relationships between the dimensions of structure, culture, and agency (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Hays, 1994) – a debate well beyond the scope of this dissertation. Following Pettigrew, however, agency should lie at the heart of any processual analysis (Pettigrew, 1997). In the following, I will therefore trace certain lines of argument from this debate that relate to this dissertation and carefully link my observations to more recent contributions.

A first general line of argument is that despite the high relevance of agency-related questions in sociological and organizational network research (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994), conceptualizations of agency have been referred to as vague (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 962) or even as neglected (Tasselli & Kilduff, 2021, p. 2). Drawing on the work of sociologists, such as Talcott Parsons, James S. Coleman, and Jeffrey C. Alexander,

contrasting views on agency have emerged: while some see the concept as too tightly bound to structure (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998), others lament the tendency to link agency to culture, and to treat both as conceptual underdogs compared to structure – the concept “with the muscle” (Hays, 1994, p. 58). What is broadly shared, however, is the description that the locus of action is usually situated on a spectrum from the network level to more micro-foundational views (Tasselli & Kilduff, 2021) and that explanations of agency range from deterministic to more voluntaristic perspectives (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Hays, 1994). Regarding the relationship between structure and agency, Tasselli and Kilduff have recently identified two competing views in organizational network research. They distinguish between an ontology of dualism, that treats structure and actors as separate domains, and an ontology of duality, from which structure and actors are considered as mutually constitutive (Tasselli & Kilduff, 2021). In reviewing the social network research agenda, they derive a dominance of the former view while stating that the duality perspective, which is in line with structuration theory (Giddens, 1984), is less developed (Tasselli & Kilduff, 2021). This dissertation followed the approach of duality that treats structure and actors as inseparable and devoted attention not only to structural levels of causation but also to more ephemeral dynamics over time – both crucial for a comprehensive understanding of processes of change (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994, p. 1445; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998).

If we become more concrete and regard the issue of agency itself, Tasselli and Kilduff link the current upsurge in agency-related network research to a renewed attention to brokerage (Tasselli & Kilduff, 2021). Brokerage has long been considered a paradigm for agentic activity with a focus on broker positions (Burt, 1992; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). More recently, the focus has shifted from mere positional views to the fruitful study of brokerage behavior and orientations (Obstfeld, 2005, 2017; Tasselli & Kilduff, 2021). This is where the findings of this dissertation, which revealed a high relevance of brokerage for the unfolding of complex urban governance processes, can be carefully linked. The theory chapter of this dissertation (chapter 2) introduced the broker types of the *tertius gaudens* (Burt, 1992; Simmel, 1950) and *tertius iungens* (Obstfeld, 2005, 2017). It further introduced the concept of the multiple insider, who is positioned at structural folds (Vedres & Stark, 2010), and the Simmelian notion of the stranger who “comes today and stays tomorrow”

(Simmel, 1908, p. 509). These conceptualizations of brokerage, which proved to be beneficial for the study of urban governance processes, come with different views on agency. In structural hole theory, a more deterministic image of the *tertius gaudens*, who gains control from an advantageous position, has prevailed. From this perspective, agency coincides and can be explained with opportunity (Tasselli & Kilduff, 2021). Despite early calls to focus more strongly on the agentic orientations that these brokerage positions may support (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 1007), it was primarily the more recent work of Obstfeld that convincingly identified different brokerage orientations toward action. Obstfeld labelled these orientations as “strategic” because they refer to preferred means of approaching problems in a social context (Obstfeld, 2005, p. 104). He distinguished between three strategic orientations: conduit, which is primarily concerned with knowledge transfer; the *tertius gaudens* that involves competitive behavior; and the *tertius iungens* that concerns more collaborative and facilitating behavior (Obstfeld, 2017). Following Obstfeld, these characteristics of nodes (push factors) are as important as the opportunities afforded by structure (pull factors) for making sense of action and “new action” in particular from a brokerage perspective (Obstfeld, 2017).

My observations would suggest that the notion of styles might be a useful concept to enrich our understanding of these strategic orientations further in two ways. First, it could serve as a means to make these orientations easier to identify due to the possibility of “style watching” (Boorman, 2011, p. 187), through which one could derive different categories of styles based not only on brokerage behavior in terms of structure (i.e., how ties are enacted) but also, for instance, on how interests are expressed. The confrontational style, for example, coincided with a *tertius gaudens* or structural fold position in the cases covered here, and could be identified by a harsh way of interacting and the submission of absolute demands. Second, styles could be a helpful concept to advance tentatively how the strategic orientations of influential brokers toward action affect the behavior of other actors, thus translating into wider behavioral patterns in the network over the course of time. This focus on dynamics might be a possibility to do justice to more time-sensitive conceptualizations of agency (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998) and to move from explanations of how agency follows structure to an exploration of the many ways in which agency in turn can shape

structure. According to White, “agency is the dynamic face of networks” that helps us to understand how institutions are upended and “fresh action” initiated (White, 1992, pp. 315, 245).

Reconnecting this to the three theoretical dimensions applied in this analysis, the concurrence of structure, policy, and style can be metaphorically described as follows. Whereas structure can be understood as the “plumbing” or “pipes” (Obstfeld, 2017; Podolny, 2001) of a governance network, policy objectives can be seen as the contents flowing through, while style is the dynamic element that, through its magnetic effect, acts as a pump – particularly when exercised from influential broker positions. It is important to note that it was not intended to simply add yet another concept to the “Babylonian variety” (Börzel, 1998, p. 253) of already existing ones. Style is by no means an unfamiliar concept in relational sociology (Boorman, 2011; Godart, 2018; Mische, 2009a; Simmel, 1991; White, 2008). Yet, by comparing the rather ambiguous style concept of Harrison White (which often serves as a reference point in relational sociology) with other sociological concepts, and by enriching it with insights from different empirical fields, this dissertation “pinned it down” (Boorman, 2011, p. 192) for the study of urban governance. The findings of this dissertation should therefore be seen as a call to further investigate the effect of styles on joint action in urban policymaking, not only at the level of the city – for instance in the form of “thought styles” (Kornberger et al., 2021) or an “inherent logic” of cities (Löw, 2018), or at a national level as research on “policy styles” would suggest (Richardson, 1982) – but also at an organizational or even individual level.

5.2. Limitations and implications for future research

To conclude, I will address three main limitations of this dissertation and link them to strategies that can either substantiate or expand on my observations. The first shortcoming concerns the research design chosen for this comparative study. By applying a most-similar case design, this dissertation examined the unfolding of governance processes in a highly specific context only, which are relatively successful policies in western European capitals. This approach uncovered the considerable differences that exist even between London and Berlin and enabled cross-case comparison of underlying mechanisms. While this offers an

indication about, for instance, the conjunction of styles and brokerage in comparable governance contexts, it comes with a limited generalizability. There are, however, several promising ways in which this generalizability could be tested. The first possibility would be to increase the number of comparable cases in order to assess whether my observations were idiosyncratic to London and Berlin. Second, a most-different case design that contrasts a successful governance process with one characterized by stalemate or even failure might provide further insights into the “negative” repercussions of specific styles. It might also be worthwhile to study styles not in times of political change but to examine their role in upholding stability. Another possibility would be to examine the relationship between structure, policy, and style in different contexts, for instance in more hierarchical political systems or in other contentious urban policy fields (e.g., housing or social inclusion) in order to test the portability of my results.

The second limitation of this dissertation relates to methodology and data. As outlined in the chapter on methods (chapter 3), this dissertation developed a distinct methodological approach of data collection and analysis. While being well suited for the research endeavor of this dissertation, this approach proved to be relatively complex and time consuming, which limits its transferability. One possibility to reduce this complexity would be to qualitatively reconstruct the actor network not based on the ego-centric networks of its members, for which the Qualitative Structural Analysis (Herz et al., 2015) was developed, but to collect their views on the whole governance network (for different time periods) right from the start. This might reduce some of the richness of individual accounts from an ego-centric perspective, but it would also reduce the number of analytical steps while increasing the robustness of the final network. Another limitation lies in the varying quality of relational data that were collected in a qualitative way. While the database of this dissertation allowed for a thorough positional analysis, the data did not suffice to systematically analyze the different working relationships at play and to, for instance, clearly differentiate between strong and weak ties (Granovetter, 1973). This shortcoming could be addressed by incorporating a quantitative element into the data collection, for example in the form of a survey, that allows for a measurement of ties along different dimensions such as emotional intensity or the amount of time spent working together. Third, the analysis of the policy

debate could be further enhanced. In this dissertation, the focus lay on policy interests, which implies a positive formulation of goals. It could be equally worthwhile, however, also to illuminate the opposite and ask what stakeholders wish to avoid or impede. One potential strategy to combine both perspectives would be the application of a complete discourse network analysis (DNA), a mixed-methods technique that maps the co-evolution of beliefs and actor constellations over time and can produce, for instance, congruence and conflict networks (Leifeld & Haunss, 2012).

Finally, the theoretical design of this dissertation comes with at least two weaknesses. First, the notion of styles was only deemed to be salient and, thus, added as a theoretical dimension during data analysis. Future research on the role of styles in urban governance would certainly benefit from integrating styles more prominently into the research design, for instance in the form of specific interview questions. Furthermore, this dissertation focused primarily on the relationships between structure and styles in the governance context. What needs to be established more convincingly, however, is the link between styles and the wider policy debate. Does a particularly contentious or urgent policy debate in times of political turmoil inject a specific style into governance processes? Can the style of key stakeholders shape the surrounding policy debate in a certain way? How can we explain that actors with contrasting policy objectives sometimes exhibit similar styles? A promising stream of literature that might be a source of inspiration to address these questions is the burgeoning work on “futures” (Mische, 2009b, 2014). According to Mische, who served as a key reference point for the conceptualization of styles in this dissertation, more research is needed on the effects of future projections on social action (Mische, 2009b). For her, there is not only a retrospective element that shapes action but also a prospective element. This dissertation went so far in tracing the style of specifically positioned actors to their past institutional environments, such as journalism or civil society. Yet, how do their aspirations for cycling or imagined future of the city as a whole impact their way of interacting and of putting forward demands in a governance setting? Focusing not only on the past and present but also on the future would do justice to time-sensitive conceptualizations of agency (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998) and create a more complete picture of governance processes that are aiming at a better urban future.

6. Bibliography

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