Citizenship in Schlossplatz

with

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Hertie School
of Governance

Schlossplatz³

Public Sector

Private Sector

Civil Society

The turn of the century has witnessed the beginning of a new era in international politics. What are the implications for citizenship, an institution that, like few others, defines who we are and how we organise political life? This issue of Schlossplatz³ provides a snapshot of the ongoing debate on the past and future of citizenship.

From the end of the Cold War through almost two decades of economic globalisation, increased trade and unprecedented immigration, to 9/11, the "war on terror" and most recently, the seemingly unfettered contagion of the global financial crisis, our world has faced and is learning to cope with challenges whose origins and solutions lie beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. The growing interconnectedness between nations seems a trend set to continue well into the future.

Many have cited a lagging behind of political globalisation, hinting at the inability of some long-standing state institutions to cope with the pressures of our changing global landscape. One such institution, citizenship, is uniquely representative of the push and pull of the old versus the new, and of the need for a political awakening to address the divisions and tensions inherent in a rapidly changing world.

This issue of Schlossplatz³ seeks to contribute to this enterprise. Taking on a range of issues and conceptual shifts in the nuanced landscape inhabited by citizenship, the issue provides a snapshot of the debate over the evolution of the state and our relation to it.

For many, the future of international governance will take a decisive turn on January 20 with the inauguration of a new U.S. President. In an unconventional pre-election speech in Berlin, Barack Obama spoke to popular conscience when he called himself a "citizen of the world." His moving into 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue this month symbolises the need as well as the willingness for a new beginning.

But this expected shift in the United States' relation with the world may raise more questions than it answers. A citizen of the world in the 21st century— what does that mean? How does citizenship today relate to citizenship in the past? Traditional state-bound citizenship continues to dominate our thinking of who we are, at least legally, and usually also in how we define each other individually and collectively. However, there are strong tensions between traditional citizenship and the world of the 21st century. The state faces challenges from many sides, its importance in people's lives eroded by the unprecedented transnational interaction and mobility of individuals and private actors. Out of this tension emerges a new range of perspectives on citizenship in a new era.

The contributions in this issue of Schlossplatz³ illuminate the concept of citizenship from various perspectives. CLAUS OFFE and ULRICH PREUSS open by recalling the long and sometimes dramatic history of citizenship, asking whether today there is a renaissance of the individual as opposed to the collective. MICHAEL GOODHART goes even further, arguing that the idea and institutions of citizenship have to be re-examined so as to avoid the erosion of democracy. In this context, JOSLYN TROWBRIDGE shares her experience with "The 21st Century Town Meeting", a new technique that puts citizen engagement at the centre of the policy-making process.

How to design appropriate and modern citizenship policies? Schlossplatz³ has put the question to two academics and one politician. MARC HOWARD, an expert on citizenship policies in the EU, presents his research on the conditions and driving forces of openness and restrictiveness. An often overlooked aspect, he argues, is the role of public opinion. CHRISTIAN JOPPKE agrees with this analysis, adding that, paradoxically, civic integration policies often revert to illiberal means.

Finally settled in: The new home of the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin Mitte, Friedrichstraße 180.

For WOLFGANG SCHÄUBLE, Germany's Minister of the Interior, the key to civic integration is common values. But what if a large part of the population has arrived and settled under a regime considered illegitimate? VELLO PETTAI's analysis of citizenship issues in the newly democratic Baltic states revolves around this question.

So citizenship is the business of the state and its subjects, right? If only it was that easy. In the world of business the concept of citizenship has made a recent appearance under the label of corporate social responsibility. ROMAN HRYCYK disentangles the term from its related concepts and examines what drives companies to become corporate citizens. One example of a firm actively engaging in corporate citizenship is Volkswagen. CHRISTINA HANLEY outlines how the car maker's corporate citizenship activities may be in line with its main business objectives.

How can we, as citizens, shape policies? The most obvious answer in a democratic state would be: go vote! But is it really rational to vote? Why is voting obligatory in some countries? Do we have a moral duty as citizens to vote? These questions are explored by three members of Schlossplatz³'s editorial team. Of course, active citizenship is much more than just voting. RAJASH RAWAL explores the new role played by modern communications technologies in the engagement of tomorrow's e-citizens.

We are looking forward to your comments, criticism and feedback.

The editors of Schlossplatz³

About us

Schlossplatz³ is a policy magazine run by a student team at the Hertie School of Governance (HSoG). In our studies, we come across myriad fascinating and cross-cutting topics. We pick one of them for Schlossplatz³ and look at it from the perspective of the public sector, the private sector and civil society—hence the superscript "3" in our name.

Apart from policies, we also take into account current and future policy-makers, the alumni and students of the HSoG. In the alumni section, nine former MPP students describe how their citizenship has impacted their personal and professional lives. The campus spotlight this time has moved to the U.S., to the campuses of Georgetown and Maxwell, where two Hertians are currently on an exchange. But thanks to the internet, we can discuss even when divided by the Atlantic. We welcome you to join that discussion on the Schlossplatz³ blog: www.hertie-school.org/schlossplatz3

Citizenship—Back to the Future

by Ulrich K. Preuss *and* Claus Offe

Almost a full decade into the 21st century, citizenship has resumed centre stage in public and scholarly debates. Ulrich K. Preuß and Claus Offe, both professors at the Hertie School of Governance, open this issue of Schlossplatz³ by reviewing the historical roots and pathways of the concept of citizenship and outlining current trends.

Citizenship has experienced a renaissance as a key concept in the contemporary social sciences in the last twenty years—in philosophy, social and political sciences, law and economics. Since the invention of the idea of citizenship by the ancient Greeks some 2,500 years ago, its meaning has undergone many changes. Yet, its relevance has survived many cycles of ups and downs and diverse socio-political orders as a normative ideal, which means: as an ever contested normative ideal. Its vitality originates in a conception of social life which was unprecedented in history at the time of its birth, namely the principle of human equality. What constituted the Greek polis as the first distinctively political association was the principle of equals ruling equals in a community of citizens.

It is not by accident that 'citizenship' and 'city' share the same etymological roots.

However, as J.G.A. Pocock remarked, "equality is something of which only a few are capable." This explains why citizenship has long been an aristocratic rather than a democratic principle. The governments of the Greek polis, of the medieval Italian city republics or of the imperial cities of the Roman-German Empire were governments of peers rather than of equals. They were socially exclusive patterns of rule. Still, it is not by accident that citizenship and city share the same etymological roots. Cities are communities of citizens who, according to Machiavelli's definition, "live at liberty under their own laws." Cities' republican character made them genuine antagonists of the sovereign state, the political formation which used coercive force as the principal means of societal integration and of enforcing social discipline.

As we know, the sovereign state ultimately triumphed over its competitors. But not without adopting several constitutional elements of the city, citizenship being the most prominent. It was the French Revolution which for the first time associated the modern sovereign state with the idea and ideal of citizenship—in fact, it was like joining fire and water. In Rousseau's construction of the identity of the rulers and the ruled the polarity between civic freedom and sovereign coercive power was conceptually abolished, but the link of citizenship with the state remained a matter of exclusivity—women, the poor, and other portions of the population were kept out of the new polity.

The extension of the suffrage in the 19th and 20th centuries aimed at remedying this deficiency and in fact effected a growing political inclusiveness in all constitutional states of the West. Nevertheless, the intrinsic tension between the sovereign state and the idea of citizenship persisted despite the state's democratisation. This is explained by the fact that mass democracy—which is what the inclusion of the lower classes in the polity ultimately amounts to—was a formation which was designed for the non-violent mastering of class conflicts in the evolving industrial society. It required more robust forms of mass participation in shaping democratic politics than what citizenship, in the traditional sense of having the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in the elections, entailed. From the end of the 19th century on, the development of modern democracy is inseparably connected with mass organisations like political parties, labour unions and concomitant associations

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ULRICH K. PREUSS teaches Law and Politics at the Hertie School of Governance. He holds a Doctor of Law from Gießen University. From 1972 to 1996, he worked as Professor for Public Law at the University of Bremen. Since 1996, Preuß has been a Professor of Public Law and Politics at the Freie Universität Berlin. In 1989/90, he co-authored the draft of the constitution as a participant of the Round Table of the German Democratic Republic. In 1992/93 he advised the Thuringian parliament on the conception of a new constitution. He is on the advisory board of various research institutions and is a member of the Staatsgerichtshof (State Constitutional Court) in Bremen.

in the fields of religion, sports, recreation, consumer interests etc., all of which aimed at the progress of collective forms of life. As authors like Max Weber, Robert Michels or Joseph Schumpeter have pointed out, the institutional ideal of mass organisations is not the autonomy of the citizen but collective solidarity, which requires a high degree of social discipline.

In retrospect, the democratic societies of the 20th century have been termed "society of organisations" as opposed to the 19th century "society of individuals" (Norbert Elias). This difference indicated a tangible change of the character of politics. Politics became ever more a struggle for power of organised political and social agents, for whom the mobilisation of the collective interests and aspirations of their respective constituencies was the most efficient instrument of political representation, of democracy. Of course citizenship existed as a legal status which everybody shared with everybody, but its relevance was marginal. Paradoxically, the more polities became inclusive and the more citizenship status became an issue of political empowerment and participation, the less importance was attached to its political and social dimensions. Where citizenship has remained an important status—namely as the status of having a legal bond with a particular state which provides the benefits associated with nationality—it has maintained the flavour of exclusivity, particularly in democratic polities. Hence arises the current salience of issues concerning who must be granted citizenship, and on what conditions.

As we stated at the outset, a major shift has occurred since the 1990s. How can we explain the renaissance of the idea of citizenship? Are we entering a world in which individuals, as opposed to organised collective actors, matter again; in which they not only make a difference, but in which their differences matter? Does the increasing interest in citizenship, in civic activities and in the changing role of civil society indicate that the social and cultural properties of individuals become ever more important because they can be seen as cultural resources of the ever more diverse societies of the 21st century? It is fair to say that the heydays of the "society of organisations" have passed. New patterns of social life and political organisation under conditions of cultural diversity and global interconnectedness of contemporary societies have to be imagined and conceptualised. This issue of Schlossplatz³ is an important part of this common intellectual enterprise.

The intrinsic tension between the sovereign state and the idea of citizenship persisted despite the state's democratisation.

> " The relationship between an individual and a state in which an individual owes allegiance to that state and in turn is entitled to its protection. Citizenship implies the status of freedom with accompanying responsibilities. In general, full political rights, including the right to vote and to hold public office, are predicated upon citizenship. The usual responsibilities of citizenship are allegiance, taxation and military service. "

Encyclopedia Britannica

The Many Faces of Citizenship

> " Citizenship is membership in a political community (originally a city or town but now usually a country) and carries with it rights to political participation; a person having such membership is a citizen. It is largely coterminous with nationality, although it is possible to have a nationality without being a citizen (i.e., be legally subject to a state and entitled to its protection without having rights of political participation in it); it is also possible to have political rights without being a national of a state. In most nations, a non-citizen is a non national and called either a foreigner or an alien. "

Wikipedia

> " Citizenship is one of the most coveted gifts that the U.S. government can bestow, and the most important immigration benefit that USCIS can grant. Most people become U.S. citizens in one of two ways:
> 1. By birth, either within the territory of the United States or to U.S. citizen parents, or
> 2. By Naturalisation.
> In addition, in 2000, Congress passed the Child Citizenship Act (CCA), which allows any child under the age of 18 who is adopted by a U.S. citizen and immigrates to the United States to acquire immediate citizenship. "

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

> " We may say, first, that a citizen is not a citizen because he lives in a certain place, for resident aliens and slaves share in the place; nor is he a citizen who has no legal right except that of suing and being sued; for this right may be enjoyed under the provisions of a treaty. [...] But the citizen whom we are seeking to define is a citizen in the strictest sense, [...] and his special characteristic is that he shares in the administration of justice, and in offices. [...] This is the most comprehensive definition of a citizen, and best suits all those who are generally so called. "

Aristotle, Politics III, Part I

" The term 'citizenship' is also used to refer to involvement in public life and affairs—that is, to the behaviour and actions of a citizen. It is sometimes known as active citizenship. Citizenship in this sense is applied to a wide range of activities—from voting in elections and standing for political office to taking an interest in politics and current affairs. It refers not only to rights and responsibilities laid down in the law, but also to general forms of behaviour—social and moral—which societies expect of their citizens. **"**

Citizenship Foundation (UK)

" Every person holding the nationality of a Member State of the European Union is, as a result, a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union supplements national citizenship without replacing it. It is made up of a set of fundamental rights and obligations enshrined in the EC Treaty among which it is worth underlining the right not to be discriminated on the basis of nationality. **"**

European Commission

" To believe that citizenship entails only voting and taxpaying—as so many voters and taxpayers, helped along by the media and cynical politicians, do—is to trivialise what should be a vital identity for women and men in a privatised world. Too many people think that being a consumer is the same thing as being a citizen. That voting is about nothing more than private preferences and 'shopping' for leaders. Yet the truth is, to be a citizen is to exercise public judgment and public liberty, to establish common ground, to participate regularly in local, regional, national and global affairs, and to take direct responsibility for justice and equality. Citizenship is not a by-product of democracy but its very foundation; it is not a matter of aggregating private interests but discovering a common will. The quality of democracy, then, is to be measured not by the quality of leaders but by the character of citizens. The democratic deficit reflects a failure of citizenship, and citizens need to stop blaming the leaders they elect and start looking at themselves. Apply this civic reasoning to the global financial crisis, and it turns out that the credit deficit is a democratic deficit, the economic meltown is a political meltdown; and that what is called for is not more economic capital but more social capital, more civic capital, more democratic confidence. **"**

Benjamin Barber (political theorist)

" World Citizenship is not a replacement for national citizenship, but rather a new responsibility in this interdependent world to work together across national boundaries to secure our common fate. **"**

**World Citizenship
(The Association of World Citizens)**

The Politics of Citizenship in Europe

The interview with MARC HOWARD was conducted by Sophia Armanski in October 2008.

The member states of the European Union differ widely in their citizenship policies. Surveying history, contemporary political dynamics and the role of public opinion, Marc Howard weighs in on why.

Schlossplatz3: How would you define citizenship?

Marc Howard: Well, there are different definitions of citizenship. According to the definition that I use it is a legal boundary between members and non-members of a community. It is a formal definition of who gets a passport and who does not. So it is a strictly legal definition, and not about who is a good or active citizen.

I do not see a European identity in a widespread sense.

In your forthcoming book "The Politics of Citizenship in Europe", what analytic approach do you take?

I look at citizenship policies in two ways. One is an historical approach, the other is focused on contemporary change. Historically, I am trying to account for why different countries have developed different traditions of citizenship. I want to provide an empirical baseline to look at how the countries of the EU-15 fit together to explain the differences. What I find is that there is a great deal of variation in terms of openness and inclusiveness of citizenship policies.

And inclusiveness means who has the right to become a citizen?

Exactly. Who is allowed to become a citizen either by birth or by naturalisation. Also, for those who do become citizens, are they allowed to hold dual citizenship? This is not about emigrants. The major issue is about immigrants because that is what really matters in terms of how diverse people are accepted. So I look at whether immigrants can keep their prior citizenship.

What are the major determinants of this openness?

In my research I found that there are two important historical factors. One is colonialism. A country that has been a major colonial power has developed many relationships with the outside world, with otherness, with different people. Even though colonialism was a very violent, horrible and exploitative system, the legacy ironically, is a positive one, based on experience with others. The other historical factor is early democratisation. Countries that democratised earlier became more civically oriented, more willing to treat people along civic lines. And the combination of those two factors goes a long way toward explaining the historical variations of citizenship policies.

And in terms of contemporary politics, what are the dividing lines among EU countries?

I basically distinguish between three groups of countries. One is the historically liberal countries—that would be France, the UK and Ireland. And then there are two other groups: one comprising countries of liberalising change and the other of restrictive continuity. Both groups historically had relatively restrictive citizenship policies, but six countries (Finland, Germany, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden) liberalised while five countries (Austria, Denmark, Greece, Italy and Spain) did not. I am trying to explain that variation.

How about the former socialist countries that are now EU member states? Do their citizenship policies differ, or did they adjust to the EU-15?

No, their policies are different. Their citizenship policies are generally quite restrictive. In many cases they restored ethnically based laws from the pre-communist era. For them this means a restoration of where they were before the Soviet regime, and they are strongly holding on to that definition.

How do contemporary events, for example a big immigration wave, influence citizenship policies?

A lot of historical factors, such as colonialism, democratisation and communism are very important in explaining what direction a country takes. Contemporary events, on the other hand, can politicise issues and thereby have an effect on change and resistance to change. The main factor in my view is public opinion. It is relatively under-acknowledged within this literature that people are quite xenophobic and racist.

Even though colonialism was a very violent, horrible and exploitative system, the legacy, ironically, is a more positive one of experience with others.

Why is that the case?

There are a lot of arguments that can be made. Some people might say that it is human nature to want to be with others like you and to be uncomfortable around people who are different. This cannot be measured but it seems to be something hard to overcome. In other cases people might have real anxieties about their jobs. In yet other cases there are perceived fears, there are stereotypes. People might hear or read about a single act committed by an immigrant and then consciously and unconsciously judge every other immigrant.

Do you know of an example where it was the other way around, where the public opinion was actually in favour of liberalising citizenship?

In some cases I think public opinion is not as strongly against liberalisation. But usually when a country liberalised its policy public opinion was absent, it was just not consulted. The policy was decided by elites, by parties in parliament, and it did not get much media attention. It did not have strongly mobilised opponents and so the whole process happened quietly. Where it was not quiet but loud, where it involved the people, the policy usually remained restrictive.

That would imply that there is a trade-off between inclusive citizenship policies and democratic participation?

Yes, that is the very troubling conclusion. Democracy and popular involvement can prompt reactions that are anti-democratic in terms of liberal tolerance and openness. That indeed is a trade-off, but the important question is whether we want to have formal democracy and live with the results or whether we want an outcome that is liberal-democratic, in which case a popular vote might not be the way to achieve that outcome. As a scholar, I am trying to highlight this tension. There is a tendency to say that there is a democratic deficit in the EU, that we need more input of the people. That is probably true on many levels. The failure of the EU Constitution is proof that there is a major disconnect between European elites and the public. But the solution of elections and referenda could be problematic, too. So it is troubling in both ways.

MARC MORJÉ HOWARD is Associate Professor of Government at Georgetown University, Washington, and holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley. His research and teaching focuses on democracy and democratisation, including civil society, immigration, citizenship and public opinion. Currently, Howard is finishing a book called "The Politics of Citizenship in Europe" (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

Do you see any future for European citizenship?

I do not, really. I think it is nice that everybody has the same-coloured passport. There are a lot of exchanges within Europe. Obviously travelling is very easy, and the Erasmus academic exchange programme and easyJet are quite helpful for European integration. I also think there is something about being European

Democracy and involvement of the people can lead to a reaction that is not democratic in terms of liberal tolerance and openness.

beyond what it was ten or twenty years ago, but it is still far from being a European citizenship. When two Europeans meet, for example a Bulgarian and a Portuguese, what do they really have in common? I just do not see a European identity in a widespread sense. For sure, there are examples in which countries have chosen not to have embassies in every other country anymore, where you can go to embassies of other EU countries. In the future you may even be able to go to an EU embassy. But I do not see national identity, national distinctiveness or national traditions going away. If anything, they are getting stronger, especially in Eastern Europe. Though many intellectuals are talking about European citizenship and the European public space, I do not see it emerging yet.

Apart from national belonging—what are the major obstacles?

An important factor that never gets discussed is language. Though more and more people do speak English, the majority are still not comfortable with it and the average person does not speak another European language. Maybe that is not such a bad thing either. I like diversity. I would not want to see languages and national traditions wiped out. That holds for immigration too, which I think should be valued in terms of viewing differences as a strength, not a problem.

What is your most important advice for policy-makers?

Be careful of simple solutions and think about how an issue can play out politically. Very often there are unintended consequences. Policies can always backfire. Changes should not be imposed from above. But at the same time be careful whether and how to involve public opinion in decision-making. I think it should be done, and I am not advocating in dark, smoke-filled rooms of elite decision-making disconnected from society in any way. But one should think through all of the different scenarios that can occur and plan several steps ahead.

In Search for a Modus Vivendi: Citizenship in the Baltics

by VELLO PETTAI

Citizenship was directly contested in the Baltic nations following the fall of the Iron Curtain. At the centre of the controversy was whether the newly independent states had the right to exclude ethnic Russian settlers and their descendants. Vello Pettai discusses how the issue of citizenship is related to the process of democratisation in these countries.

With the collapse of communism in 1989 and the transition to democracy in over a dozen countries of Central and Eastern Europe, a great deal of attention has been paid not only to how democratic institutions have been set up, but also concerning how inclusive these new democratic societies have become. In contrast to previous waves of democratisation, post-communist transition states frequently brought with them issues not only of societal transformation, but in some cases of state legitimacy itself. In several countries, state borders were disputed, relationships to neighbouring countries were contested and ethnic tensions within countries were agitated.

Citizenship played an important role in determining where the boundaries of the new demos were going to be. Where these limits were defined broadly, some of the background tension was eased. In Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, however, these issues proved thorny due to the countries' special understanding of the nature of statehood itself.

For the Baltic states, release from the Soviet Union in 1991 was seen not as secession nor as the creation of newly sovereign states, but rather as the end of a 51-year-old illegal Soviet occupation that began in the midst of World War II. Although seemingly pedantic or archaic, this perspective actually possessed considerable credibility. This was not only because the Soviet Union in 1940 did in fact take over the previously independent Baltic states illegally (with military pressure, fake elections and the arbitrary arrest of government leaders), but also because of a unique "policy of non-recognition" of this occupation among many Western nations. These two arguments together infused Baltic politicians with the sense that their independence was to be "restored," not "given." The importance of this particular point of departure is that a process of democratic transition was enmeshed in the basic issue of citizenship itself. Citizenship became a central parameter of how democratisation was going to take place and positioned the fundamental question of political rights and participation front-and-centre.

As long as the somewhat anomalous category of "non-citizen" continues to exist in each country in such noticeable numbers, there will always be a question about the completeness of democracy.

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Simply put, if the Baltic states were recognised as "post-occupation" states, it would be their sovereign right to exclude from automatic citizenship all those people who had settled (or were settled) on their territory during the Soviet occupation. Depending on the size of these populations, the consequences for democratic governance would be significant—the more such people there are, the more pressure states will feel to define citizenship narrowly. This relationship explains why Lithuania, with a less than 10% Soviet-era settler population, agreed to grant citizenship to all of its residents, while Estonia and Latvia, with over 30% of their residents falling into this category, debated the citizenship issue intensely.

The outcome in Estonia and Latvia was to restrict automatic citizenship to those who were citizens in 1940 and their descendants. Meanwhile, Soviet-era immigrants and their descendants were given permanent resident status, their citizenship being contingent on their passing a set of naturalisation requirements, including a state language test and a type of civics exam. By 1992, the consequences of restricted citizenship had become clear: non-citizens made up 32% of the population of Estonia and 30% in Latvia. Democracy building in both countries had gotten off to a much skewed start.

Needless to say, these policy decisions by the Estonian and Latvian parliaments soon came under considerable international scrutiny. Numerous international organisations (including the UN, the OSCE and the Council of Europe) sent fact-finding teams to assess whether basic human rights were being violated in the process. Moreover, because the vast majority of these new "non-citizens" were of ethnic Russian origin, the Russian Federation denounced Estonia and Latvia repeatedly and threatened various retaliatory measures.

Nevertheless, both countries ultimately held their line and promised to implement vigorous minority integration programmes to help non-citizens gradually acquire citizenship. This approach was supported

Citizenship became a central parameter of how democratisation itself was going to take place.

by the EU which acknowledged the two countries' sovereign right to define their citizenship themselves, but encouraged them to work proactively on naturalising non-citizens over time. Both Estonia and Latvia intensified these efforts after 2000, in advance of their accession to the EU in 2004 when the number of non-citizens would begin decreasing. By 2006, the proportion of non-citizens in Estonia was down to 18%, in Latvia to 20%.

While the approach of Estonia and Latvia towards citizenship created much consternation in the early years of their independence, the degree to which the problem has begun to resolve itself through naturalisation and the granting of full permanent resident rights to non-citizens has helped both countries avoid serious political turmoil. Moreover, in Estonia permanent residents are allowed to vote in local elections, an option that has also been considered at times in Latvia. To be sure, as long as the somewhat anomalous category of 'non-citizens' continues to exist in each country in such noticeable numbers, the completeness of democracy in these countries will also be questioned. For the moment, a modus vivendi has been found that has not significantly eroded the actual quality of democracy in either country.

"Corporate Social Responsibility" and "Corporate Citizenship" are contemporary buzzwords. But what do the terms actually entail? Roman Hrycyk disentangles the concepts and elaborates on their implications for management theory and society at large.

Corporate Citizenship—
Towards Companies as Community Members?

by Roman Hrycyk

Corporate social responsibility and corporate citizenship have become prominent terms in management literature and public discussion. In spite of lively academic debate, not to mention publications dedicated specifically to defining and conceptualising the social role of corporations, a consensus on what the two terms actually mean has yet to emerge. In order to understand what a corporate citizen is, it helps to examine the difference between the broadly defined idea of corporate social responsibility and the more specific idea of corporate citizenship.

With their rising influence and activism, NGOs now spread information on companies and scandals more widely and rapidly than ever before.

Published in 2001, the European Commission's definition of corporate social responsibility has generated growing consensus in Europe about what the term stands for. According to the Commission, corporate social responsibility is a concept whereby companies voluntarily integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and interaction with their stakeholders. Therefore, in order to be considered socially responsible, a company must go beyond corporate compliance with legal expectations. At the same time, despite substantial normative debate in academic business literature, companies' motivations for engaging in social or environmental activities are not considered an important element of the definition of corporate social responsibility or corporate citizenship.

The term corporate citizenship is sometimes used synonymously with corporate social responsibility— often just for the sake of simplicity. Furthermore, the term corporate citizenship has been used rather loosely, with a number of academic approaches now associating corporate citizenship with companies' political involvement or using it in reference to corporate philanthropy. Due to this multitude of definitions and opinions, corporate citizen can seem nebulous.

But corporate citizenship can also be seen as a part or concretion of corporate social responsibility, relating to proactive behaviour, civic involvement and partnering with organisations—all widely accepted attributes of the notion of citizenship at the corporate level.

Corporate citizenship activities entail investments in the social environment of a company, for which the company dedicates specific resources and cooperates with different external partners in order to solve problems in its community. Different divisions of the company work with partners from different sectors and thereby act as citizens, using their own resources to help address specific issues.

Accordingly, not every activity that deals with social or environmental concerns or that involves corporate volunteering or corporate giving can be described as corporate citizenship. For example, some companies donate large sums of money or let their employees work for a good cause for a day each year for non-profit organisations. These companies invest in corporate social responsibility programs by giving away money and labour time and thus act as philanthropists. Other companies give their employees a day off to work on a project initiated by the company itself, or along with other organisations, with the goal of solving a specific problem. These companies invest resources not only through labour time or money but also by consulting or transferring knowledge. They evaluate the ways in which their core competencies can contribute to solving problems and are responsive to the needs of the community. In doing so these companies behave as corporate citizens.

In short, while the term corporate social responsibility covers a broad range of activities (e.g. donating to local hospitals, investing in alternative energy, raising occupational safety standards, involving external stakeholders formally and informally, including social issues in risk assessment models), corporate citizenship stresses the idea of companies using their unique resources, including core competencies, knowledge and contacts, for the good of the community. The community, it should be added, is not necessarily delineated by the direct physical environment of the company's headquarters or subsidiary; while the corporate citizenship activities of small companies typically focus on local communities, the social environment of large multinationals can be global. Large corporations are positioned to address issues on a much larger scale.

But what explains the growing number of companies yearning to be recognised as corporate citizens? The answer is anything but clear as there are a range of possible motivations. The ambiguity of corporate motives for engaging in corporate citizenship and corporate social responsibility is partially responsible for the ongoing vagueness of the notion of corporate citizenship. It also raises a central duality in the concepts of corporate citizenship and corporate social responsibility, which cannot be explained without reference to both the companies' strategic goals and the expectations placed upon them by society.

Corporate social responsibility is a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and interactions with stakeholders on a voluntary basis.

A great deal of external pressure drives businesses to act as corporate citizens. This pressure comes in part from the general public: NGOs, the media and consumers. With their rising influence and activism, NGOs now spread information about companies and scandals more widely and rapidly than ever before. Consumers increasingly consider corporate citizenship and responsibility issues when purchasing goods and services, and are influenced by the availability of information provided by NGOs, which they see as representing public interest. Consumer pressure is aided by the media, which has become increasingly

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critical of corporate citizenship activities that are merely a public relations exercise. Secondly, pressure also comes from the financial market, which has witnessed a profusion of institutions fostering socially responsible investment; analysts asking about corporate citizenship activities; and rating agencies providing information on the social and environmental performance of companies.

But, external pressures are not the only reason why businesses put corporate citizenship on their agendas. Some companies considering corporate social responsibility and corporate citizenship a moral duty, and are motivated to pursue socially responsible policies by their inherent corporate values. Others are motivated by strategic interests, suggesting that there is a "business case" for socially responsible behaviour. Through intensified dialogues with stakeholders, such companies enjoy informational advantages that help them anticipate new challenges. With more and more job applicants interested in responsible behaviour of their potential employers, well communicated corporate social responsibility and corporate citizenship initiatives can help position companies advantageously on the labour market as well. Reputational effects, increased motivation and enhanced soft skills of employees, or the possibility to differentiate one's products from the competitors', further increase companies' strategic motivation to act responsibly.

While evidence suggests that becoming a corporate citizen can contribute companies' financial success, a number of restraining factors must also be taken into account. Reputation effects are less likely to occur when critical media detect that the corporate citizenship project is merely a public relations activity. And the commitment from employees will not be strengthened if the activities are not an expression of the corporate culture and therefore not genuinely supported or at least accepted by the staff. Actually integrating the ideals of citizenship is not always easy. Successful corporate citizenship, therefore, is about both creating change outside and inside the organisation.

The ambiguity of corporate motives for engaging in corporate citizenship and corporate social responsibility is partially responsible for the concept's persistent vagueness.

With Volkswagen's corporate social responsibility programme as her point of reference, HSoG student Christina Hanley explores the "business case" for corporate citizenship.

Volkswagen's Corporate Case for Citizenship

by Christina Hanley

Market liberalisation and globalisation have proven to have many positive economic, political and social outcomes; however, such benefits are rarely attained free of negative side effects. As companies become more transnational, they increasingly operate within diverse cultural and ethical regimes which inform variations in regulations and standards from country to country. As a result, many firms adopt different business standards for different production locations. To reconcile these disparities, employees, shareholders, customers, governments, suppliers and communities increasingly demand that firms not only continue to generate profits but also behave in a socially and environmentally ethical manner. The call for corporations to act as responsible citizens within their environments is growing louder. Such demands raise the question whether multinational enterprises have an obligation to act as citizens of the world, and if so, how? The approach of the Volkswagen Group in this regard provides some useful insight.

Why would Volkswagen engage in corporate citizenship activities when its core business is cars? With 329,000 employees worldwide, 50 production sites and sales in over 150 countries, Volkswagen has a strong incentive to keep its shareholders and stakeholders happy as well as to maintain its corporate reputation.

Volkswagen combines concerns for both sustainability and corporate citizenship within its broad corporate social responsibility framework. Envisioned in the shape of a pyramid, Volkswagen's corporate social responsibility model specifies its required responsibilities at the bottom and places its desired objectives at the top. High-quality management practises combined with first-rate risk management and compliance in day-to-day business are required and provide the foundation of corporate social respon-

sibility at Volkswagen. Moving up the pyramid, a strategic approach fortified in the firm's core values creates a competitive advantage and sets the stage for innovation. Desired—although not required—is philanthropy: Volkswagen can be a good corporate citizen, improve its reputation and boost the communities in which it operates. For Volkswagen, corporate citizenship stands at the tip of the pyramid as a long-term objective.

At first glance, it is hard to distinguish which initiatives Volkswagen classifies as corporate social responsibility and which as corporate citizenship. Since its corporate social responsibility model is broad, it is broken into themes and consists of engagement in environmental, social and economic development projects. Given that corporate citizenship is a way for Volkswagen to reach its broader corporate social responsibility goals, designated corporate citizenship avenues are donations (monetary and in-kind), volunteer activities and sponsorship. Take, for example, the firm's HIV/AIDS prevention programme in South Africa. It fits within the broader corporate social responsibility model as a social engagement project, while its objectives are met through corporate citizenship engagement in philanthropy and volunteerism.

What is the business case for Volkswagen to operate an HIV/AIDS prevention programme which has had a cost of more than 6 million South African Rand (€430,000) since its inception in 2001? The 2008 UNAIDS report

> Volkswagen can be a good corporate citizen, improve its reputation and boost the communities in which it operates.

on the Global AIDS Epidemic estimates that 18.1% of South Africa's adults aged 15 to 49 are HIV positive. This massive epidemic directly and indirectly affects many of Volkswagen's 6 thousand employees and the communities where their manufacturing is located. It is in the firm's best interest to promote prevention, education and awareness. As the largest German foreign direct investor in South Africa, a large part of Volkswagen's investment is spent on developing

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its human capital. It is therefore in the company's enlightened self-interest to have an internal corporate health centre reintegrating those living with and affected by HIV/AIDS into the workplace and sponsoring targeted health campaigns. The bottom-line is that, aside from being the "right" or altruistic thing to do, corporate social responsibility makes business sense.

The HIV/AIDS prevention programme also helps to make Volkswagen a competitive employer. Governmental provision of treatment has been slow to develop in South Africa and it is difficult for average citizens to access, let alone afford, treatment. Volkswagen's provision of accessible health care to its employees not only contributes to the fight against HIV/AIDS, but also establishes a reputation for Volkswagen as an employer that does not turn a blind eye to major issues within its community.

The firm's HIV/AIDS prevention programme successes have garnered international recognition, including the Global Business Coalition award for "Business Excellence in the Workplace." Volkswagen has been praised for its membership in the South African Business Coalition on HIV and AIDS. In addition, the corporation has gained recognition for following international voluntary environmental and social programmes such as the Global Compact, the International Labour Organisation's Social Charter, and every Volkswagen manufacturing site meets the ISO 14000 environmental standards. The combination of its local initiatives and baseline operating standards has also helped the firm become a member of the Dow Jones Sustainability World Index and the Dow Jones Sustainability STOXX, two of the world's leading tradable sustainability indices. Such recognition builds corporate value by giving Volkswagen a social "license to operate" which certifies the firm as a global corporate citizen.

However, investing in healthier, more productive employees and being an attractive employer recognised internationally for its social efforts will only satisfy Volkswagen's shareholders as long as such activities cause its corporate value to increase. Since the core objective of the firm is to increase its profits, shareholders and managers naturally want to ensure that Volkswagen's corporate social responsibility and corporate citizenship involvement reaps financial gains. The risk, however, is that engagement in corporate social responsibility activities does not guarantee an increase in share value. Engagement must be targeted effectively and there must be a business case for action if it is to improve the bottom line. While a firm should take on greater responsibility for the externalities it creates, its job is not to compensate for every task the government fails to deliver. Effectively designed engagement as a global citizen can be a strategy to increase the bottom line as well as to hedge against risks that can harm profit margins, such as high employee turnover, negative public scrutiny and accidents.

> The bottom-line is that aside from being the "right" or altruistic thing to do, corporate social responsibility makes business sense.

Volkswagen considers its HIV/AIDS prevention programme a major success. For Volkswagen, spending a portion of its revenues to promote its employees' education and health provides huge benefits to local communities and also to the firm's productivity. More productive employees help their bottom line and investment in preventive HIV/AIDS measures helps to lower risk of high employee turnover due to illness. This creates not only a moral impetus, but a sound business case for corporate citizenship. When such forward-looking investments are effectively directed, the result can be win-win: healthier and happier employees and communities, positive recognition as well as a more productive and profitable operation.

Never before have citizens in the United States felt so isolated from policy-makers. In an attempt to reverse this trend, innovative engagement techniques are linking the public with their leaders. Joslyn Trowbridge shares her experience with an initiative that puts citizens in command of the policies that matter to them most.

Critics of the current state of American democracy call it "polarised," "paralysed," and even "poisoned." When citizens believe they cannot trust the government and that they have no influence in political decision-making, it can be said that a democracy is ailing. This is the case in the U.S., where only 36% of Americans say they can trust the government in Washington to "do what is right" always or most of the time, and only 10% believe that people like themselves have a say in what the government does a "good deal" of the time. Under such circumstances, new participatory processes are needed to re-empower the citizenry. Fortunately, pioneering attempts to address the democratic deficit are underway.

In a small town in Southern California ten citizens displaying a diversity of demographic profiles huddle together around a table. They are listening intently to a woman speaking about her difficulties accessing

New participatory processes are
needed to re-empower the citizenry.

health care services. A rapporteur is typing almost continuously on a laptop. The table's facilitator glances around and, noticing both nods of agreement and brows furrowed in opposition, asks one of the citizens to explain what he thinks California should focus on in its newest health care reforms. At the next table, citizens are discussing the potential

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Joslyn Trowbridge will receive her Master of Public Policy from the Hertie School of Governance in May 2009. She holds a Joint Honours Bachelor of Arts, Political Science and Women's Studies from McGill University in Montreal, Canada. In the summer of 2008 she interned with AmericaSpeaks in Washington, D.C. Before coming to HSoG, she worked as the National Project Manager for the Girls Action Foundation (Fondation Filles d'Action) in Montreal.

for a sliding scale of fees to reduce inequalities in health care affordability. The table behind them is engrossed in a discussion on employer mandates related to health care benefits. In the next town over, another 500 citizens are discussing the same issues. Periodically, some of these citizens glance up at large screens in the centre of the conference room to watch, in real time, the discussions of the citizens in eight other towns. Small groups of quick thinkers organise citizens' thoughts, received wirelessly from

The 21st Century Town Meeting is revolutionising what it means to be an 'active citizen' in today's increasingly complex world.

each table's rapporteur, into a handful of emerging themes—affordability, accessibility, wellness and prevention. At the end of the day, all 3,500 citizens in each of the eight locations across California pick up keypad polling devices and vote on their top priorities for state health care reform. These priorities are directly passed on to decision-makers and key players in the California health care debate, some of whom have been present during the citizens' discussions.

The process described above is called "the 21st Century Town Meeting" and it has had a reinvigorating effect on the concept of citizenship in a healthy democracy—putting citizens at the centre of the policy-making process. The 21st Century Town Meeting is the latest development in citizen-centred engagement practices. It is revolutionising what it means to be an 'active citizen' in today's increasingly complex world. Through this process, AmericaSpeaks, a nonprofit, non-partisan organisation based in Washing-

ton D.C. has engaged thousands of ordinary Americans on key policy issues: Rebuilding Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina, fixing ailing state health care systems, ensuring an efficient and effective budget for a city with almost 600 thousand inhabitants, addressing youth obesity, and revitalising Northeastern Ohio's economy are key examples. The most famous meeting took place in Manhattan in 2002, when AmericaSpeaks engaged over 4,500 citizens in assessing plans to rebuild the World Trade Center site. Aptly named "Listening to the City", the meeting injected citizen-centred priorities into development plans, resulting in commitments to re-establishing the street grid and expanding transit infrastructure in Lower Manhattan.

Based on the belief that "an educated and involved citizenry leads to more effective and lasting public policy," the AmericaSpeaks model is unique in several ways: the scale of engagement, the immediacy of impact, the representativeness of participation, and the explicit link to decision-makers and governance processes that ensures outcomes. Working with a range of governmental, private and nonprofit partners and using a combination of keypad polling, groupware computers, large screen projection and teleconferencing, AmericaSpeaks creates a level playing field on which citizens can be authentically engaged with policy issues that are directly linked to real governance processes and to key decision-makers.

Citizenship—An Outmoded Model?

by Michael Goodhart

In the globalising world order, democratic ideals based on Westphalian understandings of state sovereignty seem destined for obsolescence. At the core of this conceptual crisis is a transformation of the meaning of citizenship. Michael Goodhart confronts the implications of the emerging transnational landscape and suggests a re-thinking of the concept of democracy itself.

Citizenship refers both to an ideal of political inclusion and to the rules and practices of political membership in modern states. Struggles to achieve the full inclusion of adults in the political life of the state, to close the gap between real and ideal, have been at the heart of modern democratic theory and practice for over two centuries. One way to think of democratisation is simply as the progressive elimination of barriers to inclusion.

This process reflects democracy's underlying commitment to the principles of freedom and equality. These principles invalidate claims of natural hierarchy or subordination, providing the theoretical justification for government based on participation and consent. The institutional aspects of democratic citizenship include all mechanisms necessary to guarantee freedom and equality. These include: rights to vote, to express opinions, to form associations and to influence political decisions; rights to subsistence, education, health care, fairness and security, without which those rights cannot be secure; and, finally, the various social and political arrangements necessary to protect these rights. Democracy's singular historical insight has been that these rights can be secured only when all people have the capacity, and are entitled, to influence and contest political decisions and to defend their rights for themselves.

Like the Roman god Janus, citizenship has two faces. As a principle of inclusion it is also always a principle of exclusion. The democratic ideal of citizenship as full political inclusion inside the state necessarily entails—indeed, is premised upon—the exclusion of outsiders. This exclusion follows from the idea of sovereignty, which has dominated modern political thinking, including democratic thinking, for half a millennium. Sovereignty, most basically, is the idea that states are natural containers of and vehicles for politics. It consists of an empirical claim about

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the exclusive, territorial configuration of political authority and a related normative claim that links this configuration to rightful rule. This fact has often been misunderstood. Sovereignty was never a

bare factual description of politics; as an account of political life it is demonstrably false. The notion is much more subtle and complex. We might call it an empirically-conditioned normative claim—that is, a claim about the appropriate organisation of politics whose validity is contingent upon a plausible degree of fit-with-the-facts.

As a practical matter, democratic theory mostly evolved after and within sovereign states and essentially took sovereignty for granted. Sovereignty thus imbued democracy with its distinctive particularity— a particularity reflected in the exclusive or state-based conception of citizenship sketched above. Democratic citizenship embodies the standard, sovereign account of legitimate political authority linked to territory—the term "popular sovereignty" is quite revealing in this respect. As a result, an exclusive conception of citizenship is a condition of legitimacy for democratic rule.

The exclusivity of democratic citizenship is perfectly consistent with the universality of democratic principles, as long as democratic aims can be independently achieved in every state. It would be similar to stating the universal goal that every student should take a core macroeconomics course: it is perfectly consistent with this aim to divide the students into several seminars. This solution will be legitimate so long as each seminar meets the substantive macroeconomic requirements and can do so itself (the instructors are all qualified, there are adequate classrooms, all of the seminars can be scheduled, etc.).

Recently, the complex set of trends, patterns, and processes known as globalisation has prompted a significant reconfiguration of political life and, with it, political authority. As a result, many important issues and challenges can no longer be addressed adequately or legitimately through state institutions alone. Intergovernmental organisations, such as the IMF or the World Bank and supranational authorities, such as the WTO and the European Union, can be seen as responses to globalisation and as instances of it: they are responses to transnational issues, and they themselves promote or advance globalisation. In such a world, the concept of sovereignty is becoming ever more problematic.

These changes raise profound questions about the adequacy and legitimacy of the exclusive model of democratic citizenship. Interdependence undermines the idea that freedom and equality can be adequately realised and protected solely through state-based arrangements. Enormous asymmetries in the wealth, influence, and capacities of states undermine the idea that freedom and equality can be realised independently in all states, even in principle. One response— common among first-world critics—is to see globalisation as a threat to democracy and to democratic citizenship. Here, external phenomena encroach on the rights and the sovereignty of citizens.

How can freedom and equality be realised globally in light of the rapid transformation of politics and the ongoing centrality of states?

Michael Goodhart is a Research Fellow of the Humboldt Foundation and a Visiting Professor at the Hertie School of Governance from the University of Pittsburgh. He holds a PhD in Political Science with a specialisation in Political Theory from University of California, Los Angeles. Goodhart's research focuses on democracy and human rights, especially in the context of globalisation. He is currently working on a book about global economic injustice and democratic governance.

But recall that sovereignty's usefulness and persuasiveness depend on a reasonable fit between its normative presuppositions and facts on the ground. If the facts have changed, the conception of democracy connected to it must also change—or risk irrelevance. Thus, from the perspective I have outlined, democracy—the commitment to freedom and equality for everyone—requires us to re-think citizenship in the context of globalisation. Seen from the vantage point of contemporary political realities, the democratic ideal of exclusive citizenship is clearly outmoded.

The difficulty is that while the configuration of political authority is changing in ways that render this judgment certain, we have yet to devise a normative alternative to modern citizenship that can fulfill the same functions in our much more complex political environment. Citizenship may be outmoded, but it remains, at the moment, irreplaceable. This problem is analogous to the problem with the carbon-based economy: we know it is not sustainable, but we do not yet have a workable replacement.

Theorists have proposed various forms of global citizenship, but these remain vague, and their articulation with existing political arrangements is particularly problematic. Membership in informal, transnational discursive networks is also often mentioned, though it seems to fall far short of meeting the substantive requirements of democratic citizenship. Policy-makers are growing more receptive to multiple citizenships. India, for example, has even pioneered a new form of "overseas citizenship" for its nationals abroad. Yet these patchwork solutions cannot address the underlying issues.

The general outlines of the problem, at least, are clear enough: how can freedom and equality be realised globally in light of the rapid transformation of politics and the ongoing centrality of states? A systematic approach should begin by un-bundling the ideal and the institutions of citizenship, analysing their normative aims and the various institutional mechanisms

> Democracy—the commitment to freedom and equality for everyone—requires us to re-think citizenship in the context of globalisation.

used to realise them, and then considering how these aims might be re-institutionalised in today's context. The focus should not be on preserving the institutions of citizenship but rather on finding more effective ways to achieve its important normative ends.

Common Values—The Key to Citizenship

The interview with Wolfgang Schäuble
was conducted by Noor Naqschbandi in December 2008.

Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany's Minister of the Interior, discusses citizenship and immigration in an open society.

Schlossplatz³: Mr. Schäuble, what do you regard as citizenship? How does citizenship change in a globalised world with increased mobility?

Wolfgang Schäuble: Citizenship or nationality is a legal relationship which ascribes a person to a specific state. Connected to citizenship are mutual rights and obligations, e.g. the right to diplomatic protection in a foreign country. The civic rights and obligations are important, as the political rights of participation, the right to vote and compulsory military service. For instance, the German passport enables visa-free travel to numerous states of the world. A person who wants to obtain German citizenship through naturalisation is expected to have the command of the German language and the willingness to integrate into our society. The decision to be naturalised is a personal decision.

The process of integration is considerably more complex than merely passing or failing a test consisting of 33 questions.

Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble is the German Federal Minister of the Interior since 2005, a position in which he has already served from 1989 to 1991. Dr. Schäuble studied law and economics and was awarded a law degree in 1971. He has been a member of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) since 1965 and a member of the German Bundestag since 1972. His various political postings have included head of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group in the German Bundestag from 1991 to 2000 and national chairman of the CDU from 1998 to 2000. He is a standing member of the CDU executive committee.

In an interview with the "Stuttgarter Zeitung" (9 July 2008) you emphasised that the "German predominant culture" (deutsche Leitkultur) is much more complex than the questions asked in the naturalisation test. How do you define such a "German predominant culture"? And what is the relationship between the "German predominant culture" and the constitution?

The process of integration is considerably more complex than to pass or fail a test consisting of 33 questions. Integration also encompasses the question of identification with Germany as the homeland. Open societies—such as the German society—are dependent upon a minimum of consensus, affiliation and common views. Terms such as "common sense", "consensus on values" (Wertekonsens) but also "predominant culture" (Leitkultur) reflect this concern. But my advice is not to fight about words. Rather, we should agree that we need common values as a basis of our living together. At the same time, this means—and this is also a part of the integration debate—that nobody has to give up his or her own cultural identity and that we are open enough to adjust to the cultural diversity that comes hand in hand with immigration.

People who cheat or lie during the naturalisation process can lose their German citizenship. This is stipulated in a draft bill that you presented recently. What will be the status of persons whose citizenship is revoked? Will the period in which the citizenship can be revoked be five years—as stated in the current draft bill?

People whose naturalisations are effectively withdrawn in that context are foreigners. They require a right of residence, e.g. a residence permit, for their further stay in Germany. Presumably, the Bundesrat (the upper chamber of German Parliament) will have no objections on 19 December 2008 against the draft bill amending the right of citizenship. Therefore, the draft bill adopted by the Bundestag will remain as it is, and that makes it impossible to revoke a fiddled naturalisation after five years.

My advice is not to fight about words. Rather, we should agree that we need common values as a basis of our living together.

Three members of the Schlossplatz³ editorial team
give differing views on why citizens should vote... or not.

Perspectives
on Voting

by Sylvia Roberge, Sébastien Eugène *and* Rasmus Relotius

Why Voting Should be Compulsory
by Sylvia Roberge

In over 30 countries around the world, including Australia and Belgium, participating in elections is an obligation. None of these governments impose compulsory voting however; they have compulsory turnout—the legal obligation to show up at the polling station. In some countries, voters are even given the option of voting for "none of the above." Compulsory turnout does not infringe on one's liberty any more than the obligation to send one's children to school, jury duty or bans on smoking in public places do. After all, elections only take place once every few years, whereas filling out tax forms is an annual ordeal! Compulsory turnout also forces governments to improve voter registration and polling access. It makes for more issues-oriented campaigns as parties vie for undecided voters' support rather than that of their already-acquired voter base.

In most advanced democracies, low voter turnout raises legitimacy issues: the latest Canadian election saw the lowest turnout since 1867, while the 2005 German federal election saw the lowest turnout since 1949. Voter turnout inequality is also a pressing concern. In the 2005 UK parliamentary election there were two voters over the age of 65 for every voter between 18 and 24 years of age. In the 2004 U.S. election, 56% of high school graduates voted, compared to 84% of those with post-graduate degrees; 48% of those with a total family income of less than $20,000 voted, compared to 81% of those with family incomes exceeding $100,000. Thus, older, wealthier and more educated voters had more influence at the ballot box. Compulsory voting increases legitimacy because it is the most effective means to increase voter turnout. It also decreases voter turnout inequality. The end result is that elections buttressed by compulsory turnout are indicative of the entire population's preferences, rather than those of the portion of the population which normally votes.

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Why Voting is a Moral Duty

by Sébastien Eugène

Citizens should face a moral commitment to vote, but they should not be obliged to do so.

Several arguments support the idea of voting as a binding moral duty. The first is a duty to democracy itself. Voting is a key element of democratic governance. Authority is legitimised on the condition that representatives are elected by a significant share of population. As a result, every vote serves this purpose. Second, what would happen if everybody would abstain? A few individuals would proclaim themselves the rulers and opponents would have no legitimacy to challenge this. In this sense voting is a duty the citizen owes to those who seek to represent them. Third, regular elections may be perceived as a renewal of the "social contract". In this case not voting becomes tantamount to exiting the community, and thus having no say on decisions taken by politicians during their mandate. This, a significant loss of the citizen's rights, demonstrates voting as a duty unto ourselves. Lastly, voting is a hard-won right. Going to cast a ballot, not more than once a year, is the least we can do to respect those who struggled or died for our freedom. It may also encourage those who fight for their own liberty in authoritarian regimes.

Although many arguments aim to push citizens to vote, massive political apathy is perhaps the greatest challenge to modern democracies. The idea of mandatory voting is increasingly prevalent. In fact, voting, as a right, is often interpreted as an obligation. But this does not mean that citizens should be forced into the ballot box. They also have the right of free speech, but should they be obliged to make public speeches or demonstrate? Moreover, to be binding, an obligation should punish those who do not respect it. But is it just to make a volunteer, who devotes valuable time to help homeless people, pay a fine because she abstains from voting? Voting empowers citizens through their own initiative. Let us not take the significance of this for granted. As a 62 year-old man argued in the New York Times one day before the 2008 U.S. elections: "Your vote is your voice, and there's more power in it than in most of the things we do. It's a lost pleasure, the feeling of that power."

Why Voting is a Waste of Time

by Rasmus Relotius

Simply put, voting is irrational—the chances of your vote actually influencing the outcome of an election are close to zero. Only if it is a tie-breaker will your ballot make a difference. The chances of that are infinitesimally low. A simple cost-benefit analysis suggests that you do better by staying at home than by wasting your time going to the ballot box. If you do happen to go to the ballot box, it is not due to personal gains you anticipate, but merely a result of either social conditioning—i.e. you see it as a patriotic duty—or a legal requirement.

Well, you say, voting might be irrational, but casting a ballot is not very time intensive. But voting may not only be meaningless to the extent that your ballot is unlikely to positively influence your preferred outcome—you may even harm yourself by voting, especially if you misunderstand the options at hand. Even in the simplest case, in which there are only two candidates whose proposals differ over only one policy, if you do not have sufficient knowledge about

the issue at stake you might actually vote against your preferences. Reality only adds complexity. In a typical election the voter is confronted with several candidates quarreling over at least as many issues. The only way to ensure that you are not voting against your interests is to acquire thorough understanding of what is at stake. This, in turn, requires a great deal of time.

From an economic-rationalist point of view, the costs of voting according to your preferences are extremely high. Plato argued that politics should be left to those who are rational and understand them. At the end of the day, you, the rational would-be voter, find yourself confronting an irreconcilable paradox: Staying at home you act rationally, while going to the ballot box your behavior is irrational. While Plato was explicit in stating the need for rational decision-makers, if the rational stay at home, voting is left to the unreasonable.

Citizenship Beyond the Nation State— Can E-Governance Make it Happen?

by Rajash Rawal

Online communication has revolutionised out private lives. Rajash Rawal looks at the potential role of the internet as a platform for transnational civic participation and in promoting more inclusive citizenship

Take a walk down any major street of any Western town or city and you will see more or less the same chain stores selling the same merchandise. Increasingly, our television sets beam out the same programmes, with some slight local dimensions. Our 'local' football teams now seem to comprise as many nationalities as the United Nations. We are increasingly confronted by the similarities between the previously gulf-ridden concepts of local, national and global. As a result, non-national forces challenge the traditional concepts of citizenship, causing a revaluation of our previously held beliefs. Add to that the rise in the role of the internet in our daily lives and the idea of citizenship as we used to know it appear increasingly obsolete.

National borders are irrelevant in cyberspace. The question now is whether this online openness can be transferred into real life.

To begin, let us clarify what we mean by the concept of citizenship. Essentially, the basic principle of citizenship is that the rights and duties of citizens within a country are universal. They do not depend on the particular circumstances of birth, race or gender. We can assume from this definition that such a 'universal' concept would naturally be open to the impacts of the outside world. Indeed, the citizen has gradually become aware that public management is becoming less and less nationally orientated; the influx of international capital and international regulative measures have ensured this. We witness the growing power of the global financial market and the corresponding erosion of national governments' power to ensure the welfare of their citizens. We see the growth in international treaties which may affect national sovereignty, media moguls such as Rupert Murdoch orchestrating the airwaves, the increase in international migration and more and more online activity in both social and political capacities. Changes are afoot.

What is the role of e-governance in this context? It is a generally accepted notion that the global information society needs comprehensive and effective privacy protection in order to build trust and confidence on the part of its participants, the prospective "e-citizens". Current e-government concepts mostly require that e-citizens reveal substantial amounts of personal data to be able to assume their rights to e-inclusion and e-participation. However, rarely are these assurances given by governments or explicitly demanded

E-government is often just seen as a cheaper delivery method for public services, but this narrow perception fails to realise the potential of the e-citizen.

by citizens. Instead, we volunteer information as required by various branches of government without giving it a second thought, even though the media is rife with stories of lost data, missing laptops and corrupted databases. That said, the potential advantages of enhancing citizens' trust in the usefulness of e-government and thereby diminishing the current atmosphere of political discontent greatly outweigh any abstract danger to the state in the form of individuals misusing the system. To do this, governments must make the system trustworthy with better provision for online privacy protection and data protection laws. Governments must free up resources to ensure the adequate enforcement of existing legislation and penalties and sanctions for privacy rights violations— both malicious and negligent.

E-government is often just seen as a cheaper delivery method for public services, but this narrow perception fails to realise the potential of the e-citizen. A future growth area of e-citizenship could be located in social networking sites such as Facebook. The way in which such sites can mobilise and motivate political activity became evident during Barack Obama's campaign winning the U.S. presidency. Interestingly, many of President Obama's Facebook friends come from all over the world. Many "facebookers" join groups to make statements about global concerns, and hence come into contact with people from other countries. This method of transnational social interaction has helped not only stimulate political mobilisation but also challenges previously held stereotypes and prejudices. Members of groups exchange messages and posts, building relationships which help create the notion that their citizenship is built less on national grounds but more on common concerns and issues. Borders have been surpassed in this respect and new community rules are being developed.

Rajash Rawal is a lecturer at the Faculty of European Studies and Communication Management at The Hague University of Applied Science. Throughout his academic career, he has focused on contemporary political developments in Europe. Rawal is interested in the impact of electronic communication and cyberspace on governance in Europe, in particular. He is currently co-editing the book "Challenges to E-Government in Europe" (forthcoming 2009) in which he examines whether cyberterrorism contradicts internet freedom.

This then brings us to one of the most important aspects of citizenship: belonging. Traditionally, people are willing to contribute to the well being of their fellow citizens because they feel a sense of communal belonging. For those who do not share this feeling, there are laws which insist that they contribute. The growth of online communities has begun to dispel beliefs centered on inclusion and exclusion. Your passport, and hence citizenship, need no longer be a determining factor in the way in which you are accepted as a member of a certain community. National borders are irrelevant in cyberspace. The question now is whether this online openness can be transferred into real life, where citizens are often reluctant to welcome outsiders. In Western Europe, for example, the rise of immigration concerns have become strong electoral issues, for instance in the success of Le Pen in the French Presidential Election of 2002, the rise of populist politics in the Netherlands and indeed Gordon Browns' difficulties in face of a call for an immigration cap in the United Kingdom.

The concept of citizenship is undergoing a re-evaluation because it is challenged by a number of primarily non-national forces. The sense of belonging embodied in citizenship has become a deeper and more inclusive concept spanning more than just national territory.

The concept of citizenship is undergoing a re-evaluation because it is challenged by a number of primarily non-national forces.

Citizenship is not only about community—but also about participation. However, this susceptible to be contradicted unless a suitable compromise can be found. One possible way is the creation of a post-national identity that draws upon civic participation, e-citizenship being a potential avenue. However, the potential of e-government, and hence e-citizenship, to discriminate against certain groups within society must also be considered. If governments see the transfer of traditional services to online services only as a way to save money they will miss the point and end up excluding various sections of the electorate. We must ensure that discrimination, however unintentional, is eradicated from e-government initiatives. Only then do they stand a chance of being adopted by the community towards the creation of a vibrant and modern notion of citizenship.

The Pitfalls of Civic Integration

The interview with CHRISTIAN JOPPKE
was conducted by Noor Naqschbandi in October 2008.

Civic integration policies have liberal goals—inclusiveness and access—yet they are often illiberal in themselves. In his interview with Schlossplatz³, Christian Joppke discusses this paradox and other stumbling blocks towards an open society.

Schlossplatz³: How would you define citizenship?

Christian Joppke: Essentially, citizenship is state membership. One should be aware of not inflating citizenship too much, as the hyphenated citizenships do. Often, one does not know what reality they are referring to. In many cases they are not institutionally definable.

Civic integration policies seek to reinforce this feeling of belonging as a means for building cohesion, integration and unity.

What are the legal effects of citizenship?

I distinguish between three major ways in which citizenship appears in the contemporary world. The most elementary is state citizenship. But there is a second dimension concerning the rights of a citizen. In the debate, this dimension is often decoupled from state membership. T.H. Marshall talks about social class and citizenship without mentioning membership in a state at all. He conceives of citizenship in terms of a gradually expanding set of rights: from civic and political to social rights. And there is a third dimension which I call "citizenship as identity". This dimension refers to beliefs and values shared by the members of a political community. Civic integration policies seek to reinforce this feeling of belonging as a means for building cohesion, integration and unity. These are the three dimensions I think are relevant if one discusses citizenship in the context of integration which, however, is not the only possible context in which to situate the concept.

Referring to civic integration, you once made the statement that "liberal goals are pursued by illiberal means." What did you mean?

This is a feature which all civic integration policies share. It started in the Netherlands in the early 1990s when there was the idea or the observation that ethnic minority policies, enabling migrants of various ethnic origins to live in their own institutional world, in fact meant social segregation. There was unemployment, welfare dependency, school failure and gross socio-economic disparities which obviously could not be tackled by multiculturalist policies. So new polices were introduced to promote Dutch language learning among newcomers and to integrate them into the official institutions of society. But from the very beginning, integration was obligatory. This, however, was initially a trick designed by liberal policy advisors in order to oblige the Dutch government to offer courses to help newcomers integrate. It was not meant to be a forceful measure of integration, but that is what it developed into in later incarnations.

There was the observation that ethnic minority policies, enabling migrants of various ethnic origins to live in their own institutional world, in fact meant social pillarisation.

In this context, how would you evaluate the Einbürgerungsleitfaden (integration guidelines) in Baden-Württemberg or the so-called Einbürgerungstest (naturalisation test)? Do you think such tests which also exist in other countries, for example the U.S., are useful tools?

These policies have been transferred from immigration law. It is of course logical that you expect of citizenship applicants what you already expected of them when they first entered the country. However, this Einbürgerungsleitfaden is completely discriminatory. There is an interesting legal statement by two lawyers from the University of Heidelberg. They reviewed these guidelines and assessed them as being targeted at applicants from Islamic states. They also argued they were unconstitutional because they were asking for a specific loyalty, conviction or morality that a liberal state cannot possibly expect from its citizens, and much less from newcomers. So the policy was illiberal in double respect and the Baden-Württemberg government had to take it back. These openly discriminatory questions, to my best knowledge, are no longer asked. The fact that they raised a debate meant that something was wrong with this procedure from the very beginning.

CHRISTIAN JOPPKE is a Professor of Political Science at the American University of Paris. He received a PhD in sociology from the University of California at Berkeley in 1989. He previously held positions at the University of Southern California, the European University Institute, the University of British Columbia and International University Bremen. He has published widely on immigration, citizenship, social movements and the state in Europe and North America. His most recent book is "Veil: Mirror of Identity", which examines Islamic headscarf laws and debates in Western Europe.

In many cases, public opinion has led to more restrictive legislation regarding citizenship. What role does civic education play?

First, one has to observe that in all matters related to immigration, there is a peculiar gap between elite approaches which are overall liberal and inclusive and a popular resistance against immigrants, often advocating to kick them out of the country and send them back. If the public had a stronger say in that domain, we would live in a different country.

> This is what multiculturalism in theory and practice comes down to: a re-education programme for the majority of the population.

How do you explain the observation that elites are more liberal than the general public?

I have no good answer to that question. It is something that has not actually been examined in any sufficient detail. But these are people who are educated, people who travel. These are people who use the service of immigrants, nannies, gardeners, etc. In fact, women who pursue an academic career are often dependent on women from the Philippines or from Mexico. This is just a hunch, which would have to be further examined. There is a real dilemma with respect to the popular dislike of immigrants. In a liberal state you cannot do too much about it. You should not boss around and patronise people as the European Commission does in its campaign against racism, treating people as if they needed to be re-educated. This is what multiculturalism in theory and practice comes down to: a re-education programme for the majority of the population. That does not work because then we march into an Erziehungsstaat (compulsory educational state), in which we would no longer be able to live freely, because somebody, the elite, would tell us what to think. However, that does not mean that there should not be policies and civic education, particularly in schools. It is vital. And there have already been substantial reforms of curricula. Diversity and tolerance are upheld as civic values. But unfortunately, you do not always get the liberal public that you would wish to have. People often think and act differently.

Alumni³

HSoG students tend to be pretty mobile. To see whether and how their citizenship has played a role in their lives, Schlossplatz³ asked the alumni for their opinion: What does citizenship mean to you?

Tiko Ninua
MPP Class of 2007, citizen of Georgia, currently working in Berlin, Germany

"While thinking of citizenship, one might think of standing in a voting booth, marching down the street in support or in protest, or other creative ways of exercising civil rights and liberties. But the word also brings different images: long queues in front of embassies; the faces of border guards carefully inspecting our travel document; spending hours in the hallways of the Immigration Office. And yet, there is a certain pride associated with citizenship, the sense of a common identity and values."

Gerrit Reininghaus
MPP Class of 2008, citizen of Germany, currently working in Frankfurt (Main), Germany

"Travelling as a German to Israel was the first time I experienced the meaning of my citizenship. Also, during my time in Paris at Sciences Po I realised that German or French citizenship no longer makes a difference for anybody anymore. No authority recognised or even cared about where I lived with which citizenship as long as it was EU."

Henry Haaker
MPP Class of 2008, citizen of Germany, currently working in Berlin, Germany

"My German citizenship leads to thinner borders and more trust in my good intentions. I do not have to face suspicions that I am a terrorist or an illegal economic refugee, and I have never had to undertake an eight-week process just to go somewhere for two days in order to see a concert. Being at HSoG showed me how much potential we are locking up behind high entry hurdles and legal barriers."

Johannes Staemmler
MPP Class of 2008, citizen of Germany, currently working in Berlin, Germany

"I have triple citizenship. One from Saxony, but that is never visible. Then I have a German citizenship, which I am reminded of when I vote. My European citizenship becomes more and more important when I travel. But the notion of citizenship as the color of my passport is certainly too narrow. During my time at HSoG, listening to Professors Offe and Preuß diversified my intellectual access-points to the idea of citizenship—it grew from a national tool of exclusion to a category of thinking."

Ivan Capriles
MPP Class of 2007, citizen of Venezuela, currently working in Berlin, Germany

"I have been moving around frequently for about a decade. Hence, for me citizenship has to do with border-crossing and being an 'alien'. I am a Venezuelan citizen; this has enabled me to avoid certain tourist visa applications, or, when I forget to shave I am conveniently absolved of the suspicion for 'looking Middle Eastern' from just a glance at my passport. Yet at other times, my citizenship raises eyebrows and I am questioned for 'important' national security reasons. Nevertheless, I am not required to do compulsory military service which is an advantage."

Rizwan Bajwa
MPP Class of 2007, citizen of Pakistan, currently working in Islamabad, Pakistan

"My citizenship has led to extended hassles at airports where I am almost always being singled out for a 'random' check. Practical issues such as applying for visas become difficult as a consequences of my citizenship."

Stephanie Rhinehart
MPP Class of 2008, citizen of the USA, currently working in Berlin, Germany

"During my time at HSoG I realised how lucky I was to hold a citizenship that allowed me to move freely throughout the world. The first time I ever felt my citizenship was a limitation rather than an asset was this year when I looked for a job in Germany."

Campus Spotlight

This time, the Campus Spotlight is cast on HSoG students abroad: Read about their experiences and encounters.

Ephraim Abwe Diabe is a student of the HSoG (class of 2009).He holds a BA in English and French as well as a degree in Private Law. His work experience includes, among others, a position with the UNCHRD for Central African Sub-Region and UN-UPEACE Africa Programme, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Notes From Maxwell

by Ephraim Abwe Diabe

HSoG student Ephraim Abwe Diabe (MPP class of 2009) is currently on exchange at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University. In comparing the two schools of public policy, he hightlights their many differences and similarities.

When I left Berlin in August 2008 for Syracuse, New York, there were no doubts in my mind that my experience at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Policy would be rewarding. First, there were few other schools of public and international affairs that have been as comprehensively defined as citadels of higher education. Second, the school has had a long-standing reputation for maintaining its position at the head of the queue of excellence among institutions of public administration in the United States and the world at large.

Barely two weeks into the semester, I noticed that in spite of the age difference between the Hertie School of Governance (2001) and the Maxwell School (1924), both institutions have a lot in common; they both offer highly innovative professional Master's Programmes which target the policy environment in diverse ways, including challenges to civil society and democracy, policy dilemmas, civic education and global engagement. Other similarities include the world-class make-up of the faculty in both schools, and the way the institutions blend theory and practice. From this, one could claim that the Hertie School regards policy and practice with remarkable seriousness.

At Maxwell, it is widely held that the barriers which divide academic disciplines from one another and from the larger world of public life are routinely breached by the wide-ranging scholarly and professional backgrounds of the faculty. These represent a careful mix of scholars and practitioners, and are complemented by an exceptionally cosmopolitan student body. Furthermore, it is also with great affection that the students, both Maxwellian and Hertian, talk about their institutions.

In the policy world, it takes extensive knowledge of a given subject, combined with the mannerisms of decision-making circles, to excel. Access to the corridors of power is crucial for policy students, and few other institutions are known to provide this better than the Hertie School and the Maxwell School. There is undoubtedly so much I will take home from my experience at Maxwell. I cherish, for instance, my first visit to the UN Headquarters in Manhattan, through the Humanitarian Action class at Maxwell, for the richness of the workshops and the quality of personal interactions. Still, being away from the characteristic camaraderie of our small Hertie community in Berlin is a challenge. As the end of my time at Maxwell draws near, I realise how much I miss everything about the Hertie School—from hair-splitting debates with colleagues to the warmth and hospitality of the Hertie staff and faculty.

Lina Huppertz is a student of the HSoG (class of 2009). She holds a BA in European Studies from the Universität Passau, Germany. Lina Huppertz has interned with Allianz, the Institute for Political Education of North-Rhine Westphalia and the German Parliament.

Six Things I Love About Georgetown...

by Lina Huppertz

HSoG exchange student Lina Huppertz gives us her view on what a semester at Georgetown really has to offer.

1

Always a pleasure in the U.S. are reality TV, bacteriophobia, and sink waste disposals. Germans cannot resist watching in awe as those hidden monsters swallow anything you flush down the drain. Bacteriophobia can actually get annoying when you spend Thanksgiving weekend with 12 host-relatives, three of which have bad colds. I saw a new peak in bacteria alerts when a noro virus spread in the undergrad cafeteria, causing about 150 people to become violently ill. Bacteriophobia can be an advantage if you are sick, though: whatever you touch automatically becomes yours.

2

Public safety alerts are e-mails sent out to all students by the university's safety department whenever something happens. Most of the time, this is something bad, like a mugging. Recently I have been receiving e-mails about girls getting their "buttocks" grabbed right on my street! Weber, where were you last night?

3

Rodents, raccoons and other animals. As my Grandpa keeps saying: Is this the country famous for its progress? After I let the spiders in my room eat the flies and the bed bugs emigrated more or less on their own, I was bothered to detect mice under my floorboards. I gave peaceful symbiosis an honest try, but then Heinrich the mouse was killed by mice-ghostbusters with sticky paper (which is so cruel it is actually illegal in Germany). Fortunately, the big animals—namely a rat and a raccoon—stay in the backyard snacking on our waste. But hey, how else would I have learnt that you do not call these furry beasts "wash bears"?

4

The strange mixture of rich Conservative old people and rich soon-to-be Conservative college kids. The building to our left is full of college girls who regularly throw midday song-and-dance parties to Cindy Lauper's "Girls Just Wanna Have Fun." The family on our right is headed by your typical desperate housewife, who got so mad about a 10-to-midnight party at our house that she wrote a 10-page letter to off-campus housing. Who knew the university had any business regulating how loud our parties are!? I found out the hard way when a random guy showed up at our house a few days later to tell us to come to his office to discuss our mischievous behaviour, "or else there would be consequences". Fortunately, the only consequence was the repeated theft of our garbage bin, and you can all guess who that was.

5

The horrible grease-seller Wisey's that will not accept German IDs. Any foreigner who has been to the U.S. probably knows the feeling when an American cashier takes a look at your ID as if you just took it out of a Mickey Mouse magazine. It would not be so bad if it was not the only shop in the area that sells alcohol. And as if that was not bad enough, all stores have to stop selling alcohol at 9:45 pm! Wow. That requires more planning capacity and causes more anxiety than I can sometimes handle. Apart from being the local alcohol monopolist, Wisey's sells grease in the form of subs for which they build a pile of about 500 chicken breasts in the early evening. Lesson: never go to Wisey's before 6.

6

Elections, Republicans, Democrats and other people without brains. By now I am convinced that half of all books written in the U.S. revolve around the following question: which party is the dumbest; or, in the words of Ann Coulter: "It's as if all the brain-damaged people in America got together and formed a voting bloc." But who doesn't love a good political celebrity death-match with pundits like Ann Coulter throwing anti-Muslim arguments like "We should invade their countries, kill their leaders and convert them to Christianity" around? God loves Germany for party variety and for laws preventing people like Ann Coulter from speaking publicly (I hope that what's *Volksverhetzung* is for).

Visit Schlossplatz³ online

All Schlossplatz³ content is available online. You can read articles and download back issues in .pdf format at the Hertie School of Governance website. Just go to www.hertie-school.org/schlossplatz3/, then click "Printed" on the right side of the page.

Schlossplatz³ in the Blogosphere

In January 2008, Schlossplatz³ went online with its own blog. The blog regularly features articles and interviews by prominent policy experts from around the world, as well as contributions from students, faculty and visitors of the Hertie School of Governance. Readers can also comment on articles in the blog, print edition, or other policy topics by e-mailing us at sp3@mpp.hertie-school.org . You can find the Schlossplatz³ blog at www.hertie-school.org/schlossplatz3

Correction

The editors of Schlossplatz³ would like to offer their sincere apologies to Peter Bosshard, Policy Director of International Rivers, Berkeley, California, whose name we misspelled in issue five, on Water, published in September 2008.

Next Issue

Is it appropriate to speak about crisis all the time and in connection to every and any topic? By overusing this word, does not one undermine what a real *crisis* is? And how should we manage crisis? That is a question for policymakers! Interested? The seventh issue of Schlossplatz³, on Crisis, will appear in September 2009.
The Crisis issue will focus on the actors and procedures behind responding to crises.
With a focus on the ways in which crises are managed, it will incorporate perspectives from individual policy makers, multilateral organisations, think tanks, NGOs, private firms, academics and students alike. The issue will cover questions of legitimacy, accountability, rationality, and ethics to name a few.

Hertie School
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Executive Seminars 2009

"I found the seminar extremely rewarding and enjoyed exchanging opinions with people from other institutions. I look forward to my next chance to participate in Executive Education at the Hertie School of Governance."

Thomas Schieb
German Federal Foreign Office

9 – 11 March	**Performance Management in the Public Sector** Convener: Professor Dr. Gerhard Hammerschmid, Hertie School of Governance
30 March – 1 April	**Managing Organisational Change** Convener: Professor Dr. Jobst Fiedler, Hertie School of Governance
2 – 4 April	**Corporate Social Responsibility:** **Regulatory Tools and their Application** Convener: Professor Dr. Anke Hassel, Hertie School of Governance
11 – 13 May	**Smart Decisions in Government** Conveners: Professor Lawrence Phillips, London School of Economics and Political Science; Dr. Martin Schilling, Decision Institute
8 – 10 June	**Strategic Political Communication** Convener: Dr. Leonard Novy, Bertelsmann Foundation

For more information and to register, please contact us.
Tim Nover,
Acting Head of Executive Education
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All seminars will be held in English. The seminars are offered in cooperation with the Executive Master of Public Management Programme.

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