

Selecting the Right Type of Personnel

**The Role of Party Membership in Shaping the Behavior of
Candidates and Members of Parliament**

Jochen Rehmert

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First Supervisor:

Prof. Mark Andreas Kayser, PhD, Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, Germany

Second Supervisor:

Prof. Dr. Philip Manow, University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany

Summary

Party membership seems to lose importance for political careers. In the wake of political dealignment and dwindling numbers in party membership, an increasing number of parties have started to recruit candidates without prior party membership. What are the implications of this trend in elite recruitment for candidate loyalty, party unity and legislators' activity in parliament? This thesis empirically addresses these questions by making use of several novel and self-collected quantitative data-sets. First, the thesis explores the formal eligibility criteria within parties that aspirants for candidacies have to fulfill. By using data based on roughly 500 self-collected (historical) party constitutions, data on parties' parliamentary voting records and candidate survey data, this thesis finds that candidacy eligibility criteria that presume a minimum length of prior party membership are associated with greater party unity and candidate loyalty. Secondly, I explore how prior party membership affects the behavior of legislators. Expectations generated from social identity theory are put to empirical tests using data on all Member of Parliament of the German Bundestag from 1953 to 2013, and their voting behavior on unwhipped votes. Longer spells of prior and active party membership are associated with greater coherence, theorized to be the product of socialization processes into parties' norms and values. Finally, the consequences of long-term party membership respective the lack thereof are investigated by taking advantage of the Japanese case. I explore the behavioral differences of candidates nominated through open recruitment and those nominated through traditional channels, as has been practiced by major Japanese parties. I find that those candidates nominated under open recruitment, oftentimes lacking prior party membership and political experience, are ill-prepared for legislative office at the national level. Compared to their more traditional colleagues, these candidates are less active in parliament. In conclusion, this thesis finds that party membership matters on such dimensions as party unity and legislative activity, and that it is (enforced) intra-party socialization processes that help prepare the individual candidate for the responsibilities of legislative office. Thus, this thesis contributes to the literature of candidate selection – by looking at eligibility criteria – and legislative studies – by assessing the former's consequentiality.

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List of Abbreviations

AI	Agreement Index
AL	Alternative Liste für Demokratie und Umweltschutz, Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection
ALP	Australian Labor Party
AME	Average Marginal Effects
B90/Gr	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Alliance 90/Greens
BCSV	Badische Christlich-Soziale Volkspartei, Baden Christian-Social People's Party
PNV	Partido Nacionalista Vasco, Basque Nationalist Party
BSP	Belgische Socialistische Partij, Belgian Socialist Party
CDA	Christen Democratisch Appèl, Christian Democratic Appeal
CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, Christian Democratic Union
CEC	Candidacy Eligibility Criteria
CSM	Candidate Selection Methods
CSU	Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern, Christian Social Union
CVP	Christliche Volkspartei des Saarlandes, Christian People's Party of Saarland
D66	Democraten 66, Democrats 66
DALP	Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project
DNA	Det norske Arbeiderparti, Norwegian Labour Party
DPJ	Minshutō, Democratic Party of Japan
DVP	Demokratische Volkspartei, Democratic People's Party
DZP	Deutsche Zentrumspartei, Catholic Centre Party
FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei, Free Democratic Party
FPTP	First-Past-the-Post
GL	GorenLinks, GreenLeft
HOR	House of Representatives
JPY	Japanese Yen

JRP	Nippon Ishin no Kai, Japanese Restoration Party
LDP	Jiyū Minshutō, Liberal Democratic Party of Japan
LPM	Lijst Pim Fortuyn, Fortuyn List
MP	Member of Parliament
ÖVP	Österreichische Volkspartei, Austrian People's Party
PDS	Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus, Party of Democratic Socialism
PMB	Private Member Bill
PPDB	Political Party Database
PR	Proportional Representation
PS	Parti Socialiste, Socialist Party
PSI	Partito Socialista Italiano, Italian Socialist Party
PvdA	Partij van de Arbeid, Labour Party
PVV	Partij voor de Vrijheid, Party for Freedom
REM	La République En Marche!, The Republic Onwards!
SED	Sozialistische Einheitspartei, Socialist Unity Party of Germany
SGP	Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij, Political Reformed Party
SNTV	Single Non-Transferable Vote
SP	Sozialistische Partij, Socialist Party
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, Social Democratic Party of Germany
SPÖ	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, Social Democratic Party of Austria
STV	Single Transferable Vote
UK	United Kingdom
USPD	Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei, Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany
UTAS	University of Tokyo and Asahi Shimbun Survey
VVD	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, People's Party for Freedom and Democracy
YP	Minna no Tō, Your Party

Chapter 1

Introduction

“I supplied land, houses and the use of much capital... but experience proved that the attempt was premature to unite a number of strangers not previously educated for the purpose, who should carry on extensive operations for their common interest, and live together as a common family.”

- Robert Owen (1771-1858) in April 1828¹,

Two years after his short-lived attempt at building a socialist-utopian society *New Harmony* in Indiana faltered, Robert Owen acknowledged that the demise was in part due to the members that constituted his society. Its admission policy, open to “any and all” (Wilson 1967, p.105), and the failure to thoroughly screen applicants and select the right type of supporters committed to the cause, corrupted Owen’s vision of an ideal communal life by admitting “crackpots, free-loaders, and adventurers” (ibid., p.116). Unlike New Harmony, the *Twin Oaks Community* in Virginia, set up in the 1960s is still thriving and one of the longest-surviving non-religious communes in the United States. Following the principles of egalitarianism, leadership roles rotate between all members. But to become a permanent member Twin Oaks’ admission policy stipulates a six-month trial period with a final decision made by a six-person selection committee (Reece 2016). This way, they can weed out obvious mismatches.²

While these two approaches to community-building share the common goal of building an infrastructure for an ideal societal life, they differ in notable ways, the most important ones being their admission and screening policies. By setting higher bars for joining and gaining admission by – for instance – demanding a trial period, the group can screen and actively control who will become a member and who will not. This holds true for any social group and can affect how cohesive the group’s membership stands to be. Moreover, the

¹Cited in Gordon (1999, p.288).

²A political party’s version of this parable is presented by De Lange and Art (2011), tracing back the difference in party survival of the Dutch Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) to the admission policies of their respective leaders, Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders.

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higher the bars for joining a social group the higher the social and psychological costs to quit and leave that group. Consequently, group leaders can expect higher commitment of those entrants that have been admitted under more demanding admission rules than those admitted under more lenient ones (see Hirschman 1970). Especially for political parties, a highly distinctive type of social group which heavily relies on its unity to function, these aspects of screening and the commitment of its members – those “on the ground” and those in parliament – can become decisive for electoral success (e.g., Greene and Haber 2015) or party survival (e.g., de Lange and Art 2011).

On the face of it, political parties share many elements with utopian societies: they follow an ideology and are set out to implement policies that are thought to bring the whole polity in the here and now closer to its members’ dreams and ideals. They also have in common that neither utopian societies nor political parties are immune from admitting potential “crackpots, free-loaders, and adventurers” (Wilson 1967, p.116). And parties, too, may be plagued from time to time by *defections* from the party (e.g., Heller and Mershon 2009), policy *disagreement* (e.g., Hix 2004; Sieberer 2006; Willumsen and Öhberg 2017) or idle and ill-prepared *duds* (see de Lange and Art 2011; Heffer 2017; Samuel 2017) – all of which constitute phenomena that are clearly not valued by those ruling the party and trying to keep the party united and productive.

When selecting candidates parties often face the challenge of selecting the type of candidate that toes the party line and is active in parliament, while avoiding the selection of the type that defies the party’s position and is unable or unwilling to contribute in parliament. In fact, the nomination of candidates poses a principal-agent problem (e.g., Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Lupia 2003). Parties are unable to observe whether aspirants for nominations are truly committed to the party or merely signal to be loyal in order gain access to the party’s electoral machine. To what extent are parties able to steer clear of these types of behavior? Can parties avoid the adverse selection of non-committed applicants by employing tougher screening mechanisms? What kind of behavioral consequences arise from selecting committed and non-committed candidates? These questions form the topic of this thesis.

This dissertation revolves around the question how political parties, and in particular parties in parliament, can regulate the admission to the exclusive pool of its candidates and how party membership before candidacy is related to greater loyalty and activity of

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Members of Parliament (MPs).³ The focus of this thesis lies in the behavioral consequences of variation in parties' screening mechanisms for candidates and consequences of variation in candidates' and MPs' party membership background. In other words, how do parties' screening mechanisms – i.e., formal Candidacy Eligibility Criteria (CEC) – help them to avoid selecting rather undesirable types of candidates, i.e. those that sit idle and disagree with the party, and instead ensure the selection of the types of candidates more desired, i.e. those active and falling in line with the party?

My inquiries examine how CEC affect the unity of parties in parliament, candidates' loyalty toward the party, and how important (enforced) socialization processes within the party are for loyal voting behavior and legislative activity. As I will argue throughout this thesis, it is socialization processes that evolve with (long-term) party membership that ensure the preference homogeneity and internalization of common norms and values that help to explain variation in legislative activity and individual level respect for party unity. Moreover, the exposure to the workings of politics and the embeddedness into networks that comes with party membership, as well as the motivation for partisan politics in the first place, are crucial factors in explaining legislative activity, such as the introduction of Private Member Bills or the tabling of parliamentary questions. While some parties ensure the selection of committed candidates by setting formal requirements such as party membership for a certain period of time before a candidature, other parties relinquish candidates with a strong party background in favor of politically inexperienced non-members.

I will show that especially those eligibility criteria that entail a long-term involvement with the party and those that nudge candidates to maintain good relations with other party members correlate with higher party unity. Although a deeper and more thorough inquiry into the reasons for these differences in candidacy eligibility criteria is certainly warranted – one could think about electoral considerations, a need for technocratic expertise or a zeal for democratic principles – it is not the focus of this thesis. Instead, I will examine how variation in CEC affect party unity, candidate loyalty and legislative activity. This, moreover, is complemented by exploring how MPs' party membership back-

³Technically one has to differentiate between admission to the party as a regular member and the screening mechanisms used to vet potential candidates. While it is definitely interesting to explore the consequences and their relationship to candidacy requirements, membership admission policies of parties are not the focus of this thesis, which instead revolves around formal criteria and requirements to be met by candidacy-seekers. Moreover, I do not look at factions within parliamentary party groups and their admission policies, as for example the *National-Liberale Aktion* (NLA) within the ruling Free Democratic Party of Germany (FDP) during their stint in office with the Social Democrats (SPD) in 1970. The NLA, a newly founded conservative faction, demanded two letters of references for admission in order to rule out less conservative youngsters undermining the faction's policy stance. See <http://www.zeit.de/1970/29/rechte-formation>, accessed: 14.01.2019.

grounds are associated with higher preference homogeneity as observed in parliamentary voting behavior and MPs' legislative activity. By linking parties' candidate selection rules to party unity and behavior of candidates and MPs, this thesis speaks and adds most importantly to the literatures on candidate selection and legislative politics. Specifically, it will show how certain internal party rules, hitherto neglected, affect the working of legislatures.

Why Study Parties' Eligibility Criteria and Party Membership?

Membership in political parties, it appears, is losing in importance for political careers. In the wake of political dealignment we see an erosion of partisan identification and voting based on party-labels (e.g., Dalton and Wattenberg 2002; Kayser and Wlezien 2011), a decline in membership-based politics (e.g., van Biezen and Poguntke 2014) and, in an increasing number of countries – including but not limited to the United States, France or the Czech Republic – the entry of political outsiders to the highest office of the executive. Although there seems to be a systemic component to this development in some of these countries (see Samuels and Shugart 2010), parties increasingly seek to recruit outsiders and newcomers as parliamentary candidates, too. Many parties have in fact responded to these trends of political dealignment, by for example changing the way they nominate their candidates.

The French *La République en Marche* (REM) – for instance– newly created in 2016 and to some degree a beneficiary of political dealignment, was put in a tough spot to attract and nominate a large number of promising candidates in a very short time. While around half of their pool of candidates was filled with former members of the traditional French parties – mainly from the Socialists (*Parti Socialiste*, PS) – the remaining spots were filled with first-time candidates selected in the wake of public calls for applications (*The Economist* 2017). Somewhat similar, multiple parties in Japan – including the two major parties the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) – started to experiment with public calls for applications for candidatures – so-called *kōbo* – as early as the 1990s. This trend toward open recruitment has since reached dramatic levels. Formed in 1996, the ambition of the DPJ to become a viable challenger to the ever-dominant LDP was initially cut short by a shortage of (quality) candidates (Smith 2013; Yu, Yu, and Shoji 2014). Reverting to open recruitment, the DPJ started filling vacant electoral districts and could eventually topple the LDP in 2009 – a result probably not possible without filling vacant districts through open recruitment.

Other examples include the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), which posted an ad on Facebook looking for a candidate to run in the conservative stronghold of *Bitburg-Prüm*

– party membership not required, but overall agreement with the party’s ideals desired. Own members were apparently not willing or able to stand (see Ripperger 2016). In neighbouring Austria, Sebastian Kurz of the People’s Party (ÖVP) drafted a party-list with many hand-picked technocratic “experts” without prior party membership (APA, 2017). Despite the various local factors that have played their role in each of these examples to adopt open recruitment or that led to the selection of candidates lacking party membership, they all point to the apparent trend that (long-term) party membership seems to lose in importance for political and legislative careers.

But why is this interesting or deserving of academic attention? Given its increasing relevance for political parties and political practitioners, new trends in candidate selection mechanisms have major implications for legislative politics and for the societal legitimacy of political parties. The head of the executive, for instance, i.e. chancellors and prime ministers, are usually chosen from among the party in parliament in most parliamentary systems. To become a member of parliament for this party, however, one needs to be nominated by the party – preferably in a safe district or high up on the party list. Only after going through the vetting process of parties’ eligibility criteria for candidates (or, where applicable, eligibility criteria for party leadership positions for that matter) can aspiring candidates be nominated. Moreover, parties’ formal eligibility criteria profoundly determine the type of personnel and candidates parties value and place before the voter – who often only has a “take it or leave it” option. These eligibility criteria therefore have crucial implications for the composition of the party in parliament. Related to this, are parties with more open CEC considered more democratic by voters? How does this affect parties’ legitimacy among voters and party members?⁴ Most importantly, though, now, that some parties have started experimenting with alternative ways of recruitment, are we to see changes in attitudes and behavior of candidates and MPs? If parties change the requirements for candidacy eligibility could this affect the selection, background and quality of those taking seat in parliament or in executive positions? What are the behavioral consequences of this variation in eligibility criteria and party membership background?

The Study of Candidate Selection

Previous studies have identified the importance of candidate selection early on. Dubbed the “secret garden of politics” (Gallagher and Marsh 1988, p. IX), the relevance of candidate selection for understanding intra-party politics has been recognized almost 120 years ago by Ostrogorski (1902). Forty years later, Schattschneider (1942) stated that “the nature of the nominating procedure determines the nature of the party; he who can

⁴Tackling these questions unfortunately have to be deferred to future projects.

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make the nominations is the owner of the party” (cited in Gallagher and Marsh 1988, p. 3). Despite the regular iterations of its relevance in subsequent decades (e.g., Black 1972; Ranney 1981), systematic research on candidate selection remained rather scarce and (case) studies about it rather descriptive (e.g., Kaack 1969; Roberts 1988; Shiratori 1988). Most early studies understood candidate selection in a behavioralist tradition through the conceptual lens of elite recruitment, where any outcome was the product of the preferences of selectors and decisions taken in the back room. This approach has often neglected the independent effects of candidate selection institutions on nomination outcomes (e.g., Obler 1974).


However, theoretical and conceptual advances in the last two decades (e.g., Rahat and Hazan 2001; Hazan and Rahat 2010) have emphasized the necessity of studying the effects of candidate selection methods on such a diverse set of political outcomes as competitiveness (e.g., Kenig 2009b; Ramiro 2016), representation (e.g., Lawless and Pearson 2008), incumbency turnover (e.g., Put, Gouglass, and Maddens 2015), and legislative behavior (e.g., Shomer 2009, 2016, 2017). These studies suggest that variation in the institutional design of candidate selection is associated with variation in the outcome of various political phenomena.

Rahat and Hazan (2001) and Hazan and Rahat (2010) conceptualized candidate selection along four separate dimensions: besides the *candidacy* dimension, which is the focus of this thesis and which asks who can be nominated as candidate, they further identified the *selectorate*, i.e. the body of the party that selects candidates; the *centralization*, i.e. the administrative level within the party at which nominations are made; and, finally, the *voting system*, i.e. whether parties appoint or vote for a candidate and, if the latter, what type of voting rules apply. For them, the candidacy dimension is “the most brutal” (p. 19) of these four dimensions as it has the potential to reduce the pool of eligibles dramatically.

The candidacy dimension adjudicates who is formally eligible to seek a party’s nomination. Are there any requirements to be fulfilled and, if so, how strict are these? These formal restrictions are the basis on which the continuum displayed in Figure 1.1 rests. At the inclusive and open end of this dimension every voter can seek a party’s nomination. The bid for the Republican presidential nomination by Donald J. Trump, real estate billionaire and reality-show TV star, epitomizes the left-most extreme of an inclusive candidacy. Trump, seeking the Republican nomination, could impose himself onto the party which reluctantly had to nominate him as presidential candidate eventually, as a

number of contenders trailing him in support failed to coordinate effectively during the campaign.⁵

Figure 1.1: The Candidacy Dimension, following Hazan and Rahat (2010)



Moving toward the center and the right-most end of the continuum, candidates for general elections have to comply with more restrictive requirements. The most common and most apparent one is membership in the party. Yet quite a number of parties allow non-members to compete on their ticket, as the German Left (Die Linke) does on their *offene Liste* (“open list”), or the German Green party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, B90/Gr) and the Social Democratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs). Beginning with their 1993 and 1998 party constitutions, respectively, both parties explicitly allow for non-members to compete on their party lists (B90/Gr, 1993; SPÖ, 1998). However, more restrictive parties demand a minimum length of membership for candidate eligibility. The Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano, PSI), for instance, stipulated five years of prior consecutive membership in the 1970s and 1980s (PSI, 1970; 1978; 1984). The Australian Labor Party’s (ALP) 1987 party constitution of its Northern Territory branch was less intensive, but demanded a number of additional requirements. To be eligible, candidates had to meet the following requirements and conditions: two years of consecutive party membership before the calling of nominations, attendance of at least three meetings in the twelve months prior to the calling of nominations, five written recommendations by other party members who themselves have had to be party members for at least 12 months before the calling for nominations, union membership, and finally the candidate had to sign the *Public Office Candidate’s* pledge (ALP, 1987).⁶ However, strict eligibility criteria are not always enforceable. As de Winter (1988) notes, the highly demanding criteria for candidates of the Belgian Socialist Party in the 1970s could at

⁵This example serves only as an illustration of a highly open and inclusive nomination process, as the focus of this thesis is the selection of candidates for general elections and not for presidents or party leaders, for that matter.

⁶This pledge reads: “I hereby pledge myself not to oppose the candidate selected by the Australian Labor Party and, if elected, to do my utmost to carry out the principles embodied in the Platform and on all questions affecting the Platform to vote as a majority of the Parliamentary Labor Party decided at a duly constituted Caucus meeting. I further pledge not to withdraw from the election contest after being duly nominated, without the consent of the Administrative Committee, nor to resign my seat in Parliament without the consent of the Administrative Committee. I hereby agree and acknowledge that any sum specified in the Constitution and Rules to be paid by me and which remains unpaid is a debt owing to the members of the NT [J.R.: Northern Territory] Branch and may be sued for and recovered in any court of competent jurisdiction” (ALP, 1987).

times not be fully enforced, as the social milieu these criteria presume have declined or disappeared completely. Yet, one can still expect that the mere presence of eligibility criteria in party constitutions influences the pool of aspiring candidates, the unfolding of their expressed ambitions (see also Fox and Lawless 2005) and, hence, the mode of their selection.

Candidacy eligibility criteria also extend to many positions and offices within parties, including that of the party leader. In classifying party leader selection methods, Kenig (2009a) compiled a set of requirements to be fulfilled by those party members that wish to become party leader. While some parties allow any type of party member to seek the leadership position, others – such as the Irish Labour Party – restrict this position to sitting MPs. Other stipulations include a defined period of prior party membership, monetary deposits, or the collection of a number of signatures from co-partisan or fellow MPs. The purpose of these requirements is to avoid fringe candidates from taking up a campaign that could potentially harm the party’s image (a case in point is Donald J. Trump’s bid for the Republican’s presidential nomination).

What are CEC and where can we find them?

But what exactly are CEC and how do they distribute across parties, electoral systems, but also across different types of parties’ selectorates? This section gives a brief overview over the different types of CEC found in parties and the empirical distribution of CEC. The following paragraphs serve the purpose of providing a first impression of the different types of CEC and datasets used in this thesis. These two datasets are: the Political Party Database (PPDB) and my own data based on collections of (historical) party constitutions.

The first dataset, the PPDB, is a cross-sectional dataset covering 18 countries for the time span of 2010 to 2014. The country list includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Based on official party constitutions and statutes formal eligibility criteria are coded for 115 parties in these countries. These criteria are comprised of demanding *party membership* from aspirants for candidacy, a *minimum length of party membership*, the *collection of signatures*, the signature of *pledges of loyalty*, *monetary deposits*, membership in *trade unions* or adherence to a specific *religion* (Poguntke et al. 2016).

Systematic data on CEC is sparse. The PPDB, the only comparative dataset that provides information on parties’ formal eligibility criteria, is unfortunately limited to a cross-

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Table 1.1: Distribution of Candidacy Eligibility Criteria

	Candidacy Eligibility Criteria							N
	Party Membership %	Minimum Length of Membership ∅ Months	Union Membership %	Religious Affiliation %	Pledge of Loyalty %	Collection of Signatures %	Monetary Deposit %	
	<i>Electoral System</i>							
Plurality/Majority	94.1	7.8	11.1	0	22.2	55.6	16.7	17
Mixed	31.3	1	0	0	12.5	12.5	0	16
PR	48.8	5.2	0	7.4	26.8	13.6	6.2	82
Closed-list PR	35	11.7	0	5	14.3	10	25	20
Open-list PR	53.2	3.8	0	8.2	29.8	14.8	0	62
	<i>Party Selectorate</i>							
National Party Leaders	71.4	3.8	0	0	0	57.1	14.3	7
Regional/State-level	57.1	5.3	5.7	2.9	30	31.4	8.6	35
Bargaining of multiple Levels	57.5	5.8	0	7.3	30.8	14.6	7.3	40
Local/Municipal Actors	33.3	7	0	11.8	13.3	0	5.9	18

Note: Data on CEC from PPDB; data on selectorate from DALP; STV system is grouped into Open-list PR category given the *de facto* option for preference voting. *Minimum Length of Membership* set to 0 where *Party Membership* is required but no further information on length requirements are made; values of selectorate rounded to integers.

sectional comparison. To examine changes over time within parties, I have therefore collected historical party constitutions for the major parties in Germany and the Netherlands. Moreover, I have collected party constitutions for mainly social democratic parties in the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. For some parties in these countries information go back as far as the 1970s.

Table 1.1 shows the percentage of parties that have adopted each of the seven types of eligibility criteria in the PPDB dataset, separated by the electoral system these parties are competing in. It appears that parties are using CEC to counter-balance incentives emanating from the electoral system. Electoral systems that incentivize the cultivation of the personal vote (Carey and Shugart 1995), such as “First-Past-the-Post” (FPTP) with plurality/majority voting and open-list PR systems, see a higher share of parties demanding party membership, pledges of loyalty and the collection of signatures. In both systems candidates may see a benefit in differentiating themselves from the party, either by appealing to particularistic interests or, in case of sitting MPs, by voting against the party line. To counter these tendencies parties, it could be argued, revert to setting stricter CEC to nominate candidates that have a higher tolerance to these electoral incentives. Although merely associational, these relationships present an intriguing intuition about the usage and prevalence of CEC.

Moreover, the rather low number of parties that cluster in even fewer countries call for caution when reading the table. Parties of the same country could set similar CEC for other reasons than the electoral system that are unique to the country. For example, the high percentage of monetary deposits required by parties in closed-list PR systems is due to four parties in Israel (the fifth being the Basque Nationalist Party, PNV, in Spain). Similarly, the relatively long time of prior party membership in closed-list parties

is equally due to some highly demanding Israeli parties, thus obscuring the otherwise clear pattern of more demanding CEC in electoral systems with greater incentives for the personal vote.

A further caveat of this comparison concerns the presumed homogeneous effect of electoral institutions and their incentives on all parties and their candidates alike. As Smith (2018, p. 125) argues, it effectively depends on the actual number of candidates that parties field in multimember districts in systems employing for instance the Single Non-Transferable (SNTV) or Single Transferable Vote (STV) as previously used in Japan or currently in Ireland, respectively. If candidates in these systems do not face other candidates from their own party they are not as much incentivized to differentiate themselves from their copartisans, as when the party fields multiple candidates. In fact, the Irish Labour Party and Sinn Féin usually nominate only one candidate in most electoral districts. Similarly, the Japanese Kōmeitō and the Japanese Communist Party tended to run only single candidates in the multimember districts of Japan's pre-reform electoral system. Hence, candidates of these parties are less incentivized to appeal to their personality despite such electoral rules. At the same time, parties can rely on a more centralized selection of candidates which could effectively serve as a supplement to more demanding CEC in terms of instilling candidate loyalty.

The environment for electoral competition appears to be a strong correlate and moderator for parties' demand of instituting less or more demanding candidacy eligibility criteria. Parties may use eligibility criteria in order to counter-balance the centrifugal incentives of an electoral system to differentiate oneself from the party. Essentially, by selecting candidates highly committed to the party and its platform, parties rely on their candidates' commitment to the party to inoculate them from these electoral pressures to disrupt party unity.

Perhaps similarly contingent on the incentives emanating from electoral systems are parties' candidate nominating selectorates (e.g., Shomer 2014; Lundell 2004). But how do they correlate with parties' CEC? Are they chosen to complement, supplement or reinforce each other? Table 1.1 displays how CEC distribute across different types of selectorates. Data on these stem from the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP)⁷ and provide information on the centralization of the selectorate. A striking observation is the large share of parties with national level selections that demand party membership (71.5 %) and a collection of signatures (57.1 %). It seems these selectorates, perhaps some-

⁷See <https://sites.duke.edu/democracylinkage/>. This data relies on several country experts that assess whether a party's *National party leaders*, *regional/state level* actors, actors at the *local/municipal* level are in charge or whether nominations are the outcome of *bargaining of multiple levels*. Answers from all experts were rounded to the closest integer.

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what detached from the base, have to reassure themselves of selecting the right candidate by demanding membership from candidates and affidavits from other party members. Moving toward more decentralized selections, candidates tend to have to prove longer spells of prior memberships – in those parties that actually demand membership from its candidates. When local or municipal actors are in charge (presumably selecting candidates for decentralized electoral districts), parties need to make sure to select candidates that remain true to the party and that exhibit a higher tolerance toward the incentive to appeal to and follow particularistic local interests too much. Regional level selectorates are somewhat in the middle when it comes to CEC, too. Almost the half of these parties demand membership, roughly half a year of it, the collection of signatures and in one third of the cases pledges of loyalty.

Overall, it appears that when discipline can be enforced through central selection, parties' national headquarters only seem to make sure to select party members that are in good standing with their peers. But as we move to more decentralized selection, party discipline cannot as easily be instilled through sanctions from the party leadership. Hence, longer spells of prior membership and pledges of loyalty appear to become more prominent and important in ensuring party unity. This cross-sectional comparison, superficial as it may be, suggests interesting patterns of complementarity between the selectorate and the candidacy dimension.

All of this, the electoral system and parties' selectorate bodies, pose of course a challenge to disentangling the effects of CEC from that emanating from the type of the electoral system or the degree of centralization in the selectorate. Below, in the section on *Research Questions & Contribution*, I will elaborate how I ensure the identification of CEC's net effect on candidate, MP and party behavior. The confounding through electoral systems or parties' selectorates are mainly controlled for by choices of the design or the statistical analysis. To increase my analytical leverage in this respect, I have collected hundreds of (historical) party constitutions to code parties' CEC in previous decades.

This neglect of the time dimension is therefore a big caveat when using the cross-sectional PPDB dataset, as changes in CEC over time within parties and party systems remain obscure. As mentioned above, the modes of parties' organizational structure, especially in relation to its members, evolved dramatically over the last hundred or so years and with it, we can expect, the need for CEC too. Moreover, incumbent MPs observed at time t could have been selected under much different CEC in time $t-1$. To explore the development of CEC over time, I have collected several hundred historical party constitutions and statutes. For example, the Catholic Centre Party (Deutsche Zentrums Partei, DZP), a centrist party standing for the political Catholicism and influential during the

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Weimar Republic in Germany (1919-1933), required merely membership and, in some party branches, Catholic denomination of its candidates (Lepper 1998). However, as the party fell into political irrelevance at the end of the 1950s, a comparison over a longer time period is not possible.

A prime candidate of studying changes over a longer time span is Germany's oldest political party, the SPD. The party split in 1917 in a row over the party's position on Germany's war effort in World War I, forming the *Mehrheitssozialdemokratie* (MSPD), i.e. the more pragmatic wing, and the *Unabhängige Sozialdemokratie* (USPD), the more radical wing. In their 1922 party constitution, the USPD demanded from its candidates seeking office at the local level a prior membership of one year, for candidates seeking national office three years of prior party membership (USPD, 1922). In 1925, two and a half years after reuniting with the USPD, the SPD had similar candidacy eligibility criteria of three year of prior party membership for its candidates irrespective of what public office is sought (SPD, 1925). After World War II and the heyday of the German mass party, the SPD's CEC were reduced drastically and its federal party constitutions did not mention any candidacy eligibility criteria until the 1971 party constitution, when it required party membership (with exception for municipal elections) (SPD, 1971) – in a decade in which the party's membership figures at times exceeded one million. While the party discussed the regular recruitment of non-member experts around the millenium without actually adopting any rule in this respect (e.g., Hainz 2006), its regional branch in the state of Rhineland-Palatine adopted an open recruitment for the 2017 election in the conservative stronghold of Bitburg-Prüm.

Hence, the SPD neatly epitomizes the development of CEC over time, in a fashion that on the face of it seems intuitive and universal. Corresponding to the contemporaneous trends of political dealignment in the electorate (e.g., Dalton and Wattenberg 2002), the decline of traditional politically-relevant societal groups (e.g., van Biezen and Poguntke 2014), and organizational changes within parties (e.g., Katz and Mair 1995), parties appear to reduce their CEC accordingly. The case of the SPD further indicates that the relationship between the electoral system and parties' CEC is not a deterministic one, as the SPD's most stringent CEC have been in place during the highly proportional electoral system of the Weimar Republic.

To complement this picture of just one party, Figure 1.2 shows the development of CEC over several decades for seven parties from the Netherlands. These parties are the Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen Democratisch Appèl, CDA), the Democrats 66 (Democraten 66, D66), GreenLeft (GroenLinks, GL), the Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA), the Political Reformed Party (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij, SGP), the Socialist

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
Party (Socialistische Partij, SP), and the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD). Each panel represents one party with its CEC at the time of revisions to its party constitution (indicated by the year numbers in each panel). Dark bars indicate the presence of a given type of eligibility criteria.

It is striking that all parties demand membership from their candidates over the whole time period. In some parties, candidates are requested to have been a member for a certain time, ranging from two months in the PvdA to two years in the SGP. An overall pattern of decreasing membership requirements over time, however, is not apparent. While the CDA demanded two months of membership after its official inauguration in the 1980s, it increased the minimum length of prior membership to one full year in 1994. The D66, in contrast, has been alternating between six months and a full year in prior membership between 1969 and 2014. The most extreme change is observed in the SGP instituting a two-year prior membership requirement only in 1996. The VVD, in comparison, went from no formal minimum length of membership to six month in 1975, to a reduced length of roughly 3 months in 2005. With the 2005 party constitution, eligibility is bestowed after the first of four quarterly focal dates after joining the party.

Another set of CEC are pledges of loyalty and the collection of signatures from other party members. Four out of the seven Dutch parties presented here demand from their candidates pledges of loyalty. The SP, however, only has asked for a pledge from its candidates for a brief period of time from 2003 to 2009. GreenLeft appears to be the only party that demands the collection of signatures from co-partisans, fifteen to be precise, from its candidates. This rule has been instituted with the 2005 party constitution and thus far has been the unique characteristic of GreenLeft in terms of CEC.

What we do not see from these figures is a similar development of CEC as has been documented for the German SPD. Dutch parties appear to rather go into the opposite direction with the installment of more demanding formal length requirements mainly in the 1990s. Data on other Social Democratic parties, however, mainly do support the trajectory that the CEC of the SPD has taken. The Labour Parties of Australia, New Zealand and the UK, have reduced their prior membership length requirements from 24 months to 12 months between the 1980s respective 1960s and the 2000s. Norway's Labour Party (Det Norske Arbeiderparti, DNA), too, reduced its length requirements from three months in 1973 (the date of its first installment) to one month in 2002. What we do see, however, is that parties appear to either experiment with their CEC (e.g., the Socialist Party adopting pledges of loyalty for only four years) or that changes in parties' CEC could reflect internal struggles for more inclusive (exclusive) CEC (the D66's alternation

Figure 1.2: Candidacy Eligibility Criteria in the Dutch Parties, 1950s to 2010s



between six and 12 months of prior membership could be the result of different factions within the party manipulating the supply of candidates in their favor).

Yet, we do not know enough about the distribution of CEC across parties and over time. We do not know enough about their consequences for candidate behavior, how they affect representation of minority groups within parties or parties' behavior in parliament. CEC are not only expressions of parties' preferences for certain types of candidates, they are also consequential for whom voters face in the voting booth and how parliament looks and how it works. Hence, studying CEC is highly relevant for several fields within the political science and touches various topics including representation, legislative behavior of parties and legislators alike, and the electoral appeal of parties.

Previous Research on CEC

Research comparing or exploring the consequences of the candidacy dimension is comparably rare. The selectorate dimension, in contrast, has attracted substantially more scholarly attention – not least due to prominent changes on this dimension in many political parties in established democracies (e.g., Pilet and Cross 2014; Detterbeck 2016). This attention has spawned a number of studies in the last two decades exploring the reasons of democratization of the selectorate (e.g., Gauja 2012; Cross and Blais 2012; Yu, Yu, and Shoji 2014), examining its impact on the competitiveness of leadership races (e.g., Kenig 2009b), on party unity (e.g., Faas 2003; Indridason and Kristinsson 2015; Shomer 2016; Cordero and Collier 2015), incumbent turnover (e.g., Put, Gouglas, and Maddens 2015), legislative behavior (e.g., Shomer 2009), or representation (e.g., Spies and Kaiser 2014).

However, changes in candidate selection in the last decades have not been restricted to changes on the selectorate dimension – oftentimes the initial installment of party primaries – but extended also to the candidacy dimension. Granted, besides some singular events mentioned above, such as calls for applications for candidates by the German SPD in 2016, most changes on this dimension stayed below the radar of the mass media.

Candidacy requirements, formal or informal, however, have received some academic attention in the past – though sparsely so. Seligman (1961) was one of the first exploring the role of *eligibility* in candidate selection in political parties. His later work broadened the scope and extended the investigation of eligibility in political recruitment to entire political systems. For him eligibility criteria, whether formal or informal, are indicative of the values a selecting system holds dear. Seligman groups these criteria into an *ascriptive* category – including sex, religion, or age – and an *objective* one – such as achievements in the party (Seligman 1964, 1971). As different types of eligibility criteria set distinctive incentives for candidacy-seekers, they are also likely to encourage a different set of candidates coming forward and seeking candidacy, as Black (1972) suggests.

But why do parties differ in their eligibility criteria? Combining the arguments of Seligman (1964, 1971) and Black (1972), parties could be considered as purposely seeking a certain type of candidate when setting eligibility criteria. Depending on what qualities and attributes in candidates parties are looking for they may set corresponding CEC. On the one hand, parties may seek loyal and committed candidates. On the other, they may prioritize candidates' electoral attractiveness or technocratic expertise. Moreover, the organizational structure of the party and its ideological self-image – following principles of openness, transparency and intra-party democracy – potentially help in explaining variation in parties' Candidacy Eligibility Criteria (CEC), too.

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One of the primary reasons for parties to set stricter CEC and have demanding vetting processes is the party's demand for committed and loyal candidates that, once elected, do not undermine party cohesion (e.g., de Lange and Art 2011). So, in order "to weed out political opportunists who may try to exploit the party's label" (Obler 1974, p. 180), parties set very strict CEC that discourage opportunists to come forward. The Belgian Socialist Party (Belgische Socialistische Partij, BSP) of the early 1970s neatly illustrates the high barriers candidacy-seekers have had to overcome: five years of membership in the party, the trade union, the co-operative and insurance association; annual minimum purchases from the Socialist co-op; regular subscription to the party's newspaper; children have had to be sent to state rather than Catholic schools; and spouses (i.e. wives) and children had to be enrolled in the appropriate women's and youth organizations of the party (Obler 1974; de Winter 1988).

In addition, setting very demanding CEC as the BSP in the 1970s, may entail two other benefits to the party. First, parties with stricter CEC may "assure that the candidates elected will assiduously follow the orders" (Obler 1974, p. 180) of the party leadership and arrive in parliament as a cohesive group. In fact, eligibility criteria can set selective incentives and rewards for long-term party activists (Hazan 2003), thus not only ensuring their obedience to the party leadership but also that of ambitious rank-and-file members of the party for whom this clear intra-party trajectory for becoming a candidate can result in greater compliance with the party's decisions and rules.

Secondly, with stricter eligibility requirements, parties may ensure the selection of candidates that are in a better position to represent the party's voters descriptively (Seligman 1964; Pitkin 1967). Especially far-left and social democratic parties have a tradition of nominating candidates affiliated with labor unions (see, for instance, the contributions in Gallagher and Marsh 1988). Nominating union members in electoral districts with an industrial tradition and a strong presence of a blue-collar milieu may result in better descriptive representation. Similarly, parties with a particular religious outlook may prefer to select candidates of the same belief, as is common in the Kōmeitō party in Japan (Smith 2014). Naturally, parties may also follow electoral considerations when satisfying demands for descriptive representation on part of their voters by nominating candidates with certain socio-economic or socio-demographic attributes.

Another factor that could explain differences in CEC across parties is the importance parties put on the electoral attractiveness or technocratic policy expertise of its candidates vis-à-vis the candidates' utility to the party as a loyal and committed party servant (Smith 2018, chapter 2). Given the trade-off between electorally promising but ideologically perhaps deviant candidates, parties are thought to strategically nominate them only

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where needed. Galasso and Nannicini (2011) argue that parties purposely select candidates barely affiliated with the party in those districts they deem electorally difficult. In so doing, they hope their candidate can garner support from party supporters and decisive swing voters that base their vote decision not only on the party label but on evaluations of candidates' personalities. Similar electoral concerns were driving changes in candidate selection in Japan, where a shortage of quality candidates in oppositional parties led to the introduction of open recruitment (e.g., Smith 2013; Yu, Yu, and Shoji 2014).

Furthermore, assuming that parties are not merely vote and seat maximizers but also care for good public policy (see Müller and Strøm 1999), they might see themselves in a position where they have to dispense the enforcement of stricter CEC to nominate technocratic policy experts that lack party membership. The SPD in Germany debated whether to allow for nomination of policy experts on ten list ranks considered safe, though to no avail, however (Hainz 2006). Solely devising his party list for the 2017 election in Austria, Sebastian Kurz, freshly elected leader of the Austrian People's Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP), hand-picked numerous "expert" candidates that were not members of the ÖVP (APA, 2017).

Some parties with a set of generally stricter CEC may formally allow for eligibility waiver for non-members in their constitutions, as for instance practiced by the Italian Socialist Party (PSI, 1978) or the Belgian Green party (Groen!) (Groen! 2008). In this way, these parties may combine the "best of both worlds". For once, their formal eligibility criteria still exert their deterrence effect on opportunists and ensures that the bulk of the party's candidates are selected following tough formal criteria. At times, when deemed necessary parties may suspend their formal requirements and selectively recruit candidates that may lack the necessary track record or even membership, but that are considered valuable to the party on electoral, policy or other grounds.

Finally, the party's organization and ideological self-image could explain variation in CEC across parties. Katz and Mair (1995) recount how the models of parties' organizations and in particular their relationships to their members and supporters have changed over the last one and a half centuries. In particular milieu-based mass parties, the dominant party type for most of the 20th century, embedded members in encompassing organizational networks that extended to many spheres of social life. Membership was organized formally and penetrated all aspects of life. Its members exhibited a social identity in line with the social segment the party represents and not merely policy agreement. Correspondingly, one could expect that parties that approximate this model more closely implement greater eligibility requirements to ensure the nomination of loyal delegates of the party.

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Now, given the evolution of parties' modes of organizing membership away from that of the mass party and toward a membership less infused with social identity, the legitimation of strict CEC might be harder to sustain. Eventually, the distinction between members and non-members becomes blurred in the cartel party model that invites both types of supporters to participate in inner party decisions (Katz and Mair 1995, p. 21). An extreme case are newly formed parties that lack a comprehensive organizational and membership structure. Not surprisingly, the relatively young Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and the even younger La République en Marche in France reached out to the public to find suitable candidates. Lacking in membership numbers, these parties had no pool of potential candidates to revert to among its members and instead were forced to seek candidates outside of the party to contest in elections (see Smith, Pekkanen, and Krauss 2013; *The Economist* 2017).

These empirical examples and the theoretical arguments for possible variation in parties' CEC presented already hint at the fact that parties do in fact differ in their CEC and at times even change them. About the consequences of the changes, however, we do not know much. One exception is the study by Smith and Tsutsumi (2014), which suggest that the adoption of open recruitment led to the selection of candidates with less political experience and more moderate policy position when compared to their co-partisans recruited through more traditional channels. How this thesis will address this gap in the literature on candidacy eligibility criteria and their consequences is presented in the next section.

Research Questions & Contribution

The research questions advanced in this thesis ask how CEC affect the unity of parties, the loyalty of its candidates and the activity of its MPs. Yet, while we have seen several accounts about why parties may choose different eligibility criteria, we do not know much about the behavioral consequences of variation in CEC and why they should affect candidate and MP behavior in the first place. As we have seen in the above discussion of the empirical distribution of CEC and the numerous accounts on why they might vary, research attempting to isolate the effect of CEC from other effects originating from, for instance, the electoral system or from other party characteristics, is challenging. To overcome some obstacles created by this conundrum, I have collected data on CEC over time to increase my leverage in estimating more credibly the independent effects of CEC. How I address these concerns are briefly hinted at when presenting my research questions in turn.

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How can CEC affect the behavior of candidates, MPs and parties? I argue that CEC affect these behaviors through mainly two channels; first by deterring and avoiding blatant candidate mismatches and secondly by (enforcing) socialization processes within the party.

First, CEC can exert influence through their deterrence effects on candidacy-seeker and thus affects the supply of potential candidates (e.g., Norris 1997). Blatant opportunists that only care about office will be more attracted to political parties that are more open in terms of candidacy requirements. Usually, such aspirants pay less attention to the party's ideological outlook or otherwise they would have joined the party in the first place. As they lack ideological conviction, they dread spending time and efforts schmoozing with local or national party figures to either obtain a critical number of formal recommendations or enduring long enough as an active member to become formally eligible. As Obler (1974) puts it, demanding eligibility criteria are in place “to weed out political opportunists who may try to exploit the party's label” (p. 180).

What could happen if candidacy-seekers are not properly screened for their commitment to the party is neatly described in the comparative account by de Lange and Art (2011) of the fate of the Dutch Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPM) and the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV). While LPM had to struggle to recruit enough candidates to exploit their favorable standing in the electorate, they have neglected to screen and vet these recruits properly with the result of internal conflicts and the premature termination of the coalition they were part of. The PVV, in contrast, has been thoroughly vetting and training its candidates and has even imposed a stop for new admissions to preclude the entrance of opportunistic recruits that could cause trouble.

Secondly, certain types of CEC moreover exert an influence through the socialization processes they entail. A minimum length of prior party membership before members can seek candidacy or the collection of reference letters or signatures from co-partisans are associated with greater involvement in the party's subculture, the development of a social identity as a party member and an internalization of the party's norms and values. Purely by being member to the party, the frequent contact to other (already socialized) members and the party's communication channels, will nudge new entrants to re-evaluate their attitudes and behaviors in light of what is expected of party members (e.g., Turner 1991; Ashforth and Mael 1989). Thus, by objectively fulfilling lengthy membership requirements candidacy-seeker undergo these socialization processes and, once eligible, will make loyal and committed candidates and MPs. Similarly, the collection of a number of signatures requires networking and schmoozing with co-partisans that vouch for the new entrant – only, however, if the entrant is deemed committed enough to the party.

Thus, in conclusion, the impact of CEC on campaign, legislative or voting behavior does not primarily work through the behavioral incentives they create to gain re-selection – as does the selectorate or the degree of decentralization (e.g., Hazan and Rahat 2010) – , but rather through the elimination of candidates seen unfit and the selection of a desired type of personnel that arrives in parliament with the appropriate behavioral norms internalized and that neither requires a carrot nor a stick to fall in line with the party’s basic policy program.

Exploring the effects of parties’ CEC on party unity, candidate loyalty and legislative activity of MPs contribute primarily to the literatures on candidate selection and legislative politics. As the first study that looks into parties’ formal candidacy eligibility criteria across space and time, this thesis advances our understanding about how candidates are selected. Examining the deterrence effect of CEC adds to our understanding of the sorting argument advanced in the literature on why we see such ideologically homogeneous parties (e.g., Krehbiel 1993; Willumsen 2017). Since the selection of candidates are the defining function of parties and given its decisive implications for the composition of the parliament and in many cases the executive, adding to our knowledge of who can be selected as a candidate in the very first place is of utmost relevance to the academic debate and the understanding of politics in practice. It further opens a new channel through which we can perceive the generation of party behavior, party unity and the workings of legislatures: that is, candidacy eligibility criteria.

Given the scarcity of comparative data on CEC, this research is also the first to systematically compare and investigate the consequences of CEC over space and time, which has been made available by first-hand data collection of several hundreds of (historical) party constitutions. Given the challenge of isolating the effect of CEC in the presence of behavioral incentives created by electoral systems and parties’ selectorates, this data collection effort has been crucial in allowing, for instance, for the estimation of party fixed-effects models that control statistically for these confounders and allow for a more credible estimate of the net impact of CEC on candidate behavior. In multiple regression models I find that those CEC that presume a (long-term) involvement with the party are empirically associated with greater unity and loyalty among its candidates.

A second research question addresses the role of pre-parliamentary socialization within the party for party cohesion and unity. By investigating how the length of party membership and involvement in the party before a member’s first candidacy and election to parliament affects their voting loyalty, I explore in a more fine-grained way the importance of socialization processes within parties. Essentially, this research question aims to test the same logic underlying the argument made above for the impact of CEC. This

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logic suggests that the more time candidates and later on MPs have spent in the party as (active) party members before their election, the more will they have internalized the party's positions, norms and values – and behave accordingly.

In a large data collection effort, I coded the party membership background of nearly all Bundestag member ever elected over the period of 1953 to 2013. By focusing on one single country the challenges of separating the effects of party membership differentials from those of the electoral system and other effects related to a party's organizational structure becomes easier. In this specific case, I employ party-by-party regression models to account for party-effects and introduce fixed-effects for the formal type of the mandate of Germany's mixed electoral system. In addition, while this accounts for the formal type of the mandate, tier-specific re-election probabilities (Stoffel 2014) are estimated and used as controls to model MPs *de facto* type of mandate given the huge number of MPs competing in both tiers. I find that longer membership spells and active party membership is positively related to voting with the majority and negatively with voting against it on unwhipped votes.

The main contribution of this research lies in the field of elite socialization and legislative politics. By putting the socialization within the party center stage, this research is addressing the gap in the literature which primarily has been either looking at socialization processes of political elites within the family (e.g., Prewitt, Eulau, and Zisk 1966; Herzog 1975; Gruber 2009) or, once elected, within the legislature (e.g., Price and Bell 1970; Garand 1988). Although a few studies exist that have addressed socialization within the party (Kornberg 1966; Clarke and Price 1977; Saalfeld 1995), they often exhibit shortcomings in their empirical analyses. Although some previous studies have examined the role of prior party office on parliamentary voting behavior (Saalfeld 1995), this thesis extends empirically on these early and bivariate studies by operationalizing party membership in novel and more fine-grained ways. It measures (1) the years of party membership prior to first candidacy and first election to parliament, (2) it gauges how the age at which MPs have joined their party, (3) how having held a party office before first candidacy, and finally (4) how previous membership in other parties affect the preference homogeneity of MPs. Thus, this study adds to our understanding how different dimensions of (long-term) party membership, hitherto operationalized in the literature merely in a dichotomous fashion, affect the loyal voting behavior of MPs. In times in which party membership seems to lose relevance for political careers (e.g., Smith, Pekkanen, and Krauss 2013; Yu, Yu, and Shoji 2014), parties lose in membership (e.g., Dalton and Wattenberg 2002) and instead recruit ever more often non-member as candidates, this research provides insights into possible consequences for parties' preference homogeneity in the near future.

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Finally, a third research question aims to explore the relationship of CEC and party membership with legislative activity. Legislative behavior is not limited to voting in parliament, but instead comprises other relevant activities such as floor speeches, questions and the writing of legislative texts, too. My third research question revolves around how minimal CEC affect the behavior of these activities in parliament. More specifically this research investigates how open recruitment in the wake of public calls for applications for candidacies resulted in the nomination of politically inexperienced candidates that in most cases acquired party membership only in the process. In some sense, this research presents an investigation of the flipside of the two other research questions. What can we expect to see in terms of parliamentary behavior when candidates and MPs lack a strong party membership background and therefore, in most cases, prior political experience and a healthy expectation about their future role in parliament? I argue that candidates and MPs selected through open recruitment, lacking prior political experience, are less well-equipped to master the intricate craftmanship of writing legislative texts and fail in fulfilling their role as a checks-and-balance on the government.

Similar to the second research question, this one too, is being answered by examining a mixed-electoral system, that of Japan. Here, however, to control for electoral system effects I restrict the universe of observations to candidates and MPs competing and elected in the nominal tier. Party fixed-effects are employed to control for differences in behavioral incentives originating from party's organizational structures and placebo-test are run to ensure behavioral differences are not driven by characteristics of electoral districts.

In light of the current trend of an increasing number of (governing) parties to recruit their candidates through open recruitment and in the wake of public calls for applications, the insights from answers to this research question hold lessons for what to expect of future legislatures in terms of preparedness and professionalism. Some pundits, for instance, have already observed a fatigue in the newly elected MPs of the French REM whose discrepancy in their expectations and their actual role as MPs seems responsible for their disillusionment (Samuel 2017). Apart from actual politics, this research further speaks to the literature of legislative studies, too. By examining how the selection background of MPs correlate with legislative activities, we can draw insights into the workings of legislatures, the likely professionalism of certain MPs and how and why opposition parties might fail to hold government accountable. All these consequences feed into the expectations of an increasing dominance of the executive over the legislative branch of government in terms of policy-making. Seemingly democratic practices within parties might thus undermine democratic principles at the core of the system.

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In sum, the relevance of this thesis originates from the consequentiality of CEC and party membership of MPs for their ability to stand and vote united and to fulfill their roles in parliament by drafting legislative texts or by holding government accountable. Against the apparent trend of parties to select ever more unaffiliated candidates, the relevance of investigating this trend's implications becomes more important. How exactly this thesis attempts to do this is outlined in the next section below.

The Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is structured alongside three chapters that examine, *a)* how parties' candidacy eligibility criteria ensure voting unity and candidate loyalty (chapter 2 *Candidacy Eligibility Criteria and Party Unity*), *b)* the importance of long-term party membership for the formation of homogeneous preferences and the internalization of norms of party unity (chapter 3 *Party Membership, Pre-Parliamentary Socialization and Party Cohesion*), and *c)* the behavioral consequences when Member of Parliament lack a strong party membership background (chapter 4 *Behavioral Consequences of Open Candidate Recruitment*). All three chapters have been designed as standalone articles that place themselves within their respective literature and, thus, can be read as such.

The second chapter examines what kind of parties' formal admission rules are associated with higher degrees of party unity. I argue that parties face two type of candidates, *opportunists* and *loyalists*, at the time of nomination. While the former's ambition are thought to be mainly motivated by seeking office, the latter's drive stems from their ideological conviction. To tell these types apart from each other, parties institute formal candidacy eligibility criteria, such as demanding a pledge of loyalty, a certain minimum length of party membership, or the collection of signatures from other party members. The more demanding, now, these criteria are and the more these involve the maintenance of good relations with other party members, the more likely it is for parties to select *loyalists* over *opportunists*. One reason for this is the deterrence of *opportunists*, which lack in ideological commitment to spend years in the party schmoozing with other party members and instead look for easier nominations in other parties. A second reason are socialization processes that accompany the fulfillment of these candidacy eligibility criteria. Aspirants are socialized into and internalize party's norms and values once they have achieved eligibility. Using three different analyses I show empirically how formal eligibility criteria for candidacy are associated with greater party unity and candidate loyalty. The first analysis relies on data of roll-call votes in 16 industrial democracies and examines at the party level how different types of eligibility criteria affect the voting unity of parties in parliament. The second and third analysis uses candidate survey data and investigates

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what type of candidacy eligibility criteria in place at the time the candidate has joined the party – the second analysis – and at the time of nomination – the third analysis – affect the expressed loyalty of candidates toward the party’s platform. My results indicate that those eligibility criteria that nudge aspirants to deeply immerse themselves with the party and to maintain close relations with other party members are associated with higher party unity and greater candidate loyalty.

The third chapter takes a closer look at long-term party membership and how socialization processes within the party affect the voting behavior of Members of Parliament. Based on social identity theory, which stipulates that joining a social group entails identification with and internalization and adherence to the groups values and norms, I generate hypotheses on how the degree of attachment to the party influences uniform voting behavior emanating from MPs’ grown homogeneity in terms of policy preferences and their desire for unity in and for itself. Empirically, I test these expectations by using data on voting behavior of German MPs on all “free votes” of the post-war era, that is, votes on which party discipline has been lifted or no official party position has been declared. For these votes, unified voting behavior can more credibly be considered values- and norms-induced than to be forced by the party whip – an observable implication of party socialization. The influence of four different measures for this socialization into the party’s norms and values are gauged in multiple models estimated for each party separately, thus accounting for potential party-specific modes of socialization. In order to disentangle party-internal socialization processes from legislative ones, I restrict the analysis to legislative newcomers. As suggested by social identity theory, uniform voting behavior on free votes is associated with a stronger socialization into and a deeper internalization of common norms of the party, as measured by the four different indicators.

In the fourth chapter I examine the behavioral consequences when Member of Parliament lack a strong background in party membership – the empirical flipside of chapter 3. Departing from the focus on unity, this chapter explores other behavioral dimensions that may be affected by long-term party membership or the lack thereof. In the analysis, I take advantage of the Japanese case where major parties have been nominating candidates through open recruitment and more traditional ways at the same time over the last two or so decades. I theorize that open recruitment, usually taking place in competitive districts, attracts entrepreneurial candidates that are able to woo crucial independent voters on account of their personality but that lack in long-term party membership. In safe district, in contrast, parties nominate loyal candidates to have their core personnel elected into parliament. By looking at different indicators of legislative activity, including the number of questions tabled and Private Member Bills (PMB) introduced and cosponsored, I find that oppositional entrepreneurial candidates fail in holding government accountable

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by not tableing questions and, when in government, are also less likely to introduce or cosponsor PMBs. Placebo-tests are examined to rule out confounding effects emanating from district characteristics.

The concluding chapter summarizes the arguments and findings of the questions addressed in this thesis. This final chapter broaches the implications of my findings for research and candidate selection and provides potential avenues for future research.

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Chapter 2

Candidacy Eligibility Criteria and Party Unity

Candidate selection methods can be consequential for party unity in legislative voting. This paper argues that party rules determining who can become a candidate, the Candidacy Eligibility Criteria (CEC), can have direct implications for party unity. I theorize that with stricter formal requirements, parties avoid adverse selection and ensure the nomination of committed candidates. By using roll-call vote data from 16 industrial democracies, candidate surveys and an original dataset consisting of nearly 500 historical party constitutions, I show that parties demanding prior membership and nudging aspirants to maintain networks within the party tend to be more unified in parliamentary voting. Moreover, their candidates, too, express greater loyalty when compared with parties without formal CEC.

Introduction

Party unity is essential for parliamentary democracy and most parties in parliamentary systems, indeed, exhibit highly unified voting records. Explanations for variation in parliamentary voting range from systemic factors, such as electoral incentives (e.g., Carey 2009; Kam 2009), to the sorting of like-minded citizens into parties at the individual level (e.g. Willumsen 2017). In addition, previous research has identified that the way parties select their candidates and who within the party wields power over candidates' (re-) nomination can be consequential for party unity (e.g. Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 1999; Rahat and Hazan 2001; Hazan and Rahat 2010).

However, despite its central theoretical significance in explaining unified party behavior, empirical research examining the role of candidate selection methods (CSM) is still limited. Only a small number of recent studies aiming to explain voting unity has produced some empirical findings on the impact of CSM on party voting unity (Faas 2003; Hix

2004; Depauw and Martin 2008; Shomer 2016, 2017). These studies assume that Members of Parliament (MPs) respond rationally to the incentive structure of parties' selection methods and understand observed party unity as the result of incentive-induced obedient behavior by re-(s)election seeking MPs.

In order to gain some leverage on the effect of CSM on party voting unity, these studies have modelled in one fashion or another the extent to which party leaders control access to the ballot. This usually has been measured by the exclusiveness of the selectorate (e.g. Faas 2003; Shomer 2016), the level at which selection takes place – i.e. decentralized selection versus centralized selection (e.g. Hix 2004; Depauw and Martin 2008; Shomer 2016) – or by collapsing both dimensions together (e.g. Shomer 2017). Empirically, centralization of candidate selection and the exclusiveness of the selectorate have been found to exert influence on party unity in line with expectations; more centralized selection is correlated with higher unity (Hix 2004; Depauw and Martin 2008) and more exclusive selectorates are associated with more unified parties as well (Shomer 2016), with a twisted result for members of the European Parliament though (Faas 2003).

Yet, while previous studies have primarily looked at *who selects*, an equally important question is to ask *who can be selected*? In other words, who can formally present themselves as candidates at the time of nomination? Is candidacy open to all citizens or is it restricted to party members who might even have to sign pledges of loyalty, collect signatures or be affiliated with labor unions? The question is not merely about who can become the party's candidate, but more profoundly what type of personnel and applicants are wanted or barred from standing as candidates according to formal party rules? How lenient or strict are parties in their nominations, what type of person is excluded from standing as a candidate and what consequences does this have for the unity of the party? As voters in most electoral systems face a “take it or leave it option” in the voting booth, these candidacy criteria set by parties have crucial implications for the make-up of the party-elect in parliament.

Despite the fundamental significance of these party rules extant research has neglected this “candidacy” dimension of candidate selection (see Rahat and Hazan 2001; Hazan and Rahat 2010). The empirical studies mentioned above have so far examined only one or two dimension of selection, namely the dimension of the selectorate and the degree of centralization of selection. Overall, research on candidacy eligibility is scarce. Early studies, however, have already emphasized the importance and consequentiality of the incentive structure set by institutional arrangements that govern elite recruitment and candidacies for the type of aspirant coming forward (e.g. Seligman 1964; Schlesinger 1966; Black 1972). In contrast to the dimension of the selectorate and the degree of centralization, the

unifying effect of the candidacy dimension does not work through the (in-) dependency on party selectors for re-nomination felt by candidates but rather through its effect on the self-selection of committed personnel coming forward. Contributions in the edited volume on candidate selection by Gallagher and Marsh (1988) present cross-sectional information on candidacy criteria, but lack systematic research on the unifying consequences of variations on the candidacy dimension. Limited empirical research has shown that candidates selected through open recruitment following nation-wide and formally undiscriminating calls for applications exhibit policy attitudes different from those of co-partisans that were selected through traditional channels (Smith and Tsutsumi 2014) and that these candidates are less active in parliament than those MPs with a stronger party membership background (see Chapter 4). As of now, the theoretical and empirical research on the candidacy dimension is bleak and empirical evidence on its effect on party unity is lacking completely.

In this study, I draw on the principal-agent framework to flesh out the reasoning of why parties may choose to set stricter Candidacy Eligibility Criteria (CEC), such as a minimum length of party membership or the collection of signatures, and present the first empirical investigation of the unifying effects of different types of CEC. My theoretical argument is that by imposing more demanding CEC parties avoid the problem of adverse selection through screening aspirants for candidacy. By employing tougher screening mechanisms parties can uncover candidates' commitment to the party, as opportunists are likely to be deterred from demanding criteria while loyal aspirants can signal their commitment to the party by fulfilling the very same. Empirically, I make use of roll-call voting data from 16 countries, a unique and new dataset with information on parties' CEC over time based on roughly 500 historical party constitutions as well as data from candidate surveys. In several regression models I show that those CEC that require aspirants to be a party member for a certain period of time before the candidacy and those CEC that nudge aspirants to maintain good relations and networks with other party members are correlated with higher voting unity in parliament at the party level and higher expressed loyalty in candidate surveys.

These findings speak to two arguments made in the literature. First, it relates to the argument of sorting of citizens with similar ideological proclivities into parties (e.g., Krehbiel 1993; Willumsen 2017), as CEC may serve as an amplifier for this behavior since opportunists looking for a quick way to national office may be deterred from joining the party when learning about demanding CEC. Secondly, this finding underscores the importance of socialization into party milieus and internalization of party rules and norms (e.g., Crowe 1983, 1986). As Dodson 1990 has argued, group membership, in this case party membership, leads to the creation of group identity in the individual, entailing the

development of psychological attachment and, in combination with regular contact with co-partisans, nudges the new member to re-evaluate their own attitudes and behavior in light of what they deem essential to belong.

Hence, this study contributes to the literature on party unity and candidate selection by proposing insights into the empirical consequences of the candidacy dimension in CSM and by adding to our understanding of how parties' internal organizations affect party unity and therefore the working of parliaments. The next section lays out the theoretical framework and derives hypotheses to be tested following the elaboration of the research design and data.

Theory

During campaigns and in parliament, parties have to delegate actions at the micro-level to their candidates (e.g. campaign speeches) and MPs (e.g. voting behavior). This sort of delegation is ubiquitous in democracies. Voters delegate to parties and candidates, and parties in parliament delegate to the cabinet which in turn delegates to ministries and the bureaucracy (Strøm 2003). A less frequently examined part of this chain is the one mentioned above between the parliamentary party leadership and its candidates respective MPs during election campaigns. As any delegation relationship, this one is prone to potential *agency loss*, too, when the candidate or MP (the agent) has preferences diverging from that of the party leadership (the principal). By delegating these actions, parties rely on their members not to undermine the unified image and the perception of the party it wishes to display to the electorate. While a unified party image brings benefits to all its members – candidates, MPs and party leaders alike – by sending a clear and unblurred policy signal to voters (e.g. Greene and Haber 2015), individual candidates and MPs may be tempted electorally to defect from the official party line to cater to particularistic constituency or interest group interests (e.g. Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Tavits 2009; Willumsen and Öhberg 2017).

Parties interested in containing agency loss and in maintaining an undiluted policy image should thus be inclined to instill party unity by employing *ex ante* mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms related to the selection of candidates that share the same preferences with the broader party, and *ex post* mechanisms, i.e. those related to the monitoring and sanctioning of candidates' and MPs' behavior. Recent research has focused more heavily on parties' *ex post* mechanisms, by looking into when and how parties punish renegades at the time of re-nomination (Schröder and Manow 2016) or how effective disciplining is in keeping the party united (e.g. Kam 2009). In this paper, I show empirically that *ex ante*

screening mechanisms, too, are crucial in promoting party unity by way of producing a more loyal party personnel (see Müller 2000). The next paragraphs lay out my theoretical reasoning and develops my main hypothesis.

Adverse Selection in Candidate Recruitment

Before general elections, parties face the consequential task of selecting their candidates. Candidate selection can be defined as

“the predominantly *extralegal* process by which a political party decides which of the persons legally eligible to hold an elective public office will be designated on the ballot and in election communications as its recommended and supported candidate or list of candidates” Ranney 1981, p. 75

This selection is crucial in many respects. It not only determines the face of the party and how it is perceived by the electorate, but also the demographic, socio-economic and ideological make-up of the party in parliament after the election. During the selection, however, parties are confronted with different types of candidates. Some candidates, hereafter referred to as *opportunists*, are motivated mainly by office while others, *loyalists*, are motivated by policy. Naturally, parties favor loyalists over opportunist candidates as the former constitutes the party’s main personnel in parliament (see Galasso and Nannicini 2011).

The main dilemma for parties, though, remains. Most of the time parties cannot readily observe how committed candidacy-seekers are and cannot therefore observe a candidate’s potential for undermining the party’s cohesiveness at times. One way to solve this problem of adverse selection is to employ *screening* mechanisms, that make it more difficult for *opportunist* aspirants to persist (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Lupia 2003). This screening can come in the form of Candidacy Eligibility Criteria (CEC), that is, requirements set forth in a party’s constitution adjudicating whether a candidate is formally eligible to run or not. This not only ensures avoiding opportunist would-be candidates through deterrence but also creates a structure of selective incentives and rewards for loyalist and long-time activists (Hazan and Rahat 2010, p.21).

First and foremost, by employing tougher CEC parties can raise the cost of seeking candidacy for all types of candidates. These costs may accrue from the time and money to be invested but also from indispensable long-term networking efforts. The Belgian Socialist Party of the 1970s epitomizes the potentially high costs associated with the ambition for candidacy; aspirants were required to have joined the party, the Socialist trade union and health insurance at least five years before seeking candidacy. Moreover, they were also asked to have joined the Socialist cooperate with minimum annual purchases and to have

subscribed to the party's newspaper. Even their spouses and children were expected to join the respective organizations of the party and were not allowed to attend Catholic schools (see De Winter 1988).

Strict requirements like these, although not always completely enforceable, serve two purposes that benefit party unity. First, highly demanding requirements, such as certain period of prior party membership, are likely to deter opportunists who shun the effort to be invested for several months or years in the service of the party. Truly opportunist aspirants are rather attracted to political outlets that are less restrictive and in which nominations are comparably easier to obtain. However, in the case an opportunist would-be candidate has joined a party with strict CEC, nonetheless, they are forced to comply with the party's formal rules to be considered for nominations. This often entails the socialization into prevailing party norms and values with the likely result that their preferences have converged with that of the party at the time they have obtained eligibility. Still, in most instances it is the ideological orientation of many would-be candidates that make them join parties in the first place. As the studies in van Haute and Gauja (2015) and by Young and Cross (2002) show, the major factor driving party membership is ideological conviction and not career advancement.

Secondly, strict requirements create an incentive structure of rewards for those that have already joined the party. Here, ambition for office can only unfold after years of service to the party, entailing processes of socialization into and internalization of common norms and values. The longer the time spent in a certain group, new entrants may be socialized into the groups values and norms through compliance and/or affiliative ties. While ambitious new members have to play by the rules to be considered for nominations in parties that demand such strict CEC (compliance), an increase in psychological attachment to the party and contact with co-partisan nudges new members to re-evaluate their own attitudes and behavior in light of what they deem essential to belong (affiliative ties) (Dodson 1990). Parties that demand CEC that entail long-term membership or networking within the party are likely to impose these socializational processes on future candidates. And those aspirants for candidacy that formally fulfill the eligibility criteria send a strong signal to the selectorate. Moreover, the processes of socialization that many screening mechanisms try to encourage through their stipulations entail not necessarily a homogenization of policy preferences, but much more likely the internalization of party unity as a norm in and for itself, as suggested by survey data reported by Crowe (1983, 1986).

Granted, electoral considerations may weaken a party's preference for loyalists and instead urge them to select less loyal but electorally more attractive candidates. Some parties

that have demanding formal screening mechanisms, indeed, allow for waivers for certain candidates that would otherwise not be eligible, given the approval of some higher ranking party committee. Candidates that receive these kind of waivers, however, are very likely to be in good standing with the respective party branch in charge and have proven their value to the party or they would not be under consideration in the first place. That is, even when looking for electorally more attractive candidates party loyalty is likely to play a big role in the selection. These stipulations leave untouched the formal criteria that still unfold their effects on the majority of candidates. Moreover, as these sorts of waivers are mainly relevant for single-seat electoral districts, the large number of safe seats (see Matland and Studlar 2004) suggests that most opportunist candidates are, first of all, an exception – as they are not needed in safe districts – and secondly, are likely to run in marginal seats that not all of them may win. Eventually, their number in any given electoral cycle should be small and not taint the theoretical logic or empirical test of the hypothesized relationship between CEC and candidate respective party behavior.

Thus, demanding strict CEC affect party unity and candidate loyalty through two channels: (1) deterrence of opportunists, that is amplifying ideological sorting into political parties (e.g. Willumsen 2017), and (2) selection of candidates that have been socialized into prevailing party norms and values (see Müller 2000). The main hypothesis of this paper is that parties employing tougher screening mechanisms, i.e. more demanding CEC, show higher levels of party unity. In the empirical analysis I will first explore the unifying effects of different types of screening mechanisms at the party level, and secondly, how different types of CEC affect the expressed loyalty of candidates toward their party's policy platform. Using two slightly different analyses at the individual level of the candidate, I explore whether CEC have rather a deterrence effect on potentially unloyal party members to-be or a socialization effect on ambitious members that have joined the party.

Research Design

Data

The data used to empirically assess my hypothesis on party unity stem from several sources. Data on parties' candidacy eligibility criteria comes from the *Political Party Database* (PPDB) (Poguntke et al. 2016).⁸ Based on recent official party statutes and constitutions, parties' formal eligibility criteria for candidates are coded in a binary fashion for the following requirements: party membership, union membership, religious affiliation, pledge of loyalty, collection of signatures, and monetary deposits. The minimum length

⁸Online: <http://www.politicalpartydb.org/>

Figure 2.1: Eligibility Criteria in the Norwegian Labour Party, 1961-2011

		DNA, founded in 1887									
		1961	1967	1971	1973	1983	1989	1992	1996	2002	2011
Membership					[Shaded bar from 1973 to 2011]						
	Minimum Length				3 months					1 months	

of party membership prior to candidacy is measured in months. These variables form my independent variables for the analyses below.

As CSM in many countries are subject only to the discretion of the party leadership or a qualified majority of party members at party conventions, CSM including CEC are comparably easy to reform. In order to explore changes over time I have in addition to the PPDB data collected hundreds of historical party statutes for mainly social democratic parties from Australia, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.⁹ Generally, we see a decline in such meritocratic requirements as minimum periods of party membership in these social democratic parties, as exemplified by the Norwegian Labour Party presented in Figure 2.1. However, in many of these parties we see that only in the 1970s have they in fact instituted formal requirements. The decline over time can possibly be attributed partly to the dwindling away of traditional party milieus in the electorate in the wake of increasing individualism and declining unionized work as well as a decline in the importance of comparable organizations adjacent to the political realm (e.g., van Biezen and Poguntke 2014; Dalton and Wattenberg 2002).

I use two dependent variables that operate at different analytical levels. The first applies to the party level and measures the party’s unity in roll-call votes. I have collected data on roll-call votes for 16 countries from national sources. Where possible, I have done so for two legislative cycles in order to get variation on potential confounders such as

⁹The focus on social democratic parties is for the most part a function of data availability. The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, a think-tank linked to the German social democrats, has archived a substantial number of (historical) party statutes from mainly social democratic parties from many advanced democracies. For no other party family could I retrieve a comparable amount of party statutes. Other sources besides the parties themselves include the Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, and the Norwegian Labour Movement Archives and Library.

government status and party size (see Sieberer 2006).¹⁰ Voting unity is measured by the Agreement Index (AI) as proposed by Hix, Noury, and Roland (2005),¹¹ by party and legislative cycle.

As roll-call votes in many countries suffer from high selection bias (Hug 2009) and are subject to party discipline instilled through other ways than mere preference homogeneity (Kam 2009), I complete this measure by a second dependent variables from the *Comparative Candidate Survey* (CCS) that applies at the individual level.¹² Candidates were asked anonymously whether MPs should follow their own opinion or their party position in case of conflict. I recoded their answers in a way that loyal answer behavior equals 1 and 0 otherwise.

By employing these two dependent variables I can assess the importance of parties' CEC for such consequential actions as roll-call votes in parliament, but can also probe their impact on candidates' reverence for their party's position individually, and thus establish a plausible link at the micro-level between CEC and voting unity.

As neither parties' CEC nor parties' voting behavior and candidates' attitudes unfold in an institutional vacuum, I control for several institutional confounders in my analyses. Apart from the government status and party size as mentioned already above, I also control for the centralization of the selectorate dimension in candidate selection (Hazan and Rahat 2010), in order to rule out possibly spurious relations between CEC and my dependent variables. The data for this variable comes from the *Democracy and Accountability Linkage Project* (DALP).¹³ The variable's values range from 1 to 4 in real numbers capturing the level at which selection takes place. A 1 indicates national party leaders as deciding upon selection and a 4 indicates local actors to be in control. Values inbetween indicate regional levels to be in charge (2) or that selection is an outcome of bargaining between different levels (3). An additional control at the party level is the party's age, measured as the

¹⁰These countries and periods are: Austria (2006-2008, 2008-2013), Australia (2010-2013, 2013-2016), Belgium (2007-2010, 2010-2014), Canada (2008-2011, 2011-2015), Denmark (2007-2011, 2011-2015), Germany (2009-2013, 2013-2017), Hungary (2006-2010, 2010-2014), Ireland (2007-2011, 2011-2016), Israel (2006-2009, 2009-2013), Italy (2006-2008, 2008-2013), Netherlands (2006-2010, 2010-2012), Norway (2009-2013, 2013-2017), Spain (2011-2015), Sweden (2006-2010, 2010-2014), United Kingdom (2005-2010, 2010-2015). Data for the Netherlands comes from the *Dutch Parliamentary Behaviour Dataset* (Louwerse, Otjes, and Vonno 2017), and data on the United Kingdom from the *The Public Whip*, <http://www.publicwhip.org.uk/>.

¹¹In contrast to the widely used RICE Score of Cohesion, the Agreement Index allows to take into account not only Yea and Nay votes, but also the number abstentions:

$$Agreement\ Index_i = \frac{\max\{Y_i, N_i, A_i\} - \frac{1}{2}[(Y_i + N_i + A_i) - \max\{Y_i, N_i, A_i\}]}{(Y_i + N_i + A_i)}$$

where Y denotes the number of *yea*, N the number of *nay* and A the number of *abstentions* for the *i*th vote.

¹²Online: <http://www.comparativecandidates.org/>

¹³Online: <https://sites.duke.edu/democracylinkage/data/>

years between its foundation and the first year of the legislative cycle. I expect that older and more institutionalized parties tend to have higher CEC than newer parties.

A second important control variable are the electoral circumstances of candidates and MPs. To measure the degree of centrifugal pressures that emanate from the electoral system and to which candidates and MPs are exposed to, I control for the incentive of cultivating a personal vote of an electoral system. Data for this variable comes from Johnson and Wallack (2012) who coded countries' electoral systems in accordance to Carey and Shugart's (1995) classification. Here, the maximum value of 10 indicates an electoral system that incentivizes the cultivation of the personal vote the strongest. Secondly, and where possible, I control for the perceived electoral security of candidates in the individual level analyses. In the CCS dataset, candidates were asked how likely they think their election is. I regrouped the answer categories of "I thought I could hardly lose" and "I thought I could not lose" into "Thought to win" and the categories of "I thought I could hardly win" and "I thought I could not win" into "Thought to lose". "I thought it was an open race" will be the reference category. Descriptive statistics for my two analyses can be found in Tables 2.5 to 2.7 in the Appendix.

Candidacy Eligibility Criteria

How do CEC distribute across different types of parties? Are there systematic differences in what certain types of parties demand from their candidates? Hazan and Rahat (2010) speculate that catch-all parties might be more lenient in their requirements due to electoral considerations while more ideological parties put more emphasize on whom they recruit and run as candidate. Additionally, Gallagher (1988) sees a difference in formal requirements between left-wing and right-wing parties, with the former one being more demanding. Table 2.1 presents a cross-sectional snapshot of the share of parties in the *Political Party Database* that have instituted a given criterion, grouped by their party family affiliation.

Table 2.1: Party Families and Candidacy Eligibility Criteria (%)

	Communist/ Socialist	Green/ Ecologist	Social Democracy	Liberal	Agrarian	Christian Democracy	Conservative	Right- Wing	Special Issue
Membership	42.86	33.33	60	52.94	33.33	58.33	64.71	54.55	0
Length of Membership (months) \emptyset	1.71	0	3.13	3.10	6	3	5.67	2.3	0
Union Membership	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0
Religious Affiliation	0	0	0	5.88	0	25	0	9.09	0
Pledge of Loyalty	14.29	11.11	35	17.65	0	50	17.65	36.36	0
Signatures	14.29	22.22	30	23.53	33.33	8.33	23.53	18.18	0
Monetary Deposit	0	0	5	5.88	0	8.33	29.41	9.09	0
N	7	9	20	17	3	12	17	11	3

Source: Political Party Database, Poguntke et al. (2016)

In contrast to Gallagher and to Hazan and Rahat, it is not the more ideological parties and not rather left-wing parties that demand the fulfillment of formal CEC. It seems that parties that follow one of the traditional ideologies of the 19th century, that is Social Democracy, Liberalism and Christian Democracy as well as Conservatism, are the ones with higher numbers of formal candidacy requirements. Ecological and Green parties, as well as Agrarian ones tend to be more lenient in terms of formal requirements. However, CEC do not provide any information on possible informal criteria and screening mechanisms. In case of Green parties, though, this might possibly relate to these parties' self-image of openness and intra-party democracy.

Data Analysis

Candidacy Eligibility Criteria and Party Voting Unity

To what extent do CEC in fact have an impact on parties' behavior? Table 2.2 presents results from fractional logit models explaining voting unity in parliament. All models have been estimated with country and party-family fixed-effects and coefficients are shown with standard errors clustered by country and party. Moreover, controls for a party's age, its size, its government status and its degree of centralization in its electorate are included. Country fixed-effects effectively control for influences emanating from the electoral system. The main independent variables, i.e. the various types of CEC, are once included individually and once collectively.

In the models with individual CEC predictors three specifications and their CEC stand out: (1) Parties requiring membership from their candidates tend to have higher agreement scores; (2) in contrast to this, parties asking only for a monetary deposit of its candidates, and (3) those parties that do not institute any sort of formal CEC appear to be less unified.

However, as parties may institute multiple criteria at the same time model specifications including all predictors are shown as well. In these more fully specified models, formal criteria such as party membership, and especially a minimum length of membership or the collection of signatures from other party members in support of one's candidacy are all (though in parts only marginally) statistically associated with higher unity in parliamentary voting.

Interestingly, these three types of CEC found in favor of higher unity require candidates to immerse themselves deeply with the party through official (long-term) membership and/or the building of support networks within the party. This corresponds nicely with

Chapter 2 Candidacy Eligibility Criteria and Party Unity

the notion that it is the affiliative ties and the social identity of a party member respective candidate and MP that comes with officially belonging to a certain group that informs their political behavior. Or, from the party's perspective, instituting these kind of criteria ensures the selection of those members that have engaged with the party and its members more seriously and who thus have signalled their commitment.

Figure 2.2 shows average marginal effects for all types of CEC. The quantities shown are the expected increases on the agreement index ranging from 0 to 100. The AMEs of no formal CEC are obtained from model (8) in Table 2.2, the others are obtained either from model (10) or (11). Although the effects appear to be rather miniscule, the average of the agreement index across all parties in this sample is an extremely high 98,7. Against this backdrop, the effect of a 0,512 increase when demanding official party membership pushes the expected unity score to 99,2 – almost perfect unity. In the same vein, the installment of monetary deposits for candidacies reduces unity to below 98, entailing a greater number of votes that see defections.

Table 2.2: CEC and party voting unity. Fractional Logit Estimation


	<i>Agreement Index</i>										
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
<i>Candidacy Eligibility Criteria</i>											
Party Membership	0.487** (0.199)								0.379 (0.239)	0.408* (0.227)	
Min. Length of Membership		0.016 (0.010)							0.021* (0.011)		0.025** (0.010)
Pledge			0.085 (0.169)						0.040 (0.232)	0.081 (0.248)	0.035 (0.214)
Signatures				0.168 (0.415)					0.479* (0.277)	0.292* (0.173)	0.406 (0.324)
Union Membership					0.347 (0.286)				0.086 (0.402)	0.177 (0.339)	0.101 (0.321)
Monetary Deposit						-0.726** (0.349)			-0.544 (0.372)	-0.531 (0.365)	-0.696** (0.351)
Religious Affiliation							-0.207 (0.192)		-0.043 (0.415)	0.005 (0.394)	-0.333 (0.212)
No formal CEC								-0.402** (0.177)			
<i>Party Level Controls</i>											
Party Age	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
Party Size	0.004** (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003** (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)
Government Status	0.262 (0.210)	0.334 (0.231)	0.320 (0.235)	0.336 (0.232)	0.340 (0.230)	0.373* (0.201)	0.320 (0.238)	0.277 (0.215)	0.372* (0.193)	0.332* (0.178)	0.420** (0.200)
Selectorate	-0.056 (0.345)	-0.108 (0.422)	-0.138 (0.425)	-0.116 (0.452)	-0.180 (0.426)	-0.142 (0.389)	-0.157 (0.416)	-0.067 (0.371)	0.132 (0.427)	0.012 (0.390)	0.057 (0.516)
Constant	24.485*** (1.675)	23.860*** (1.957)	24.242*** (1.904)	24.168*** (1.882)	23.697*** (1.605)	24.700*** (1.866)	24.293*** (1.897)	24.919*** (1.980)	24.303*** (1.778)	24.522*** (1.779)	24.192*** (1.903)
Country Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party Family Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Countries	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
Number of Parties	89	89	89	89	89	89	89	89	89	89	89
Residual Deviance	0.677	0.712	0.72	0.719	0.718	0.676	0.72	0.696	0.632	0.645	0.655
Observations	166	166	166	166	166	166	166	166	166	166	166

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Government status, previously found to be consequential (e.g. Sieberer 2006), appears to have effects on unity only in some specifications. The findings for the selectorate dimension are at odds with theoretical expectations and previous empirical research – though, the

Figure 2.2: Average Marginal Effects on Voting Unity by CEC



Solid lines and whiskers present 90 % confidence intervals, dashed ones present 95 % confidence intervals. Obtained from 1000 simulated random-draws from the variance-covariance matrix. Based on models (8), (10) and (11) from Table 2.2. AME of a unit-change except for length of membership for which AME is calculated for a change of one standard deviation.

overall direction of its effect is in line with expectations (e.g. Shomer 2017, 2016). Party age exhibits a negative and party size a positive effect on voting unity. The latter finding is arguably somewhat counterintuitive, as the greater the number of MPs the greater the risk of particularistic incentives to materialize.

To sum up, this explorative analysis of roll-call votes led to some interesting tentative findings that support the expectation that screening mechanisms and CEC that encourage the development of a social identity as a party member and also affiliative ties to other party members produce a more loyal pool of candidates to-be. However, while candidates of these parties have internalized party norms and very likely share many policy positions in the first place (see Crowe 1983, 1986), parties that merely ask for a monetary deposit or that do not install any sort of formal eligibility criteria at all are found to be less unified – presumably through the selection of candidates that lack in reverence for the party’s policies and image and in the internalization of prevailing party norms.

Although these findings speak to the importance of formal CEC in molding party behavior, one caveat to this analysis is the uniform coding of CEC that does not take into account possible changes in CEC over time. It could very well be that current MPs have joined their party under different CEC decades before. Nonetheless, as Figure 2.1 epitomizes, most parties have seen a move towards less strict requirements over a time period most relevant for my sample. This implies that parties that are strict today are likely to have

been even stricter in previous periods, suggesting an underestimation of the predictors' effects.

Ultimately, analyses relying on roll-call votes to gauge preference homogeneity or loyalty towards the party usually suffer from several shortcomings, such as a biased collection of actually recorded votes and the fact that most parties instill voting unity through “carrot-and-stick” discipline. Keeping this in mind, the next section will recover corresponding effects of these types of CEC at the individual level bar the uniform coding of CEC and placed in a setting in which candidates' behavior is less distorted by expectations of rewards or punishments by party whips when anonymously speaking their mind.

Candidacy Eligibility Criteria and Candidate Loyalty


While the previous analysis gauges the influence of CEC on unity and loyalty at the party level, this section examines the effect of different types of CEC at the individual level using data from candidate surveys in order to establish a plausible link between CEC and candidates' loyalty. Candidates were asked the question: “An MP in a conflict between own opinion and the party position should follow?”. The answer options are “own opinion” and “party's position”. I recoded this variable in a way that a 1 indicates following one's own opinion and 0 following the party line. The first analysis examines whether and to what extent eligibility criteria in place at the time the now-observed candidates have joined the party exert any impact on these candidates' expressed loyalty. This analysis, thus, tests whether CEC serve as a useful deterrence on opportunists and keeping them from joining the party. In other words, do demanding CEC amplify ideological sorting into political parties?

Candidacy Eligibility Criteria as Deterrence

Table 2.3 reports logit estimates of the influence of CEC on candidates' loyalty to the party platform. The sample is restricted to social democratic parties from 10 countries for which I could establish their CEC over a longer period of time.¹⁴ An overview of these parties CEC are presented in Table 2.8 in the Appendix. All models are estimated with party fixed-effects and standard errors clustered by party.

¹⁴These parties are the Australian Labour Party, the Socialist Party – Different and the Parti Socialist of Belgium, the Social Democratic Party of Denmark, the Social Democratic Party of Germany, the Irish Labour Party, the Partij van de Arbeid of the Netherlands, the New Zealand Labour Party, the Norwegian Labour Party, the Socialist Party of Portugal and the Labour Party of the United Kingdom. Data sources next to my own collection efforts include the PPDB, contributions in Gallagher and Marsh (1988) and by Galligan (2003).

Figure 2.3: Average Marginal Effects on Candidate Loyalty by CEC



Solid lines and whiskers present 90 % confidence intervals, dashed ones present 95 % confidence intervals. Obtained from 1000 simulated random-draws from the variance-covariance matrix. Based on models (3) and (4) from Table 2.3. AME of a unit-change respective one standard deviation change for minimum length of membership.

Through the focus on one single party family and the inclusion of party fixed-effects, I compare candidates within the same parties and coefficients present effects aggregated over parties of this party family. Furthermore, this allows me to estimate the effect of CEC on candidates' loyalty while controlling for parties' organizational and ideological make-up. To further account for potential cohort effects, I control at the individual level for the length of party membership. Additionally, I include an indicator for having ever been employed by the party.¹⁵ These two variables account for heterogeneity among candidates in terms of commitment to the party. Finally, two variables capturing electoral incentives, such as the electoral system's incentives to cultivate a personal vote and the candidate's perceived electoral security are included. As the second variable is based on a survey question not asked in all countries, observations from the New Zealand Labor Party drop out of model (5). Given the low variation over time for most CEC, I have to focus on a comparison of differences in the demanded minimum length of party membership, the signing of a pledge of loyalty and no formal CEC.

Among the variables capturing the effects of eligibility criteria, only the minimum length of membership yields a significant effect with the expected direction of the effect – even when controlling for the electoral circumstances of the individual candidates. Candidates that have joined their party while it demanded a longer minimum period of membership

¹⁵The inclusion of the employment variable results in the drop-out of the Irish data, as the item was not asked in the Irish wave of the survey. Running the models with the Irish data leaving out this variable does not change the findings substantially.

Table 2.3: CEC at time of joining the party and candidate loyalty. Logit Estimation.

	<i>Party Position Over Own Opinion</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Candidacy Eligibility Criteria</i>					
Minimum Length of Membership	0.022*** (0.004)			0.020*** (0.004)	0.023*** (0.005)
Pledge		0.294 (0.256)		0.141 (0.212)	0.280 (0.175)
No formal CEC			0.195 (0.901)		
<i>Individual Level Controls</i>					
Ever Employed by Party	0.232 (0.256)	0.236 (0.255)	0.233 (0.250)	0.234 (0.258)	0.137 (0.209)
Time Party Member (Years)	0.009 (0.008)	0.009 (0.009)	0.004 (0.009)	0.010 (0.009)	0.019** (0.010)
<i>Electoral Security – Reference category: I thought it was an open race</i>					
Thought to Win					0.012 (0.240)
Thought to Lose					0.037 (0.369)
<i>System Level Controls</i>					
Incentive for Personal Vote	-0.401*** (0.075)	-0.133 (0.117)	-0.258*** (0.062)	-0.326*** (0.112)	-0.726*** (0.099)
Constant	3.588*** (0.531)	1.430 (1.168)	2.744*** (0.468)	2.873*** (1.027)	5.835*** (0.687)
Party Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Parties	10	10	10	10	9
Observations	639	639	639	639	555
Log Likelihood	-358.490	-359.121	-359.373	-358.429	-306.223
Akaike Inf. Crit.	742.980	744.242	744.746	744.858	642.445

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

express greater loyalty than candidates of parties demanding a shorter or no fixed periods of membership at the time of joining. Hence, this result speaks to the possible sorting and deterrent effects CEC may unfold upon potential new party members. Figure 2.3 presents average marginal effects of all three variables of interest. The average marginal effect of a one standard deviation change, i.e. about 6 months, in the minimum length of membership required before a candidacy can formally be obtained results in a 3.2%-point decrease in following one's own opinion.

For the other two CEC variables variation is rather low, which very likely explains the presented insignificant effects. In fact, only two parties in the sample changed their CEC as fundamentally as moving from no formal CEC to requiring membership.

Candidacy Eligibility Criteria as Socialization

In this final analysis, I examine the effects of CEC in place at the time of nomination. In this cross-sectional analysis I remove candidates that have competed in the election prior to the one in the survey. In this way I minimize the risk that previous candidates and especially incumbents are re-selected automatically. That is, I look at new candidates and the effect of CEC in place at the time of their nomination on their expressed loyalty toward the party. However, due to this pruning of the data I am left with only 37 parties from six countries.

As in previous analyses, I control for a set of potential confounders at the individual, party and country level. Besides country and party family fixed-effects, I control for the length of membership of individual candidates and whether they have ever been employed by the party. At the party level, I control for the centralization of the selectorate. Electoral incentives are captured by the candidate's perceived electoral security, which again causes a drop in observations and are thus only included in model (9). Moverover, through the inclusion of country fixed-effects incentives originating from the electoral system are taken out of the equation.

Table 2.4 presents results from logit estimation with standard errors clustered by party. Corresponding to the findings from my other two analyses, it is again the minimum length of membership and the collection of signatures that exhibit statistically significant effects in the expected direction. Candidates, nominated for the first time, are less likely to follow their own opinion in a conflict with their party's position and instead express greater loyalty to the party's policy platform, if their party demands a period of party membership and/or a collection of signatures before they become eligible for a candidacy.

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
Table 2.4: CEC at time of nomination and candidate loyalty. Logit Estimation.

	<i>Party Position over Own Opinion</i>								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
<i>Candidacy Eligibility Criteria</i>									
Membership	0.193 (0.262)					0.020 (0.214)	0.253 (0.294)		
Minimum Length of Membership		0.081*** (0.021)				0.098*** (0.020)		0.098*** (0.021)	0.094*** (0.020)
Signatures			0.232 (0.255)			0.524* (0.270)	0.302 (0.304)	0.520** (0.251)	0.571** (0.251)
Pledge				-0.027 (0.271)		-0.196 (0.280)	0.051 (0.248)	-0.203 (0.282)	-0.194 (0.271)
No formal CEC					-0.067 (0.243)				
<i>Individual Level Controls</i>									
Ever Employed by Party	0.241 (0.193)	0.223 (0.193)	0.220 (0.190)	0.228 (0.193)	0.228 (0.191)	0.217 (0.195)	0.234 (0.193)	0.216 (0.193)	0.184 (0.202)
Time Party Member (Years)	0.014** (0.007)	0.014** (0.007)	0.015** (0.007)	0.015** (0.007)	0.014** (0.007)	0.015** (0.007)	0.014** (0.007)	0.015** (0.007)	0.015** (0.007)
<i>Electoral Security – Reference category: I thought it was an open race</i>									
Thought to Win									0.082 (0.260)
Thought to Lose									0.219 (0.168)
<i>Party Level Controls</i>									
Selectorate	0.338 (0.263)	0.329 (0.211)	0.339 (0.260)	0.254 (0.212)	0.303 (0.234)	0.486 (0.306)	0.477 (0.323)	0.476* (0.248)	0.402 (0.237)
Constant	-0.677 (1.251)	-1.794* (1.000)	-0.503 (0.983)	-0.167 (1.026)	-0.316 (1.054)	-2.560** (1.265)	-1.281 (1.436)	-2.512*** (0.930)	-2.449*** (0.849)
Country Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party Family Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Countries	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5
Number of Parties	37	37	37	37	37	37	37	37	29
Observations	1,220	1,220	1,220	1,220	1,220	1,220	1,220	1,220	1,177
Log Likelihood	-788.393	-783.817	-788.480	-788.778	-788.745	-781.991	-787.891	-781.994	-756.659
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,608.786	1,599.634	1,608.960	1,609.555	1,609.489	1,601.982	1,611.782	1,599.989	1,551.318

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 2.4: Average Marginal Effects on Candidate Loyalty by CEC



Solid lines and whiskers present 90 % confidence intervals, dashed ones present 95 % confidence intervals. Obtained from 1000 simulated random-draws from the variance-covariance matrix. Based on models (5), (7) and (8) from Table 2.4. AME of a unit-change respective one standard deviation change for minimum length of membership.

The results from Table 2.4 again are in line with my expectation: parties instituting screening mechanisms can expect their pool of candidates to be more loyal. Figure 2.4 shows average marginal effects of each type of CEC at the time of nomination of first-time candidates' expressed loyalty. A standard deviation change in the minimum length of membership reduces the probability of choosing one's own opinion over the party position by roughly 11%. Demanding the collection of signatures, too, reduces the likelihood of going against the party by roughly 10%. These results at the individual level complement the results from the first analysis and underscore the importance of candidacy eligibility criteria. The next section sums up the results, mentions some caveats of this analysis and links the findings to the bigger picture of the current status of the literature.

Conclusion

Candidacy eligibility criteria are highly consequential party rules that affect what type of candidate voters face in the voting booth. However, its consequences for party unity among others are underresearched. In contrast, the other dimensions of candidate selection as conceptualized by Hazan and Rahat (2010), namely the dimensions of the selectorate and of the centralization, have been receiving more and more attention in the last two decades. To remedy this imbalance, this paper has argued and empirically tested that CEC can serve as a countermeasure to adverse selection in candidate recruitment and ensures the selection of candidates that are loyal to the party once elected. Especially those candidacy criteria that require and incentivize candidates to seriously immerse themselves with the party and its members, turn out to be associated with higher party unity and candidate loyalty. The underlying factors contributing to this behavior are thought to be the psychological attachment and a social identity that evolve in the (enforced) socialization process and shape the attitudes and behavior of candidates and Members of Parliament.

Even though these findings significantly advance our understanding of how candidacy eligibility criteria influence candidate and party behavior, they remain subject to some limitations. First, the analysis of parliamentary voting is restricted to a cross-sectional comparison of whipped votes. Secondly, parties' decisions to adopt, change or scrap eligibility criteria altogether might be endogenous to strategic considerations in response to electoral incentives or intra-party struggles. I have presented a longitudinal analysis to partially address both of these issues. However, low variation and lack of information on parties' CEC over a longer time span preclude a more thorough investigation at this point. A possible avenue for addressing this problem is a systematic data collection effort going back in time or exploiting within-party variation in, for instance, federal sys-

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tems. Moreover, future research should also engage in disclosing the impact and methods of informal screening mechanisms of candidates, in order to add further scrutiny of the important topic of candidate selection – especially in light of gender imbalances among candidates.

In summary, the findings of this study suggest a new angle through which party unity and candidate selection can be looked at and calls for more attention to eligibility criteria in the study of party and political elite behavior in general. Studies on party unity or representation, for instance, stand to gain by taking into account the type of personnel constituting the party, or any social group for that matter, and its screening mechanisms for admission. For the study of candidate selection, eligibility criteria should be studied for its own sake, but also in light of possible conditional effects with other dimensions of candidate selection and possible conditional consequences for the nomination of members of minority groups.

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Appendix

Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics for Voting Unity Analysis

Variable	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Median	Max
Agreement Score	163	0.988	0.014	0.935	0.994	1.000
CEC None	163	0.331	0.472	0	0	1
CEC Membership	163	0.589	0.494	0	1	1
CEC Incentive-based	163	0.454	0.499	0	0	1
CEC Length of Membership	163	2.850	5.814	0	0	36
Party's Age	163	51.945	42.553	0	36	176
Party Size	163	17.341	13.723	1	11.5	59
Government Status	163	0.446	0.490	0	0	1
Selectorate	163	2.664	0.759	1.000	2.684	4.000
Incentive for Personal Vote	163	4.595	3.223	1	3	10

Table 2.6: Descriptive Statistics for Loyalty Analysis I

Variable	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Median	Max
Own Opinion over Party Position	639	0.490	0.500	0	0	1
Ever Employed by Party	639	0.121	0.326	0	0	1
Time Party Member (Years)	639	18.676	11.545	0	18	48
Thought to Win	555	0.232	0.423	0	0	1
Thought to Lose	555	0.573	0.495	0	1	1
I thought it was an open race	555	0.134	0.341	0	0	1
No formal CEC	639	0.119	0.324	0	0	1
Pledge	639	0.362	0.481	0	0	1
Minimum Length of Membership	639	5.252	8.458	0	0	24
Incentive for Personal Vote	639	6.646	3.858	1	10	10

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Table 2.7: Descriptive Statistics for Loyalty Analysis II

Variable	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Median	Max
Own Opinion over Party Position	1,220	0.506	0.500	0	1	1
Ever Employed by Party	1,220	0.113	0.317	0	0	1
Time Party Member (Years)	1,220	12.625	10.775	0	9	53
Thought to Win	1,177	0.105	0.306	0	0	1
Thought to Lose	1,177	0.762	0.426	0	1	1
I thought it was an open race	1,177	0.133	0.340	0	0	1
Membership	1,220	0.627	0.484	0	1	1
Minimum Length of Membership	1,220	4.286	5.406	0	0	12
Signatures	1,220	0.189	0.392	0	0	1
Pledge	1,220	0.475	0.5	0	0	1
No formal CEC	1,220	0.249	0.433	0	0	1
Selectorate	1,220	2.674	0.754	1.4	2.833	4

Table 2.8: Overview of Parties' CEC from Loyalty Analysis

Country	Party	Time Coverage	Candidacy Eligibility Criteria			
			Membership	Length of Membership	Pledge	None
Australia	ALP	1983–2007	Yes	12-24 months	Yes	No
Belgium	PS	1978–2006	Yes	–	Yes (1997–)	No
	SPa	2002–2010	No	–		Yes
Denmark	Sd	2008–2009	Yes	12 months	No	No
Germany	SPD	1962–2008	Yes (1971–)	–	No	Yes (–1971)
Ireland	Lab	1974–2007	Yes	6-12 months	No	No
Netherlands	PvdA	1972–2006	Yes	0-2 months	Yes	No
New Zealand	LP	1969–2011	Yes	12-24 months	No	No
Norway	DNA	1967–2007	Yes	1-3 months	No	No
Portugal	PS	1974–2011	No	–	No	Yes
United Kingdom	Lab	1962–2010	Yes	12-24 months	No	No

Notes: Data of empty cells interpolated when information before and after available. Data on ALP partly interpolated from regional party branches.

Chapter 3

Party Membership, Pre-Parliamentary Socialization and Party Cohesion

Party membership seems to lose relevance for political careers in most established democracies. Yet, what are the implications of long-term party membership for party cohesion? In this paper, I argue that pre-parliamentary party membership is crucial. Using data on the party membership background of ca. 2,000 MPs of the German Bundestag from 1953 to 2013, I show that MPs that have joined their party at a younger age and that have been a member for a longer time before their candidacy, are less likely to disagree with the majority of their party on free votes. By examining free votes on which discipline is lifted, alternative sources generating unity are controlled for by design. Results are in line with expectations generated from social identity theory and underscore the importance of party membership for party cohesion. The paper concludes with a discussion of the findings' implications in light of recent developments in parties' candidate recruitment.

Introduction

Political dealignment is one of the most central and consequential trends in politics of the last few decades. We see the erosion of partisan identification (e.g. Dalton and Wattenberg 2002), a decline in membership-based politics (e.g. van Biezen and Poguntke 2014), and in an increasing number of countries the entry of political outsiders to the highest political offices, including such businessmen as Donald J. Trump in the United States, Emmanuel Macron in France, or Andrej Babiš in the Czech Republic. These trends, combined with additional local factors, have led parties in Japan (e.g. Yu, Yu, and Shoji 2014; Smith and Tsutsumi 2014), France (e.g. Par et al. 2017; The Economist 2017), Austria (e.g. Austria Presse Agentur 2017), and Germany (e.g. Ripperger 2016), to nominate candidates

without prior party membership or political experience. Membership in political parties, it appears, is losing in importance for political careers (see also Bailer et al. 2013).

What role, however, does party membership and especially long-term party membership play for (converging) political preferences and behavior of Members of Parliament (MPs), and eventually party cohesion in parliament? This chapter explores in particular the role of pre-parliamentary party membership and the effects of socialization processes it entails on the voting behavior of MPs of the German Bundestag. Kam (2009), for example, shows that the share of freshmen arriving in parliament is not related to the frequency of defections. Similarly, Crowe (1986) argues that there is no difference between parliamentary newcomers and veterans in the United Kingdom when assessing the most important factors underlying party loyalty: agreement and duty. These two findings suggest that loyalty inducing socialization processes are likely to take place before entering parliament and highlight the importance of party membership. At the same time, now, however we observe trends that indicate a decline in the importance of party membership for political careers that lead to Parliament. Thus, addressing questions on the role of pre-parliamentary party membership and its socialization effects on behavior in parliament warrants to produce insights for and predictions for party cohesion and about future workings of legislative institutions.

In general, two major approaches exist that dominate the literature in explaining why MPs vote with or against the majority of their party; a rational choice approach and a sociological one. The rational choice approach, currently the more dominant one of the two, assumes that individual legislators vote after pondering the potential sanctions and rewards of their actions (e.g., Kam 2009). In contrast to this assertion stands the sociological approach. This approach itself can be further subclassified into a strand explaining unity by social cohesion, i.e. the preference homogeneity of MPs as a function of similar socialization processes due to shared socio-economic and demographic backgrounds (e.g., Saalfeld 1995), a strand arguing that party unity is the result of preference alignment of party members due to sorting processes of citizens with similar ideological proclivities into parties (e.g., Krehbiel 1993; Willumsen 2017), and a strand asserting that unity is a product of shared values and norms (e.g. Crowe 1983). These three mechanisms, while taking effect at different temporal sequences, are but just the product of one overarching process: the process of socialization (see Searing 1969). However, the process of socialization can have many faces.

Most empirical investigations of the sociological strand hail from the 1960s and subsequent decades. Some of the studies focus on the political socialization in the family during a legislator's childhood (e.g., Prewitt, Eulau, and Zisk 1966; Clarke and Price 1977; more

recently see also Fox and Lawless 2005) or the impact of political events during the adolescence (Herzog 1975; Gruber 2009), others have explored the socialization processes that take place once MPs have arrived in the legislature (e.g., Price and Bell 1970; Garand 1988). Again others have looked at the socializational role played by political parties (e.g., Kornberg 1966; Clarke and Price 1977; Dodson 1990; Saalfeld 1995; Patzelt 1999). Out of these, only one though has empirically linked socialization within the party, measured by holding party office, with voting behavior in parliament (see Saalfeld 1995). This bivariate analysis, however, falls short in several aspects, such as ignoring subtle differences in MPs party history (when did they join, have they been a member of another party, etc.), a lack of relevant control variables, and by attempting to examine the role of previous party office on loyal voting behavior on whipped and not unwhipped votes.

The behavioral consequences of a lack of party membership has been investigated too. A methodologically innovative recent study by Bailer et al. (2013) explores different types of political careers that lead to the German Bundestag using sequence analysis. They find that political career-changers, so-called *Seiteneinsteiger* that lack long-term party activism, tend to be less successful in obtaining party or parliamentary offices, gather less in committees related to district interests, and tend to defect less often from the party line. A low number of these *Seiteneinsteiger*, however, precludes any conclusive inference. For the Japanese case, Smith and Tsutsumi (2014) report that candidates nominated in the wake of public calls for applications mostly lack prior party membership and political experience and that these candidates exhibit political attitudes more moderate when compared to their copartisans selected through more traditional channels.

In this study I take advantage of so-called “free votes”, i.e. unwhipped roll-call votes, in the German Bundestag from 1953-2013 to gauge the effect of pre-parliamentary party membership and its socializational effects on the (dis-) uniform voting behavior of MPs. Examining the effect of these socialization processes using four different indicators, I find that by and large lengthy party membership results in less voting dissent as predicted by social identity theory.

Theory

Social Identity Theory & Party Membership

The extant empirical literature on party unity rarely relies on psychological explanations, despite its apparent applicability. In an unusual investigation, Russel (2014) examines the reason for the unexpected high level of party unity in the British House of Lords, despite its system of appointments and the lack of credible threats from the party whips.

Yet, Russel finds empirical support for arguments in favor of social identity theory. Loyal voting behavior of the members of the House of Lords is strongly informed by feelings of loyalty, belonging and a fear of disrupting the unity of their group.

According to social identity theory, individuals that join a social group develop a social identity that helps the individuals to define who they are, where they belong and how they should act. Thus, group membership *per se* is thought to affect members through identification with the group, entailing internalization and adherence to group values and norms and resulting in homogeneity in attitudes and behavior (Turner 1991; Ashforth and Mael 1989).

New members of groups are often put in a position of uncertainty about their roles and status, inducing them to learn the role expectations and behavioral norms of the group. This process of social identification takes place in interactions with other group members, helping the new entrant to resolve his behavioral ambiguity. In fact, new entrants typically adopt the characteristics perceived by them as stereotypical of the group. Moreover, as the group's identity, goals and values deviate from the societal mainstream, the more dramatic is the need for group identification and thus adoption of norms and values by the new entrant (Ashforth and Mael 1989).

As a member of a group now, the entrant's behavior becomes more and more oriented to significant others, i.e. other group members, from which they yearn to receive ingroup respect and social approval (e.g., Rise, Sheeran, and Hukkelberg 2010; Pagliaro, Ellemers, and Barreto 2011). Not before long, membership in the group and the group's values become part of the entrants (social) identity (e.g. Bettencourt and Hume 1999) and membership in itself becomes a predictor of intention, motivation and action (see Fielding, McDonald, and Louis 2008; Bagozzi and Lee 2002).

In the political realm, survey studies have shown that members of the same party in parliament indeed exhibit highly congruent policy attitudes (Willumsen 2017), congruent expectations about behavioral norms (Crowe 1983) and that party leaders rely on long-running processes of socialization to maintain party unity in floor votes (e.g. Kam 2009). In other words, the self-categorization as a member of party A generates the expectation of this member voting with the majority of party A (see Turner 1987). Another straightforward expectation derived from this is that with greater exposure to the group's values and norms, or the party's for that matter, party members should vote in line with the majority of their party in parliament more often. To put it differently, the longer a MP has been a member of the party the more she has internalized the party's norms and values (see Dodson 1990) – implying as an observational correlate that longer party membership

should be associated with a voting pattern more in line with that of the majority of the party (*length of membership hypothesis*).

Hypothesis 1: The longer the MPs party membership, the more likely it is that their vote choice is congruent with that of the majority of the party.

Related to the length of exposure of the group's values, one could imagine an effect of the age of entering a group, i.e. joining a party. The younger new entrants or party members are, the more malleable their identities and thus the more pronounced processes of socialization and internalization of group values and norms. Accordingly, I expect to see that Members of Parliament who have joined their party at a younger age are more likely to vote in line with the majority of their party (*formative years hypothesis*).

Hypothesis 2: The younger the age at which MPs have joined their party, the more likely it is that their vote choice is congruent with that of the majority of the party.

Party membership can differ in quality and intensity and while the length of membership in a party may tell us something about the time span of the self-categorization into a political group, it does not tell us much about the quality of attachment or activism within the group. Holding an office within the party, therefore, may tell apart passive and active party membership. It also signals the ambition for responsibility for the group and entails the internalization of the duty to or norm of unity on the demanding end. I therefore expect that MPs that have held a party office before becoming a candidate or a Member of Parliament express higher demand for unity on their own part by voting more in line with the majority of their party (*party office hypothesis*).

Hypothesis 3: The vote choice of MPs that have held a party office before entering parliament is more likely to be congruent with that of the majority of the party.

Expectations on the voting behavior of MPs that have previously been a member of a different party are more complex. Social influence via group membership operates through three modes; compliance, internalization and identification (Bagozzi and Lee 2002). Current party members that have been a member in another party undergo these processes two or even more times – presumably not completely though, as otherwise leaving the group would cause too much cognitive dissonance in relation to one's social identity. To be accepted into the party, the former member of an oppositional group has to comply by the rules in order to objectively belong lest not being ostracized formally or socially. However, their true political preference might diverge from the official party line of their new political homes, otherwise they would not have been members of other parties unless a complete change of political attitudes took place. Thus, I expect that MPs with a party

switching history tend to not vote with the majority of their new party member colleagues on free votes (*switcher preference hypothesis*).

Hypothesis 4: MPs that have been a member of a different party before are more likely to diverge from the vote choice of the majority of their current party.

Research Design and Data

To test my hypotheses on the role of party socialization and party membership on unity I will explore as an observational implication of aligned preferences and internalization of party's norms the voting behavior of German Members of Parliament on so-called "free votes", i.e. unwhipped roll-call votes on which party discipline has been lifted. In doing so, I minimize the likelihood that observed (uniform) voting behavior can be explained by other unity inducing factors, such as sanctions or rewards (see e.g. Kam 2009). For the period from 1949-2013, 112 votes on which party discipline has been lifted could be identified (see Ohmura 2014). Data on actual voting behavior and MP characteristics come from Bergmann et al. (2016). The unit of analysis will be the MPs' decisions on each of these 112 free votes. The dependent variable, i.e. the vote choice, can take one of five categories: voting with the majority of the party, voting against the majority of the party, abstaining from voting, missing unexcused from voting and being excused from voting (e.g. traveling, on leave, sick, etc.).

As no free votes have been identified in the 1st, 3rd, and 9th legislative terms in post-war Germany, my sample consists of all MPs elected for the first time to the Bundestag in the other legislative terms with free votes until the 17th Bundestag. By only looking at legislative freshmen I am disentangling socialization processes that may take place within the legislature (e.g. Price and Bell 1970; Garand 1988) from pre-parliamentary socialization processes. Using multiple sources,¹⁶ I could code for 89% ($n = 2065$) of these freshman MPs the age at which they have joined for the first time the party for

¹⁶These include several editions of *Kürschners Volkshandbuch* for the different legislative cycles, the newspaper *Das Parlament*, biographies on websites of the Bundestag and state legislatures, Munzinger's Archive, archives of the Bundesländer, personal websites, and websites of the party-affiliated foundations (The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, and the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung).

which they have been elected,¹⁷ the length of their membership in years in this party before standing as candidate and being elected to the Bundestag for the first time. Moreover, I have also coded whether MPs have been a member of a different party and if so, for how long if data was available. In addition, I have coded whether MPs have held any party office before their first candidacy and first election, respectively.¹⁸

Figure 3.1: Distribution of Age Joining the Party




Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of the ages at which first-time MPs in my sample have joined their party for the first time. Most MPs have joined their respective party during their 20s. A clear outlier here are MPs of PDS/Linke, a product of their coding (see Footnote 17). The higher average for Bündnis90/Grüne might be related to their late founding date. While the other four parties – i.e., CDU, CSU, FDP and SPD – have been (re-) established at the end of the 1940s, B90/GR have only been established in 1979/1980.

¹⁷ Where relevant and when coding the year of joining the party I treat predecessor parties as organizational forerunners of the later parliamentary parties. This means that for members of Bündnis90/Grünen I code the year of joining the party as the year they have joined for instance the Alternative Liste (AL) or Demokratischer Aufbruch which later merged into or became the Bündnis90/Grünen (other include *Demokratie Jetzt* and *Neues Forum*). For the FDP this includes the Liberal-Demokratischen Partei (LDP) and the *Demokratische Volkspartei* (DVP) in Baden-Württemberg, for the CDU the *Christliche Volkspartei des Saarlandes* (CVP) and the *Badische Christlich-Soziale Volkspartei* (BCSV). Membership in the *Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus* does not start when joining the *Sozialistische Einheitspartei* (SED) of the German Democratic Republic for a lack of systematic data on earlier membership.

¹⁸ Granted, as many sources depend on self-declared biographies, especially in *Kürschners Volkshandbuch*, it could be that MPs were coded as not having held any party office even though they in fact did. However, any potential bias due to misreporting and mismeasurement are expected to run counter to the expected direct of its effect on parliamentary voting behavior.

Although most votes in the German Bundestag are decided upon by vote plurality in contrast to a qualified majority, which leaves abstaining from voting inconsequential for the vote outcome, abstentions in and for themselves are generally seen as a breach of party unity, if not the official party line on a given vote (see Crowe 1983). Table 3.1 shows separately for each party how vote choices on the 112 free votes correlate empirically with each other.¹⁹ Not surprisingly, the number of votes cast against the majority and the number of votes cast in line with the majority correlate negatively. Abstentions, interestingly, correlate negatively with the number of votes for the majority line but only for the CDU and PDS/Linke. They are correlated positively with the number of votes against the majority for the CDU, implying the same conjunction that abstentions are another channel of voicing disagreement. For most parties missing unexcused from a roll-call vote is strongly negatively correlated with the number of votes in line with the majority choice, with the exception of the PDS/Linke. A similar but less significant pattern exist for excused absentism. These correlations suggest that disunity may express itself through more channels than outright voting against the majority of the party. Being absent from the vote, be it excused or not, can mean imply the avoidance of taking a stance on an issue controversial in the eye of co-partisans or constituents and that as a form of disagreement is more evasive and softer than pure abstentions (e.g., Kam 2001). These tendencies apparent in these correlations are even more pronounced and emphasized when looking at whipped votes (see Table 3.3 in the Appendix).

Table 3.1: Correlation between Vote Choices, by Party

Party	With Majority				Against Majority				Party Unity	
	Against	Abstention	Missing	Excused	With	Abstention	Missing	Excused	Free Votes	Regular Votes
CDU	-0.588**	-0.074	-0.481**	-0.421**	-0.588**	0.277**	0.028	-0.008	0.836 (0.224)	0.970 (0.094)
CSU	-0.770**	-0.372**	-0.505**	-0.469**	-0.770**	0.368**	-0.044	-0.035	0.875 (0.208)	0.974 (0.085)
SPD	-0.566**	-0.028	-0.132	-0.076	-0.566**	-0.009	-0.072	-0.084	0.85 (0.215)	0.973 (0.080)
FDP	-0.282**	0.020	-0.335**	-0.164	-0.282**	0.082	0.094	0.087	0.841 (0.208)	0.950 (0.116)
B90/Gr	-0.005	0.074	-0.273**	0.155	-0.005	-0.059	-0.121	-0.099	0.799 (0.221)	0.951 (0.132)
PDS/Linke	-0.211	-0.219*	0.610**	0.632**	-0.211	-0.050	-0.093	0.152	0.841 (0.230)	0.961 (0.129)

Note: Correlations based on all free votes; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Party unity scores (and standard deviations) on all free and all regular votes between 1949-2013, respectively.

The last two columns of Table 3.1 show the average party unity scores over all roll-call votes between 1949 and 2013 but distinguished by free and regular votes. Here, party unity is measured by the agreement index as proposed by Hix, Noury, and Roland (2005), taking into account the dispersion of the number of *yes*, *no* and *abstentions*. If all MPs of a given party vote the same way the value is 1, if however the caucus is split equally into two or three voting blocs the value becomes 0. Not surprisingly, parties are more unified in regular votes on which party discipline is ensured by the party whips. Looking at free votes, now,

¹⁹These parties are the six main parliamentary parties of the post-war period: The socialdemocratic party (SPD), the two christiandemocratic parties (the CDU and its Bavarian sister party CSU), the liberal party (FDP), the green party (B90/Gr) and the socialist party (PDS/Linke).

we see that parties are still very much united but at a lower average. These numbers, of course, cover up other ways of preference divergence by ignoring the possibilities of being excused or missing from the vote. In fact, in 1987 (11th Bundestag) a roll-call vote on which discipline has been lifted concerning construction plans for construction work at the German Bundestag (Drs 11/407) saw only one member of the Green party voting in favor, while 35 were missing unexcused and six MPs were excused – over a controversy of monumental protection. This voting behavior results in a perfect unity score following the calculation of the agreement index even though the 35 MPs missing from the vote presumably had a different agenda than the one MP voting in favor of the construction plans.

One caveat when exploring the socializing role of party membership using free votes, it could be argued, is the fact that the selection of votes on which in fact discipline has been lifted is not representative of all votes and mostly applies to votes on issues of conscience or morality. While it is certainly true that free votes are not representative of all votes, it does not necessarily invalidate any exploration of the role of party membership on voting behavior. First of all, Crowe (1983) reports from survey data on MPs from the United Kingdom that defections and abstentions are seen as heavy transgression on group norms and that party unity in and for itself is a group's goal and value to be held up irrespective of the matter of the vote. In addition, Pagliaro, Ellemers, and Barreto (2011) argue that transgressions of moral norms, such as party unity, in contrast to competence-based norms by members tend to be seen as more dramatic by other group members. That is, party unity is a goal that is to be maintained as much as possible even on free votes and transgressions might equally invoke perhaps more informal social sanctions when compared to defections or abstentions on regular votes. Thus, compliant voting behavior of individuals on these votes should be even more informed by preferences acquired through socialization processes. In other words, voting against the majority of the party on these votes should have higher in-group repercussions, as divergent decisions can not be justified by lack of knowledge, by protesting a motion's or bill's technicalities and so on. Empirically, most of these free votes fall into the categories of *Law, Crime, and Family Issues* ($n = 27$), *Healthcare* ($n = 21$), and *Defense* ($n = 8$) from a total of fourteen different categories²⁰. Given the individual level MP \times vote-dyadic nature of the unit of analysis, I can account for the policy area of each vote by including corresponding fixed-effects (see Ohmura 2014).

²⁰These categories are: (1) Macroeconomics, (2) Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties, (3) Healthcare, (4) Labor, Employment, and Immigration, (5) Law, Crime and Family Issues, (6) Social Welfare, (7) Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce, (8) Defense, (9), Foreign Trade, (10) International Affairs and Foreign Aid, (11), Government Operations, (12) Reunification, (13) Constitutional Amendment, and (14) Other, Miscellaneous, and Human Interest.

Another important control variable in this setting are the electoral circumstances of the individual MPs. Baumann, Debus, and Müller (2013) show how characteristics of the electoral district influence voting behavior of German MPs on controversial free votes related to the pre-implantation genetic diagnosis. As these district characteristics, in this case the religiosity of the constituents, are more likely to find their way into MPs' decision calculus when they feel electorally insecure, I control for MPs re-election probabilities. MPs that electorally feel more secure may feel they can afford voting their conscience on controversial votes. Due to Germany's mixed-member electoral system, I estimate two types of re-election probabilities. The first captures the probability of re-election in the electoral district, the second the probability of being re-elected on the party list under the assumption that list positions remain unchanged, following the estimation procedure proposed by Stoffel (2014). Both probabilities enter as separate variables. These two variables also account for the type of candidacy, i.e. district versus list candidates and candidates competing on both tiers. Throughout the time period of my sample, candidates of all parties are becoming more likely to be dual candidates formally (see Manow 2015). The re-election probabilities however account for the *de facto* type of candidacy as most district candidacies of the smaller parties are futile anyhow.

To account for additional political confounders, I control for holding a party office (i.e. the party leader (*Parteivorsitzende/r*), the caucus leader (*Fraktionsvorsitzende/r*) and co-leader (*stellvertretende/r Fraktionsvorsitzende/r*), the party whips (*parlamentarische Geschäftsführer* and the policy-field specific speaker of the caucus (*Arbeitskreissprecher/in*)), a legislative office (i.e. committee chair (*Ausschussvorsitzende/r*) and co-chair (*stellvertretende/r Ausschussvorsitzende/r*)) or an executive office (i.e. cabinet minister (*Bundesminister/in*) and junior minister (*parlamentarischer Staatssekretär/in*)). These three variables are coded binary where a 1 indicates holding that office and 0 not holding that office. Although I only look at parliamentary freshmen it can happen that there are prominent party figures among these freshmen that immediately assume a legislative or executive office in their first legislative term. Other demographic control variables include the sex and age of MPs. Especially the latter is important in distilling the effects of length of party membership or the age at which a given MP has joined the party from potential effects of (non-) compliance emanating from biological age.

Examining the voting behavior of legislative freshmen on these free votes, while accounting for potentially confounding vote specifics as well as for electoral, political and demographic characteristics of the MPs, allows me to adjudicate on my hypotheses and to draw conclusions on the socializational effects of party membership prior to the legislative mandate. The next section will present the results of my analyses.

Analysis


Given the choice nature of the dependent variable I will use multinomial logistic regression models to explain the variation in vote outcomes in free votes. The reference category for all models is set to voting with the majority of the party, in order to explore the way how pre-parliamentary socialization or lack thereof manifests itself in different ways of voicing divergent opinions or even avoiding taking a controversial stance in the first place. All models are estimated separately for each party, i.e., Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (B90/Gr), Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Christian Social Union (CSU), Free Democratic Party of Germany (FDP), Party of Democratic Socialism and its successor The Left party (PDS/Linke), and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), and with fixed-effects controlling for the policy field of any given vote and standard errors clustered by MPs. Given the large number of combinations (party \times independent variables) I will present figures showing the average marginal effects of the independent variable on the five vote choices separately for each party. The full regression tables can be found in the appendix.

Length of Membership before First Candidacy

Figure 3.2 presents average marginal effects (AME) of a one standard deviation change in the length of party membership prior to MPs first candidacy. These AME are obtained following the procedure suggested by King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000), based on models run separately for each of the six parties, with a set of control variables and standard errors clustered by MPs (see Tables 3.5, 3.9 and 3.13 in the Appendix for the full models). The figure shows the AME of the length of party membership on each of the five vote choices for each of the six parties.

Overall, we see significant results in the expected direction, i.e. a significant positive effect on voting with the party's majority and negative effects on abstaining. For members of the SPD an increase in the length of membership prior to candidacy by one standard deviation results in an increased likelihood of voting with the majority of the party. On the flip side, the same increase is associated with lower probabilities of abstaining for MPs of the SPD, the CDU and PDS/Linke. The effect on missing from the vote is less obvious. While for the SPD, lengthy membership may urge MPs to not miss any votes, its effect for MPs from PDS/Linke is the opposite. Yet, one result is puzzling. Weakly significant, it appears MPs of PDS/Linke are in fact less likely to vote with the majority of their colleagues. However, apart from this exception, longer party membership appears to be associated with more unified voting patterns.

Figure 3.2: Voting Behavior and Length of Party Membership before First Candidacy



AMEs obtained from 1000 simulated random draws from the variance-covariance matrix. Black color indicates significance at 95% level. Quantities based on models as found in Tables 3.5, 3.9 and 3.13.


Formative Years

Effects of the age at which the MPs has joined the party follow a clearer pattern, as shown in Figure 3.3. For three parties – the SPD, the CDU and B90/Grüne – we see less voting with the majority as the age of joining the party increases. To the same substantive consequences, we see three partly different parties – again the SPD and the CDU, now with PDS/Linke – whose MPs are also more likely to abstain from voting as the age of having joined the party increases.

Its impact on missing from votes is mixed. While older entrants of the SPD are more likely to miss votes, the opposite seems true for MPs of PDS/Linke.

Only for the CSU, again, do we see an unexpected and only slightly statistically significant effect in the direction of less abstentions. Nonetheless, we see a tendency that the older MPs are when joining the party for which they will be elected, the less unified their voting behavior tends to be.

Figure 3.3: Voting Behavior and Age of Joining Party




AMEs obtained from 1000 simulated random draws from the variance-covariance matrix. Black color indicates significance at 95% level. Quantities based on models as found in Tables 3.4, 3.8 and 3.12.

Holding Party Office Before First Candidacy

While the previous two measures of pre-parliamentary socialization cannot distinguish between passive and active party membership, holding a party office before the first candidacy can. Holding a party office not only evinces deeper involvement with the party, its members and successful compliance with the party's formal and informal rules, it further implies the internalization of norms of unity for the sake of unity. Figure 3.4 presents the AME of holding a party office on MPs' voting behavior. Those MPs that have held party office before their first candidacy of the three parties right of the centre, i.e. CDU, CSU and FDP, are more likely to vote with the majority of their party on free votes. On the flip side, former office-holders are also less likely to vote against the majority (applies to MPs of the CDU and FDP) or to abstain (MPs of PDS/Linke).

Previous party office barely produces are clear picture of predictions for absentism. While prior office-holders of the CDU are less likely to be excused from votes, MPs of the SPD and with lower statistical significance MPs of PDS/Linke are more likely to miss free votes.

Figure 3.4: Voting Behavior and Party Office Before Candidacy




AMEs obtained from 1000 simulated random draws from the variance-covariance matrix. Black color indicates significance at 95% level. Quantities based on models as found in Tables 3.7, 3.11 and 3.15.

Switcher

Average marginal effects relating to the final hypothesis on the influence of previous party membership in another party are presented in Figure 3.5. The effects are largely in line with expectations. For MPs of the CDU that switched from another party their likelihood of voting with the majority decreases. At the same time, their likelihood of voting against or to abstain grows larger – the latter significant only at the 90% level however. Abstention becomes more likely for MPs of the SPD, the CDU and B90/Grüne. They become less likely for MPs of the CSU – an unexpected result.

MPs that have switched into the SPD or the CSU tend to miss more free votes. Possibly a way to avoid upsetting party leadership by disrupting party unity (further).

Figure 3.5: Voting Behavior and Ever Being Member of Other Party



AMEs obtained from 1000 simulated random draws from the variance-covariance matrix. Black color indicates significance at 95% level. Quantities based on models as found in Tables 3.6, 3.10 and 3.14.

Discussion

Examining the role of party membership on the voting behavior of MPs in the German Bundestag suggest that voicing divergent stances on free votes – often but not only related to matters of conscience – are contingent on the degree of pre-parliamentary socialization processes and party affiliation. Moreover, it appears that disagreement is voiced through different channels of varying degrees of dissent, as the number of MPs missing or being excused from the vote correlated negatively with the number of votes in line with the majority (see Table 3.1 and 3.3). Yet, mixed results in this respect at the individual level of the MPs do not reveal any empirical pattern of how pre-parliamentary socialization processes might influence the missing from votes. This, it appears has more idiosyncratic reasons.

Table 3.2 shows how all four indicators of pre-parliamentary socialization processes within parties, i.e. the length of membership before candidacy, the age of joining the party, holding a party office before first candidacy and being a member of another party, by and large support results, though varying by party, in line with theoretical expectations. The longer MPs have been party members when assuming their legislative mandates for the first time, the more likely they are to vote in line with the party and less likely to dissent.

The same patterns hold for the age of joining the party. The older the future MP is when joining the party, the less likely they are to vote with and more likely to vote against the majority of the party or abstain. Notable exceptions are the CSU and the FDP. While for the latter no systematic difference is supported empirically, contradicting results are made out for MPs of the CSU.

First-time MPs that have held a party office before their first candidacy show higher probabilities of voting with the majority of the party compared to non-office holders. These MPs are also less likely to abstain or vote against the majority of their party. These results too differ between parties, with one counterintuitive finding for the SPD, whose MPs with prior party offices are in fact less likely to vote with the majority – though only weakly significant. Finally, the last indicator of intra-party socialization processes or lack thereof, i.e. those MPs that have previously been a member of another party, is related to expected behavioral patterns too. CDU MPs with this background show lower likelihood of voting with and greater likelihood of voting against the majority. They also tend to abstain more often, yet significant only at the 90 % level. Members of the SPD and B90/GR are also more likely to abstain, while MPs of the CSU and PDS/Linke defy expectations and either are less likely to vote against the majority (PDS/Linke) or less likely to abstain (CSU). Additionally, it appears that these MPs have a tendency to miss free votes, presumably to avoid making tough decisions that could estrange them from other group.

These results underscore the importance of intra-party socialization processes for the development of such group norms as loyalty and a shared duty for unity, as well as for development of homogeneous (policy) preferences. The overall empirical pattern resonates perfectly with expectations set by social identity theory: belonging to a group nudges the individual to re-evaluate its attitudes, norms and values in light of what they deem relevant and adjust their behavior in line with expectations from significant others, i.e. other members of the group. To be become a candidate, aspirants have to comply with the party's internal rules in order to be considered for a candidacy in the first place. The younger now the new entry into the party is the more formative will obeying to and complying with the rules to become a candidate be. The variance of these effects between the different parties may allude to differences in intra-party organizational structures, most notably the formal and informal rules governing candidate selection (see e.g. Reiser 2014).

What do these findings imply for candidate selection? As a number of parties have started with expanding their supply of candidates by allowing non-members to seek party nominations as for instance is allowed for by the constitution of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen in

Table 3.2: Summary of Results by Party and Predictor

Expectation		B90/GR	CDU	CSU	FDP	PDS/Linke	SPD
<i>Length Membership before 1st Candidacy</i>							
With	+	0	0	0	0	-	++
Against	-	0	0	0	0	0	0
Abstain	-	--	0	0	0	--	--
Excused	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missing	-	0	0	0	0	++	--
<i>Age of Joining Party</i>							
With	-	--	--	0	0	0	--
Against	+	0	+	0	0	0	0
Abstain	+	0	++	-	0	++	+
Excused	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missing	+	0	0	0	0	--	++
<i>Party Office before Candidacy</i>							
With	+	0	++	++	++	0	0
Against	-	0	--	0	--	0	0
Abstain	-	0	0	0	0	--	0
Excused	0	0	--	0	0	0	0
Missing	-	0	0	--	0	+	++
<i>Switcher</i>							
With	-	0	--	0	0	0	0
Against	+	0	++	0	0	-	0
Abstain	+	++	+	--	0	0	++
Excused	0	0	+	--	0	0	0
Missing	+	0	0	++	0	0	++

Note: -|+ p<0.1; --|++ p<0.05

Germany (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 1993), placing non-party members on safe list positions as happened in the Christandemocratic ÖVP in Austria (Austria Presse Agentur 2017), or by searching for candidates through advertisements in national newspaper as happened in Japan (Yu, Yu, and Shoji 2014). While these developments have different causes – which may range from democratic ideals over selection of technocrats to filling the pool of quality candidates – they are surely imperiling these parties' coherence.

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Appendix

Table 3.3: Correlation between Vote Choices in Regular Votes, by Party

Party	With Majority				Against Majority			
	Against	Abstention	Missing	Excused	With	Abstention	Missing	Excused
CDU	-0.331**	-0.221**	-0.316**	-0.402**	-0.331**	0.410**	0.037	0.159**
CSU	-0.404**	-0.285**	-0.419**	-0.356**	-0.404**	0.200**	-0.014	0.076**
SPD	-0.118**	-0.111**	-0.254**	-0.345**	-0.118**	0.342**	0.029	-0.030
FDP	-0.106**	-0.112**	-0.262**	-0.211**	-0.106**	0.330**	0.014	0.146**
B90/Gr	-0.075**	-0.051	-0.218**	0.064*	-0.075**	0.192**	-0.052	-0.015
PDS/Linke	-0.120**	-0.074*	0.196**	0.495**	-0.120**	0.226**	0.035	-0.061

Note: All roll-call votes from 1949-2013, without free votes.

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Table 3.4: Multinomial Logit Estimation of Age Joined Party, CDU and CSU

	CDU				CSU			
	Excused from Voting	Missing from Voting	Voting Against the Majority	Abstaining	Excused from Voting	Missing from Voting	Voting Against the Majority	Abstaining
Age	0.021 (0.027)	0.018 (0.023)	-0.011 (0.009)	0.012 (0.020)	0.098* (0.060)	-0.017 (0.034)	0.004 (0.021)	0.023 (0.037)
Female	-0.109 (0.439)	0.165 (0.358)	-0.206 (0.176)	0.195 (0.377)	1.992** (0.913)	0.509 (0.633)	-1.020* (0.524)	0.583 (0.910)
Probability of Re-Election List	0.902 (0.853)	0.071 (0.575)	-0.044 (0.268)	-0.189 (0.608)	4.069*** (1.293)	3.055*** (0.757)	-0.426 (0.543)	-0.158 (0.881)
Probability of Re-Election District	0.482 (0.628)	-0.542 (0.399)	-0.323 (0.229)	-0.383 (0.524)	-0.110 (0.916)	-0.041 (0.630)	-0.652 (0.499)	1.192 (1.043)
Party Office	0.351 (0.664)	-1.165 (0.908)	0.137 (0.330)	0.162 (0.810)	-18.802*** (1.145)	-19.103*** (1.300)	-21.034*** (1.066)	2.052** (0.841)
Executive Office	-0.021 (1.072)	0.256 (0.690)	-0.348 (0.351)	0.327 (0.898)	-20.794*** (1.426)	-21.182*** (1.311)	0.862 (1.047)	-19.532*** (1.653)
Parliamentary Office	0.775 (0.789)	0.578 (0.524)	-0.024 (0.216)	-0.330 (0.647)	3.571*** (1.351)	1.707* (0.926)	-20.276*** (0.949)	0.920*** (0.315)
Age Joined Party	0.021 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.022)	0.013* (0.008)	0.060*** (0.016)	0.008 (0.046)	-0.011 (0.054)	0.016 (0.029)	-0.083* (0.048)
Intercept	-5.351*** (1.851)	-3.171*** (0.851)	-1.173*** (0.417)	-7.534*** (1.390)	-10.838*** (2.941)	-4.191*** (1.507)	-2.287* (1.196)	-5.255** (2.341)
Observations	5,983				898			
Policy Field Fixed-Effects	Yes				Yes			
R ²	0.133				0.177			
Log Likelihood	-2,995.893				-411.759			
LR Test	915.601*** (df = 88)				176.914*** (df = 60)			

Note: Standard errors clustered by MPs; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.5: Multinomial Logit Estimation of Length of Membership, CDU and CSU

	CDU				CSU			
	Excused from Voting	Missing from Voting	Voting Against the Majority	Abstaining	Excused from Voting	Missing from Voting	Voting Against the Majority	Abstaining
Age	0.042* (0.024)	0.013 (0.018)	0.002 (0.008)	0.071*** (0.017)	0.106** (0.048)	-0.032 (0.057)	0.026 (0.026)	-0.065 (0.043)
Female	-0.104 (0.438)	0.149 (0.357)	-0.208 (0.175)	0.211 (0.377)	1.995** (0.912)	0.514 (0.628)	-1.024* (0.525)	0.563 (0.879)
Probability of Re-election List	0.898 (0.854)	0.080 (0.576)	-0.047 (0.268)	-0.207 (0.610)	4.072*** (1.291)	3.073*** (0.784)	-0.461 (0.502)	0.396 (1.009)
Probability of Re-election District	0.475 (0.628)	-0.535 (0.396)	-0.329 (0.229)	-0.412 (0.521)	-0.102 (0.916)	-0.031 (0.617)	-0.670 (0.485)	1.577 (1.258)
Party Office	0.356 (0.664)	-1.172 (0.912)	0.140 (0.328)	0.162 (0.813)	-18.802*** (1.142)	-18.984*** (1.337)	-21.159*** (1.060)	2.322*** (0.896)
Executive Office	-0.024 (1.075)	0.267 (0.686)	-0.343 (0.350)	0.331 (0.904)	-20.801*** (1.426)	-21.214*** (1.345)	0.880 (0.999)	-20.086*** (1.848)
Parliamentary Office	0.783 (0.786)	0.571 (0.524)	-0.021 (0.216)	-0.310 (0.643)	3.557*** (1.350)	1.697* (0.924)	-20.259*** (0.951)	0.885*** (0.309)
Length of Membership	-0.020 (0.016)	0.003 (0.022)	-0.014* (0.008)	-0.058*** (0.016)	-0.007 (0.046)	0.020 (0.056)	-0.027 (0.028)	0.103** (0.050)
Intercept	-5.340*** (1.851)	-3.185*** (0.853)	-1.169*** (0.416)	-7.507*** (1.393)	-10.845*** (2.934)	-4.232*** (1.370)	-2.268** (1.096)	-5.916** (2.650)
Observations	5,983				898			
Policy Field Fixed-Effects	Yes				Yes			
R ²	0.132				0.179			
Log Likelihood	-2,996.391				-410.700			
LR Test	914.607*** (df = 88)				179.033*** (df = 60)			

Note: Standard errors clustered by MPs; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.6: Multinomial Logit Estimation of Member of Other Party, CDU and CSU

	CDU				CSU			
	Excused from Voting	Missing from Voting	Voting Against the Majority	Abstaining	Excused from Voting	Missing from Voting	Voting Against the Majority	Abstaining
Age	0.032 (0.025)	0.019 (0.017)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.041** (0.017)	0.099** (0.046)	-0.024 (0.033)	0.010 (0.020)	-0.002 (0.031)
Female	0.034 (0.438)	0.117 (0.357)	-0.175 (0.175)	0.338 (0.386)	1.989** (0.907)	0.629 (0.657)	-1.071* (0.586)	0.506 (0.803)
Probability of Re-Election List	0.919 (0.828)	0.062 (0.567)	-0.073 (0.264)	-0.284 (0.626)	3.833*** (1.352)	3.170*** (0.843)	-0.429 (0.548)	0.128 (0.869)
Probability of Re-Election District	0.514 (0.622)	-0.540 (0.381)	-0.329 (0.233)	-0.228 (0.531)	-0.293 (0.817)	0.196 (0.585)	-0.623 (0.507)	1.110 (1.091)
Party Office	0.204 (0.696)	-1.236 (0.950)	-0.023 (0.300)	0.006 (0.821)	-17.896*** (1.135)	-19.998*** (1.201)	-20.795*** (0.960)	0.913** (0.393)
Executive Office	-0.200 (1.097)	0.271 (0.662)	-0.380 (0.361)	0.173 (1.028)	-20.618*** (1.455)	-21.457*** (1.308)	0.900 (1.081)	-19.511*** (1.530)
Parliamentary Office	0.803 (0.741)	0.528 (0.528)	-0.011 (0.216)	-0.278 (0.626)	3.606*** (1.264)	1.701* (0.896)	-20.281*** (0.949)	1.033*** (0.331)
Member of Other Party	0.945* (0.507)	0.159 (0.745)	0.894** (0.431)	1.062* (0.597)	-17.824*** (1.010)	2.236*** (0.776)	-0.371 (1.371)	-18.449*** (1.030)
Intercept	-5.276*** (1.850)	-3.325*** (0.888)	-1.307*** (0.419)	-7.093*** (1.417)	-10.506*** (2.833)	-4.293*** (1.128)	-2.249* (1.175)	-5.824*** (2.164)
Observations		5,859					895	
Policy Field Fixed-Effects		Yes					Yes	
R ²		0.131					0.178	
Log Likelihood		-2,935.464					-411.524	
LR Test		884.641*** (df = 88)					178.717*** (df = 60)	

Note: Standard errors clustered by MPs; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.7: Multinomial Logit Estimation of Party Office before 1st Candidacy, CDU and CSU

	CDU				CSU			
	Excused from Voting	Missing from Voting	Voting Against the Majority	Abstaining	Excused from Voting	Missing from Voting	Voting Against the Majority	Abstaining
Age	0.029 (0.019)	0.014 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.007)	0.043** (0.018)	0.099** (0.050)	-0.057* (0.031)	0.001 (0.019)	-0.022 (0.034)
Female	-0.211 (0.409)	0.094 (0.342)	-0.152 (0.172)	0.505 (0.347)	1.413 (1.013)	-0.217 (0.689)	-1.086** (0.527)	0.140 (0.850)
Probability of Re-Election List	0.971 (0.768)	0.017 (0.521)	-0.038 (0.262)	-0.139 (0.589)	3.980*** (1.330)	2.001*** (0.739)	-0.396 (0.544)	0.133 (0.933)
Probability of Re-Election District	0.243 (0.595)	-0.518 (0.360)	-0.135 (0.224)	-0.206 (0.546)	0.311 (0.859)	0.170 (0.512)	-0.627 (0.475)	1.400 (1.190)
Party Office	0.079 (0.644)	-1.235 (0.919)	0.052 (0.359)	-0.037 (0.869)	-18.926*** (0.894)	-19.044*** (0.803)	-20.696*** (0.939)	1.131*** (0.385)
Executive Office	-0.252 (1.084)	0.319 (0.645)	-0.366 (0.344)	0.128 (0.961)	-20.873*** (1.451)	-21.689*** (1.229)	1.057 (1.132)	-19.467*** (1.628)
Parliamentary Office	0.674 (0.658)	0.672 (0.492)	-0.019 (0.227)	-0.248 (0.631)	3.280*** (1.187)	-0.261 (0.741)	-0.555 (0.789)	0.379 (0.621)
Party Office Before 1st Candidacy	-0.718** (0.281)	-0.122 (0.269)	-0.324** (0.133)	-0.276 (0.328)	-0.849 (0.875)	-1.439** (0.594)	0.032 (0.347)	-0.379 (0.494)
Intercept	-4.585*** (1.556)	-3.096*** (0.799)	-1.018** (0.431)	-7.217*** (1.520)	-10.419*** (3.010)	-1.169 (1.435)	-1.937* (1.141)	-5.085** (2.333)
Observations		6,520					1,097	
Policy Field Fixed-Effects		Yes					Yes	
R ²		0.130					0.170	
Log Likelihood		-3,262.074					-498.890	
LR Test		977.311*** (df = 88)					204.345*** (df = 60)	

Note: Standard errors clustered by MPs; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.8: Multinomial Logit Estimation of Age Joined Party, SPD and FDP

	SPD				FDP			
	Excused from Voting	Missing from Voting	Voting Against the Majority	Abstaining	Excused from Voting	Missing from Voting	Voting Against the Majority	Abstaining
Age	0.002 (0.023)	-0.0004 (0.020)	0.008 (0.009)	-0.033** (0.016)	-0.017 (0.033)	0.034 (0.034)	-0.007 (0.018)	0.015 (0.026)
Female	-0.262 (0.352)	-0.273 (0.304)	-0.085 (0.129)	-0.610** (0.307)	0.308 (0.455)	0.656 (0.440)	0.300 (0.244)	0.291 (0.506)
Probability of Re-Election List	-0.281 (0.465)	0.400 (0.457)	0.045 (0.229)	0.224 (0.505)	1.180 (0.836)	-0.096 (0.856)	-0.257 (0.558)	-1.620 (1.509)
Probability of Re-Election District	-0.078 (0.395)	-0.078 (0.526)	-0.680*** (0.236)	-0.567 (0.452)				
Party Office	-0.128 (0.560)	-0.823 (0.548)	0.237 (0.259)	-0.983 (0.752)	0.582 (0.530)	0.001 (0.503)	-0.214 (0.324)	-0.486 (0.756)
Executive Office	0.336 (0.794)	0.413 (0.512)	-0.722 (0.839)	1.258 (0.854)	-0.307 (0.637)	0.455 (0.556)	0.377 (0.393)	0.549 (0.597)
Parliamentary Office	-0.310 (0.692)	0.623 (0.598)	-0.207 (0.441)	0.093 (0.753)	-0.547 (1.282)	0.991 (0.942)	0.960 (0.867)	-15.922*** (0.905)
Age Joined Party	0.025 (0.022)	0.036** (0.015)	0.003 (0.006)	0.033** (0.013)	0.032 (0.026)	0.010 (0.025)	0.010 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.026)
Intercept	-3.742*** (1.190)	-3.429*** (0.869)	-2.972*** (0.513)	-2.654** (1.086)	-3.555*** (1.094)	-3.055** (1.386)	-2.136*** (0.793)	-3.122* (1.677)
Observations	6,995				2,124			
Policy Field Fixed-Effects	Yes				Yes			
R ²	0.139				0.142			
Log Likelihood	-3,842.213				-1,171.879			
LR Test	1,235.422*** (df = 88)				388.593*** (df = 84)			

Note: Standard errors clustered by MPs; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.9: Multinomial Logit Estimation of Length of Membership, SPD and FDP

	SPD				FDP			
	Excused from Voting	Missing from Voting	Voting Against the Majority	Abstaining	Excused from Voting	Missing from Voting	Voting Against the Majority	Abstaining
Age	0.027 (0.027)	0.035** (0.015)	0.012 (0.009)	-0.0005 (0.016)	0.015 (0.021)	0.045* (0.023)	0.002 (0.015)	0.009 (0.022)
Female	-0.253 (0.352)	-0.262 (0.303)	-0.082 (0.128)	-0.606** (0.307)	0.307 (0.455)	0.656 (0.440)	0.295 (0.244)	0.291 (0.506)
Probability of Re-Election List	-0.295 (0.463)	0.383 (0.457)	0.041 (0.227)	0.214 (0.505)	1.174 (0.832)	-0.089 (0.855)	-0.172 (0.561)	-1.615 (1.507)
Probability of Re-Election District	-0.075 (0.395)	-0.073 (0.527)	-0.680*** (0.235)	-0.565 (0.452)				
Party Office	-0.132 (0.561)	-0.826 (0.549)	0.236 (0.259)	-0.983 (0.752)	0.585 (0.529)	-0.001 (0.503)	-0.228 (0.326)	-0.486 (0.756)
Executive Office	0.341 (0.795)	0.420 (0.512)	-0.722 (0.839)	1.265 (0.855)	-0.305 (0.636)	0.453 (0.556)	0.358 (0.391)	0.548 (0.596)
Parliamentary Office	-0.306 (0.693)	0.629 (0.600)	-0.207 (0.440)	0.097 (0.752)	-0.545 (1.281)	0.988 (0.942)	0.936 (0.865)	-15.923*** (0.904)
Length of Membership	-0.025 (0.022)	-0.036** (0.015)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.033** (0.013)	-0.032 (0.026)	-0.011 (0.025)	-0.011 (0.015)	0.006 (0.026)
Intercept	-3.744*** (1.192)	-3.433*** (0.871)	-2.971*** (0.513)	-2.653** (1.087)	-3.557*** (1.095)	-3.053** (1.386)	-2.136*** (0.791)	-3.122* (1.677)
Observations	7,015				2,125			
Policy Field Fixed-Effects	Yes				Yes			
R ²	0.138				0.142			
Log Likelihood	-3,849.296				-1,174.802			
LR Test	1,237.169*** (df = 88)				387.791*** (df = 84)			

Note: Standard errors clustered by MPs; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.10: Multinomial Logit Estimation of Member of Other Party, SPD and FDP

	SPD				FDP			
	Excused from Voting	Missing from Voting	Voting Against the Majority	Abstaining	Excused from Voting	Missing from Voting	Voting Against the Majority	Abstaining
Age	0.015 (0.023)	0.022 (0.017)	0.013* (0.008)	-0.014 (0.015)	0.009 (0.022)	0.042* (0.025)	-0.001 (0.014)	0.012 (0.018)
Female	-0.120 (0.361)	-0.066 (0.301)	-0.053 (0.131)	-0.431 (0.298)	0.302 (0.489)	0.512 (0.481)	0.280 (0.252)	0.405 (0.550)
Probability of Re-Election List	-0.339 (0.463)	0.265 (0.458)	0.025 (0.230)	0.113 (0.472)	1.027 (0.804)	-0.133 (0.859)	-0.220 (0.536)	-1.575 (1.647)
Probability of Re-Election District	-0.107 (0.396)	-0.301 (0.547)	-0.754*** (0.234)	-0.642 (0.455)				
Party Office	-0.160 (0.582)	-0.720 (0.547)	0.205 (0.282)	-1.011 (0.751)	0.645 (0.541)	0.144 (0.530)	-0.224 (0.374)	-1.035 (1.048)
Executive Office	0.265 (0.782)	0.312 (0.523)	-0.726 (0.843)	1.128 (0.857)	-0.115 (0.586)	0.425 (0.556)	0.401 (0.388)	0.644 (0.584)
Parliamentary Office	-0.388 (0.696)	0.508 (0.585)	-0.203 (0.445)	-0.025 (0.757)	-18.058*** (0.928)	-18.150*** (0.784)	1.195 (0.984)	-16.813*** (1.035)
Member Other Party	0.604 (1.322)	-18.539*** (0.730)	0.666 (0.953)	-18.164*** (0.692)	0.591 (0.741)	0.392 (1.251)	-0.153 (0.750)	0.956 (0.790)
Intercept	-3.631*** (1.203)	-3.474*** (0.869)	-3.003*** (0.517)	-2.598** (1.090)	-3.817*** (1.184)	-3.263** (1.376)	-2.109*** (0.809)	-3.361* (1.744)
Observations		6,744						2,063
Policy Field Fixed-Effects		Yes						Yes
R ²		0.135						0.129
Log Likelihood		-3,727.859						-1,141.594
LR Test		1,162.239*** (df = 88)						337.754*** (df = 84)

Note: Standard errors clustered by MPs, *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.11: Multinomial Logit Estimation of Party Office before 1st Candidacy, SPD and FDP

	SPD				FDP			
	Excused from Voting	Missing from Voting	Voting Against the Majority	Abstaining	Excused from Voting	Missing from Voting	Voting Against the Majority	Abstaining
Age	0.014 (0.024)	0.012 (0.016)	0.008 (0.008)	-0.015 (0.015)	0.015 (0.020)	0.024 (0.024)	-0.007 (0.014)	0.007 (0.022)
Female	-0.194 (0.348)	-0.137 (0.287)	-0.070 (0.128)	-0.465 (0.294)	0.149 (0.465)	0.442 (0.423)	0.267 (0.241)	0.333 (0.478)
Probability of Re-Election List	-0.254 (0.431)	0.279 (0.418)	-0.028 (0.226)	0.075 (0.456)	0.627 (0.880)	-0.094 (0.707)	-0.100 (0.486)	-1.467 (1.615)
Probability of Re-Election District	-0.048 (0.407)	-0.032 (0.511)	-0.692*** (0.230)	-0.659 (0.462)				
Party Office	-0.158 (0.564)	-0.840 (0.536)	0.234 (0.260)	-1.032 (0.750)	0.621 (0.488)	-0.013 (0.563)	-0.070 (0.348)	-0.420 (0.774)
Executive Office	0.117 (0.728)	0.199 (0.565)	-0.736 (0.844)	1.137 (0.885)	-0.272 (0.585)	0.369 (0.560)	0.402 (0.368)	0.551 (0.581)
Parliamentary Office	-0.506 (0.694)	0.317 (0.687)	-0.236 (0.438)	-0.078 (0.745)	-0.355 (1.181)	1.100 (0.932)	1.114 (0.695)	-15.963*** (0.822)
Party Office before 1st Candidacy	-0.413 (0.376)	-0.603** (0.273)	-0.004 (0.143)	0.060 (0.329)	0.432 (0.420)	-0.652 (0.400)	-0.669*** (0.253)	-0.276 (0.591)
Intercept	-3.388*** (1.294)	-2.602*** (0.920)	-2.852*** (0.525)	-2.371** (1.008)	-4.047*** (1.272)	-1.687 (1.353)	-1.506* (0.800)	-2.809 (1.721)
Observations		7,229						2,236
Policy Field Fixed-Effects		Yes						Yes
R ²		0.140						0.145
Log Likelihood		-3,928.047						-1,241.071
LR Test		1,280.974*** (df = 88)						421.480*** (df = 84)

Note: Standard errors clustered by MPs, *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.12: Multinomial Logit Estimation of Age joined Party, B90/Gr and PDS/Linke

	B90/Grüne			PDS/Linke		
	Excused from Voting	Missing from Voting	Voting Against the Majority	Excused from Voting	Missing from Voting	Voting Against the Majority
Age	-0.083* (0.043)	-0.040 (0.042)	-0.006 (0.029)	0.033 (0.040)	0.140*** (0.050)	-0.052 (0.036)
Female	-0.532 (0.438)	0.687 (0.479)	-0.140 (0.361)	0.232 (0.456)	-0.247 (0.495)	0.103 (0.397)
Probability of Re-Election List	2.493** (1.021)	1.585** (0.779)	-0.095 (0.688)	0.972* (0.527)	-0.589 (0.751)	0.742 (0.640)
Probability of Re-Election District				-1.417 (1.724)	-0.362 (1.437)	2.501 (1.692)
Party Office	1.484*** (0.451)	0.561 (0.601)	-1.036* (0.552)	1.069** (0.464)	-0.110 (0.567)	-0.607 (0.392)
Executive Office	3.347*** (0.592)	-13.986*** (1.387)	2.105*** (0.438)	2.152* (1.157)		
Parliamentary Office	1.285* (0.691)	0.892 (0.625)	-0.138 (0.618)	-19.066*** (0.789)	-1.040* (0.591)	0.274 (0.695)
Age Joined Party	0.068 (0.043)	0.040 (0.043)	0.024 (0.025)	-0.044 (0.033)	-0.081** (0.039)	0.037 (0.038)
Intercept	-3.444*** (1.291)	-4.308*** (1.101)	-2.598*** (0.880)	-3.001** (1.472)	-6.056*** (1.483)	-1.358 (0.994)
Observations		1,556				1,350
Policy Field Fixed-Effects		Yes				Yes
R ²		0.245				0.115
Log Likelihood		-994.352				-950.287
LR Test		645.091*** (df = 52)				248.044*** (df = 68)

Note: Standard errors clustered by MPs, *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.13: Multinomial Logit Estimation of Length of Membership, B90/Gr and PDS/Linke

	B90/Grüne			PDS/Linke		
	Excused from Voting	Missing from Voting	Voting Against the Majority	Excused from Voting	Missing from Voting	Voting Against the Majority
Age	-0.017 (0.028)	0.001 (0.023)	0.018 (0.021)	0.009 (0.024)	0.047* (0.024)	-0.018 (0.019)
Female	-0.539 (0.440)	0.697 (0.476)	-0.141 (0.361)	0.525 (0.488)	-0.134 (0.487)	-0.176 (0.384)
Probability of Re-Election List	2.469** (1.017)	1.644** (0.780)	-0.100 (0.688)	0.770 (0.490)	-0.566 (0.756)	-0.604 (0.568)
Probability of Re-Election District				-1.724 (1.457)	-0.005 (1.423)	-1.391 (2.364)
Party Office	1.480*** (0.452)	0.594 (0.589)	-1.048* (0.553)	0.719 (0.479)	0.080 (0.523)	-0.586 (0.461)
Executive Office	3.319*** (0.591)	-13.912*** (1.386)	2.103*** (0.437)			
Parliamentary Office	1.293* (0.695)	0.862 (0.615)	-0.137 (0.620)	-19.761*** (0.820)	-0.855 (0.596)	0.340 (0.643)
Length of Membership	-0.064 (0.042)	-0.048 (0.041)	-0.023 (0.025)	0.074*** (0.027)	0.060** (0.029)	-0.147*** (0.039)
Intercept	-3.426*** (1.290)	-4.344*** (1.097)	-2.595*** (0.880)	-3.854*** (1.392)	-5.460*** (1.451)	0.029 (0.822)
Observations	1,560					
Policy Field Fixed-Effects	Yes					
R ²	0.244					
Log Likelihood	-999.269					
LR Test	645.878*** (df = 52)					
	256.004*** (df = 68)					

Note: Standard errors clustered by MPs, *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.14: Multinomial Logit Estimation of Member Other Party, B90/Gr and PDS/Linke

	B90/Grüne			PDS/Linke		
	Excused from Voting	Missing from Voting	Voting Against the Majority	Excused from Voting	Missing from Voting	Voting Against the Majority
Age	-0.039 (0.027)	-0.002 (0.023)	0.011 (0.021)	0.050** (0.023)	0.036 (0.025)	-0.015 (0.021)
Female	-0.500 (0.433)	0.833* (0.480)	-0.219 (0.387)	0.064 (0.475)	0.004 (0.529)	-0.582 (0.456)
Probability of Re-Election List	2.353** (0.974)	1.228 (0.776)	-0.133 (0.699)	0.468 (0.532)	-0.434 (0.632)	1.037 (0.703)
Probability of Re-Election District				-3.203** (1.506)	0.804 (1.155)	0.099 (1.513)
Party Office	1.506** (0.451)	0.456 (0.618)	-0.999* (0.557)	0.653 (0.408)	0.148 (0.552)	-0.052 (0.407)
Executive Office	2.985*** (0.627)	-14.191*** (1.341)	1.909*** (0.382)			
Parliamentary Office	1.260** (0.638)	0.511 (0.655)	-0.202 (0.636)	0.242 (0.873)	-0.883 (0.616)	0.310 (0.588)
Member of Other Party	0.228 (1.171)	0.553 (0.680)	-0.169 (0.561)	-0.743 (0.502)	0.236 (0.584)	-0.975* (0.527)
Intercept	-3.269*** (1.165)	-4.512*** (1.112)	-2.548*** (0.900)	-4.523*** (1.352)	-4.349*** (1.486)	-1.522 (0.970)
Observations		1,483				1,504
Policy Field Fixed-Effects		Yes				Yes
R ²		0.238				0.124
Log Likelihood		-964.651				-1,070.458
LR Test		601.004*** (df = 52)				302.555*** (df = 80)

Note: Standard errors clustered by MPs, *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.15: Multinomial Logit Estimation of Party Office before 1st Candidacy, B90/Gr and PDS/Linke

	B90/Grüne			PDS/Linke		
	Excused from Voting	Missing from Voting	Voting Against the Majority	Excused from Voting	Missing from Voting	Voting Against the Majority
Age	-0.033 (0.025)	-0.006 (0.020)	0.007 (0.020)	0.025 (0.023)	0.044** (0.021)	-0.022 (0.016)
Female	-0.415 (0.384)	0.623 (0.450)	-0.079 (0.340)	0.534 (0.394)	-0.030 (0.449)	-0.091 (0.332)
Probability of Re-Election List	2.205** (0.912)	1.802** (0.752)	0.087 (0.623)	0.626 (0.485)	-0.368 (0.624)	0.881* (0.499)
Probability of Re-Election District				-0.400 (1.020)	0.224 (1.070)	1.555 (0.983)
Party Office	1.500** (0.436)	0.689 (0.572)	-1.076* (0.554)	0.799** (0.393)	0.005 (0.517)	-0.090 (0.380)
Executive Office	3.022*** (0.606)	-14.379*** (1.275)	2.079*** (0.412)			
Parliamentary Office	1.135* (0.634)	0.613 (0.596)	-0.213 (0.623)	0.213 (0.882)	-0.211 (0.674)	-0.009 (0.567)
Party Office Before 1st Candidacy	0.005 (0.512)	-0.150 (0.474)	-0.299 (0.327)	-0.265 (0.389)	0.998* (0.531)	0.276 (0.373)
Intercept	-3.506*** (1.190)	-4.617*** (0.978)	-2.420*** (0.862)	-3.896*** (1.346)	-5.667*** (1.458)	-1.758* (0.999)
Observations	1,663					
Policy Field Fixed-Effects	Yes					
R ²	0.245					
Log Likelihood	-1,071.691					
LR Test	694.387*** (df = 52)					
	237.374*** (df = 68)					

Note: Standard errors clustered by MPs, *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Chapter 4

Behavioral Consequences of Open Candidate Recruitment

Candidate selection methods (CSM) crucially affect the behavior of Members of Parliament (MPs). Extant research investigates the consequentiality of the selectorate, but is neglecting the candidacy dimension of CSM. But what are the behavioral implications of minimal candidacy eligibility criteria (CEC)? I theorize that parties adopt closed CEC in safe districts to ensure nominating loyalist candidates, while they use open CEC in contested districts to attract entrepreneur candidates able to woo decisive swing voters. Using survey and observational data from Japan, where parties have concurrently been nominating candidates through open and more closed CEC, I show that entrepreneur candidates are more responsive to their districts but less active in the legislature, measured by different types of activities. These findings corroborate my expectations that entrepreneur candidates lack political experience and are sidelined by their more traditional colleagues. Moreover, the results broaden our understanding of how CSM affect MPs' behavior.

Introduction

Who can become a candidate for general elections? Recently, it seems that membership in political parties is losing in importance for political careers. An increasing number of parties have started expanding their supply of candidates, oftentimes reaching out to non-affiliated citizens. Examples include Sebastian Kurz, Prime Minister of Austria, who hand-picked political outsiders without party membership for his party-list in 2017 (Austria Presse Agentur 2017). The Social Democrats in neighbouring Germany, too, have started experimenting with broadening their supply of candidates in a radical way. The party placed a job advertisement on Facebook to find a suitable candidate to run in the district of *Bitburg-Prüm* for the general election (Ripperger 2016). In the wake of political

dealignment, including the erosion of partisan identification (e.g., Dalton and Wattenberg 2002), a decline in membership-based politics and dwindling numbers of party members (e.g., van Biezen and Poguntke 2014), these trends in political recruitment seem only logical.

Selecting candidates for elections is one of the most important and consequential tasks political parties carry out. Parties' recruitment schemes determine the demographic, ideological and geographic make-up of parliament to an enormous degree. The recent changes in parties' selectorates, i.e. the party's body that decides on nominations, and especially the trend towards greater inclusion of rank-and-file members in primary elections for party leaders and general election candidates (see e.g., Pilet and Cross 2014; Cross and Blais 2012), have been mirrored by medial attention and by academic studies exploring the consequences of these changes for electoral competition (Kenig 2009), representation (Lawless and Pearson 2008), or party voting unity (Indridason and Kristinsson 2015).

However, inclusive candidate selection methods are not limited to the installment of primary elections or to other changes in the selectorate. The supply of would-be candidates, too, varies across parties and appears to open up. Yet, we know only little about the behavioral consequences of this variation and when the supply of candidates is opened up to citizens that lack party membership and prior political experience. What can voters, who often face a "take it or leave" option, and parties alike expect from Member of Parliament (MP) that were, for instance, recruited in the wake of public calls for applications?

Although conventional views suggest that parties recruit candidates from within their own ranks and affiliated networks, not all parties require aspirants to be formal members of the party in order to seek the party's nomination. In fact, parties often are aware of the electoral attractiveness of candidates that appear to be an alternative to more established political figures. One of the most recent examples is the landslide victory of *La République en marche* (REM) in France's legislative election in June 2017. The party was launched only in April 2016 by Emmanuel Macron, who himself was elected President in May 2017. Both, the president and his party are perceived as overcoming the traditional party-divide that has ruled France ever since the beginning of the V. Republic. However, the party's appeal is equally due to the many fresh faces it presented to the voters. Roughly 19.000 citizens felt encouraged to apply as candidate. More than half of the final pick of 525 has never held any elective office before (The Economist 2017; Par et al. 2017).

While fielding candidates not tainted by previous establishment politics might generate votes and eventually a parliamentary majority as in the French case, many of these newly minted MPs feel ill-prepared for their legislative duties and have started considering quitting altogether (see Samuel 2017). Overwhelmed by the workload and underprepared due

to a lack of prior experience, inefficient and inactive MPs might serve well as voting cattle in parliament but risk that policy-making will shift to the executive or extra-parliamentary party entities and that the opposition fails in holding the cabinet accountable – this lack of experience is something parties cannot induce through the whip. In the long-run this trend of selecting inexperienced candidates can even contribute to pre-mature coalition terminations (de Lange and Art 2011) and could eventually undermine the importance of legislatures.

What is the reasoning of parties when opening up their supply of candidates? The above examples already hint at a possible reason. In a nascent era of outsider- and the decline of membership-based politics (van Biezen and Poguntke 2014), established parties are put in a tough place to secure majorities. Ever more are parties forced to appeal to an ever more diversified electorate. In many cases, this entails that in any given electoral system major parties face districts with weak and strong support. Below I theorize that in safe districts parties employ more strict Candidacy Eligibility Criteria (CEC) in order to sort out *loyalist* from free-riding candidates. In weak and contested districts, however, parties are compelled to use less demanding CEC to broaden the supply of would-be candidates and to attract promising *entrepreneur* candidates that are able to woo independent voters through their personality rather than the party's ideology. I hypothesize that these *entrepreneur* candidates, selected through open recruitment, exhibit a greater personal responsiveness to their district but fall short in playing their part in the legislative arena. Due to a lack of prior exposure to the workings of politics that comes with long-term party membership and socialization, these MPs are excluded from long-standing co-partisan networks, are ill-prepared for drafting intricate legislative texts, for holding government accountable and they might carry ill-fitting expectations of their legislative tasks and duties. This lack in legislative prowess has severe implications for party governance in democratic systems.

To address the theoretical implications, I take advantage of the Japanese case. Similar to the German example, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and its centre-right opponent the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), besides some smaller parties, have been recruiting candidates through public job postings – known as *kōbo* – for general elections on a large scale for the last 20 or so years. The *kōbo* system as implemented by the DPJ and the LDP is more or less open to anybody wishing to run for office and both parties have nominated a total of 189 *kōbo* selected candidates in the five general elections between 2000 to 2012. Out of these, 133 candidates were elected and entered parliament (Yu, Yu, and Shoji 2014). As Smith, Pekkanen, and Krauss (2013) shows, the overwhelming majority of these candidates have never held any elective political office before, neither at the national nor local level and oftentimes became party members only in the process. At the same time,

though, these parties were also nominating candidates using more traditional ways, which allows for a sound comparison of candidates with different selection backgrounds.

Using data from candidate surveys and data on legislative activity, measured by the number of written questions tabled and Private Member Bills (PMB) initiated and cosponsored, I show that *entrepreneur* candidates in fact return more often to their districts while parliament is in session and are less likely to engage with the legislative process when in government and less likely to hold government accountable when in opposition. Instead of focusing on rather re-active legislative behavior or those regulated by the leadership of the parliamentary party group, e.g. roll-call votes or floor speeches, the rather pro-active behavior of written questions and PMBs allows to compare the innate disposition, ability and drive of MPs. These findings support my theoretical expectations about the legislative non-activity and these MPs' weak standing in the party, questioning these candidates' value to the party in parliament apart from being "voting cattle".

While a growing number of studies is focusing on causes and consequences of the selectorate dimension (Hazan and Rahat 2010), we know relatively little about behavioral consequences of more open candidacy requirements (a notable exception, Smith and Tsutsumi 2014). What can party leaders and voters alike expect from such candidates that often enter politics through the short-cut of applying for nominations in response to public calls for applications? This paper offers the first empirical investigation of the behavioral consequences of variations of these requirements. By doing so, I address two major strands of the literature; my findings add to the literature on CSM and legislative politics. While CSM are primarily understood to shape the behavior of candidates and MPs through the degree of (in-) dependence felt toward the selector (e.g., Carey 2009), I show that CSM affect the behavior of political actors through a second channel, too, namely the candidacy dimension, i.e. the kind of personnel that is eligible to seek nomination. The next section provides a brief overview of the scarce studies on the candidacy dimension in the literature.

Candidate Selection and Candidate Behavior

The study of CSM is influenced tremendously by the seminal work of Hazan and Rahat (2001; 2010), who conceptualized candidate selection mechanisms along four distinct dimensions – i.e., the selectorate, the candidacy, the decentralization and the voting system. While most attention has been paid to the dimension of the selectorate (Kenig 2009; Kenig et al. 2015; Shomer 2009; Faas 2003; Indridason and Kristinsson 2015) and the degree of

centralization (Lundell 2004; Langston 2006), the candidacy dimension failed to amass a similar degree of attention.

Although the country-specific contributions in Gallagher and Marsh (1988) offer a first overview of some of the personal characteristics a party's selectorate is looking for in a candidate, no systematic analyses of how candidates recruited under different eligibility criteria are provided. Taking a step back and examining the supply of candidates more thoroughly, the work by Fox and Lawless (2005; 2010) and Lawless (2012) revolves around the formation of political ambition prior to any political work or office and sheds light on the socio-economics, the character traits and familial socialization that encourages and fosters the development of these ambitions to seek nomination and run for office. However, their studies stop before entering the realm of political parties, their candidacy requirements and the latter's behavioral consequences.

Yet, while the US with its open primaries and weak gate-keeping capacity of its parties, seems to be an ideal case to study the effect of low demanding CEC, previous studies have suggested that despite the *de jure* openness of the selection process, outsiders barely have a chance of securing a party's nomination. Most incumbents go either unchallenged or win against low-quality challengers (e.g., Carson, Engstrom, and Roberts 2007). Even in the contest for open seats in the wake of an incumbent's retirement or death, mainly high-quality candidates, i.e. candidates with prior political experience who have held elective office at a lower administrative level before, secure the party's nomination (e.g., Hirano and Snyder Jr. 2014). Hence, despite the fact that US party primaries are technically among the most inclusive selectorates, the recruitment of candidates for Congress remains closed to an inner circle of career politicians.

The only study, so far, that examines the consequences of variation along the candidacy dimension is the one by Smith and Tsutsumi (2014). Relying on the same empirical example which will be used in this article, they show that new candidates recruited under more open candidacy requirements exhibit more moderate policy attitudes than their counterparts recruited through traditional channels. They also show that the open recruitment scheme attracted more candidates without prior political experience and without local roots in the district they ran in. However, the study is limited as it only looks at candidates and neglects to analyse the parliamentary behavior of those candidates selected under open recruitment that were elected.

Despite all the mounting research on candidate recruitment and most specifically the selectorate, there is virtually no study investigating the behavioral and representational consequences of variations on what Hazan and Rahat (2010) call the "candidacy dimension" (save for Smith and Tsutsumi 2014). The significance of the candidacy dimension

results from its rather easy changeability of eligibility requirements for candidates and can eliminate a huge number of otherwise eligible aspirants. It has been noted early on, that the structure of a recruitment scheme affects the type of candidate coming forward, and the variation in the same should also lead to variation in the motivation and characteristics of those candidates (Black 1972). When allowing virtually everybody to seek nomination without any formal filter, i.e. official candidacy requirements, aspirants less interested in the party's policy position but more so in its electoral sway are likely to emerge, as I argue below. But what indeed can party leaders and voters expect from candidates nominated in the wake of public calls for applications? The next section will lay out my assumptions on why and when parties institute open recruitment and when they employ rather demanding CEC, and how this shapes the type of candidate likely to come forward under each of these selection regimens.

Theory

The selection of candidates is one of the defining functions parties fulfill in democratic systems. By presenting and pre-selecting a number of candidates to the electorate, parties reduce the voters' choice in terms of personnel tremendously and crucially determine the final composition of parliament. Oftentimes, voters face a "take it or leave it" option. But what can parties and voters expect from candidates selected under open recruitment in terms of behavior and legislative prowess? A candidate that is likely to have no prior political experience and who potentially is an opportunist trying to seize their chance of national office? What are the behavioral repercussions when aspirants for candidacy have to fulfill only a bare minimum of requirements?

CSM have been found to play a crucial role in determining the behavior of members of parliament. The main channel through which CSM are thought to affect the behavior of candidates and MPs is the level of (in-) dependence from the party leadership. Contingent on who is responsible for (re-) selection, candidates and MPs might cozy up to primary voters or toe the party line in order to please the national party leadership (see Carey 2009). However, in this paper I argue that a second channel exists through which CSM affect MPs' behavior. This second channel works directly via the personnel that is selected as candidates and, later on, take seat in parliament. Parties regulate their supply of candidates through more or less restrictions on candidacy eligibility criteria (CEC). These requirements are often subject to parties' internal rules and, hence, easily malleable and capable of eliminating a huge number of otherwise eligible personnel. Thus, parties that desire to arrive in parliament as a cohesive unit may set demanding criteria to only select committed candidates. On the other hand, if parties are more interested in attracting

electorally promising candidates, opening up selections to a more diverse set of candidates is the way to go (Hazan and Rahat 2010, p.20 f.).

The continuum of candidacy requirements runs from being completely open, with few to none requirements, to highly closed, with multiple requirements to be fulfilled by aspirants. At the open end, parties do not impose any requirements and candidates only have to abide to the very basic legal requirements of minimum age and citizenship. However, moving toward more closed candidacy, parties may demand the fulfillment of additional requirements. The most common being party membership. Many parties expect aspirants to have joined the party a specified time before a possible nomination is being bestowed. Further requirements may include pledges of loyalty, monetary deposits, or recommendations from other party members (Hazan and Rahat 2010; Poguntke et al. 2016). As a result, and contingent on the very opportunity structure created by the CEC, a varying set of would-be candidates is likely to come forward and seek nomination (Black 1972). One of the most important factors in the candidates' pondering whether to run, is the cost of candidacy – to be understood as the monetary costs associated with campaigning as well as the costs that accrue by fulfilling parties' CEC.

Accordingly, the more demanding CEC are, the higher is the cost associated with seeking candidacy. Costs might be low when joining the party at any time before the election suffices, but grow costlier when would-be candidates have to canvass sitting MPs to collect signatures or do even more. This requires a great deal of networking and a significant amount of time. Only would-be candidates that are highly committed and who have joined the party out of intrinsic – i.e. ideological – rather than instrumental reasons are likely to deem this ordeal worthwhile. In other words, the cost of candidacy associated with the party's CEC can be neutralized to some degree by the utility would-be candidates derive from purely being a member and by being in good standing with other party members. From the party's perspective, costlier CEC create a structure of selective incentives that helps to sort out free-riding candidates that are *only* in for the promise of office (Hazan and Rahat 2010, p. 21). Although all final candidates hope to win election, parties can ensure through highly demanding criteria that only those would-be candidates come forward that have proven their commitment to the party – i.e. party loyalists.

So what are the incentives for parties to be more open about candidacies? For one, parties, not unlike candidates, want to win elections or at least win as many seats as possible, be it to enter government or just to be in a better position to promote the parties' platforms. Following the logic of the model laid out by Galasso and Nannicini (2011), I assume that parties use different variants of candidate selection to target specific districts, which differ structurally in their party support. That is, parties face safe, contested and hopeless

districts. As Galasso and Nannicini (2011) have suggested for the case of Italy, parties usually select *loyalists* in safe districts. By doing so, they ensure the election of its core personnel while simultaneously giving the voters a candidate that is ideologically close to them. In contested districts, in contrast, parties are more likely to nominate high-valence candidates that are not necessarily associated with the party but that can woo independent and swing voters who cast their votes based not on party affiliation but on idiosyncratic evaluations of the candidates' personalities.²¹ How does this affect the CEC of parties? As parties usually have no shortage of willing candidates to run in safe districts, employing more demanding CEC deters those free-riding on the electorally attractive party ticket and instead ensures the selection of committed loyalist candidate. In contested districts, however, parties may open up their selection and encourage applications from a broader and more diverse set of would-be candidates that are able to capture the swing vote. This holds the promise of selecting the most attractive applicants out of many and, in addition, to veil these candidates in an aura of a seemingly enhanced open and democratic selection.

What type of candidate is likely to come forward and seek candidacy when parties employ more open CEC? Installing more open CEC first and foremost has the consequence of reducing the cost of candidacy for would-be candidates. Instead of costly demands of membership, parties may merely ask candidates to pledge allegiance to the party's platform. Moreover, the party leadership may even advertise their search for candidates in newspapers (Yu, Yu, and Shoji 2014) or online. As a result, would-be candidates previously deterred by strict and costly CEC now feel encouraged to seek nomination. I name those candidates that respond to these *casting*-selections *entrepreneurs* as opposed to *loyalists*. These entrepreneur candidates take advantage when parties open up their CEC and, once selected, benefit from the party's campaign machinery and support.

The candidacy of the entrepreneur candidate is the product of special circumstances. Only through the lowering of selection criteria and the encouragement of non-member to apply for candidacy are entrepreneur candidates put into the situation of being a candidate. For most of these candidates, this is a first. As they lack the socialization that comes with long-term party membership, they are unlikely to have undergone the same political trajectory as loyalist candidates. These include campaign experiences, elective office at the local or regional level, and the establishment of a support network within the local

²¹One could also argue that parties are not actively targeting certain districts but that they are rather re-active about the selection of candidates. That is, in weak districts parties may lack promising candidates in the first place which triggers the search for more independent and less affiliated candidates. However, this argumentative difference does not alter the conjunction of weak support in districts and the nomination of more independent candidates on one hand, and the nomination of party members in safer districts on the other.

and national party. All this can put entrepreneur candidates at odds with the ideologically more zealous rank-and-file of the party (see e.g. Shoji 2013).

In their bid for re-selection and re-election, entrepreneur candidates are thus well advised to make friends with the local party chapter. To credibly do so, they either have to produce some personal link with the district (Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen 2005; Campbell and Cowley 2014), or at least show “good will” and engage with local politics and issues. By spending more time in the constituency, entrepreneur candidates can gather local knowledge, increase their name recognition, and can more plausibly claim to know “what it’s like down here”. Moreover, being present in the district may also serve to mend fences with suspicious local rank-and-file members, who generally favor policy and ideology over personal advancement (van Haute and Gauja 2015; Young and Cross 2002), and on whose support future campaigns hinge.

Hypothesis 1: Candidates selected under more open candidacy requirements are more likely to be responsive to their district and local party chapter, especially in their early terms.

As a corollary of the pre-occupation with constituency work and the lack of previous political experience, entrepreneur candidates once elected into parliament are possibly in a difficult position to engage in the detail-oriented and intricate legislative process. Therefore, I expect them to struggle first in the legislative arena but to adapt later on when learning the rules of the game. Moreover, as entrepreneur candidates make their way into national politics via open recruitment, a short-cut compared to traditional political career trajectories, more seasoned candidates and MPs might hold grievances against them and exclude them from their mutual support networks. Over time, however, entrepreneur candidates may earn their senior’s trust and start working together with them. That is, with increasing time in parliament and exposure to its working mechanisms, entrepreneur candidates are likely to converge in their behavior with MPs selected under more closed CEC.

Hypothesis 2: Members of Parliament selected under more open candidacy requirements are less likely to engage in pro-active legislative activity in their early terms.

In the next section I will elaborate on the background of the open recruitment scheme administered by major Japanese parties and why they provide the perfect empirical example to assess these hypotheses.

Empirical Strategy and Data

Open Candidate Recruitment in Japan

My hypotheses will be addressed by taking advantage of the unique Japanese case, where major parties have been fielding two types of candidates concurrently since the early 2000s. The electoral reform of the mid-1990s left its mark on the CSM of the major Japanese parties. Confronted with a new electoral system using single-seat districts, the veteran Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) saw a centralization of its CSM (Asano 2006) and a demand for candidates with universal appeals, transcending the particularistic ones prevalent under the former SNTV system (e.g. Catalinac 2016). Among the opposition, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), a merger of several centre-left and centrist parties, formed and assumed the role of the main opposition party in the early 2000s. However, the DPJ's initial ambitions were cut short by a shortage of (quality) candidates and weak local organizations.

To overcome this shortage, attract promising candidates and compensate for weak local party organizations,²² the DPJ started to employ nationwide open recruitment – known as *kōbo*, literally meaning public advertisement of a position – and was followed in this by other newly founded parties such as the Japan Restoration Party (JRP) or Your Party (YP). *kōbo* is designed as a competitive recruitment scheme to attract potential candidates from the general public irrespective of party membership or political experience. The DPJ, in fact, invested around 50 to 100 million JPY on ads in newspapers for each round of *kōbo* recruitment, which usually were held before elections (Yu, Yu, and Shoji 2014). Basically, aspirants need to fulfill merely the conditions spelled out in the Public Offices Election Law's chapter on passive suffrage, i.e. holding the Japanese citizenship and being of at least 25 years.

In the first step, applications are sent directly to the national headquarter, where a first screening takes place. Applicants, then, have to undergo interviews with senior party members before entering negotiations about potential districts to run in, in the second round. In the final step, the headquarter has to mediate between local party chapters and finalists designated to a given vacant district, to ensure the former's support. Technically, *kōbo* recruitment differed from traditional recruitment only in the first step, while all prospective candidates had to undergo steps two and three as well (Shoji 2013). Hence, *kōbo* and non-*kōbo* candidates barely differ in their selectorate background.

²²In case of the DPJ, *kōbo* nomination across districts is thus not random but oftentimes rather a function of whether or not high quality candidates exist in the district already. I address potential issues of confounding of selection background with district characteristics in my analyses.

Pushed into the defensive, the ever-dominant LDP, too, adopted *kōbo* recruitment to fill vacant districts, lest being branded as a rather backwards and closed party in comparison. Compared to the DPJ, the LDP's open recruitment is handled at the district level and the actual implementation of *kōbo* recruitment varies between districts. Some of these are more open in terms of CEC than others. Among the more strict districts, applicants have to be members of the party and/or collect signatures (Smith, Pekkanen, and Krauss 2013; Yu, Yu, and Shoji 2014). However, in the LDP, too, does the selectorate dimension barely differ between the two types of candidates. In general, moreover, the overall majority of *kōbo* recruitment is highly open and encourages applications from a broader range of would-be candidates. Party-fixed effects in the analysis accounts for the differences in *kōbo* implementation.

In the five elections between 2000 and 2012, while also fielding candidates selected through traditional channels, the two biggest parties, the DPJ and the LDP, ran a total of 189 *kōbo* recruited candidates, out of which 133 were eventually elected to the House of Representatives (HOR) which holds 480 seats in total (Yu, Yu, and Shoji 2014, appendix). Thus, a significant number of candidates and MPs during this time were in fact selected through highly open CEC. Underscoring my earlier assumption, Smith and Tsutsumi (2014) show that *kōbo* selected candidates, indeed, have less political experience (measured by local office and service in the House of Councillors). While this is true for the large majority of *kōbo*, there are a few instances, mostly in the LDP, in which hereditary politicians or previous staffer to MPs were selected through *kōbo* recruitment, though.

In addition, the mixed-member electoral system of Japan makes running in otherwise contested districts – bivariate relationships indicate that districts with *kōbo* recruitment are slightly more competitive – not completely unattractive for (inexperienced) candidates. Most parties usually place all their candidates that compete in the nominal tier also on the party list – on the same slot! While those candidates that win their districts are ticked-off the party list, the remaining district-loser are reordered on the party list in accordance to their loss margin (their voteshare divided by the district winner's voteshare). Contingent on the number of PR seats won by the party in a given PR block, these re-ranked “best-losers” are elected too through the party list. This “safety-net” provision implies that candidates running in insecure districts do not have to win the district *per se* to get elected, but only to mobilize enough votes to be among a certain top number of best losers within their own party.

The Japanese case, thus, presents an ideal case to test my theoretical expectations concerning the effects of more inclusive candidacy requirements. As both types of candidates were running at the same time for the same parties within the same electoral system, pos-

sible cultural, periodical or systemic confounders, typical pitfalls in cross-country studies, as well as the selectorate dimension in candidate selection are controlled for by design. In the next section I will present the data sources that I use to empirically assess my hypotheses.

Data

I make use of two main data sources; the pre-election candidate survey jointly administered by the University of Tokyo and the *Asahi Shimbun* (henceforth UTAS survey)²³ and data on legislative activity, available on the website of the HOR.²⁴ From the UTAS survey, I will use the 2012 wave, as only for the 2012 election were incumbent candidates asked how often they have been returning to their district in the previous legislative term. This question is used to examine my first hypothesis by looking at the frequency of returning as an observable implication of a greater personal responsiveness to the district. Overall, this wave, targeting all candidates competing, has an average response rate of 93,4 %. Data on legislative activity consists of the introduction and cosponsoring of Private Member Bills (PMB) and written questions in the HOR by individual MPs for the 43th to 46th electoral periods between 2003 and 2014. Members of the HOR may submit bills to parliament, irrespective of the government's policy agenda. MPs intending to submit PMB need the support of at least 20 other legislators. Apart from initiating own PMBs, MPs can also endorse and cosponsor other MPs' PMBs to broaden support. PMBs and written questions are legislative activities the least controlled by party leadership or the plenary agenda when compared to speeches or legislative voting. These kind of activities can therefore be considered *pro-active* and to measure a MP's legislative activity and capability more accurately (see also Burden 2007).

The samples for my analyses thus vary according to the hypotheses tested (Table 4.2 in the Appendix provides descriptive statistics organized by my hypotheses). Whereas the first hypothesis on district responsiveness is tested using the sample of incumbent candidates in the 2012 election, my hypotheses on legislative activity are assessed by a sample of all MPs in the four legislative terms between 2003 and 2014,²⁵ as the number of elected *kōbo* candidates reached significant numbers in these periods. The shares of *kōbo* among all MPs for each period are 4,34 %, 8,68 %, 14,38 %, and 26,46 %, respectively.

In the following analyses, I employ the coding of Smith and Tsutsumi (2014) and code *kōbo* MPs with a 1 if they were selected through open recruitment, i.e. candidates that applied

²³See <http://www.masaki.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/utas/utasindex.html>.

²⁴See <http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/index.nsf/html/index.htm>.

²⁵The 43th (2003-2005), 44th (2005-2009), 45th (2009-2012), and 46th (2012-2014).

and were selected following public calls for nominations, and 0 otherwise. The majority of control variables are binary in nature, too. I suspect that *kōbo* will be negatively associated with either *Party Office*, *Parliamentary Office* or *Executive Office*. However, since parliamentary activity, too, is likely to be correlated with these three types of office, I control for each using a binary indicator. Specifically, holding *Party Office* is coded 1 if a given MP fulfills one of the following functions within the party: leader, vice-leader, secretary-general, or chairman of one of the party's internal councils, such as the Policy Research Council (in case of the LDP) or the Election Strategy Council. *Parliamentary Office* is coded 1 for all MPs that chair or are directors of any committee in the HOR and 0 otherwise. *Executive Office* is coded one for all cabinet members. Given the frequent cabinet reshuffles and common fluctuation in committee chairmanship, 1s are assigned to these two variables if a given MP held a cabinet post or a committee chairmanship, respectively, at some point during the legislative term. *Government status*, too, is assumed to correlate with certain activities in parliament and with the number of *kōbo* MPs. Similarly, *Seniority* is assumed to be associated with legislative activity and negatively with the freshmen status of many *kōbo* MPs. It is measured as the number of times elected to the HOR. *Vote Margin* indicates the difference in the voteshares of the district's winner and the runner-up and shall account for electoral permissiveness of legislative activity. Additionally, since most candidates take advantage of the dual-candidacy opportunity in the Japanese mixed-member system, district losers may still be elected to parliament through the party list. For these so-called *zombie MPs* the vote margin is calculated as the distance to the district winner's voteshare and is therefore negative.

Analysis

Returning to the District

In this section I address my first hypothesis on candidates' responsiveness to their district and the local party chapter. Given the limitation of available data to test the interaction of candidates with their local party chapter and their constituents directly, I rely on an observable implication of my hypothesis: the frequency of incumbents to return to their district. As frequent visits signal interest in local matters on part of the MP we should expect MPs with weak standing in the local party chapters to return more often in order to strengthen their position in both the electorate and the party. Although all candidates respective MPs competing in geographic electoral districts are thought to be policy-responsive to their district, *kōbo* candidates and MPs are in addition more heavily induced to be personally responsive on account of their presumable outsider status.

The UTAS survey was conducted shortly before the 2012 general election and targeted all candidates. With a response rate of 84 % among incumbents and after dropping $n = 55$ MPs that solely competed through the party-list in the previous election and removing parties that did not employ open recruitment²⁶, I am left with $n = 333$ observations for analysis (i.e. 78,4 % of incumbent competing in districts in 2009). The survey provided an ordinal answer scheme with six categories to the question how often MPs return to their district; *never*, *once a month*, *two to three times a month*, *once a week*, *every other day* and *everyday*. Given the skewed distribution of the ordinal variable, peaking at *once a week* with $n = 220$, I collapse *never*, *once a month*, and *two to three times a month* into the new category *less than once a week*. The two categories of *every other day* and *everyday* were grouped together to form the category *more than once a week*.

Concerns about misreporting of how often incumbents have returned to their districts are warranted – especially for those electorally weak. However, I expect that visits to the districts are aimed not solely to win over voters but moreover to appease potentially suspicious party members on the ground. Misreporting how often MPs have returned can in the eyes of local party members, who have greater knowledge of how often their incumbent actually has returned, paint the misreporting incumbent in an unfavorable light. Moreover, controlling for vote margin might partially account for the incentive to misreport. However, I can not rule out misreporting completely and findings should thus be consumed with caution.

Table 4.1 presents estimation results based on multinomial logistic models.²⁷ I control for the distance from the HOR, which is based in Tokyo’s 1st district,²⁸ party and executive office as well as seniority, the previous vote margin and party fixed-effects. Moreover, to account for possibly systematic variation in the nomination of *kōbo* across districts, I control for the party’s district voteshare in the 2005 election as the incumbents of the 2012 wave of the UTAS survey were nominated for and elected in the 2009 election. In this way, I control for the past electoral performance in the districts – which might have prompted open recruitment in the first place – and minimize spill-over effects on the selection background.

²⁶This, in combination with party fixed-effects, allows for a comparison of different candidate selection backgrounds within parties.

²⁷Robustness checks using ordered logit models yield the same results and can be found in Table 4.9 in the Appendix.

²⁸Using a shapefile of the 300 single-member districts, I calculate the distance between any given district and Tokyo’s 1st by taking the distance between the district-polygon’s centroids. To avoid distortions emanating from small islets off the Eastern coast belonging to Tokyo’s 10th district, I manually assigned a value 10 km based on a calculation using *Google maps*.

Chapter 4 Behavioral Consequences of Open Candidate Recruitment


The effect of the selection background is significant in all four model specifications. In the first two models *kōbo* selection background is coded as 1 only for those *kōbo*-selected MPs in their first legislative term – those *kōbo*-selected MPs in higher terms are coded 0 (Operationalization A). Models (3) and (4) codes all *kōbo*-selected MPs as 1 irrespective of the term they are serving (Operationalization B). As expected are *kōbo*-selected incumbents more likely to return to their district. This tendency, however, becomes less likely once they have reached higher seniority. Figure 4.1 shows average marginal predictions of *kōbo* selection background compared to a non-*kōbo* background for MPs in their first (panel a) and second term (panel b).

Table 4.1: Multinomial Logit Estimation. Returning to District

	Operationalization A				Operationalization B			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	less than once a week	more than once a week	less than once a week	more than once a week	less than once a week	more than once a week	less than once a week	more than once a week
<i>kōbo</i>	0.180 (1.123)	2.078*** (0.538)	0.867 (1.160)	1.699*** (0.564)	0.507 (0.767)	1.049** (0.476)	-0.090 (1.327)	1.638*** (0.557)
<i>kōbo</i> × Seniority							0.055 (0.550)	-0.971* (0.502)
Distance from Diet, in km (log)	-0.466** (0.215)	-1.777*** (0.197)	-0.445** (0.221)	-1.891*** (0.211)	-0.413* (0.219)	-1.863*** (0.208)	-0.427* (0.227)	-1.905*** (0.214)
Party Office	2.940** (1.151)	2.869* (1.643)	2.239* (1.160)	3.773** (1.852)	2.254* (1.159)	4.038** (1.882)	2.272* (1.160)	3.465* (1.883)
Executive Office	1.441** (0.598)	-1.513* (0.900)	0.572 (0.658)	-0.404 (1.035)	0.561 (0.657)	-0.507 (1.038)	0.546 (0.657)	-0.125 (1.087)
Born in Prefecture	-1.251*** (0.444)	-0.757* (0.423)	-1.196*** (0.463)	-0.798* (0.436)	-1.166** (0.465)	-0.725* (0.430)	-1.193** (0.467)	-0.793* (0.439)
Vote Margin	0.053*** (0.018)	0.029* (0.017)	0.063*** (0.020)	0.032* (0.017)	0.062*** (0.020)	0.025 (0.017)	0.061*** (0.020)	0.033* (0.017)
Previous Party Voteshare in District	-0.004 (0.022)	-0.067*** (0.021)	-0.028 (0.024)	-0.047* (0.024)	-0.027 (0.024)	-0.047* (0.024)	-0.029 (0.024)	-0.045* (0.024)
Seniority			0.347*** (0.115)	-0.447** (0.175)	0.342*** (0.115)	-0.495*** (0.176)	0.334*** (0.115)	-0.445** (0.177)
Constant	0.490 (1.578)	11.019*** (1.407)	0.457 (1.588)	11.398*** (1.489)	0.261 (1.588)	11.427*** (1.479)	0.528 (1.629)	11.386*** (1.490)
Observations	333		333		333		333	
Akaike Inf. Crit.	389.877		372.176		376.822		375.314	
Controls								
Party Fixed-Effects	Yes				Yes			

Note: Multinomial Logistic regression; “once a week” as reference category; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Controlling for the party’s previous voteshare in the district as well as the incumbents’ vote margins disentangles the effect of selection background first from structural characteristics that might have prompted open recruitment in the first place and secondly from other electoral incentives. To sum up and assuming no misreporting, these results suggest that *kōbo* selected incumbents tend to return to their district more often, which is strongest in their first legislative term. With increasing seniority *kōbo*-selected incumbents tend to converge in their behavior with their colleagues selected through more traditional channels.

Figure 4.1: Average Marginal Effects of being *kōbo*-selected MP on returning to district.

Graph shows average marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals of falling into respective category conditional on *kōbo* selection background. Reference category is *once a week*. Quantities obtained from model (4) in Table 4.1.

Legislative Activity

For my final hypothesis on legislative activity I now turn to observational data, specifically three different types of legislative activity: the number of written questions tabled and the number of PMBs a MP has initiated and cosponsored in a given legislative cycle²⁹. The initiation of PMBs and tabling of written questions are *pro-active* activities that reflect MPs' initiative and their prowess in the legislative arena to a greater degree than, say, *reactive* behavior such as roll-call votes (see Burden 2007). The cosponsoring of PMBs, in contrast, indicate not *pro-active* behavior of MPs but rather how well they are connected and respected within their party.

To isolate the impact of the candidacy background and to control for possible confounding features I run multivariate analyses and present robustness checks. Given the clear count nature of my data I employ negative binomial models with period and party fixed-effects and standard errors clustered by MPs.³⁰ All models are estimated on a subset containing only parties that have employed *kōbo* selection (i.e. DPJ, LDP, JRP and YP), to exploit the within-party variation in selection background. As before, two variants of the *kōbo* operationalization are employed. Variant A codes only *kōbo* in their first term as 1, while operationalization B codes any MP as *kōbo* if they have been selected through open se-

²⁹Source: <http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/index.nsf/html/index.htm>.


³⁰To ensure a common length of exposure time as assumed by count models, I have excluded MPs that dropped out during the term and MPs that entered midway as replacements. Moreover, I have excluded the two speakers of the House of Representatives, given their special role detached from legislation.

lection background at some point. Moreover, for each legislative activity there are three model specifications. The first one is pitching *kōbo* selected MPs against those selected through traditional channels. The second specification includes an interaction term with seniority to explore potential learning and socialization effects. The third specification, moreover, introduces an interaction effect with government status, as some types of legislative activities are more relevant to the opposition (e.g., questions) and others more relevant to government MPs (e.g., PMBs). Finally, robustness checks are presented by running the same models on all activities again using a binary variable (*kōbo*-District) that indicates those districts of a party that at some point saw or will see a *kōbo* selected candidate in my sample. These models exclude actual *kōbo*-selected MPs and thus compares MPs selected through traditional channels which ran in presumably difficult districts and those that ran in districts with purely traditional ways of selection. In this way, I disentangle the effects emanating from the selection background from those from district characteristics. That is, if it is the district that drives the results and not the selection background, we should see significant effects in the expected direction. In addition, a variable capturing the electoral margin is furthermore accounting for difficult districts and thus district-induced behavioral incentives for legislative activity.

Figure 4.4a presents average marginal effects of *kōbo* selection background shown as the difference in predicted counts for each type of legislative activity (all full models as well as zero-inflated negative binomial robustness tests of the same specifications are presented in Table 4.3 to 4.8 respective Table 4.10 to Table 4.12 in the Appendix). Among the *pro-active* activities *kōbo* selected MPs are significantly less likely to engage. On average, *kōbo* MPs table one written questions less than non-*kōbo* MPs. Similarly, *kōbo* MPs are less likely to initiate PMBs. When running these models again with an indicator for MPs of districts with a *kōbo* selection of the same party at some point – presented in Figure 4.4b – we do not observe any significant results. Overall, it appears that behavioral differences are mainly due to the selection background and not characteristics of a district which should affect the behavior of traditionally selected MPs too.

The second model specification attempts to capture learning and socialization effects by introducing an interaction term between selection background and seniority, measured by the times MPs have been elected to parliament. Figure 4.6a and 4.6b present again average marginal effects of *kōbo* selection background shown as differences in predicted counts and robustness tests, respectively. The upper panel clearly shows that newcomer with a *kōbo* selection background are significantly less likely to engage in tableing questions and initiating PMBs in their first two terms when compared to newcomer with a traditional selection background. Over time, however, these systematic differences become smaller

Figure 4.3: Average Marginal Effects. Differences in Predicted Counts by Activity.




Average marginal effects obtained through simulations of 1000 random draws from variance-covariance matrix. Solid lines indicate 90 % confidence intervals, dashed ones 95 %. Significant effects are shown in black, insignificant effects in grey.

and tend to disappear. No systematic difference can be reported when replacing $k\bar{o}b\bar{o}$ selection background with the $k\bar{o}b\bar{o}$ -District variable.


Finally, as not all legislative activities are equally relevant for all parliamentary actors, I furthermore introduce an interaction effect between $k\bar{o}b\bar{o}$ selection background and government status in the final model specification. Written questions, for example, are usually seen as the opposition’s mean to hold government accountable, while PMBs not introduced by government MPs have higher chances of success. Therefore, we would expect highly active opposition MPs to table many questions and government MPs to attempt introducing their or supporting a colleague’s legislative pet project through the initiation or cosponsoring of PMBs.

Figure 4.8a presents results for the final model specification accounting for the behavioral differences of government and opposition $k\bar{o}b\bar{o}$ selected MPs. When in government, $k\bar{o}b\bar{o}$ selected MPs are less likely to engage with the initiation or the cosponsoring of PMBs. This implies that $k\bar{o}b\bar{o}$ MPs lack the ability to draft and the connections to be asked to cosponsor PMBs. What does this reclusive behavior imply for the passage of PMBs? Since many PMBs are submitted by oppositional MPs anyhow, the overall share of PMBs that pass is rather low, roughly 8 % in the whole sample. However, those that did pass were cosponsored by 6.7 other MPs on average, those that did not by 4.9 MPs. More important, however, are cosponsors from across the aisle; passing bills, on average, had the support from 2 MPs from the government side if the initiator was in opposition and vice versa. In contrast, bills that did not pass had on average 0.15 supporters from the other block.

Figure 4.5: Average Marginal Effects. Differences in Predicted Counts by Activity and Seniority.




(a) AME of *kōbo*




(b) AME of *kōbo*-District

Average marginal effects obtained through simulations of 1000 random draws from variance-covariance matrix. Solid lines indicate 90 % confidence intervals, dashed ones 95 %. Significant effects are shown in black, insignificant effects in grey.

Figure 4.7: Average Marginal Effects. Differences in Predicted Counts by Activity and Government Status.



(a) AME of *kōbo*



(b) AME of *kōbo*-District

Average marginal effects obtained through simulations of 1000 random draws from variance-covariance matrix. Solid lines indicate 90% confidence intervals, dashed ones 95%. Significant effects are shown in black, insignificant effects in grey.

Among PMBs initiated by *kōbo*, not a single one elicited support from across the aisle. Support from the own party, too, is lower for PMBs initiated by *kōbo* colleagues with 3.7 cosponsors on average. It appears, the inactivity of *kōbo* is not in any sense rectified by greater legislative efficiency and that they are sidelined by their colleagues recruited through more traditional channels.

In opposition, *kōbo* MPs are also systematically less likely to hold government accountable by asking questions – to a large substantive degree. On average one can expect *kōbo* MPs to table roughly 25 questions less than non-*kōbo* in opposition. No similar pattern in these activities can be seen for non-*kōbo* MPs from *kōbo*-Districts as shown in Figure 4.8b.

In summary, *kōbo* selected MPs fail where it matters. In government, they are less likely or even able to grapple with legislation and in opposition they are less likely to hold government accountable. These findings corroborate my theoretical expectations. Although PMBs are not as consequential as legislation forwarded by the cabinet, it indicates how well MPs have mastered the craftsmanship of the legislative process, ranging from the formulation of complex issues to eliciting support and favors from colleagues. However, my findings show that not all hope is lost as *kōbo* selected MPs tend to converge over time in their legislative behavior toward MPs selected through traditional channels.

Given the political inexperience and electoral uncertainty of *kōbo*, it appears rational to allocate the limited resources of time and attention not on legislative but rather on activities that improve the chance of re-(s)election, such as constituency work. In the concluding section I discuss the normative implications that arise from the consequences of employing more open candidacy recruitment.

Conclusion

An increasing number of parties in established democracies have started to experiment with expanding their supply of candidates. Examples include the People's Party in Austria, the Social Democrats in Germany, and the French La République en marche that have all followed, though in different flavors naturally, Japanese parties which have pioneered in the nomination of candidates using public calls for applications. However, academic attention did not keep pace with this trend and its repercussions for legislative behavior are underresearched.

In this paper I have argued that CSM affect the behavior of candidates and MPs not only through the selectorate, but also through the candidacy dimension – the broadening of the supply side of eligible candidates. I have provided empirical evidence that the type

of personnel selected by parties using the same selectorate has crucial implications for legislative behavior. Specifically, the usage of open recruitment and the selection of rather inexperienced candidates has implications on at least two dimensions of behavior: first, the personal responsiveness of candidates to their districts, including constituents and local party activists, and second, legislative activity.

The first behavioral consequence is likely to speak to the weak standing of candidates and MPs selected under open recruitment in the party. The tendency to return more often to the district might be induced by the insecurity of the MP over the local party's support. Anecdotal evidence obtained through interviews with party officials by Shoji (2013) support the assumption that candidates and MPs selected under open recruitment were considered as taking a short-cut to national office. This could also explain the low support for legislation introduced by MPs selected under open recruitment in parliament, as more traditional MPs might hold grievances against them.

In the legislative arena, MPs selected under open recruitment are less active. Often times lacking prior political experience in local and party politics, these MPs are ill-equipped to quickly master the craftmanship of drawing own legislation or holding the government accountable. While government MPs selected under open recruitment are less likely to advance own legislative initiatives, their oppositional pendants are dramatically less likely to hold the government accountable by tableing questions.

In analogy to a growing number of studies showing that the seeming democratization of parties' internal conducts do not necessarily result in outcomes normatively valued – such as more competition in leadership races (Kenig 2009), higher legislative turnover (Put, Gouglas, and Maddens 2015), or more balanced gender or minority representation (Rahat, Hazan, and Katz 2008), – parties employing open candidate recruitment, too, might feel torn. As open recruitment candidates are thought more likely than traditional ones to win contested districts, parties might welcome them to maximize their seatshare. On the other hand, however, these candidates respective MPs fall short in fulfilling their legislative roles, as they are less likely – and possibly less able – to participate in the legislative process. On a larger scale, my findings resonate with those by de Lange and Art (2011). Nominating too many inexperienced candidates can contribute in undermining a party's ability perform. Therefore, the tendency to employ open recruitment could harbor further implications when a growing number of MPs lack the ability to craft legislation or to hold government accountable. Executives might take on an even bigger role in policy-making, perhaps sidelining an inexperienced and possibly disinterested and ill-prepared parliament.

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Cross-nationally, this trend to nominate politically inexperienced outsiders that oftentimes lack party membership, as has been happening in Japan but also more recently in France and Germany, underlines the relevance to study its behavioral consequences not only for legislatures but also for the electorate. Do candidates and MPs selected under open recruitment compensate their lack of legislative prowess by greater loyalty to the party and do they mobilize segments of the electorate hitherto abstaining from voting? Are voters more satisfied with democracy if they can vote for candidates that appear untainted by establishment politics? As the trend of candidate recruitment in established democracies moves into this general direction, these questions are becoming more relevant.

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Appendix

Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics by Hypotheses

<i>Hypothesis 1</i>	Selection Background	Mean	St. Deviation	Min	Max	N
Incumbents	kōbo	–	–	–	–	63
	non-kōbo	–	–	–	–	270
Return to District	kōbo	once a week*	–	never	every day	63
	non-kōbo	once a week*	–	never	every day	270
Distance from Parliament, in km	kōbo	5.005	1.339	2.190	6.798	63
	non-kōbo	5.355	1.392	0	7.592	270
Party Office	kōbo	0	0	0	0	0
	non-kōbo	0.041	0.198	0	1	11
Executive Office	kōbo	0.031	0.177	0	1	2
	non-kōbo	0.122	0.328	0	1	33
Vote Margin	kōbo	7.442	12.810	–26.68	36.97	63
	non-kōbo	10.301	13.854	–26.74	47.52	270
Previous Party Voteshare in District	kōbo	37.215	7.751	16.931	56.968	63
	non-kōbo	42.479	12.752	0	73.618	78
Seniority	kōbo	0.556	1.059	0	5	63
	non-kōbo	2.693	2.389	0	12	270
Born in Prefecture	kōbo	0.635	0.485	0	1	40
	non-kōbo	0.730	0.445	0	1	197
<i>Hypothesis 2</i>						
MPs	kōbo	–	–	–	–	245
	non-kōbo	–	–	–	–	1252
PMBs Initiated	kōbo	0.102	0.455	0	3	14
	non-kōbo	0.314	0.953	0	12	207
PMBs Cosponsored	kōbo	0.906	2.085	0	12	80 †
	non-kōbo	1.217	2.294	0	25	547 †
Written Questions	kōbo	0.563	2.777	0	32	29 †
	non-kōbo	2.044	16.62	0	423	228 †
Seniority	kōbo	0.665	1.325	0	11	245
	non-kōbo	3.018	2.785	0	15	1252
Party Office	kōbo	0.008	0.0902	0	1	2
	non-kōbo	0.044	0.205	0	1	55
Parliamentary Office	kōbo	0.482	0.501	0	1	118
	non-kōbo	0.698	0.459	0	1	874
Executive Office	kōbo	0.016	0.127	0	1	4
	non-kōbo	0.113	0.316	0	1	141
Vote Margin	kōbo	5.405	14.038	–36.32	61.29	245
	non-kōbo	10.996	16.596	–47.52	90.6	1252
kōbo District	kōbo	1	0	1	1	393
	non-kōbo	0	0	0	0	1104
Government MP	kōbo	0.812	0.391	0	1	199
	non-kōbo	0.634	0.482	0	1	794

* denotes the mode instead of mean; † number of MPs with PMB/Question/Speeches greater than or equal to 1.

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Table 4.3: Number of Written Questions. Negative Binomial Estimation.

	Number of Written Questions					
	Selection Background, Operationalization B			Robustness Check		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Seniority	-0.316*** (0.050)	-0.316*** (0.050)	-0.321*** (0.050)	-0.330*** (0.053)	-0.324*** (0.053)	-0.330*** (0.053)
Party Office	0.064 (0.425)	0.066 (0.427)	0.055 (0.421)	0.077 (0.440)	0.086 (0.442)	0.082 (0.440)
Parliamentary Office	0.185 (0.269)	0.188 (0.272)	0.162 (0.268)	0.131 (0.300)	0.133 (0.301)	0.129 (0.300)
Executive Office	-31.624*** (0.438)	-31.610*** (0.442)	-31.526*** (0.476)	-31.617*** (0.477)	-31.277*** (0.401)	-30.869*** (0.503)
Electoral Margin	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.008)
Government MP	-6.885*** (0.404)	-6.894*** (0.421)	-7.018*** (0.472)	-6.943*** (0.466)	-6.983*** (0.464)	-6.842*** (0.476)
<i>kōbo</i>	-0.814** (0.360)	-0.769* (0.396)	-1.093*** (0.349)			
<i>kōbo</i> -District				-0.066 (0.526)	0.785 (0.567)	-0.020 (0.530)
<i>kōbo</i> × Seniority		-0.053 (0.160)				
<i>kōbo</i> × Government MP			0.686 (0.777)			
<i>kōbo</i> -District × Seniority					-0.456*** (0.130)	
<i>kōbo</i> -District × Government MP						-28.643*** (1.005)
Constant	1.343*** (0.304)	1.341*** (0.306)	1.375*** (0.297)	1.421*** (0.313)	1.384*** (0.324)	1.416*** (0.314)
Observations	1,497	1,497	1,497	1,292	1,292	1,292
Period Fixed-Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Party Fixed-Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Log Likelihood	-1,100.782	-1,100.765	-1,100.199	-987.515	-986.799	-987.272
θ	0.197*** (0.016)	0.197*** (0.016)	0.197*** (0.016)	0.188*** (0.016)	0.189*** (0.016)	0.188*** (0.016)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,229.564	2,231.531	2,230.399	2,003.029	2,003.597	2,004.544

Note:

Standard errors clustered by MPs; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.4: Number of Written Questions. Negative Binomial Estimation, Operationalization A

	<i>Number of Written Questions</i>	
	Operationalization A	
	(1)	(2)
Seniority	-0.309*** (0.051)	-0.313*** (0.051)
Party Office	0.045 (0.435)	0.023 (0.436)
Parliamentary Office	0.177 (0.274)	0.140 (0.270)
Executive Office	-31.649*** (0.440)	-31.560*** (0.480)
Vote Margin	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.008)
<i>kōbo</i>	-0.664 (0.411)	-1.047*** (0.374)
Government	-6.885*** (0.415)	-7.000*** (0.471)
<i>kōbo</i> × Government		0.773 (0.778)
Intercept	1.324*** (0.310)	1.362*** (0.300)
Observations	1,497	1,497
Period Fixed-Effects	YES	YES
Party Fixed-Effects	YES	YES
Log Likelihood	-1,102.091	-1,101.481
θ	0.195*** (0.016)	0.196*** (0.016)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,232.183	2,232.962

Note: Standard errors clustered by MPs; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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Table 4.5: Number of PMBs Cosponsored. Negative Binomial Estimation.

	<i>Number of PMBs Cosponsored</i>					
	Selection Background, Operationalization B			Robustness Check		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Seniority	-0.070** (0.028)	-0.078*** (0.029)	-0.076*** (0.028)	-0.079*** (0.029)	-0.087*** (0.030)	-0.078*** (0.029)
Party Office	0.087 (0.277)	0.061 (0.269)	0.073 (0.262)	0.127 (0.270)	0.134 (0.268)	0.108 (0.266)
Parliamentary Office	0.636*** (0.114)	0.599*** (0.112)	0.608*** (0.113)	0.606*** (0.122)	0.608*** (0.122)	0.601*** (0.122)
Executive Office	-0.388** (0.183)	-0.382** (0.183)	-0.433** (0.181)	-0.399** (0.182)	-0.408** (0.181)	-0.402** (0.183)
Vote Margin	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
Government MP	-1.834*** (0.114)	-1.812*** (0.113)	-1.708*** (0.114)	-1.727*** (0.116)	-1.731*** (0.115)	-1.700*** (0.120)
<i>kōbo</i>	-0.166 (0.152)	-0.344** (0.154)	0.312* (0.175)			
<i>kōbo</i> -District				0.130 (0.142)	0.002 (0.247)	0.276 (0.215)
<i>kōbo</i> × Seniority		0.166*** (0.047)				
<i>kōbo</i> × Government MP			-0.928*** (0.247)			
<i>kōbo</i> -District × Seniority					0.044 (0.065)	
<i>kōbo</i> -District × Government MP						-0.233 (0.287)
Intercept	0.182 (0.122)	0.215* (0.122)	0.159 (0.124)	0.177 (0.127)	0.197 (0.129)	0.162 (0.128)
Observations	1,497	1,497	1,497	1,292	1,292	1,292
Period Fixed-Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Party Fixed-Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Log Likelihood	-1,898.941	-1,896.887	-1,891.861	-1,710.924	-1,710.519	-1,710.542
θ	0.897*** (0.078)	0.905*** (0.079)	0.925*** (0.081)	0.901*** (0.082)	0.902*** (0.082)	0.902*** (0.082)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,825.882	3,823.774	3,813.721	3,449.848	3,451.038	3,451.083

Note:

Standard errors clustered by MPs; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.6: Number of PMBs Cosponsored. Negative Binomial Estimation, Operationalization A

	<i>Number of PMBs Cosponsored</i>	
	Operationalization A	
	(1)	(2)
Seniority	-0.073*** (0.028)	-0.078*** (0.028)
Party Office	0.070 (0.274)	0.118 (0.273)
Parliamentary Office	0.614*** (0.113)	0.609*** (0.115)
Executive Office	-0.388** (0.183)	-0.420** (0.181)
Vote Margin	0.004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)
<i>kōbo</i>	-0.261 (0.160)	0.236 (0.195)
Government	-1.821*** (0.114)	-1.736*** (0.114)
<i>kōbo</i> × Government		-0.865*** (0.292)
Intercept	0.201 (0.122)	0.177 (0.124)
Observations	1,497	1,497
Log Likelihood	-1,898.171	-1,893.450
θ	0.900*** (0.078)	0.919*** (0.081)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,824.342	3,816.899

Standard errors clustered by MPs; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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Table 4.7: Number of PMBs Initiated. Negative Binomial Estimation.

	Number of PMBs Initiated					
	Selection Background, Operationalization B			Robustness Check		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Seniority	0.211*** (0.026)	0.199*** (0.027)	0.199*** (0.026)	0.191*** (0.026)	0.190*** (0.026)	0.192*** (0.026)
Party Office	-0.160 (0.330)	-0.166 (0.332)	-0.152 (0.331)	-0.178 (0.332)	-0.176 (0.332)	-0.186 (0.334)
Parliamentary Office	0.824*** (0.186)	0.782*** (0.186)	0.775*** (0.185)	0.695*** (0.182)	0.696*** (0.182)	0.692*** (0.182)
Executive Office	0.209 (0.262)	0.199 (0.261)	0.157 (0.259)	0.181 (0.259)	0.179 (0.259)	0.177 (0.261)
Electoral Margin	0.014*** (0.005)	0.014*** (0.005)	0.014*** (0.005)	0.013*** (0.005)	0.013*** (0.005)	0.013*** (0.005)
Government MP	-1.900*** (0.188)	-1.853*** (0.185)	-1.756*** (0.186)	-1.792*** (0.181)	-1.792*** (0.181)	-1.763*** (0.190)
<i>kōbo</i>	-0.548** (0.279)	-1.249*** (0.353)	0.004 (0.256)			
<i>kōbo</i> -District				0.034 (0.212)	0.006 (0.327)	0.184 (0.257)
<i>kōbo</i> × Seniority		0.367*** (0.084)				
<i>kōbo</i> × Government MP			-2.494** (0.976)			
<i>kōbo</i> -District × Seniority					0.007 (0.056)	
<i>kōbo</i> -District × Government MP						-0.253 (0.415)
Constant	-1.998*** (0.291)	-1.946*** (0.289)	-1.994*** (0.293)	-1.902*** (0.288)	-1.898*** (0.292)	-1.914*** (0.295)
Observations	1,497	1,497	1,497	1,292	1,292	1,292
Period Fixed-Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Party Fixed-Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Log Likelihood	-806.098	-804.207	-801.540	-790.251	-790.247	-790.112
θ	0.344*** (0.047)	0.346*** (0.047)	0.355*** (0.049)	0.362*** (0.050)	0.362*** (0.050)	0.363*** (0.050)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,640.195	1,638.413	1,633.081	1,608.502	1,610.494	1,610.223

Note:

Standard errors clustered by MPs; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.8: Number of PMBs Initiated. Negative Binomial Estimation, Operationalization A

	<i>Number of PMBs Initiated</i>	
	Operationalization A	
	(1)	(2)
Seniority	0.196*** (0.026)	0.193*** (0.026)
Party Office	-0.174 (0.331)	-0.158 (0.330)
Parliamentary Office	0.751*** (0.186)	0.739*** (0.185)
Executive Office	0.203 (0.261)	0.188 (0.260)
Vote Margin	0.013*** (0.004)	0.013*** (0.004)
<i>kōbo</i>	-1.821** (0.767)	-1.177 (0.762)
Government	-1.817*** (0.184)	-1.784*** (0.183)
<i>kōbo</i> × Government		-30.947*** (0.759)
Intercept	-1.903*** (0.283)	-1.906*** (0.283)
Observations	1,497	1,497
Period Fixed-Effects	YES	YES
Party Fixed-Effects	YES	YES
Log Likelihood	-801.469	-799.819
θ	0.358*** (0.049)	0.359*** (0.050)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,630.939	1,629.637

Note: Standard errors clustered by MPs; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.9: Robustness Check. Ordinal Logit Estimation.

	<i>Returning to District</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Operationalization A		Operationalization B	
kōbo	0.619*** (0.205)	0.432** (0.211)	0.161 (0.180)	0.469** (0.207)
kōbo × Seniority				-0.438*** (0.147)
Distance from Diet, in km (log)	-0.676*** (0.059)	-0.692*** (0.060)	-0.686*** (0.059)	-0.707*** (0.061)
Party Office	-0.572 (0.375)	-0.247 (0.383)	-0.205 (0.383)	-0.322 (0.385)
Executive Office	-0.876*** (0.236)	-0.496* (0.256)	-0.512** (0.255)	-0.422 (0.258)
Vote Margin	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.010* (0.006)	-0.009 (0.006)
Seniority		-0.170*** (0.042)	-0.179*** (0.042)	-0.172*** (0.043)
Born in Prefecture	0.040 (0.147)	0.014 (0.148)	0.012 (0.148)	-0.018 (0.150)
Previous Party Voteshare in District	-0.014* (0.007)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.008)
<i>Cut-off Thresholds</i>				
never once a month	-6.858	-6.914	-6.958	-7.003
once a month two three times a month	-6.579	-6.616	-6.659	-6.703
two three times a month once a week	-5.960	-5.963	-5.999	-6.045
once a week every other day	-3.687	-3.596	-3.644	-3.659
every other day every day	-2.802	-2.697	-2.758	-2.744
Observations	333	333	333	333
Party Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log Likelihood	-317.256	-309.063	-310.769	-306.054

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.10: Number of Written Questions. Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Estimation.

	<i>Number of Written Questions</i>				
	Operationalization A		Operationalization B		
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Zero Component</i>					
kōbo	-11.485*** (1.947)	-11.863*** (2.128)	0.957 (1.029)	-2.453** (0.818)	-3.839*** (0.891)
Executive Office	17.554*** (2.092)	17.554*** (2.246)	28.746*** (0.996)	16.225*** (0.970)	16.224*** (1.016)
Intercept			-16.255*** (0.976)	-9.026*** (0.985)	-8.732*** (1.009)
<i>Count Component</i>					
kōbo	-1.192** (0.388)	-1.318*** (0.392)	-0.814* (0.394)	-1.093** (0.370)	-0.768* (0.453)
kōbo × Government		0.324 (0.787)		0.686 (0.773)	
kōbo × Seniority					-0.053 (0.222)
Seniority	-0.233*** (0.071)	-0.235*** (0.071)	-0.316*** (0.069)	-0.321*** (0.069)	-0.316*** (0.069)
Party Office	-0.291 (0.474)	-0.303 (0.468)	0.064 (0.451)	0.055 (0.447)	0.065 (0.450)
Parliamentary Office	0.171 (0.277)	0.153 (0.274)	0.185 (0.277)	0.162 (0.277)	0.188 (0.279)
Vote Margin	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.010 (0.010)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.010 (0.010)
Government	-6.233*** (0.416)	-6.301*** (0.480)	-6.885*** (0.431)	-7.018*** (0.494)	-6.891*** (0.440)
Intercept	1.676*** (0.318)	1.694*** (0.318)	1.343*** (0.319)	1.375*** (0.320)	1.341*** (0.320)
Observations	1497	1497	1497	1497	1497
Period Fixed-Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Party Fixed-Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Log Likelihood	-1142.497	-1142.345	-1099.782	-1099.205	-1099.772
Log(θ)	-0.970*** (0.092)	-0.970*** (0.092)	-1.626*** (0.081)	-1.624*** (0.081)	-1.625*** (0.081)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2316.993	2318.689	2233.564	2234.409	2235.544

Note: Standard errors clustered by MPs; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Zero component in model (1) & (2) estimated without intercept due to convergence issues

Table 4.11: Number of PMBs Cosponsored. Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Estimation.

	<i>Number of PMBs Cosponsored</i>				
	Operationalization A		Operationalization B		
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Zero Component</i>					
<i>kōbo</i>	11.448*** (1.540)	-3.313* (1.453)	12.501*** (1.350)	-3.548** (1.168)	13.132*** (1.416)
Executive Office	20.836*** (1.335)	8.111*** (1.249)	23.883*** (0.875)	7.479*** (1.557)	27.096*** (0.837)
Intercept	-22.703*** (1.793)	-9.806*** (1.090)	-25.839*** (1.538)	-9.168*** (1.534)	-29.105*** (1.585)
<i>Count Component</i>					
Seniority	-0.080** (0.030)	-0.084** (0.030)	-0.076** (0.029)	-0.082** (0.029)	-0.084** (0.030)
Party Office	0.079 (0.265)	0.124 (0.263)	0.091 (0.267)	0.081 (0.253)	0.062 (0.259)
Parliamentary Office	0.623*** (0.109)	0.616*** (0.111)	0.642*** (0.109)	0.616*** (0.109)	0.601*** (0.110)
Vote Margin	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)
<i>kōbo</i>	-0.253* (0.151)	0.226 (0.190)	-0.152 (0.139)	0.305* (0.171)	-0.343* (0.149)
Government	-1.849*** (0.109)	-1.767*** (0.112)	-1.861*** (0.108)	-1.742*** (0.112)	-1.836*** (0.108)
<i>kōbo</i> × Government		-0.844** (0.280)		-0.908*** (0.242)	
<i>kōbo</i> × Seniority					0.182** (0.057)
Intercept	0.213* (0.119)	0.191* (0.120)	0.194* (0.118)	0.173 (0.119)	0.230* (0.120)
Observations	1497	1497	1497	1497	1497
Period Fixed-Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Party Fixed-Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Log Likelihood	-1898.406	-1894.275	-1898.636	-1892.852	-1896.249
Log(θ)	-0.095 (0.088)	-0.073 (0.089)	-0.098 (0.088)	-0.067 (0.089)	-0.089 (0.088)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3830.813	3824.550	3831.272	3821.704	3828.498

Note:

Standard errors clustered by MPs; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.12: Number of PMBs Initiated. Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Estimation.

	<i>Number of PMBs Initiated</i>				
	Operationalization A		Operationalization B		
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Zero Component</i>					
<i>kōbo</i>	2.305 (1.636)	1.760 (1.607)	-8.302 (5.270)	-11.930*** (1.937)	-1.908 (10.754)
Executive Office	-0.641 (1.682)	-0.599 (1.562)	-0.768 (1.251)	-0.494 (0.745)	-0.721 (1.810)
Intercept	-0.618 (2.343)	-0.602 (2.318)	-0.464 (1.248)	-0.285 (0.943)	-0.406 (1.035)
<i>Count Component</i>					
Seniority	0.199*** (0.023)	0.196*** (0.029)	0.218*** (0.028)	0.205*** (0.029)	0.204*** (0.033)
Party Office	-0.080 (0.457)	-0.064 (0.456)	-0.051 (0.381)	-0.013 (0.365)	-0.053 (0.465)
Parliamentary Office	0.731*** (0.196)	0.722*** (0.196)	0.840*** (0.182)	0.792*** (0.182)	0.795*** (0.207)
Vote Margin	0.011 (0.008)	0.011 (0.008)	0.012* (0.007)	0.011 (0.007)	0.011 (0.009)
Government	-1.774*** (0.217)	-1.748*** (0.216)	-1.892*** (0.192)	-1.724*** (0.197)	-1.840*** (0.323)
<i>kōbo</i>	-0.542 (0.751)	-0.179 (0.729)	-0.899* (0.417)	-0.485 (0.420)	-1.478* (0.873)
<i>kōbo</i> × Government		-14.149*** (0.750)		-2.528** (0.977)	
<i>kōbo</i> × Seniority					0.315 (0.577)
Intercept	-1.451 (1.030)	-1.447 (1.031)	-1.495* (0.674)	-1.415*** (0.610)	-1.410 (1.035)
Observations	1497	1497	1497	1497	1497
Period Fixed-Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Party Fixed-Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Log Likelihood	-799.133	-797.655	-803.047	-797.710	-801.264
Log(θ)	-0.251 (0.566)	-0.236 (0.568)	-0.241 (0.568)	-0.050 (0.428)	-0.186 (0.589)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1632.266	1631.310	1640.093	1631.419	1638.528

Note:

Standard errors clustered by MPs; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Chapter 5

Conclusion

The second round of the French legislative elections on 18th June 2017 only confirmed what many pundits and pollsters have been predicting: the end of the traditional French party system revolving around alternating majorities for either the centre-right and its allies or the centre-left with its allies. Founded only a year before the dramatic poll, the winner of the contest was La République En Marche! (REM). The party's founder and leader, Emmanuel Macron, a political outsider in his own right³¹ won the French presidency only a month earlier. Part of his party's appeal were the many fresh faces it presented the voter. Roughly half of all candidates of REM were political novices hailing from the civil society, while the other half migrated from other parties. Dual party membership, in fact, was and is still allowed.³² The downside of this fairy-tale of democratic rejuvenation comes in the form of rookie MPs that are not up for the job. Lacking in political expertise and oftentimes party membership, many of the newly elected MPs were not socialized for their legislative tasks. So much so, that a substantial number of them have considered quitting altogether (see Samuel 2017).

The party received around 19.000 applications before the election and had to fill ca. 250 vacant electoral districts with candidates selected through this open recruitment. The REM's slate of candidates were on average the second youngest and reached a gender ratio of perfect parity with 232 women to 229 men. Of these candidates only 244, however, have held political office before and 255 have previously been a member of another party.³³ Hence, lacking the socialization into politics left these newcomers totally unprepared for and with ill-fitting expectations of their legislative tasks and duties.

³¹Although he has spent three years as finance minister in the cabinet of his predecessor François Hollande, Macron has never stood for an elective office before.

³²See https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/lrem/legislatives-les-candidats-de-la-republique-en-marche-investis-d-ici-a-jeudi_1906237.html; accessed: 17.12.2018.

³³See https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2017/06/06/qui-sont-les-candidats-de-la-republique-en-marche-l-enquete-du-monde_5139646_4355770.html; accessed: 17.12.2018 and https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2017/05/24/qui-sont-les-7-882-candidats-aux-legislatives_5132898_4355770.html; accessed: 17.12.2018.

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Given the recent developments in candidate recruitment, the trend toward more open recruitment and the decline in importance of party membership for candidacies, it seems we stand to see more candidates and MPs that enter parliament without political socialization through (long-term) party membership and prior political expertise (either within the party or in local office). The examples from Japan (chapter 4) and France show that when parties lack suitable candidates they are not afraid of using open recruitment to fill vacant districts. The SPD's candidate casting in Rhineland-Palatine is another point in case. More generally, however, it seems that parties tend to become more open for non-members as is the case with Sebastian Kurz's party list or career changers (see also Bailer et al. 2013) – a development foreshadowed by parties' organizational trajectories over the last 100 or so years (see Katz and Mair 1995). But what do all these developments entail for the working of legislatures, for party unity and the legislative activity of MPs?

This thesis has investigated these questions and has examined how certain party rules for the selection of candidates and how long-term party membership affects the behavior of MPs and the unity of parties. Both of these phenomena eventually have implications for the working of legislatures and governments. Hence, by providing empirical evidence for the influence of candidacy eligibility criteria (CEC) and that of long-term party membership on party, candidate and MP behavior this thesis has made a first contribution to the study of CEC and the importance of a strong party membership background for legislative behavior.

In terms of theory, this thesis centers on the importance of socialization processes within parties that are indispensable for both, the internalization of the party's norms and values, and the preparation for politics in parliament. These processes evolve hand-in-hand with (active) party membership. Social identity theory suggests that solely belonging to a group by and in itself leads to the development of a social identity affecting attitudes and behavior (e.g., Turner 1991; Ashforth and Mael 1989). Spending time with other party members nudges politicians and future candidates to reevaluate their attitudes in light of what they deem appropriate to elicit in-group praise and avoid potential social sanctions or ostracism. Apart from internalizing the party's norms and values on how to behave (especially in the case of conflicting opinions), party membership also exposes its members to the working of politics in general and helps to regulate expectations about it.

Hence, the most important message of my thesis is that party membership matters. It matters for candidates' loyalty to the party's platform, for uniform voting behavior of Members of Parliament, the overall activity in the legislature and for the embeddedness in co-partisans' networks – in short it matters for the overall and seamless working of party government. In the background of these findings loom parties' candidate selection rules,

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most prominently formal candidacy eligibility criteria, which determine who can stand as candidate. Focusing on this candidacy dimension in candidate selection, I go beyond the often posed question of who decides in candidate selection. Instead, my thesis sheds some first light on what kind of questions can be answered by a systematic investigation of parties' eligibility criteria and candidates' party membership background.

What is the underlying mechanism that connects candidacy eligibility criteria with party membership and party membership with behavior in parliament? The central link between eligibility criteria and party membership is as straightforward as is the link between party membership and legislative behavior: socialization into the party and internalization of its norms and values. Formal candidacy eligibility criteria that expect would-be candidates to spend a certain minimum time in the party and that demand other party members to vouch for a candidate entail (or perhaps enforce) the socialization of the candidacy-seeking aspirant into the party's milieu and subculture. With time as an (active) member comes psychological attachment to the party and an increase in the number of affiliative ties to other party disciples. Membership thus entails the development of a social identity that internalizes norms, such as party unity, for its own sake and in order to receive approval from relevant others, i.e. party members, necessary to prop up one's own social identity. This social identity, which of course is a matter of degree, and the values that comes with it can affect legislative behavior. I have presented several empirical tests of these links in the preceding three chapter, of which the first one has examined the role of formal eligibility criteria on candidate and MP behavior, the second one the effect of degrees of party membership socialization on uniform voting behavior in the absence of formal sanctions and the last chapter the consequences of a lack of strong party membership background for legislative activity.

In chapter 2, *Candidacy Eligibility Criteria and Party Unity*, I have analyzed the role of formal candidacy eligibility criteria for party unity. Drawing on the principal-agent framework, I argue that by setting stricter eligibility criteria parties can avoid adverse selection by weeding out non-committed opportunistic candidates and instead select – or rather reward – candidates that have proven themselves loyal through long-term service in the party. With the collection of roughly 500 historical and contemporary party constitutions, which I have combined with parliamentary voting records at the party level and candidate survey data, I have shown that some types of eligibility criteria are more associated with greater party unity and greater revealed loyalty of candidates than others. Specifically, it is those formal criteria that demand a longer minimum period of party membership prior to candidacy and those that nudge aspirants to maintain good relations with other party members. Both of these types of criteria entail processes of socialization into the party of the candidates. These findings speak to two arguments made in the literature on party

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unity. For once, it relates to the argument that citizens with similar ideological proclivities sort themselves into parties, as eligibility criteria can amplify this type of behavior by deterring non-committed opportunistic citizens. Moreover, these findings underscore the importance of socialization processes within the party for party unity. Finally, as the first systematic investigation of candidacy eligibility criteria and their effects on behavior, this finding adds to our understanding how a dimension of candidate selection methods, hitherto neglected, shapes behavioral outcomes.

Chapter 3, *Party Membership, Pre-Parliamentary Socialization and Party Cohesion*, has investigated the role of long-term party membership on voting behavior of Members of the German Bundestag. Based on social identity theory, I have generated several hypotheses on how party membership reflects socialization processes into the party's norms and values. Upon entering a political party, new entrants develop over time and in interaction with other party members a new social identity. This social identity internalizes rules and norms deemed important by other group members, whose approval the entrant seeks. Thus, longer running membership consolidates these norms further. Empirically, I have tested these claims by examining the voting behavior of German MPs on so-called "free-votes", i.e. votes on which party discipline has been lifted or no official party position has been given. Looking at these "free-votes" allows to more credibly attributed uniform voting behavior of individual MPs to their converging preferences with the rest of the party and to their internalization of group norms, such as upholding party unity even in the face of personal disagreement. Socialization and internalization is measured by four different indicators of the degree of party membership socialization; the age at which the MP has joined the party, the length of party membership before the first candidacy, holding a party office before first candidacy and whether the MP has ever been a member of a different party. My findings suggest that socialization into the party tend to result in less disagreement and more agreement with the majority of the party, that this, however, varies across parties. This first empirical investigation of how gradual measurement of party membership informs voting behavior contributes to our understanding of how party membership, a proxy for party-internal socialization processes, influences legislative behavior and party unity.

Lastly, chapter 4, *Behavioral Consequences of Open Candidate Recruitment*, explores the behavioral consequences of lacking a strong party membership background. This chapter compares the legislative activity of MPs with strong party membership background with those that lack this background. Here, I took advantage of the Japanese case, where major parties have been nominating candidates through open recruitment and through more traditional ways at the same time. I have theorized that candidates that answer to parties' public calls for applications are more motivated by office than by policy and that

they lack prior political experience. Lacking socialization processes within the party, these candidates and MPs are ill-suited to master quickly the challenges of legislative work. Due to their weak standing in the party, I expected them to be more concerned with constituency work, meant to garner support for future elections, and less involved in the legislative process. Using survey data and observational data on such activities as written questions and Private Member Bills (PMB), I have shown that MPs selected through open recruitment are in fact less likely to ask questions and hold government accountable when in opposition, and similarly less likely to engage in drafting PMBs when in government. Moreover, it appears that they are even sidelined by their more traditional colleagues that do not ask them to cosponsor their own PMBs. Instead, I found that open recruitment MPs are more likely to return more often to their district while parliament is in session – an observational implication of higher personal responsiveness to the constituency and the local party branch (although this finding should be treated cautious due to potential misreporting). In conclusion, this chapter suggests that party membership is not only important for party unity and voting behavior, but also for activity in parliament.

Implications for Research & Candidate Selection

The overarching insight of this thesis is that party membership matters and that it is a matter of degree. Moreover, I have found that a set of candidate selection rules hitherto neglected – candidacy eligibility criteria – affect the unity of parties through channels, i.e. the type of personnel, other than those promoted usually in the literature, i.e. obedient behavior in light of re-selection incentives. Due to these insights this thesis has several implications for future research but also for political practitioners.

In the academic realm for instance, the novel approach I took in measuring party membership could prove useful beyond answering the question for which this operationalization was used in this thesis. While previous studies have predominantly used dichotomous indicators for party membership (e.g., Kam 2001), i.e. {member, –member}, I have measured party membership in a more fine-grained way by counting the years of party membership prior to a MP’s first candidacy and, in a second version, the year at which the MP had joined the party for the first time. This operationalization allowed me to measure the degree of intra-party socialization in a continuous fashion. Future studies may equally benefit from a more fine-grained measure of party membership when exploring campaign or legislative behavior of candidates and MPs.

Moreover, party membership in and as itself has only seldomly be used as a prime explanatory variable. Here, my findings speak to the importance of long-term party membership for congruent and loyal behavior and at the same time to the lack of activity when party

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membership is lacking. Especially in times of dwindling numbers in party affiliates, these findings may hold further repercussions for the future.

Another implication of my findings relates to the phenomenon of party unity. Many theoretical models in political science, for example, rely on the assumption of parties as unity actors, one of which is the responsible party government model (Ranney 1962). This model stipulates that parties are mainly policy-driven and communicate their policy program during electoral campaigns which, once elected, they enact thanks to their party unity. Voters may then reward or punish the party's performance comes the next election. But if parties now, driven by motivations for office, select candidates and future MPs that lack in reverence for the party's platform, undermine party unity or in other ways fall short in delivering intricate legislative and legal texts a responsible party government could become unattainable – as the example of the Dutch Lijst Pim Fortuyn attests to (de Lange and Art 2011).

For democratic accountability – which of course lurks beneath the responsible party government model – formal candidacy eligibility criteria hold implications as well. Delegation in democracies is ubiquitous, with voters delegating to parties, which in turn delegate to candidates and MPs, who again delegate to the cabinet that eventually delegates to ministers and bureaucrats (e.g., Müller, Bergman, and Strøm 2003). With more demanding CEC the delegation chain between the party and its candidates and MPs can be strengthened. Setting higher bars for candidates – or agents – the party – or principal – can rule out candidates whose own interests are too far off from that of the party and can thus contain agency loss. Parties benefit as they maintain a unified policy image and minimize infighting and voters benefit as parties are more likely to deliver what they have promised. In the end, satisfaction with democracy increase and, thus, democracy benefits. However, CEC, too, need to be understood as a continuum and may have a stronger or weaker impact on the chain of delegation, depending on the design of these formal eligibility requirements.

On top of that, my dissertation holds implications for political parties and political practitioners alike. As the analyses in the preceding chapters have suggested, party membership matters on multiple dimensions. It affects the preference homogeneity and the degree of commonly shared norms and values, manifesting itself in uniform voting behavior of the party's MPs, and the future MPs' procedural and inside knowledge about the workings of parliament, expressing itself in the degree of legislative activity.

An increasing number of political parties has started to open up their supply of candidates. Oftentimes, candidates without prior party membership are nominated and elected to parliament. What can parties adopting these recruitment policies expect from their

candidates and MPs? Although they might electorally be attractive, they harbor serious risks for the party's unity and legislative output. How can parties successfully combine candidates of both backgrounds? My research would suggest to not nominate too many candidates that lack a strong party membership background when credible and effective means for sanctioning are absent.

Avenues for Future Research

The research I have presented in the preceding chapters underscore the consequentiality of candidacy eligibility criteria and party membership for various political phenomena at the individual level of candidates or MPs and the level of the party. It touches upon several literatures in political science, including the broader literature on political parties, political sociology and legislative politics. This research holds extensive implications for future research; not only research on candidate selection, but also on political ambitions, representation and legislative behavior. The following paragraphs briefly sketch potential future research agendas that could build on the research I have presented. All of these research ideas relate to the literature on candidate selection and have implications for political representation and legislative behavior.

My research on candidacy eligibility criteria suggests that they exert an independent impact on behavioral outcomes and thereby provide a new angle from which candidate selection can be studied. My findings therefore imply that, first and foremost, future research in this field should devote more time in collecting, coding and systematizing candidacy eligibility criteria further. The serious gap in our knowledge about and in the availability of CEC impedes meaningful further research in this area. In fact, we know little about the development of CEC over time and how fragmented CEC of the same party might be in its different territorial branches. Yet, parties' candidacy eligibility criteria can tell us a lot about their preferences for loyal candidates, for rewarding long-term party members or for non-party outsiders that may bring an electoral bonus to the table. CEC can tell us about party's preferences for office (i.e., nominating more party outsiders) or for policy and representation of their supporters (i.e., nominating more long-term party members). Consequently, they can tell us about the likely ideological composition of parliament and perhaps their legislators' ability to compromise on policy grounds.

Moreover, I argue that future research on candidate selection should take the candidacy dimension more seriously into account. Studies examining the impact of the selectorate dimension in candidate selection on party unity, for instance, – a quite popular topic recently (e.g., Faas 2003; Hix 2004; Depauw and Martin 2008; Shomer 2016, 2017) – can benefit

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from including candidacy eligibility criteria into their theoretical and statistical models to more clearly estimate the effects of candidate selection methods on party unity.

What are the consequences of various types of CEC for representation? Do more exclusive eligibility criteria lead to the selection of candidates that reflect the parties' voter to a larger degree in terms of socio-economic status or other factors relevant to that particular party's electorate? Are voters facing candidates more similar to themselves happier with democracy than those voters who have to vote for someone who is socio-economically far away from them and their preferred party's ideology? In other words, can CEC help boost parties' candidates to exhibit greater descriptive representativity of the parties' core voters?

Future research on CEC should also explore and investigate the interplay of CEC, party's selectorates and electoral systems. How do they interact? Are they reinforcing each other or are they used to supplement each other? Have CEC even stronger implications for non-professionalized parliaments whose legislators are less dependent on a political career in political parties? To answer these and related questions we need collect more CEC in a systematic manner.

One genuine potential avenue for future research is to investigate and explore how political ambitions for candidacies or party offices unfold in response to the incentive structures generated by parties' candidacy eligibility criteria (see e.g., Schlesinger 1966; Black 1972; Norris and Lovenduski 1993; Fox and Lawless 2005, 2010; Lawless 2012). Extant research on political ambition (Schlesinger 1966; Fox and Lawless 2005, 2010; Lawless 2012) focuses predominantly on the US with its distinct system of candidate selection. But how do other systems of candidate selection, in particular the candidacy eligibility criteria of parties in the parliamentary systems of Europe and Australia and New Zealand affect the development of political ambitions? Smith (2014), for instance, reports that most candidates of the Japanese Kōmeitō are usually approached by the party leadership rather than come forward themselves. But how does political ambition interact with more formal eligibility rules of parties? How do these formal criteria affect the development of ambitions for candidacy among party members belonging to minority groups? Are they especially unlikely to come forward and seek candidacies? And if so, is this due to rather direct or indirect discrimination (see also Norris and Lovenduski 1993)? How do eligibility criteria for party office and party leadership positions (Kenig 2009) affect the political ambition of, say, women?

Research on formal candidacy eligibility criteria should be complemented in future research by a thorough investigation of formal and informal criteria for the non re-selection,

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i.e. the *de facto* de-selection, of incumbent MPs. Are formal criteria, such as age limits, adhered to and do they result in what they were intended to achieve, i.e. a younger party in parliament? When do selectors make exemptions from such formal criteria? And, more critically, what are informal criteria for the de-selection of incumbents? At what points will untenable incumbents be de-selected by the party's selectorate (see also Put, Gouglas, and Maddens 2015)? Naturally, empirical examinations have to overcome the challenge of the endogenous decision of MPs to seek re-selection in light of possible strong challengers or a party's selectorate unwilling to further support a nomination.

This potential strand of future research stands to gain in explanatory leverage from institutional changes within parties. Two German parties, the Greens (Bündnis90/Die Grünen) and the Left party (Die Linke), have adopted in some of their regional branches quotas for young and rookie candidates. In some German states, the Greens have adopted a newcomer quota stipulating that one in every three consecutive list positions has to go to a candidate that has not yet been a member of a professionalized legislative body – that is, Landtag (regional legislature), Bundestag or European Parliament. Somewhat similar but more informal, the Left party aims to guarantee two safe slots on the list for candidates under age 35 in some states (Reiser 2014). How will parties deal with the excess number of incumbents after introducing such rules? Will they have to hope on voluntary retirement, a rotational system or perhaps a vote? How will party selectors decide among excess incumbents? Future research in this direction holds insights in how a rejuvenation of politics in times of political disenchantment with establishment politics is possible. What do parties value in incumbents? Are less loyal incumbents easier targets, than, say, policy experts? And, eventually, will these rules in fact result in younger parliamentary party groups and perhaps in policies geared toward the young (see McClean 2018)?

Moreover, future studies may explore how different dimensions in candidate selection (Hazan and Rahat 2010) interact with and complement each other. Are parties that are relatively lenient in their eligibility criteria more likely to have instituted a more central and exclusive selectorate? And likewise, are parties that link nominations to stricter eligibility criteria more likely to democratize their selectorate than those that do not? In addition, do electoral systems need to be taken into account here? One could expect that electoral systems that employ single-member districts and in which candidate selection therefore is often organized locally, party leadership may ensure the selection of committed candidates by setting nationwide strict eligibility criteria, lest local party branches nominate candidates beneficial only to the local party. Entertaining this thought further, the leadership of parties using closed lists in systems using proportional representation can ensure loyalty and commitment of their candidates and MPs through clear incen-

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tives for re-selection and may therefore be in a more comfortable position to open up their recruitment.

Finally, future research may build upon the research on candidacy eligibility criteria by exploring what party selectors' are looking for in candidates on top of the fulfillment of formal eligibility criteria. This research avenue may benefit tremendously from new advances in experimental research, as for example by employing the ever more popular conjoint analysis (e.g., Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014; Horiuchi, Smith, and Yamamoto 2018). By placing (hypothetical) pairs of candidates with a given set of attributes before party selectors, future research stands to gain insights into the preferences of parties for certain personal and political attributes of candidates, whether subtle biases potentially cement current underrepresentation of minority groups and women, and whether electoral incentives might condition the preferences of selectors for certain candidate attributes.

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List of Papers

Chapter Two: Candidacy Eligibility Criteria and Party Unity

Single-authored

Chapter Three: Party Membership, Pre-Parliamentary Socialization and Party Cohesion

Single-authored

Chapter Four: Behavioral Consequences of Open Candidate Recruitment

Single-authored