Student Paper Series

Improving Inter-Agency Collaboration in International Development Analysis of conditions under which to enter into, develop and sustain successful partnerships
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Executive Summary

Development aid is underperforming in terms of effectiveness due to donor diversification, proliferation and fragmentation. The request for more harmonized and collectively effective actions formulated in the High-Level Fora on aid effectiveness have gained support across donor and recipient countries. However, commitment has not been successfully translated into significant changes on the ground. This gap between policy and country level practices needs to be addressed to make development assistance more effective.

A first formal partnership of Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Agence Française de Développement (AFD) and Lux-Development (LuxDev) has been established in the sector of technical vocational education and training. To assess this partnership and to identify areas for improvement, the study addresses the following research question: Under which conditions do implementing agencies in international development cooperation enter into, develop and sustain inter-organizational collaboration?

The dimensions of the collaboration process are at the center of the analysis. The study develops a theoretical framework that consists of criteria to assess collaboration efforts of the agencies in four selected countries and identifies weaknesses in the structural, the agency, and the social capital dimension. Structural aspects include common visions, shares power arrangements and commitment of the recipient country. Shared personal opinions, alignment of procedures and information exchange helps reconciling individual and collective interests. The analysis of the social capital dimension shows that mutual interaction, reciprocity and trust-building are crucial to successfully build social relationships which form the basis of any collaboration process.

A set of nine recommendations are proposed to address the shortcomings in each of the three dimensions of the collaboration process to improve the partnership of the three agencies. To address the structural blocking factors, the agencies should evaluate their collaboration efforts, create a coordinating body and speak to the recipient country's government with one voice. To manage the tension between individual and collective interests, regular discussions with everyone involved and knowledge about the tools, procedures and implementing mechanisms of the collaboration partners are crucial. To better meet the criteria of the social capital dimension, the agencies should appoint boundary-spanners and create opportunities to learn about their collaboration partners' culture.

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List of Abbreviations

AFD	Agence Française de Développement
BMZ	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EU	European Union
FAFPA	National Fund for Technical Vocational Education and Training
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
LILAMA 2	Centre of Excellence for Technical and Vocational Education and Training
LuxDev	Lux-Development
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MEST	Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
TVET	Technical vocational education and training
UN	United Nations

"In following up the Declaration, we will intensify our efforts to provide and use development assistance, (…) in ways that rationalise the often excessive fragmentation of donor activities at the country and sector levels."(OECD, 2005, p. 2)

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Context and Problem Statement

The concept of development aid has its roots in the context of Post-World War II, when the United States launched the Marshall Plan, a large-scale aid program for Europe. Today, official development assistance (ODA) is defined as financial aid given by governments and other agencies to recipient countries and multilateral institutions to support the economic development and welfare of developing countries.[1]

The effectiveness of aid has always been subject to debate and the literature provides contradictory findings. On the one hand, aid flows from the members of the OECD have significantly increased from $ 67.4 billion in 2002 to $ 156.4 billion in 2011 (OECD 2013) and numerous development projects and programs have contributed to the progress that has been made in global poverty reduction over the last decade. Scholars also find that economic growth would be lower in the absence of aid and that aid is associated with higher public expenditures (McGillivray 2004). At the same time, official aid is criticized for not contributing to poverty reduction and economic growth and for not achieving other related developmental outcomes. The fast growth of emerging economies such as China and India causes poverty to fall more than ever before, but these countries hardly receive aid. In contrast, poverty is falling much slower in the main aid recipient countries. In these countries, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will be difficult to achieve. The major MDG, reducing the proportion of people living in extreme poverty to half by 2015, for instance, will not be achieved in sub-Sahara Africa until 2147 on current trends (McGillivray 2004). This mix of casual evidence and the absence of a correlation between aid and growth have made clear that in order to reach development goals, the focus has to shift from the amount of aid to the quality of that aid.

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[1] The DAC of the OECD defines ODA as "those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions which are:
  i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and
  ii. each transaction of which:
     a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and
     b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent." (OECD n.d.)

Both donor and recipient countries agree that aid is underperforming in terms of effectiveness (Doucouliagos & Paldam 2007). Indeed, a combination of various factors lead to little lasting impact of aid, including donor diversification, proliferation of donor activities and aid fragmentation (Fengler & Kharas 2011). There has been an explosion in the number of donors that run an estimated 340,000 development projects around the world: 46 governments run aid programs administered through 280 bilateral development agencies, 242 multilateral programs, 24 development banks, and about 40 United Nations agencies (Deutscher & Fyson 2008). The increasing number of private foundations and the existence of hundreds of thousands of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) add to the complexity (Hermias & Kharas 2008). Additionally, the involvement of emerging donors such as recent members of the European Union, Middle Eastern countries, China, India, South Africa and Brazil increases the proportion of aid.

With more players, aid has become less predictable, less transparent and less consistent. Moreover, their isolated way of working reduces the sustainability and value of the aid received. Problems arising from a lack of cooperation between different actors working in the same field are often referred to as "coordination failure". This lack of coordination among donors makes it hard for recipient countries to manage aid. Deutscher and Fyson (2008) observed that usually 15 or more donors collectively provided less than 10 percent of the country's total aid, but typically each donor required the developing country to apply their respective procedures and standards. Thus, given the lack of capacity at the country level, the number and diversity of donor policies, priorities and procedures and the lack of coordination create a burden for local institutions of recipient countries, weakens the local administrative capacity and compromises local ownership (OECD 1996).

The need to understand why aid was not as effective as desired, led to the formulation of a set of principles marked by four events: the High-Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness in Rome, Paris, Accra, and Busan. The breakthrough came with the Rome Conference on Harmonisation and Alignment in 2003, where principles for aid effectiveness were laid out in a concrete declaration stating that donors should alleviate the problem of low aid effectiveness by coordinating their efforts, harmonizing their requirements and assisting partner countries in taking control of the development process. During the High-Level Forum in Paris in 2005, donors and recipient countries took the harmonization agenda forward by endorsing the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, in which they commit themselves to

clear targets to improve aid effectiveness. Donors should support national development strategies (ownership); aid should be increasingly aligned with country priorities (alignment); donors should streamline and coordinate their efforts (harmonization); development policies should be directed to achieving clear goals (managing for development results); and donors and partner countries should be jointly responsible for achieving these goals (mutual accountability). The need to deepen the implementation of these goals was emphasized at the High-Level Forum in Accra in 2008. Improvements in the areas of ownership, partnerships and delivering results were proposed. The High-Level Forum in Busan in 2011 assessed whether the progress in the aid effectiveness agenda is enough to meet the MDGs and to overcome global challenges in the face of the recent financial, food, security and climate crises (OECD 2008; OECD 2005).

The principles agreed upon in the High-Level Fora have gained support across donor and recipient countries. Harmonization is on top of the aid effectiveness agenda. In order to arrive at more harmonized, transparent and collectively effective actions, donors should simplify procedures, reduce the number of separate, duplicative actions and implement common arrangements. Moreover, a pragmatic approach to the division of labour and burden sharing increases complementarity. Donors should make use of their comparative advantage at country or sector level by delegating authority to major donors for the execution of activities (OECD 2005). In this regard, the European Union has assumed a leading role. EU member states agree that they need a common development-assistance policy, which requires a coordinating system as well as more efficient imlementing agencies. In 2006, the European Consensus for Development pressed donors to utilize common implementation mechanisms, joint missions and co-financing.

To put these principles into practice strong donor commitment is needed. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has formulated best practices for donor behavior in the areas of harmonization, alignment and ownership. According to the DAC, implementing agencies, those organizations responsible for the implementation of aid effectiveness policy guidelines at the country level, should harmonize their assistance, respect government ownership and align their activities with the priorities identified by partner countries. By living up to these three guidelines, donor agencies can overcome problems of proliferation, duplication and high transaction costs and hence make their assistance more effective.

In 2004, the DAC concluded that although some progress has been achieved, the commitment to the harmonization and alignment agenda has not been successfully translated into significant changes on the ground. There is still a gap between policy and practice - between overall policy, detailed operational procedures, and country level practices. This gap needs to be addressed in order to successfully implement a model of development cooperation based on harmonization and donor coordination (De Renzio 2005).

1.2 Research Question and Purpose

Following the need for increased harmonization and coordination at the agency level, a first formal partnership of the German implementing agency Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the French development bank Agence Française de Développement (AFD) and the Luxembourgish implementing agency Lux-Development (LuxDev) has been established in the sector of technical vocational education and training (TVET)[2]. At the moment collaboration efforts only exist in a limited number of countries, thus, the representatives of the agencies feel the need to further streamline their efforts. To assess the collaboration of the three agencies and to identify areas for improvement, the study addresses the following research question:

Under which conditions do implementing agencies in international development cooperation enter into, develop and sustain inter-organizational collaboration?

1.3 Scope and Relevance

This study is focused on the partnership between three European implementing agencies in international development, GIZ, AFD and LuxDev, in the sector of TVET. Information on the agencies' collaboration efforts in four selected countries, Kosovo, Burkina Faso, Vietnam and Togo were collected and analyzed from the perspective of organizational theory. The results of the analysis will serve as a basis for recommendations for the implementing agencies on how to improve their collaboration efforts. These recommendations will be presented to the representatives of each agency as well as to representatives of the respective ministries at their semi-annual meeting in Luxembourg in June 2013. Furthermore, the study can serve as a guideline for the staff in the TVET sector as well as in other sectors in countries where an increased cooperation between implementing agencies is planned.

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[2] TVET is defined, in contrast to general and academic education, as education and training which "develops craftsmanship, practical experience and practical problem-solving." (Education International 2009: 5)

Moreover, the study will contribute to the already existing body of knowledge in the field of inter-organizational collaboration. Existing literature has been criticized for theoretical insufficiency and lack of empirical research. Schermerhorn (1975) notes further a lack of additivity, i.e. scholars do not build upon existing theories and concepts. These criticisms imply a need for conceptual developments and empirical investigations, in particular on the determinants of inter-organizational cooperation.

The study will also add to the extensive academic literature on how to improve aid efficiency. Existing research in this domain is focused on coordination and harmonization on the international, national and ministerial level. Research on cooperation of implementing agencies is limited. By analyzing the collaboration efforts of three European implementing agencies, this study will shed light on an aspect that so far has not been examined sufficiently in the academic literature.

1.4 Structure

The content of the thesis has been divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 provides a theoretical and analytical basis in three steps. First, it introduces the key definitions and describes the applicable concepts. Second, it analyses the conditions that make collaboration possible, the process through which collaboration occurs, and the outcomes of collaboration. Third, it develops a multidimensional model of collaboration which focuses on criteria for a successful collaboration process. Chapter 3 lays out the methodology of data collection for the study. Chapter 4 presents the key research findings and investigates how inter-agency collaboration in the four cases coincides with the criteria, or the lack thereof. Finally, Chapter 5 and 6 make recommendations and present conclusions.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

There is little comprehensive theoretical background on the mechanisms of successful collaboration related to implementing agencies in international development. By collecting insights from the literature on organizational theory, this study developed a framework for the analysis of the partnership between GIZ, AFD and LuxDev. This chapter introduces the key definitions, describes the applicable concepts and develops a multidimensional model of collaboration which defines criteria for a successful collaboration process.

2.1 Key Definitions and Concepts

2.1.1 Inter-Organizational Collaboration

Among the various terms used in the literature to describe inter-agency collaboration are cooperation, collaborative alliance, organizational interdependence, exchange and concerted decision making. This variability in terminology raises the question what the underlying concepts hold in common. The lowest common denominator is organizational interdependency (Schermerhorn 1975). Litwak and Hylton (1962) state that two or more organizations are interdependent if they take each other into account in pursuing individual goals. Other scholars consider purpose a further distinguishing element of interdependency. According to those characteristics, Gray (1991) defines collaboration as "a process through which parties who see different aspects of a problem can constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible." (p. 4)

Thomson expands on Gray's definition by including key elements from further theoretical perspectives, and adding the notions of governance, administration, mutuality and norms. She defines collaboration as "a process in which autonomous actors interact through formal and informal negotiation, jointly creating rules and structures governing their relationships and ways to act or decide on the issues that brought them together; it is a process involving shared norms and mutually beneficial interactions." (Thomson & Perry 2006, p. 23) As this encompasses various elements of a collaboration process, this definition will be used for the purpose of this study.

2.1.2 Types of Organizational Relationships

In the literature, collaboration, cooperation and coordination are often used interchangeably. However, as Thomson and Perry point out, most scholars agree that coordination, cooperation and collaboration "differ in terms of their depth of interaction, integration, commitment, and complexity." (Thomson & Perry 2006, p. 23)

Kloth and Applegate (2004) defined five different types of organizational relationships (Figure 1). Organizations that do not work together are described as working independently in their own distinct boundaries following their own vision and priorities. When businesses or agencies decide that there is value in working together on common interests, they can enter into a coordination relationship, which allows them to maintain their boundaries and distinct interests. In a cooperation relationship, each organization also maintains distinct boundaries and interests. However, the difference is that each organization has an important part in achieving a very specific shared outcome. Collaboration is described by Kloth and Applegate (2004) as a relationship between organizations that aim at achieving a shared goal by opening their organizational boundaries enough to share information and practice to create synergy and alignment, thus sharing control and accountability. Finally, the interests of some organizations are so similar that they choose integration, which usually takes the form of a merger or acquisition.


Figure 1: Working Together: A Continuum
Source: Adapted from Kloth (2004)

This study uses the term collaboration to describe a general notion of working together. Where applicable, a differentiation according to the types of relationships by Kloth and Applegate will be made.

2.1.3 Turf Wars

According to Wilson (1989), the struggle for turf and autonomy makes coordination between agencies very difficult. Wilson argues that high priority is attached by bureaucracies to autonomy or turf of the organization. Agencies are not always imperialistic, which means they do not always seek to maximize their size by accepting new functions and expanding their budgets if it comes at the cost of losing their autonomy.

Autonomy is defined by Philip Selznick as a "condition of independence sufficient to permit a group to work out and maintain its individual identity" (as cited in Wilson 1989, p. 182). There are two parts to this definition, external and internal autonomy. The external aspect of autonomy refers to independence which is equivalent to jurisdiction or domain of the organization. Agencies with a monopoly jurisdiction have a minimum number of rivals and only few political constraints imposed on them by superiors. The internal aspect of autonomy represents identity or mission which is defined as a shared understanding of the core task of the agency. When organizations have similar tasks or have to coordinate tasks, struggles over autonomy become especially visible. According to Wilson, turf conscious organizations are averse to division of labor and cooperation, because they do not want to share power or they fear being dominated by other agencies. Inter-agency agreements are viewed as threats to the autonomy of an agency. In development cooperation the variety of activities and the number of agencies that are active in the same field have increased. Thus, the opportunities for agencies to have an uncontested jurisdiction have shrunk and large turf problems occur.

However, even if turf struggles make it difficult, Schermerhorn (1975) argues that inter-agency cooperation is increasingly considered to be good and worth encouraging. In public services, the problem of duplicating, overlapping, and fragmentary services due to a "coordination gap" between responsible agencies can be observed (Schermerhorn 1975, p. 846). In the literature inter-agency cooperation is the suggested corrective strategy. In international development cooperation in particular, cooperation becomes more and more important as donors face the challenges of an increasingly complex environment.

2.2 The Antecedent-Process-Outcome Model of Collaboration

The literature comprises studies on the preconditions that make collaboration possible, the process through which collaboration occurs, and the outcomes of collaboration. In their review of collaboration research, Wood and Gray (1991) develop an antecedent-process-outcome model (Figure 2). In this study, the literature on collaboration is examined for overlapping and commonly discussed factors. These factors are then summarized based on the categories proposed by Wood and Gray in the antecedent-process-outcome model.

Figure 2: Antecedent-Process-Outcome Model

Sources: Adapted from Wood & Gray (1991) and Thompson & Perry (2006)

2.2.1 Antecedents of Collaboration

Various structural conditions or actors' motivations that give rise to collaborative alliances are described in the literature. The following five examples represent the main antecedents:

a) **Resources:** The resource dependence perspective suggests that organizations will consider inter-organizational cooperation a solution when faced with scarcity of resources such as funds, manpower, facilities, or information (Levine & White 1961). Collaboration can be a way to gain access to such resources that would otherwise be unavailable or to employ resources more efficiently (Schermerhorn 1975).

b) **Transaction costs:** From a microeconomics perspective, the need of individual organizations to reduce transaction costs and maximize efficiency is noted as a condition under which organizations seek to enter into inter-organizational relations. In this case, as explained in game theory, previous experiences with efforts to collaborate may influence future behavior (Axelrod 1984).

c) **Goals:** Using the approach of political theory, Roberts and Bradley (1991) claim that actors, that share at least one common interest, are motivated by their shared purpose to collaborate to achieve a common goal. Ostrom (1991) argues that actors are motivated to enter into collaboration by their need to protect their interests in common resources that may be depleted by others.

d) **Norms:** The degree to which existing norms of the organization support inter-organizational cooperative activity also influence an organization's behavior. Evan (1965) suggests that positive reference points, inducing the value that cooperation is intrinsically good, can lead to collaboration. Baker and O'Brien (1971) speak of the role played by external ideological values in general in encouraging inter-organizational cooperation.

e) **External forces:** Institutional theory attributes organizations' motivations to enter into collaboration to institutional environmental forces. Organizations may be influenced in their ability to establish alliances by the extent to which these relations are encouraged or legitimized by the external environment. Thus, demands from powerful extra-organizational forces including government are important motivators of collaborative alliances (Schermerhorn 1975).

2.2.2 Outcomes of Collaboration

Two competing views of the outcomes of collaboration exist in the literature. Some scholars associate collaboration with negative outcomes, some identify collaboration with positive achievements.

a) **Inefficiency and free-riding:** Skeptics argue that collaboration should be reduced to a minimum level because it leads to inefficiency and free-riding. In organizational economics, collaboration is noted as a condition that disturbs the functioning of the market because it results in inefficient allocation of resources. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) predict that teamwork will erode because it blurs individual contributions and facilitates free-riding and shrinking. Collaboration across hierarchical levels disguises responsibilities and invites opportunism and exploitation of asymmetrical information and dependency.

b) **Efficiency and trust:** The majority of scholars identify collaboration with a list of positive outcomes. Johnson and Johnson (2001) suggested that collaborative alliances, when compared with competitive actions, create higher achievement and productivity. Self-governing collective action can solve problems of institutional supply, commitment and monitoring (Ostrom 1990). A specific outcome of successful collaboration is that transactions among organizations are transformed into socially embedded relationships. Collaboration also enables organizations to bridge institutional and cultural differences, as Cohen and Mankin (2002) suggest.

2.2.3 Process of Collaboration

Collaboration scholars as well as literature on inter-organizational relations and organizational behavior strongly support an integrative view of collaboration as a process through which actors can use their differences to jointly solve a problem (Gray 1989, Ring & Van de Ven 1994).

Wood and Grey (1991) argue that this process component of collaboration is a "black box" and that it is least understood. Thomson and Perry (2006) summarize the elements of the process component in three key dimensions: the structural dimension, the agency dimension and the social capital dimension. They emphasize that public managers must manage these three dimensions intentionally in order to collaborate effectively. Governance and administration are elements of the structural dimension, organizational autonomy describes the agency dimension, and mutuality and norms are part of the social capital dimension (Thomson et al. 2007). These dimensions allow classifying elements of collaboration processes as explained in the literature:

a) **Governance:** First of all, agencies that want to collaborate need to jointly make decisions about rules that will direct their activities and relationship. The partners must create structures with shared power arrangements which allow to determine who will make decisions, which actions will be allowed, what information needs to be shared, and how costs and benefits will be distributed (Ostrom 1990). The dimension of governance implies a lack of hierarchical structure (Huxham 1996). Awareness, that the agencies are not only responsible for reaching an agreement but also need to impose decisions on themselves as well as willingness to respect the interests and opinions of all parties needs to be given (Gray 1989, Thomson 2001). The key to success is the partners' willingness to monitor themselves and each oth-

er. Factors that increase the likelihood of collective action are trust, reciprocity, communication, a shared vision and commitment to a supra-organizational goal (Thomson & Perry 2006).

b) **Administration:** To achieve the intended goal of a collaborative alliance, an administrative structure needs to be in place in order to transition from decision to implementation of collaborative efforts. The key functions of the administration dimension are clarity of roles and responsibilities, coordination, concrete achievable goals, capacity to set boundaries, communication, and monitoring mechanisms. The implementation is complex, because traditional coordination mechanisms such as hierarchy are less feasible, and communication among the different participants is based more on interdependent relationships than on contracts (O'Toole 1996, Powell 1990). Thus, a central position is still necessary for coordinating communication, disseminating information, and keeping partners alert to the rules (Thomson & Perry 2006). Scholars agree that the key to implementing collaborative efforts is based on the right combination of administrative elements and the capacity to build relationships. Sagawa and Segal (2000), for example, advocate for the presence of boundary spanners, who manage and build interpersonal relationships.

c) **Autonomy:** This dimension describes the need to reconcile individual and collective interests. Partners that collaborate face an intrinsic tension: They need to maintain their own individual organizational identities, missions and authority while at the same time adhering to the collaborative identity and goals (Van de Ven et al. 1975, Wood & Gray 1991). On the one hand, organizations protect their own identities in a collaborative alliance by maintaining individual control. Shared control, on the other hand, involves participants' willingness to share information about their organizations' operations (Wood & Gray 1991). This tension is especially problematic because collaborations typically respond to problems that organizations cannot solve individually (Gray 1989, Huxham 1996), yet the missions of the individual organizations can create a difficult choice for the partners. When collaboration goals conflict with the autonomous goals of individual partner organizations, individual goals will usually trump collective goals, unless the problem is of sufficient urgency to all organizations and they understand the high costs of not engaging in a common solution (Logsdon, 1991).

d) **Mutuality:** When organizations experience interdependence and a mutual need or purpose, organizations are more likely to enter inter-organizational collaboration. They have to experience mutually beneficial interdependencies which are based either on differing or on shared interests and goals. Complementarity describes a situation in which "parties to a network agree to forego the right to pursue their own interests at the expense of others" (Powell 1990: 303). It occurs when "one party has unique resources that another party needs or could benefit from (and vice versa" (Thomson & Perry 2006: 27). The likelihood that partners will collaborate depends on the consensus they can get out of differences based on each other's needs. In contrast to complementarities, shared interests are based on homogeneity, i.e. commonalities among organizations such as similarity of mission or culture (Thomson & Perry 2006).

e) **Norms:** Reciprocity is identified as a key factor for successful collaboration in the literature (Axelrod 1984, Powell 1990). Participants in collaboration often "demonstrate a willingness to interact collaboratively only if their partners demonstrate the same willingness" (Thomson & Perry 2006: 27). This tit-for-tat reciprocity based on repeated interaction means that organizations accept to bear initial disproportional costs, because they expect that over time their partners will balance the distribution of costs and benefits (Axelrod 1984, Ring & Van de Ven 1994). Over time, as collaboration partners communicate and learn what works, elements, such as critical individual partner roles, may develop and form the basis of reciprocal exchange (Thomson & Perry 2006).

The second element of norms is trust. Trust can be defined as a belief among individuals that their partners will make "good-faith efforts to behave in accordance with any commitments both explicit and implicit" (Cummings & Bromiley 1996 cited in Yeh 2009 p. 75). Huxham and Vangen's (2005) and Tubin and Levin-Rozalis (2008) conclude that trust is a important component of collaboration, but it takes an excessive amount of time at low productivity and nurturing to establish relationships and build trust. Over time, partners can build reputation for trustworthy behavior and establish "psychological contracts" which allows to move from reciprocity to longer-term commitments based on personal relationships (Ring & Van de Ven 1994).

2.3 From Engaging in Collaboration to Developing and Sustaining it

In the literature, the collaboration process is described as a continuum of stages. Scholars suggests that collaboration occurs over time as organizations interact formally and informally through sequences of negotiation, development of commitments, and execution of those commitments. Gray's (1989) three-phase framework, for example, involves problem setting, direction setting, and implementation.

Ring and Van de Ven (1994) describe collaboration as cyclical process (Figure 3). If organizations that enter into collaboration agree on minimal expectations regarding their alliance, then they will commit to an initial direction of the collaboration. If the collective actions are then implemented in a reciprocal fashion, the parties will continue to negotiate further objectives, expand their commitments and the collaboration will develop. However, if commitments are not executed based on reciprocity, organizations will take corrective measures either through renegotiating initial expectations (voice) or by reducing their commitment to collaborative actions (exit). Thus, collaboration evolves over time.


Figure 3: Process Framework of Collaboration
Sources: Adapted from Ring & Van de Ven (1994) and Thompson & Perry (2006)

Ring and Van de Ven's (1994) process-oriented perspective implies that in order for collaboration to flourish, personal relationships, psychological contracts and informal and commitments need to replace organizational roles, formal agreements and legal contracts.

Thus, successfully sustaining collaboration over time is based on finding the right balance between formal organizational structures and personal relationships (Thomson & Perry 2006).

2.4 A Multidimensional Model of Collaboration

Bringing together the three process dimensions of Wood and Gray's antecedent-process-outcome model (1991) and the cyclical description of the collaboration process by Ring and Van de Ven (1994), allows developing a multidimensional model of collaboration which includes the criteria for a successful collaboration process as well as the time dimension of the collaboration process (Table 1). The criteria in the three dimensions form the basis for the analysis of the research question in chapter 4.

Table 1: Multidimensional Model of Collaboration

	Negotiation	**Commitment**	**Implementation**
Structural Dimension	Joint decision-making about rules and goals, agreement on shared power arrangements, roles, responsibilities, and coordination, definition of communication and monitoring mechanisms	Commitment to collective rules and goals, respect of power structures, roles, responsibilities and coordination, acceptance of communication and monitoring mechanisms	Implementation of actions that reflect joint decisions about rules and goals, adhering to roles and coordination arrangements, using communication ad monitoring mechanisms
Agency Dimension	Negotiating collective identity and goals while protecting individual organizational identities and respecting individual missions	Reconciling individual and collective interests, understanding the costs of not engaging in a shared solution and commitment to collective goals	Sharing of information about individual organizations and following collective goals while at the same time maintaining individual organizational autonomy
Social Capital Dimension	Identifying mutually beneficial interdependencies based on differing or shared interest and goals, willingness to interact and to communicate	Commitment to actions based on complementarities or homogeneity, long-term commitments based on reciprocity and trust	Implementation of joint or complementary actions, reciprocal interaction, transformation from reciprocity to psychological contracts

Source: Self-compiled from Wood &Gray (1991) and Ring & Van de Ven (1994)

Chapter 3: Methodology

This chapter lays out the methodology of the study and explains how the research question will be answered, how the data was collected and analyzed. It also comments on the limitations of the study.

3.1 Research Design

By analyzing collaboration efforts of three implementing agencies in international development cooperation in four selected countries, the study will identify the elements of the collaboration process that need to be in place in order for two or more agencies to successfully create and sustain a collaborative alliance. Thus, this thesis aims at answering the following research question: Under what conditions do implementing agencies in international development cooperation enter into, develop and sustain inter-organizational collaboration? The study will not touch upon the antecedents and outcomes of the collaborations, but focus on the collaboration process. According to the three dimensions of the theoretical framework, the research has been structured into three parts:

1.   The structural dimension: Do joint governance aspects and the administrative structure of the collaboration support collaborative efforts?

2.   The agency dimension: Are individual and collective interests reconciled and does the structure of the agencies allow for collaboration?

3.   The social capital dimension: Do mutually beneficial interdependencies, trust and reciprocity exist?

While a range of methods could have been employed for answering the research question posed, the exploratory nature of the study and the research logic that is "of discovery and not of proof" (Schmitter 2008: 7) lead to the decision to use exploratory qualitative methods of analysis and data collection. Also, the small number of cases, constraints on data availability as well as strong emotions and controversies incited by the topic made a convincing case for the use of the exploratory qualitative method (Schmitter 2008).

3.2 Selection of Cases

The collaboration of GIZ, AFD and LuxDev in the sector of technical vocational education and training was selected since it is the first partnership of GIZ and other European imple-

menting agencies that has been formalized. With the objective of improving this partnership and promoting the establishment of similar partnerships in other sectors and countries, this example of an inter-agency collaboration was chosen.

To identify possible case studies – already existing forms of collaboration of at least two of the agencies – an online survey was sent to the managers of TVET projects in 14 countries where a joint presence of at least two of the three agencies exists. The online survey included basic, open-ended questions (Appendix A) that were used to throw light on the elements, the success factors and the blocking factors of already existing collaborations.

Based on the results of the online survey, collaborations in Burkina Faso, Togo, Vietnam and Kosovo were selected as cases. These cases represent a wide range of levels, progress and foci of collaboration. The willingness of the managers in charge of the projects to share their experiences and opinions and their availability also played a role in the selection of cases.

3.3 Data Gathering Method

Primary Data

After the selection of case studies, qualitative, semi-structured interviews were conducted via telephone with managers of the selected TVET projects in Burkina Faso, Togo, Vietnam and Kosovo as well as with project and country managers at headquarters of the three agencies. The interviews were arranged with the support of GIZ, AFD and LuxDev in Paris, Luxembourg and Eschborn. A pre-drafted questionnaire (Appendix B) was used as a broad reference to gather their insights on structural, agency and social capital dimensions of the collaborations.

In accordance with the nature of the research question to explore the elements of the collaboration process, semi-structured interviews were chosen since they allow for the emergence of new themes and have in-built flexibility of adapting to respondents' reactions and of further investigating certain issues (Saunders et al. 2007). Open-ended questions were included in the questionnaires to elicit thoughts, perceptions, attitudes and opinions from the managers.

All interviews were conducted via telephone. As outlined by Aronson (1994), the interviews were recorded, transcribed and in some cases translated from German or French to

English. In the first analysis, information shared by the interviewees was categorized into different themes while in the second analysis, collective themes spanning across all responses were identified. Quotations to recurrent themes were picked up from the audio recordings. In quoting sensitive information from the interviews, names are not provided due to interviewees' requests for anonymity.

Secondary Data

Secondary data on the projects in four different countries was collected from internal documents of GIZ, AFD and LuxDev such as instructions, guidelines, meeting minutes and other documents which were made available by the managers interviewed or accessed through the respective websites or intranets. The study Comparison and Analysis of the Processes of AFD, GIZ and LuxDev (2012), an internal document of GIZ that compares the processes of the agencies in the field of TVET making the points in common and the major differences visible in order to identify where processes could be further streamlined, forms an important background reference document.

Besides these internal documents, extensive literature review has been conducted including, for instance, the EuropeAid Comparative Study of External Aid Implementation Process (2007) of the European Commission.

3.4 Limitations

There are three limitations of approach and methodology. First, the primary data has its limitations. The responses to the questionnaire were sometimes unstructured as not all respondents chose to answer all questions. Second, in context of interviews, problems of subjectivity and bias arose but measures were taken to eliminate them wherever possible. In cases where the topic under investigation involved negative experiences and opinions, some managers interviewed were likely to give politically correct responses. The researcher tried to avoid this by developing a cordial rapport with the interviewees and by using secondary probes wherever it was necessary. Third, generalized conclusions from exploratory research cannot be drawn from samples to be applied to the population at large.

Chapter 4: Presentation of Findings

In order to embed the responses obtained from the interviewees into the organizational setting, the chapter will first describe the elements and the objectives of the partnership of GIZ, AFD and LuxDev, before presenting recurrent themes in the primary data findings collected through interviews with TVET managers and project managers in the field as well as in headquarters of GIZ, AFD and LuxDev.

4.1 The Partnership of GIZ, AFD and LuxDev in TVET

In 2009, a first formal partnership has been established between the German implementing agency Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the French development bank Agence Française de Développement (AFD) and the Luxembourgish implementing agency Lux-Development (LuxDev) with the objective of improving their cooperation in the sector of technical vocational education and training.

The partnership has been set up to increase aid effectiveness through harmonization and coordination in the TVET sector. The partners are able to co-finance projects, use complementarities and strengthen synergies along the interventions. Such collaboration enables the governments of the recipient countries to deal with less coordination cycles, lower transaction costs, and fewer contact persons. The collaboration will also result in more effectiveness which in turn leads to better results and impacts. Moreover, the partnership makes more financial and technical volume available and allows for sector-wide and sector-deep approaches.

The collaboration was initiated in 2005, when GIZ and AFD started to exchange information, to conduct joint studies and to set up regular meetings. The partnership was strengthened in 2009, when LuxDev joined the alliance and a trilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on a partnership in TVET was signed. Concrete collaboration on project level in selected countries started in 2011 (GIZ, AFD & LuxDev 2011, 2012, 2013).

A joint presence of AFD and LuxDev in the TVET sector can be found in Burkina Faso and Niger. AFD and GIZ carry out TVET projects in Algeria, Congo, Ivory Coast, South Africa, Vietnam and Togo. GIZ and LuxDev have a joint presence in Kosovo, Montenegro and Namibia and in Laos, Mali and Senegal all three agencies are active (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Joint Presence

Source: Self-compiled based on internal documents

In these 14 countries, the level of collaboration differs significantly. It ranges from a minimum level of collaboration, including information exchange and regular meetings, to a high level of collaboration, where a project is co-financed by two or more agencies (Figure 5). A delegation of funds is currently not possible, because it is conditional upon a mutual recognition of procedures that does not exist between the three agencies under the existing circumstances.


Figure 5: Levels of Collaboration

Source: Self-compiled based on interviews

4.2 Analysis of the Selected Cases Using the Multidimensional Model

Co-financing in Burkina Faso, a formal partnership in Kosovo, collaboration at the implementing level in Vietnam and information exchange in Togo were selected as cases for this study because they represent a diversity of levels, progress and foci of collaboration. The following table presents an overview of the collaboration efforts, the objectives and the current status (Table 2).

Table 2: Collaborations in Burkina Faso, Kosovo, Vietnam and Togo

	Co-financing in Burkina Faso	**Formal Partner-ship in Kosovo**	**Collaboration at the implementing level in Vietnam**	**Information Ex-change in Togo**
Agencies involved	AFD, LuxDev	LuxDev, GIZ	AFD, GIZ	GIZ, AFD
Objectives	Financing a sector policy support program which supports the National fund for TVET	Strengthening the performance of the TVET system following the Kosovo Education Sector Plan	Coordination of two separate projects to support a technical training center in becoming a Center of Excellence for TVET	Joint assessment and preparation of a new TVET program
Activities	• Joint support to the government of Burkina Faso in designing and implementing a national TVET strategy • Financing of activities within this strategy	• Joint provision of advisory services to the ministry • Support in the development of sector-specific training centers LuxDev: • Supporting the training centers with technical and financial assistance GIZ: • Development the conceptual framework of the national	GIZ: • Development of the center's conceptual framework • Support in the development of occupational profiles • Implementation of training for teaching staff AFD: • Support in the development of occupational profiles • Provision of	• Joint assessment and preparation of the program • Discussions and information exchange during three missions to Togo

		TVET reform	workshops and equipment	
Reasons to collaborate	Increase of the financial force, the political voice and the visibility of the project	Harmonization and alignment of the agencies' activities under the leadership of the ministry	Division of labor to avoid overlapping activities and investments in the same occupational profiles	Interest in the aid effectiveness agenda
Current status	Implementation phase: • Implementation of collective actions	Commitment phase: • No implementation of commitments in a reciprocal fashion	Commitment and implementation phase: • Start of execution of commitments in a reciprocal fashion	Negotiation phase: • Discussion of expectations regarding collective action

Source: Self-compiled from primary data collected through interviews and internal documents

This study analyzes each of these cases according to the multidimensional model of collaboration developed in chapter 2. It does not take into account variations in the negotiation, collaboration and implementation factors described by Ring and Van de Ven (1994), instead focuses on the criteria for a successful collaboration process described by Wood and Gray (1991):

1. The structural dimension: Do joint governance aspects and the administrative structure of the collaboration support collaborative efforts?
2. The agency dimension: Are individual and collective interests reconciled and does the structure of the agencies allow for collaboration?
3. The social capital dimension: Do mutually beneficial interdependencies, trust and reciprocity exist?

Based on the primary data collected through interviews, collective themes spanning across all responses were identified and categorized into the aforementioned dimensions. The following sub-chapters will analyze the collaboration process by answering these questions for each of the four cases.

4.3 Co-financing in Burkina Faso

In Burkina Faso, AFD and GIZ are co-financing a sector policy support program which supports the National fund for TVET (FAFPA). The collaboration is characterized by joint decision-making, clear roles and responsibilities, formalized communication, willingness to share information and to adopt common procedures, complementary elements and positive personal relationships. Blocking factors, such as different visions and approaches as well as unequal power structures, remain.

Structural Dimension

a) **Joint decision-making:** United by the shared goal of supporting the vocational training sector, the two agencies jointly made decisions on vision, goals, and rules that direct their activities and relationship. Managers from headquarters as well as representatives of the agencies in Burkina Faso took part in the negotiations of an initial course of action. The working group also jointly designed the new project and developed a political strategic framework that made it possible to co-finance the implementation: "We worked through the design phase together, and that's of course a very interesting exercise because it obliges to have the same vision and the same priorities and the same discussions and the same diplomatic voice towards the local government." (Interview 1)

b) **Clear roles and responsibilities:** The roles and responsibilities are clearly defined. Each agency signed a specific bilateral financial agreement with the government of Burkina Faso and all signed an agreement which describes the elements of the collaboration. Individual roles are also clearly defined. The project managers of AFD and LuxDev at the offices in Ouagadougou are in charge of monitoring the progress of the implementation. The sectoral experts in the head offices in Paris and Luxembourg are also involved. Since Luxemburg has been designated head of donors, the project manager of LuxDev in the field has a coordinating role. He organizes monthly meetings and disseminates information.

c) **Formalized communication:** The communication between all agencies is formalized. The steering committee, which includes the Ministry for Vocational Training of Burkina Faso and all donors involved, meet once a month. Outside of these meetings there is an effective communication between both the managers of AFD

and LuxDev in the field as well as the sectoral experts at headquarters. As a representative of LuxDev states "The project manager in Burkina Faso is on top of it and he coordinates with the partner from AFD. The sectoral experts are at headquarters, a little bit more distant, but I do think that there is a good communication between all actors." (Interview 1) The steering committee acts as a central position for coordinating communication, disseminating information, and keeping partners alert to the rules.

d) **Different visions and approaches:** Even if the negotiation of a collaborative course of action was successful, different visions and approaches on empowering the government of Burkina Faso remain. Both agencies want to ensure that the government takes ownership of the project and that the Ministry of Vocational Training of Burkina Faso takes the lead in the decision-making and implementation process. In this regard, the approach of one of the agencies is seen as more straight forward, because it puts more pressure on the government than the other donors. "In the end we still have different visions on development." (Interview 1)

e) **Unequal power structure:** Another structural aspect is the unequal power arrangement that has been criticized by the persons interviewed. Luxembourg has been designated coordinator and leader of the group of donors. This means the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Luxemburg is the Head of Donors and leads the discussions and acts as an interface between government of Burkina Faso and the partners. However, it seems that not every donor has the same power in the discussion: "You might say that every donor has one voice, in theory yes, but it might be a little bit stronger from one donor to another donor." (Interview 1) The fact that one donor has the leading role may lead to biased decisions: "It's kind of difficult; it is biased if a head of donors is representing one donor. Then this head of donors will maximize the benefits for his own donor and not for the others." (Interview 1)

Agency Dimension

f) **Willingness to align procedures:** Regarding the success of reconciling individual and collective identities and goals, a willingness to align procedures can be observed. As this is a sector policy support program, the agencies align with the national procedures of the government. This means they simply follow one procedure, instead of many donor-specific procedures, with the exception of LuxDev that still uses some of its procedures to contract consultants for example.

g) **Different structure of the agencies:** However, the difference in approaches can create difficulties, in a sense that AFD as a development bank is more focused on inputs and controls the local partner in every step whereas LuxDev as an implementing agency is more focused on the outputs and gives the local partner more freedom. According to an interviewee, "everyone has his kind of priorities, AFD is a bank so they are very much into the budgeting and in the input, whereas Luxemburg is a development cooperation agency, meaning they look much more at the results at the end, not so much at the inputs and that is a big difference." (Interview 1)

h) **Individual interest:** Also, individual interests could still block the collaboration. The agencies defend their own interests, priorities and goals which often make decision-making a lengthy process, because agreements have to be accepted by everyone. "All these donors are coming in with their background, with all their wishes and needs and I must say it is not that easy." (Interview 1) Nevertheless, the agencies understand the problem and the joint vision and are committed to achieve the collective goals.

Social Capital Dimension

i) **Complementarities:** According to the interviewees the collaboration works well because there is a real complementarity. For example, LuxDev has a lot of technical staff at the national level in Burkina Faso managing different projects and programs. They are much more involved in the implementation of the programs, than AFD which operates through the national services. "So I would say that complementarity of approach was useful for the progress of the program." (Interview 2)

j) **Positive interaction:** There are positive personal relationships both at headquarters and in the field. The attitudes and behaviors of the persons involved impact the agencies' ability to collaborate in an efficient way. "We need the people, people with a good vision. If you have people that just think about unilateral projects then of course you cannot move ahead. You need to have another mentality, another set of ideas. We have them, that is good." (Interview 1)

Conclusion

In Burkina Faso two structural aspects could lead to difficulties in the collaboration process: Different visions and approaches, for example on empowering the government of Burkina Faso, can block consensus building while unequal power arrangements within the steering committee can lead to biased decisions.

4.3 Formal Partnership in Kosovo

In Kosovo, there is no sector policy support program in place as in Burkina Faso, but LuxDev and GIZ agreed to harmonize and align their activities under the leadership of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST) to avoid overlapping of international donor contribution. The collaboration in Kosovo fulfills some of the criteria of successful collaboration, such as joint decision-making and regular communication. Other factors, such as information exchange and interaction, need to be improved in order to achieve the common goals.

Structural Dimension

a) **Joint decision-making:** GIZ and LuxDev jointly decided on the goals for the collaboration between GIZ, LuxDev and the MEST which has been formalized through a Memorandum of Understanding. They agreed to design and implement separate projects that are interconnected in order to follow their own interests while at the same time benefiting from complementarities.

b) **Regular communication:** At the moment the two agencies are having bi-weekly meetings, which include a minimum of information exchange. They „meet informally on an irregular basis to talk about the project and have regular meetings to exchange information and document these meetings. I would say we have the same

opinion on donor coordination." (Interview 7) The agencies talk about their approaches regarding teacher training, teaching material development and partnerships with the private sector. (Interview 8) However, there are severe disagreements on fundamental issues.

c) **Different opinions on essential issues:** In some areas, such as partnerships between companies and training centers, a high degree of consensus exists. On specific questions, however, the representatives of the two agencies have different opinions on essential issues concerning the TVET system in Kosovo. There is a disagreement, for example, on the topic of the development of a coordinating agency for the TVET sectors, as one manager puts it: "I regret that the project manager had a different opinion and that is of course not very positive for the collaboration." (Interview 7)

d) **Disagreements on tools and processes:** Another problem is that tools and processes of one agency are not necessarily known or recognized by the other agency. This can lead to disagreements and delays in implementation. Usually, the Memorandum of Understanding defines which processes and tools are used, but disagreements might still arise because one agency is not used to adhering to certain principles or using specific tools. " The MoU defines what we do and how we do it, this means the processes are fixed and one could expect that both partners implement the activities along the rules of the MoU." (Interview 7)

Agency Dimension

e) **Lack of willingness to exchange information:** The lack of willingness to exchange information shows that the agencies do not achieve to reconcile their individual and the collective interests. The agencies are not willing to disclose certain information. "Sometimes it is really exchange of information and nothing more, or even less. I feel lack of providing all information to the project." (Interview 8) Protecting their own interests leads also to ignoring or bypassing the other agency in the decision-making or implementation process on both sides. Both agencies demand more transparency and consultation, for example with regard to meetings with the local partners: "We plan to support the school with an instrument called "Entwicklungspartnerschaft". In this context I would like to see more transparency. The project manager should, for example, inform us when he meets the local com-

munities." (Interview 7) They also feel that there are too many "unilateral moves and decisions (…), which can embarrass and surprise sometimes the cooperation partners" (Interview 8) or that agencies keep "silent on certain issues, activities, developments from utmost importance for the further development in VET, and use easier cooperation partners for implementing the own agenda." (Interview 8)

f) **Disagreements within the agencies:** There are not only disagreements between the two cooperation partners, but also within one agency between the project managers on the one side and regional and sectoral experts at headquarters on the other side. „An opinion on a content-related question is not regulated in a contract. The expert in the field is free to defend his or her own opinion." (Interview 5) This leads also to disagreements and unilateral moves, which leads to confusion in the ministry: „The different opinions of LuxDev and GIZ in the field also divide the ministry." (Interview 5) The interviewees feel that „this is very dangerous, because such different views can create confusion among the local partners." (Interview 7)

Social Capital Dimension

g) **Lack of willingness for a mutual collaboration:** Since the interests and fundamental concepts of each agency are so far apart, working on the same objectives is not possible, because not even a decision based on complementarities can be reached. Both managers in the field feel a lack of willingness for mutual collaboration and agreements that are based on mutually respected inputs from the other agency.

h) **Difficult interaction:** Building relationships based on reciprocity and trust is very difficult, because the project managers have differing personal opinions and professional views which create a tension between the two agencies: „They agree on the broad framework. However, their opinions on thematic issues are so far apart that this also affects their personal interaction. They do not meet over a coffee as often as others that get along very well." (Interview 5)

Conclusion

The formalized collaboration in Kosovo is severely blocked due to weaknesses in the agency and social capital dimensions. Different personal visions and opinions on fundamental questions, as well as different implementing mechanisms and tools, hinder the willingness for mutual interaction, reciprocity and trust-building which negatively affects social relationships and the willingness to exchange information.

4.4 Collaboration at the Implementing Level in Vietnam

In Vietnam, AFD and GIZ coordinate two separate projects to support a technical training center (LILAMA 2) in becoming a Center of Excellence for TVET by offering demand-oriented vocational training in selected occupations following international standards. In order to avoid duplicative activities and investments in the same occupational profiles, the agencies divided up the domains and follow this division of labor during the design and implementation of their activities. Joint decision-making, clearly defined roles, coordination through meetings and information exchange as well as the commitment to collective goals have been identified as success factors of the collaboration. However, the division of labor prevents the agencies from collaborating more closely, thus they are managing their projects in an autonomous way using their own procedures and mechanisms.

Structural Dimension

a) **Joint decision-making:** Before the two projects commenced, GIZ and AFD conducted a joint project appraisal mission in Vietnam. The representatives of the agencies discussed their overall project concepts and implementation details with representatives of the college's management and of the ministries involved. "Each institution will have its own project but there has been a significant effort to make sure there is as much coordination as possible and that there is no overlapping." (Interview 9) The agencies agreed on parallel financing with common vision, objective and ends, despite different means. For two years the two projects have been in the design phase and during that phase there was a constant consultation and joint discussions on a conceptual framework in order to reduce overlapping activities and to divide the domains in a reasonable way. According to the project managers, "the

challenge is to have the best coordination during the preparation of the project and then we will enter into the implementation of the project." (Interview 9)

b) **Clearly defined roles:** The roles of the two agencies are clearly defined. AFD supports five TVET institutions and works on specific domains in each of these institutions. One of these schools is also targeted by GIZ. So it has been decided that each agency will focus on specific domains. However, as GIZ is an implementing agency and AFD is a development bank, they do not play the same role. The most important difference is that AFD is financing the government of Vietnam to implement the project, whereas GIZ implements itself the project. (Interview 9)

c) **Formalized communication:** The project managers and their teams meet once or twice a year in Vietnam to exchange information. Often the project manager from headquarters, in the case of AFD as well as some consultants who work on the implementation of the projects, take part in those meetings. The interviews made clear that both agencies understand the importance of collaborating and are committed to the collective goal and vision. However, there are some factors that block a more intensive collaboration.

d) **Lack of commitment from the local government:** Most importantly, the lack of willingness from the government of Vietnam to combine the projects reduced the agencies' ability to work together more closely. According to the project managers, the best way to collaborate would have been a single project co-financed by both agencies. Unfortunately, that has not been possible, because the government of Vietnam does not want to organize a joint project, but prefers to have two separate projects instead, in order to receive more funds. "I think the government has a strategy to have several partners (…) So it is not the highest level, unfortunately. But there has been a very significant willingness to coordinate as much as possible." (Interview 9)

Agency Dimension

e) **No alignment of procedures and no systematic exchange of information:** The division of labor makes it easy for the two agencies to follow a common goal while still adhering to their individual interests and following their own procedures and ways of working. There is no overlap which needs to be discussed and the projects

are in different stages of the design and implementation process. Thus, even if there is a willingness to communicate, information is only exchanged on demand and not yet in an automatic and systematic way (Interview 7).

Social Capital Dimension

f) **Complementarities:** The collaboration is based on a shared vision and goals but the actions are designed and implemented separately, because the two agencies invest in different domains at the same training center. The two projects are similar in their content but not in their form. A big difference is that GIZ contracts consultants who work as technical assistants directly at the center LILAMA 2 and implement the project there, whereas the consultants financed by AFD work on five different centers, so they rather provide advice and consult the center on how to implement the elements of the project. The fact that AFD as a development bank and GIZ as an implementing agency do not use the same implementation mechanisms explains this difference: "There are some differences because AFD is a bank using consultants to implement a project. In contrast, GIZ is an implementing agency that has different offices in the countries and the employees oversee the implementation of the project." (Interview 4)

g) **Professional relationships:** Both agencies design and implement two separate projects, but work closely together to avoid overlapping activities. The relationships of everyone involved were described as very professional: "Each time the teams in Vietnam meet regularly and each time there is a supervision meeting from Paris. During my mission the discussion was very open." (Interview 9)

Conclusion

In Vietnam, to avoid overlapping activities and investments in the same occupational profiles, the agencies agreed on a division of labor and the coordination of two separate projects to support a technical training center. The problems that arise are of a structural nature. The lack of willingness from the government of Vietnam to combine both projects prevents a more effective collaboration. Hence, even if the agencies share a common goal, they still design and implement their projects independent of each other using their own procedures. Also, a systematic and extensive exchange of information does not take place.

4.5 Exchange of Information in Togo

Both GIZ and AFD prepare a new program in Togo. AFD has been active in the country for a long time and is now implementing a new program which supports an industrial training center and three technical advocacy centers as well as the national training fund. The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) only recently decided to start activities in Togo, so GIZ is designing a new program in the field of TVET. The fact that both organizations are at the beginning of the project cycle makes it easy for them to collaborate. Thereby, GIZ and AFD are now jointly assessing and preparing a new technical cooperation program in Togo. The collaboration so far has been described as very positive.

Structural Dimension

a) **Agreement on an initial course of action:** Since the collaboration has just begun, the agencies have not yet decided on specific goals. Employees from GIZ headquarters visited Togo on three different occasions to identify sectors and primary schemes of the project and on these occasions they met with the project manager from AFD. "Now I am waiting that things are starting from their side to work closely with them. I have a kind of idea what they want to do but I don't have a concrete idea, because I don't think they already have it. They need more studies and preparation of the projects before knowing exactly what the projects will look like." (Interview 6)

b) **Shared vision:** At the moment AFD is still focused on its project and the manager in the office in Ouagadougou is waiting for GIZ to become operational. GIZ sent a manager to the field who is now setting up the project. Both agencies have a joint vision, they agreed, as a first step, to set up a sector group on vocational training and jointly discuss with the government of Togo on the topic of training reforms and other public policy questions. So there is a shared understanding of the objectives and a well-defined division of labor (Interview 3).

c) **Joint Steering Committee:** The agencies agreed that a joint steering committee will be set up to decide on joint activities. The activities of the steering committee will also be monitored: "In the beginning we do not discuss in detail which monitoring mechanisms we will use, but if a joint steering committee is set up, it is clear,

that the work of the committee will be monitored and we will decide on appropriate monitoring arrangements." (Interview 3)

d) **Commitment of the government unclear:** The agencies agreed on a common framework for the project but they have not begun the conversation with the government of Togo. According to the sectoral expert, the approval of the ministries is crucial for the success of the project and could be a potential risk: „The Togolese ministries have to be involved. We intent to set up a joint steering committee, but it is unclear if the Togolese accept this and want to be involved in this. We can motivate and convince them, but of course we cannot decide for them." (Interview 3)

e) **Commitment of consultants unclear:** Another risk potentially lies with the fact that AFD, in line with its internal procedure, has subcontracted the implementation of its Togo program to a consulting firm. This firm may not feel the same commitment to the cooperation as the local AFD office and AFD headquarter. In the terms of reference of the experts the partnership will be mentioned and specified, however, the manager at headquarters states that a contract cannot influence the willingness to collaborate and to build relationships, so the commitment of the experts remains unclear. „We do not know whether the consulting firm, that wins the contract, will be willing to implement all this, if it is not part of the terms of reference. This is a risk, that we in Germany cannot influence." (Interview 3)

Agency Dimension

f) **Willingness to share information:** The partners understand the advantages in engaging in a shared solution and are willing to respond to the requirements of other organizations in order to make collaboration successful. A strong willingness to share information about their own organizations' operations and about what they can contribute to the collaboration can be observed: "For the moment I have all the information and I don't think they have more than what I have. So they are still in the process of identifying the projects. And I think the next step will be for them to present exactly the projects and the other step is to set up some people on the field and then we will work together closely on a daily basis." (Interview 6)

g) **Flexibility to reconcile individual and collective interests:** There seems to be great flexibility, because both agencies are starting a new program. They are able to incorporate changes and adaptations right from the beginning. The project manager emphasizes, that "from our side we are flexible and we will adapt to try to maximize the collaboration." (Interview 6)

Social Capital Dimension

h) **Complementarities:** On the one hand, the interests of the agencies are complementary. They divided some sectors according to their strengths and approaches. On the other hand there is also an interface where the interests and priorities overlap. A division of labor might therefore be likely. Both agencies set up their projects in order to avoid overlap but to complement the activities of the other organization. Specific areas for each agency have been defined and interfaces identified.

i) **Positive personal interaction:** The personal relationships are described as very positive. There is trust and transparency on both sides. Both agencies show interest in the aid effectiveness agenda and in a common objective of collaborating in order to increase their impact. However, since the project is still in the initial phase, discussions and joint meetings are necessary in order to strengthen these relationships. According to the sectoral expert, „the broad framework has been agreed upon. Now the people in the field have to get along. One step is the planning phase where the intentions and directions are clarified, but how these decisions will be implemented really depends on the willingness of the people in the field." (Interview 3)

j) **Risk of difficult personal relationships:** As parts of the project will be implemented by consultants, the risk could be due to consultants' personal relationships with employees from the other agencies if that does not work. The expert states that "it is not only an institutional but also a personal issue. Personal relationships are per se a risk. If people do not get along very well, then they will not approach each other. They will do their duty, but this will not lead to a long-term collaboration based on trust." (Interview 3)

Conclusion

In Togo the two agencies are at the beginning of a new project cycle, so they are jointly assessing and preparing a new program. The collaboration so far has been described as very positive. There are some external factors that are still unclear. The Togolese government could block the collaboration efforts. Also, the consulting firm which will implement parts of the project will have to be committed to the collective goals. However, everyone involved agrees, that if the intentions are put into practice, the results promise to be very beneficial and Togo has the potential to become a model for an initiative of the partnership of AFD, GIZ and LuxDev.

4.6 Synthesis of Findings

The analysis of the four cases shows that certain criteria of the three dimensions of the collaboration process are fulfilled more easily than others depending on the particular situation (Table 3).

Table 3: Elements of the Collaboration Process in Burkina Faso, Kosovo, Vietnam and Togo

Dimensions	Criteria	Burkina Faso	Kosovo	Vietnam	Togo
Governance	Joint decision-making	+	+	+	+
	Shared power arrangements	-			+
	Shared vision	-	-		+
	Commitment of local government/ consultants			-	-
Administration	Clear roles and responsibilities	+		+	
	Formalized communication	+	+	+	
Agency	Reconciling individual and collective interests	-	-		+
	Alignment of procedures	+		-	
	Information exchange		-	-	+
	Coherence within one agency		-		
Mutuality	Interdependencies		-	+	
	Complementarities	+		+	
Norms	Interaction	+	-	+	+

Source: Self-compiled from primary data collected through interviews

Structural aspects, such as different visions and approaches and unequal power arrangements in Burkina Faso, can inhibit consensus building or lead to biased decisions. External factors can also affect the collaboration structure negatively. For instance, the lack of willingness of the government of Vietnam to unite both projects blocks a more intensive collaboration.

Furthermore, shortcomings in the agency dimension can severely block collaboration efforts as the examples of Kosovo and Vietnam demonstrate. The failure to reconciling individual and collective interests in Kosovo due to different personal visions or the usage of individual procedures and the lack of information exchange in Vietnam prevent both agencies from benefitting from complementarities or interdependencies.

Finally, the case of Kosovo shows that the social capital dimension is crucial. The willingness for mutual interaction, reciprocity and trust-building must be given in order to successfully build social relationships which form the basis of any collaboration process.

Chapter 5: Recommendations

From the above analysis, it is concluded that the blocking factors of a successful collaboration in the four cases can be categorized into three dimensions: the structural, the agency and the social capital dimension of the collaboration process. Thomson and Perry (2006) argue that, even if collaboration is hard to realize, public managers should negotiate with collaboration partners across the three dimensions to allow for trial-and error learning. This chapter presents recommendations for each dimension that address the current weaknesses of the partnership.

5.1 The Structural Dimension

In order to strengthen joint governance and administrative collaboration structures:

1. **Collaboration efforts should be evaluated:** According to Daley (2008), the key to success of the decisions that govern collective action rests in the agencies' willingness to monitor themselves and each other. Neither LuxDev nor AFD nor GIZ evaluated their adherence to the jointly determined rules. Regular discussions on the progress of the collaboration efforts take place at the meetings of the sectoral experts at headquarters and at the meetings of the project managers in the field, but formal monitoring mechanisms are absent. Only in Kosovo, an analysis of the collaboration and a follow-up on the MoU by a commission from Luxembourg is planned (Interview 7).

   Ideally, an evaluation of the collaborative activities should be conducted regularly and jointly by both agencies. Without evaluation and monitoring mechanisms, joint decision-making is unlikely and the ability to build credible commitment is lost (Thomson and Perry 2006). The twelve indicators of the Paris Declaration could be used as a basis for an analysis of collaboration efforts of development agencies (Interview 1). Sharing the results with all parties involved guarantees a maximum of transparency and allows for meaningful feedback and improvements.

2. **A coordinating body should be created:** In a collaborative structure, it is crucial to establish a central position which keeps partners alert to the agreed-upon rules, coordinates communication and disseminates information (Freitag & Winkler 2001, McGuire 2006). In Burkina Faso, the joint steering committee fulfills this role, but, at the same time, this leads to unequal power arrangements. In other countries, such

as Kosovo and Vietnam, it would be up to the local ministries to take a coordinating role, but they hesitate, because they prefer to keep all donors separate in order to receive more funds (Interview 8).

Therefore, creating an independent coordinating mechanism or appointing a facilitator that does not submit itself to any political interests would be the optimal option. This person or body should streamline different wishes and needs, make sure that each party can express their opinions freely and lead the group to a consensus. In Burkina Faso, this can result a shared power arrangement where "every voice counts." (Interview 1) In Kosovo, this can help the parties agree on an approach and reach a consensus on fundamental questions.

3. **The agencies should speak to the local government with one voice:** According to the interviewees, "it is difficult to speak the same language and send to all external partners and parties one message." (Interview 8) Therefore, the agencies should jointly approach the local partner institutions and present their common strategy. This avoids delivering different messages which lead to confusion among the partner institutions. A single point of communication gives the agencies a stronger position in the negotiations with the local government. Sending a coherent message to the embassies and the ministries in Germany, Luxemburg and France as well as to partners in the private sector is equally important.

5.2 The Agency Dimension

In order to manage the tension between individual and collective interests:

4. **Regular discussions with all parties involved should be organized:** In cases, such as in Kosovo, where individual interests block information exchange and the commitment to collective goals, all parties involved should meet regularly to discuss the aspects of the project. The managers do not only want to meet „ just one person to talk about the modalities, but everyone involved. And once we take a decision in these meetings, everyone should stick to it. I suggest that the different responsibilities and meta levels should be brought together." (Interview 7) These meetings should include all levels involved, for example project managers, country managers, regional experts and sectoral experts. Missions from headquarters to the

respective countries should be organized at the same time, so that these discussions can take place during those missions (Interview 5). The meetings should serve as a forum to set the principles and develop a long-term vision which serves as a common, guiding framework for the collaboration in the respective country. While some agencies may still continue to design and implement projects based on their expertise and division of labor, they will be organized under common objectives and goals, minimizing turf wars by establishing common priorities and targets. The interviewees agreed that it would be helpful "to meet with everyone who has a say and to set the content-related principles of the collaboration, meaning what are the joint actions and where do we support each other." (Interview 5)

5. **Learning about tools, implementation mechanisms and procedures of the partner agencies should be facilitated:** The project managers need to learn about the tools, procedures and implementation mechanisms of the partner agencies in the field in order to better understand the decisions and approaches of the other agencies (Hocevar et al. 2011). This could be achieved through workshops at the partner agencies or by distributing a document which compares the processes of each of the three agencies. The exchange of staff, as described in point 7, could also contribute to a better understanding of the mechanisms and tools used by the collaboration partners. A better knowledge of their partners' way of working in general would make it easier to come to a consensus regarding the alignment of procedures and the joint use of certain tools and could help reconciling individual and collective interests.

5.3 The Social Capital Dimension

In order to strengthen mutually beneficial interdependencies and norms of trust and reciprocity:

6. **Boundary-spanners should be appointed:** The key to successful collaboration rests in the right combination of administrative and social capacity. Therefore, the coordinating body which ensures that collaboration requirements are met should be augmented by boundary-spanning roles. Boundary spanners are individuals who manage and build inter-organizational relationships, mediate among contested

power structures and manage interdependency (Schermerhorn 1975). An independent consultant, paid by all agencies, could fulfill this role.

Nonetheless, boundary-spanning responsibilities may not rest in a single individual but instead should be part of any manager's competencies (Radin 1996). In the absence of an independent facilitator, necessary competencies and abilities, such as conflict-management skills, should be considered when recruiting individuals involved in collaborative alliances.

7. **Opportunities to learn about partner agencies' culture should be increased:** In some cases, different opinions on fundamental questions block attempts to collaborate. In other cases, a relatively fast job rotation prevents long-term relationships. Some individuals know their collaboration partner in the other agency only from conversations via phone or email (Interview 5). In such an environment it is very difficult to build social relationships based on reciprocity and trust. To counter these developments it is crucial to gain an understanding of the other agency's culture (Hocevar et al. 2011). Joint meetings are a good opportunity to get to know the people of the other organizations as well as their visions and methods of working. At the beginning of a new collaboration a mutual briefing of the core staff should take place (Interview 3). Moreover, representatives of all agencies could be invited to events or workshops on specific topics organized by one of the agencies or the agencies could jointly organize events. This already happens at headquarters level, but should be extended to project level. Attending events at their partner agency would allow the project managers to get to know the culture and the people, which in turn would make it easier to understand the interests, decision and approaches of their collaboration partners.

Another option to learn about the partner's culture is the exchange of staff. Project managers could work at the partner agency for a few months, where they will not only get to know the people and the culture but also learn about processes, tools and working methods. Back at their own agencies they can use this knowledge and network to strengthen the collaboration.

5.4 Further Recommendations

8. **Agencies should aim at higher levels of collaboration:** The analysis of the four cases shows that co-financing usually allows for better coordination of activities because all activities are harmonized within the framework of one single project. To achieve a collaboration which ranges from preparation over design to implementation of a project the agencies should in general target high levels of collaboration such as co-financing or formal partnerships. "I think that in co-financing there would be really joint partnerships, jointly implementation of projects, equality, better chance on a multilateral approach." (Interview 8) Moreover, the agencies should push the mutual recognition of their procedures in order to realize the highest level of collaboration, the delegation of funds.

9. **Greater involvement of the ministerial level:** In order for the partnership to become sustainable commitment from the ministerial level should be demonstrated. Backing and support from the ministries would make it easier for the agencies to reach a consensus and to enforce joint decisions. Representatives of the ministries could not only take part in the meetings of the three agencies, but the ministries of Germany, France and Luxembourg should also coordinate among themselves and come to an agreement regarding their strategies on the country and sector level. „The whole chain should be involved, including the ministries of Germany, Luxembourg and France. The higher the level where agreements begin, the easier the collaboration in the field would be." (Interview 5)

Chapter 6: Conclusion

The collaboration of AFD, GIZ and LuxDev in TVET is the first formalized partnership of the three implementing agencies to close the gap between policy and practice regarding harmonization and coordination of implementing agencies in international development. In the 14 countries, where two or all three of the agencies are present, different levels of collaboration can be observed, ranging from information exchange to co-financed projects.

The dimensions of the collaboration process are at the center of the analysis. The study identifies criteria for each of the three dimensions to assess the process of collaboration:

1. The structural dimension: Do joint governance aspects and the administrative structure of the collaboration support collaborative efforts?

2. The agency dimension: Are individual and collective interests reconciled and does the structure of the agencies allow for collaboration?

3. The social capital dimension: Do mutually beneficial interdependencies, trust and reciprocity exist?

As explained in the problem analysis in chapter 4, there are different weaknesses and fields for improvement in each of the four selected cases.

The co-financing of a program in Burkina Faso is characterized by joint decision-making, clear roles and responsibilities, formalized communication, willingness to share information and to adopt common procedures, complementary interdependencies and social relationships based on trust and reciprocity. Some blocking factors remain in the structural dimension. Different visions and approaches on certain issues can block consensus building. Also, unequal power arrangements within the steering committee can lead to biased decisions.

The collaboration in Kosovo is formalized through a MoU aiming at harmonizing and aligning donor activities under the leadership of the local ministry to avoid overlapping contributions. Criteria of the structural dimension, such as joint decision-making and regular communication, are fulfilled. However, collaboration efforts are severely blocked due to weaknesses in the agency and social capital dimensions. Different personal visions and opinions on fundamental questions, as well as different implementing mechanisms and

tools, hinder reciprocity and trust-building which negatively affects social relationships and the willingness to exchange information.

In Vietnam, to avoid overlapping activities and investments in the same occupational profiles, the agencies agreed on a division of labor and the coordination of two separate projects to support a technical training center. Joint decision-making, clearly defined roles, coordination through meetings and information exchange as well as the commitment to collective goals have been identified as success factors of the collaboration. The problems that arise are of a structural nature. The lack of willingness from the government of Vietnam to combine both projects blocks a more intensive collaboration. Thereby, even if the agencies follow a shared goal, they still design and implement their project in an autonomous way using their own procedures and implementation mechanisms. Also, a systematic and extensive exchange of information does not take place.

In Togo the two agencies are at the beginning of a new project cycle, so they are jointly assessing and preparing a new program. The collaboration so far has been described as very positive. The agencies agreed on a direction of collective action following a joint vision. A joint steering committee will coordinate the design and implementation of joint activities. There are some external factors that are still unclear. The Togolese government could block the collaboration efforts. Also, the consulting firm commissioned to implement parts of the project will have to commit to the collective goals.

A priority for the future is certainly to foster and extend the promising partnership of the three agencies and to solve the weaknesses that are blocking current collaboration efforts. As the success or failure of a collaborative alliance can often be attributed to its initial design, the agencies should avoid such barriers from the beginning when setting up new partnerships.

Based on the three dimensions and the problem analysis, this study proposes a set of nine recommendations are expected to improve the collaboration of the three agencies. The most immediate and largest improvements should result from structural improvements. To address the structural blocking factors, the agencies should evaluate their collaboration efforts regularly and jointly to allow for timely feedback and improvements, create a coordinating body to streamline different wishes and needs and facilitate discussion, and speak to the recipient country's government with one voice to avoid different and confusing messages. To manage the tension between individual and collective interests, regular discus-

sions with everyone involved to set the principles and develop a long term vision and knowledge about the tools, procedures and implementing mechanisms of the collaboration partners are crucial. To better meet the criteria of the social capital dimension, the agencies should appoint boundary-spanners to manage and build inter-organizational relationships and create opportunities to learn about their collaboration partners' culture to build social relationships based on reciprocity and trust. Furthermore, the three agencies should not only promote further collaborative alliances in other countries and sectors, they should also strive to reach higher levels of collaboration, such as delegation of funds, in order to increase the effects of the collaborative alliances. The analysis also shows that commitment from the ministerial level is crucial to build a long-term and sustainable partnership.

This study provides the basis for further conceptualization and new questions that can be used as ideas for further research. One target for additional research is the causal process component. This thesis showed an approach for improving weaknesses of the four selected cases. Some suggestions have been given on why these problems emerged. There are however many opportunities for looking at the sequence of events in these cases and determining the causal process that leads to those outcomes.

Finally, it is important to apply a broader policy perspective to collaboration in international development cooperation. If the agencies develop the partnership in the described direction, it has the potential to become a model for an initiative that contributes to overcoming the problem of fragmentation and proliferation of implementing agencies in the TVET sector. To address the gap between policy and country level practices and to successfully translate the commitments made regarding more harmonized and collectively effective actions into significant changes on the ground comprehensive enforcement and implementation mechanisms and a change of mindset in the implementation of development aid are crucial. Therefore, it is important to move beyond a collaboration of three implementing agencies in one sector and to promote the exchange of information, common strategies, delegation of activities and joint design and implementation of projects between all players in international development, including ministries, United Nations agencies, NGOs, and community-based organizations to overcome the problems of donor fragmentation and proliferation to make development assistance more effective.

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Appendix

Appendix A: Questions of the Online Survey

1. Please indicate the organization you work for.

2. Please specify your position.

3. In which country are you working? / In which country are the TVET (technical vocational education and training) projects located you are managing or working on?

4. Please specify the title of the technical vocational education and training project(s) you are managing or working on.

5. Are you aware of some sort of cooperation between GIZ and/or AFD and/or LuxDev in the sector of technical vocational education and training in your country?

6. What is the level of collaboration?

   - High level of cooperation (eg. cofinancing)

   - Intermediate level of cooperation (eg. formal partnership)

   - Cooperation at the implementing level (eg. joint missions)

   - Minimum level of cooperation (eg. information exchange)

   - No form of cooperation

7. Please specify the elements of the cooperation.

8. How do you perceive the cooperation?

9. How do the government of the partner country and the institutions you are working with perceive the cooperation?

10. In your opinion what are the main positive outcomes of this cooperation?

11. Have you experienced or do you perceive any challenges since starting this cooperation?

12. What have been the three main success factors for this cooperation?

13. What have been the three main blocking factors for this cooperation?

14. In your opinion, would a higher level of cooperation between the agencies be beneficial to the project or program?

15. Why/ Why not?

16. How could the cooperation be improved?

17. Is there anything you would like to add?

18. I am hoping to conduct follow-up interviews with a sample of participants of this survey. Please indicate your contact information if you are willing to answer some of the questions raised in more detail via email or telephone.

Appendix B: Questionnaire for the Semi-Structured Interviews

Introduction:

My name is Lisa-Marie Kreibich from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin and I am a former intern at GIZ in the department of TVET. I am calling you as you had agreed to be interviewed today at this time. Before we begin, I want to thank you for participating in my study on inter-agency coordination.

As you know my Master Thesis will analyze the prerequisites for a successful collaboration between GIZ, AFD and LuxDev and I want to use the collaboration in the TVET project in____ as a case study.

1. **The Project**
   a. Can you remind me of the title of the project/program?
   b. What are the elements of the project?
   c. What is the role of each agency?

2. **The Elements of Collaboration**
   a. How would you describe the level of collaboration between ___ and ____?
   - High level of cooperation (eg. cofinancing)
   - Intermediate level of cooperation (eg. formal partnership)
   - Cooperation at the implementing level (eg. joint missions)
   - Minimum level of cooperation (eg. information exchange)
   b. Please specify the elements of the collaboration.
   c. Are other donors/stakeholders involved?

3. **Purpose and Strategy**
   a. Why and when did you enter into collaboration with ___?
   b. How did the collaboration evolve?
   Follow-up:
   c. Did your organization make any resource commitments for the collaboration? (in terms of budget, personnel)
   d. Do specific goals for the collaboration exist?
   e. Is senior leadership commitment demonstrated?

f. Is there a willingness to consider other organizations' interests?

4. Structure

a. Does each organization have a clearly established role in the collaboration?

b. Are there specific internal processes that enable effective collaboration?

c. Does each organization respond to the requirements of the other organization?

d. Do criteria and performance standards for evaluating inter-organizational efforts and outcomes exist?

5. Communication

a. How does communication work? Does someone fulfil a liaison role between the two organizations?

b. Do interagency teams and task forces exist?

6. Flexibility

a. Do you think the partnership would be flexible enough to adapt if the requirements change?

b. Is there a willingness and the possibility to adjust own procedures to facilitate collaboration?

7. Individual collaborative work and capabilities

a. Who is/Are you responsible for representing ___ in the collaboration in the field/in headquarters?

b. Is individual collaborative work clearly structured in terms of clear goals, constraints, and authorities?

Follow-up:

c. Are employees rewarded for investing time in building collaborative relationships with other organization members and for successful collaborative results?

d. Are collaborative talents and achievements considered when people are recruited or reviewed for promotion?

e. Do the persons involved have the attitudes, skills, knowledge, and behaviour that improve the organization's ability to collaborate?

8. Relationships

a. How would you describe the social and professional relationships that organizational members have with counterparts in other organizations?

b. Is there awareness and trust?

9. Information Sharing

a. Are technical mechanisms for collaboration used, information systems and collaborative planning tools?

b. Do the organization's norms and values support information sharing?

Follow-up:

c. Do the other organizations have access to information relevant to their success in the collaborative activity?

d. Do the persons involved have the opportunity to learn about the interests and capabilities (and limitations) of the other organization?

10. Outlook

a. Can you think of other factors that could block developing and sustaining this cooperation?

b. In your opinion, what improvements should be made for the collaboration to work better?

c. Is there anything you would like to add?

Thank you again for your time and participation, I really appreciate your help.

Appendix C: Additional Information on the Agencies

	AFD	GIZ	LuxDev
Status	Development bank	Implementing agency	Implementing agency
Instruments	Financial cooperation	Technical cooperation	Technical cooperation
Clients	Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (MAEE), Ministry of Economy, Finance and Employment (MINEFI)	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), other federal ministries; multilateral agencies; other Governments	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE)
Staff	1,715 employees (2010)	17,296 employees (12,254 national staff) (2010)	641 employees (2012)
Field offices	75 representations worldwide	90 country offices and 18 offices across Germany	6 regional representations
Amount disbursed	6.9 billions €(2011)	1.85 billion €(2010)	76.6 millions €(2011)
Projects		Approximately 3,000 projects (2010)	14 projects in formulation, 117 projects in execution (2012)
Projects in TVET	35 ongoing projects in TVET (2011)		
Geographical focus	More than 60 developing countries in Africa, Asia, Mediterranean Basin, Middle East, South America, and French Overseas Territories	More than 130 countries worldwide of which 50 are priority countries of BMZ (Asia, Southeastern Europe, Latin America, Middle East, Africa)	10 privileged partner countries and 6 other countries

Sources: Self-compiled based on AFD (2012), GIZ (2013), Lux-Development (2012), BMZ (2012)

Appendix D: Comparison of the Project Cycles

Due to their different status the agencies are characterized by different project cycles and procedures. Nevertheless, clustering each of the different phases according to the categorization of EuropeAid (2007) allows for meaningful comparison. The ODA project cycle starts with the programming phase which translates political and recipient country needs into strategic development objectives. In the design phase, based on these development objectives, program and project proposals are developed and decision on financial contributions are made. In the implementation phase financing decision are translated into activities on the ground. Finally, during the evaluation phase, outputs and outcomes are reviewed for lessons learned and feedback.

Comparison of the Project Cycles

Sources: Self-compiled based on EuropeAid (2007)